happiness in augustines confessions1

Happiness in Augustine’s Confessions1

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Augustine'sConfessions:PhilosophyinAutobiographyWilliamE.Mann

Printpublicationdate:2014PrintISBN-13:9780199577552PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:June2014DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577552.001.0001

HappinessinAugustine’sConfessions1

NicholasWolterstorff

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577552.003.0004

AbstractandKeywords

ThisessayfirstarguesthatwhatAugustinehasinmindby“happiness”(“beatitude”)isquitedifferentfromwhatthePeripateticsandStoicshadinmind.ItthendiscussesAugustine’sdiagnosisofthecauseofhisunhappinessbeforehisconversion:helovedearthlythingsinsteadofGod.Augustinetellsthestoryofhisconversioninsuchawaythatoneexpectsthat,uponhisconversion,hehasfoundhappiness.Book10makesclearthatthatisnotthecase;heremainsdeeplyunhappy,thecauseofhisunhappinessnowbeingthatheyieldstothetemptationtodelightinthingsotherthanGodandGodalone.Completehappinessisnotpossibleinthislife.

Keywords:happiness,Stoics,conversion,pleasure,temptation

InthefirsttenbooksofhisConfessionsAugustinetellsthestoryofhislifeasthestoryofhissearchforhappiness.Therebyheappearstostandsquarelyinthetraditionofancient

eudaimonism,fortheeudaimonistsheldthatthefundamentalquestionweshouldeachposeforourselvesishowtoconductone’slifesothatitisahappylife.

Butappearancesdeceive.NotonlydidAugustine’ssearchforhappinesstakehimdownaroadverydifferentfromthattrodbyanyoftheeudaimonists;whathemeantbythetermtranslatedashappiness,beatitudo,turnsouttohavebeenverydifferentfromwhattheRomanphilosophersmeantbythetermandfromwhattheGreekphilosophersmeantbythetermeudaimonia,ofwhichbeatitudowasthetranslation.(p.47)

WhatDidtheAncientPhilosophersMeanbytheTermsEudaimoniaandBeatitudo?ThoughtheancientGreektermeudaimoniaisalmostalwaystranslatedintoEnglishas“happiness,”everyonewhocommentsonthematterobservesthatthepresent-daymeaningandconnotationsofourEnglishterm“happiness”arequitedifferentfromthoseofeudaimoniaasitwasusedbytheancientGreekphilosophers.

InhisNicomacheanEthics(6.5,1140a25–8),Aristotleremarksthat“itisthoughttobeamarkofamanofpracticalwisdomtobeabletodeliberatewellaboutwhatisgoodandexpedientforhimself,notinsomeparticularrespect,e.g.,aboutwhatsortsofthingsconducetohealthortostrength,butaboutwhatsortsofthingscontributetothegoodlifeingeneral.”2Fromthecontextinwhichthispassageoccursweknowthatitisaboutthecharacteroftheeudaimônlifethatthemanofpracticalwisdomdeliberates.WecanconcludethatAristotleunderstandstheterm“theeudaimônlife”tomeanthegoodlifeingeneral.

Thoughourterm“thegoodlife”seemstomedefinitelybetterthan“thehappylife”fortranslatingwhatAristotlemeantbythetermeudaimonia,ittoohasirrelevantanddistractingconnotations.Ijudgethatourterms“theestimablelife”and“theadmirablelife”comeclosertocatchingwhatAristotlehadinmind.Theeudaimônlifeisthelifeworthyofesteem,worthyofadmiration.

InwhatfollowsIshallassumethatwhatAristotlemeantbythetermeudaimoniawastypicaloftheancientGreekphilosophers;Iknowofnoevidencetothecontrary.IshallalsoassumethatwhattheancientphilosopherswhowroteinLatinmeantbybeatitudowasthesameaswhatAristotlemeantbyeudaimonia.Again,Iknowofnoevidencetothecontrary.

Whatthetermseudaimoniaandbeatitudomeantisonething;whattheancientphilosophersheldtocharacterizeorconstitutetheestimablelifeisanotherthing.Thereweresustaineddisputesamongthemonhowthatquestionshouldbeanswered;thosewhowereeudaimonistsagreed,however,onthegeneraloutlineoftheanswer.EarlierintheEthics,beforethepassagequotedabove,Aristotlehadtakennoteofsomeofthe(p.48) disagreements(1.1,1095a17–20).Some“thinkitissomeplainandobviousthing,likepleasure,wealth,orhonour.”Thoseof“superiorrefinement”say,however,thateudaimoniaischaracterizedbylivingwellanddoingwell.3ItgoeswithoutsayingthatAristotlecountedhimselfamongthoseofsuperiorrefinement;theestimablelife,on

Aristotle’sview,consistsoflivingwellanddoingwell.

Whatevertheirdisagreementsonothermatters,theancienteudaimonistsallsharedthisview.4Theyallheldwhatonemightcalltheactivitythesisconcerningtheestimablelife.Describingancienteudaimonismingeneral,thesuperbscholarofancientphilosophy,JuliaAnnas,saysthat“Happinessis...thoughtofasactiveratherthanpassive,andassomethingthatinvolvestheagent’sactivity,andthusasbeing,commonsensically,uptotheagent.Thiskindofconsiderationwouldruleoutwealth,forexample,rightaway.Happinesscannotjustbeathing,howevergood,thatsomeonemightpresentyouwith.Attheveryleastitinvolveswhatyoudowithwealth,thekindofuseyouputitto.”5AnnasquotesArius’paraphraseofAristotle:“[Sincethefinalgoodisnotthefulfilmentofbodilyandexternalgoods,butlivingaccordingtovirtue],thereforehappinessisactivity....Happinessislife,andlifeisthefulfilmentofaction.Nobodilyorexternalgoodisinitselfanactionoringeneralanactivity.”6

(p.49) Theactivitythesisoftheancienteudaimonistsisboldandstriking.Everyethicalsystememploystheideaofcertainstatesandeventsinaperson’slifeasbeinggoodthingsinthatperson’slife.Likewiseeveryethicalsystememploystheideaofcertainactionsandactivitiesonthepartofthepersonasbeinggoodthingsinthatperson’slife.Mybeingofgoodhealthisoneofthestatesinmylifethatisagoodinmylife;mylisteningtoafineperformanceofaBeethovenstringquartetisoneoftheactivitiesthatisagoodinmylife.

Theactivitythesisassumesthatonlysomeofaperson’slife-goodscontributetoone’sassessmentoftheestimabilityoftheperson’slife;theothersareirrelevanttothatassessment.TheStoicsemphasizedthepointbydecliningtocallthelattergoods,reservingthattermfortheformer.Theycalledthelatterpreferables;andtothese,alongwithwhatonemightcallthedis-preferables,theygavethenameofindifferents,theideabeingthattheyareindifferentwithrespecttoassessingtheestimabilityofaperson’slife.Whattheactivitythesisthensaysisthatonlythoselife-goodsthatareactionsandactivitiesonaperson’spartarerelevanttoassessingtheestimabilityofaperson’slife;thoselife-goodsthatarestatesandeventsinherlifeareirrelevant,indifferent.ThePeripateticspartedwaysfromtheStoicsbyholdingthatthedeprivationoflife-goodsofthelattersortmaywellimpairone’sexerciseofvirtuousactivityandtherebydiminishtheestimabilityofone’slife;butitisthatimpairmentofvirtuousactivitythatdiminishestheestimabilityofone’slife,notthemeredeprivationoflife-goodsthatarestatesandeventsinone’slife.HereishowAnnasmakesthepoint:“Theindifferents—conventionalgoodsandevils—havevalueforhappinessonlyinbeingthematerialsforandcontextwithinwhichthevirtuouslifeislived.Ontheirowntheyneitheraddtothehappinessofalifenorsubtractfromit.”7Oneperson’slifemaybepreferabletothatofanotherwithoutitsbeingmoreestimable,morehappy.

TheStoicdistinctionbetweengoodsandpreferableshasbeenasourceofperplexitytocommentatorsbothancientandmodern.CiceroandAugustinewereoftheviewthatitwasapurelyverbaldistinction.InCityofGodAugustineremarksthat“when[theStoics]saythatthesethingsarenottobecalledgoodsbutadvantages[commoda],weareto

regard(p.50) thisasadisputeoverwords,notasagenuinedistinctionbetweenthings”(CG9.5).8

AfewpagesearlierAugustinehadhimselfcitedthereasonthattheStoicsgavefortheirdistinction:“theStoicsrefusetocallbodilyandexternalthings‘goods’.Rather,theycallthem‘advantages’,becausetheyconsiderthatthereisnogoodformanexceptvirtue,andthatthisistheartoflivingwell,whichexistsonlyinthemind”(p.362).Augustinethenproceedstoarguethat,inrefusingtocall“bodilyandexternalthings”goods,callingtheminsteadpreferablesoradvantages,theStoicsweredepartingbothfromordinaryusageandfromtheusageofthePeripatetics:“inthisquestion,theStoicsareonlytakingpleasureinanoveluseofwords”(p.362).

Augustinemayhavebeenrightonthatlastpoint.Butfromthefact,ifitwasafact,thattheStoicsweredepartingbothfromordinaryusageandfromthephilosophicalusageofthePeripatetics,itdoesnotfollowthattheywerenotmarkingoutagenuinedistinctionwiththeiridiosyncraticuseofterms.Theywere.Itwas—soIsuggestedabove—thedistinctionbetweenthoselife-goodsthatarerelevanttoappraisingtheestimabilityofaperson’slifeandthosethatarenot.

Icalledtheactivitythesis“boldandstriking”:howapersonfaresplaysnoroleinassessingtheestimabilityofherlife,onlywhatshedoes—thoughonthePeripateticview,howshefaresmaywellhaveaneffectonhervirtuousactivityandtherebyontheestimabilityofherlife.Imighthaveaddedthat,formanyifnotmostofus,thethesisisalsocounterintuitive.ThoughJob,intheHebrewBible,livedhislifewell,hislifedidnotgowell;hedidnotfarewell.TheimplicitnarratorofthestoryclearlyregardedJob’slifeaslessestimableonthataccount.Wasthenarratornotrightaboutthat?

Whatargumentdidtheancienteudaimonistsgivefortheirview?Whydidtheyholdthatitisonlywhatapersondoesthatisrelevantforappraisingtheestimabilityofhisorherlife,notwhathappenstohim,nothowhefares?Iknowofnopassageintheancienteudaimonistsinwhichthisquestionisaddressedinitsfullgenerality.InthepassagesIknow,thewritercontentshimselfwitharguingagainstspecificversionsofthealternative:beingwealthydoesnotcontributetotheestimabilityofone’slife,(p.51) havinghonorsbestowedononedoesnotcontributetotheestimabilityofone’slife,etc.

WhattheStoicscalledpreferables,thePeripatetics(Aristotelians)callednaturalgoods.Thoughthepreferablesornaturalgoodsinone’slifearenotrelevanttoassessingtheestimabilityofaperson’slife,theydofunctionastheindispensablematterforlivingone’slife—“matter”isAnnas’sterm.Thepreferables—wealth,health,friendship,etc.—differintheirrelativeworth.Thechallengeforeachofusistodeterminethecorrectprioritiesamongthosepreferablesthatareavailabletous;andthen,thatdone,toactaccordingly.Andnotonlytoactaccordingly,butalsotoactinacertainmanner.Onemightactaccordinglyaftergoingthroughagoniesofindecision.Farbetter,theeudaimoniststhought,todosooutofhabit.TheyallagreedwithAristotle’sdictumthattheeudaimônorestimablelifeisthelifelivedinaccordwithvirtue,avirtuebeinganhabituatedskillinassessingprioritiesamongtheactualandpotentialpreferablesinone’slifeandacting

accordingly.TheStoicscalledapersonwholivessuchalifeasage.

ItwascharacteristicoftheStoicstomakemuchofthefactthatbecomingasagerequiresafundamentalreformationofthenaturalself.Weallexperiencenegativeemotions.Butinthefullyestimablelifetherewillbenonegativeemotions—nofear,nogrief,noregret,noremorse,nothingofthesort.OntheStoictheoryoftheemotions,theonlywaytoeliminatenegativeemotionsfromone’slifeistodivestoneselfofallattachmentsto,andofalldesiresfor,thatwhichisnotfullywithinone’sowncontrol—theonlygoodentirelywithinone’sowncontrolbeingone’sownvirtue.Andtheonlywaytodivestoneselfofallattachmentsto,andofalldesiresfor,thingsnotinone’scontrolistoarriveatthepointofrecognizingandbelievingthatnoneofsuchthingsisworthdesiringorbeingattachedto.Thewaytoeliminatefromyourlifegriefoverthedeathoffriendsandrelativesistobringyourselftobelievethatthey’renotworthbeingattachedto;onlyyourownvirtuehasthatworth.Arrivingatthispointofemotionaldetachmentisdifficult;itrequireslongtrainingandardenteffort.Onlyafewpeoplebecomesages.

WhatAugustineMeantbyHappiness“Surelyhappinessiswhateveryonewants,”saysAugustine,“somuchsothattherecanbenonewhodonotwantit”(10.20).“Withoutexception(p.52) wealllongforhappiness”(10.21).9Inmakingtheseclaims,whatdidAugustinemeanbytheterm“happiness”?

InBook10oftheConfessionshewritesthefollowing:

Iftwomenwereaskedwhethertheywantedtoserveinthearmy,onemightreplythathedidandtheotherthathedidnot.Ifontheotherhand,theywereaskedwhethertheywantedtobehappy,theywouldbothreplyatonceandwithouthesitationthattheydid.Theonlyreasonwhyoneofthemshouldwishtoserveinthearmyandtheothernottoservewouldbethattheywantedtobehappy.Isitthatdifferentpersonsfindjoyindifferentthings?Allagreethattheywanttobehappy,justas,iftheywereasked,theywouldallagreethattheydesiredjoy.Infacttheythinkthatjoyisthesameashappiness.Theymayallsearchforitindifferentways,butalltrytheirhardesttoreachthesamegoal,thatis,joy.(10.21)

Augustineaskswhyitisthatonemantriestofindhappinessbyservinginthearmywhereasanothertriestofindhappinessbystayingoutofthearmy.Isitbecausedifferentpeoplefindjoyindifferentthings?Everybodydoes,afterall,wanthappinessandeverybodyidentifieshappinesswithjoy.Augustinedoesnotdirectlyanswerthequestion,nordoeshecorrectthecommonpracticeofconnectinghappinesswithjoy.Tothecontrary:afewpageslaterheexplicitlyidentifiestruehappinesswithtruejoy.“OLord,...farbeitfrommetothinkthatwhateverjoyIfeelmakesmetrulyhappy.Forthereisajoythatisnotgiventothosewhodonotloveyou,butonlytothosewholoveyouforyourownsake....Thisistruehappiness,andthereisnoother.Thosewhothinkthatthereisanotherkindofhappinesslookforjoyelsewhere,buttheirsisnottruejoy.Yettheirmindsaresetuponsomethingakintojoy”(10.22).

Theidentificationoftruehappinesswithtruejoyissuggested,ifnotquiteexplicitlyaffirmed,inanumberofotherpassagesintheConfessions.Book6openswithAugustinetellingabouthisarrivalinMilantotakeupapositionas“teacherofliteratureandelocution”(5.13).Thoughhispositionwassecureandrespectable,hewasmiserable.Herecallshowoneday,“you[God]mademerealizehowutterlywretchedIwas”(6.6).Hehadbeen“preparingaspeechinpraiseoftheEmperor,intendingthatitshouldincludeagreatmanylieswhichwouldcertainlybeapplaudedby[the]audience”(6.6).(p.53)

AsIwalkedalongoneofthestreetsinMilanInoticedapoorbeggarwhomust,Isuppose,havehadhisfilloffoodanddrink,sincehewaslaughingandjoking.SadlyIturnedtomycompanionsandspoketothemofallthepainandtroublewhichiscausedbyourownfolly.MyambitionshadplacedaloadofmiseryonmyshouldersandthefurtherIcarriedittheheavieritbecame,buttheonlypurposeofalltheeffortswemadewastoreachthegoalofpeacefulhappiness.Thisbeggarhadalreadyreacheditaheadofus,andperhapsweshouldneverreachitatall.ForbyallmylaboriouscontrivingandintricatemanoeuvresIwashopingtowinthejoyofworldlyhappiness,theverythingwhichthismanhadalreadysecuredatthecostofthefewpencewhichhehadbegged.

Ofcourse,hiswasnottruehappiness.ButthestateoffelicitywhichIaimedtoreachwasstillmorefalse.He,atanyrate,wascheerful,whileIwasunhappy;hehadnoworries,butIwasfullofapprehension.(6.6)

Bytheterm“joy”Augustineclearlymeantacertainexperientialstate.Sotoo,then,by“thehappylife”hemeantalifewhoseexperientialconditionisthatofjoy,truejoy.WhatAugustinemeantby“happiness”wasthusmuchclosertowhatwetodaymeanbythetermthanitwastowhattheancienteudaimonistsmeantbyeudaimoniaorbeatitudo.OfcourseAugustineregardedthelifeoftruejoyastheestimablelife;that’sobvious.Buthedidnotusetheterm“thehappylife”(beatitudo)tomean“theestimablelife.”Ifby“thehappylife”(beatitudo)hehadmeanttheestimablelife,itwouldhavebeenappropriateforhimtoraisethequestionwhetherthejoyfullifefitstheconceptofthehappy(estimable)life,orwhetherperhapsitissomeothersortoflifethanthejoyfullifethatfitstheconcept.NowheredoesAugustineraisethatquestion.10

Aswesawearlier,theStoicsheldthatthepersonwhohadsucceededinbecomingafull-fledgedsagewouldexperiencenonegativeemotions;hewould,however,experiencecertainpositiveemotions,includingthatofjoy.Thejoytheyhadinmindwasthejoythatthesageexperiencesuponsatisfyinghisdesiretobeasage.Thethingdesired,namely,tobe(p.54) afull-fledgedsage,wasnotitselfajoyfulexperience.WhatAugustinedesired,andwhathethoughteverybodydesired,albeitofteninaconfusedway,wasalifewhoseexperientialqualitywasjoy.

ThequestionthatremainstobeconsiderediswhatAugustinetooktruejoytobe.Thoughheneverexplicitlysays,Ithinktherecanbelittledoubt.Truejoyisjoyunalloyedbymisery.Truejoyisalsoenduringjoy,joynotfollowedbymisery.Andtruejoyisdeep,notshallow,thedeepestjoyavailabletoahumanbeing.Thereasonthejoyofthebeggar

inMilanwasnottruejoywasthatitwastemporaryandshallow.11

Augustine’sDiagnosisofhisMiserybeforehisConversionIntheConfessions,Augustinetellsthestoryofhislifeasthestoryofhissearchforhappiness.Inthecourseofdoingsoheoffersadiagnosis,inthefirstninebooks,ofthemiseryheexperiencedbeforehisconversion.Hereandthereheindicatesthatbeforehisconversionhealreadyhadsomeinklingofthisdiagnosis.Butit’simportanttokeepinmindthathisprojectinthefirstninebooksisnottodescribehowhediagnosedhispre-conversionmiseryatthetimebuthowhenowdiagnosesit,afterhisconversion.

HisdescriptionofthegriefhefeltuponthedeathofhisschoolboyfriendinTagasteisextraordinaryinitsstrikingimageryandeloquentpathos:“Myheartgrewsomberwithgrief,andwhereverIlookedIsawonlydeath.Myowncountrybecameatormentandmyownhomeagrotesqueabodeofmisery.Allthatwehaddonetogetherwasnowagrimordealwithouthim....Mysoulwasaburden,bruisedandbleeding.Itwastiredofthemanwhocarriedit,butIfoundnoplacetosetitdowntorest.Neitherthecharmofthecountrysidenorthesweetscentsofagardencouldsootheit.Itfoundnopeaceinsongorlaughter,noneinthecompanyoffriendsattableorinthepleasuresoflove,noneeveninbooksor(p.55) poetry.Everythingthatwasnotwhatmyfriendhadbeenwasdullanddistasteful”(4.7).

Therootcauseofthegriefhefeltisnow,afterhisconversion,obvioustohim.Hehadbeenattachedtohisfriend.Whenoneisattachedtosomeoneandthatpersondies,onegrieves.Nowayaroundit;it’salawoflife.Hismiserywaslikethatof“everymanwhosesoulistetheredbytheloveofthingsthatcannotlastandthenisagonizedtolosethem”(4.6).“ThegriefIfeltforthelossofmyfriendhadstrucksoeasilyintomyinmostheartsimplybecauseIhadpouredoutmysouluponhim,likewateruponsand,lovingamanwhowasmortalasthoughhewerenevertodie”(4.8).

ThemiseryAugustinefeltlaterinMilan,intheyearsbeforehisconversion,wasdifferent;itwasnotgriefoverthedeathofsomeonetowhomhewasattachedbutthemiserythatensueduponthefrustrationofdeepdesiresonhispart.“Iwaseagerforfameandwealthandmarriage,”hesays,“butyou[God]deridedtheseambitions.Theycausedmetosufferthemostgallingdifficulties”(6.6).WhatAugustinehappensnottomentionhereiswhatwas,onhistelling,themostpersistentsourceofmiseryinhislifeforagoodmanyyearsbeforehisconversion.Hewasinastateofintellectualturmoil,hauntedbyphilosophicalquestionstowhichhecouldfindnosatisfactoryanswers.WritingabouthisearlydaysinMilan,whenhewasthirtyyearsold,hesaysthatalongtime“hadpassedsinceIwasnineteen,theageatwhichIhadfirstbeguntosearchinearnestfortruthandwisdomandhadpromisedmyselfthat,onceIhadfoundthem,Iwouldgiveupallthevainhopesandmaddelusionswhichsustainedmyfutileambitions.IrealizedthatIwasnowthirtyyearsoldandwasstillflounderinginthesamequagmire”(6.11).

WhatstrikesyouandmewhenwereadAugustine’slongstoryofthemiseriesheexperiencedbeforehisconversionandofhissearchforreleasefrommiseryintohappiness,ishowseldomhementionsanymiseriesthatbefellhim.Themiserieshe

mentionsarealmostallbroughtonhimselfbydesiresthathecannotsatisfyandbyattachmentstopersonswhodie.Onacoupleofoccasionshementionshisannoyanceathisrowdystudents;butthat’sitbywayofmiseriesthatbefellhim.Neverdoeshementionanybodilypainordiscomfort,anyworriesaboutmoney,andthelike.Nodoubtthisreflectshishealthandhispositioninsociety;hismiserieswerethemiseriesofahealthyprivilegedyoungmaninthelateRomanEmpire.

ThecurethattheStoicswouldhaverecommendedtoAugustineforhismiserywasthatheworkatreforminghimselfsothathewouldbefreeof(p.56) allattachmentsandwoulddesireonlywhatwasentirelyinhisowncontrol,viz.,hisownvirtue,thustobecomeimmunetonegativeemotions.ThecureAugustinesoughtforhismiserywasinsteadakintothatwhichthePlatonistsandNeoplatonistswouldhaverecommended,namely,todetachhislovefromeverythingmutable:toattachitinsteadtosomethingimmutableandindestructible,andthentoseetoitthatallhisdesireswereincorporatedintothatlove.ForAugustine,theonlycandidateforsuchlovewasGod.“[InGod]istheplaceofpeacethatcannotbedisturbed,andhewillnotwithholdhimselffromyourloveunlessyouwithholdyourlovefromhim....Makeyourdwellinginhim,mysoul.Entrusttohimwhateveryouhave....Allthatiswitheredinyouwillbemadetothriveagain.Allyoursicknesswillbehealed”(4.11).“Blessedarethosewholoveyou,OGod....Noonecanloseyou...unlessheforsakesyou”(4.9).ForGodisimmutable,“eternallythesame”(1.6).

AugustineRemainsMiserableUponfinishingBook9oftheConfessionsonehasthedistinctimpressionthatAugustine’sconversiontoChristianitymeantthathewasnowonthepathawayfrommiseryandtowardtruejoy.InBook9hedescribedanepisodeofpurejoy.Itoccurredduringoneofhisfinalconversationswithhismother.“WhilewespokeoftheeternalWisdom,”hesays,“longingforitandstrainingforitwithallthestrengthofourhearts,foronefleetinginstantwereachedoutandtouchedit.Thenwithasigh,leavingourspiritualharvestboundtoit,wereturnedtothesoundofourownspeech,inwhicheachwordhasabeginningandanending—far,fardifferentfromyourWord,ourLord,whoabidesinhimselfforever,yetnevergrowsoldandgivesnewlifetoallthings”(9.10).LaterhesaysthatitwasGodwhohadtouchedhimratherthanhewhohadtouchedGod,andthathehadtastedGod:“Itastedyou,andnowIhungerandthirstforyou.Youtouchedme,andIaminflamedwithloveofyourpeace”(10.27).

FromtheremainderofBook9,inwhichhedescribeshisresponsetothedeathofhismother,welearnthathisconversiondidnotimmediatelyreleasehimfromallmisery.Uponthedeathofhisschoolboyfriendhehadallowedhistearstoflowfreely;theywerehisonly“consolation”(4.6).Uponthedeathofhismotherhefoughttocontainhistears:“Ifoughtagainstthewaveofsorrowandforawhileitreceded,butthenitswept(p.57)uponmeagainwithfullforce....Itwasmiserytofeelmyselfsoweakavictimofthesehumanemotions,althoughwecannotescapethem,sincetheyarethenaturallotofmankind,andsoIhadtheaddedsorrowofbeinggrievedbymyownfeelings,sothatIwastormentedbyatwofoldagony”(9.12).Hehadbeenattachedtohismother,muchmorethantohisschoolboyfriend.Nowtheir“lifetogether,whichhadbeensoprecious

andsodeartome,wassuddenlycutoff”(9.12).Griefensued,unavoidably.Butaddedtothisgriefisnowthemiseryhefeelsfornothavingbeenabletoreformhimselfashedesired;hewasstill“guiltyoftoomuchworldlyaffection”(9.13).

SoweknowfromBook9thathisconversiondidnotimmediatelyreleasehimfromallmisery.Nonetheless,mostreaderswillhavegottentheimpressionthathisconversionmeantthatAugustinewasonthepathtoreleasefrommiseryandtowardtruejoy.Itcomesasasurprise,then,indeedashock,tolearnintheremainingbooksoftheConfessionsthatthatwasnotthecase.Augustineremainsasmiserableasever.Themiserynowtakesanewform,however,theformittookinhisgriefoverhismother’sdeath;hefindsthatheisincapableofreforminghimselfashedesirestoreformhimself.HeisconvincedthatloveofGodisthepathtodeliverancefrommisery.ButhefindshimselfincapableofsatisfyinghisdeepdesiretoclingtoGodwithallhisbeing:“WhenatlastIclingtoyouwithallmybeing,formetherewillbenomoresorrow,nomoretoil.”Buthecan’tdoit.“Havepityonme,OLord,inmymisery!Idonothidemywoundsfromyou.Iamsick,andyouarethephysician”(10.28).Heisdismayedwithhimself,deeplydispleased,ashamed(9.2).

Theproblem,asheseesit,isthathefindshimselfincapableofresistingcertaintemptations—temptationsthatheknowstobetemptations.Heclassifiesthesetemptationsunderthreeheadings.Hisanalysisofhowtheyworkisfascinating.12Sincemuchofwhathesaysaboutthesetemptationsisforuscounterintuitive,sometimesevenrepellant,Iwillbequoting(p.58) ratherextensivelysoastoassurethereaderthathereallydidholdtheviewsthatIattributetohim.

TheTemptationtoDesireSensoryPleasureforitsOwnSakeThefirstsortoftemptationthathediscussesis“thebody’stemptationtopleasure”(10.34).Hebeginswiththepleasurethathefindsineating.“Thepurposeofeatinganddrinkingistopreservehealth”(10.31).“Ilookuponfoodasamedicine,”hesays(10.31).Butournatureissuchthattheprocessofsatisfyingone’shungeris“asourceofdelight,”“apleasure”(10.31).Andthispleasureprovestobe“ominous,”forittemptsonetoeatforthesakeofthepleasureratherthanforthesakeofone’shealth.“Moreover,healthandenjoymenthavenotthesamerequirements,forwhatissufficientforhealthisnotenoughforenjoyment,anditisoftenhardtotellwhetherthebody,whichmustbecaredfor,requiresfurthernourishment,orwhetherwearebeingdeceivedbytheallurementsofgreeddemandingtobegratified.Myunhappysoulwelcomesthisuncertainty,usingittovindicateandexcuseitself.Itisgladthattheproperrequirementsofhealthareindoubt,sothatunderthepretenceofcaringforhealthitmaydisguisethepursuitofpleasure”(10.31).

Bycontrast,thepleasureyieldedbythesenseofsmellhasneverbeenasignificantsourceoftemptationforhim.“Idonotmisssweetscentswhentheyareabsent,”hesays,“butneitherdoIrefusethemwhereIfindthem.Iamevenreadytodowithoutthemaltogether”(10.32).

Thepleasuresofsoundaredifferentagain.Previouslyhewas“enthralledbythem,but

you[God]brokemybondsandsetmefree.”Hecontinuesto“findsomeenjoymentinthemusicofhymns,whicharealivewithyourpraises,whenIhearthemsungbywell-trained,melodiousvoices.ButIdonotenjoyitsomuchthatIcannottearmyselfaway.IcanleaveitwhenIwish”(10.33).Andinanycase,itisnow“notthesinging[ofthehymns]thatmovesmebutthemeaningofthewordswhentheyaresunginaclearvoicetothemostappropriatetune”(10.33).Inthispracticethereis“greatvalue”;itinspiresthelistenerwith“feelingsofdevotion.”Onthoseoccasionswhenhenoticesthatheisfinding“thesingingitselfmoremovingthanthetruthwhichitconveys,”hewouldprefer,saysAugustine,“nottohearthesinger,”for“thisisagrievoussin”(10.33).

(p.59) Thepleasuresofsightremainaseriousproblemforhim.“Theeyesdelightinbeautifulshapesofdifferentsortsandbrightandattractivecolors.Iwouldnothavethesethingstakepossessionofmysoul.LetGodpossessit,whomadethemall.”Butdespitehisdesire,theydotakepossessionofhissoul.Theproblemisthataslongasoneisawake,withone’seyesopen,onecannothelpbutsee.Theeyes“grantmenorespitesuchasIamgrantedinmomentsofsilencewhenthereisnosingingandsometimesnosoundatalltobeheard.Forlight,thequeenofcolours,pervadesallthatIsee,whereverIamthroughouttheday,andbytheever-changingpatternofitsraysitenticesmeevenwhenIamoccupiedwithsomethingelseandtakenonoteofit.Itwinssofirmaholdonmethat,ifIamsuddenlydeprivedofit,Ilongtohaveitback,andifIamleftforlongwithoutitIgrowdispirited”(10.34).Lightisa“sweetseasoning”;itisthisthatmakesit“temptinganddangerous”(10.34).

Beforewemoveontoanothersortoftemptation,let’sreflectabitonthisfirsttype.Augustine’sanalysisofwhatitisthatthesensestemptustodoandwhatitisaboutthemthatcreatesthetemptationisclear.Thesensestemptustodesiretheacquisitionorprolongationofsensorypleasureforitsownsake;andtheyharborthistemptationbecausewearesocreatedastofindpleasureanddelightinagoodmanyofoursensoryexperiences.There’snothingwecandoaboutthis.Andthereisnothingwrongwithsensorydelightassuch.Thismuchisclear.

WhatislesscleariswhyAugustinethinksthatdesiringtheacquisitionorprolongationofsensorypleasureordelightforitsownsakeiswrong.Obviouslydesiringitforitsownsakeiswrongifitresultsingluttony.ButAugustinethinksthatdesiringitforitsownsakeisinherentlywrong,alwayswrong.Whyso?

Theclue,soIsuggest,liesinthelastsentencequoted:“Itwinssofirmaholdonmethat,ifIamsuddenlydeprivedofit,Ilongtohaveitback,andifIamleftforlongwithoutitIgrowdispirited.”Desirefortheacquisitionorprolongationofsomesensorypleasureissusceptibletobeingfrustrated;andthefrustrationofdesirealwayscausesmisery.One’sdesiresforcertainkindsofsensorypleasuremaybesuchthatthechanceoftheirbeingfrustratedisvanishinglysmall;somemaybesuchthatthemiseryensuringupontheirfrustrationisutterlyminor.Nonetheless,desireforanythingotherthantheimmutablealwaysharborsthepotentialformisery.Andtruejoyrequiresreleasefrommisery.

(p.60) OnemorecomponentinAugustine’sviewsconcerningsensorypleasuremustbenoted.One’sacceptanceofsuchsensorypleasureascomesone’swayisnottobeacomponentinone’slifeinadditiontoone’sloveofGod.ThoughAugustinehappensnottoemphasizethepoint,itisclearlyhisviewthatsuchsensorypleasuresascomeone’swaymustbeincorporatedintoone’sloveofGodby,forexample,thankingandpraisingGodforsuchdelight.Thoughherecognizesthatthe“allurementsoftheeye”aredangerous,Augustinehasnonetheless“learnttopraiseyou[God]forthisaswellasforyourothergifts”(10.34).Andasforthebeautifulthingsmadebyhumanbeingsthatdelightthesenses,“forthesethingstooIofferyou[God]ahymnofthanksgiving.Imakeasacrificeofpraisetohimwhosanctifiesme;forthebeautywhichflowsthroughmen’smindsintotheirskilfulhandscomesfromthatBeautywhichisabovetheirsoulsandforwhichmysoulsighsalldayandnight”(10.34).

TheTemptationtoDesirePraiseandtoEnjoyItAugustine’sanalysisofthesortoftemptationthathediscussesthirdissimilartohisanalysisofthatwhichhediscussedfirst,whereashisanalysisofthesecondissignificantlydifferent;soletmereversehisorderinmydiscussion.

Augustinefindshimselfafflictedbythetemptationtodesire“tobefearedorlovedbyothermen,simplyforthepleasurethatitgivesme,thoughinsuchpleasurethereisnotruejoy.Itmeansonlyalifeofmiseryanddespicablevainglory”(10.36).Theproblemis,ofcourse,thatthedesiretobefearedorlovedisatleastassusceptibletofrustrationasthedesireforsensorypleasure.

Augustinefindsitdifficulttodeterminewhetherhehassucceededinrootingoutthedesiretobelovedandpraised.“IcanseewhatprogressIhavemadeintheabilitytorestrainmymindfromgivingintosensualpleasuresoridlecuriosity.ItbecomesplainwhenIdowithoutthesethings,eithervoluntarilyorforlackoftheoccasion,becauseIthenaskmyselfhowmuch,orhowlittle,ittroublesmetobewithoutthem”(10.37).Butthistestisnotavailableinthecaseofpraise.“Ifwearetodowithoutpraiseinordertotestourpowers,arewetolivesuchoutrageouslywickedandabandonedlivesthatallwhoknowuswilldetestus?Isitpossibleto(p.61) imagineamoreinsaneproposalthanthis?Ifpraiseisnormallyassociatedwithagoodlifeandgoodworks,andrightlyso,weoughtneithertoceaselivinggoodlivesnortoabandontherightfulconsequence.ButIcannottellwhetherornotIhavetheforbearancetodowithoutanything,unlessitistakenawayfromme”(10.37).

Difficultthoughitistodeterminewhetheronehasinfactrootedoutthedesireforpraise,wemustdoourbest.Butwhataboutfindingjoyinthepraiseassuch,ratherthaninthesatisfactionofone’sdesireforpraise?Isthatacceptable?

Itisnot.Thepraiseitselfisagoodthingifthatforwhichoneispraisedispraiseworthy;it’sagoodthingifthepraiseis“for[God’s]sake”ratherthan“in[God’s]place”(10.36).Butratherthanfindingjoyinthepraiseitself,oneshouldfindjoyinone’s“possessionofthegiftforwhichmenpraise”one(10.37).Augustineconfessesthatalltoooftenheyieldstotemptationonthisscore.“Iwishthatwordsofpraisefromothermendidnotincrease

thejoyIfeelforanygoodqualitiesImayhave.YetIconfessthatitdoesincreasemyjoy.Whatismore,theircensuredetractsfromit.”Itisa“wretchedfailing”(10.37).

An“excuse”occurstohim;“howgoodanexcuseitisonlyyouknow,OGod”(10.37).Perhapswhenhefeelsjoyuponbeingrightlypraisedit’snotthepraiseitselfthatgiveshimjoybutthefactthatthepraise-giverhasdiscernedwhatispraiseworthyinhim.“ItellmyselfthatwhenIamgratifiedbythepraiseofamanwhowellunderstandswhatitisthathepraises,thetruereasonformypleasureisthatmyneighbourhasmadegoodprogressandshowspromiseforthefuture.Similarly,whenIhearhimcastasluruponsomethingwhichhedoesnotunderstandorsomethingwhichinfactisgood,Iamsorrythatheshouldhavethisfailing”(10.37).

Imyselffinditgrotesquetoenjoypraisebecauseitspeakswellforthepraise-giver.Butbethatasitmay,Augustineisnottheleastbitsurethatthisisinfactthesourceofhisjoyinbeingpraised.Maybeit’sonlyanexcuse;maybeitreallyisthepraisethatheenjoysratherthanthemoralacuityofthepraise-giver.InthelightofGod’struthheknowsthat“ifmyfeelingsarestirredbythepraisewhichIreceive,itshouldnotbeformyownsakebutforthegoodofmyneighbour.ButwhetherthisissowithmeIdonotknow,forinthismatterIknowlessaboutmyselfthanIknowofyou[God]”(10.37).

WhydoesAugustinethinkit’swrongtoenjoybeingpraised?Hedoesn’tsay.Thoughhethinksit’sdifficulttodeterminewhetheronehassucceeded(p.62) ineliminatingsuchjoyfromone’slife,hequiteclearlythinksthatitispossibletodoso.Inthatway,itisunlikesensorydelight.Itbelongstoourcreatednaturetoexperiencesensorydelight;itdoesnotbelongtoourcreatednaturetoexperiencejoyinbeingpraised.Somethingismalfunctioningwhenapersonexperiencesnosensorydelight;notsoforthepersonwhofindsnojoyinbeingpraised.Butthatleavesopenthequestion,whyisitwrongtoenjoybeingpraisedandwhy,accordingly,shouldwetrytorootsuchjoyoutofourlives?IjudgethatAugustine’sanalysisofthethirdsortoftemptationgivesacluetohowhewasthinking;solet’smoveontothat.

TheTemptationtoIndulgeinVainCuriosityAugustineintroduceshisdiscussionofthethirdsortoftemptationthatheisfighting(secondinhisorderofpresentation)byremarkingthatitis“moredangerousthan[thefirst]becauseitismorecomplicated”(10.35).It’sthetemptationtoindulgeinvaincuriosity,idlespeculation,futileinquisitiveness.“Itistosatisfythisunhealthycuriositythatfreaksandprodigiesareputonshowinthetheatre,andforthesamereasonmenareledtoinvestigatethesecretsofnature,whichareirrelevanttoourlives,althoughsuchknowledgeisofnovaluetothemandtheywishtogainitmerelyforthesakeofknowing.Itiscuriosity,too,whichcausesmentoturntosorceryintheefforttoobtainknowledgeforthesamepervertedpurpose.Anditeveninvadesourreligion,forweputGodtothetestwhenwedemandsignsandwondersfromhim,notinthehopeofsalvation,butsimplyfortheloveoftheexperience”(10.35).

Ofcourseit’swrongtopursueknowledgeforpervertedpurposes;it’swrongtopursueknowledgeforthepurposeofputtingGodtothetest.ButwhydoesAugustinethinkit’s

wrongtopursueknowledge“merelyforthesakeofknowing”?One’sinitialguessisthatwhatAugustineseesaswrongwiththisisthesameaswhathesawwrongwithdesiringsensorypleasureforitsownsakeandwrongwithdesiringthepleasureofbeingpraised:suchdesiresarealwayssusceptibletobeingfrustrated,andhenceofcausingmisery.

Hedoesindeedthinkthatindulginginvaincuriosityoftenresultsinthemiseryoffrustrateddesire.Butcuriositythatisnotvainrunsthesameriskofbeingfrustrated;andAugustinedoesnotrecommendtherooting(p.63) outofallsuchcuriosity.Book11openswithanextraordinarilyagonizedpleatoGodtogranttohim,Augustine,abetterunderstandingofGodandChristianscripture.

OLordmyGod,answermyprayer.InyourmercygrantwhatIdesire,foritisnotformyselfalonethatIsoardentlydesireit:IwishalsothatitmayservetheloveIbeartoothers....Hearme,OLord.Havemercyonme,OLordmyGod....Listentomysoulasitcriesfromthedepths....Yoursistheday,yoursisthenight.Nomomentoftimepassesexceptbyyourwill.Grantmesomepartofitformymeditationsonthesecretsofyourlaw.Donotcloseyourdoortothosewhoknock;donotclosethebookofyourlawtome....OLord,perfectyourworkinme.Opentomethepagesofyourbook.Yourvoiceismyjoy,agreaterjoythananyprofusionofworldlypleasures.GivemewhatIlove,fortrulyIloveitandthislove,too,wasyourgift....OLord,havemercyonmeandgrantwhatIdesire.For,asIbelieve,thislongingofminedoesnotcomefromadesireforearthlythings....Listen,myGod,asItellyouthecauseofmylonging....Mayitbepleasingtoyou,asIstandbeforeyourmercy,thatIshouldfindgraceinyoursight,sothatthehiddenmeaningofyourwordsmayberevealedtome.Openyourdoortomyknocking.ThisIbegofyouthroughourLordJesusChrist....Letmehearandunderstandthemeaningofthewords:IntheBeginningyoumadeheavenandearth.(11.2)

Notewell:whatAugustinepraysforhereisnotthathebefreedfromthedesiretounderstandGodandScripturebutthathisdesiretounderstandbesatisfied,atleastinpart.Thedesireisgoodandnoble;butinsofarasitisnotsatisfied,heisinmisery.WhatfollowsintheremainderofBook11isAugustine’sfamousmeditationontime,eternity,andcreation.

Sowhatthenistheproblemwith“vaincuriosity”and“idlespeculation,”ifit’snotsimplythatone’sdesireisliabletobefrustrated?SomeofhisexamplesmakeclearwhatAugustineseesasthebasicproblem.HerearetwoexamplesthatAugustinegivesofvaincuriosity.“WhatexcusecanImakeformyselfwhenoften,asIsitathome,Icannotturnmyeyesfromthesightofalizardcatchingfliesoraspiderentanglingthemastheyflyintoherweb?Doesitmakeanydifferencethattheseareonlysmallanimals?”(10.35).Desireisnotinvolvedhere;Augustinedidnotgooutlookingforalizardcatchingfliesorforaspiderentanglingfliesinitsweb.Hejusthappenedonthesightoftheseandwasfascinated.Whydidhethinkthatwaswrong?

What’swrongwithsuchfascinationisthatitisindependentofhisloveofGodanddistractshimfromactivitiesexpressiveofthatlove.“Itistruethatthesightof[thelizard

andthespider]inspiresmetopraiseyou[God]forthewondersofyourcreationandtheorderinwhichyou(p.64) havedisposedallthings,butIamnotintentuponyourpraiseswhenIfirstbegintowatch.Itisonethingtorisequicklyfromafall,anothernottofallatall”(10.35).Sotoo,to“stopandgloat”atthesightofadogchasingarabbitistoallowhimselftobedistracted“fromwhateverseriousthoughtsoccupiedmymind”(10.35).WhatIshoulddo,saysAugustine,is“eithertoturnmyeyesfromthesightandraisemythoughtstoyouincontemplation,ortodespiseitutterlyandcontinueonmyway”(10.35).Idlecuriosity“isthecauseofinterruptionanddistractionfromourprayers....Allkindsoftrivialthoughtsbreakinandcutusofffromthegreatactofprayer”(10.35).

TakingStockLet’stakestockofwhatwehavelearnedthusfarfromBook10.Augustine’smaintopicinthebookisthemiseryheexperienced,atthetimeofwriting,overthefactthathisselfhasnotyetbeenreformedashedesiresittobereformed.Heyieldstothetemptationtodesiresensorypleasureforitsownsake,tothetemptationtodesireandtoenjoypraise,tothetemptationtoindulgeinvaincuriosity.Hismiseryisnowdouble.Henotonlyexperiencesthemiserythatensuesuponthefrustrationofthosefirst-orderdesires,butalsothemiserythatensuesuponthefrustrationofhissecond-orderdesiretopurgehimselfofthosefirst-orderdesires.

ButthoughwhatAugustinehighlightsisthemiseryheexperiencesuponthefrustrationofthosefirst-orderdesiresandthefrustrationofhissecond-orderdesiretoberidofthosefirst-orderdesires,closescrutinyofwhathesaysshowsthatthereisanotheranddeepersourceoffrustrationatwork.Hisdelightedfascinationatthesightofalizardcatchingfliesoradogchasingarabbitwasnotthedelightofdesiregratification.Hehadnopriordesiretocatchasightofsuchthings;theyjustcamehisway.ThereasonhegivesforchastisinghimselfforhisbehaviorinthefirstcaseisthatinsteadofspendingtimeindelightedfascinationatthesightofthelizardcatchingfliesheshouldimmediatelyhaveallowedthesighttoleadhimtopraiseGodforthewondersofGod’screation;thereasonhegivesforchastisinghimselfinthesecondcaseisthathisdelightedfascinationatthesightofthedogchasingtherabbitdistractedhimfromhiscontemplationofGod.Thesereasonsareessentiallythesame.InAugustine’swords,theywere“thecauseofinterruptionanddistractionfromourprayers”(10.35).

(p.65) There’sapatternintheseexamples.PraisingGod,contemplatingGod,offeringprayerstoGod,theseareallmanifestationsoflovingGod.WhatAugustinedesiresisthattherebenothinginhislifethatisnotanexpressionofhisloveofGodorincorporatedintohisloveofGod,andhence,ofcourse,nothingthatdistractshimfromhisloveofGod.EverythingthathedoesistobedoneoutofloveofGodorincorporatedintoloveofGod—bythankingGodforit,praisingGodforit,andsoforth.Hereishowheputsthepointinonepassage:“Ifthethingsofthisworlddelightyou,praiseGodforthembutturnyourloveawayfromthemandgiveittotheirMaker,sothatinthethingsthatpleaseyou,youmaynotdispleasehim.Ifyourdelightisinsouls,lovetheminGod,becausetheytooarefrailandstandfirmonlywhentheyclingtohim....Lovethem,then,inhimanddrawas

manywithyoutohimasyoucan.Tellthem,‘Heistheoneweshouldlove’”(4.12).

IsuggestthatthisexplainswhyAugustinerejectsdelightinbeingpraised.Ratherthanluxuriatinginthepraise,weshouldincorporatethepraiseintoourloveofGodbypraisingGodforthatinourselveswhichisrightlyfoundpraiseworthyandbytakingjoyinthefactthatourneighborhasthemoralacuitytorecognizethatinuswhichispraiseworthy.“You[God]wantusnotonlytoloveyou,butalsotoloveourneighbour.ForthisreasonItellmyselfthatwhenIamgratifiedbythepraiseofamanwhowellunderstandswhatitisthathepraises,thetruereasonformypleasureisthatmyneighbourhasmadegoodprogress”(10.37).

UnderlyingAugustine’sdiscussioninBook10isthusafourthsortoftemptation,inadditiontothethreeheidentifies.It’sthetemptationtotoleratefragmentsinhislifethathavenotbeenincorporatedintohisloveofGod.Thisisthefundamentaltemptation.It’saformoftemptationthathedidnotrecognize,andcouldnothaverecognized,beforehisconversion.Andso,ofcourse,hehadnodesiretoresistthistemptation;lackingthedesire,heneverexperiencedthemiseryofitsfrustration.Nowherecognizesthistemptation.Andoverandoverhesuccumbs.Soheismiserable,profoundlyunhappywithhimself.“WhenatlastIclingtoyouwithallmybeing,formetherewillbenomoresorrow,nomoretoil”(10.28).Butthatdayhasnotyetarrived.Soheprays,“Havepityonme,OLord,inmymisery”(10.28).“Iampoorandneedy,andIambetteronlywheninsorrowofheartIdetestmyselfandseekyourmercy,untilwhatisfaultyinmeisrepairedandmadewholeandfinallyIcometothatstateofpeacewhichtheeyeoftheproudcannotsee”(10.38).Untilthat(p.66) timearrives,hisdispleasurewithhimselfiscommendable.Thecauseofthemiseryisnotcommendable;butthemisery,givenitscauseiscommendable.“Therearetimeswhenwemustwelcomesorrow”(3.2).

There’sanobviousquestionlurkinghere.Whyisitwrongforevenasecondtoexperiencedelightedfascinationinthesightofalizardcatchingflies?WhymustthesightimmediatelyleadonetopraiseGodforthewondersofGod’screation?WhyisitnotacceptabletobefascinatedforawhileandthenpraiseGod?Andwhyisitwrongforevenasecondtoenjoybeingpraisedforwhatispraiseworthyinwhatonehasdone?WhymustoneinsteadpraiseGodforthatwhichthepraise-giverfindspraiseworthyandforhisfindingitpraiseworthy?Whyisitnotacceptabletoenjoybeingpraisedandthentoincorporatethatintoone’spraiseofGod?WhydoesAugustine’sconvictionthateverythinghedoesistobedoneoutofloveofGodorincorporatedintothatlovetakesuchanextremelyrigoristicform?“Amanlovesyousomuchtheless,”saysAugustine,“if,besidesyou,healsolovessomethingelsewhichhedoesnotloveforyoursake”(10.29).IassumethatAugustineregardeddelightedfascinationatthesightofalizardcatchingfliesasanexampleoflovingsomethingelsethanGodwithoutlovingitforGod’ssake.ButwhymusthisloveofGodtaketheformofGodalwaysbeinginhisthoughts?WhycannothisloveofGodprovidetheall-embracingcontextforwhathedoesandforhisreceptionofwhathappenstohimwithoutGodandhisloveofGodbeingalwaysonhismind?

Idonotknowtheanswertothisquestion.Augustineneveraddressedit.

FreedomfromMiseryisNotYetTrueJoyAboveIquotedAugustineassaying,“WhenatlastIclingtoyouwithallmybeing,formetherewillbenomoresorrow,nomoretoil.”Whatfollowsthatsentenceisthisone:“ThenatlastIshallbealivewithtruelife,formylifewillbewhollyfilledbyyou”(10.28).It’stemptingtoinferthat,forAugustine,truelife—whichsurelyisthesameastruejoy—justisbeingfreeofsorrowandtoil.ButquiteclearlythatwasnotAugustine’sview.There’smoretoexperiencingtruejoythanbeingsoreformedthatoneexperiences“nomoresorrow,nomoretoil.”Truejoygoesbeyondreleasefrommisery.

(p.67) InbringingtoaclosehisdiscussioninBook10ofthethreeformsoftemptationthatafflicthimafterhisconversion,Augustinesaysthat“Ihavenowconsideredthesorrystatetowhichmysinshavebroughtme,accordingtothethreedifferentformswhichtemptationmaytake,andIhaveinvokedyourhelpinghandtosaveme.ForinmywoundedheartIsawyoursplendouranditdazzledme”(10.41).Justafewlinesearlierhehadsaidthat“sometimesyou[God]allowmetoexperienceafeelingquiteunlikemynormalstate,aninwardsenseofdelightwhich,ifitweretoreachperfectioninme,wouldbesomethingnotencounteredinthislife,thoughwhatitisIcannottell.Butmyheavyburdenofdistressdragsmedownagaintoearth.AgainIbecomeapreytomyhabits,whichholdmefast”(10.40).

Later,inthefinalbookoftheConfessions,hesaysthatI“ask‘whereareyou,myGod?’andtheanswerIfindisthis.ForawhileIdrawabreathofyourfragrancewhenmysoulmeltswithinmeandIcryoutinjoy,confessingyourglory,likeamanexultantatafeast.Butmysoulisstillsadbecauseitfallsbackagainandbecomesanabyss,orrather,itrealizesthatitisstillanabyss”(13.14).Abitlaterhesays,“Letourlightshineoutintheworldandfromthishumblecropofgooddeedsletuspassontothatmoresublimeharvest,thejoyofcontemplation,sothatwemaycometopossesstheWordofLifeandshineintheworldlikestarssetinthefirmamentofyourScripture”(13.18).

Thepassagesarecrypticandallusive.ButIthinktherecanbelittledoubtthatAugustineisreferringtomysticalexperiencesofsomesort.Hemakesnoattempttodescribetheexperiencesthemselves;hedescribesonlyhisresponse:hewasdazzled,heexultedlikeapersonatafeast.Theexperienceswerebrief—aswasthemysticalexperiencethatbefellhimandhismothershortlybeforeherdeath.Hiswordssuggestthatthereasonfortheirbrevityisthateachtime,hisheavyburdenofdistressdragshimbackdowntoearth.Helongsfortheexperiencetoreachperfectioninhim,bywhichhepresumablymeansthathelongsforittoendure.Butitcannotenduresolongasheremainsinmiseryoverhisunreformedself;hismiserywillalwaysdraghimbackdown.Werehetobefreedfromhismiseryandweretheexperiencethentobeprolonged,itwouldbe“somethingnotencounteredinthislife.”

TheStoicsthoughtthatitwaspossiblebyone’sowneffortstobecomeasage—difficult,butnotimpossible,toreshapeone’sattachmentsanddesiressothatonedesiresonlywhatonecanbesureofachievingandthus(p.68) becomeimpervioustogriefanddisappointment.Augustine’sdisagreementwasprofound.Hefounditimpossibletoreformhisselfsothatitconformedtowhathedesiredittobe;heneededGod’s

assistance.AndthetruejoyofenduringmysticalexperiencewouldbeentirelythegiftofGod,aswerethebriefepisodesthathehadalreadybeengranted.“OhLord,havemercyonmeandgrantwhatIdesire”(11.2).“Iampoorandneedy”(10.38).

EmpathicMiseryWemusttakenoteofyetonemoreformofmiserythatAugustineexperiencesafterhisconversion;callitempathicmisery.Havingconfessedtohisreadersthe“grievoussin”ofallowinghimselftofind“thesinging[ofahymn]moremovingthanthetruthwhichitconveys,”Augustinesays,“Letthoseofmyreaderswhoseheartsarefilledwithcharity,fromwhichgoodactionsspring,weepwithmeandweepforme”(10.33).Augustineholds,ofcourse,thathisownheartshouldalsobefilledwithsuchcharity.

ComingtothesurfacehereisAugustine’sconvictionthatoneimplicationofChrist’sinjunctiontoloveone’sneighborasoneselfisthatthosewholoveGodaretobeunitedinanempathicsolidarityofgrievingandrejoicing.Theyaretofeelmiseryoverthesinsoftheneighborjustastheyfeelmiseryovertheirown,theyaretofeelmiserywiththeneighborinhismiseryoverhissins,andtheyaretofeelmiseryovertheneighbor’ssinofnotfeelingmiseryoversomesinthathehascommitted.Inasimilarsortofwaytheyaretobeunitedinanempathicsolidarityofrejoicing.

Letallwhoaretrulymybrothersloveinmewhattheyknowfromyourteachingtobeworthyoftheirlove,andletthemsorrowtofindinmewhattheyknowfromyourteachingtobeoccasionforremorse.ThisiswhatIwishmytruebrotherstofeelintheirhearts....Butmytruebrothersarethosewhorejoiceformeintheirheartswhentheyfindgoodinme,andgrieveformewhentheyfindsin.Theyaremytruebrothers,becausewhethertheyseegoodinmeorevil,theylovemestill.TosuchastheseIshallrevealwhatIam.Letthembreatheasighofjoyforwhatisgoodinmeandsighofgriefforwhatisbad.ThegoodIdoisdonebyyouinmeandbyyourgrace;theevilismyfault;itisthepunishmentyousendme.Letmybrothersdrawtheirbreathinjoyfortheoneandsighwithgrieffortheother.Lethymnsofthanksgivingandcriesofsorrowrisetogetherfromtheirhearts.(10.4)

(p.69)

WouldtheReformationofSelfthatAugustineDesiresEliminateAllMisery?SupposethatAugustinehadsucceededinreforminghimselfashesoardentlydesired.EverythingthathedidwouldnowbedoneforthesakeofhisloveofGodandeverythingthathappenedtohimwouldnowbeimmediatelyincorporatedintohisloveofGodbythankingGodforit,bypraisingGodforit,andsoforth.Therewouldbenofragmentofhislife,nomatterhowbrief,thatwasnotincorporatedintohisloveofGod.Ratherthandesiringfoodforthepleasurehegotfromeatinghewoulddesirefoodsolelyforthesustenanceitgavehisbody;andhewoulddesirebodilysustenancesolelyinordertoloveandserveGod.WouldAugustinethenhavebeenreleasedfrommisery?

Hewouldnot.ThefactthathenowdesiresfoodforthesakeofhisloveofGoddoesnotmeanthathisdesireforfoodcannotbefrustrated.Itcanbe.Andifitis,hewillfeelthe

miseryoffrustrateddesire.Sotoo,thefactthathehasbeenpurgedofvaincuriosityandnowdesiresunderstandingsolelyforthesakeofhisloveofGoddoesnotmeanthatthatdesirecannotbefrustrated.RecalltheanguishedcryforunderstandingthathevoicedinBook11.ThiswasnotapleaforthegratificationofsomevaincuriosityonhispartbutapleaforbetterunderstandingofGodandScripture.AddthatunlessallofAugustine’sneighborswerealsofullyreformed,hewouldalsonotbefreefromempathicmisery.

Wesawthattruejoyrequiresreleasefrommiserybutgoesbeyond.Weexperiencetruejoywhen,asAugustineputsitintheverylastsectionoftheConfessions,weareadmittedtothegreatholinessofGod’spresence(13.38).ButthereasonAugustinehasexperiencednomorethanbriefepisodesofmysticalexperienceisthateachtimeheisdraggeddowntoearthbyhismiseries.WhatwehavejustnowseenisthatnoteventhecompletereformationofhisselfwouldreleaseAugustinefromthemiseryoffrustrateddesire.Thatraisesthequestion:istruejoyimpossiblehereinthislife?

Itisimpossible.Onlyinthelifetocomewilltruejoybeours.Notuntilthenwillwebefullyreformedsothatwearenolongerunhappywithourselves.Andevenifwewerefullyreformedalreadyhereinthislife,notuntilthenwouldwebefreedfromthemiseryoffrustrateddesires.ThefirstparagraphoftheConfessionsconcludeswithAugustine’s(p.70) much-quoteddeclarationthat“ourheartsfindnopeaceuntiltheyrestinyou,OGod.”ThepeaceAugustinehadinmindcannotbeattainedhereinthislife,onlyinthelifetocome.Andthepathinthispresentlifethatleadstotruejoyandpeaceinthelifetocomeisapathofsorrowandmisery.Herethereisnorest.

Notes:

(1)ImadesomecommentsabouthappinessintheConfessionsinmyessay“SufferingLove”(reprintedinmyInquiringaboutGod:EssaysinPhilosophyofReligion,ed.TerenceCuneo,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010).IthinkInowunderstandtheconceptandroleofhappinessintheConfessionsconsiderablybetterthanIdidthen.ThechiefflawinthatearlierdiscussionwasthatIdidnottakesufficientnoteofthedifferencebetweenAugustine’sdiagnosisofhismiserybeforehisconversionandhisdiagnosisofhismiseryafterhisconversion.

(2)IamusingthetranslationbyW.D.Ross,revisedbyJ.O.Urmson,inJonathanBarnes(ed.),TheCompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984).

(3)InTheMoralityofHappiness(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),44,Annastranslatesas“doingwell”whatRosstranslatesas“faringwell.”IthinkAnnasisrightonthis.

(4)InmyJustice:RightsandWrongs(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2008),IspentalmostanentirechapterdiscussingthedifferencesbetweenthePeripateticsandtheStoicsonwhatconstitutestheestimablelife;inparticular,IdiscussedthedisputebetweentheStoicsandthePeripateticsoverwhethervirtueissufficientfortheestimablelife.Here,insettingthebackgroundformydiscussionofAugustine,myconcernisexclusivelywithapointonwhichalltheancientphilosophicaleudaimonists

agreed.

(5)Annas,op.cit.,45.HereiswhatJohnCoopersaysonthesamepoint:“AccordingtoAristotle’saccount,[externalgoods]areneededasantecedentlyexistingconditionsthatmakepossiblethefullexerciseofthehappyman’svirtuousqualitiesofmindandcharacter.Ineachcasethevaluetothehappymanconsistsinwhattheexternalgoodsmakeitpossibleforhim,asaresultofhavingthem,todo.Anyvaluegoodsotherthanvirtuousactionitselfmighthavejustfortheirownsakesisdenied,oratleastleftoutofaccountonthistheory.”“AristotleontheGoodsofFortune,”inAristotle’sEthics,ed.TerenceIrwin(NewYorkandLondon:Garland,1995),189.

(6)Annas,op.cit.,37.ThepassagefromAristotlethatAriuswasparaphrasingistobefoundinNicomacheanEthics1.7,1098a16–19:“Humangoodturnsouttobeactivityofsoulinconformitywithexcellence,andiftherearemorethanoneexcellence,inconformitywiththebestandmostcomplete.Butwemustadd,‘inacompletelife’.Foroneswallowdoesnotmakeasummer,nordoesoneday;andsotoooneday,orashorttime,doesnotmakeamanblessedandhappy.”

(7)JuliaAnnas,PlatonicEthics:OldandNew(Cornell:CornellUniversityPress,1999),43.

(8)ThetranslationisbyR.W.DysoninAugustine,TheCityofGodagainstthePagans(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),364.

(9)IamusingthetranslationbyR.S.Pine-CoffininStAugustine,Confessions(London:Penguin,1984,reprintof1961).

(10)IntwopreviouspublicationsIhavediscussedAugustine’sbreakwitheudaimonism,inthechaptertitled“Augustine’sBreakwithEudaimonism”inmyJustice:RightsandWrongs,andintheessay“Augustine’sRejectionofEudaimonism”inJamesWetzel(ed.),Augustine’sCityofGod:ACriticalGuide(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),149–66.InthoseearlieressaysmyinterestwasmainlyinAugustine’srejectionofvariousthesesabouttheestimablelifeespousedbytheancienteudaimonists,includingtheactivitythesis;andmyevidenceforhisrejectionofthesetheseswasmainlyAugustine’slatebook,CityofGod.Inthispresentessay,myargumentisthatAugustinemeantsomethingdifferentbybeatitudofromwhatthephilosophersmeant;whileemployingthesameword,heattachestoitadifferentconcept.AndIthengoontodescribehowheemploysthisnewconceptintheConfessions.

(11)Inmyessay“Augustine’sRejectionofEudaimonism,”IargueagainstthecommonviewthatAugustinedevelopedasomewhateccentricversionofeudaimonisminfavoroftheviewthatherejectedeudaimonism.InowthinkthathisrejectiongoesdeeperthanwhatIarguedforintheessay.Augustinemeanssomethingdifferentby“happiness”fromwhattheeudaimonistsmeant.Hemeantajoyfullife,whereastheymeantanestimablelife.Aconsequenceofthisdifferenceisthattheeudaimonistpictureofestablishingprioritiesamongthepreferablesornaturalgoodsinone’slife,andhabituallyactingaccordingly,is

simplymissinginAugustine.Thereisnothingevenremotelylikethispicture.

(12)Augustine’sdescriptionofhislifebeforehisconversionmakeshimsoundlikeasexaddict.In10.30heindicatesthatafterhisconversionsexualtemptationwasnolongeraproblemforhim—thoughheisdisturbedbythefactthathecontinuestohavesexualdreams.Itisalsostrikingthatintherecitationofthemiseriesthatheexperiencesatthetimeofwritinghenowherementionsgriefuponpartingfromsomeonetowhomheisattached.Hedoesnotmentionfeelinganygriefuponpartingfromthewomanwithwhomhehadlivedforsometenyears,nordoeshementionfeelinganygriefuponthedeathoftheirson,Adeodatus.

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