judgment day: april 12 th 2015 the internet of things: who is in control? johannes b. ullrich, ph.d....
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Judgment Day: April 12th 2015The Internet of Things: Who is in Control?
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.jullrich@sans.edu
@johullrich
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About Me
• Dean of Research, SANS Technology Institute
• SANS Internet Storm Centerhttps://isc.sans.edu
• Created DShield.org• Instructor for SANS• Past: Physicist, Web Developer• Living in Jacksonville, FL
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Are We in Control?
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Quantified Self
Data
Internet of
Things
Devices
Quantified Self: Dawn to Dusk
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Photo: Withings.com
Quantified Self: Dawn to Dusk
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Photo: thevesl.com
Quantified Self: Dawn to Dusk
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Photo: Progressive
Quantified Self: Dawn to Dusk
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Photo: Fitbit
Hello Barbie
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Quantified Self: Dawn to Dusk
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Home / Small Business
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Enterprise Networks
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Municipal/Gov Networks
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The “Internet of Things”
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New Protocols: IPv6
• Easier to Scale then IPv4• Auto configuration• Extensible• Integrated with various Layer 2
options
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New Protocols: 6LoWPAN / IEEE 802.15.4
• IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Network
• Easier network management• Low Power• Low Hardware Requirements• Security
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Risks: New Wireless Protocols
• IEEE 802.15.4 / 6LoWPAN• AES identified as encryption
algorithm• Key Management challenge: Auto
configuration / on-boarding at scale• IPSec (IKEv2) may not work due to
power constraints
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Example: LIFX Light Bulbs
• Light Bulbs communicate via 6LoWPAN with each other (mesh)
• One light bulb acts as router/controller to connect to Wi-Fi (802.11)
• Pre-shared AES key hardcoded. Same for all bulbs
• 6LoWPAN is used to exchange WiFi credentials (which are now at risk)
• Solution: Derive 6LoWPAN key from Wi-Fi Password.
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Risks: New Attack Platforms
• Many devices use customized versions of commodity operating systems (Linux/Windows)
• Wide range of architectures, not just x86
• Embedded systems can even be found inside conventional systems
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SciFi
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Photo: Warner BrothersPhoto: Paramount Pictures
Photo: tailgrab.org
ISC Mission
• Global Network Security Information Sharing Community
• We share fast, ask readers for insight• Expanding diverse sensors for
automatic data collection• Built around DShield platform• Raw data available for others to
analyze
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ISC: The big picture
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ISC Handlers
• Currently about 30 volunteer handlers
• Located worldwide and working in different industries
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How to use our data
• Threat Intelligence– Diaries– IP Address Feeds– Domain Feeds
• Data is free to use for your own network (Creative Commons License)
• Share back!
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Case #1 – Compromised Routers
• E-Mail + phone call from ISP in Wyoming– Affects Linksys E1000/1200– Scanning for Port 80/8080– Latest firmware not affected– Reset of router clears malware
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Case #1: Verification
• Check DShield Logs: No spike in port 80/8080, but they are always busy
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Case #1: Honeypot Data
Seeing “interesting” requests:
GET /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.1Host: a.b.c.d:8080
But nothing else…Something seems to be going on, publishing first “Diary”
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Case #1: Experiment
wget http://routerip/HNAP1/
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/…”><soap:Body><GetDeviceSettingsResponse ... >
<DeviceName>Cisco40033</DeviceName><VendorName>Linksys</VendorName>…<ModelName>E4200</ModelName>…</GetDeviceSettingsResponse></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>
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Case #1: Honeypot
• Setting up a simple Honeypot to simulate router (reply with correct HNAP response)
• Scanning routers now send exploit:POST /tmUnblock.cgi HTTP/1.1Host: [ip of honeypot]:8080Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46JmkxKkBVJDZ4dmNH
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Case #1: The Moon Worm
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Case #1: Challenges
• MIPS Architecture• No common virtual environments
available• Most reverse analysis tools are x86
centric• Exploit requires specific firmware
versions• NO PATCH?!!
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Case #2: Port 5000 Traffic
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Case #2: Compromised DVRs
• Security Camera DVRs• Exposed to Internet for remote
monitoring
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Case #2: Exploit
• Very simple exploit: default username/password (root/12345) used to telnet
• Various binaries copied to DVR– Bitcoin miner– Scanner for Synology Vulnerability– wget / helper tools
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Case #2: Why Vulnerable?
• Simple Password Dialog• Not possible to turn off telnet
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Case #2: Who Did it?
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Case #2: Who did it?
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Case #2: Why Vulnerable?
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Echo File Transfer
echo -ne '\x00\x00\x00\x2f\x00\x00\x00\x1a\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x2a\x00\x00\x00\x1b\x00\x00\x00 \x14\x00\x00\x00' >> /var/run/rand0-btcminer-arm && echo -e '\x64\x6f\x6e\x65'
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Case #3: Synology Disk Stations
• Vulnerable web based admin interface• Exposed on port 5000• Allows remote code execution• Exploited before patch
became available• Difficult to patch devices
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Case #3: Synology Vulnerability History
• CVE-2014-2264: Hardcoded VPN Password
• CVE-2013-6955: webman vulnerability allows appending to arbitrary files
• CVE-2013-6987: read/write/delete files via directory traversal
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Case #3: Iowa State Breach
• Iowa State stored student data including SSNs on Synology devices
• Devices got breached by Bitcoin miner campaign
• 5 devices breached• 29,780 SSNs exposed
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Case #3: Continuation … Synolocker
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https://www.facebook.com/events/birthdays?extra_data%5Bstart_date%5D=2015%2F04%2F11
Case #4: Handheld Inventory Scanners
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Case #4: Targeted Attack
• 12 of 40 scanners delivered to a robotics/logistic company came with malware pre-installed
• Malware attacked network “from the inside”
• Targeting accounting systems• Exfiltrating data• Firmware downloaded from
manufacturer site was infected as well
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Case #4: Malware Details
• Scanner runs Windows XP Embedded• Malware only detected due to
network monitoring• Not possible to install standard AV or
Whitelist tools on scanner
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Defensive Strategies
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We need solutions that scale!
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Network Segmentation
• Target: Air Conditioner network not sufficiently segmented, allowed for breach of “business” network.
• How many segments can we manage?• Do all devices fit into the same
segment?• How do they talk to the rest of the
network?
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Onboarding Devices
• Accounting for devices / inventory• Configuring security parameters
(passwords, keys)• Establishing baseline configuration• Develop/Procure tools to provision
devices at scale securely
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Patching
• How are patches distributed / validated?
• Can automatic patching be used?• Centralized patch management
solutions?• Inventory/Onboarding first. Needs to
integrate with Patching
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Logging / Monitoring
• What logs to collect and how?• Flooded by meaningless logs?• Setup “satellite collectors” that
aggregate and pre-filter before sending to central log management system
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Solution 1: Don’t buy crap
• Ask the right questions before purchasing devices:– Onboarding tools?– Logging standards?– Support contracts?
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Solution 2: Scalable & Repeatable Processes
• Take what you learned from your desktop/server environment
• Automation!
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Conclusion
Are we still in control?
Probably not… but not clear who is in control… the machines? The cloud? The miscreant pw0ning your machines?
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Thanks!
Questions?jullrich@sans.edu
http://isc.sans.edu
Daily Updates * Daily Podcast * Data FeedsTwitter: @johullrich / @sans_isc
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