gangl - taming the struggle. agonal thinking in nietzsche and mouffe
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Taming the Struggle? Agonal Thinking in Nietzsche and Mouffe
Georg H. Gangl, unpublished paper, written in Feb 2011
1) Introduction
The last two decades or so saw the rise of agonal political theory. Theorists with a leftist bent
such as Bonnie Honig, Lawrence Hatab, William Connolly or Chantal Mouffe re-appropriated
agonistic thinking so as to render it fertile for their conception of (radical) democracy (see
Fossen 2008 for a first overview). The former three draw in this endeavour explicitly on
Nietzesches theory of the Agon, the latter bases her agonistic theory on Jacques Derridas
and Carl Schmitts thinking (see, for instance, Mouffe 2005). We have heard to some extend
about Honig, Hatab and Connolly in our course, in my paper I would like to deal in more
detail with the theory of Chantal Mouffe.
In what follows I want to focus primarily on the agonal elements in Mouffes theory as well
as their ontological underpinnings (and not so much on her theory of radical democracy in
general). A viable research question for this endeavour would be the following: DoesMouffes agonism that is informed by Jacques Derrida and Carl Schmitt open up political
dimensions of the agon, which Nietzsche did not see, or does Nietzsches account of the agon
expose critical problems or weaknesses in her political agonism? One could say that I would
like to weigh Mouffe against Nietzsche in this paper, and Nietzsche against Mouffe, giving
thereby special attention to the ontological foundations of both theorists. It is my firm
contention that ontological questions are at the heart of most debates and that they cannot be
eschewed. Instead, they should be fleshed out as precisely as possible so as to make themaccessible for deliberations1. Against this background I will focus on both theorists
conception of the Agon along three interrelated topics: identity, pluralism and the problem of
limits.
Nietzsche is known to be the philosopher of life; his whole theory gravitates around an
affirmation of the forces of life in their totality. Yet, he is not advocating every form of
destructive struggle just for the sake of lifes enhancement. Nietzsche is aware of the problem
that the forces of life, in the way he defines them, have to be nurtured without disintegrating
1This stance is informed by a philosophical position developed by Roy Bhaskar in the last decades. I can merelyindicate it here without giving it the proper space it deserves. See, for instance, Bhaskar 1998 and 2008.
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into battles of mutual annihilation in Nietzsches own terms: Vernichtungskmpfe. In other
words, affirming the forces of life entails for Nietzsche equally affirming the dark side of
human existence with all its suffering, without letting the destructive dynamic hold sway over
the whole process, since this could lead to a destruction of this very dynamics of life. In the
following chapter we will look at the presuppositions of this position, because this kind of
partisanship is based on a specific ontology of life and struggle. An ontology that embraces
strife, antagonism and contestation while at the same time seeking for some form of
moderation that does not impede these essential forms of life. We will, in this sense, talk in
the following section about Nietzsches organization-struggle model (Aydin 2007: 40) and
counterpose it to Mouffes ontology of power that is primarily informed by her
poststructuralist conceptualist commitments.
On these grounds both theorists differing conception of agonal interaction can be discussed.
The Agon is for Nietzsche a fragile social constellation that can at the same time foster the
competitive needs of every society and pose (necessary) limits on them, without rendering
competition in general nugatory. The Agon is for him a source of non-coercive measure
(Siemens 2001: 521). For Mouffe the agonal is likewise a form of mutual measure and
restraint in the social realm, though the ways of functioning of the measures that lead to
mutual limitation are totally different in both theories. We will therefore outline both
conceptions of agonal interaction so as to come to an assessment concerning the question
posed above. But before we engage with these questions I would like to reflect shortly on the
relevance of a comparison between Nietzsche and Moufe.
2) Nietzsche and Mouffe: Two Kinds of Agonal Thinking
Nietzsche is normally not acknowledged as a very prolific political thinker. This has at least
partially also to do with Nietzsches own writing: he never put forth any systematic account of
his political thinking. His primary concerns were questions of culture, especially the
enhancement of humankind (Ansel-Pearson 1994: 3). He was devoted to the perfection of the
human animal, which was for him, for better or worse, das nicht festgestellte Thier (2[13]
12.72). However, a more pertinent view on the relation Nietzsche and Politics would be that
Nietzsches work gravitates around the most essential political question of all, founding the
political field as it is: what is human life for and what should it become? Chantal Mouffe
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shares this interest in the grounding questions of the political. She is likewise predominantly
asking foundational questions about the political realm itself, in her own words she intends to
grasp the nature of the political (Mouffe 2005: 99). Her thought equally wants to establish
the foundations of any political Gemeinwesen(in lack of a better word), foundations, which
must exist for any political association to prosper.This also indicates that for both there is no
stark contrast between ethical and political questions; asking questions about the purpose of
the political entails questions about the proper conduct of human beings in relation to this
purpose. However, Mouffes political theory is, as we will see shortly, not so much propelled
by the motif of human perfectibility than by an emancipatory impulse. Mouffe sees her
project of radical democracy as the only real alternative for the Left after the demise of real
socialism (Mouffe 1993a: 1)
Both theorists recuperate, in this sense, the genuine meaning of democracy. Mouffe does so in
an explicit fashion, whereas Nietzsches thought is very prone to such an adaptation, as
agonal theorists in his tradition are by all differences eager to emphasize. If democracy as
a term signifies any basic meaning in this tradition, then it is a framework of incessant
contestation. Things are not taken for granted, they are publicly disputed without any a-priori
limitations to deliberation.
The ethical commitments as well as the conceptions of the political of both, Nietzsche and
Mouffe, are anchored in their respective ontologies of power and antagonism. In the next
section we will turn to these ontologies and try to carve out the differences between both.
Nietzsche is very explicit about his ontology of power and struggle, in one phrase: the famous
will-to-power. Mouffe, on the contrary, more a political theorist than a philosopher, does not
spell out her general ontology in much detail. We therefore will have to read between the lines
to get a grasp of her most basic concepts. This exposition of Nietzsches and Mouffes basic
ontological commitments is a precondition for engaging with their respective agonal thinking.
As we have just heard, incessant contestation in one way or another is vital part of any kind ofhuman society for both Nietzsche and Mouffe. Yet, matters of contestation raise immediately
issues of measure and limitation. Against the backdrop of their ontologies we will be able to
compare Nietzsches and Mouffes account of the intertwining of both opposed principles. In
short, we should see the differences in their conceptions of pluralism, identity and limitations
all three crucial parts of any agonal interaction.
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2.1) Nietzsches and Mouffes ontology of power
In Nietzsches ontology the concepts of pluralism, dynamism and struggle play a
quintessential role. Nietzsche is the pre-eminent philosopher of antagonism and conflict, hefurnished without a doubt a genuine Philosophie der Gegenstze (Mller-Lauter 1971: 4).
His form of pluralism is therefore not one of self-sufficient entities, but one that entails the
dynamic entwining of forces, leading to some sort of conflict or struggle. In the light of
Nietzsches critique of Causalism (2[139] 12.135) and subject-object dichotomies in
general it is probably even misleading to say dynamism leads to struggle in Nietzsche, instead
it should be emphasized that struggle is the very form of dynamism. Reality is in this sense
continuously pregnant with a measureless variety and multiplicity of possibilities (Aydin
2007: 43), yet it is not just a contingent flux of multifarious and countervailing forces, it has
according to Nietzsche equally some sort of grounding principle: the will-to-power. As such
all life-forms, which are in themselves different and unique, are will-to-power. Nietzsches
philosophy tries to embrace the widest possible notion of pluralism and dynamism, while at
the same time holding to some kind of monism and structuring principle of reality, a
monism, however, which is not understood in classical metaphysical terms. The will-to-power
is not so much something akin to a traditional substance, but Nietzsches attempt to get a
handle of the inherent processuality of all reality a processuality that can hardly be
expressed in our kind of language with its strict separation between subject and object. In this
sense it could be said that that the will-to-power is the common quality of all reality, but not
so much as a metaphysical grounding principle that somewhat rests in itself. The will-to-
power cannot be separated off from its inherent processual dynamic of struggle (Mller-
Lauter 1971: 30).
This becomes immediately clearer when we see the will-to-power not as a substance that is
willing something, but as an inextricableprocess. Will-to-power does not signify an entity
that is striving for this or that, for something external to its very being, it implies an active
process where both sides can just be tentatively separated; they are initially one yet one
process. The will-to-power in Nietzsche can only be understood in relational terms, it entails
some sort of directedness or striving without there being a solid fundament (or subject) that is
the doer of this striving (Aydin 2007: 26). In Nietzsches own words:
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[D]as Leben ist nicht Anpassung innerer Bedingungen an uere, sondern Wille zur
Macht, der von innen her immer mehr ueres sich unterwirft und einverleibt ()
(7[9] 12.295, original emphasis)
In this quote the conflictual character of the will-to-power becomes apparent. It does not adapt
itself to its environment, it actively wants to subordinate the external world, i.e. other wills-to-
power with the same aspiration. Overall, this amounts to a ubiquitous struggle for life and
expansion. Nietzsches worldview is in this sense dynamic to the utmost and this kind of
dynamic can only exist in the way of becoming instead of mere being, to evoke the terms
inherited from ancient Greek philosophy (in this sense Nietzsche sides with Heraclites against
Parmenides). However, being is for Nietzsche still a part of the world, but one subordinated to
multiple struggling forces that are always already becoming. All life is therefore in the
process of becoming, and it has become what it is, and will become something else in the
future. Becoming is ineradicable and it is the fate of any being. Everything has to change to
stay the same, to put it somewhat paradoxically. Nietzsches maxim for every life-form is
therefore self-overcoming (in his words: Selbst-berwindung or Selbst-Aufhebung2). In a
nutshell Nietzsche states: Alles ist () geworden (MA I 2.24).
But becoming itself is for Nietzsche not a totally unstructured and chaotic flux of forces and
processes. There is also relatively enduring being in his account, so that struggle can also
yield to organizationand relative fixity. There are no pre-given forms for Nietzsche, but that
does not mean that the different struggling wills-to-power cannot be kept together in a certain
arrangement, triggering some form of organization (Aydin 2007: 30). This organization is
then itself held together by one will-to-power, a will-to-power that was able to overpower all
other wills and thereby to give the whole a certain shape. Aydin gives a succinct definition of
the outlook of such will-to-power organizations:
A will to power organization can be characterized as a hierarchically structured
multiplicity of will to power organizations that internally and externally interact with
each other continuously (Aydin 2007: 30)
2 The german noun (Selbst-)Aufhebung expresses the relation between being and becoming in a veryillustrative fashion. Basically Aufhebung (or aufheben as a verb) has 3 interrelated meanings. Firstly itmeans to lift something (from the floor), secondly to keep or maintain something and thirdly to suspend. So, the
inherent processuality Nietzsche upholds is condensed in this term: the first meaning connotes process and theother two the inexorability of suspending (or change) if we want to maintain something. Hegel drew, of course,already on the threefold meaning of the verb aufheben, yet in totally different philosophical system very muchopposed to Nietzsches.
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These organizations are thus not bereft of dynamic and becoming, something alien to
Nietzsches thought. On the contrary, they still exhibit this dynamic but in a hierarchical way
with one will or some wills-to-power at the top of it. This inner constitution can give such an
organization, for better or worse, certain durability. It should be clear by now that Nietzsches
philosophy is not just one of eternal unmitigated dynamic and struggle, as it also entails
temporary organization as one of its central concepts. Nietzsches will-to-power can just exist
through struggle and conflict, but struggle and conflict can yield to partial organization (or
even transient pacification), without being capable of terminating the underlying struggle
once and for all. It is therefore legitimate to speak of an organization-struggle model (Aydin
2007: 40) in Nietzsches ontology. Nietzsche himself puts this thought in a very instructive
way, highlighting once more the organizational moments of his overall processual view:
Leben wre zu definieren als dauernde Form von Prozeder Krftefeststellungen, wo die
verschiedenen Kmpfenden ihrerseits ungleich wachsen (36[22] 11.560)
Krftefeststellungen here is an ambiguous term that epitomizes Nietzsches organization-
struggle model. It means simultaneously that there is a certain evaluation of forces as well as
the establishment of a certain hierarchy of organization (feststellen). In the second sense we
find to some degree a suspension of the overall dynamic without its nullification. And the
quote makes clear that this suspension if it at all can be called a suspension cannot be a
total one, as Nietzsche equally argues in its second part that there is an incessant process of
forces that grow very differently (and have thus very different potential to overpower each
other).
Since process and struggle are underlying even the most stable organizations, there can be no
institution without struggle and process. So, in a temporary Feststellung in organizational
form the struggle has to be maintained and maybe even intensified, otherwise the organizationlooses its vitality and its power for self-overcoming (and overpowering others). But internal
struggle always bears the risk of becoming inimical to the organizational structure itself, with
the consequence of its eventual disintegration (Aydin 2007: 38). This fragile relation between
incessant and possibly destructive processes on the one hand and the temporary Feststellen
on the other is especially of importance when we talk about Nietzsches notion of the Agon,
which can tentatively be defined as a very special form of organization, which maintains the
necessary inner and outer struggle while at the same time enjoining a sort of measure on itselfso that it does not degenerate (the possibility to do so is, of course, indelible).
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The will-to-power is for Nietzsche one (anti-metaphysical) principle stretching over the whole
of reality from the inorganic world to the wills and wants of human beings. If everything is an
expression of the will-to-power or is will-to-power tout court, then Nietzsches own
philosophy cannot be said to stand beyond that principle, instead it has to be seen as yet just
another expression of it. Nietzsche endorses in this sense, more theoretically put, a certain
epistemologicalperspectivismthat does away with such traditional philosophical conceptions
like truth, cause, effect and so on3(the latter two are for Nietzsche figments of our language
see Nietzsches note on Causalism: 2[139] 12.135). Correspondingly does Nietzsche favour
an instrumental notion of truth. For him it is not so much material whether a belief is true or
not, but whether it affirms life as such - as the will-to-power in all its sometimes dreadful
shades (Ansell-Pearson 1994: 16).
Nietzsches ontology is generally speaking an ontology of becoming that consists of
pluralism, dynamism and struggle. All these notions are entailed by the all-pervasive, but not
substantive principle of the will-to-power. However, such a dynamic view of reality does not
rule out, as we have just seen, temporal stability and fixity. On the contrary, Nietzsche shows
how certain forms of Feststellen stem itself from the struggle of countervailing forces, from
overpowering others and being overpowered by them. In the engagement with the other wills-
to-power a certain Struktur der Selbstverabsolutierung und Selbstrelativierung (Van
Tongeren 1989: 202) is characteristic of the struggle, and this structure can form the basic
configuration of the Nietzschean Agon, of which we will talk shortly. The general objective
of all wills-to-power, however, is self-overcoming, something that can only be achieved
according to Nietzsche by overpowering others. His position could thus be called teleology
without telos (Aydin 2007: 26, original emphasis) and it is the ontological point of origin of
Nietzsches ethical perfectionism.
Nietzsche anchors ethics explicitly in ontology. Something is good when it affirms life, life
understood as the eternal struggle of wills-to-power for self-overcoming and overpoweringothers. Reality demands to lead your life in a certain way, to overcome and perfect yourself in
the dynamics of conflicts and struggle. This notion seems to be at the core of Nietzsches
ethical perfectionism. Nietzsche admits openly to this kind of naturalism when he states the
following:
3Nietzsche formulates this in his own words as follows: Die Welt ist uns vielmehr noch einmal unendlichgeworden: insofern wir die Mglichkeit nicht abweisen knnen, dass sie unendliche Interpretationen in sichschliesst (FW 374 3.627)
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Grundsatz: wie die Natur sein: zahllose Wesen zum Opfer bringen knnen, um Etwas mit
der Menschheit zu erreichen (25[309] 11.91)
Nietzsches basic ethical principle is to lead a life in accordance with nature, whereas nature
is not understood harmonically, but as will-to-power, as self-overcoming and striving for
more power. The goal of this endless striving without a telos is the production of true and
great human beings that affirm life as it is (and do not sooth their misery by blaming others
something Nietzsche famously came to call the slave revolt of morality). So, human beings
have for Nietzsche to be exposed to the hardships of contesting human perfectibility
(Siemens 2001: 519), moreover they should openly embrace these hardships, as they are
constitutive of every form of life. Everything else would lead, in Nietzsches words, to the
Verkleinerung des Menschen (GM I.12 5.278), to mediocre human beings that lag far
behind their possibilities.
This partisanship for life and the hardships of human perfectibility can even be seen in the
performative dimension of Nietzsches theory: The form of his engagement with opponents
and his style of polemicism can be defined as an agonalmodel of limited warfare (Siemens
1998: 334, original emphasis). Not just the Genealogy of Morals is a polemic, as its
subtitle reveals. Nietzsches own aphoristic style tries to convey dynamics and struggle and he
does not want so much to destroy his opponents as to declare war on them (Van Tongeren
1989: 208). This is a performative stance very much in line with Nietzsches basic ontological
commitments and his perfectionist account that both highlight the centrality of struggling
against others.
In Nietzsche we have, to sum up, a veryfirm ontology. The core principle of his ontology of
becoming is will-to-power and in this principle pluralism, dynamism, struggle and
organization are closely interrelated. This ontology of one all-pervasive, non-substantial
principle then yields to Nietzsches epistemological perspectivism and his instrumentalist
notion of truth and it also underpins his ethical perfectionism and his performative (or
stylistic) polemicism (his art of agonal warfare). With this framework in mind we can have
a closer look on Nietzsches social ontology of tension and his theory of the Agon 4. But
4We should, however, refrain from calling Nietzsches theory of the Agon a special and more concrete form ofhis general ontology. The Agon was devised by Nietzsche already in 1871-2, especially in his famous textHomers Wettkampf [HC 1.783-92], his ontology of struggle evolving around the will-to-power dates from1881 (and onwards). So, one should refrain from reading back into the Agon the concepts outlined here., I
would, nevertheless, uphold that the Agon is underpinned by a forerunner of the ontology named here, especiallythe theory of the inescapability of struggle and organization I think the Agon can be consistently re-described inthe terms given in this chapter. It can be seen as a (will-to-power) organization with a plurality of approximatelyequal forces enticing and restraining each other and thereby bringing together the necessary internal struggle
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before we do that we will turn to Chantal Mouffes essential ontological commitments.
Mouffe is first and foremost a political theorist; consequently her general ontology has to be
unearthed out of her more concrete political ontology. At any rate, I find it indispensable to
give equal attention to her general ontology, as certain nexuses and contradictions can just be
pinned down against the background of a theorists most basic ontological commitments.
Chantal Mouffes basal ontology is likewise one of power relations, whereby for her these
power relations are at the same time intrinsically political. She herself puts this thought of the
pervasiveness of power and its inherently political character as follows:
The central thesis of the book is that social objectivity is constituted through acts of
power. This implies that any social objectivity is ultimately political and that it has to
show the traces of exclusion which governs its constitution (Mouffe 2005: 99)
Power is for Mouffe the central constituent of the social in general and it appears to have in
her account necessarily exclusionary character (see also Mouffe 1995: 42). Human sociality is
then due to this exclusionary character intrinsically prone to antagonisms and violence; the
same forces that make human beings band together divide them, so that rivalry and violence
display an ever-present possibility (Mouffe 2005: 131) in any kind of human society.
However, this propensity of power to strife and misery is for Mouffe not something that
should be thought of in essentialist terms. Power constitutes objectivity, objectivity does not
underlie power. So, different forms of power will create different forms of objectivity and, a
fortiori, different forms of exclusion. Mouffe works in this sense in an anti-essentialist
framework (Mouffe 1995: 33). This also entails for her that social relations have a purely
constructed character and are themselves an outcome of competing and excluding power
relations.For Mouffe, to come to the linchpin of her ontology, social relations without antagonism and
exclusion are a conceptual impossibility (Mouffe 2005: 98). That means her ontology of
power and antagonism is at the rock-bottom undergirded by some sort of ontological
conceptualism that reduces reality to the conceptual. As we will see in the section on
Mouffes agonistic pluralism, her whole account is premised on this conceptualism. But as
far as I can see, there is no discussion (let alone a tentative justification) of this conceptualism
in her work. In Mouffes account power leads by virtue of this anti-essentialist ontological
with some sort of measure and limitation. We will outline this in more detail in the following section of thispaper.
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conceptualism to ineradicable strife and antagonism in the social realm. In other words,
Mouffe derives central antagonisms from conceptual claims, not so much from genuine
ontological or empirical ones. In the section of this paper on Mouffes political ontology we
will see how exactly she envisages such a derivation by help of the Derridean differnce
and the Schmittian logic of the political. Here it suffices to remark that Mouffes task on the
most basic level is to derive the permanence of conflict and strife out of some form of
conceptual necessity.
Furthermore, pluralism is for Mouffe equally an axiological principle; we should celebrate
and enhance (Mouffe 1996: 246) the plurality of being. Pluralism has thus a central standing
in Mouffes ethics of emancipationand we will have to examine in the following parts of this
paper in which ways (if at all) this axiology is joined up and mediated with her basic
conceptualism.
There is not much more that can be said on this most fundamental level about Mouffes anti-
essentialist ontological conceptualism of power. These most basic axioms of Mouffes
thought are located, to adapt her terminology in a way she would not endorse, in the pre-
political, as they inform her account of the political, without being fully fleshed out as such.
The political precedes for Mouffe politics, it is the dimension of antagonism that is inherent
in human relations (Mouffe 2005: 101). Her whole account gravitates around the political so
as to furnish it with a proper theory that can account for its alleged inherent antagonism. Here
we were concerned in the abstract with Mouffes concealed derivation of this antagonism and
in the section on her political ontology proper we will see how this antagonism is unfolded
within the political by the help of Derridarean and Schmittian theory; with the objective of
grounding the Mouffian agonistic pluralism (Mouffe: 2005: 101).
In Nietzsche we have a firm ontology that gravitates around the will-to-power and leads to
Nietzsches basic attitudes towards epistemology, ethics and style listed above. Mouffes
fundamental ontology can also be called an ontology of power, but one that is conceptuallyanchored and coupled with an epistemological perspectivism and a pluralist ethics of
emancipation. At least with the latter it is not quite clear how it is related to the underlying
ontology. Also both, Nietzsche and Mouffe, embrace antagonism and pluralism, yet on
different grounds. Whereas in Nietzsche both are characteristics of the will-to-power, standing
in a determinable relation to the other pivots of his theory, in Mouffe this relation becomes
more blurry. Pluralism and dynamism seem somehow be related to Mouffes overarching
anti-essentialist ontological conceptualism, but she keeps quiet about the precise relations, inwhich they stand to each other (at least on this most fundamental level). Overall, this means
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both ontologies display a considerable difference, and Mouffes ontology also exhibits certain
indeterminacy in the linkage of its basic principles. We will now turn to the social ontology
proper of both, dealing firstly with Nietzsches theory of the (Greek) Agon. The differences
we pinpointed here very abstractly should become more palpable on the more concrete levels
we now focus on.
2.2) The Agon in Nietzsche
Nietzsches discussion of the Agon occurs early in his writing, around the time he broke up
withRichard Wagnerand his cult of (himself as) the genius. Nietzsche realised in these days
that the reign of one genius is very likely to degenerate into one form or another of open
tyranny. In old Greece he could spot a counter-model to this tyrannical structure: the Agon. In
texts like Homers Wettkampf (1.783-792)) he sets out to scrutinize the enormous
productivity of Greek culture and recognizes as its main cause the competitive character of
the whole of this culture. Competition, struggle and strife are not condemned in ancient
Greece; quite to the contrary these traits are affirmed and nurtured. So, in agonal settings or
institutions there is a regime of reciprocal stimulation and restraint among a plurality offorces or geniuses (Siemens 2009: 23). Plurality is required so that no single towering
individual can seize power and subordinate all the others to his/her tyrannical rule. More
abstractly, these competing forces or geniuses engage with each other and entice each other to
excel in the vocabulary of the later Nietzsche one could say in this setting they try to
overpower and overcome each other (and in this process also themselves) without destroying
thereby the whole organizational structure of the Agon: they mutually stimulate as well as
restraint each other. Nietzsche himself puts this thought in Homers Wettkampf thefollowing way:
()da, in einer natrlichen Ordnung der Dinge, es immer mehrere Genies giebt, die
sich gegenseitig zur That reizen, wie sie sich auch gegenseitig in der Grenze des Maaes
halten. Das ist der Kern der hellenistischen Wettkampf-Vorstellung () sie begehrt als
Schutzmittelgegen das Genie ein zweites Genie (HC 1.789, original emphasis)
Nietzsche emphasizes in this quotation that there is an inseparable intertwining in this peculiar
socio-institutional setting in ancient Greece of enticing each other tilts through competition
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and restraining each other. Here it should also be noted that Nietzsche conceptualizes this
restraining measure not as the intentional deed of the competitors, but as some sort of
outcome of side-effect of their very competition. This whole social arrangement seems
therefore to be fragile and prone to be thrown into turmoil. Nietzsche himself acknowledges
that the Agon was abolished in ancient Greece followed by tyrannical rule (which is for
Nietzsche the starting point of the decline of Greek culture).
The agonal setting displays in general a high degree of pluralism, dynamism and diversity.
There are always several competitors who intend to overcome each other and they are within
the setting part of a continuous strife. A precondition for this agonal interaction is an
approximate equilibrium of their strength. If the measure is not intentionally set by the
competing parties, what would amount to some sort of partial suspension of the struggle,
which in Nietzsches eyes is inimical to the inherent process of life, then the equal strength of
the opponents alone must keep them in compliance. The expectation (or fear) of the strength
of the other forces is keeping the Agon alive; in a thriving Agon there is thus an approximate
equilibrium of more-or-less equal forces (Siemens 2001: 516). With Volker Gerhardt we
could speak of a principle of equilibrium (Princip des Gleichgewichts) in Nietzsches
notion of the Agon (Gerhardt 1983). Within this equilibrium the antagonistic traits of all life,
as Nietzsche understands it, are maintained, but through the clash of the forces they are
equally constrained in a productive setting that stimulates them to peak-performances and that
forms the core driving force of the institution (or organization) of the Agon (Gerhardt 1983:
125). This equilibrium is anything but a subjective achievement of the antagonistic opponents
they stay antagonists the agonistic taming of them is done by the whole equilibrium
setting and is therefore an unintended emergent achievement of the whole setting of forces.
It is obvious that such a structure is frail and therefore of temporary and transient character.
That means it also needs certain institutional safeguards (Siemens 2001: 515) to be kept
alive. One of these safe-guards is explicitly mentioned by Nietzsche: the Greek custom ofostracism. On the same page of Homers Wettkampf that was quoted above Nietzsche calls
the ostracism a Stimulanzmittel instead of a Ventil (HC 1.789) of the agonal setting.
However, this institutional and intentional safeguard of the Agon in Nietzsches thought
points our attention to a certain tension between the intrinsic limitation of the agonal setting
and the generally measureless antagonistic drives of life (the antagonistic nature of the
many different will-to-power organizations). Nietzsche himself writes in Beyond Good and
Evil the following about the generalizability of the Agon:
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Sobald man aber dies Prinzip weiter nehmen wollte und womglich gar als Grundprincip
der Gesellschaft, so wrde es sich sofort erweisen als Das, was es ist: als Wille zur
Verneinung des Lebens, als Auflsungs- und Verfallprinzip (JGB 259, 5.207, original
emphasis)
The Agon stands in this sense in a certain tension to the general features of the will-to-power.
Ostracizing a towering individual or force is the opposite of an outright affirmation of
struggle and competition, even if it is just done for the sake of reintroducing proper
competition among defeated but more or less equal opponents. Nietzsche seems to suggest in
this quote, moreover, that the encroachment upon the dynamic of life would have to be huge
in case of a wholesale implementation of the Agon so that its overall dynamics of life would
thereby be nullified a thought every democratic appropriation of the Agon should pay
attention to.
The mediating instance between Nietzsches general ontology of the will-to-power and the
socio-institutional setting of the Agon is his social ontology of tension, which we have been
already spelling out throughout this chapter without naming it properly. Nietzsche upholds:
Jede Begabung muss sich kmpfend entfalten, so gebietet es die hellenische
Volkspdagogik (HC 1.789). Only in conflictual relations to others can endowments unfold
themselves, according to Nietzsche. People can just define their own identity in relation to
others, relations that are first and foremost built up by the resistance of these others against
oneself. So, individuals can develop their capacities solely in and through the antagonistic
striving with others and in this striving they also continuously change and overcome
themselves. This stance is also mirrored by Nietzsches perfectionist commitments, and that is
no surprise, as we have seen before that these commitments are derived from his ontological
tenets. The Agon can be seen as a social setting that animates human beings to excel and
perfect themselves in the struggle with others. And under favourable (balanced) conditionsthis struggle continues and therewith does the striving for human perfection (to recall: a
teleology without a telos).
In a nutshell can the Agon be defined as a socio-institutional setting exhibiting a dynamic of
mutual affirmation or empowerment, and mutual limitation or disempowerment (Siemens
1998: 338, original emphasis). The main feature of this double structure is the approximate
equilibrium of more or less equal forces that boosts competition as it puts a gauge on its
destructive dynamics. In relation to Nietzsches general ontology of struggle the Agon can bedefined as an especially favourable will-to-power organization that extends inner struggle as
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far as possible whilst it still remains one whole. So, there is a multiplicity of struggles and
divisions within the whole, but nevertheless there is a hierarchical whole that forms a certain
synthesis of all the forces. In short: The Agon represents utmost difference within one-ness,
the maximisation of inner tension consistent with the continued existence of the hierarchical
whole for Nietzsche very suitable conditions for the perfection of human beings.
Now, for this setting to prevail special circumstances are required. In Nietzsches ontology no
will-to-power organization is intrinsically stable, as it consists of many different forces. This
is, a fortiori, true of human societies where Nietzsches general ontology of struggle presents
itself in the guise of a social ontology of tension. Just under conditions of equilibrium within a
setting of institutional safeguards the Agon can burgeon. Yet, this setting is tendentially at
odds with the characteristics of the will-to-.power, as it tends to inhibit its intrinsic dynamics.
There seems to be no easy way out of this dilemma, and we will put it aside for the moment
(more about this difficulty and the adjacent problem of the detachability and transferability of
the ancient Agon in the conclusive section of this paper). In any case, what can be pointed out
here, before we engage with Mouffes political ontology, is that Nietzsches theory of the
Agon and his social ontology in general furnish us with sophisticated notions of identity,
difference and limitation. In Nietzsche we have an intrinsically antagonist notion of pluralism
that is continuously nurtured by the will-to-power. Identity is something of a derivative
category of this pluralism, it is the provisional and transient Feststellen or Festsetzen of
the dynamic of forces and it can in the case of human beings develop itself just in the
course of tension and struggle with other individuals. Overall these notions of identity and
pluralism are active ones and they are formed incessantly in endless struggle. Transient
measure or limitation is achieved in this struggle via organizations (in special cases:
equilibria), and they are neither in the social realm nor anywhere else outcome of intentional
behaviour. We will now see how Mouffe conceptualizes struggle and antagonism in her
political ontology, whereby special emphasis will be put on these three features. This is oftheoretical interest, because her general ontology, as we have seen, displays some
considerable indeterminacy that should also yield to certain repercussions on a more concrete
level.
2.3) The Agonal in Mouffe
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Mouffe dubs her own political theory agonistic pluralism. It can be subsumed in political
philosophy under the broader rubric of political agonism, whose distinctive feature is the
recognition of struggle and strife at the heart of politics. Politics is for theorists in this
tradition incessant contestation without the possibility of any kind of rational closure of
question of political concern (Fossen 2008: 376). Mouffe in particular argues in line with
modern liberal theories that modern-day democracies are devoid of a substantial common
good (Mouffe 1993b: 229), but she hastens to add, contra liberalism, that power and
antagonism are ineradicable parts of the political so that no rational or liberal consensus can
be achieved that would not have any repressive effects on one marginalized group or another.
Liberalism draws, in her own words, the picture of a dangerous utopia of reconciliation
(Mouffe 1996: 252).
For Mouffe modern democracy is, on the contrary, inherently contradictory, as it is always
potentially torn by two incommensurable logics: the democratic aspiration of equality and the
liberal promise of individuality trying to tare both signifies for her the democratic paradox
(Mouffe 2005). Mouffe herself affirms this paradox with its two conflicting logics and her
theory tries to mediate between both so as to turn antagonism into agonism and provide in this
framework also space for equality (along with her ethics of emancipation). In this endeavour
of furnishing an agonistic political ontology Mouffe draws particularly on Jacques Derrida
and Carl Schmitt and to the theoretical incorporation of both theorists in Mouffes framework
we are now going to turn.
The inherent pluralism, which every agonist theory of democracy pronounces, stems for
Mouffe from a logic of differnce in a Derridaean sense. Differnce is construed as the
condition of possibility of being and it concerns the symbolic level (Mouffe 1996: 246,
original emphasis). Here we can see again overtly Mouffes overarching ontological
conceptualism the reality is tantamount to the conceptual and the symbolic. Mouffe spells
this out as follows:
[I]t is the notion of the constitutive outside which helps me to emphasize the usefulness
of a deconstructive approach in grasping the antagonism inherent in all objectivity and the
centrality of the us/them distinction in the constitution of political identities. (Mouffe
2005: 12)
And this constitutive outside
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by showing the radical undecidability of the tension of its constitution, makes its very
positivity a function of the symbol of something exceeding it: the possibility/impossibility
of positivity as such (Mouffe 2005: 12)
These two quotes are a very dense account of Mouffes basic ontological commitment along
with the derivation of political antagonism thereof. Her whole notion of plurality hinges on
the (Derridaean) theory of the constitutive outside. It triggers for her the antagonism that
yields to a us/them-distinction and it is itself equivalent to the logic of differnce. In Mouffes
somewhat enigmatic formulation the opposition between inside and outside is a function of
the symbol of something exceeding it. Concepts are in general relational, one cannot be
defined without the other this is somewhat common sense in most branches of philosophy.
Yet, Mouffes embracement of the logic of differnce goes farther than that. In her anti-
essentialist conceptualism concepts are not just defined by virtue of each other, this definition
equally implies the impossibility of each concept as such, as it always refers to its
constitutive outside. The effect is for Mouffe an undecidability that can just be overridden
by fiats of power and those are by conceptual necessity then somehow antagonistic in
character.
Through the constructed character of every symbol and the immanent undecidability inherent
to this logic identity becomes purely contingent (Mouffe 1996: 247). Identity is constructed
by power and it is in this very process of identity forming that an outside is defined, which is
simultaneously expelled from it. The us stands then starkly against the them. There is no
identity beyond the symbolic act of identifications, which can be seen as partial fixations
that limit the flux of the signified under a signifier (Mouffe 1995: 34), at least for some
time. On a more concrete level political identity is for Mouffe formed by a chain of
equivalence (Mouffe 1995: 38). By definition different and divided people (constitutive
outside) rally for hegemony, but they might come together under one symbolic conceptionand then act as if there was no antagonism. The chain represents different people under a
common (eventually symbolic) signifier, say gay liberation, and thereby a common identity is
constructed (Rummens 2009: 380), an identity that is in permanence precariously and
temporarily sutured (Mouffe 1995: 10).
Now, it is dubious whether Mouffes reliance on differnce really can furnish the
antagonism she is up for. Coming back to the two incommensurable logics of modern-day
democracy Mouffe refers to a political theorist of a totally different political bent: CarlSchmitt (who is also known as the Kronjurist des dritten Reichs). Schmitt argues that true
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democracy is premised on antagonistic opposition between peoples, whereas each of them is
understood as a uniform whole with a homogenous national identity (Rummens 2009: 378).
The political in this conception is then indeed pervaded by antagonisms between different and
mutually exclusive identities and one nation fears the existential threat of annihilation by
another. Mouffe agrees with Schmitt, as we have seen, that the mentioned logics are
potentially contradictory, but she shuns his consequence of jettisoning liberalist individuality
for the sake of unified nation (Mouffe 2005: 9). Her deconstructivist logic of the constitutive
outside forbids her to think of nations (or anything) as essentially homogenous entities,
instead she emphasizes that rifts and splits also appear by (conceptual) necessity within the
nation (Mouffe 2005: 53).
Mouffes objective is to mitigate Schmitts stark antagonism, as it leaves with the threat of
annihilation no room for agonistic interaction. Her endeavour is rather to turn antagonistic
enemies into agonistic adversaries, which are defined by Mouffe somewhat paradoxically as
friendly enemies (Mouffe 2005: 13). Spelled out in more detail this means for Mouffe that
they engage in a common symbolic space (Mouffe 2005: 13), yet they have different
visions for that common space and want to organize it accordingly. The common space
Mouffe dwells on is of course the agora of liberal democracy, understood from a pluralist
standpoint. Adversaries agree that they act within the democratic realm, they are characterized
in Mouffes terms by a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal
democracy (Mouffe 2005: 102). The gauge that is put on antagonism and ubiquitous
enmities is in Mouffes account an intentional and subject-centred one; antagonistic enemies
undergo some sort of conversion into adversaries by subjecting themselves to the ethico-
political principles of democracies. At the core of this recognition Mouffe sees the respect
of pluralism and difference (Mouffe 1995: 39) and the objective of her agonistic pluralism is
to transform destructive and violent antagonism into a democratically tamed agonism. In the
just cited text Mouffe even speaks about a consensus (Mouffe 1995: 41) that is necessary tomake agonistic pluralism possible. Mouffes answer to the pressing question of the limits to
antagonism is an appeal to some sort of democratic ethos of self-restraint, or even a
consensus. The actors in the democratic game decide in her theory intentionally to mitigate
the antagonism they are subjected to by conceptual necessity. Of course, this collective
decision is encompassed by the general logic of Mouffes conceptual antagonism, yet it is
central to note that the whole question of limits within this overall antagonistic account boils
down to a question of agreement and consensus.
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Somehow detached from the theoretical references to both named theorists is Mouffes
emancipatory commitment (though Derrida shared her leftist stance). Radical democracy
means for Mouffe to acknowledge the fundamentally power-infested character of the political
its intrinsically violent character while still upholding the need to transform and redress
this power relations, as they are continuously creating harm, injustices and inequities (by
means of exclusion and restriction see Fossen 2008: 377).
Quite generally it can be said that both the Mouffian conceptualist ontology of power and her
political ontology proper are rather un-Nietzschean. Mouffe incorporates the thought of
Derrida and Schmitt on different levels in her theoretical framework. Overall, she is
committed to an anti-essentialist ontological conceptualism of power, which undergirds her
borrowings from Derrida (however, both cannot be separated that easily). The Derridaean
concepts of differnce and constitutive outside have the function to ground the
indomitable antagonism by means of conceptual necessity, yet her positions falls short of
showing how pluralism implies the permanence of conflict and antagonism (Mouffe 2005:
33). In other words, it is far from clear how purely conceptual reflections can furnish any such
real antagonism. Mouffe would have to show in which way reality is exhausted by concepts (a
matter of basic ontology) and how thereby genuine antagonism is created (a matter of
revolving around her theoretical borrowings from Derrida).
Her notions of pluralism and identity stand on the grounds of this conceptual antagonism.
Pluralism seems to be for Mouffe negative and in itself non-dynamic category, despite the
contingency of every identity construction. It is parasitic upon negation and forms something
like the necessary remainder of identity constructions. Similarly is her conception of identity
in itself without dynamics and bereft of any kind of activity. Once the undecidable has been
temporarily decided both spheres seem to be static and in the one there is no trace of the other,
though one is always defined in reference to the other. Both conceptions are grounded on a
reactive momentum in her theory that stems from the strong decisionist moment in Mouffetriggered by her general conceptual logic.
Since the Derridaean logic does not furnish the intended antagonism Mouffe turns in the
question of collective political identities to Carl Schmitt. His theory, in contrast to Derridas
differnce, definitely embraces antagonism, but it is hard to see how this antagonism could
be reconciled with Mouffes overall anti-essentialist conceptualist thinking (Schmitt is after
all a fervent essentialist). Mouffe mitigates this logic by means of a subject-centred
democratic ethos that is itself at odds with her conflictualist ontology in general and herpolitical ontology of hegemony in particular. It is unclear how the pernicious and
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exclusionary consequences of a strictly hegemonic logic (Rummens 2009: 387), which is
itself constitutive of her whole framework, can be alleviated by this appeal to an intentional
fiat (and what consequences this would have for the aspired genuinepluralism).
In sum, Mouffe cannot uphold with her political ontology any sensible notion of antagonism
and pluralism, not to mention pluralism as an axiological principle and her emancipatory
claims. In the following conclusion we will now turn to the question whether Nietzsches
dynamic ontology of conflict provides us with a more suitable political ontology that can
account for the insight that genuine pluralism is inextricably coalesced with antagonism5.
3.) Conclusion on the limits of Nietzsches and Mouffes agonism
Coming back to the question that was posed at the onset of this paper we can now conclude
that Mouffe fails to conceptualize plurality, identity and the problem of limits in the light of
the inherent antagonism she affirms. Mouffe weds Derridaean deconstructionism to the
Schmittian logic of the political in an overall anti-essentialist and conceptualist framework.
Eventually this theoretical melange falls short of her own claims and she can neither account
for the inherent antagonism of all social life nor for any mitigated logic of the political thatwould still reckon with unescapable antagonism. All these problems in Mouffes framework
are linked up with the ontological indeterminacy of her conceptualism; it is far from clear in
her texts how this conceptualism can underpin any notion of the political, let alone her
emancipatory ethics that are totally detached from the rest of her theory. The quest seems to
be to hold onto the thought that genuine pluralism triggers antagonism without falling into a
logic of differnce where no boundaries can be drawn anymore or the extreme determinacy
that is displayed in Schmitts theory of the political (Siemens, unpublished paper: 8).Nietzsches theory of the Agon seems to offer some means to address these shortcomings in a
more proper way, though there are equally troubles in his account. In Nietzsches theory of
the Agon we have an active notion of identity, pluralism and limitation that is not at odds with
his general commitment to antagonism. The Agon is a social setting of approximate
equilibrium kept in shape by certain institutional safeguards (ostracism). As such it is
encompassed by Nietzsches social ontology of tension, which is itself some sort of
application to the social realm of Nietzsches general ontology of struggle. In all this steps
5The paragraphs on the critique of Mouffe profited highly from an unpublished paper by Herman W. Siemens.See the bibliography.
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reality is affirmed as intrinsically dynamic and antagonistic and Nietzsches ethical
perfectionism is in line with these basic features of his ontology. However, Nietzsche himself
raises in Beyond Good and Evil the problem of the generalizability of the Agon; and it is far
from clear how, if at all, it could be implemented in modern-day democracies, especially as
Nietzsche sees in the long run a (latent) opposition between the Agon and its safeguards and
the general features of the will-to-power. Any present-day appropriation of the Agon would
have to engage with questions about the generalizability, the detachability and the
transferability of the Agon and it would also have to take Nietzsches fervent critique of the
democracy of his times very seriously (for an overview of his critique see Siemens 2009).
In the end of this paper some sort of democratic paradox remains: Can there be an agonistic
theorization and, a fortiori, an agonistic justification of modern democracy? The question
must remain unanswered in this breadth. Yet, one thing seems to be certain: For different
reasons there cannot be an agonistic theory of modern democracy in a straightforwardly
Mouffian or Nietzschean way. Nietzsche, however, offers a more sophisticated theory of
agonal interaction and Mouffes theory falls short of many of his crucial insights concerning
plurality, identity and the question of limits.
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