knowing knowledge- 15th century tibet meets 20th century … · 2020. 4. 1. · knowing knowledge:...

KnowingKnowledge:15thCenturyTibetMeets20thCenturyAmerica1

JayLGarfieldSmithCollege

HarvardDivinitySchoolCentralInstituteofHigherTibetanStudies

UniversityofMelbourne

JanetGyatsohascontributedenormouslytoourunderstandingoftheemergenceand

natureofTibetanmodernity,callingourattentiontotheseedsofmodernthoughtin

classicalTibetanmetaphysics,literarypractice,andmedicine,aswellastotheimportant

interactionsbetweenTibetanandotherscholarsthathavesupportedthemodernizationof

Tibetanthought.ThisessayaddresseshowtounderstandTibetanmodernityinthedomain

ofepistemology.HasBuddhistTibetalwaysbeenmodern,invirtueofitscommitmentto

“innerscience,”astheDalaiLamaXIVsometimessuggests,orhasTibetonlyrecently

emergedintomodernityinvirtueofitsinteractionwiththeWestfollowingtheexileof

1959?TowhatdegreetoTibetanepistemologicalideasandtheirevolutionmaponto

Westernepistemologicalideasandtheirevolution?Iwillapproachthesequestionsina

roundaboutway,beginningwithsomegeneralreflectionsonepistemologyandthe

modern,takingadetourthroughaninstructiveepisodein20thcenturyAmerican

philosophy,andthenturningtothedebatebetweenGelukscholarsandtheirSakyaand

Kagyuinterlocutorsconcerningtheverypossibilityofmakingsenseoftshadma/pramāṇa

inthecontextofPrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakaasawayofunderstandingthebasisofcurrent

thinkingaboutscienceandknowledgeintheTibetanworld.

1.TwoApproachestoEpistemologyTheYakherds(2021)distinguishtwoapproachestoepistemologytakenbyIndianand

Tibetanphilosophersexploringtheideaofpramāṇa/tshadma,orepistemicwarrant.2The1ThisworkderivesfromacollaborativeprojectaddressingGeluk-Sakya/KagkupolemicsinspiredbyTaktsangLotsawa’scritiqueofTsongkhapa’sapproachtoPrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakaundertakenbytheYakherds,withthesupportoftheSingaporeMinistryofEducationandtheAustralianResearchCouncil.Ithankthesetwofundingagencies,aswellasYale-NUSCollege,theUniversityofTasmania,DeakinUniversity,SmithCollege,andtheCentralInstituteofHigherTibetanStudiesforsupportingthisresearch.TheYakherdsareJoséCabezón,RyanConlon,ThomasDoctor,DouglasDuckworth,JedForman,myself,JohnPowers,GesheYeshesThabkhas,SonamTakchöe,andTashiTsering.ThankstoDanArnoldforcommentsonanearlierdraft.

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firstiswhatwemightcalltranscendentalepistemology.Thisisthemostfrequentregisterof

epistemologicalreflection,bothintheIndo-TibetanworldandintheWest.Whenwe

pursueepistemologythisway,webeginbythinkinganalyticallyaboutthenatureof

justificationitself,bracketingactualhumanpractices,anddevelopapurelyprescriptive

accountofepistemicwarrantembodyingasetofstandardsthatmightormightnotbemet

byactualhumanpractice.Wemight,forinstance,determinethataclaimcanonlybe

warrantedifitislogicallyderivablefromclaimsthatarethemselvesreportsofourown

cognitivestates,orthataclaimiswarrantedifandonlyifitisdeliveredbyeitherthedirect

perceptionofparticularsorbyinferencefromsuchperceptualjudgments.Itmightthen

turnoutthatsomeornoneofwhatwetakeourselvestoknowisactuallyknown;butwe

wouldknowwhatitis,orwhatitwouldbetoknow.

Thesecondapproachtoepistemologyistheanthropologicalapproach.Onthis

approach,webeginnotwithanalyticalreflectiononthemeaningsofepistemicterms,but

ratherbyaskingwhatactualpeopledowhentheyclaimtobejustifyingstatements,or

whentheycertifystatementsbyothersaswarranted.Inthisapproachtoepistemology,

webracketquestionsaboutwhetherthosepracticesmeetsometranscendentalstandard,

anddevelopapurelydescriptiveaccountofactualepistemicpractices.Onthisapproach,

wetakewhatcountsasknowledgetobeasocialorinstitutionalaffair,likewhatcountsas

currencyorasalegalvote,andthenaskabouttheinstitutionalconditionsonbestowing

thathonorificonacognitiveorlinguisticepisode.Wemight,forinstance,discoverthat

thoseinsomecommunitycountasknowledgeonlythatwhichisendorsedbyscientists,or

thatanothercommunityincludesthedeliverancesofcertainoraclesasknowledge.Ifwe

takethisapproach,wetakeitforgrantedthatthereisknowledge,andaskonlywhatleads

ustoclassifysomestatementsunderthathead.3

2ThesetermsarevariouslytranslatedinEnglish.Populartranslationsincludevalidcognition,meansofknowledge,evidence,instrumentsofknowledge,epistemicinstruments,epistemicwarrant.Iwilluseepistemicwarrantwhenjustificationisatissue,andepistemicinstrumentswhenthemeansofacquiringknowledgeisatissue,followingtheuseoftheYakherds.3Compareanattitudetowardsbaptism.AtranscendentalistmightarguethatsincebaptismmustinvolvetheinvocationoftheHolySpirit,baptismispossibleif,andonlyif,theHolySpiritexistsandcanbeinvokedbyimmersioninwater.Otherwise,whatlookslikeabaptismritualisjustadunking.Ananthropologistwouldarguethatbaptismjustistheappropriatedunkingperformedusingthe

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Therearebroadreasonsthatmightbeadducedforfavoringeachofthese

approachestoepistemology.Transcendentalepistemologycanbeunderstoodas

conceptualanalysis.Wehaveaconceptofknowledge—perhapscapturedroughlybythe

so-called“JTB+formula”ofjustifiedtruebeliefplussomeyet-to-be-specifiedGettier-

proofingcondition—anditisthejobofphilosophytorevealwhatiscontainedinthat

concept.Moreover,weshouldnotpresumeofanyconceptthatitisinfactsatisfiedbyany

instances,justasthegeometricdefinitionofacircledoesnotentailthatanyperfectcircles

haveeverbeendrawn.So,weshouldbeginbyunderstandingtheconceptitself,andthen

determinethedegreetowhichwemayormaynotsatisfyitinourepistemiclife.Moreover,

onemightargue,sinceknowledgeisanepistemicideal,asgoodnessis,forinstanceinthe

moraldomain,itisquiteappropriatetorepresentitassomethingthatnobodyever

achieves,butyetstandsasaregulativegoalinpractice.Onlyatranscendental

epistemologycanaccomplishthistask.

Ontheotherhand,onemightarguethatinasmuchasepistemicactivityishuman

activity—nodifferentfromspeakingalanguage,playingagame,ordiningwithfriendsin

thatrespect—anyepistemologyshouldcharacterizethatactivity.And,onemightpointout,

sinceknowingiseffectivelylikewinningtheepistemicgame,nottheachievementof

perfection,andsincewedooftenbothclaimtoknowandcreditotherswithknowledge,an

epistemologyshouldtellsusunderwhatcircumstancesweinfactdothat,andwhatthe

normsarethatgovernsuchattributions.Suchanepistemologycanonlybe

anthropological.

Thisisonlyapreliminarysketchofhowonemightmaptheconceptualterrain

definedbythisdebate.Wewillreturntothequestionoftheconsequencesofadoptingeach

ofthesestrategieslaterinthisdiscussion,firstbyexamininganinstanceofeachinrecent

Westernepistemology,andthenbyexamininganinstanceofeachinadebatewithorigins

in15thcenturyTibet.Thesecasestudieswillgiveusmorepurchaseonwhythisdebate

matters.TheywillalsoallowustoaskwhenTibetanepistemologyreallybecomesmodern.

appropriateritualbytheappropriateperson,thatis,thatsocialpractices,notspiritualevents,defineit.

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Notethatthedistinctionbetweentranscendentalandanthropologicalepistemology

isdifferentfromthatbetweennaturalizedandnon-naturalepistemology,althoughtheyare

relatedtooneanother.Thatlatterdistinctionclassifiesapproachestoepistemologyby

askingwhetherornottheyaregroundedinfactsabouthumanpsychology.Anaturalized

epistemologyisonethattakespsychologyseriously,anddevelopsanaccountofepistemic

warrantthatisspecifictoknowerslikeus,takingintoconsiderationourpowersand

limitationsasknowers.So,forinstance,atranscendentaltheorythatarguesthatsinceeach

ofoursensefacultiesistunedtoaparticularkindofinformation,onlyvisioncanwarrant

colorjudgments,andonlyhearingjudgmentsaboutpitch,wouldstillbenaturalistic.

Anon-naturalepistemologyisonethatabstractsfromourpsychologicalpowersand

limitations,andproposesanaccountofknowledgeforknowersperse,whatevertheir

actualcapacitiesmightbe,basedonreflectionontheverynatureofjustificationandthe

relationofcognitiontoreality.Pursuingsuchanepistemologymightleadustodetermine

thatsome,orall,epistemicsubjectsareincapableofknowledge.Totheextentthatsuchan

epistemologyreveals,forinstance,thathumanbeingsareincapableofknowledge,itcan

leadtoaprofoundformofskepticism.ManyPyrrhonianarguments,suchastheargument

regardingthecriterion,orthetropesofAenesidemus,takeusinthisdirection.

Thesetwodistinctionsarenotthesame,eventhoughitisapparentthatthe

intuitionsthatdriveonetonaturalismmightalsodriveoneintheanthropological

direction,andthatnon-naturalismisalwaystranscendentalinform.Thisisbecausewecan

imaginetwoformsofnaturalizedepistemology.Epistemicnaturalistscouldarguethat

theirnaturalisticaccountofepistemologyshouldproposetranscendentalconditionson

knowledgeforknowerslikeus,takingintoaccountourownbiologicalandpsychological

constitutionandenvironment,butnonethelessestablishingstandardsthatreflectakindof

idealthatmayormaynotbesatisfied.Ortheycouldarguetheappropriateformof

naturalismisananthropologyofourlinguisticpractices.So,naturalismalonedoesnot

determinewhetheronesignsupfortheanthropologicalorthetranscendentalprogram.

Thereisnospace,however,forapositionthatissimultaneouslynon-naturaland

anthropological.Inwhatfollows,itisthedistinctionbetweentheanthropologicalandthe

transcendentalthatwilltakecenterstage.

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2.ModernityandEpistemology:TheCentralityofScienceBeforewegetdowntocasesandenterthehistoryofphilosophytomakesomeofthese

abstractdistinctionsabitmoreconcrete,wemustaddressonemorebroadquestionabout

therelationofepistemologytomodernityandeventuallytopostmodernity.Doingsowill

helpustogetahandlebothontherespectsinwhichsomeTibetanandWesterndebates

aboutknowledgedifferfromoneanotherdespitedeephomologies,andontherespectsin

whichsomecurrentTibetanapproachestoknowledgemaylookmoreliketheirWestern

counterparts.ThiswillalsohelptousseewhatitisforTibetanepistemologytobecome

modern,orevenpostmodern.

Itiswidelyrecognizedthatamongtheimportantcharacteristicsofmodern

epistemologyasitemergesin17thand18thcenturyEurope(andforbetterorworse,thisis

atleastaparadigmcaseoftheapplicationofthetermmodern)arethese:(1)the

recognitionoftheindividualrationalsubjectastheknower;(2)therecognitionofthe

responsibilityofthatsubjecttocommonstandardsofrationalinquiryinordertocountasa

knower;(3)anunderstandingofthesubjectasimmediatelyawareofherowninnerstates,

providinganepistemicfoundationforaccesstotheexternalworld.Knowledgeofthe

externalworldisthenregardedasmediatedbyoursensoryandcognitivefaculties,

facultieswhichmaybefallible,andwhichmayinterposeakindofveilbetweenusandthe

externalworld.Thesearefeaturesofmodernapproachestoepistemologyregardlessof

whethertheyarerationalistorempiricist,foundationalistorcoherentist.4

Butasecond,andperhapsultimatelymoreimportantcharacteristicofEuropean

modernityinepistemologyderivesfromitsoriginsintheGalileoaffair.Thatisthe

installationofscienceastheparadigmofrationalinquiryandasthefinalarbiteroftruth

regardingthenatureofreality.Thisdisplacementoftradition,ofcollectivewisdom,andof

religiousauthorityiswhatenabledthefaithinprogress,inreason,andinthepowerofthe

individualsubjectoperatinginthepublicspherethatconstitutetheheartofthemodern

sensibility.

4SeeGarfield(1996)foramoredetailedexplorationofthesethemes.

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Thisfaithinsciencehasseveralmomentousconsequencesforepistemologyasithas

beenunderstoodinEuropesincetheEnlightenment.Thefirstofthesehasbeenthe

introductionofadistinctionbetweenwhatSellarshasfamouslycalledthe“manifest”and

the“scientific”imagesof“manintheworld.”(1963a)Thatis,wedistinguishaworldasit

appearstousineverydayexperiencefromthatrevealedbyscientificinquiry,repletewith

unobservabletheoreticalentities,andwetakeitthatwhilebothimagesoftheworldare

accurate,thescientificimageiscapableofexplainingandevencorrectingthemanifest

image.Ithasakindofepistemicpriority,butonlyakind:whereasthescientificimagemay

haveepistemicprioritywithrespecttothefundamentalnatureofrealityandthecausal

principlesthatgovernphysicalprocesses,themanifestisthesourceofthenormsthat

governscientificinquiry,aswellasthehomeoftheobservationsthatvindicateits

discoveries.5Theimportantpointforourpurposesisthatscienceisnonethelessgranted

authorityoverthebasicstructureofreality,andourowneverydayexperienceanswertoit

inthatdomain.

Thisdichotomyleadstoasecond,surprising,andlittle-remarkedconsequence:a

subtlebutpervasivetransformationinourunderstandingoftruth.Truthandtrustare

cognatenotions.AndaprimarysenseoftruthinEnglishistrustworthy.Atruefriendisone

wecantrust;atruecoinisonewecanuse;tobetruetoapartneristorepayhertrust,etc…

Theapplicationofthetermtosentencesortobeliefswashomologous:atruestatement,or

atruebeliefisoneonwhichanagentcanrelyinreasoning,orasagroundforaction.Tosay

thatastatementistrueistocommitoneselftousingitasabasisforinvestigationorasa

reasonforaction.6

Theriseofscienceasthemeasureofrealityalteredthesemanticbalanceinour

understandingoftruth.Becausescienceisnowtakenasthearbiterofthereal,weendp

adoptingtheattitudethattherealisfullydeterminate,andindependentofourownviews

orknowledge,theattitudewenowcallscientificrealism.Andsincescienceisalsotakenas

thearbiteroftruth,truthcomestobeunderstoodasconnecteddirectlytothereality

5SeeGarfield(1988,2012)formorecompleteexplorationsofthisreciprocalrelation.6NotethatthisisconsistentwithmanyclassicalIndianaccountsoftruthasthatwhichenablesonetoachieveone’sends(puruṣārtha).IdevelopthisnotionfurtherinGarfield(2019).

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sciencedelivers.Itisnolongersimplythepropertyofbeingreliableinoureveryday

practices.Thisinturnintroducestheideathattruesentencesortruebeliefscorrespondto

reality,aviewwenowcallthecorrespondencetheoryoftruth,anotherhallmarkof

modernity.(Andnotethatnobodyhaseverproposedacontentfulaccountofjustinwhat

thatcorrespondencecouldconsist.)

Finally,themanifest-scientificdichotomy,withitsrecognitionofscienceasthe

measure(pramāṇa?)ofrealityleadsinevitablytoakindofreciprocitybetweenthe

manifestandscientificimagethatintroducesadeeptensioninmodernityitselfregarding

self-knowledge,atensionthatarguablycontainstheseedsofthepostmodernattitude.

Sinceourownbodiesandmindsarepresentin,andnotexternaltotherealworld,thefinal

storyabouthowtheyworkisthescientificstory,thestorytobetoldbybiology,

neuroscience,psychology,andeventhesocialsciences.Thatauthorityinturnreinscribes

themanifest-scientificdichotomyinthedomainoftheinner.Wenowmustdistinguishour

minds(andbodies)astheyappeartousfromourmindsandbodiesasscienceunderstands

them,andthisincludesoursensoryandcognitivefaculties,ourbasicmeansofaccesstothe

world(onceagain,pramāṇa).

Thefactofthisdichotomy,andthefactthatourintrospectiveawarenessof

ourselves,likeoureverydayawarenessofeverythingaroundusmeansthatwemust

jettisontheviewthatwehaveimmediateprivilegedaccesstoourowninnerstatesasthey

are.ThisisthefoundationofSellarsattackontheMythoftheGivenin“Empiricismandthe

PhilosophyofMind.”(1963b,henceforthEPM)Althoughthecommitmenttoindubitable

knowledgeofourownmindsasafoundationforpossiblyfallibleaccesstotheexternal

worldisacornerstoneofmodernity,wenowseethatthecommitmenttoscientiamensura

orscienceastheprinciplepramāṇaunderminesthatverycornerstone,atensionthat

issuesinthepostmodernrevolutioninepistemologyinitiatedbyQuineandSellars.7The

authorityofsciencemeansthatthenatureofourminds,ofoursensoryapparatus,andof

ouraccesstoanyobjectsofknowledgeisopaquetointrospection.Wearestrangersto

ourselves.7SeeGarfield(2018)foradetailedconsiderationoftheconnectionsbetweentheSellarsiancritiqueoftheMythoftheGivenandBuddhistepistemologyoftheinner.

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Wecannowturntoanimportantcasestudyofadebatethatraisesthequestionof

transcendentalvsanthropologicalepistemologyinthecontextofthistransitionfromthe

moderntothepostmodernin20thcenturyepistemology.Thiswillconstitutealensthrough

whichtoexamineamucholderTibetandebateonthesameterrain,adebatewitha

differentrelationtothemodern.

3.RespondingtoCarnap:QuineandSellarsIntheAufbau(TheLogicalStructureoftheWorld1967)firstpublishedin1925,Carnap

(1891-1970)proposesanaccountofourknowledgeoftheexternalworldthattakesasits

foundations“thestreamofexperience,”towhichhealsorefersas“thegiven.”(102)He

emphasizesthathisgoalis“toconstructtheobjectivebystartingwiththestreamof

experience,”amethodhecharacterizesas“methodologicalsolipsism”or“autopsychology.”

(107)Thesetermsemphasizethefirst-person(singular)foundationofallknowledgeon

thismodel.Basicknowledgeisindependentofanyknowledgeoftheexternalworldorof

otherknowers.Theaccountiscomplex,butthedetailsneednotdetainus.Theideaisthis:

Wehaveimmediateknowledgeofthegiven,thestreamofexperience,orwhatwaslaterto

becalledbythelogicalpositivistssensedata.(Ayer1963)Thisknowledgeisachieved

simplyinvirtueoftheirimmediategivenness.

Conceptsandexternalobjectsarethen“logicalconstructions”outofactualor

counterfactualexperiencesorsensedata.Weformtheconceptofrednessonthebasisof

redsensedata;ofanappleasthatkindofthingwhichleadstoredsensedatawhenseenat

adistance,whiteonesandsweetoneswhenbitten;offruitaseitheranapple,anorange,

or…;etc…,logicallyconstructingboththeworldandtheconceptsadequatetoitina

foundationofimmediatelyknownsensation.Meaningisgroundedinreference:words

referultimatelytopatternsofactualorpossiblesenseexperience.So,onthis

understandingofthestructureofknowledge,knowledgehasafoundation;thatfoundation

isinindividualfirstpersonsenseexperience;themostbasicknownobjectsaresensations;

allotherobjectsandjudgmentsarelogicalconstructionstherefrom.

IintroducetheAufbauframeworknotforitsownsake,butbecauseIaminterested

inthetwomostprominentresponsestothisshort-lived(but,duringitsheyday,

overwhelminglypopular)proposal,aproposalthatthoseinBuddhistStudieswillnoteis

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intriguinglyakintoideasfloatedintheIndianBuddhistpramāṇavādatraditionofDigṅāga

andDharmakīrti.ThosearetheresponsesofthetwoAmericanphilosophersWVQuine

(1908-2000)andWilfridSellars(1912-1989),responsesthatechoinfascinatingways

thoseofTsongkhapaandTakstangtoDharmakīrti.SellarsandQuineareeachnaturalists

aboutepistemology,buttheirapproachesdiffersharply.WewillseethatQuine

presupposesatranscendentalunderstandingofepistemology,andthatSellarsadvocates

ananthropologicalaccount.Andthatdifferencegeneratesverydifferentattitudestowards

thepossibilityofknowledgeandofmeaning.

QuineandSellarseachseethatatleastonefundamentaldifficultyofCarnap’s

programliesinitsfoundationalism.Carnaprequiressensations,orbasicexperiences,tobe

nonconceptualandimmediateandatthesametimetoconstitutebothknowledgeand

semanticprimitivesservingasthefoundationsforboththeedificeofknowledgeandthe

edificeofmeaning.(Aswewillsee,SellarspointstoasecondfatalprobleminCarnap’s

program—itsmethodologicalsolipsism—butwewillgettothatinabit.).AlthoughIwant

tobeginwithQuine’sresponsetoCarnap,heagreeswithSellars’diagnosisoftheproblem

here,andgivenitsclarity,itisusefultotaketheSellarsiandiagnosticaccountasourbasis

here.

InEPM,Sellarspointstoaninconsistenttriadthatliesatthebaseofallsense-datum

theories,onethatwewillseeTsongkhapaanticipates.Sensedataaremeanttobegiven,

thatis,tobeimmediateandnonconceptual;allknowledgeisexpressibleinlanguage,and

thereforeconceptual;sensedataaremeanttoconstituteknowledge,indeedthemost

secureofallknowledge.SellarsandQuineeachconcludefromtheinconsistencyofthat

triadthatnothingcouldsatisfythedescriptionthatsensedataaremeanttosatisfy,and

indeedthatitmakesnosensetotalkaboutfoundationsofknowledge,althoughtheirroutes

tothisconclusionandthewaythedeployitgoingforwardaresomewhatdifferent.8

Thisargumentagainstthepossibilityofepistemicfoundations,whichrestsonthe

insightthatnothingcanbeimmediateandfoundationalandatthesametimelieinwhat

8ThereisinsufficientspacetogointothedetailsofthecomplexargumentofEPMhere.ButdeVriesandTriplett(2000)presentanexcellentoverview.

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Sellarscalls“thespaceofreasons,”thatis,thedomainofjustificationthatconstitutes

knowledge,constitutestheheartoftheepistemologicalattackontheMythoftheGiven.But

thereisasemanticargumentaswell,whichwewillseeisalsorelevanttotheTibetan

debatestowhichwewillsoonturn.ItisimportanttoCarnapthatsensedataarenotonly

epistemicprimitives,knownimmediatelywithoutanyjustificationorconceptualization,

butthattheyarealsosemanticprimitives,thedenotationsofthemostbasictermsinour

language.

Carnaptakesthesetobeobservationterms,correspondingtoimmediatelygiven

sensoryqualities,whichmightberenderedaslooksgreen,looksred,soundslikeC#,etc…

Theseobservationterms,hesupposes,gettheirmeaningsdirectlybyreferringto

immediatesenseexperiences,or,wemightsay,bybeingconnectedaslabelsforthose

experiences.Morecomplexdescriptivepredicates,suchasisgreen,isred,isaC#,etc…are

thenlogicalconstructionsfromtheseprimitivelyreferentialterms,denotingtheproperties

oftendingtoproducetheexperiencesoflookinggreen,lookingred,soundinglikeC#,etc….

Andontotherestoflanguage.Onthisview—justasinthecaseoftheepistemicsideofthe

foundationalistprograminwhichallofknowledgeisgroundedinthesensorygiven—allof

meaningisgroundedintheimmediatereferentialrelationbetweenappearancetermsand

experiences.Thisentailsthattheconstitutionofmeaning,liketheconstitutionof

knowledge,issolipsisticinCarnap’ssense,thatis,thatasingleknowerorreportercouldbe

aknowerandalanguageuser.9

Thisviewalsoentailsthatappearancetalk—predicatesoftheformappearingtobe

F—islogicallyandsemanticallypriortodirectpredication—theuseofpredicatesofthe

formisF.SellarsputpaidtothisideaaswellinEMP,pointingoutthatonecanonlylearn

suchappearancepredicatesifonehasalreadymasteredthecorrespondingdescriptive

predicates,andthatmasteringthoserequiresbeingsocializedintolinguisticnormsand

practices,justaslearningtojustifyone’sclaimsrequiresbeingsocializedintoepistemic

9ItisnoteworthythatthisapproachtosemanticsisakintothatofWittgensteinintheTractatus,andisalsothetargetofthedecisiveattackonprivatelanguageinPhilosophicalInvestigations.IwillleaveasidethecomparisonofCandrakīrti’sandTsongkhapa’spositiononlanguageandmeaningtoWittgenstein’s.Buttherearerichparallelsthere,alsosuggestingapostmodernturninpremodernTibetanphilosophy.SeeThurman(1980).

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normsandpractices.Thatis,onecannotknowwhatisforsomethingtolookredifonedoes

notalreadyknowwhatitisforsomethingtobered.Onecannotknowsomethingtobeared

sensedatumunlessonealreadyhastheconceptofrednessthatismeanttobederivedfrom

knowledgeofredsensedata.

SomuchforwhatwaswrongwiththeAufbauprogram.Letusnowturntothevery

differentconclusionsthatQuineandSellarsdrawfromitsfailure.Quine,asa

transcendentalist,acceptsCarnap’sclaimsthatmeaningdemandsprimitive,determinate

referentialcontactwithparticularmomentsofexperience,andthatanynormativelyrich

accountofknowledge—onethatgeneratesthepossibilityofepistemicobligation,criticism,

etc—demandsimmediatecontactwithrealitytogroundthosenorms.Heconcludesfrom

thisthatsincethereisnofundamentalmeaning-inducingrelationbetweenlanguageand

theworld,therecanbenosuchthingasmeaning,thattheveryideaoflinguisticmeaningis

incoherent.Healsoconcludesthatsincetherearenobasicepistemicrelationsbetween

mindsandtheworldthatcoulddeterminewhatoneoughttobelieve,thatnormative

epistemologyisimpossible.

Quine’sproposalinthisdomainistonaturalizeepistemologybymakingita

subdisciplineofpsychologyandthesocialsciences,thatis,byadoptingananthropological

approachtoepistemology,eschewinganynormativepretensions.Onhisview,wecanask

whatpeoplesayanddowhentheyclaimtopursueknowledge,butwecannotaskwhether

theyarerighttosayandtodothosethings;wecanaskabouttheregularitiesofusesof

words,andabouttheconditionsunderwhichpeopleapproveordisapproveoftheiruse,

butnotabouttheirmeanings.Thisiswhyheisbothanaturalistandatranscendentalist.10

SellarsdrawsverydifferentconclusionsfromtheincoherenceofCarnap’sprogram.

Heconcludesfromtheimpossibilityofprimitivesemanticandepistemicrelationsof

languageandthoughttotheworldthatneitherlanguagenorknowledgecanhaveany

foundations.ButconvertingQuine’smodustollensintoamodusponens,hearguesthat

neithermeaningnorknowledgerequirefoundations:meaningisconstitutedsimplyinthe

networkofpracticesthatconstitutelanguageuse,practicesthatthemselvesinducethe

10SeeQuine(1960,1981)forthedetailsofthearguments.

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normsthatgovernsyntax,semantics,andpragmatics;knowledgeisthatwhichisachieved

bytheappropriateuseofepistemicconventionsthatthemselvesarejustifiedbythe

knowledgetheyenable.Hethusarguesthatwecanmakeperfectsenseofthenormsthat

inducelinguisticmeaningaswellasthosethatgovernepistemicactivitybyattendingtothe

powerofconventionstoinducenormativity.Indeed,wecanseeSellars’focusonCarnap’s

solipsismasleadinghiminthisdirection.11

Sellarsarguesinsteadthatempiricalknowledgehasnofoundation(oras

Wittgensteinputsasimilarpointsoperfectly:“thefoundationsareheldupbythewallsof

thehouse.”[1972,¶248]).Webecomeknowers,onhisaccount,whenwecometo

participatecompetentlyinthecollectivesocialpracticeofjustificationandcriticism;

knowledgeisjustwhatweasacommunityofknowerstaketobejustifiedbyour

conventionsofjustification;noprimitiveworld-experiencerelationsareneededinorderto

constituteknowledge.Weuselanguagemeaningfully,onthisaccount,whenwecometo

participatecompetentlyincollectivesocialpracticeoflanguageuse;meaningisjusttheuse

thataword,oraphrasebythemembersofthecommunityoflanguageusers;noprimitive

semanticword-worldrelationsarenecessarytoconstitutemeaning.

Sellarsthusdoesnotdenythenormativitythatgovernsmeaningandjudgment.

Insteadheexplainsit.Heexplainsthatitderivesfromconvention,theonlypossiblesource

ofnormativity.SellarshencejoinsQuineinhisnaturalism;butunlikeQuinehisapproachto

epistemologyisnormative,notanthropological,simplybecausehebelievesthatwecan

naturalizenormativityitself.WhereasQuine’snaturalismleadshimtodenythatwecan

makeanysenseofthenormativitypresupposedbymeaningandknowledge,Sellars’

naturalismleadshimtoanexplanationofhowthatnormativityarisesinnature.

11ThispointalsoconnectsSellars’thoughttothatofHumeandWittgenstein,eachofwhomemphasizedconvention,orcustom,asthesourceofnormativity,aswellasthefactthatconventionsareungrounded,constitutedonlybytheimplicitagreementofthosewhoparticipateinthem,openingawideavenuetowardsthenaturalizationofmeaningandepistemology.SeeGarfield(2019)foradiscussionofhowthisworksinHume’sphilosophyandKripke(1982)foradiscussionofhowitworksinWittgenstein’sphilosophy.NotealsothatthisconnectionforcesonetotaketheEmpiricisminthetitleofEPMveryseriously.ManyreadthisessaysimplyasanattackonthelogicalempiricismofCarnapandhisfollowersinthesensedataindustry;butitisalsothedefenseofanolderformofempiricismfoundinHume.

13

4.RespondingtoDharmakīrti:TsongkhapaandTaktsangItishardtomisstheparallelsbetweenthePramaṇavādaaccountofknowledgeand

Carnap’s.DigṅāgaandDharmakīrti(henceforthIwillgenerallyonlyrefertoDharmakīrti,

asitwashewhowasinfluentialinTibet,notsomuchDigṅāga)alsotakeknowledgetohave

afoundationinimmediatesensoryexperience,orpratyakṣa,perceptionthatputsusin

directcontactwithsensibleparticulars(svalakṣana).Ontheiraccountaswell,the

macroscopicphenomenaweencounterindailylifearelogicalconstructsoutofthese

sensoryexperiences,knowninferentially(viaanumāna)throughtheengagementof

universals(samanyalakṣana).AndDharmakīrtialsotakessenseperceptiontobe

immediateandveridical,absentanyconceptualmediation,anddirectlypresentingsensory

experiencesastheyare.Thepossibilityoferrorinexperienceenterswithconceptual

thoughtandtheengagementwithunrealuniversals.Thefoundationalism,thecommitment

tothegiven,themethodologicalsolipsism,andthenonconceptualnatureofperceptionwe

encounteredinCarnap’sprogramareallpresagedinearlyIndianBuddhistepistemology.

ThesemanticsideofCarnap’sprogramalsohasantecedentsinBuddhist

Pramāṇavāda,althoughthehomologiesarenotsotightinthiscase.Thisisbecausethe

Pramāṅavādinsdidnotthinkthatthesenseexperiencesdeliveredbyperceptionare

expressibleatall.Theyarguethatlanguageandconceptualitygohandinhand,andthat

languagealwaysengageswithuniversals,nottheparticularsgiventousinperceptual

experience.Nonetheless,thereisanimportantpointofagreement:Carnap,aswehave

seen,thoughtthatourordinarylanguagedenotesthingsthatarelogicalconstructionsfrom

asensorygiven,andthatwordsgettheirmeaningthroughasemanticrelationtotheworld

mediatedinthefirstinstancebyreferencetothoseobjects,andinthefinalanalysisbythe

particularsintowhichthosemacroscopicobjectsresolveonanalysis.Theonlydifferenceis

thatwhereasCarnaptakesthemeaningsofordinarytermsthemselvestobeanalayzablein

termsoftermsdenotingexperiences,Dhamakīrti,becausehetakesthatmoreprimitive

denotationtobeimpossible,doesnotadoptthisanalyticsemanticfoundationalism.12

12Instead,followingageneralBuddhistsuspicionoftheadequacyoflanguagetotheworldinvirtueofthefalsifyingnatureofconceptuality,Dharmakīrticouldberegardedasakindofsemanticnihilist.Language,onhisview,appearstobemeaningfulandtodenoterealphenomena,butthatismereappearance;intheend,itismeaninglesschatter.

14

BecauseofhisenormousimpactonBuddhist(andforthatmatternon-Buddhist)

epistemologyinIndia,Dharmakīrti,andhiacommentatorsattractedagreatdealof

philosophicalattentioninTibet.Nonetheless,theywerenotwithoutrivals.His

MādhyamikacriticCandrakīrtihadaverydifferentepistemologicalperspective.

CandrakīrtiarguesinClearWords(Prasannapadā)againstlimitingthenumberof

pramāṇastotwo(addingatleasttestimony(śabda)andanalogy(upamāna)tothelist,

suggestingthatitisopen-ended.Healsorejectstheirfoundationalism,following

Nāgārjunaintakingthepramāṇastobevindicatedbytheobjectstheydeliver(prameyas)

andbyoneanotherinacoherentistepistemology.Inthesetworespects,wealsosee

CandrakīrtirejectingthemethodologicalsolipsismsharedbythePramāṅavādinsand

Carnap.

CandrakīrtialsodivergesfromthePramāṇavādatraditioninhisunderstandingof

linguisticmeaning.Inacarefulanalysisoftheideaofconvention(samvṛti/lokavyāvahāra)

hetakesmeaningtobeconstitutednotbydirectreferentialrelationstoextralinguistic

reality,butbyanetworkofcustomsfortheuseofwords.Thisidea,championedinthe20th

centuryinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesbyWittgensteinandSellars,notonlyrunscounter

totheDharmakīrti’sreductionism,butalsotohismethodologicalsolipsism.Foritforces

us,ifwewanttounderstandthecontentoflanguageandthought,tolooktothecommunity

oflanguageusersandthinkers,andnottotheindividualspeakerorsubject.

ThisisparticularlyimportantinthepresentcontextbecauseTsongkhapaandhis

followersintheGeluktradition,aswellasTaktsangandhisfollowersintheSakyaand

KagyutraditionsalltakethemselvestofollowCandrakīrtiandnotthePramāṅavādinsin

theirunderstandingofknowledgeandjustificationinthecontextofPrāsaṅgika

Madhyamaka.Butjusthowtheytakethemselvestodosoisamatterofcontention.They

eachrejecttheDharmakīrti’sfoundationalism,aswellashisindividualism.Butwhile

Tsongkhapaarguesthatthisisconsistentwitharobustnormativeepistemologyandthe

possibilityofexpressingatruePrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakaposition,Taktsangarguesthatat

mostitleavesuswithananthropologicalaccountofpeople’sdeludedepistemicpractices,

andreducesMadhyamakatoinexpressibility.WehenceseeTsongkhapaasfollowing

15

Sellars’approachtotheCarnapinhisresponsetoDigṅāga,andTakstangfollowingQuine’s

approachinhisverydifferentresponse.

LetusbeginwithTsongkhapa.IntheSpecialInsight(lhagtong)sectionofGreat

ExpositionoftheStagesofthePathtoEnlightenment(Lamrimchenmo,2004),Tsongkhapa

explainshowheinterpretsCandrakīrti’sexpositionofPrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakaandhowhe

interpretsCandrakīrti’sepistemologyinthiscontext.Therearefourcentralissuestowhich

weneedtoattend:howhetakesCandrakīrti’saccountofpramāṇatodifferfromthatof

DigṅāgaandDharmakīrti;hisaccountofknowledgeasalwaysconceptual;his

understandingofconventionaltruthastruth;hisargumentthatthePrāsaṅgika

Madhyamakapositionmustbeexpressible.

TsongkhapanotesthataccordingtothoseinthePramāṇavādatradition,perception

isanepistemicwarrantbecauseitputsusindirect,conceptuallyunmediatedcausal

contactwithparticulars,whichitdeliverstoconsciousnessnondeceptively,thatis,witha

modeofappearancecongruentwiththeirmodeofexistence.Thisisbothwhyperception

canserveasafoundationforknowledge,andwhyperceptionisnondeceptive,hence

warranting.Itisfoundationalbecauseitdependsonnothingelse;itiswarrantingbecause

itisalwaysdirectandnondeceptive.Candrakīrti,ontheotherhand,heargues,follows

Nāgārjuna’saccountinReplytoObjections(Vigrahavyāvartanī),arguingthatthepramāṇas

andtheirprameyasaremutuallydependent,andthatthevariouspramāṇasalsoare

mutuallysupportive,likethesheavesinastack.13Welearntotrustourvisionwhenweare

toldthatitisgood;inferenceonlygivesusgeneralknowledgewhenwecandiscern

analogiesbetweencases,etc…TsongkhapaisclearintheSpecialInsight(lhagtong)section

ofGreatExpositionoftheStagesofthePathtoEnlightenment(Lamrimchenmo)thathe

sideswithCandrakīrti,notDharmakīrtiinhisunderstandingofepistemicwarrant.He

writes,“Astoassertionsaboutformsandsuch,wedonotholdthatvalidcognitiondoesnot

establishthem;validcognitiondoesestablishthem.”(2015,v.3,p.163)Andabitlater,

13OneshouldpointoutthatwhileCandrakīrtienumeratesfourpramāṇas,addingtestimony(śabda)andanalogy(upamāna)tothetworecognizedbyPramāṇavādins,withoutclosingthedoortoanyconventionalepistemicinstrumentorwarrant,TsongkhapadoesfollowDharmakīrtiinarguingthatallotherpramāṇasreducetoperceptionandinference.(SeeGarfield2015,c.7formoreonthisissue.)

16

…thelogiciansholdthataperceptionisaconsciousnessthatisfreefrom

conceptualityandisnon-mistaken…Thereforeitisinrelationtothe

intrinsiccharacterofthesefiveobjectsthattheyconsidersuch

perceptionstobevalid.

…Candrakīrtidoesnotacceptevenconventionallythaanythingexists

essentiallyorbywayofitsintrinsiccharacter….Thus,howcouldheaccept

thisclaimthatthesensoryconsciousnessesarevalidwithregardtothe

intrinsiccharacteroftheirobjects?(Ibid.,p.165)

Tsongkhapa’sstudentKhedrupje(1385-1438)putsthepointthisway:

Focusingonthevariousdesignationsofpersonsandphenomena—

labelingthisapot,andthatDevadatta—basedjustonthat,wecanengage

ineffectiveaction.Therefore,theseareconventionallynondeceptive.Butif

itwerefirstnecessarytoinitiallysearchforthereferentofthosenames,

nothingcouldbeaccomplished.(1972,171-172)

Andagain:

InthePrāsaṅgikasystem,onedetermineswhetherornotsomethingisa

mistakencognitionbasedonwhetherornotthereisanepistemicwarrant

thatcontradictshowitapprehendsitsobject,notonwhetherornotthe

conceivedobject(zhenyul)appearserroneously,oronwhetherornot

thereisanepistemicwarrantthatcontradictshowitappears.(Ibid.,458)

Thatis,onthisunderstanding,whatgeneratesepistemicwarrantisnotdirectcontactwith

thingsastheyare,butratheraroleinordinaryactivityandconfirmationbyotherwarrants

andtheyobjectstheydeliver.

Moreover,TsongkhapaandhisGelukfollowersargue,apramāṇamaybeveridical

ortrustworthywithrespecttoanobjectinsomerespects,butnotinothers.Perception,for

instance,maybeawarrantforthesize,shape,orlocationofanexternalobject,butmight

mistakenlydeliverittousasintrinsicallyreal.Thereisthusakindoffallibilismbuiltinto

Tsongkhapa’sunderstandingofepistemicwarrant.Hecashesthisoutbydistinguishing

17

betweenconventionalandultimatepramāṇas,andemphasizingthatconventional

pramāṇasarenondeceptivewithrespecttoconventionaltruth,invirtueofbeingconfirmed

by,andnotbeingunderminedby,otherconventionalpramāṇas,butarenonetheless

deceptivewithregardtoultimatetruth,adomainaccessibleonlybyultimatepramāṇas.

Wethusendupwithanepistemologygroundedininterdependenceandincollective

epistemicactivity.Warrantarisesnotfromdirect,nondeceptiveaccesstorealityasitis,but

fromparticipationinasetofconventionsthataremutuallysupportiveandthatconstitute

conventionaljustification.ThefirstPanchenLama,LosangChökyiGyaltsen(1570-1662)

explainsTsongkhapa’spositionasfollows:

Thevisualconsciousnessthatapprehendsmaterialformisepistemically

reliablewithregardto:(a)form,(b)theappearanceofform,and(c)the

appearanceofform’sexistingessentially;butitisnotepistemically

warrantinginregardto(d)form’sexistingessentially.Therefore,even

thoughanordinaryvisualconsciousnessapprehendingformisan

erroneousconsciousness,thisdoesnotcontradictitsbeingepistemically

warrantedinregardtoform.(Yakherds2020vol.2,pxxx)

GesheYeshesThabkhassummarizesthispointnicely:

Consideravisualcognitionapprehendingablazingobjectsuchasfire.The

visualcognitionapprehendingafireisanepistemicwarrantwithrespect

totheobject’sabilitytoproduceheatandburnthings;butthesamevisual

cognitionisnotanepistemicwarrantwithregardtotheobject’sobjective

existence,becausealthoughtheobjectappearstoexistobjectively,this

appearancedoesnotconstitutetheobject’smodeofexistence.Ifthe

blazingentitythatthecognitionapprehendsasafirecanproduceheatand

burnthings,thecognitionapprehendingthefireisnon-deceptivewith

respecttothefire.(Yakherds2020,pxxx).

Tsongkhapaalsorejectstheideathatknowledgecaneverbenonconceptual.Even

perceptualknowledge,heargues,mustbeassertableandcommunicable.Even

nonconceptualmeditativeequipoiseonlyyieldsactualknowledgeinthepostmeditative

18

statewhenitcanbeverbalized,whenitachievesastructurethatcanbeassessedastrueor

false,andvalidatedbyappealtoappropriatepramāṇas.Hewritesthatthepointofuniting

meditationandanalysisisto“experiencebothserenitywhichobservesanon-discursive

imageandinsightwhichobservesadiscursiveimage.”(2015,v.3,p.358)Ifthisisso,even

perceptualknowledgeisknowledgethat,andisthereforeconceptuallymediated.Ifso,

onceagain,therearenofoundationsforknowledge,andwhatvalidatesknowledgeisnot

directconnectionwithreality,butrathertheuseofconventionallyacceptedepistemic

practices,evenifthosepracticesarenotalwaysveridical.Tsongkhaparelieshereon

Candrakīrti’sanalysisinClearWords:

Sincecyclicexistenceisalsoaconcept(rtog),nirvanatoomustbea

concept,forthebothexistasmundanelinguisticconventions.…[Ultimate

truth]iscalledultimatetruthbymeansofmundanelinguisticconvention

becauseitsnatureisnottodeceivetheworld.[5cd,7b,translatedin

Yakherds2020,vol.1,ppxxx)

Thistakesusstraighttotheissueofthenatureofconventionaltruth.Candrakīrti

famouslynotesthatsamvṛticaneithermeanconventionalinallofitsfamiliarsenses,

indicatingbyagreement,ordinary,nominal,everyday,etc…orconcealing,obscuring.So,we

canglosssamvṛti-satyaaccuratelyeitherasconventionaltruthorasconcealingor

obscurationaltruth.One’sattitudetowardsthestatusofconventionaltruthdependsagood

dealonwhichofthesereadingsonetakestobeprimary.14Tsongkhapatakesthefirstroute,

emphasizingthattobeconventionallytrueisawayofbeingtrue,notashamthatconceals

thetruth.HeleanshardonNāgārjuna’sdoctrineoftwotruths,arguingthattherecanonly14DanArnoldobserves(forthcoming)“thedifferentlyvalencedsensesofthewordsamvṛtihereinplay–thesenseofthisas‘concealing’thenatureofrealityfromus,andthesenseofitasalsodenotingthe“customarytruth”thatisaconditionofthepossibilityofourknowinganythingatall–wouldbeintensiononlyifitisthoughtthatwhatordinaryexperienceconcealsissomethingreal.Ifwhatordinaryexperiencepreventsusfromseeingisthekindof‘intrinsicidentitythatisanexistent’,thenitwouldmakesensetosaythatconventionaltruthhas,relativetothat,abasicallydeficientstatus.Thereisnosuchproblem,however,ifitisrecognizedthatwhatisconcealedfromusisthe‘mereabsence’oftheexistentialstatushabituallyimputedtoentities–thattheradicalcontingencyofdependentlyoriginatedexistentstendstobehiddenfromviewdoesnotchangethefactthatitisonlybecauseallexistentsarecontingentthatthisobscurationcaninthefirstplacebeovercome.Tothatextent,itmakessensethattherealitythat‘conceals’itsowncontingencyisnonethelesstheonlyrealitythereis.

19

betwoofeachofthemisinfactakindoftruth.Andsincetruth,orreality,andvalidation

bypramāṇasarecoextensivetermsinthistradition,conventionaltruthisverymuchaway

ofbeingreal,awayofbeingtrue,ofbeingtrustworthy.ThisiswhyTsongkhapacanargue

thatthebasisofdivisionofthetwotruthsisobjectsofknowledge:conventionaland

ultimateareeachobjectsofknowledge,eachreal.Wethusseeatightconnectionbetween

normativityandreality:whatisrealiswhatiswarrantedbynormativepractices.15

AndthisbringsustotheissueoftheexpressibilityofthePrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka

position.Thequestiongainspoignancynotonlybecausethisisacentralboneof

contentionbetweenTsongkhapaandTaktsang,butalsobecauseoftheconsensusthat

emptiness,ortheultimatetruth,isanon-implicativenegation(meddgag)andNāgārjuna’s

insistenceinFundamentalVersesontheMiddleWay(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā)that

emptinessisnotaview,(13.8)aswellashisclaiminRepliestoObjectionsnottoassertany

proposition.(29)TheseclaimscanbetakentosuggestthatifwereallytakeMadhyamaka

seriously,noclaimaboutultimatetruth,andsonocomprehensiveassertionofany

Madhyamakaposition,canmakeanysense,thatallwouldbeself-refuting.

Tsongkhaparepliestothissuggestionbyarguingthateventodenyaclaimisto

assertanegation;thatevenifemptinessisanon-implicativenegation,Mādhyamikasassert

thatallphenomenaareempty.Moreover,sinceNāgārjunaarguesfortheequivalenceof

emptinessandependentorigination,andsinceallMādhyamikasassertthatall

phenomena—includingemptiness—aredependentlyoriginated,wecancertainlysay

thingsbothabouttheconventionalandtheultimatetruth,andpositivelyaffirmthetruthof

thePrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakavision.ThisisenabledbyCandrakīrti’sunderstandingof

meaningintermsoflinguisticuse.Evenifwesaythatlanguagedoesnotlatchdirectlyonto

theworldandconsideritonlytobeupāya,thefactthatitisupāyaconstitutesitsutilityas

language.Andifusecandeterminemeaning,thenevenintheabsenceofdirectword-world

referentiallinks,thereisnobartomeaning,eveninthecontextofPrāsaṅgikadialectic.

HereisthefirstPurbuchok,NgawangJampa,(1682-1762)defendingTsongkhapa’s

positionagainstTaktsang:15SeeCowherds(2010)foramoredetaileddiscussionofthesensesinwhichCandrakīrtiandTsongkhapatakeconventionaltruthtobebonafidetruth.

20

Again,youclaimthattheprincipleofdoublenegationelimination

(dgagpagnyiskyisrnalmagoba)—thefactthat,forexample,whatever

phenomenondoesnotexistmustbenonexistent—issomethingthatonly

thelowerphilosophicalschoolsaccept,whereastheGreatMadhyamaka

rejectstheviewthatallphenomenaareeitherexistentornonexistent.

Hence,youassertthatMādhyamikashavenothesesandnoclaims

whatsoever,fortohavethesesandclaimsistocommittoreificationor

nihilism.…

[This]isafallacythatcomesfromnotreadingReplytoObjectionsevenina

cursoryfashion,muchlessreadingNāgārjuna’sotherworkssuchasthose

in the collected hymns of praise and in the collection of analytical texts.

ReplytoObjectionssays:

Toopposeessencelessness

Istosupportessentialism.(26cd)

Therefore,consideryourtwotheses—that“therelativetruthisnot

epistemicallywarranted,”andthat“allphenomenaareneitherexistent,

nornonexistent.”ItwouldfollowthatitisafallacyforPrāsaṅgika

Mādhyamikastoacceptthesebecausetheyaretheses.Checkmate!

(Yakherds2020,pxxx)

So,oneachoftheseissues,Tsongkhapaandhisfollowershaveaclearpositive

position:wecanbewarrantedwithregardtotheconventionaleventhoughthereisno

foundationofempiricalknowledge;allknowledgeisconceptuallymediated;conventional

truthisakindoftruth;andthePrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakapositionisassertable.Wenow

turntoTaktsangandhisfollowers,who,wewillsee,willdisagreewitheachofthese

positions.

InthefifthchapterofFreedomfromExtremesAccomplishedthroughComprehensive

KnowledgeofPhilosophy(Grubmtha’kunshesnasmtha’‘bralsgrubpa),TaktsangLotsawa

adduceswhathecalls“the18greatcontradictionsinthethoughtofTsongkhapa.”

(Yakherds2020,vol.2)ThevastmajorityoftheseconcernwhatheseesasTsongkhapa’s

21

illegitimateimportationofthelanguageofpramāṇa,whichheseesasinextricablytiedto

Digṅāga’sandDharmakīrti’sproject,intoPrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka,aswellasTsongkhapa’s

insistenceontheexpressibilityofthePrāsaṅgikaposition.Hesummarizesthepointnicely

inthisversefromtheroottextofFreedomfromExtremes:

18. Thereasonforthisheavyburdenofcontradictions Istheirharpingonapurelymundaneandnonanalyticperspective Whileimposingrationality,theyanalyzeandjustify Becauseoftheirlogichabit.

The“logichabit”andtheanalysisandjustificationtowhichTaktsangobjectsistheuseof

theconventionalpramāṇasthattheGeluktraditiontakestobeessentialtotheprojectof

understandingthetwotruths,andtobecompletelyconsistentwithCandrakīrti’sproject.

Taktsang,ontheotherhand,takeseachofthesetobeinconsistentwithCandrakīrti’s

articulationofMadhyamaka.

WhiletherearemanywaystounderstandthedisputebetweenTsongkhapaand

Taktsangandtheextensivedebateitengendered,andagreatdealofnuanceinTakstang’s

ownarticulationofPrāsaṅgikaphilosophicalpractice(Yakherds2020,vol.1),muchofthis

isbesidethepresentpoint.Fornow,notethatwhenweseethisdisputeasframedby

distinctresponsestothePramāṇavādaproject,wewillseeTaktsangasplayingQuineto

Tsongkhapa’sSellars.LikeTsongkhapa,TaktsangtakesDharmakīrtiandhisfollowerstobe

committedtoafoundationalistunderstandingofwarrantandofmeaningandto

methodologicalsolipsism;likeTsongkhapa,herejectsbothoftheseideas.Butwhereas

Tsongkhapaarguesthatepistemicwarrantandmeaningcanbereconstructedthrougha

realisticaccountofnormativitygroundedinconvention,Taktsangarguesthatany

commitmenttowarrantortomeaningpresupposesthefoundationalist,solipsistic

frameworkinwhichtheyarearticulated,andhencethatneitherintheendmakesany

sense.

Forpresentpurposes,amongthemoreimportantofthecontradictionsTaktsang

adducesagainstTsongkhapaarethese:

Allobjectsbeingfalsecontradictstheirsubjectsbeingnon-deceptive

[13a]

22

Acceptinginferencecontradictsnotarticulatingprobative

arguments.[13c]

Thingsbeingtrueorfalsecontradictsnothingbeingcorrector

incorrect.[15b]

Thenonexistenceoffloatinghairscontradictstheexistenceofthe

riversofpus.[14c]

Refutingthefoundationconsciousness,reflexiveawarenessand

othersuchdoctrines…

Contradictstherecognitionofepistemicwarrantsinone’sown

framework.[17]

Letusspendamomentsimplyexplainingeachofthese,beforeturningtoTaktsang’s

diagnosisoftheircommonroot.Thefirstoftheseconcernsthetensionbetweenthe

assertionthatallconventionallyrealthingsareultimatelyfalse(rdzunpa)invirtueofthe

discordancebetweentheirmodeofexistence(conventionallyreal)andtheirmodeof

appearance(ultimatelyreal)ontheonehandandtheclaimthattheyarenondeceptive(mi

sluba)conventionally,invirtueofbeingascertainedbyconventionalepistemicwarrants.

Taktsangarguesthatthesamethingcannotbothbedeceptiveandnon-deceptive.

Thesecondinthissamplerconcernstheroleoflogicandreasonedargumentinthe

Prāsaṅgikaproject.TsongkhapaarguesthatPrāsaṅgikaisdistinguishedfromSvātantrika

inpartonthegroundsthatthelatterschooladmitstheuseofIndianprobativearguments

(prayoga)whosetermsareunderstoodincommonbybothdialecticalparties,whereasthe

former—whileitadmitstheuseofreasoning,includingbothreductioadabsurdum

(prāsaṅga)andargumentacceptableonlytothePrāsaṅgikaherselfinwhichthereisno

presuppositionthatanynon-Prāsaṅgikainterlocutorwouldusetermsinthesameway—

rejectstheuseofthoseprobativearguments.Taktsangarguesthatonceoneiscommitted

tothevalidityofinference,itisinconsistenttoadmitsomekindsofinferencewhile

rejectingothers.

23

Thethirdandfourthareeachconnectedtothefirst.Thethirdraisesavery

importantissuerelevanttotheresponsetofoundationalism:ifthereisnoabsolute

standardofcorrectnessorincorrectness—nofoundationforsuchjudgments—howcan

truthorfalsitymeananythingatall?Arethesejudgmentssimplymattersofsubjective

approvalordisapproval?Andthefourthintroducestheproblemofrelativism.Werea

humanbeingtoseefallinghairsinhervisualfield,shewouldbewrong;theywouldbean

illusioncausedbyeyedisease.Andifsheweretoseepusandbloodwherethereisreally

water,shewouldbeequallywrong.Butifapretaweretoseepusandbloodinthesame

location,hewouldbecorrect.Howisitthattheperceptionofwaterbyahumanbeing,and

thatofpusandbloodbyapretaarebothcorrect,whiletheperceptionofhairsbythepeson

withophthalmiaandtheperceptionoftheirabsencebyeveryoneelsearenot?Letusnow

turntothefourissuesweraisedabove,andseehowTaktsangdiffersfromTsongkhapaon

eachofthese.

First,thereistheissueoftherelationshipbetweenpramāṇaandfoundations.Aswe

sawabove,Tsongkhaparespondstotheincoherenceofepistemicfoundationalismby

reconstructingnormativityinacoherentist,conventionalistframework.Taktsangreacts

verydifferently,acceptingtheentailmentbetweenatrulynormativeaccountofwarrant

andfoundationstogroundthatwarrant,heusesmodustollenstoconcludefromthe

incoherenceoffoundationalismthatthereisnopossibilityofanormativeepistemology,

assertingthatwecanonlysayinaneveryday,non-analyticcontext,whatpeoplesayabout

justification,notwhatjustificationis.Hewrites:

Theymightreplythattheydonotacceptfoundations.Butnotbeing

foundational contradicts being epistemically warranted; for to be

epistemically warranted means to be nondeceptive, and being

nondeceptive means nothing more than being foundational.

(Yakherds2020,vol.2,p.xxx)

24

Thatis,headoptswhatwehavecalledananthropologicalaccountofwarrant,anaccount

thatpretendstonothingmorethanadescriptionofdeludedpractice.Whenwemovetoa

moresophisticatedcontext—thatofslightanalysis,inwhichweengagedinPrāsaṅgika

reflection,warranthasnoplaceatall.

Second,thereistheissueofthepossibilityofknowledgegiventhatconceptuality

alwaysissuesinsomekindoffalsification.WehaveseenthatTsongkhapaarguesthateven

ifwhenwecognizeanobjectweareincorrectinsomerespects,wecannonethelessbe

correctinothers,andthatsinceknowledgeisalwaysexpressibleinapropositionasserting

thatanobjecthassomeproperty,itisalwaysconceptual;nonetheless,assumingthatwe

followtheepistemicpracticesappropriatetotheconventionalworld,wecanhave

knowledgeofthatworld.Taktsangonceagaingoestheotherway.Since,heargues,

knowledgemustrelyoninfallibleepistemicfacultiesandsomustalwaysbenon-

conceptual,andsincethereisnosuchaccesstotheconventionalworld,therecanbeno

genuineknowledgeofconventionalreality.Thisisarticulatedinthefirstseveral

contradictionsheadducesagainstTsongkhapa.Here,forexample,isthefirst:

Allobjectsbeingfalsecontradictstheirsubjectsbeingnon-deceptive.

(13a)

Ouropponentsexplainthatunlessonerealizesthattheobjectisfalse,one

willfailtounderstandthemeaningofrelativetruth.Thisisexactlyright.

In the Prāsaṅgika’s own system, one indeed realizes that the relative is

false.Therefore,itiscontradictorytoholdontheonehandthatallrelative

objectsare falseandon theotherhandthat thecognitions thatare their

subjects can be nondeceptive and epistemically warranting.

(Yakherds2020,vol.2,pxxx)

ThisiscloselyrelatedtothethirdissuethatdividesTsongkhapaandTaktsangin

thisdomain:theverystatusofconventionaltruth.WehaveseenthatTsongkhapa,

emphasizingthatitisdeliveredbyconventionalpramāṇas,concludesthatconventional

truthisakindoftruth.Taktsang,ontheotherhand,rejectingthevalidityofany

conventionalpramāṇa,andfocusingontheconcealingnatureofconvention,andthe

25

deceptivecharacterofconventionaltruths,arguesthatitisnottruthatall,andhencethat

totalkaboutknowingitisutternonsense.Heasserts,forinstance,that“Thingsbeingtrue

orfalsecontradictsnothingbeingcorrectorincorrect,”(Yakherds2020,vol.2,p.xxx)

concludingthatsinceallconventionalthingsarefalse,therecanbenostandardof

correctnessintheconventionalworld.

WefinallyarriveatthequestionconcerningtheexpressibilityofthePrāsaṅgika

philosophicalapproach,andsoofthemeaningfulnessofanythingwemightsayabout

reality.Tsongkhapaurgesthatwemustbeabletosaywhatwemeanandtoendorsewhat

wesaywhendoingphilosophy,andthatthemeaningfulnessofthelanguageweusederives

fromtheconventionsthatgovernitsordinaryuse.Taktsang,ontheotherhand,arguesthat

sinceultimaterealitymustbeinexpressible,somustthePrāsaṅgikaposition;thatsince

therearenotruthmakersforourlanguage,andnoconnectionoflanguagetotheworld,itis

ultimatelymeaningless.Allwecandoistotalkaboutwhatpeoplesay;weneversee

throughlanguagetoreality,andwenevertakeourownutterancestobeactualassertions.

Taktsang’sdefenderthe9thKarmapaWangchukDorje(1556-1603)putsthepointthis

way:

In[thePrāsaṅgika]context,unlessapropositionisconsideredfrom

theperspectiveofothers,doublenegationelimination isneveraccepted.

Hence, to deny existence is not to accept nonexistence; to deny

nonexistence is not to accept existence. The law of the excludedmiddle

fails.

Somemight propose the following reductios: “Because others say

that there is aMadhyamakasystem, there is aMadhyamakasystem”;or,

“Because others say that there is karmic causality, there is karmic

causality.” Neither follows. There is no proof of karmic causality, even

thoughothersacceptit.Thisappearstobehowweshouldformulateour

response.

If we grant that karmic causality exists and is a valid principle

accordingtoothers,thenwemayalsosaythatkarmiccausalityaccording

toothersexistsandisavalidprinciple.Doesthekarmiccausalityknown

26

toothersexistornot?Weacceptneither.Doesthekarmiccausalityknown

toothersexistaccordingtoothers?Itdoes.Buttoparsethatproposition

tomeanthatitssubjectistakenas“thekarmiccausalityknowntoothers

accordingtoothers”amountstosophistry.(Yakherds2020,vol,2,p.xxx)

Ihopethatbynowtheextraordinaryparallelsbetweenthesetwophilosophical

debatesregardingtheproperresponsetofoundationalism—despitetheirseparationby

fivecenturiesandamassiveculturaldivide—areapparent.DigṅāgaandDharmakīrti—like

Carnap—proposeanepistemologygroundedindirectperceptualaccesstoparticulars,

individualisticincharacter,andonethatoffersasemantictheorygroundedindirect

referentialrelationsofsingulartermstoindependentlyrealobjects.Knowledgeand

meaningare,ineachcase,vindicatedbyfoundationalism;collectivepracticeisregardedas

thesumofindividualcompetenciesinthisdomain.

TaktsangandTsongkhapa,asQuineandSellarsweretodo,reactedagainstthis

foundationalism.AsQuineandSellarsweretodo,theyeachfocusedonthemerely

conventionalcharacteroflanguageandtheabsenceofanytranscendentontologythat

couldgroundknowledgeandmeaning.AndQuineandSellars,likeTaktsangand

Tsongkhapabeforethem,despitethisbroadagreement,disagreedvehementlyaboutwhat

thisentailed,aboutwhethermodusponensormodustollensrepresentedthecorrect

responsetothispredicament.TaktsangandQuinetookthenegativeroute,concedingthat

anyaccountofknowledgeandmeaningthatisgenuinelynormativemustbetranscendent,

andsorejectingthepossibilityofanormativeepistemologyandoflinguisticmeaning,

settlingforamerelyanthropologicalaccountofepistemicandlinguisticpractice.

TsongkhapaandSellarstookthepositiveroute,arguingthatconventioncould—andindeed

must—groundnormativity,andsoarguingforanaturalisticbutnormativeaccountof

knowledgeandofmeaningthatisconventionalandcoherentist,notfoundationalistin

character.So,whilethereisagreementamongtheprincipalsineachofthesedebatesthat

notranscendentaccountofnormativityispossible,thereissubstantialdisagreementabout

whetherthisdoomsthesearchfornormativitytoutcourt.

27

Reasonablepeoplecandisagreeaboutwhowinstheseparalleldebates.HereIoffer

somewordsindefenseoftheTsongkhapa/Sellarssideoftheargument.Firstofall,we

mustmakesenseoftherolethatnormativityplaysinourlives.Perhapsthemost

significantcharacteristicofoursharedhumanityisourdispositiontoinstitute,to

recognize,toenforce,andtoconformtorules.16Thisistruewhetherthosearerulesforthe

useofwordsthatmakelanguagepossible,rulesforinferencethatmakereasoningpossible,

rulesforconductthatenableustorespectmoralityandthelaw,orrulesoretiquetteand

religiousobservancethatbindusmoretightlyintothecommunitiesthatconstitutethese

rules.Thenormswelivebyarenotsuigeneris,andtheydonotcometousfromany

transcendentalsource.AsCandrakīrtiandHumeeachmakeclear,theyderivefromtheway

thatourbiologicalnatureworksitselfoutinthesocialcontextsforwhichweare

biologicallytuned.Nonetheless,rules,andthenormativitytheyrequireandinduce,are

real,asrealismoney,asrealasgovernments,asrealasthought,thatis,asrealasanything

weencounter.

Anyaccountofourlivesthatdeniestherealityofthenormsthatgovernsthem

thereforedeniesourveryhumanity.Moreover,anyaccountthatdeniestherealityof

meaningortheauthorityoftheargumentsthatestablishthataccountdeniesitsown

cogency.Andanyaccountofexpressibilitythatdeniesthatitisexpressibleisareductioon

itself.Forthesereasons,thepurelyanthropologicalaccountsofournormativelife,andof

languageandepistemologyinparticular,advancedbyTaktsangandQuine,appearsnot

simplywrong,butself-defeating.TsongkhapaandSellars,ontheotherhand,byaffirming

therealityandthebindingcharacterofhumannorms,whilegroundingtheminconvention

managebothtoavoidthefoundationalismthatistheirsharedtarget,togetherwiththe

essentialismthatitentails,whileembracingthenaturalismthatmotivatesit.Theydonot

eliminatenormativity,butshowhowtomakesenseofitasconventionallyreal.Wemight

initiallybalkattheideasthatconventionsthemselvesareonlyconventionallyreal;butthat

regressisvirtuous,notvicious,reflectingthegroundlessrealitythatMadhyamakaaffirms.

Forthesereasons,Tsongkhapa’sandSellars’versionofconventionalismandnaturalism

16SeetheessayscollectedinRoughleyandBayertz(2019)forarangeofdiscussionsoftheroleofnormativityinhumanlifeandofitsbiologicalandsocialbasis.

28

appearstobeamorecogentresponsetoDharmakīrtiandtoCarnapthanthatofTaktsang

andQuine.

5.TibetanModernityRevisited:theDalaiLamaXIVandModernScienceIhavebeenarguingthatthedebateinauguratedbyTaktsang’sattackonTsongkhapa

anticipatesthatbetweenSellarsandQuineinthe20thcentury.But,itisnowtimetoask,is

thisreallyanindicationofmodernityinTibetanphilosophyinthe15thcentury?WasTibet,

indeed,modernavantalettre?Ithinknot,andthereasonsforthisindicateatensionin

Tibetanmodernityeveninthepresent.

Modernity,asInotedabove,comestoEuropeandinfusesphilosophicalthoughtnot

simplythroughtheadvanceoftime,andnotevensimplythroughtheadvanceofideologies

suchasindividualism,rationalism,orsecularity,althoughthesearecriticalcomponentsof

themoderncomplex.Theothercriticalcomponent,Iemphasized,isthedeferenceto

scienceasthearbiterofthefundamentalnatureofreality,astheultimateepistemic

authority.WemightsayfairlythatEuropeanphilosophychosetobemodernwhen

philosopherssidedwithGalileoagainsttheChurchinthecontestforthatepistemic

authority.Therestfollowsfromthat.

ItisnoteworthythatCarnap,Quine,andSellars,despitetheenormousdifferencesin

philosophicaloutlookthatdividethem,sharethiscommitmenttoscientiamensura.Indeed,

eachgroundshisrespectivepositiononanaccountofwhatsciencedemandsordoesnot

demand.ThiscommitmentisnotablyabsentintheworkofDharmakīrti,Tsongkhapa,and

Taktsang.AndnotalkofBuddhist“innerscience,”ofthekindmadepopularbytheworkof

theDalaiLamaXIV(2006,2018)andotherssuchasAllanWallace(2009)canundermine

thisclaim.ForwhileitistruethatBuddhistmeditatorsandadeptsinTibetduringthat

perioddevelopedgreatphilosophicalinsightintothemind,itisnottruethattheydeployed

anythinglikethescientificmethodinthatendeavor.Therearenocontrolledexperiments;

thereisnothird-personstudyofthesephenomena,andnoscientificsuspicionofthe

veridicalityoffirst-personreport.Buddhistphilosophicalapproachestothemind—while

theydoembedadistinctionbetweenatheoreticalandanobservationlanguage,andwhile

theydoappealtotheoreticalentitiestoexplainobservations—donotsubjecttheirtheories

totheteststhatconstitutescience.

29

WecanfairlysaythatmodernityentersTibetanphilosophywiththepresentDalai

Lama’sengagementwithscience,andwithhisexplicitcommitmenttoscientiamensura.He

hasrepeatedlyassertedthatwheresciencecontradictsBuddhistdoctrine,sciencetrumps

Buddhism.Andhispersonalengagementwithandendorsementofsciencehaspercolated

deepintoTibetanacademicculture,asevidencednotonlybytheMindandLifedialogues,

butmoreimportantlybytherecentrevisionsinTibetanmonasticcurriculaspearheadedby

theScienceforMonksprogramjointlyadministeredbyEmoryUniversityandtheLibraryof

TibetanWorksandArchives.Tobesure,theheritageofphilosophicalreflectionhe

inherits,invirtuenotonlyofitssystematicrigor,butalsoinvirtueofitsrecognitionofthe

distinctionbetweenobservationandtheory,anditsattentiontotheimportant

epistemologicalissueswehavescouted,enablesthisventureintomodernity.But

philosophicalmodernityreallyonlyarriveswiththeseriousengagementwithsciencethat

wenowseeintheTibetancommunity.

ThisisnottosaythatTsongkhapaisnotanimportantprecursortothisdeveloping

modernity.Hiscommitmenttoreason,hisinsistenceonthefactthatknowledgeis

discursiveandconceptual,andthatwecanmakesenseoftruth,knowledge,andmeaningin

theordinaryconventionalworld,areallnecessaryingredientsofamodernoutlook,and

indeedarenecessaryprecursorstoscienceitself.Theymakepossibletheengagementwith

sciencethatistransformingTibetanapproachestounderstandingrealitytoday,andthat

usherinagenuineTibetanmodernity.

Butthismodernityisnotyetcomplete.Andparadoxically,itismuchoftherhetoric

about“innerscience”thatstandsinthewayofatruemodernity.Fortoomanyinvolvedin

therapprochementbetweentheTibetanBuddhistworldandthecontemporaryscientific

world—prominentlyincludingtheDalaiLamaXIV—persistintheideathatthemindis

directlyaccessibletoitselfinintrospection,andthevalorizationofwhathasbeencalleda

“firstperson”scienceofconsciousness.Todosoisnotonlyatoddswiththescientific

method,whichdemandsintersubjectivityandwhichtakesseriouslytheideathatall

observationismediatedbypotentialdistortion,butisalso,paradoxically,todisregardthe

adviceofTsongkhapa.FortodosoistosuccumbtotheMythoftheGiventhatheso

astutelyrejectedlongbeforeSellarsnamedit.Itistosuggestthatouraccesstoourinner

30

spaceisconceptuallyunmediated,direct,andpresentsthemindanditspsychological

processestoobservationastheyare,asopposedtoastheyappeartopotentiallyerroneous

introspectiveprocesses.

Toputthepointmostbluntly,ifourgoalistounderstandthenatureofthemind,we

mustpresupposethatwedonotyetdoso.Butifthemindistheveryinstrumentbymeans

ofwhichweinvestigatethemind,wemustconfessthatwehavenoideahowthat

instrumentworks,orhowveridicalitsoutputis:isitthemicroscopethatthosewho

valorizethisapproachclaimittobe,orisitthekaleidoscopeasanyoneconvincedofthe

pervasivenessofcognitiveillusionmustsuspectthatitis?Withoutansweringthis

question,wehavenoreasontobeatallconfidentaboutanyintrospectivemethodologyin

cognitivescience.ThisiswhytheideathatBuddhismhasincorporatedan“innerscience”

formillenniaissoflawed.Asystematicstudyoftheinnerisnotyetascienceoftheinner,

andthattransitionfromphilosophicalreflectiontoscientificstudyisonlyhappeninginthe

lastfewdecades.

PhilosophicalmodernityishenceaworkinprogressintheTibetanworld.Thatis

nottosaythatthereisnoprogress,onlythatmodernityisnotyetfullyhere.Butthe

modernitythatisarriving,wehaveseen,hasveryoldrootsindeed,andemergesinaform

notallthatdifferentfromthatithastakeninWesternphilosophy.

31

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