james r. hoffa and his trucking triumph

AI~THUR A. SLOANE

JAMES R. HOFFA and His Trucking Triumph 25

I t will be some time before one can say whether or not the two 1964 convictions

of James R. Hoffa have ushered in the twi- light of a career. Possibly two years will elapse before either of the jail sentences re- cently imposed upon the Teamster president (eight years for jury tampering and up to five years for defrauding a pension fund) has been fully appealed and final judgment rendered. Meanwhile, despite small-scale and abortive internal revolts, the Teamster leader has continued very much in control of his union. Most notably, Hoffa still exer- cises firm and highly personalized control in the sector of the economy that constitutes

Mr. Sloane is Assistant Professor of Business Ad- ministration in the School of Business, Indiana University.

the largest single provider of Teamster jobs -over-the-road trucking.

This article is only tangentially concerned with Hoffa's current position, however. It focuses instead on a major but almost for- gotten triumph that the controversial union president achieved in January, just weeks before his first conviction-the consumma- tion of what has generally been referred to as a "nationwide" trucking agreement. More specifically, it attempts to explain how Hoffa, in the face of both a strong tradition of local government within the Teamsters union and the abiding opposition of many employers to either areawide or national bargaining, was able to succeed in this project.

Technically, the new contract, which is scheduled to remain in effect until April 1,

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1967, is not nationwide. Teamster drivers in southern New England (where a contract negotiated in 1961 does not expire until 1967), Virginia, Chicago, and five of the fourteen New York City locals will not have even their basic conditions of employment governed by the January agreement. More- over, the master contract neither covers all negotiated working conditions nor elimi- nates all area wage and benefit differentials. In addition, Hoffa's widening of the scope of the bargaining unit-wlth the power simul- taneously falling into his hands-has left a few once powerful Teamster local leaders extremely bitter and potentially rebellious. Anti-Hoffa sentiments are quite noticeable in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Philadelphia; in New York City and Chi- cago, Hoffa's inability to achieve complete absorption of the local contracts speaks for itselL

Nonetheless, the January agreement, which covers not only most over-the-road employees but almost all local cartage com- pany workers, dramatically symbolizes the culmination of a project that Hoffa had em- barked upon twenty-four years earlier. Ever since his rise to a position of power within the Teamsters, Hoffa had steadily devel- oped the mechanism of the areawide truck- ing agreement. As chief bargainer for the Midwestern over-the-road drivers since 1940, he had regularly negotiated more intraregional uniformity into the single Cen- tral States contract that he had inherited. He achieved even more notable success in 1955 when he closely tied the terms of the existing Southeastern and Southwestern road contracts to the Central States contract; in effect, road drivers in twenty-three states thereafter worked under a single uniform rate contract.

Along the East and West Coasts, too, it was Hoffa who converted the myriad agree- ments into a handful of relatively uniform ones. When Dave Beck made his inglorious exit from the Teamster general presidency in 1957, 35 road contracts remained in his old West Coast domain. As Beek's successor,

Hoffa replaced these the following year with a single master contract that paralleled the Central States document in many aspects. In addition, Hoffa had been working closely with the Eastern Conference of Teamsters since its creation in 1953. As Beck's special assistant, he had taken the lead in consoli- dating the East's 103 contracts into 23 by the time he succeeded Beck. By 1961, only 16 of these contracts remained.

Clearly, the controversial Hoffa has regis- tered an amazing performance. One close observer of trucking labor relations has re- ferred to Hoffa's January success as a "miracle." This paper attempts to explain the miracle by summarizing and analyzing information provided by approximately two hundred field interviews-including visits with truckers, employer association staff members, Teamster officials, rank-and-file union members, lawyers, government offi- cials, and educators. 1 Although the bulk of the research was concluded before the Janu- ary contract was signed and before either of Hoffa's convictions, the basic conclusions re- main unchanged for two reasons. First, the over-the-road parties had anticipated the broad outlines of the new contract long before it was officially negotiated. Second, Hoffa's alleged criminality has been ger- mane to any evaluation of him for almost a decade now; most opinions of the Teamster leader do not appear to have been greatly changed by the lower court decisions.

H O W HAS H E D O N E I T ?

Hoffa's miracle does not seem to have been achieved through the use of any single de- vice. Rather, according to most of those

1 These individuals, located in eight cities from Boston to San Francisco, were generally selected for their experience and reputations. However, sev- eral people who were known to the writer only as advocates of minority viewpoints were also inter- viewed. In addition, a wide variety of written ma- terial was inspected prior to the interviews, particu- larly past and present labor contracts, minutes of Teamster and employer meetings, government docu- ments, and official union and employer journals.

BUSINESS HORIZONS

JAMES lq. ttOFFA AND tIIS TRUCKING TRIUMPH

interviewed, it has stemmed from five fac- tors: (1) the persona/ populari ty of the Teamster president with his membership; (2) the respect in which Hoffa has been held by employers who have dealt with him personally; (3) powers granted to him by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters constitution; (4) certain terms that he has been able to insert into renegotiated con- tracts over the past few years, allowing him to pave the way for future uniformity and contract consolidation; and (5) the logical grounds for the program afforded by the economies of the trucking industry and, ironically, by the restrictions imposed upon all unions by federal legislation.

POPULARITY W I T H H I S MEMBERSHIP

Except for the few remaining outposts of anti-Hoffa Teamsters, the general president has been extremely popular with his rank and file, although the general public be- lieves that he has maintained his leadership only through rigged elections and the like. There are several plausible explanations for this situation.

Accessibility Hoffa has been quoted as saying of his predecessor:

"Beck was an iceberg. Very cold. He didn't visit the local unions . . . . I saw Beck come into Chicago once: he got off the plane, and two cars picked him up and he swung over to the hotel. [As] he walked through the lobby, he'd say 'Hi fella.' [Then] he went up to his room and stayed there till everything was ready. Then he came bustin' in, up on the platform and made a tremendous speech, got down, walked through the crowd, 'Hi fe l la . ' . . . Hi fella what? You go to, hell-if you don't know my name I don't wanta talk to you. You at least got to know who came to your meeting. ''2

Hoffa is just the opposite, and the differ- ence is appreciated by his constituents. Probably only one-third of his working time is spent at the International building in Washington. He spends the rest of his time on the road addressing mass meetings, join- ing the rank and file on picket lines, touring

new terminals, and taking a turn behind the wheel of new equipment. Says one of his close advisers, who has accompanied him on many of these trips:

"Hoffa is very accessible. He loves direct con- tact with people, especially his own people. And you can sense the genuine admiration of the truck driver for him because of this. He has never separated himself from die working Teamster. He knows everybody's name and, at least in a general way, everybody's problems. If he's a politician at all, he's one in a good sense of the word."

Nor is anyone who knows the man very cynical about the following invitation, quoted here from his presidential accept- ance speech at the 1961 convention but con- tinually repeated:

"Sterling 3-0525 and Sterling 3-0670 has been there for four years. Those telephone num- bers will be there the next five, and If I am not on the other end [my office staff] will know where I am, and for the sake of a second call, you will be able to have my services around the clock as you have had in the past, ''3

"Around the clock" is to be taken literally. Hoffa's regular workday begins at 8 a.m. and is rarely over until 2 a.m. or later; he fre- quently works through the night.

A qualified Teamster staff official says, "This union is Jim's whole life. And this is the major secret of his popularity among those who know him."

Background Hoffa's earlier days were not easy ones (in marked contrast with the histories of many labor leaders), and he has not let his membership forget this. This point may appear to be of little value in ex- plaining the Teamster president's popu- larity. In the opinion of informed observers, however, the mT lower echelons attach so much importance to the personal histories of their leaders that the many Hoffa lieu- tenants who have not at one time been either

2 John Bartlow Martin, "The Making of a Labor Boss," The Saturday Evening Post (July 4, 1959), p. 53.

3 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Pro- ceedings of the 18th Convention, 1961, p. 51.

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truck drivers or warehousemen have been eliminated from consideration as successors to Hoffa for this reason alone.

When Hoffa was seven years old, his coal- driller father died, reportedly a victim of coal-dust poisoning. Young Jimmy helped to provide for his mother, two sisters, and brother in Indiana mining towns and, after 1925, when he was twelve years old, in De- troit. According to. his official biography, the future IBT leader "finished the ninth grade" in Detroit and "never went back to school again. "* Hoffa himself, on the other hand, claims just seven school grades, insisting that the two other grades exist only in the mind of "some sharp public relations man, trying to make me look educated."

At seventeen, Hoffa took a job loading boxcars with produce at Detroit's Kroger warehouse for 32 cents per hour. He was paid only for hours actually worked, so his workday depended upon the vagaries of business demand, The following year, he led his fellow workers out on strike just as a load of strawberries came in. The company, confronted with the loss of its perishable fruit, gave in; the strikers received a labor contract containing a small pay increase, im- proved working conditions, and an insur- ance plan.

During the next nine years, which culmi- nated in his appointment as negotiating chairman of the Central States Drivers Council in 1940, Hoffa was very much ex- posed to the violence of Detroit's labor rela- tions. Following the Kroger strike, he had received an AFL federal local charter for his warehouse local, and in the next two years the Teamsters had also granted him charters for two debt-ridden Detroit locals. But to maintain and enlarge his holdings he was forced to fight it out with what he calls "hired thugs who were out to get us." In describing these days, Hoffa has said:

"Our cars were bombed out. Three different times, someone broke into the office and de- stroyed our furniture. Cars would crowd us off the streets. Then it got worse.

The Name is Hoffa (St. Louis: Teamsters Joint Council 13, April, 1956), p. 17.

" . . . Brother, your life was in your hands every day. There was only one way to survive- fight back. And we used to slug it out on the streets. They found out we didn't scare . . . . -5

Hoffa feels that this kind of background is an asset in what is still a union of tough- minded individualists, and he has frequently capitalized on it. A reprinted portion of his March, 1962 address to the Eastern Confer- ence is symbolic: "I was brought up on the street and nobody is going to make me squirm, wiggle, twist or turn- to hell with them. [The audience arose and ap- plauded.] "6

"Bread-and-Butter" Gratitude Not to be overlooked in explaining the IBT general president's popularity is, of course, his demonstrated negotiation performance. In- deed, it is logical to assume that Hoffa's patent accessibility and his now useful early struggles still have to be supplemented by proven performance in order to ensure his popularity.

The extremely favorable contracts that Hoffa has been executing since 1940 are fie- quently compared, in widely circulated pub- lications of the International, to the Central States Drivers Council Agreement of 1938. This agreement contained no provisions for fringe benefits and said nothing of worth to the union on job security, subcontracting, or new methods and equipment. Its $.0275 mileage and $.75 hourly rates were a little over one-quarter of the current amounts. Moreover, since use of the Central States pattern had not as yet extended beyond the Midwest, employers were frequently mov- ing their bases of operations to lower paying areas.

Table I indicates only the wage rate gains achieved in the central states since 1940. These have been paralleled by progress in the nonwage contractual fields and, of course, in other geographic areas. The Janu-

5 The Name is Hoffa, pp. 19-20. 6 Eastern Conference of Teamsters, An Address

Delivered by James R. Hoffa, General President, IBT, to the Eastern Conference of Teamsters, 6th Area Conference, March 13, 1962, p. 10.

BUSINESS HORIZONS

.)'AMES B., ttOFFA. AND HIS TRUCKING TRIUMPH

TABLE 1

Over-the-Road Mileage and Hourly Rates, Central States Area Agreements, 1940-63

Single-Axle Tandem-Axle Units Units (4 axles) Regular Run

Year (cents/mile) (cents/mile) (rate/hour) 1940 3.0 -- $0.80 1941 3.4 -- .90 1943 3.7 -- .97 1944 3.75 -- .97 1945 4.0 4.25 1.02 1946 4.5 4.75 1.17 1947 5.0 5.25 1.32 1948 5.5 5.75 1.47 1949 5.75 6.0 1.55 1951 5.875 6.125 1.60 1952 6.625 6.875 1.79 1953 6.925 7.175 1.875 1954 7.2 7.45 1.97 1955 7.45 7.7 2.07 1956 7.75 8.025 2.18 1957 8.2 8.45 2.33 1958 8.52 8.725 2.46 1959 8.825 9.075 2.55 1960 9.175 9.425 2.66 1961 9.425 9.675 2.76 1962 9.675 9.925 2.84 1963 9.925 10.175 2.94

SOURCE: Jacob Seidenberg, Evolution of the Current Pay Practices and Fringe Benefits in the Over-the-Road Motor Freight Industry, in Report of the Presidential Railroad Commission, Appendix to Volume IV, Washington (Febru- ary, 1962), p. 57.

ary, 1964 contract further increased the rates by $.0025 per mile and roughly $.10 per hour for each of the next three years.

The broadcasting of such results does more than abet the mT president's standing with his membership; it directly strengthens support for the areawide ( and, now, nation- wide) bargaining mechanism, since Hoffa can point out, as he frequently does, that such benefits would probably never have been realized without the widened bargain- ing scope.

In addition, the bread-and-butter grati- tude of his membership probably accounts considerably for the fact that Hoffa's legal problems do not appear to have decreased his popularity. Again and again, in the course of this study, the writer encountered such remarks as, "Jimmy's always been good to us drivers and that's all we care about," and "Everyone has a little bit of the cheater in him. It's just that they're making a scape- goat out of Hoffa because he's been such a successful labor leader."

O t h e r Fac to r s Certain other theories have also been advanced to explain Hoffa's high and continuing popularity with his membership. Some analysts have stated that he has skillfully converted the widespread attacks on his personal conduct into attacks on all Teamsters ("Well now, you know and I know that Jimmy Hoffa is nothing-just a name, just an individual. So when [John F. Kennedy] talks about [me], he talks about destroying the entire Teamsters Union").7 They argue that the truck driver, in particu- lar, is apt to identify more closely with his union than other classes of workers since he is free from the confines of the plant. At least for the driver, say these theorists, verbal assaults on the Teamster leadership are fighting words.

Others point to some of Hoffa's com- mendable living habits, ironic in view of the quite unenviable allegations levied at his personal behavior in other areas. He neither drinks nor smokes, is a devoted husband and father, and lives in an unimposing Detroit residence for which he reportedly paid $6,800 in 1939. Still others explain Hoffa's success with his membership by citing his persuasive oratorical powers. (However, it must be pointed out that the unpopular Beck was also a convincing public speaker. ) Says one New York Teamster leader, who has as yet resisted Hoffa's attempts to in- clude his local in any kind of an areawide agreement:

"I've been reelected to the presidency of this local many times without a defeat, but Hoffa could outsell me to the membership on the question of local-versus-area-or-national con- tract. He can outsell anybody! He's a spell- binder with the rank and file-a charmer."

Whatever the explanation, Hoffa has al- most always been able to count on consider- able grass roots support when confronted with opposition from the recalcitrant local autonomists among his business agents. His consequent by-passing of their authority has recently occurred in several places-notably

r International Teamster ( February, 1959 ), p. 5.

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in southern New England ( although he has allowed the separate contract to continue there) and in parts of the Middle Atlantic states. In other sections of the East and along the West Coast as well, he has merely had to threaten leaders of the erstwhile local fiefdoms with such action to win his points.

REPUTATION WITH EMPLOYERS

One of the great paradoxes of trucking labor re la t ions- in view of both Hoffa's demand- ing contracts and his public image- i s that the Teamster president has been much re- spected by most trucking managements for his qualities as a labor leader. This is not to imply that he has not made enemies in the ranks of management; the writer uncovered several inveterate ones, and there are un- doubtedly many more. From all available evidence, however, these are in the minority among the truckers who know Hoffa.

The following representative sampling of comments comes from employers who (1) enjoy excellent reputations within the indus- try, (2) have known Hoffa intimately both as a bargaining table adversary and in activities related to contract administration, and (3) spoke, in the writer's opinion, quite frankly ( their freely given opinions of other Teamsters, for example, were generally far less favorable than those relating to the mT leader) .

From the vice-president of a large carrier based in the central states:

"James R. Hoffa has many o~ the character- istics of the founders of our country: great per- sonal and physical courage, boundless energy. �9 . . He has one of the keenest minds of anyone I've ever met . . . . He's tough both tactically and emotionally. But he honors his contract immaculately, even to the point of placing him- self in political jeopardy. He has withstood a huge personality crusade against him in the last few years better than almost any other man could have. He's affable, almost hypnotic (you have to watch out for this in negotiations) and a hard worker . . . . Has a great memory for names, faces and associations. A master psy- chologist, also."

The opinion of a co-owner of a medinm- sized New England company:

"He's an extremely intelligent man, the smartest guy I know. He's very fair in most re- spects, demands a fair day's work for a fair day's pay as much as any employer and knows the over-an industry better than anybody. He wants no more than any other union leader (less than many, like Walter Reuther) because of his great intelligence and knowledge of the indus- try's problems. But sometimes he's politically not in a position to curb his demands: any labor leader must look to his constituents for his goals.

"I disagree with him on some things, but I admire him tremendously and like him very much . . . . He's actually a genius."

From the labor relations director of a large carrier, operating in both the western and central states:

"Hoffa is more of a man than the general public gives him credit for being. He under- stands the trucking industry better than any other union official. He may ramrod his actions through, but he's been quite influential in pro- tecting the industry . . . . He's tops-a great statesman."

And, finally, the thoughts of the president of a smaller, Chicago-based company:

"My opinion of Hoffa is very high . . . . He has no real weaknesses, except that he's apt to fly off the handle pretty quickly�9 It would be al- most impossible to have a better negotiator than he is. He's like an elephant with his memory- it's beyond belief. He's sharp as a tack . . . and he'll always listen to reason. He remains an ability-to-pay man. He knows just how far he can go and he won't jeopardize the goose that lays the golden egg, which is the trucking indus- try."

These men and most of their counterparts from the dozens of other companies inter- viewed added that Hoffa has never been anything but honest in his dealings with t h e m - e v e n "too conscientious [laughter]."

This respect has greatly helped Hoffa implement his system of master contracts with uniform provisions. The larger carriers, generally speaking, have always favored such an arrangement anyway; its stability works against the cost-cutting practices of the smaller trucking operators, and the strong union provides effective policing actions. In addition, many of these truck- ers have felt that the broader unit can strengthen managements even more than the union by forcing the highly competitive

BUSINESS HORIZONS

J A M E S R. H O F F A AND I-IIS TRUCKING T R I U M P H

and often mutually suspicious carriers into a more united front in labor negotiations. To them, therefore, the caliber of the man who holds most of the consolidated power on the union side constitutes only a further reason for supporting his goal.

The thousands of small trucking com- panies, which had at least some say under the old local bargaining systems, have never believed that these advantages outweighed their loss of labor relations participation. Moreover, they have felt that what Hoffa has really wanted is akin to, in the words of one small-company owner, "the U.S. Army trying to make one size of uniform for all of its men. It would do irreparable damage."

However, even these smaller companies, in the months immediately preceding Janu- ary, 1964, appeared to be recognizing the advantages of allowing union authority to concentrate in the hands of a reputedly com- petent leader-as opposed to seeing their locals controlled by Teamsters whose abili- ties have varied widely and have rarely reached Hoffa's level. In coming to this con- clusion, nonetheless, they assumed that what they have been hearing of Hoffa's consider- ation for special local conditions would continue.

This last point deserves particular elabo- ration. There is ample evidence that Hoffa has been willing to recognize particular eco- nomic circumstances by granting relief from his master contracts. The international offi- cers are tight-lipped on the subject of such local deviations. Hoffa came under attack from the McClellan committee for allegedly altering contractual terms in favor of truck- ing managements for personal monetary re- ward. There is widespread feeling in the industry that the recent amendments, at least, have been fully aboveboard, but this fact has not increased his or his staff's will- ingness to speak about them.

A second qualification must also be in- serted. It is far too early to assess the degree of deviation that Hoffa would allow partici- pants in his current contract, assuming that he stays in office. By and large, past compro- mises have been worked out over the period of the agreements, and this could be ex-

pected to hold true in the 1964-67 period. It can, at this point, be stated only that most employers feel certain that Hoffa would maintain his use of the local "rider" indefi- nitely and would be guided predominantly by sound economic considerations. And these considerations, for the foreseeable future at any rate, do not indicate that the drivers of bankrupted companies would be hired by other Teamster-organized units. Rather, say these employers, there is an ex- cellent chance that the railroads, non- Teamster private carriers, and other forms of competition would absorb the freight business. Whether or not these managers are correct, Hoffa's demonstrated willingness to compromise has doubtless been given great weight by many truckers in assessing both the desirability of a widened bargaining scope and James R. Hoffa himself.

Exemplifying Hoffa's most recent devi- ations are three types that were rather freely granted under the 1961-64 Central States Over-the-Road Agreement. Since Hoffa has traditionally used the Central States docu- ment as his "pattern," the use of riders here has been of more than passing interest. Only a few examples of each type will be de- scribed.

First, some riders have been based on geographic handicaps. For example, com- panies in South Dakota operate under con- ditions that are unknown in most of the country. The state's sparse population and its general absence of centralized manufac- turing activity mean that the carriers must sometimes all but beat the bushes for a pound of freight. The all important backhaul is less easily obtained. In addition, second- ary roads are often inadequate, and the winter weather is rigorous. Because of these obstacles, truckers were generally granted for their South Dakota operations less expensive terms than those imposed by the Central States agreement.

Under the so-called Iowa 75-Mile Rider, all drivers operating wholly within that sparsely settled state were paid on an hourly basis for runs within 75 miles of their home terminal. This inevitably was less costly for

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the employer than the alternative guarantee system, It was, in addition, widely believed that employers in Nebraska, North Dakota, and other relatively unprofitable agricultural areas who could not pay the union scale were generally given dispensation when they requested it from Hoffa.

Second, riders for individual companies have been based on financial considerations. In late 1963 well over 150 such riders were attached to the 1961-64 Central States mas- ter agreement, and new ones were granted regularly by the quarterly meetings of the Joint Area Committee's subcommittee on change of operations. The actions of this body, normally composed of three employer and three union representatives, were sub- ject to the approval of the parent committee in whose deliberations Hoffa played and continues to play a dominant role.

At one of its 1961-64 meetings, the sub- committee approved seven rider requests involving over-the-road companies and de- nied only one. Among those approved was one from a company operating straight trucks and paying a mileage rate of $.0875 cents to their drivers. The company pointed out that the Central States agreement did not provide for straight trucks and that it could not possibly pay the higher semitrailer mileage rates. It therefore requested that the $.0875 cent rate remain in force.

Another petitioner sought successfully to eliminate premium pay for special types of runs. If he could not obtain this relief, it was argued, he would not only be forced out of business but a nonunion freight line would take over his customers. He provided the subcommittee with a financial statement to support his claim of adverse financial condi- tion. On the other hand, a request embody- ing greater pickup and delivery flexibility was denied. No special reason for the de- sired dispensation was presented to the sub- committee in the written petition.

A third group of riders has been based on the product handled. The exclusion of cer- tain types of freight from the master con- tract possibly has more implications than do the previous types of deviations listed, in

view not only of this rider's geographic scope and number of employers covered but also of its recently accelerated use. The transpor- tation of iron, steel, and many perishable commodities, once considered over-the-road operation by the union, was by late 1963 commonly covered by separate downward riders. These types of freight are low rated and not particularly profitable; they most frequently allow just one-way hauls and re- sult in the kind of abnormal layover that neither the drivers nor the company con- trois.

The last Central States contract had from its 1961 inception a rather lengthy adden- dum applicable to carriers "engaged pre- dominantly in or [having] special divisions for the transportation of" iron and steel arti- cles, and certain other similar "special com- modities" such as gypsum, clay, asbestos, and "edible perishable commodities as de- fined by the icc." This supplement was less demanding of the companies than was the master contract in several areas. In case of breakdowns or impassable highways, drivers were to receive the hourly rate only after the ninth hour. Pickup and delivery limita- tions were less restrictive. Most important, the addendum provided that all drivers would be paid for their normal duties on a percentage of gross revenue basis, the wages to be no less than 23 per cent of gross reve- nue.

The majority of the other master contracts also have increasingly allowed special down- ward treatment for steel and similar com- modity operations, although nowhere have the substituted conditions seemed to be as radically downward as in the Central States. Most runs of U.S. mail, likewise a low-rated commodity that does not readily lend itself to backhauls, have also been accorded less stringent contract terms in recent years. Here, however, the dominant method has not been the "industrywide-within-regions" type of addendum, but separate riders for individual companies.

In all fairness, it must be pointed out that some trucking managers feel that Hoffa is still pursuing complete national uniformity on the theory that, even if companies are

BUSINESS HORIZONS

JAMES R. HOFFA AND HIS TRUCKING TRIUMPH

bankrupted in the process, their business will be absorbed by financially stronger car- riers and their drivers will continue to be Teamsters. They declare that all of the devi- ation types have been "temporarily" forced upon Hoffa by tactical necessities. For example, they charge, these downward re- visions have allowed Hoffa to play favorites among individual companies (or groups of companies ) in an attempt to win over allies in what is still his transitional period from localism to nationalism. This opinion, which can be neither proved nor disproved, is definitely a mino~ty one.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Under the IBT constitution, two traditional devices for strengthening the position of the union president have been available to Hoffa: power of the purse and patronage. "Jimmy takes care of his friends" is a maxim widely circulated within the IBT, and pro- Hoffa Teamsters appear to have been amply rewarded.

Several Hoffa supporters who have lost their local elections have, for example, re- cently been made international representa- tives and are said to receive anywhere from $15,000 to $20,000 per year plus generous travel allowances. Anthony (Tony) Proven- zano and Frank Fitzsimmons (Teamster leaders in New Jersey and Michigan, re- spectively, and firm backers of Hoffa's widened bargaining scope program,) were elected to international vice-presidencies three years ago because of Hoffa's strong support. Roy Williams, also loyal to the gen- eral president and his policies, was ap- pointed to the crucial chairmanship of the Central States Drivers Council in the sum- mer of 1961. And Murray W. (Dusty) Miller and Thomas E. Flynn continue as chairmen of the Southern and Eastern Conferences, respectively, in recognition of their devotion to Hoffa.

The general president's other major con- stitutional powers are equally extensive. Particularly relevant here is his control of the union's press. The pages of the monthly

journal and other publications are saturated with such articles as "Area Agreements: What They Mean to Teamsters" and "Na- tional Over-the-Road Survey Proves Need for Single National Master Contract." Many of Hoffa's speeches on the subjects are also reprinted. And, just in case these have failed to catch the reader's eye, they are often re- produced and circulated to the membership free of charge.

Hoffa can also constitutionally use his office to impose trusteeships on local unions if, for example, they are "being conducted in such a manner as to jeopardize the inter- ests of the International Union." He has thus far done this sparingly. The IBT was attacked by governmental investigators for apparent overuse of the trusteeship device for purely political reasons in the later months of the Beck regime, and the strict controls more recently imposed by the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 must also be reckoned with. However, the leverage pro- vided Hoffa by this trusteeship clause re- mains.

A new instrument that can be even more important to the remaining mx holdouts is the first sentence of Section 4 (a) of the con- stitution's Article XVI, added to the docu- ment at the 1961 convention: "If a majority of the affiliated Local Unions vote for area negotiations for an area contract, all affili- ated Local Unions shall be bound by such vote, must participate in such area bargain- ing and shall be bound by the area contract approved."

In the opinion of one of Hoffa's top- ranking assistants, the general president can still do nothing constitutionally to enroll the few remaining local unions that are still out- side a major area agreement. However, this analyst adds, "Once a local does join such an agreement, it would seem to be wedded to it for life."

CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS

A method frequently used by Hoffa before last January to achieve Central States uni- formity for other contracts was the explicit provision in these contracts for the gradual

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narrowing of economic differentials. He had been using this device, a compromise that both recognizes local economics and makes his program more palatable to his local antagonists, for years. His 1952-54 South- eastern contract, for example, contained a $.19 hourly differential from the Central States rate; in 1953 the scheduled variance became 8.13, and in 1954 it was reduced to $.07. There was, as cited, no differential after 1955, and this was also true of the other economic areas in the Southeastern contract, although not of such noneconomic ones as seniority and discipline.

One of the many more recent examples is the 1961 New England Freight Agreement. For years its rates had been lower than in the Midwest. In eari~ 1961 the hourly rate stood, at $2A~I ~n :ebnr the Central States 82.66. The April, 1961 renegotiation saw the economic portion of the contract almost completely rewritten to bring it in line with the Central States pattern by the sixth year. The $.58 hourly wage rate increase was ap- portioned as follows:

Effective April 11, 1961 ........... 10r Oct. 11, 1961 . . . . . . . . 5r April 11, 1962 ............ 8r Oct. 11, 1962 . . . . . . 5r April 11, 1963 ............ 10r Oct. 11, 1963 . . . . . . 5r April 11, 1964 ............ 5r April 11, 1965 .......... 5r April 11, 1966 ............ 5r

Total 58r

Since all contracts outside New England were to expire in 1964, the 1961 New Eng- land parties further agreed that "any amend- ment or changes relating to money and cost factors" that might be negotiated by the parties to the Central States Agreement for the period beginning Feb. 1, 1964 (when the former Midwestern contract was sched- uled to lapse) would automatically apply to the New England agreement.

The noneconomic provisions have been less gradually introduced. Particularly in the past two rounds of negotiations, such Cen- tral States clauses as those relating to sub- contracting, secondary boycotts, and union

security have been inserted verbatim into the bulk of the other contracts. However, one of these has also had major implications for the Hoffa program. All contracts rene- gotiated in 1960-61, the twenty that re- mained in effect until 1964, included an un- precedented provision concerning a national agreement. In it, the signatories pledged acceptance of the "principlC' of a national over-the-road contract and promised, on written notice from the union at least ninety days before the termination date of each current agreement, to "enter into negoti- ations for the purpose of negotiating such National Agreement." The final sentence of this article added, however, that "nothing herein contained shall be construed as re- quiring any party hereto to be committed to a policy of complete uniformity in all mat- ters which are covered by such National Agreement."

THE APPARENT LOGIC OF HOFFA ARGUMENTS

Notwithstanding Hoffa's popularity, the respect of employers, and the constitutional and contractual weapons at his disposal, it is quite possible that he still could not have implemented his present bargaining ar- rangements without rational arguments for them. The motivations that have led many employers to support his goals, ignoring for the moment the bargaining strength of the union, have already been discussed.

For internal Teamster consumption, Hoffa has used both economic and legal reasons. In the economic sphere, he has continually drawn on several arguments. First, agree- ments of a broader scope help to conteract the growing size (and, as a normal conse- quence, the growing resources) of the indi- vidual carriers. Smaller local unions no longer need to attempt to deal with com- panies that have merged, unilaterally aug- mented their routes, or otherwise increased their strength. Second, companies no longer need to move from high to lower-wage cen- ters, at least on the grounds of wage differ- entials. The mileage and hourly rate stand-

BUSINESS HORIZONS

JAMES H, HOFFA AND HIS TRUCK/NO T ~ H

ardization thus strengthens the job security of all workers and eliminates inequities of different rates of pay for identical work.

Third, the pooling of pension and welfare funds allowed by the areawide mechanism leads to more economical operation and, therefore, to increased benefits. Fourth, the stability afforded trucking managements under the broader agreements means a healthier industry, a situation that would necessarily benefit the workers. Hoffa has said:

"We're making every company compete strictly on one level: service. And our bringing this about has already led to great improve- ments for the carriers and our members. The companies have brought in new equipment, built new terminals and introduced new oper- at-ions that they never would have thought of otherwise."

Hoffa has also been disposed to use two law-related reasons. He has pointed out that the secondary boycott and "hot cargo" pro- visions of Landrum-Griflln force the mr into areawide (and, now, national) bargaining mechanisms. Only under the widest possible bargaining system does the union no longer have to worry about illegality in these areas, for all strikes can then be considered "pri- mary" ones. Hoffa freely used this same argument long before the adoption of the new labor law, and for "Landrum-Grittln," at least insofar as the secondary boycott was concerned, one could read "Taft-Hartley" before 1959. The only difference would seem to be that the Teamster leader is now using Landrum-Griflln's strictures to justify pri- marily a nationwide contract, where the older law served him exclusively as a vehicle for demanding the regional agreements.

In addition, Hoffa argues that employers, emboldened by Landrum-Griffln and also by the anti-Teamster "vendetta" being staged by the U.S. Department of Justice, are showing more muscle in their labor rela- tions. The Teamsters must, therefore, fight back through the area and national arrange- ments.

Hoffa's detractors assert that none of these professed reasons constitutes the true ex-

planation for his steadfast espousal of wider bargaining. While these critics admit that all of the arguments may be plausible to Hoffa's audiences (albeit not necessarily valid), they feel that the true motivation behind the Teamster president's program has been an insatiable appetite for personal power. "At least Beck just stole money," says one of these detractors. "Hoffa has usurped everybody's authority and now all the deci- sions in contract negotiation and administra- tion are made solely by him. ~

If the general public tends to view Jimmy Hoffa as something of a cross be- tween A1 Capone and Prince Machiavelli, this evaluation is not shared by those most familiar with Hoffa's activities in over-the- road trucking. From the latter source emerges the picture of a hard-driving labor leader who possesses considerable collective bargaining ability and who has been respon- sive to the needs of his membership while attempting to act in the best interests of the industry.

In transforming the general presidency into a position of control by widening the scope of the bargaining units and placing the mT international organization at the head of the union's structure, Hoffa has been greatly aided by his reputation. He has been able to capitalize upon his resulting popularity with the vast majority of the Teamster rank and file.

In addition, Hoffa's success has been due to the respect in which he has been held by the majority of the industry's managers and to their support of his program. Notwith- standing the chief Teamster's public image, the opinions of him that were offered by truckers in the course of this study could hardly be more favorable. Admittedly, em- ployer antagonism would by itself be no great cause for concern to the general presi- dent in view of the relative bargaining im- potence of the highly divided and mutually suspicious truckers. It is equally true, how- ever, that the operators could-in subarea and now subnational groups-align them-

35

F A L L . 1964

AnTntrn A. SLOArrE

36

selves on the side of Hoffa's various local union opponents ff they were so inclined, and could exercise constraint on Hoffa's actions. To the writer, this pro-Hoffa bias on the part of the truckers cannot be treated lightly. Support of his program of power centralization through the widened units implies a willingness to allow the power to be concentrated almost exclusively in Hoffa's hands, in preference to sharing it with Team- ster local ottlcials.

Employer support also connotes acquies- cence in allowing the union more strength than it has ever had. Moreover, despite the professed desires that employers would also be strengthened by the structural changes, it is improbable that the industry did not also recognize the strong likelihood of the greater heterogeneity on its side actually dissipating management bargaining efforts. This latter outcome has, in fact, proved to be the case. In short, the trucker support of Hoffa and his program implies, whether or not the em- ployers will admit it, the truckers' willing- ness to place themselves very much at Hoffa's mercy in their labor relations.

There are several rational explanations for this major paradox.

First, part of Hoffa's goal in widening the bargaining unit scope coincided with a ma- jor objective of at least the more responsible carriers. These truckers, generally the larger and more influential ones, desired to mini- mize the excessive internal price competition that had plagued the industry from its ear- liest days. They strongly believed that Hoffa's system of master contracts, with its relatively uniform intercontract provisions, would work in their favor and against the traditional cost cutting of the more marginal operators.

Second, truckers were generally satisfied that what they had heard of Hoffa's consid- eration for special local conditions was ac- curate. They felt, accordingly, that they would gain the best of two worlds by the realization of his program: stability for the industry and individual dispensation from contractually imposed uniformity where this was genuinely warranted.

Third, and probably most important, Hoffa's reputation with employers for abil- ity, knowledge of the industry's problems, and desire to resolve these problems in the interests of a healthy trucking industry pre- ceded him outside the Midwest. Employers were given the alternatives of allowing un- ion authority to be concentrated in the hands of such an individual or seeing their locals controlled by Teamsters whose abilities var- ied widely and were thought rarely to reach Hoffa's level; most chose the former.

Perhaps Hoffa could have performed his "miracle" with only rank-and-file popularity and employer respect going for him. It ap- pears undeniable, however, that he has made adroit use of three other factors in solidify- ing his position and accelerating the pace of the widened bargaining units: maximum mileage out of the constitutional power at his disposal; willingness to wait even for the "o~cial" uniformity of the master contracts; and plausible economic and legal arguments for the widened bargaining scopes.

James R. Hoffa has frequently been re- ferred to as a supreme pragmatist. The ex- planations ofered in this paper in no way negate that description. Whether Hoffa's foremost goal has indeed been greater eco- nomic effectiveness for the union in a stronger industrial framework (as he has claimed) or a burning desire for personal power ( as many of his critics have charged), his road to success has been paved with stress on the practical. There is nothing of the social visionary in Hoffa; his is bread- and-butter unionism, par excellence. What- ever his motivation, his conquests have stem- med from a skillful capitalization on the needs of his members and of their basic in- dustry-above all, economic gains for the former and stability without rigid uniformity for the latter.

There is considerable irony in the possi- bility that the structure which Hoffa has so painstakingly and competently erected may ultimately collapse because its architect stands convicted of tampering with a jury and diverting pension resources for his per- sonal gain.

BUSINESS HORIZONS