infoaxioms nautilus institute
Post on 11-Jan-2016
215 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
INFOAXIOMS
www.infoaxioms.org
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE
INFOAXIOM 1 www.infoaxioms.org
1. Common Knowledge
2. Network effects
3. Early entrants win
4. Information Feedback Loops
5. Standard setting is market power
6. Do You Know your users’ needs?
7. Gatekeepers and Intermediaries
8. Information Distortion
9. “Revenues”
10. The best information is free
INFOAXIOM 1 www.infoaxioms.org
Common Knowledge
Effective public policy electronic networks will:
•transform the information milieu
• create stocks of common knowledge that are the basis for cooperative
engagement
INFOAXIOM 1 www.infoaxioms.org
Common Knowledge
Effective public policy electronic networks will:
•transform the information milieu
• create stocks of common knowledge that are the basis for cooperative
engagement
INFOAXIOM 1 www.infoaxioms.org
Consensual Knowledge
and Public Policy
• What information frames the public policy issue and how can we transform
this information milieu?
• What stocks of consensual knowledge are needed for cooperative
engagement in this issue area?
INFOAXIOM 2 www.infoaxioms.org
Network effects
As the number of nodes in a network increases, the total value of the network increases as well.
To develop a policy network, member aggregation is
paramount.
INFOAXIOM 2 www.infoaxioms.org
Network effects
As the number of nodes in a network increases, the total value of the network increases as well.
Not only what you read, but who else is reading it that matters
INFOAXIOM 2 www.infoaxioms.org
How do we achieve network dominance?
What fraction of the key players (individuals, institutions, countries,
sectors, etc.) must become addicted to our e-services to be the authoritative, reference site
that auto-generates the network? And what moves them?
INFOAXIOM 2 www.infoaxioms.org
Common Knowledge and NetworksSpeed of diffusion varies by weak-strong links (less processing, less distance, fastest communication in
weakly coupled networks)
More powerful effect on proximate problem-solving
Profile Directory
Network mapping
Analog: business networking: http://www.ryze.org/
INFOAXIOM 3 www.infoaxioms.org
Early entrants win
Weak lock-in: users are compatible with themselves and don’t want to change
Strong lock-in: using our service is incompatible with other services in some
way so they can’t change even if they want to
INFOAXIOM 3 www.infoaxioms.org
Early entrants win
The longer you wait to enter the field, the more difficult (and expensive) it will be to
pry members out of existing online communities due in part to lock-in of
already-committed users
INFOAXIOM 3 www.infoaxioms.org
Early Birds, Latecomers?
If we are the early bird, in which core information services must we be world-
class leaders?
If we are latecomers, what are the unique niche needs that we can occupy and
parlay into strength?
Who are our collaborators in both instances?
INFOAXIOM 4 www.infoaxioms.org
Information Feedback Loops
•Users seek peer-sanctioned information dissemination services, and therefore, are
more likely to learn about a commonly used network than one with few previous users.
•Hence, networks that win market share early gain an information feedback advantage.
INFOAXIOM 4 www.infoaxioms.org
Exploiting Information Feedback Loops
•Who are the opinion leaders and are they registered users willing to:
• appear (write for)
•validate (say something strong about relying upon the service)
• or introduce other users to us (by recommendation upon registration)?
•Are we hyperlinked to other sites/services?
INFOAXIOM 5 www.infoaxioms.org
Standard setting is market power
•The technical and legal standards underlying the internet are path-dependent.
•Due to network effects, they tend to have a winner-take all quality, with one standard
becoming dominant.
•Devotees of other standards are left stranded.
INFOAXIOM 5 www.infoaxioms.org
Standard setting is market power
• What standard of service is critical to being dominant? Are we setting the
standard or following?
• Examples: responsive to individual need (eg modular email), timely (daily, if so, what
time of day in what time zone?), analytic (opeds from diverse, antithetical
viewpoints), reasonable (offer agendas that are consistent with conflict resolution
without war), two tier (email and web based) etc.
INFOAXIOM 6 www.infoaxioms.org
Know your users’ needs
•In policy information networks, consumer utility is maximized when the product is
short, timely, and of high quality
•Due to low switching costs, less-than-best service will rapidly lose dominance
INFOAXIOM 6 www.infoaxioms.org
Do You Know your users’ needs?
• Is the product is short, timely, and of high quality--what do these terms mean in your issue area (guidelines please!)
• How do you know your network user’s needs? Have you asked a sample? All of
them (survey)? Inferred from others’ service?
•Is your registration growing exponentially? If not, why not?
INFOAXIOM 6 www.infoaxioms.org
Do You Know your users’ needs?
• how do you combine deep research and analysis with timely, succinct, broad,
information service, and with dialogue that promotes diversity and difference in
search of common knowledge?
INFOAXIOM 7 www.infoaxioms.org
Gatekeepers and Intermediaries
“Information overload leads to a scarcity of attention.”
•Increasingly attention is becoming a scarce resource
•Those who can distinguish valuable signals from white noise gain power
INFOAXIOM 7 www.infoaxioms.org
Gatekeepers and Intermediaries
• Are you serving key public policy decision-makers (at all the levels and sectors needed for dominance in an
information milieu)?
•Have you gone the extra mile to get the service to the key leaders having
identified them?
INFOAXIOM 8 www.infoaxioms.org
Information Distortion
•As they process and forward upwards information, big organizations condense it.
•The final output at the top will be very different in quality from the original input
•In short, significant distortion will occur.
•The goal of non-profit information networks is to bypass these information-distorting
channels.
INFOAXIOM 8 www.infoaxioms.org
Information Distortion
What strategies do you employ to bypass the information-distorting channels and effects of
big organizations that you are aiming to affect?
• Personal networks
•Introductions from right people
•Use of home email address
•Extreme summaries for busy people vs longer reference material for researcher types
(eg DR vs weekly summaries)
INFOAXIOM 9 www.infoaxioms.org
“Revenues”
•Excellent information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce.
•Therefore you must price your information good according to consumer value, not
according to your production cost
•Electronic publishing SAVES cost
•The right revenue for a public information good is not $ but valuable information about users and creation of consensual knowledge
INFOAXIOM 9 www.infoaxioms.org
“Revenues”• Who in the donor world cares about the information and might be willing to pay for creating a free public
information good?• Are you collecting useful information about users
during registration that can be used in the networking/advocacy phases?
• What missing information/analysis is needed to create consensual knowledge sufficient for a
cooperative engagement strategy to unfold in a conflict situation? Can your network supply it or do
you need to bring in new players/analysts?
INFOAXIOM 10 www.infoaxioms.org
The best information is free
•Excellent e-information is more valuable when it is abundant
•Excellent e-information is cheaper as its value increases due to abundance
•The most valuable e-information is ubiquitous and free
INFOAXIOM 10 www.infoaxioms.org
Is your information the best and free?
•Does your network generate abundant information that is tailored to user need?
•Does it get cheaper to produce excellent information as your network
achieves dominance?
•Have you minimized (close to zero or positive as possible) the registration cost
to the user?
Old Information HierarchyPerc
eiv
ed Im
port
ance
Lo wH
igh
Liberal
Conservative
1
234
5
6
7 8 7
10 11 129
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Old Information HierarchyPerc
eiv
ed Im
port
ance
Lo wH
igh
Liberal
Conservative
1
234
5
6
7 8 7
10 11 129
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
IAEA Reporting
Arms Control Analysis from ACDA and the Labs
Routine Diplomatic Reporting
Routine HUMINT Reporting and CIA Analysis
Routine DIA Reporting and Analysis
“Liberal” US Press
“Centrist” US Press and Electronic Media
Conservative US Press
Activist-Grass
Roots NGO Informatio
n
Typical Track II Diplomacy
Liberal Academic Analysis
Foundation Generated
Reports
Foreign Press: FBIS and JPRS
Public Opinion
Most Belt Way Bandit Analysis
Conservative Academic Analysis
Old Information HierarchyPerc
eiv
ed Im
port
ance
Lo wH
igh
Liberal
Conservative
1
234
5
6
7 8 7
10 11 129
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Policy Advice from “Serious” Allied Governments or World Statesmen
Policy and Budget Advice from “Serious” Members of Congress
Sensitive State Department Diplomatic Reporting (NODIS)
Sensitive HUMINT Reporting (Colored Border)
Restricted Data DOE/National Labs and Technical Analysis
“A Team” DIA ReportingExecutive Branch Initiated Track II Diplomacy
Perceptions of Fully Cleared Exec. Branch Staff With Formal “Need to Know”
Recommendations of Respected Former Gov. Officials
Elite DOD Funded Think Tank Analysis
Old Information HierarchyPerc
eiv
ed Im
port
ance
Lo wH
igh
Liberal
Conservative
1
234
5
6
7 8 7
10 11 129
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Final US PresidentRecommendation From Select Heads of State
Policy “Choice Candidates” and Recommendations from Intimate Presidential Advisors, Cabinet Secretaries, and Select Senior Policy Makers
Eyes-Only Information from the Soviet Union and Advice from Associated Experts
NSC-DOD Dominated Inter-Agency Tasking, Decision Memos and Advice from Select Senior Staff
“Hard” SCI Intelligence Data: COMINT, ELINT, Photo-Reconnaissance, Environmental Sampling
Emerging New Paradigm Information
Hierarchy1
2
3
4
5
6
Two-Hat-Plus Innovators
One Percent, One-Hat (Career-Track) “Pros”
Two Hat Plus Establishment Gatekeepers
Two-Hat Traditionalists
Radical Republican Isolationalists
One Hat Implementers
information axioms
http://www.infoaxioms.org
Bibliography
Agre, Philip E. (1999) 'The Law of Opposite Numbers: Standards Dynamics and Global Logic of Software' Paper presented to eFlorida Conference on Electronic Government'.
Agre, Philip E. (1998a) 'Designing Genres for New Media: Social, Economic, and Political Contexts' in CyberSociety 2.0 Revisiting CMC and Community, Steven Jones, ed., Sage.
Agre, Philip E. (1998b) 'The Internet and Public Discourse' First Monday http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_3/agre>.
Arthur, W. Brian and Lane, David A. (1994) Information Contagion. Edited by W. Brian Arthur. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Arrow, K.J. (1975) Economic Development: The Present State of the Art, Honolulu: East-West Center.
Bell, Daniel (1976) The Coming of Post-industrial society: A venture in Social Forecasting New York: Basic Books.
Bially, Janice (1997)'Information and State Power: Toward a Techno-social Approach,' RAND working paper.
Braman, Sandra (1989) 'Defining Information: An Approach for Policymakers', Telecommunications Policy, 13 (3), September, 233-42.
Castells, Manuel (1996) The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume I: The Rise of the Network Society Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Castells, Manuel (1997) The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume II: The Power of Identity Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Demchak, Chris C.; Friis, Christian; La Porte, Todd M. (1997) Governance in an Information Age: Early Patterns of Global Diffusion of the Web and Openness Across Public Agencies.<http://cyprg.arizona.edu/CygovN97.htm>.
Downes, Anthony (1967) Inside Bureaucracy Boston: Little Brown and Company.
Figallo, Cliff (1998) Hosting Web Communities New York: Wiley Computer Publishing.
Hagel, John III and Armstrong, Arthur G. (1997) Net Gain: Expanding Markets Through Virtual Communities Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
information axioms
http://www.infoaxioms.org
Bibliography
Kelly, Kevin (1998) New Rules for the New Economy New York: Viking Press.
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1998) "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age" Foreign Affairs, September/October. Lamberton, Donald M. (1996), ed., The Economics of Communication and Information Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Machlup, Fritz (1962) The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mulgan, G.J. (1991) Communication and Control: Networks and the New Economies of Communication, New York: Guilford.
Shapiro, Carl and Varian, Hal R. (1999) Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Toffler, Alfin and Heidi (1993) War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century New York: Warner Publishing.
top related