insight knowledge of no self in buddhism - an epistemic analysis

volume14,no.21 july2014

Insight Knowledge of

No Self in Buddhism:

An Epistemic Analysis

Miri AlbahariUniversity of Western Australia

2014 MiriAlbahari

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Prologue

MaryAnalogueisabouttogiveatalkon noself. It isthemostan-ticipatedtalkattheconferencebecausewordhasitthatshe,likehercousin the famouscolourscientistMary,knowseverything there istoknowabouthersubject-matter.1Atleast,sheknowsallthetheory.In particular, she knows that there is no self of a certain kind thatmosthumansdeeplybuyinto:apersonalisedandpersistingcentreofagencyandownership,acentrewithelusiveboundaries thaten-closeathingofutteruniquenessandaxiologicalsaliencethatmustbeprotected.2Itistheselfonbehalfofwhichpeopleseektosatisfytheirdesires,dreamsandambitions:thethingthatfeelsemotionsofpleasure(suchasexcitement,lust,joy)ifthedesiresarefulfilled,anddispleasure(suchasanger,fear,disappointment)iftheyarefrustrat-ed.It isthethingthatisperceivedtoinitiatesuchactionstosatisfythedesires.3Maryhasclosely studieda rare sectorof theBuddhistcommunity(calledarahants)who,throughyearsofmeditationprac-tice,arerumouredtohaveseenthroughandovercomethisillusionofself.Shehasextractedeveryfactfromtherumour:sheknowsalltheintricaciesoftheircognitivetransformationtonibbna(asitscalled)howmeditationchangestheirbrainandeliminatesthosecomplexandpervasivepatternsofdesire-drivenemotionandactionthatstemfromanassumedidentificationasasolid,separateself.Amongstthe

1. Despite the namesake, a complete theoretical knowledge of their subject-matterisasfarastheanalogybetweenthetwoMarysissupposedtogo.Atalaterpoint,thetwocasesarecontrasted.Thepaperwillbeassuming,forthesakeofargument,thatthereisnoself.

2. Ontheelusivenessandaxiologicalsalienceofself,GilbertRylewrites:Healsofeels,veryvaguely, thatwhatever it is thathis Istandsfor, it issome-thingveryimportantandquiteunique,uniqueinthesensethatneitherit,noranythinglikeit,belongstoanyoneelse.(1966,31).

3. William Jameswrites: It is thehomeof interestnot thepleasant or thepainful,notevenpleasureorpain,assuch,butthatwithinustowhichplea-sureandpain,thepleasantandthepainful,speak.Itisthesourceofeffortandattention,andtheplacefromwhichappeartoemanatethefiatsofthewillbeingmoreincessantlytherethananyothersingleelementofthementallife,theotherelementsendbyseemingtoaccretearounditandtobelongtoit.Itbecomesopposedtothemasthepermanentisopposedtothechangingandinconstant(1890,297298).

ImprintPhilosophers

mirialbahari Insight Knowledge of No Self in Buddhism

philosophersimprint 2 vol.14,no.21(july2014)

0. Introduction

Nibbnaisthesummon bonumofBuddhistpractice.4Puttingasidemys-ticaldescriptions,acentraltenetofnibbna,asdescribedinearlyBud-dhisttradition,isthatityieldsacompleteunderstandingofthetruthofno-self.Sometimescalledawakening,therealisationissaidtoper-manentlyfreetheaspirantfromtheaffective,behavioural,andmotiva-tionaldrivesthatstemfromhavingasenseofself.Itissaidtobeastateofutmostcontentmentandequanimity,withnocapacitytomentallysuffer(hencenounpleasantemotionssuchasfearorgloom).Atten-tionissharpandneverlostinthought.Thereisimmensecompassiontowardspeoplessuffering,yetwithoutanyattachmenttooutcomes.Thereisnoidentificationwithelementsofthemindandbody,whichwouldgiverisetosuchthoughtsasthisisme,thisismine,thisismy action.5Theprocessofunderstandingtherealityofselflessnessisthus

4. My interpretationofBuddhismdrawsprimarilyuponearlyBuddhist teach-ingsfromthePlisuttas (discoursesbetweenthehistoricalBuddhaandhisdisciples)andasexpoundedintheworkofleadingBuddhistscholarssuchasBhikkhuBodhi.IthususePlispellinginalltheBuddhistterminology.

5. Elsewhere I introduce a distinction betweenwhat I call perspectival andpersonalownership(Albahari2006,2011).Perspectivalownershipisthesortofmine-nessneutrallybornetowardsobjectsthathappentoappearuniquelytoonesperspective (suchas thoughts, feelings,perceptionsandbodilyac-tions);personalownership isanemotionally investedmine-ness that is re-ciprocallybornefromidentifying,amongstotherthings,withperspectivallyownedelementsofonesbody-mindasmeandwhoIam.InthePlisuttas,theBuddhaalludestoidentification(evidencedbythoughtsof thisisme)alongwithreciprocalfeelingsofpersonalownership(thisismine)asbeingcentraltothesenseofself.ThusoneencounterssuchpassagesasBhikkhus,therebeingaself,wouldtherebeformewhatbelongstoaself?Yes,ven-erablesir.Or,therebeingwhatbelongstoaself,wouldtherebeformeaself?Yesvenerablesir(MN22, 1995,transl. amoli and Bodhi).Oneshouldthusaspiretoastatewherenolongeridentifieswithorfeelspersonalownershiptowardsanyfacetoftheirpsychophysicalexistence,hence:Whatisnonselfshouldbeseenasitreallyiswithcorrectwisdomthus:Thisisnotmine,thisIamnot,thisisnotmyself.(MN22andSN35, 1995,transl. Bo-dhi).Thefollowingpassagestarklyillustratesthecompletelackofemotion-allyinvestedidentificationandpersonalownershipthatshouldeventuallybeharbouredtowardseachelementofpsycho-physicalexistence: Bhikkhus,whatdoyouthink?Ifpeoplecarriedoffthegrass,sticks,

branches, and leaves in this JetaGrove,orburned them,wouldyouthink: Peoplearecarryingofforburningusordoingwhat they like

emotionsstrikinglyabsentinarahantsisfear:forjustasourawaken-ingfromadreamdispersesanyfearofadreamt-oftiger,theirawak-ening from the illusion of self disperses any fear on behalf of theformerly-assumedself-entity.

Conversely,Maryknowsthata feelingof fear typically indicatesasenseof theself,andthatshe,MaryAnalogue, isafraidofpublicspeaking. Upon mounting the podium and seeing a packed audi-encerepletewith famousphilosophers, theanxietykicks in.Struckby stage-fright she stands in the spotlight and falteringlybegins tospeak.Thiscausessomepeople in theaudience towonder if thereisnotsomethinginconsistentaboutMary.Thereshestands,givingapaperonhowthereisnoselfyetasenseofthatveryselfiscausingherwordstotremble.Peoplewonder:IsMaryabitlikeHume,who,afterrecitingphilosophicalargumentsfornoself,returnstohisback-gammonwithbiasontheimagination?Couldhersenseofselfbetrayan irrational commitment to the selfs existence,which contradicts(whatwearesupposingis)hercompletetheoreticalknowledgethattheselfdoesnotexist?WouldMarysomehowimproveher(alreadytheoreticallycomplete)knowledgethatthereisnoselfif,likethoseeliteBuddhistpractitioners, shewere toeliminate thevastarrayofaffectiveandbehaviouraldispositionsthataccompanythemistakenassumptionthatsheisaself?AndcouldsuchepistemicimprovementcastlightonwhatBuddhistsmeanwhentheytalkaboutthehighlyes-teemedeventofgaininginsightknowledgeofnoself?AsMaryAna-loguefumblesthroughhertalk,amemberoftheaudiencedecidestowriteapaperaddressingtheseepistemologicalquestionswithaviewtoanalysingatopicthathasbeengivenlittleattentioninWesternan-alyticphilosophy.Couldtherebeanythingepistemicallydistinctive,andindeedprofound,aboutthegainingofso-calledinsight knowledge intotherealityofnoself?Andcouldanythingaboutsuchanalysisil-luminatetheepistemicstructureofawiderrangeofcases,suchastheovercomingofaphobiaoneknowsisirrational?



deepandcomprehensiveseeing into thenatureofexis-tencewhich fathoms the truthofourbeing in theonlyspherewhereitisdirectlyaccessibletous,namely,inourownexperience.[1994,56]

While the general topic of insight knowledge in Buddhism has re-ceived littleattention inWesternphilosophy,GalenStrawson inhisre-releasedbookFreedom and Beliefwrites:

ItisnotimplausibletosupposethatBuddhistmonksandmysticshavesucceededinalteringquiteprofoundlytheirexperienceofthemselvesasacting,thinking,andfeelingbeings.Norisitimplausibletosaythattheyhaveinsodoingachievedwhatisincertainrespectsamorecorrectviewoftheworld[2010,103] 6

Thispaperoffersananalysisofwhatitcouldmean,inepistemicterms,toarriveatamorecorrectviewoftheworldthroughtheprofoundal-terationoflivedexperienceorofwhatistermed,byBuddhists,asin-sight(vipassan),ormorebroadly,wisdom(pa).7WhileBuddhisttraditionsalludetovaryingtargetsanddegreesofinsightknowledge,myanalysiswillfocusonwhatiswidelyagreed,inearlyBuddhism,tobeaninsightofthemostprofoundinnature:thatoffullyapprehend-ingtherealityoftherebeingnoself,throughtheattainmentofnibbna.Myanalysisneednotassumethatthefullpurportedinsight intonoselfmustoccurall at oncefromastageinwhichthepractitionerhasa

6. Owen Flanagan has in a recent book described Buddhist wisdom asabsorb[ing]andinternaliz[ing]acertainmetaphysicofself(2011,131).Histreatmentofthetopic,however,focusesonthepsychologicalandethicaldi-mensionhowwisdommaydiminishsuffering/desireandpromotehappi-ness/compassionratherthanonanepistemicanalysis.

7. While these two terms indicatedifferences inemphasis (vipassan ismoreassociatedwiththeactivityofcuttingthroughdelusion,andpawiththeresultingwisdom), Iwill, for purposes of this paper, use theEnglish terminsight or insight knowledge to cover both these aspects. I will use thetermawakeningtorefertotheeventofhavingattainednibbna,andarahant (sometimeun-italicized)torefertoonewhohasawakened.

said,intheBuddhisttradition,tobenotmerelyintellectual,butdeeplytransformativeintegrallyconnectedtotheexperienceofeliminatingthesenseofselfanditspsychologicalstructures.Suchstructuresaresaidtosustainmentaldefilements,suchaspreferencesandaversions,whichmakeoneattachedtothingsbeingonewayratherthananother,causingus to sufferwhenourdesiresare frustrated.On the insightintoselflessness,aleadingscholarmonk,BhikkhuBodhi,writes:

Ofthesecognitivedistortions,themostdeeplygroundedandresistant is thedelusionofself, the ideathatat thecoreofourbeingthereexistsatrulyestablishedIwithwhichwe are essentially identified. This notion of self,theBuddha teaches, is an error, amerepresuppositionlackingarealreferent.Yet,thoughamerepresupposition,theideaofselfisnotinconsequential Becausewemaketheviewofselfthelookoutpointfromwhichwesurveytheworld, ourmindsdivide everythingup into thedu-alitiesofIandnotI,whatismineandwhatisnotmine.Then,trappedinthesedichotomies,wefallvictimtothedefilementstheybreed,theurgestograspandde-stroy,andfinallytothesufferingthatinevitablyfollowsTofreeourselvesfromalldefilementsandsuffering,theillusionofselfhoodthatsustainsthemhastobedispelled,explodedbytherealizationofselflessness.Preciselythisisthetasksetforthedevelopmentofwisdomwisdomremoves the veils of distortion, enablingus to see phe-nomena in their fundamental mode of being with thevivacityofdirectperception.Thetraininginwisdomcen-tersonthedevelopmentofinsight(vipassan-bhavana),a

withus?No,venerablesir.Whynot?Becausethatisneitherourselfnorwhatbelongstoourself. What is it that isnotyours?Mate-rialformisnotyoursFeelingisnotyoursPerceptionisnotyoursFormations are not yoursConsciousness is not yoursAbandon it.Whenyouhaveabandonedit,thatwillleadtoyourwelfareandhappi-nessforalongtime.(MN22).Formoreonhowidentificationcouldcontributetothesenseofself,seenote16.



coreofmyanalysiswillexpandupontheStrawsonian/Buddhistde-scription of insight as overcoming a delusion. Delusions, at leastthenon-clinicalkind,arecommonlythoughttobetypesofstubborn,falsebelief.Buildingonthis idea, Ihypothesisethatthegainingofinsightknowledge,throughlosingthesenseofself(ofaparticularnature),wouldinvolvetheuprootingofadeep-seatedandreflexivefalse belief that one is a self, alongwith the re-alignment and inte-gration of ones emotional, cognitive and behavioural dispositionsinaccordancewiththecorrectbeliefthatthereisnosuchself.Ifthecorrectbeliefisalreadyacomponentofthesubjectsexisting(theo-retically-based)propositionalknowledgeasIamassumingisthecasewithMaryAnalogue andmost Buddhist practitionerstherewill be the loss of a false action-based belief that contradicts thedoxasticcomponentofthisknowledge. Throughsubsequentdoxas-ticintegrationofaction-basedwithreflectivebelief,Icontendthatthesubjectspropositionalknowledge,thatthereisnoself,willhavegreatly improved inquality.8This typeofexperientiallybasedepis-temicprogressistobedistinguishedfromthathadbyMarytheco-lourscientist;itismorethansimplycomingtoknow what it is liketoexperienceamindfreedfromtheillusionofself.

Thesuccessofsuchaproposalwillrelyonthetruthofatleastthreeclaims,namelythat:(1)thesenseofselfisdoxasticallyanchoredinanaction-basedbelief, (2) ifdoxastic,onecansimultaneouslyharboursuchanaction-basedbelief(thatoneisaself)withanopposingre-flectivebelief(acomponentofthepropositionalknowledgethatthatthereisnosuchself),and(3)replacingthefalseaction-basedbeliefwithonethatdoxasticallyintegrateswiththecorrectreflectivebeliefwouldimprovethequalityofonesexistingpropositionalknowledgethatthereisnoself.Whiletherewillnotberoomtofullydefendeachof theseclaims, Iwilloffersomelinesofargumentthatcanbepur-suedintheirdefence,withthesuggestionthatupsurpingthesense

8. The terms action-based belief and reflective belief will be properly ex-plainedinsection3;fornow,itisenoughtonotetheirrespectiveconnectionwithpatternsofaction/emotionversusreflectiveendorsement.

definitivesenseoftheself.Iftheattainmentofnibbnaoccursoveraseriesofsmallerstagesorbreakthroughs,myinquirywillcomparethestagesofwherethepractitionerdefinitivelyhasasenseoftheselfwiththefinalstageatwhichalltracesoftheself-illusionhavevanished.

Myquestion is thus:assuming that there isnoselfand that it ispossibletolosethesenseofselfinawaythatretainsnormalpsycho-logicalfunctions,howmightwearticulateandexplaintheappearanceofepistemicprogressthatoccurswhenthepractitionerissaidtogainfull insight into the realityofno self?Buddhist traditionputsmuchemphasisontheclaimthatinsightknowledgeisnot(ornotmerely)theoreticalknowledge,butisknowledgeofakindthatisgainedviaexperience.Whenapproachingtheissue,itisthusinstructivetocom-pareMaryAnaloguewiththesubjectofFrankJacksons(1986)famousthought-experiment,MarytheColourScientist.Raisedfrombirthinablack-and-whiteroom,Maryacquirescompletephysicalknowledgeaboutthephysicsandphysiologyofcolourandcolourvision.Uponreleasefromhercell,sheseescolourforthefirsttime,promptinginphilosophers (amongst other conclusions) thewidespread intuitionthat shemakesepistemicprogress thatgoesbeyondher theoreticalknowledge.Manywill claim thatMarynowknows, in someexperi-entialorpracticalsense,what it is liketoseecolour.IfMaryAnalogueweretobeliberatedfromtheillusionofself,forthefirsttimeexperi-encingamindcompletelyfreedfromtheillusion,wouldanyepistemicprogressbebestdescribedalongthesame linesasMarythecoloursci-entist(suchthatshenowknowswhat it is liketobefreedfromtheillu-sionofself),orwouldtherebealsosomethingelsethatisdistinctiveaboutherepistemicimprovement?

While I surmise that there would indeed be parallels with theepistemic progress ofMary the colour scientist (if such there be),I will propose that Mary Analogues impression of having a more correct view of the world typified in reports from Buddhist tradi-tionswould indicate that there is somethingquitedistinctive, aswell,aboutherprogress.Iofferananalysisofwhat,atleastinpart,thisdistinctivekindofepistemicimprovementcouldamountto.The



theproposal rests. Idonotpurport toprovideacompleteoverviewonthenatureof insightknowledge,nordo Ipretendtoeventouchuponeverythingthatcouldbeprofoundaboutit.Moreover,offeringsuch ahypothesis on the gainingof insight knowledge intono-selfwillrequiremaking,forthesakeofargument,severalprovisionalandcontentiousassumptions.Ofthese,nonearesocontentiousastheas-sumptionthatnibbna qua losingthesenseofself (andassociatedaffectiveandbehaviouraldrives)whileretainingorenhancingmentalacuity and well-beingis psychologically possible. Despite Straw-sonsoptimismthatsuchasuppositionisnotimplausible,somethingmustbesaidtoallaythelegitimateconcernthatitissoimplausibleastodemotivatetheprojectfromtheoutsetatleastaspartofaseriousinquiryintowhathumancognitioniscapableof(asopposedtoamereexerciseinspeculativelogic,akintoanalysinghowmanyangelscanfitontheheadofapin).

Section1willthusbedevotedtoexpoundinguponandaddressingthismajorconcern,beforeturning,morebriefly,torelativelylesscon-tentiouspresuppositionsthatareassumedforpurposesofmydiscus-sion:thatthereisnoself,andthatwehaveasenseoftheself.Whileaddressingthesepresuppositionswillnot,ofcourse,justifythem,mygoalistoshowthattheyarenotsoobviouslyimplausibleastoarresttheprojectbeforeitcangetstarted.Iaimtoshowthatphilosophicalinquiryintogaininginsightknowledgeofno-self,asdescribedinearlyBuddhistteaching,isofgenuinerelevancetothecontemporaryfieldsofknowledge,mindandcognition.Itishopedthatthisexercisewillalsomakemoreconcretetheoverallcontextofinquiry,suchashowitsitswithcurrentempiricalresearch,aswellaselucidatethediffer-encebetweenthecentralnotionsofselfandsense of selfastheystandinrelationtothenon-existenceofself.Unlessspeltout insufficientdetail,subsequentdiscussionabouttheepistemicbenefitsof losingthesenseofselfwillhavelittletohangon.

Theremainderofthepaperhasalreadybeenforeshadowed.Insec-tion2,Iintroduce,inmoredetail,thecomparisonofMaryAnaloguewithMary the Colour Scientist, via the question: what distinctive

of self in thisway involves the alteration of a deeply foundationalframeworkbelief.

The general analysis of knowledge-improvement, if correct, willnot be confined to the gaining of Buddhist insight knowledge, butshouldapply toothercasesofwhere there isdissolutionofconflictbetween (thedoxastic componentof)propositionalknowledgeandrecalcitrantbeliefs. Iwill suggest that in suitablydoxastic instancesof(say)losingaphobia,superstitionorclinicaldelusion,thesubjectspropositional knowledge (e. g. that feathers are not dangerous)willsimilarlyhaveimprovedthroughthereplacementofacontradicting,falseaction-basedbelief(e. g.thatfeathersaredangerous)withacor-rectbeliefthatintegrateswiththedoxasticcomponentofthesubjectsexistingpropositionalknowledge.

Whileextendingtheanalysisofknowledge-improvementtoawid-errangeofcasesmaybeviewedasanadvantageoftheaccount,italsoraisesthequestionofwhetherthereisanythingreallydistinctive,afterall,aboutthegainingofso-calledinsightknowledge.Couldtherebesomethingsubstantivebehindthefactthatthenomenclatureinsight(orwisdom)occurswithinBuddhisttraditions,ratherthaninconnec-tionwiththelossofthephobiasorsuchlike?Indeedtherewouldap-peartobe.Theinsightarisingfromovercomingthedelusionofselfissaidtocarryanauraofprofundity;itisacognitivetransformationthatdeeply,globallyandirrevocablyshiftsonesentireperspectiveontheworldbefittingthealterationofafundamentalframeworkbelief.Iwilloffersomeempiricallybasedspeculationsonwhatcouldaccountforthisprofoundcognitiveshift, insofaras itexplainswhythelevelofinsightintotherealityofnoselfmaybedistinguished,atleastindegree,fromthatofthemoremundanecases.

DoingfulljusticetothetopicofBuddhistinsightknowledgewillbeafarlengthierenterprisethanwhatcanbecoveredwithinthescopeofasinglepaper.WhatIhopetoprovideissomephilosophicaltractiontotheideaofgaininginsightknowledgeofno-self:namely,acorepro-posalofitsepistemicstructure,alongwithanindicationofthedirec-tionthatfurtherresearchmaytakeindefendingkeyclaimsonwhich



regulation is no longer possible in a complex environ-ment.In fact, left to their own devices, deathwouldensureinamatterofhoursbecausebodilymaintenancewould collapse.This, andcomparableexamples,wouldsuggestthatastateofconsciousnesswhichencompassesasenseofselfasconceptualisedinthisbookisindispens-ableforsurvival.[1999,304305]10

How,inmoredetail,isthisselftobedefined,andhowisittobedis-tinguishedfromthesenseofself?Howmightweunderstandtheclaimthatthesenseofself isthesortofthingthatexists,whiletheself isnot?Andhowmightsuchasenseofselfbeseen,onDamasiosview,asessentialtosurvival?

Whiletherearemanynotionsofselfintheliterature,thecoreno-tionof selfat stake inDamasioswork, inBuddhism,and in thatofseveralWesternphilosophersisthatofyouasobserverorknowerofthethingsobserved,[]youasownerofthoughtsformedinyourper-spective,youaspotentialagentonthescene(1999,127).11Thisowner/observer/agentisapersonalisedandpersistingentity:aunique,uni-

10.Withregardtothenecessityofthementalconstructionofself,DanielDen-nettalsowrites:Strippedofit,anindividualhumanbeingisasincompleteasabirdwithoutitsfeatures,aturtlewithoutitsshell.(1991,416).Seealsonote18onPanksepp(1998).

11. Westernphilosopherswhohavealsodeniedtheexistenceofaselfofthisde-scription(orsomethingclose)includeHume(1739/1978),James(1890/1981),Parfit(1984),Dennett(1991),Flanagan(1992),Metzinger(2003),andtheau-thor(2006).ElsewhereIprovidedetailedevidenceandargumentfortheviewthatDamasioandsomeoftheseWesternphilosophersaredealingthesameorverysimilarnotionofselfthatcanbegleanedfromsuttasintheBuddhistPliCanon(Albahari,2006). Ialsoofferacomparativeanalysisofhow,ac-cordingtoBuddhistandWesterntraditions,theillusionofsuchaselfmaybesaidtoarise.Fromthis,itbecomesapparentthatnoteveryone,evenwithinaparticulartradition,agreesuponhowthesenseofselfgetsconstructed.Den-nett,forinstance,hasamorelinguisticemphasisthanDamasio,seeingtheselfasacentreofnarrativegravity.InalaterbookDamasiowrites:Thereisindeedaself,butitisaprocess,notathing,andtheprocessispresentatalltimeswhenwearepresumedtobeconscious(2012,8).Thisseemsmainlytobea semantic shift:whathe isdescribing is theneurological (etc.)pro-cessunderpinningthesenseofself,aprocesshealsoascribestopre-linguistic

epistemicdimensioncouldthegainingofso-called insight-knowledge addtoalreadyperfecttheoreticalknowledgeofthepropositionthereisnoself?Indevelopingthiscomponentoftheaccount,IintroduceafurtherpassagebyStrawsonfromwhichIdrawoutmyspecificpro-posal.Then,insection3,Iofferpreliminaryargumentsforthethreefurtherclaimsuponwhichthisproposaldepends,whichwouldallowforknowledge-improvementthroughdoxasticintegration.Insection4, I describehow the account of knowledge-improvement could ex-tend toothercases, including the lossofphobias,clinicaldelusions,and superstitions. In section 5, I offer some empirical speculations,basedupontheaccountofselfinsection1,onwhatcouldmakeMaryAnalogues knowledge-improvementas opposed to (say) the lossofaphobiaprofoundlyinsightful.Iconcludebybrieflyconsideringhowtheaccountmightbearuponcaseswhereasubjectlacksinitialknowledgethatthereisnoself.

1. The empirical viability of the nibbnic hypothesis

Letuscalltheproposalthatlosing the sense of self whilst retaining or en-hancing mental acuity is psychologically possiblethenibbnichypothesis.Acentral concern for thenibbnichypothesis lies inevidence fromscientificquarterstosuggestthatlosingthesenseofbeingaseparate,axiologicallysalientself,alongwithattendantself-regardingemotion-alandbehaviouralpatternseveniftheselfisanillusionissuretoresultinsub-humanratherthansuper-humanstates.Oneofthemostcarefullyworkedoutandinfluentialhypothesesabouttheoriginsandneurologicalunderpinningsoftheself-senseistobefoundintheworkofneurologistAntonioDamasio(1999,2012).9Fromhisstudiesofanumberofsuchcaseswherethesenseofselfhasbeensuspended,in-volvingpathologiessuchasakineticmutismandepilepticautomatism,Damasioconcludes:

Whenthementalaspectofselfissuspended,theadvan-tages of consciousness soon disappear. Individual life

9. SimilarideashavebeenproposedbyneurologistJaakPanksepp(1998).



Now,thosewhodenytheexistenceofsuchaselfdonotusuallydenythatthesenseofselfisreal,anymorethandenyingthatthetwolinesinaMuller-LyerIllusionareofunevenlengthinvolvesdenyingtheappearanceofsuchlines.Whatisheldtolackrealityatleastinits entiretyis rather thevery thing thatwehavea reflexive senseofbeing:aself,withalltheenlistedfeatures,thatiswhollyanteced-enttoandunconstructedbythethoughtsandexperiencesthatitap-pearstoownorgenerate.Theideaisthatinsteadofbeinganchoredinathought-antecedentself,astheysubjectivelyappeartobe,atleastsome features of the thing that we reflexively and unwittingly takeourselvestobe(viathesenseofself)suchfeaturesasboundedness,persistence,agency,unity,axiologicalsalienceturnouttobewhollyorpartiallygeneratedbytheverythoughtsandexperiencesthattheselfseemstoownorgenerate.Putsimply,theself(withthosefeatures)doesnot,asitpurportsto,thinkthethoughts;instead,thethoughtsthink(thosefeaturesof)theself.Themismatchbetweenappearanceandrealityiswhatmakestheselfanillusion.

Denying theexistenceof selfdoesnotentail, then,denying therealityofevery featureascribedtotheself,aconsequencethatsomewould find implausible. Non-illusory, unconstructed features as-cribed to the self can survivedissolutionof the self-illusion,hencethe locution losing the senseof self shouldbe readas losing thesenseof those illusory features ascribed to the self.13Now,despitedisagreementovertherangeoffeaturessaidtobementallyconstruct-ed,bothDamasio and the scholarsof earlyBuddhismare likely toconvergeonatleastthefollowing.Theywillagreethattheuniquely personalised boundary that separates self from the rest of theworld(whichIcallboundedness)thefeaturethatmakesmeseemlikeadistinctlyseparate,unique,axiologicallysalientthinginrelationtotheworldismentally constructed andhence, illusory (because it

13. Forinstance,Iargueelsewherethatthefeatureofconscious,unifiedaware-ness(modus operandiofobserver)cannotbementallyconstructedandhenceillusory(Albahari2006,2011).

fied and bounded locus of agency that underlies and is somehowgenerativeofourthoughtsandexperiences.Thisselfisdescribedassystematicallyelusivetoitsownobservation.Whileabletoturnitsfo-calawarenessontoitsthoughtsandexperiences,aswellasaspectsofthewiderworld,thesupposedselfcanneverseemtodirectlyobserveitselfinthismanner.Theelusivenessiswhatessentiallydistinguishestheselfasatypeofsubjectratherthanobjectintheworld,aligningitwith theobserver rather thanwith the thingsdirectlyobserved.Yettheselfstillseemsreflexivelyandperipherallyawareofitsownpres-ence,suchthatanindividualsexperienceisnotconfinedtoobjectsofawareness,butseemsdividedintotheobservingsubject(quaself)andtheobservedobjects.Thissubtle,reflexivefeelingthatwehaveofourownpresenceas suchaboundedthought-antecedentself,assomethingdistinctandseparatefromitssurroundingenvironment,iswhatisreferredtoasthesenseofself.12

creatures. It remains the case thatqua boundedobserver/owner/actor,histheoryimpliesthereisnosuch(unconstructed)thingasaself.

12. Itisapresuppositionofthispaperthatwedoindeedhaveasenseofbeinganentitywiththeabove-listedfeatures.Still,somethingshouldbesaidabouthow,giventhatwecannotdirectlyintrospectandreadoffthecharacteristicsofoursupposedselves,wecanarriveatthelistoffeaturesthatwesuppos-edlyascribetoourselves.Muchofthecontenthastobeinferredindirectly,throughreflectingonourmodesofinteractionwiththeworld,includingourlikelymotivations, emotions and behaviours. TakeMaryAnalogues risingfearattheupcomingtalk.Thisindicates,arguably,thatshedeeplyidentifiesasthepersonwhoisabouttogivethespeech,suchthatsheassumesittobethenumericallysamebeingastheonenowundergoingtheanxiety,implyinganassumptionofpersonalised,uninterruptedpersistenceovertime.Supposethatsheberatesherselfforbeingabruptwithaquestionerintheaudience,thinkingIshouldnothavesaidthat!Thisguiltwouldindicatenotonlyanassumedpersistence,but the fact that she thinks itpossible,allelsebeingequal, that she could have actedotherwise.This arguably implies that shetakesherselftobeanagentwithlibertarianfree-will.InthecurrentsectionIelaborateonhowtheassumptionofboundednesscanbeinferredfrom(andindeedconstructedby)cognitionsthatamplifyanongoingreflexiveconcernforonesownwelfare,althoughIargueelsewherethatboundednesscanbeinferredfromamultitudeoffactors,includingthesenseofagency.Forade-tailedaccountanddefenceofhowtheentirelistoffeaturesgetsascribedtotheself,seeAlbahari2006,2011.



AccordingtoDamasio,thissubtlesenseofourselvesassomethingpsychologically bounded, separate, unique, and important is bothmentallyconstructedandcriticaltothesurvivalofourorganismsbio-logicalboundaries.Toseehowthismaybeso,onemustconsider,atleastinoutline,thecentralrolethatDamasioascribestoemotioninconstructingtheboundedself.17Damasiousesthetermemotiontorefer specifically to thebodys complexsetof stereotypedchemical/neuralresponsestotheenvironment; feelingsreferstothefamiliarsubjective side of these emotions. Through conditioning, emotionsbecome associatedbothwith objects in the environment, andwithpatternsofmotorresponsesuchthat:

Memoriesofanobjectthatwasonceactuallyperceivedinclude not only records of the sensory aspects of theobjectbut also records of themotor adjustments thatnecessarily accompanied the gathering of the sensorysignalsandtheobligateemotionalreactionto theob-ject.Asaconsequence,whenwerecallanobjectwere-trievenotjustsensorydatabutalsoaccompanyingmotorandemotionaldatathepastreactionsoftheorganismtothatobject.[1999,161]

isanon-illusorylocusofperspectivalconsciousnessintoapersonalised,sol-id-seemingme,therebysharpeningandexaggeratingthesenseofboundarybetweenonesassumedexistenceandtheworld.Theemotionalinvestmentinthesemantlesofidentitywould,moreover,reinforcethefeelingofbound-ednessbyfeedingintoanongoingasymmetricalconcernaboutoneswelfare(alludedtobyDamasio),therebypresupposingadistinctandimportantthingonbehalfofwhichoneisconcerned.Theprocessofawakeningcaninviewofthisalsobeunderstoodasonewhichdismantlesthelayersofidentityandaccompanyingself-concern;Isaymoreaboutthissoon,andinPart5.

17. MypresentationofDamasiospositionhereissimplified,focusingmainlyonhis accountofhowemotionsand feelingshelp to construct the featureofboundedness,andignoringothertechnicalitiesabouttheconstructionofself,includinghisaccountofhowtheorganismsrelationtotheenvironmentismappedinthebrain.Damasiothinksthatallfeaturesofselfareconstructed,notjustboundedness.

purportstonotbementallyconstructed).14Thispersonalisedbound-arybetweenselfandtheworldismuchpsychologicallythickerthanthatwhichcomesfrommerelyoccupyinganembodied,first-personperspectiveontheworld.15AsGilbertRyleputsit,Healsofeels,veryvaguely,thatwhateveritisthathisIstandsfor,itissomethingveryimportantandquiteunique,uniqueinthesensethatneitherit,noranythinglikeit,belongstoanyoneelse(1966,31).Thefeelingofim-portanceattachedtobeingthisverythingmaybesummonedbythereactionofhorroraroundtheprospectofbeingreplacedbyapsycho-physicalreplicawhowillgoontoliveyourlife(anideaexploredinParfit,1984,199201).16

14. WhileIregardsuchboundednessascentraltotheself-illusioninBuddhism,other authorsmay takeother featuresof the self tobeprimary targets forBuddhistmeditativepractice.GalenStrawsonholdsregarding[oneself]andothersastrulyself-determiningsourcesofaction(2010,103)viz.,anagentoflibertarianfreewilltobeasuchatarget.WhileIremainneutralonthispoint,ifStrawsoniscorrect,myoverallphilosophicalanalysis(ofwhatitistogaininsightintonoself)willstillapply.

15. Thepassiveboundarythatcomesfrommerelyoccupyingafirst-personem-bodiedperspectivegoesreciprocallywithwhatIrefertoinnote5asperspec-tivalownership. Boundednesspertains to theemotionally invested,moreactively (albeit elusively) sensed boundary that arises with identification(moreinnote16),reciprocalwithwhatIvecalledpersonalownership.Itisalludedtointhesuttasinnote5andinBhikkhuBodhi:Becausewemaketheviewofselfthelookoutpointfromwhichwesurveytheworld,ourmindsdivideeverythingupintothedualitiesofIandnotI,whatismineandwhatisnotmine.(1994,56).IsurmisethatDamasiospatientswhohavelosttheirsenseoftheboundedselfthroughpathologywouldstillhaveapas-sivefirst-person,embodiedperspectiveontheworld;theydlackanysenseofboundedidentityinrelationtothisperspective.So,forthatmatter,wouldBuddhistarahantsalthoughtheleveloftheircognitionwouldvastlydifferfromthepathologicalcases.

16. Inmoredetail,howmightidentificationcontributeto(andprovideevidencefor)thesenseofboundednessandaxiologicalsalience?Identificationoccursasoneappropriatesvariousideas(e. g.thosepertainingtospecificattributessuchasbody,gender,age,race,character traits,preferences,profession,ortocommonmodesofinteractionsuchasobserver,owneroragent)toonesperspective,sothattheworldisapproachedandthoughtaboutthroughtheirassumed,reflexivefilter.AsJ.DavidVellemanputsit:Ifthereisapartofyourpersonalitywithwhich younecessarily think about things, then itwill beyourmentalstandpoint,alwayspresentingareflexiveaspecttoyourthought(2002,114).ThenumerousmantlesofidentificationhelptoreifywhatIthink



of thoughts, images and felt emotions (attended and unattended),whosecontentrepresents,aspartofitsnarrative,not only the objects perceived and acted upon but also the organism perceiving and acting upon them(1999,93,188192). Thebiologicalorganismisinotherwordsrepresentedvia the subjective elusive impressionof abackgroundagentialself:aprotagonistwhoengageswiththeworldinsuchawaythat it is driven by an individual concern which permeates all as-pects of thought-processing, focuses all problem-solving activities,and inspires theensuing solution (1999, 304). Identifyingas suchaprotagonistmakestheorganismreflexivelycareaboutwelfare,byfuelinganongoingsenseofurgencyintheserviceofhelpingtheor-ganismtoautomaticallythinkandactinsuchawayastopreserveitsbiologicalboundaries.Thefeelingofbeingathingthatmustbepro-tectedgreatlyexaggeratesthe(assumed)boundarybetweenmindedorganismandenvironment.19

InrelationtoBuddhistthought,DavisandThompsonhavenotedthat thenotionofvalence (thepurelyaffectivecomponentofwhatDamasio calls feeling) has a direct analogue in the Buddhist no-tionofvedan: therawfeelingofpleasure,displeasureorneutralityasmanifestedthroughthesixsensemodalities(includingthemind).Theywrite:

Inthecaseofbothconcepts,valenceandvedan,thefeel-ingtoneofpleasantversusunpleasantiscloselyrelated

ofself(withtheirconnectiontoaffectiveandmotorresponses)wouldprob-ablyinvolvemajordeficitsinhighercerebralfunctions(1998,314).

19. OnDamasios theory(and indeedPanksepps), themorecomplextheenvi-ronmentalpressures, themoredeveloped thesenseof selfwillhave tobetocopewith them.Mostanimalsandhumanshave thebasicsenseofself(orcoreself)sofardiscussed:anunreflectivesenseofidentityasanagent/owner/observerthatisboundedandseparatefromitsenvironment,abletocogniseitsimmediatefutureandpast.Oncelonger-termplanninganddeci-sion-makingbecomeadvantageous,requiringaconsciousrepresentationofoneselfasthesubjectofrememberedandimaginedoutcomes,thesenseofboundednessandidentityovertimegetsgreatlyenhancedintowhatDama-siocallstheautobiographicalself,withmanyadditionallayersofidentifica-tionsuchasthosementionedinnote16.

While it is evident that variousobjects and situations can regularlyinduce strongly felt emotional reactionstowhich he gives the fa-miliarnamesfear,anger,hope,etc.recentstudieshavesubstanti-atedDamasioscontentionthatevenrelativelyneutralobjectssuchastablesandcoffeecupsproducemeasurablemicro-valences(Lebrechtetal,2012).Thesesubtleaffectivefeelingsofpleasantnessorunpleas-antnessmayliebelowthethresholdofconsciousawareness,buttheynevertheless prime perception, helping us tomore quickly identifyandactuponsourcesofperceivedharmandbenefit.Damasioholds,then,thatthefunctionofemotionbothfeltandunconsciousistoreliablydirectattentiontotheenvironmentinwaysthatreadyustoact so as to avoidharmandprocure advantage.On the connectionbetweenattentionandemotion,hewrites:

Emotion is critical for the appropriate direction of at-tention since itprovidesanautomatedsignalabouttheorganismspastexperiencewithgivenobjectsand thusprovides a basis for assigning orwithholding attentionrelativetoagivenobject.[1999,273]

Damasio maintains that the felt, attention-directing emotions be-comefarmoremotivatingiftheorganismpsychologicallyidentifiesasabounded,axiologically salient selfon behalfofwhich theemo-tional reactionsare felt.18 Thewordless impressionofbeingsuchaself is synchronically generated, he claims, by the ongoing stream

18. Onthecloseconnectionbetweenourbasic,elusivesenseofboundedagen-tial self and sensory/affective/motor responses, there appears to be someconcordancebetweenDamasioandPanksepp.LikeDamasio,Panksepp re-gardsthecoresenseofself,viz.,ourego,thefeelingofwillorI-nesstoberootedindeep,evolutionarilyprimitivestructuresofthebrainthatserveas thefirstpointof contact for the intermixingof motormaps (i. e., bodyschema),sensorymaps(worldschema)andemotionalmaps(valueschema)(1998,300).Theinteractionofthesestructuresinvolvingcircuitsthatlikelyfirstrepresentedthebodyasanintrinsicandcoherentwholeandthroughwhich a variety of sensory stimuli become hedonically valencedfeedsintothat ineffable feeling of experiencing oneself as an active agent in the perceived events of the world(1998,310,hisitalics).AndlikeDamasio,Pankseppholdsthatabreakdownoftheprimitiveneuralcircuitsthatsubtendthebasicsense



isfulfilled(inreactiontopleasantvedan)andlesshappywhenitisnot (unpleasantvedan).Tah isbehind the constantdrive, con-sciousandunconscious,tobringstatesofaffairsintolinewithonespreferences.While the resulting thoughts and emotions of satisfac-tionorfrustrationseemtobeexperiencedonbehalfofapersonalself,andareperpetuatedsolongasonehasthesenseofbeingsuchaself,Buddhismcontends,likeDamasio,thatthereisnoactualsuchself:nothought-antecedent,thought-generating,axiologicallysalientcornerof theworldanunderlying, separate I thatwill stand to benefitor lose from the situation at hand.The senseof boundedness thatseemstoseparatetheselfasasalientthingfromtherestoftheworld(includingonesthoughts)isheldtoimmediatelystem,instead,fromtheverystreamoftah-driventhoughtandemotionthatisassumedtooriginateintheself.20

Yetdespiteconvergenceoverhowtheboundednessofselfispsy-chologically constructed, Buddhist thought radically diverges fromDamasio(andPankseppseenote18)overthenecessityofthesenseof thisself forautonomoushumanexistence. It isnot thatBuddhisttraditionwould rejectDamasios theoryabout theoriginof the self-illusion; itmaywell accept that the senseof bounded self,with itsaccompanyingdesire-drivenemotions,evolvedasacomplexsurvivalmechanismthatcontinuestoserveits importantbiological function.ButaswasevidentinthepassagefromBhikkhuBodhi,Buddhismdoesnotregardawell-functioninghumanmindashavingtobeanimatedbythisdesire-drivensenseofself.ThecoreteachingexpressedinwhatisknownastheNobleEightfoldPath(theFourthNobleTruth)alongwiththedoctrineofDependentOrigination,maintainsthatitispos-sible,viameditativepractice,tobreakdowntheconditioningbetween

20.Note:theideathatthesenseofself(perhapsalsoabeliefthatoneisaself)perpetuatesI-thoughtsshouldnotbeconfusedwiththemistakenideathatitis theactual thought-antecedentself thatperpetuatesthosethoughts.Com-pare:Jimiscoweringunderthebedbecausehesensesthataliensarewatch-inghim.Itisentirelythesense(perhapsalsoabelief)thataliensarewatchinghimthatmakesJimcower,ratherthananythingaboutanactualsituationofalienswatchinghimthereisnosuchsituation.

toactiontendenciesofapproachversusavoidance.Fromthe modern neuroscience perspective, the bodily re-sponses constitutive of an emotion, including an emo-tionsvalenceandactiontendency,canbeactivatedevenwhenwedonotreportconsciouslyfeelingtheemotionMoreover, recentworkhas shown that such implicit af-fectvalenceisnotlimitedtoemotionalepisodesandin-fluencesdecision-makingoneverythingfromconsumerchoicestomoraljudgementThisunderstandingofthepervasive role of affect valence in human psychologyfindsaparallelintheBuddhistsuggestionthatvedanispresentwitheverymentalstate,not just thoseWesternpsychologyincludesundertheemotions.[2013,587588]

It is important, nonetheless, not to conflate vedan raw sensorypleasant, neutral or unpleasant hedonic tonewith the action ten-dencies of approach and avoidance towards those hedonic tones(feeling an emotionwould usually involve amixture of these).Ac-cordingtoearlyBuddhistteaching,thequalityofvedanhelpscondi-tionourmental reactionsofpreferenceor aversion (tah) to suchsensorystimuli,whichinfluences(andisinfluencedby)ourpercep-tionofthings(sa)asdesirableorundesirable,aswellasthearis-ingofmentalformations(sakhra)thatincludevolitionaltendencies(cetan) and object-specific grasping (updna). From these tah-driven mental formations arise thoughts and feelings of me andmine:manifestationsofwhatIvedescribed(innotes5,15,and16)as the emotionally invested personal ownership and identification,central to theearlyBuddhistnotionof self.The root causeof suchI-thoughtsliesinboththesenseofselfthattheyperpetuate,andintah.TahcorrespondscloselytoDamasiosnotionofthepermeat-ingindividualconcern.Oftentranslatedascravingorattachment,itisthedispositiontoemotionallyinvestinthesatisfactionofdesire.Itistheunderlyingcurrentofdesiretopreferthattheworldbeonewayratherthananother,suchthatoneismadehappierwhenthedesire



casesofwheresubjectshavepurportedlylostordiminishedthesenseofselfvia thesortofmeditativepracticesdetailed inBuddhist tradi-tions.Perhapstheway inwhichthesenseofboundedselfiserodediscrucialtoharnessingordevelopingcapacitiesofthemindandbrainthatmaypermitautonomoussurvivalsansthesenseofboundedself.

Asithappens,Buddhistmeditativepracticesandthecognitiveandneuralcorrelatesofhavingpracticedforanythingfromafewminutestoover44,000hourshaveincreasinglybeenstudiedinlaboratorycon-ditions.Whilestillatanearlystage,someofthefindingstoemergearepromising.Forexample,studieshaveindicatedthatincreasesinhoursofmeditationpositivelycorrelateswithdecreasesofactivityinneuralcorrelatesassociatedwithself-narrative(mid-corticalstructures)23andwith fear, depression, and other self-concerning emotions (e. g., theamygdala).24Thereisalsomountingneuropsychologicalevidencetosuggestthat,foradvancedpractitionersofmeditation,thereisasub-stantialincreaseinthelevel,quality,andeaseofattentionthatispaidtoongoingstimuli(ratherthanonlystimulithatisofselectiveinterestto the self).25Thesefindingsare significant forat least two reasons.

23. While freely engaging in self-referential thought, individuals [in controlgroups]exhibiteddistinctengagementofcorticalmidlinestructuresandposteriorcingulatecortices,regionsassociatedwiththeaffectiveappraisalofeventsasgoodorbad for theself.Bycontrast,mindfulnesspractitio-nersengaginginametacognitiveprocessexhibitedapronouncedshiftawayfrommidlinecorticalactivation[andtoward]sensoryrepresentationsintheinsula and secondary somatosensory cortices.These regionsmay supportmore detached, objective interoceptive, and somatic awareness that mayserveastheprimitivesensoryrepresentationsoftheself(Farb,Andersonetal,2010,26).

24. Inapapersummarisinganumberofstudies,DavidsonandLutzwrite:Ex-pertmeditatorsalsoshowedlessactivationthannovicesintheamygdaladur-ingFA[focusedattention]meditationinresponsetoemotionalsounds.Acti-vationinthisaffectiveregioncorrelatednegativelywithhoursofpracticeinlifeThisfindingmaysupporttheideathatadvancedlevelsofconcentrationareassociatedwithasignificantdecreaseinemotionallyreactivebehavioursthatareincompatiblewithstabilityofconcentration(2008,173).

25. ArecentstudyusedfMRItointerrogatetheneuralcorrelatesofFA[focusedattention]meditation in experts andnovices.Whereas expertmeditatorswithanaverageof19,000practicehoursshowedstrongeractivationintheseareasthanthenovices,expertmeditatorswithanaverageof44,000practice

vedanandtah.21Astahisweakened,onereactswithdecreasingpreferenceoraversiontopleasantandunpleasantvedan.Thisinturnweakenstheillusionofself(withthoughtsofIandmine)thatbothdepends upon and helps generate these emotionally invested reac-tions.22Suchpracticeissaidtoculminateintheexultednibbna:thefinalflashofinsightthatburnsouttahandthesenseofselfforgood.

Bycontrast,DamasioandPankseppregardtheemotionally-investedsenseof self tobeuniversally critical to survival.The contention ismorethan just theoretical;wehaveseenthatDamasioappeals toanumber of clinical studies: subjects who, through various neuropa-thologies,havelostthesenseofboundedself(alongwithallmanifes-tationsofemotion)andareunabletofendforthemselves.

Howseriousaretheseconcernsforthenibbnichypothesis?ItisworthrememberingthatDamasiostheory,whileempiricallysupport-edinmanyofitsdetails,isahypothesisratherthanverifiedfact:andthecaseswherehedocumentsasuspensionoftheself-sensealloccurinthecontextoftraumatothebrain,suchasstroke.Theinabilitytoactautonomouslymaythusbeasmuchtodowiththetraumaaswiththelossofthesenseofself.Moresignificantly,Damasiohasnotstudied

21. TheFourNobleTruths, foundational toBuddhism,arepartof thefirstdis-courseoftheBuddha(SN56.11,1995,transl.Bodhi)andcanbesummarisedas:(1)Suffering(dukkha)exists,(2)Theoriginofdukkhaistah,(3)Theces-sationofdukkhaliesinthecessationoftah,and(4)Thereisapathtothecessationofdukkha(andtonibbna):theNobleEightfoldPath,involvingthepracticesof insight-wisdom(pa),meditation(samdhi),andvirtue(sla).ThedoctrineofDependentOrigination(Paiccasamuppda,SN12)identifies12proximallinksinthecycleofbirthanddeath(sasra),expressingthecen-tralBuddhist ideathateverythingwhicharisesdependsonmultiplecondi-tions.Whilemanylinksareseenaspassivelydetermined(e. g.,withsixsensebases(sayatana)ascondition,contact(phassa)comestobe;withcontactascondition,feeling(vedan)comestobe),thelinkwithvedanascondition,tahcomestobeisrecognisedasonethatcanbeactivelybroken.

22.Hence, undermining the sense of selfbased on a form of ignorance,avijj inturndiminishes tah,bothofwhicharepurportedlyat therootofmentalsufferingforthelivingpractitioner.Asmentalsufferingisfinallyeliminatedthroughinsight,unpleasantvedanwillbeconfinedtoonlyphysi-cal(notmental)suffering.Andasthearahantissaidtonotberebornintothecycleofbirthanddeath(sasra),physicalsufferingeventuallyceases.



Ihavejustprovidedonesuchoverviewastohowthesenseofbeingsuchabounded,separateentitycouldbeconstructedfrompatternsofthoughtandemotion.Asforhavingasenseofselfofthatdescription,I have elsewhere offereddetailed arguments thatwedo commonlyidentifyassuchaself(alludedtoinnote12)aswellassomeevidencehereforthesenseofboundednessinparticular(seealsonote16).Withtheprovisionalassumptionsnowdeemedasnotunreasonable,andwith a clearer understanding ofwhatwillmeant in ensuing discus-sionbythetermsselfandsenseofself,wecanturntothequestionofhowlosingthesenseofbeingabounded,axiologicallysalientself,whileretainingmentalacuity,maybeunderstoodinepistemicterms.

2. The Core Proposal: Knowledge-Improvement through Doxastic Integration

ManywillbefamiliarwithFrankJacksons(1986)fictitiousMary,theomniscient colour scientist. Raised from birth in a black-and-whiteroom,Marylearnsallthephysicaltheoreticalfactsthatcanbeknownaboutcolourandcolourvision.Butwhen the roofofherenclosureopensforthefirsttimetorevealabrightbluesky,Marysunderstand-ing of seeing blue seems dramatically enhanced.AsMartineNida-Rmelinputsit,thereisastrongintuitioninfavourofthethesisthatMarymakesgenuineepistemicprogressafterherrelease(2004,241).Supposingthatthisintuitionisright(andputtingasidedeepermeta-physical conjectures such as whether this understanding indicatesnon-physicalfactstheoriginalpurposeofthethoughtexperiment),therearethreemainhypotheseswhichaimtofleshouttheideathatMarynowknowswhatitisliketoseeblue(evenifthelocutionis,intheend,misleading).28

aboutinthiscontextwhoseexistenceisbeingdeniedisbynomeanstheonly one; asDanZahavi (2011, 6667) and othersmake clear, there areothernotionsofselfthatmaywellcorrespondtophenomenathatexist.Idohowevermaintain,contraZahavi,thatthecurrentnotionofselfisacentralandimportantone.

28.Forthissummary,IdrawuponNida-Rmelin(2010).

First, themovement from increased todecreased emotional activity,andfromaselectivetowardsanimpartialpatternofattention,servesas evidence that the sense of selfcorrelativewith selective tah-drivenattentionbeingpaidtoobjectsofpersonalsignificancecanbeeroded.Second,inthosecontrastingpathologicalcaseswherethesenseofselfisseverelycompromised,thelevelofattentionisusuallyabnormally low, something thatDamasio views as indicative of pa-thology.Perhapstherecomesastagewhereasustained,highlevelofeffortless,unbiasedattentiontoonessurroundingshelpscircumventanypathologytothedegreethatiteventuallysubstitutesthevisceralfeelingofself-concernthat,withourusual(lower)levelsofattention,isneededtokeeptheorganismoutofdanger.Ofcoursethesereflec-tionsonthepossibilityofaltogethereliminatingthesenseofselfviameditativepracticearespeculative,butratherthanbeingbasedmere-lyuponreligiousconvictionanduntestable,theyextrapolatefromsci-entificstudiesandaretestable.26Thenibbnichypothesis,whilestillrequiringfurtherevidence,isnotanunreasonableone.

The other immediate provisional assumptionsthat there is noselfandthatweneverthelesshaveasenseofbeingsuchaselfarelesscontentious.Therehavebeenanumberofargumentsfromscien-tific,philosophical,andcontemplativequartersfortheviewthatthereisnoself:atleast,nobounded,personalisedandpersistingcentreofagencyandownershipfromwhichthoughtsandexperiencesarise.27

hoursshowedlessactivation.Thisinvertedu-shapedfunctionresemblesthelearningcurveassociatedwithskillacquisitioninotherdomainsofexpertise,suchaslanguageacquisition.Thefindingssupporttheideathat,afterexten-siveFAmeditationtraining,minimaleffortisnecessarytosustainattentionalfocus(DavidsonandLutz2008,173).DavidsonandLutzalsociteevidence(with reference to the attentional blink phenomenon) that mindfulness,whichaimstocultivateaclearawarenessofthefieldofcurrentexperienceasitarisesmoment-to-moment,haslastingeffectsonthequalityofattentionoutsidethecontextofformalFAmeditationpractice,suchthatsubjectsarebetterabletoattendmoment-to-momenttothestreamofstimuli(2008,173).

26. Insection5,Iofferfurtherspeculationontheavenuesalongwhichmedita-tivepracticemightunderminethesenseofself.

27. Argumentsagainsttheexistenceoftheselfhavebeenofferedbytheauthorsmentioned note 11. It should be reiterated that the notion of self talked



abilities(suchasactuallydeliveringapublicspeechwithoutfear)orthroughsimplybeingdirectlyacquaintedwiththestateofhavinglostthesenseofself.

Yetwhilesomeformofknowingwhatitisliketohaveanosenseofself(andindeedasenseofnoself)maywellbeacentralcompo-nenttoMaryAnaloguesimprovedepistemicstatusaccordingwellwithBuddhistinjunctionsthatonemustknowrealitythroughdirectexperiencethereremains,Icontend,animportantsenseinwhichitfailstocapturewhatisdistinctiveaboutMaryAnaloguesepistemicimprovement. To bring this out, consider the following example. IhavenevertakenmescalinbutIvereaddescriptionsofwhatitisliketotakeit.SupposeItakeitandIamstruckwiththeconviction:This is a more correct view of the world.Isthisthoughtinfactcorrect?Well,itdepends.IfallImeanbymorecorrectviewoftheworldissomethinglocalised like Inowknowwhat it is like to takemescalin thenmyconvictionmaywellberightforthesortofreasonsoutlinedabove:Imay,forexample,havegainednewphenomenalconceptsthatbolsterwhatIalreadyknewfromreadingdescriptionsoftakingmescalin.Butsuppose Imean somethingmoreuniversal like: This experienceoftakingmescalin is infusedwithnoetic resonance,asense of rightness that exemplifiesaprofoundlymoreaccurate frameofmindandout-lookontheworld.30Insuchacase,thereisgoodreasontodoubtthetruthofmystatement:aswithmanysuchdrug-inducedexperiences,Iamprobablydeluded.31

Likewise, ifpost-revelatoryMaryweretoexclaimthatherexperi-enceofbluenessoffersamorecorrectviewoftheworld,herstatement

30.BysenseofrightnessandnoeticresonanceImeantoconveythefeelingofdirectintuitiveunderstandingthatcomeswithanahamoment,whenthingscoalesceinawaythatappearstomakeperfectsense.

31. Bythisexample,Idonotintendtoruleoutthepossibilitythatsomedrugex-periences(orneurologicaltraumas)could,infact,instil(intheradicalsense)amorecorrectviewoftheworld,andhencebeawayofacquiringso-calledinsight-knowledge(foradramaticexampleofneurologicaltraumaelicitingapparentboundary-dissolving insight, see JillBolteTaylors2008TED talkMyStrokeofInsight).Tomyknowledge,however,nosuchcasesthatfullymatchthedescriptionofnibbnahavebeenreported.

Verybriefly,thefirsthypothesisisthatMarygainsknowledgeofthephenomenalcharacterofblueunderaphenomenal conceptofblue-nessaconceptwhoseacquisitionrequires,asanecessarycondition,the direct experience of seeing blue. Once acquired, this phenom-enalconceptofbluemayleadhertohavephenomenalbeliefsaboutthecolourofvariousthings,suchthatshecan(forexample)cometoknowthat theskyappearsphenomenallyblue toothernormalper-ceivers.Anotherhypothesisforherimprovedepistemicstatusisthatshegainsnewabilities: shecannow imagineor recallwhatablueskylookslikeandshecanimmediatelyrecognise,withouthelpfromscientificinstruments,thatanobjectisofacertaincolour(defendersoftheviewholdthatknowingwhatbluenessislikeamountstonomorethantheacquisitionof therelevantabilities).Thisdimensionhassometimesbeentermedknowledge how.Athirdhypothesisisthatwithoutacquiringnewfacts(suchasthoseassociatedwithphenom-enalconcepts),Marysimplybecomesdirectlyacquaintedwiththeex-perience of blueness,which is enough to account for her sense ofknowingwhatbluenessislike.

Itisnotthepurposeofthispapertoarbitrateonwhich,ifany,oftheseaccountsiscorrect.Butifweacceptthatcolour-scientistMaryepistemicallyprogressesalonganyoftheseavenues,thenitisreason-abletosupposethatMaryAnalogue,wereshetoawaken,wouldmakeparallelepistemicprogress.29Beforeawakening,shewouldknowallthetheoryinconnectionwiththepropositionthereisnoself(includ-ingtheneuropsychologyofthoseBuddhistswhohaveovercomethesenseofself).Afterawakening,shewillknowwhatitisliketohavenosenseofself,whetherthisbeaccountedforintermsofhergainingnewphenomenalconcepts(suchthatshenowknowswhatarahantsphenomenallybelieve,whentheyclaimthatthereisnoself),ornew

29. Ifoccurringoveraseriesofsmallerbreakthroughs,mightMaryAnaloguesfinalrevelationnotbeasdramaticasthatofMarythecolourscientist?TheaccountsIvereadofpurportedarahantsallsuggestthefinalbreakthroughtobedramatic;butevenifthisisnotso,insofarasMaryAnaloguecomestoknowwhatitisliketoexperienceamindcompletelyfreefromthestructuresofself,thecomparisonstillstands.



ofwhich,theyclaim,istocausethedelusiontodislimn.[2010,101102]

Here iswhere Ipropose thedifference lies.Unlike in thecoloursci-entistormescalincase,MaryAnaloguestheoreticalunderstandingoftheproposition there isnoself (andbyimplication, thatsheisnotsuchaself)isbeingcoupledwiththeovercomingofapowerfulandpervasivedelusionthedelusionthatsheisaself.Overcomingthisdelusionimbuesherwithagenuinelyaccuratefeelingofnoeticreso-nance:ofhavingdispelledacognitiveerroranalogous, it is some-timessaid,toawakeningfromadream.Thedepthandpervasivenessof the errorovercomeexplains andgroundsher feeling that the in-sightisprofoundandirreversible,resultinginacorrespondinglymoreaccuratemodeofcognition.32Inthemescalinandcolourscientistcase,thereisnoerrortobeovercome,suchasadelusionaboutwhatblue-nesslookslike;Marysimplylearns(orappearstolearn)whatitisliketoexperienceblueness.Whiletothisextentthecolourscientistmaywellhaveamorecorrectviewoftheworld,itisnotthesortofcor-rectnessthataccompaniestheovercomingofacognitiveerror,norisitprofoundinacognitivelypervasivesense.Thatiswhyshewouldnotbewarrantedtomakeanyclaimsaboutharbouringaprofoundlymoreaccuratestateofmind.

From this,wecandistinguish two features that characteriseepis-temic progress towards insight knowledge of no self: the overcom-ing of a delusionthat is, the dispelling of a cognitive errorandthedepthandpervasivenessof thedelusionovercome, resulting ina correspondinglymore accurate way of viewing the world. In the

32. Itisimportanttonotethatjustaswithanyintellectual(suchasmathematical)insight,asenseofrightnessattachingtoanypurportedinsightaroundover-comingthedelusionofselfwillnotalwaysbeveridical.Buddhisttraditioniswellawarethatpractitionerscanbemistakenabouttheirclaimstoinsight,which iswhy the traditionplaces importanceuponothermembers of themonasticcommunityespeciallyteacherstohelpverifysuchclaims,suchasthroughmonitoringreactionstodifferentsituationsovertime.Anydisplayoftah(suchasthroughanger,fear,pride,orlust)wouldforinstancebeareliableindicationthatthepractitionerisnotawakened.

wouldbecorrectuptothepointatwhichshenowknowswhatitisliketoexperiencethesensationofblue,suchthatshecanforinstanceapply therelevantphenomenalconcepts towhatshealreadyknewaboutblueness.Butifsheweretoinsist No,Imeanmorethanjustthat:itcarriesasenseofrightness,instillingaprofoundlymoreaccu-rateframeofmindandoutlookontheworldshewould,aswiththemescalincase,begoingbeyondwhatshehaswarranttoclaim.Butthis,precisely, is thekindofdescription thatBuddhist tradition im-partstoinsightknowledgeintono-self.Itisnotjustamatterofclaim-ingInowknowwhatitisliketohavenosenseofselfonwhateverreading.Thefeelingofovercomingthesenseofself issaidtocarryanadditionalnoetic resonanceasenseof rightness thatpurports,inconnectionwithhavingseenthroughtheillusionofself,toinstilaprofoundlymoreaccurateframeofmindandoutlookontheworld:acognitiveplatform,as itwere, fromwhichotherchunksof reality,which relatemind to thewiderworld,areapprehendedandunder-stoodwithfarlessdistortion.

Nowwhatcouldinfusetheexperienceoflosingthesenseofselfwithaveridicalnoeticresonance,makingtheclaimtoincreasedaccu-racymorelegitimatethanthatofthemescalinorcolour-scientistcase?A central clue canbe foundboth inBuddhist sources (e. g. BhikkhuBodhi),andinthisfurtherpassagebyStrawson:

Consider certain Buddhist philosopherswho argue, ona variety of metaphysical grounds, that our natural no-tionofapersistingindividualself isanillusion.Havingreachedthisconclusion,theysetthemselvesatask:thatofovercomingthedelusion.Theyrecognize,however,thatonecannotsimplyabolishonessenseofindividual-ity,bysomesortofeffortless,rationallymotivated,self-di-rectedintellectualfiat.Delusionsdelude,afterall;andtheordinary,strongsenseofselfisaparticularlypowerfuldelusion.They therefore recommend theadoptionof acertainpracticethatofmeditationtheeventualeffect



falsity.Contrastthiswithanon-recalcitrantbelief,alsobasedonillu-sion.EncounteringtheMuller-LyerIllusionforthefirsttime,youmayinnocentlyassumethetwoparallel linestobeofunequal length, inaccordancewiththewaytheylook.Youhavebothanillusionandadelusion that the linesareunequal.Someoneplacesa rulernext tothem(ortellsyouitsanillusion)andyouarenowcorrectlyconvincedthattheyareofthesamelength.Althoughtheopticalillusionpersists,thedoxasticanchorhasbeenpulledup.All tracesofdelusion,bothinyouractions/affectandinreflectiveendorsement,havevanished;yourinitialbeliefinunequallinesisusurpedbythecorrectintegratedbeliefthattheyareequal.Bycontrast,whiletheintroductionofaratio-nallysupportedbeliefthatthereisnoselfdoesindicateadoxasticshiftatthelevelofreflectiveendorsement,itdoesnotpullupthedeeperaction-baseddelusionthatanchorsthepersistingillusionofself.

Prior toovercomingthedelusion, therecalcitrantbeliefco-existswith the reflectiveone,whichbringsus to a third implication fromStrawsonspassage:withinagivensubject therecanbe theco-pres-enceofcontradictingbeliefsaninconsistencyofwhichthesubjectcanbeaware.Thereflectivebeliefthatthereisnoselfwillbeacom-ponentofwhatweareassuming is thepractitionersknowledge thatthereisnoselfpropositionalknowledgethatcohabitswithafalseaction-basedbeliefthatthereisaself.

A fourth implication suggests that this cognitive state is notepistemically ideal. By overcoming the delusion of self, the sub-ject comes toholdamorecorrectviewof theworld, anepistemicimprovement signalled by a feeling of direct intuitive understand-ing I have been calling noetic resonance.33 But there is a further

33. Thenoeticresonanceseemstoimplytheemergenceofareflectivecompo-nentthatisnotreducibletotheexistingpropositionalknowledgethatthereis no self (although itwould doxastically integratewith and improve thatknowledge).Thereflectivecomponentwouldcomefromthedirectintuitiverecognitionthattheselfisadelusion.Thatsaid,priorintellectualreflectiononnoself(alongwithformalmeditation)maystillcontributetotheprocessofundoingtheaction-basedbeliefinaself,andhenceingainingcompleteinsightintotherealityofnoself.Ireturnbrieflytothisissueinnote42andintheconclusion.

remainderofthissection,IexpandStrawsonspassageintoananaly-sisofhowtheBuddhistpractitioner,throughdispellingthedelusionofself,couldendupwithbetterqualityknowledgeofthepropositionthatthereisnoself:ananalysiswhichIthenapplytoothercases(sec-tion4).Inthefinalsection(5),Itrytoaccountforwhywemightexpectthegainingofinsightknowledge,inparticular,toresultinasubstan-tivelymoreaccuratemodeofcognitionthanthatwhichoccursinmostothercasesofknowledge-improvement.

Strawsonspassagecarriesanumberof implications fromwhichwe canpropose amoredetailed epistemic analysis ofwhat it is toovercomethedelusionofself.First, thereisreferencetotheselfasbeingbothan illusionanddelusionbothofwhich imply that theselfdoesnotexist.Illusionsoccurwhenanappearancepresentstheworld(toasubject)ashavingx,whentheworlddoesnotinrealityhavex.Whileoftenperceptual,illusionscansometimesbecognitive.Theillusionofselfwillbecognitiveratherthanperceptual:akintoasenseofdanger,wherethedangerdoesnotexist.Itakeitthatbyde-lusionStrawsonmeansatypeoffalseorinaccuratebelief minimally,awayoneassumestheworldtobe.Inmanydelusions,thesubjectwill take the content of an illusion to be veridical, thereby assum-ingtheworldtocarrythatfeature.Justasanillusionofdangermaybeassumed,byitssubject,toindicaterealdanger,sotheillusionorsenseofselfis(reflexively)assumed,bytheunawakenedBuddhist,toindicatearealself.Iwillputthisbysayingthatthesenseofselfacognitiveillusionisanchored inadelusionofself,abeliefthatthecontentoftheillusionisreal.

A second implication pertains to Strawsons claim that Buddhistphilosophers (presumably serious practioners) intellectually arriveat their conclusionof therebeingnoselfbefore settingout toover-comethedelusionofself.Thissuggests that thephilosophicalargu-mentandscientificevidencewhichjustifytheirreflectivebeliefthatthereisnoselfhaslittleeffect,byitself,ondislodgingtheirdelusionalcommitment toaself.Thedelusion thatanchors the illusionof selfis thus recalcitrant, failing to be shifted by standard evidence for its



Muller-LyerIllusion,wheretheillusionwillremainafterthedelusionhasbeendispelled.)ThedoxasticintegrationresultingfromthefinalnibbnicinsightisthusacentralrespectinwhichsomeonewithpriortheoreticalknowledgeofhersubjectmatternowhaswhatStrawsontermsamorecorrectviewoftheworldinrelationtohersubject.Wemightsay thatawakenedMaryAnaloguenow thoroughly knows thatthereisnoself.Inmodernidiom,shewalksthewalkaswellasnon-nervouslytalkingthetalk.

3. Defending supporting claims of the core proposal

Theaboveanalysis,whichproposesacoreepistemiccomponentforthegainingofinsightknowledgeintonoself(thatofknowledge-im-provement throughdoxastic integration), reliesuponthe truthofatleast three contentious claims. To reiterate, these are: first, that thesenseofselfisanchoredina(false)action-basedbelief;second,thatthisfalsebeliefthatoneisaselfcanco-existwithacontradictingre-flectivebeliefthatthereisnosuchself(acomponentofthesubjectspropositionalknowledge);andthird,replacementofthefalse,contra-dictingbeliefwithatrue,consistent(action-based)beliefwill,viadox-asticintegration,improvethequalityofthepropositionalknowledgethatthereisnoself.Whatfollowsaresomesuggestionsonhoweachoftheseclaimsmaybedefended.

3.1 The sense of self is doxastically anchored. Despite the self being commonly called a delusion in Buddhist lit-erature,manywilldeny that the senseof sucha selfwhether theselfexistsornotcanbeanchoredinabeliefthatoneissuchaself.Mostcentrally, thesenseof selfs reflexiveandelusivemodeofpre-sentationwillmeanthatitscontentisnotimmediatelyaccessibletointrospectionandthereforenotamenable,viathatchannel,toreflec-tiveendorsement.36TobelievethatP,theobjectiongoes,onehasto

36. IfonedoesreflectivelyendorsethepropositionIamaself,itwillbethere-sultofanexercisewhichobjectivelyreflectsupontheinferredcontentofselfandaffirmsitsexistence.Thisdoesnotmakesenseofselfin itselfdoxastic.

dimension to the progress, to dowith how this shift in what Ivebeencallingaction-basedbeliefcomestointegratewiththeexistingpropositional knowledge. Before transition, the false action-basedbelieffromwhichstemsavastarrayoftah-drivenemotionsandbehaviourscontradictsthereflectivebeliefthatisacomponentofthepropositionalknowledgethatthereisnoself;aftertransition,theaction-basedbeliefanditsattendantattitudesno longercontradictbut are in complete conformitywith the propositional knowledge.Throughbecomingconsistent,theaction-basedandreflectivebeliefsdoxasticallyintegrateintoonebelief(asmostbeliefsalreadydo).Inthisrespect,Iwanttoclaimthatonesdoxasticallyintegratedknowl-edge of the proposition there is no self is better quality knowledge thanthatwhichwashadbeforethetransition.

Because theaction-basedbelief (thatone isaself) is recalcitrant,themethodforattainingthisepistemicallyimprovedstatewillnotbetheconventionalrouteofgarneringbetterphilosophicalorscientificevidence for the truereflectivebelief;wecansuppose that thebestevidenceofthatsortwasrecruitedintheearlierphase.34Therouteinthiscase,asStrawsonhasnoted,isratheroneofdedicatedmeditationpractice,throughwhichthecomplexnetworkoftah-drivenpsycho-logicalstatesthatfeedintotheillusionanddelusionofselfiseventu-allytransformed:themotivations,behaviours,dispositions,affectivedrivesandattitudes.35 (Thattheillusionofselfmustbedestroyedinordertodissolvethedelusionmakesitsignificantlydifferentfromthe

34.Onacoherentistaccountof justification(andperhapsafoundationalistac-count aswell), thebelief that one is not a selfmay, after loss of the falseandcontradictingbeliefoneisaself,becomebetterjustifiedinvirtueofthesetofbeliefshavinggreateroverallcoherence.Itisnotclear,however,thatthisshouldbedescribedasacasewherethesubjecthasbetterevidenceforthebelief,as theaction-basedbeliefwasrecognisedas false tobeginwith.Therelatedquestionofwhatsortofevidentialandjustificatoryrolemightbeplayedbyaveridicalexperienceofhavingovercometheillusionofself,is,Ithink,animportantonethatwillhavetobedeferredtoanotheroccasion.Ireturntoitbrieflyintheconclusion.

35. Althoughthefinalinsightwillitselfhaveareflectivecomponentformoreonthisseenotes33,42,andtheconclusion.



Assumingtheviabilityofanaction-basedapproachtobeliefascrip-tion(anassumption thatwouldneed furtherdefence),havewerea-sontosupposethatthesenseoftheselfcouldactuallybeanchoredinsuchabelief?Here isan initial reason.Thesenseof theself canbedescribedasaconsciousimpressionofbeingaself,namely,ofbe-inganelusiveentitywithsuchfeaturesasboundedness,agency,andaxiologicalsalience.Astheself(quasubject)eludesdirectintrospec-tion,thesefeatureswillbeindeedbeascribedlargelyonbasisofbe-haviouralandemotionalpatterns,andIhavealreadyprovidedsomeexamples (for instance in note 12) of how such featuresmay be in-ferred.Thatweidentifyasbeingaboundedentityinparticularismostbroadlyevidenced,aswesawinsection1,throughmanifestationsoftah: the spectrumof desire-driven thoughts, emotions andbehav-ioursthattacitlyassumeasalient thingonbehalfofwhichthedesiresandemotionsarefeltandtheactionscarriedout.Nowbarringbeliefswithtautologicalcontent,anecessarycomponentofanybelief,wheth-erjudgement-oraction-based,isthatitcontainstruth-aptcontentthatcanbeinerrorandthisindeedisbeingclaimedaboutthesenseofself.For if theself (wehaveasenseofbeing) turnsoutnot toexist,thenoursenseofselfwillbeperpetuatingsomekindofpsychologicalerror,or,asiscommonlysaid,anillusion.Wewillnotinrealitybethesortofthingthatweunwittinglytakeourselvestobe.Fromthis,itmaybe tempting to infer thatwecommonlydoharboura (false)action-basedbeliefthatweareaself;theillusionisanchoredinadelusion.

Mattersarenot,however,sostraightforward.Inapaperwhichar-gues that a subjective senseof libertarian freewilldoesnotentail abelief in such freewill,RichardDouble (1991) invitesus to consider,

Dennett(1987).While third-personaloraction-basedapproaches(suchasaninterpretivestance)canallowthedisplayofnot-P-ishbehaviouralandemotionalpatternstotrumpcontrarydisplaysofreflectivelyendorsedbeliefthatP(suchthatSisascribedabeliefthatnot-P),weshouldnotassumethattheyalldo. Incasesofconflictbetweenwhat is reflectivelyendorsedandhowoneacts,Smightnotbeascribedanybeliefatall,ormightbeascribedbothabeliefthatPandabeliefthatnot-P.Myanalysisofinsightknowledgedependsontakingthelatterdisjunctiveapproachtobelief-ascription.Moreonthissoon.

bereadilydisposedtoconsciouslyaccessandreflectivelyjudgethatP,where thedisposition to judge thatP ispartofabroaderdisposi-tion-basetofollowvariousnormsofrationality.Suchnormsincluderevisingthebeliefinthefaceofchangestoourall-things-consideredevidence,beingpreparedtobethighstakesonPbeingtrue,andbe-lievingpropositionsthatfollowobviouslyfromP.Thesenseofbeingaself(forexample,itspotentialrecalcitranceinfaceofcountervailingevidence)disobeysatleastsomeofthesenorms.Thosedefendingadoxasticaccountof theself-sensecanrespond that this rationalisticjudgement-based conception of beliefwhat I have so far alludedtoas reflectivebeliefisnot theonlyoneavailable;philosophicaltraditionalsorecogniseswhatIhavebeencallinganaction-basedap-proach,wherebeliefscanbeascribedonthebasisofnon-reflectivecriteriasuchasobservablepatternsofemotionsandbehaviours.Suchcriteria,whichincludethoseexemplifiedinbelief-desireanalysesofbehaviour,37maypermit theascriptionofbelief tonon-rationalcrea-turessuchasanimals.Ifthesenseofselfisdoxasticallyanchored,thenitwillbeanchoredinthesortofbeliefthatisascribedalonganaction-basedratherthanjudgement-basedavenue.38

37. Onthebelief-desireanalysis(characterised,butnotendorsedbyVelleman),abeliefthatPdispose[s]thesubjecttobehaveincertainwaysthatwouldpromotethesatisfactionofhisdesiresifitscontent[P]weretrue(2000,255).The term action-basedalso includesreference topatternsofemotion,e. g.,ifSdesiresthatP,thencomingtobelievethatPwillelicitpositiveemotion,andcomingtobelievenot-Pwillelicitnegativeemotion(Zimmerman2007,64).Canthesestandardaction-basedcriteriabeusedtoindicatethesortofreflexive,action-basedbeliefintheselfsexistencethatwouldbeinstantiatedbyharbouringasenseofself?NotbydirectlysubstitutingtheselfexistsforP.WhileIshortlydiscusstheimplicationsofthisin3.2,Iwillfornowsupposethataction-basedcriteriapertainingtomanifestationsoftahapply.

38.Whilethetermsjudgement-basedandaction-basedaremyown(andaregiven a detailed formulation in Albahari 2014), variants of these two ap-proaches to belief-ascription have been described under different names.Forexample,H.H.Price,asnotedinGendler(2008a,638n),attributeswhathe calls the traditional (i. e. judgement-based) view to Descartes, Hume,Spinoza, Cardinal Newman and Cook Wilson. Insofar as they privilegeevidenceaccessiblefromthethird-personperspective,Zimmerman(2007,71, 7273)attributesversionsof a third-personal (action-based)positiontoWilliamson(2000),Smith(1994),Stalnaker(1984),Davidson(1984),and



perceptual senses, suchpressure commonlyexerts itself in the caseof conscious impressions, particularly if the impression is powerfulandpersistent.Wewillhaveheardabout theschizophrenicwho, intheabsenceofknowledgeabouthercondition,thoroughlybuysintothecontentofsuchimpressionsashavingherthoughtsmonitoredbysecretpolice, etc.we infer it from theparanoid, fearfulbehaviour.The conscious impressionof being a selfwill not onlybepowerfulandpersistent,butwilltendtoberegardedasneitherabnormalnorpathologicalnorfalse.Hence,atleastincaseswithnocountervailingevidenceathand, it seemsat this stage reasonable to infer that theconsciousimpressionofbeingaself,justlikeoursense-impressions,isanchoredinapowerfuldefaultaction-basedbeliefintheveracityofthatimpression.

3.2 Delusion of self co-exists with knowledge that there is no selfIfweprovisionallygrant that thesenseofself isnormallyanchoredina false action-basedbelief thatone is a self, can thedelusionbeheldinconjunctionwithanopposingjudgment-basedbeliefindeedknowledgethatoneisnotsuchaself?Herewearefacedwithwhatappears tobea two-horneddilemma.Thefirsthornpertains to thesecondpointwithinDoublesobjectionabove.Hewouldcontendthatajudgement-basedconvictionthatoneisnotsuchaself(elicitedbycountervailing evidence)will, just as in the caseof theMuller-LyerIllusion,servetoreplaceanyopposing,action-basedbelief thatoneisaselfwithaconsistentandintegratedaction-and-judgement-basedbeliefthatoneisnotsuchaself.IfDoubleiscorrecthere,thenmypro-posedanalysisofinsightknowledgemustfail,asitdependsuponthedelusionofselfbeingrecalcitrantinthefaceofevidencethatsupportsanopposing,judgment-basedbelief.ButiftheotherhandDoubleisnot correct and the so-calleddelusionof self persists in the faceofitsapparentlyopposingconviction,thenwehavereasontosupposethatthesenseofselfisnotactuallyanchoredinabeliefatall,butinsomethingpre-doxastic,suchasanaliefordefaultpsychologicalarchi-tecture.Inaddressingthissecondhornofthedilemma,werevisitthe

amongstotherexamples,theMuller-LyerIllusion.Whilethecontentoftheperceptualillusionmisrepresentsreality,socontainstruth-aptcontentthatallowsittobeinerror,thispre-emptorybelief(ashecalls it) in noway implies thatwe harbour a genuine belief abouttheunevenlengthofthelines.Asmyearlierexampleshowed,coun-tervailingevidencecanmakeus instantlyswitch fromastateofbe-lieving the contentof the illusion todisbelieving itwhere beliefisascribedonaction-basedaswellasjudgement-basedcriteria.(Be-haviours aroundattempting to re-designoneshouseusing Muller-Lyer technologywill,after initialdisappointment,beshifted).Simi-larly, theobjectiongoes, thecognitive illusionofhavinglibertarianfreewillor of being a self which has itmay beguile the philo-sophicallynave,butthosewhoknowbetterwillnotbetakeninbyit.Doubles objection is actually double-barrelled. First, it suggeststhat an impressionor senseor illusionof xdoesnot automaticallyguaranteeabelief thatx,sothere isnopressingreasontosupposethatthesenseofselfisactuallyevidenceofabeliefinaself.Second,itsuggeststhatifthereisanyinitialbeliefintheself(whetheraction-orjudgment-based)thenwillberevisedbycountervailingevidence,leavinguswithnoreasontosupposethatanaction-basedbelief intheselfwouldpersist inthecaseofthosewho,onjudgment-basedcriteria,cometobelievethereisnoself.

In response to the first pointwithinDoubles objection,we cannoteisthatwhileaperceptualorcognitiveimpressionofxdoesnotguaranteeabeliefthatx,itisneverthelesstruethatwithoutcounter-vailingevidence,animpressionofxwillusuallybeunquestioninglyassumedtoindicatearealx,allowingustoascribetothesubjectanaction-basedbeliefthatx.Thedefaultposition,afterall,istobelieveandactuponthedeliverancesofonessenses;asystematicscepticismisnothowwehaveevolvedtoengagewiththeworld.Presentedwithappearancesofgrass, treesandpeople,wetakeforgrantedtheirve-racity.39Justasthereiscognitivepressuretoacceptdeliverancesofthe

39.WecandrawaconnectionherewithWittgensteinsnotionofa frameworkbelief,discussedinsection3.2.



thereflexivecontentof theselfsystematicallyeludesdirectobserva-tion,andsocannotbetheimmediatetargetofitsownobservationalscrutiny.Revelationofitsillusorystatus(andthesubsequentrevisionofbelief)couldthusneverhappenviathesamesortofdirectobser-vationalchannelsthatoccur,say,withtheMuller-LyerIllusion;theresnoequivalentofplacingarulernexttothelines.Itstandstoreason,then,thatanoverturningofthedefaultaction-basedbeliefthatoneisaselfwillhavetocomeaboutthroughmethods(suchasmeditation)thaterodetheverypsychologicalstructuresthatsubtendthesenseofbeingaself.42Thiswouldaccountforthelackofparallel,mentionedearlier,between the illusionof self andmostotherperceptual (andlikely,cognitive)illusions.Whereasinmostcases,theillusioncanordoespersistafterthedelusionhasbeendispelled,thisisnotthecasewiththesenseofself.Beingreflexive,theimpressionthatoneisaselfcannotcomeapart fromthebeliefthatoneisaself;the tah-driven cognitions that constitute the sense of self double as the vehicle through which the self is assumed.Thecognitiverelationbetweensenseofselfanditsdoxasticanchoristhusaverycloseone.Forthesesortofreasons,weshouldexpectsuchanaction-basedbelieftoremainrecalcitrantinthefaceofopposingtheoretically-basedevidence.

Yettheveryconsiderationsthatspeakinfavourofthebeliefinselfbeingrecalcitrantworkagainstitsbeingdoxasticallyanchored,takingustothesecondhornofthedilemma.Couldthedeeprecalcitrance,alongwith the lackofparallelwithother illusions, indicate that thesenseofself(evenwithouttheco-presenceofaconflictingbelief)isnotdoxasticallyanchoredatall,but is rooted in somethingentirelymoreprimitiveandpre-doxastic,suchasanalieforbasicpsychologi-calarchitecture?DamasioandPankseppbothregardtheimpressionof

42. Throughsuchprocesses,therewouldcomeastageatwhichthesenseofselfiserodedenoughtopermitthefinalpurportedburstofinsight,uponwhichthedelusionofselfisseenthroughandcomprehendedinthedirectandin-tuitivewaythatIvebeencallingnoeticresonance.Whilesuchexperiencedoessuggestamodeofdirectobservation,Isurmisethatitwouldtranscendnormalconstraintsofsubjectversusobject,sothatordinarynotionsofelu-siveness(whichpresupposethisdivision)nolongerapply.Thisisatopicforfurtherinvestigation.

assumedviabilityofanaction-basedbeliefasbestexplanationforthedelusionofself.Ifthesenseofselfisnotafterallanchoredinabelief,thenmyanalysismustfail.

Tothefirsthorn:IthinkthatDoublespointabouttheMuller-LyerIllusiondoesnotcarryovertothatoftheself(includingaself initscapacityofharbouringlibertarianfreewill).Whilediscoveringtherealstatusoftheopticalillusionwouldinvolveadiscernableshiftinourunderlyingemotionalandbehaviouralattitudestowardsthephenom-enon,sothatwenolongertakeitseriously,becomingconvinced(onjudgement-basedcriteria)thatthereisnoselfisnotlikelytoelicitananalogousshiftinmanifestationsoftah,suchthatwetaketheselfless seriously.40 As Strawson implies, there is little evidence to sug-gestthatphilosophersandBuddhistpractitionerswhobecomeintel-lectuallyconvincedthatthereisnoselfwillbeanylessemotionallyinvested inprotecting the imaginedboundariesof their selves thantheywerebefore. Indeed, there is likely tobenodiscernablediffer-enceinthelevelsoftahbetweenthosewhoreflectivelyendorsetheexistenceofselfandthosewhodenyit.MaryAnaloguesfearatpublicspeakingisnotmerelythestuffoffiction.

Why might this be so? First, those advocating the reality of ac-tion-basedbeliefsoftennotetheirconnectionwithdeeplyingrainedmodesofconditionedorinstinctualresponsetotheenvironmentthatareatbestslowtorespondtocontraryevidence,and insection4, Iconsiderseveralfurthercandidatesforsuchbelief.41Thebeliefsmaybeespeciallystubbornifthemodeofresponsehasevolvedtoaidsur-vival,asDamasiosupposesinthecaseoftheself.Afurtherreasonforrecalcitranceinthecaseoftheself,Isurmise,liesinthestructureofthesubject/objectdivision.Lyingonthesubjectsideofthedivision,

40.Recall our supposition that emotional and behavioural manifestations oftahcomprisetherelevantsortofaction-basedevidenceforbelievingoneisaself.

41. WhileIshortlyconsideranalternativehypothesisofalief,agooddiscussionofdual-processcognition,whichoffersapsychologicalexplanationfor therecalcitranceofvariousbeliefsthataretypicallyslowtoformandchange,canbefoundinKeithFrankish(2009).



motor/affective tendencies that clashwith judgement-basedbelief(Albahari,2014).Inparticular,aliefdoesnotprimarilyexplainthoseinstancesofdiscordantbehaviourandemotionthatfitstandardcri-teria for action-based belief; action-based belief explains those.43 Alief offers the primary explanation for cases where themotor-af-fectivetendenciesarebetterdescribedasmodulatingthedominant,judgement-concordantaffective-behaviouralarcwithopposingten-dencies.44Comparethetypicalbehavioursandemotionsofaheight-phobicandanon-phobicwhofindthemselvesontheglassSkywalk.Whilebothhavevertigoandrationallyjudgetheplatformtobesafe,onlythephobicsbehaviourandemotionfitsstandardaction-basedcriteriaofbelief-ascriptionshefeelsherlifetobeindangerasshedesperatelytriestoleavetheplatform.Shehasa(contradicting)be-lief that the platform is unsafe.45 The non-phobics butterflies andhesitancy in stepping, by contrast, are caused by aliefs that serveto modulate her overarching, action-and-judgement-based belief(manifestedthroughgut-levelfeelingsofsafetyandsteppingontheplatform)withopposingtendencies.46

43. Forevolutionaryreasonsdiscussed in thatpaper, I rejectGendlersconten-tionthatbeliefcanonlybeascribedonjudgement-basedcriteria,asguidedbynormsofrationality.

44. IsayprimaryexplanationasIholdthataliefhassomeexplanatoryroletoplayineverycasewherethereisthattripletofRABassociation,includingthoseofcontradictingbeliefs;itisjustthatintheselattercasesaliefisnotthemaincauseofthediscordantreaction.Isaymoreaboutcomplementaryrolesofaliefandbeliefinnote46.

45. I recognise that the notion of having contradicting beliefs is contentious;moreonthissoon.

46. InthatpaperIproposethatthesecriteriafordistinguishingalieffrombelief(inthecapacityofexplainingdiscordanttendencies)areaptlygroundedintheirdifferentandcomplementaryevolutionaryroles. Iargue that theevo-lutionary role of beliefin keeping with the common belief-desire plati-tudesis to guide and execute behaviour (in conjunctionwith prevailingdesires).Thefunctionofaliefisassociativeratherthanexecutive;itsroleistospeedupreactiontimebyassociatingrepresentationswithaffectiveandmo-torresponses,sothatwhenfeedingintotheaction-guidingbeliefcircuitry,theactionsarecarriedoutmuchfaster.Hencealiefswillalwaysmanifestaspar-tial(neverfullycarriedout)reactionsthatspeedilyassociaterepresentational,

aselftoariseataprimitiveneurologicallevel,involvingcircuitrythatcombinesbasic sensory-motorwithaffective inputs.Taking theirac-countsseriously,asIhavedone,seemstofavourapre-doxasticanaly-sis.Inowconsiderthepre-doxastichypothesesthatthesenseofselfisanchoredin(a)analief,andthen,(b)basicpsychologicalarchitecture,suchasamodelthebraincreatestoallowtheorganismtofunctionintheworld.

Tothealiefhypothesis.Aliefs(thetermwasrecentlyinventedbyT.S. Gendler, 2008a, 2008b) are defined as primitive, pre-doxastic,pre-rational, clusters of reaction to apparent stimuli, that associaterepresentationalcontent(e. g.aprecarious-lookingheight)withaffec-tivereactions(e. g.feelingsoffear)andbehaviouralproclivities(e. g.anurgetostepaway).Gendlerintroducesthenotionofalieftoprovideaunifyingexplanation for thosepuzzlingphenomenawherebehav-iouralandaffectivetendenciespersistinspiteofrationalbeliefstothecontrary:thinkofthecommonreaction(butterflies,shaking)tostep-pingontheglassSkywalkabovetheGrandCanyonthatwerationallyknowissafe.While thenormforbelief, shesays, is toberationallyresponsivetoall-things-consideredevidence,makingitappropriatetocriticiseasirrationalifstubbornlypersisting(suchasabeliefthatoneisabetterdriverthanoneis),aliefisnotgovernedbysuchnormsofrationality(2008b,570).Whilealiefsmaybeseenasundesirable(e. g.incasesofracism),theirinherentunresponsivenesstoall-things-con-sideredevidencemakesitinappropriatetodeemthemirrational.Anychangestoformationsofaliefmustoccurgradually,throughprocessesofassociationandconditioning.Fromeverythingsaidsofar,itwouldseemthatthedeeplyrecalcitrant,survival-promotingassumptionofbeingaself,whichwouldautomaticallyandreflexivelyassociatethecontentwithfeelingsofemotionalattachmentandbe-haviouralproclivitiestoprotect,isaprimecandidateforalief.

Alief is a controversial cognitive category; some argue, for in-stance,thatitdeflatesintobelief.Myowntakeonit,thatIdevelopatlengthelsewhere,isthataliefisanindependentcognitivecategorythat (contraGendler) is not themain unifying explanation for all



emotionsandbehaviourtoconstituteuniqueaction-basedevidenceforthereflexivebeliefthatoneisaboundedself.Butcouldthisanom-alyintheso-calledaction-basedcriteriabywhichanassumptionofselfispresupposedintheveryhavingofanordinaryaction-basedbe-liefsuggestanotherhypothesis?Couldthesenseofselfbeanchorednotinabeliefthatoneisaself,butinbasic,pre-doxasticpsychologicalarchitectureoraself-modelthatgroundsmuchofourordinarypsy-chologicalpracticesandbehaviours?

Iproposethatsomethinginbetweeniscorrect:thatthesenseofself,while indeedanchoredinadeeppsychologicalstructureof thesortdescribedbyDamasioandPanksepp,isneverthelessanchoredinastructurethatisdoxasticatitscore.Thevastedificeofneurological-ly-basedaffectiveandmotorproclivitiesthatcomprisethisstructureservesasthevehiclethatbearstheunifyingdoxasticcontent.Butwhatkindofaction-basedbeliefcoulditbe?Whileafulldefenceisnotpossiblehere,IsuggestthatwhatIvebeencallingtheassumptionofselfcloselyfitstheprofileofaframeworkbelief(orhingeproposition) along the linesdescribedbyWittgenstein inOnCertainty(1969)anddevelopedbylaterthinkerssuchasLisaBortol-loti(2010).Frameworkbeliefsareaxiomaticassumptionsthatplayafoundationalroleintheformationofotherbeliefs;theyarecentraltoourworldview.Ratherthanbeingobjectsofovertknowledgeorbeliefwithintheframework,theyareappealedtoorassumedwhenjustify-ingorformingotheritemsofknowledgeandbelief.Frameworkbeliefsaretypicallytakencompletelyforgranted.AsBortolottiputsit:Thecommitmenttoaframeworkpropositionispervasiveandmanifestedinmany instances of behaviour, although the belief remains in thebackgroundandmayneverbeexplicitlyreportedorjustified(2010,192).Theyarelikelytobediscovered,ratherthanexplicitlylearnt:

Idonotexplicitlylearnthepropositionsthatstandfastforme.Icandiscoverthemsubsequentlyliketheaxisaroundwhichabodyrotates.Thisaxisisnotfixedinthesense

Ifmyaccountiscorrect, thenthecaseoftheselfdoesnotfittheprofileofamerealief, for it resembles thecaseof thephobicmorethan thatof thehesitant stepper.47Consider the typical self-deniersthought that something unpleasant is about to befall them. Theirtah-influencedemotionsandbehaviours(taken,sofar,asthemostlikelyaction-basedcriteriaforaffirmingtheexistenceofself)arenotaptlydescribedasmerelymodulating adominant action-and-judge-ment-based belief in no self with self-like tendencies. Tah drivestheiremotionsoftrepidationandbehavioursofavoidance.Asnotedearlier,theirleveloftahislikelytobenolesspronouncedthaninthosewhoreflectivelyendorsetheselfsexistence.Soifnotanchoredinmerelyanalief,isthesenseofselfanchoredinanaction-basedbe-lief?Herewenowfaceadifferentproblem;thereflexivebeliefintheselfsexistencedoesnotconformtostandardaction-basedcriteria.

Letusrevisit thecriteriaathand.Onthebelief-desireanalysis,abelief that P dispose[s] the subject to behave in certainways thatwouldpromote thesatisfactionofhisdesires if itscontent [P]weretrue(Velleman,2000,255).Onthepatternsofemotionanalysis:IfSdesiresthatP,thencomingtobelievethatPwillelicitpositiveemo-tion,andcoming tobelievenot-Pwill elicitnegativeemotion (Zim-merman,2007,64). Ifwesubstitute theselfexists forP,wequicklyseethatneitherformulaapplies.Forastart,theexistenceofselfisnotsomethingthatfromanaction-basedperspectivewecometobelieve,whichwould in turncausevariousemotional reactions. Indeed, thestandardaction-basedcriteria(bywhichasubject isdisposedtobe-haveinwaystopromotethesatisfactionofdesirebecominghappierthedesiresaresatisfiedandlesshappyiftheyarenot)presupposethesubjecttobeinthegripoftah.SofarIhavebeentakingtah-driven

motorandaffectivecontentmostnoticeablyinbelief-discordantcases,butalso in the vitally importantbelief-concordant cases, such aswhenhastilysteppingawayfromamovingcar(Albahari2014).

47. The examples of phobia, superstition, and clinical delusion, as I describetheminthefollowingsection,willalsofittheprofileofbeliefratherthanalief,althoughadoxasticdiagnosiswillnotuniformlyapplytoallsuchphenomenawithinthosecategories(e. g.clinicaldelusions).



Viewingtheassumptionofselfasanaction-basedframeworkbe-liefthatcanpossiblyberevisedisilluminating,asitthrowsintorelieftheutterenormityofwhatwouldbeentailedbyitseventualrevision.48 Theinitialassertionofanopposingjudgement-basedbelief thereisnoselfnowappearsasamerechippingatthetipofaniceberg,atinyshadowofcontradiction.Withthedisintegrationofthevastedificeofcognitions that express self-assumingpreferences, aversions, anxiet-ies,identities,etc.,andtheirreplacementbyasetofcognitionsconsis-tentwiththerebeingnoself,wouldcomearadicalalterationofonesentirewayof thinkingand livingexactlyasdescribed inBuddhisttexts.49IreturntothisthemeinPa

insight knowledge of no self in buddhism - an epistemic analysis

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