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From CompetitiveAdvantage toCorporate Strategy
by Michael E. Porter
Reprint 87307
Harvard Business Review
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
HBRMAY–JUNE 1987
From Competitive Advantage toCorporate Strategy
Michael E. Porter
Corporate strategy, the overall plan for a diver-sified company, is both the darling and thestepchild of contemporary management
practice—the darling because CEOs have been ob-sessed with diversification since the early 1960s, thestepchild because almost no consensus exists aboutwhat corporate strategy is, much less about how acompany should formulate it.
A diversified company has two levels of strategy:business unit (or competitive) strategy and corporate(or companywide) strategy. Competitive strategy con-cerns how to create competitive advantage in each ofthe businesses in which a company competes. Cor-porate strategy concerns two different questions: whatbusinesses the corporation should be in and how thecorporate office should manage the array of businessunits.
Corporate strategy is what makes the corporatewhole add up to more than the sum of its businessunit parts. The track record of corporate strategies hasbeen dismal. I studied the diversification records of33 large, prestigious U.S. companies over the 1950-1986 period and found that most of them had divestedmany more acquisitions than they had kept. Thecorporate strategies of most companies have dissi-pated instead of created shareholder value.
The need to rethink corporate strategy could hardlybe more urgent. By taking over companies and break-ing them up, corporate raiders thrive on failed corpo-
rate strategy. Fueled by junk bond financing andgrowing acceptability, raiders can expose any com-pany to takeover, no matter how large or blue chip.
Recognizing past diversification mistakes, somecompanies have initiated large-scale restructuringprograms. Others have done nothing at all. Whateverthe response, the strategic questions persist. Thosewho have restructured must decide what to do nextto avoid repeating the past; those who have donenothing must awake to their vulnerability. To sur-vive, companies must understand what good corpo-rate strategy is.
A SOBER PICTURE
While there is disquiet about the success of corporatestrategies, none of the available evidence satisfacto-rily indicates the success or failure of corporate strat-egy. Most studies have approached the question bymeasuring the stock market valuation of mergers,captured in the movement of the stock prices ofacquiring companies immediately before and aftermergers are announced.
Michael E. Porter is professor of business administrationat the Harvard Business School and author of CompetitiveAdvantage (Free Press, 1985) and Competitive Strategy(Free Press, 1980).
Copyright © 1987 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved.
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
These studies show that the market values mergersas neutral or slightly negative, hardly cause for seri-ous concern.1 Yet the short-term market reaction is ahighly imperfect measure of the long-term success ofdiversification, and no self-respecting executivewould judge a corporate strategy this way.
Studying the diversification programs of a com-pany over a long period of time is a much more tellingway to determine whether a corporate strategy hassucceeded or failed. My study of 33 companies, manyof which have reputations for good management, is aunique look at the track record of major corporations.(For an explanation of the research, see the insert“Where the Data Come From.”) Each company en-tered an average of 80 new industries and 27 newfields. Just over 70% of the new entries were acquisi-tions, 22% were start-ups, and 8% were joint ven-tures. IBM, Exxon, Du Pont, and 3M, for example,focused on start-ups, while ALCO Standard, Beatrice,and Sara Lee diversified almost solely through acquisi-tions (Exhibit 1 has a complete rundown).
My data paint a sobering picture of the success ratioof these moves (see Exhibit 2). I found that on averagecorporations divested more than half their acquisi-tions in new industries and more than 60% of theiracquisitions in entirely new fields. Fourteen compa-nies left more than 70% of all the acquisitions theyhad made in new fields. The track record in unrelatedacquisitions is even worse—the average divestmentrate is a startling 74% (see Exhibit 3). Even a highlyrespected company like General Electric divested avery high percentage of its acquisitions, particularlythose in new fields. Companies near the top of thelist in Exhibit 2 achieved a remarkably low rate ofdivestment. Some bear witness to the success ofwell-thought-out corporate strategies. Others, how-ever, enjoy a lower rate simply because they have notfaced up to their problem units and divested them.
I calculated total shareholder returns (stock priceappreciation plus dividends) over the period of thestudy for each company so that I could compare themwith its divestment rate. While companies near thetop of the list have above-average shareholder re-turns, returns are not a reliable measure of diversifi-cation success. Shareholder return often dependsheavily on the inherent attractiveness of companies’base industries. Companies like CBS and GeneralMills had extremely profitable base businesses thatsubsidized poor diversification track records.
I would like to make one comment on the use ofshareholder value to judge performance. Linkingshareholder value quantitatively to diversificationperformance only works if you compare the share-holder value that is with the shareholder value thatmight have been without diversification. Becausesuch a comparison is virtually impossible to make,
measuring diversification success—the number ofunits retained by the company—seems to be as goodan indicator as any of the contribution of diversifica-tion to corporate performance.
My data give a stark indication of the failure ofcorporate strategies.2 Of the 33 companies, 6 had beentaken over as my study was being completed (see thenote on Exhibit 2). Only the lawyers, investmentbankers, and original sellers have prospered in mostof these acquisitions, not the shareholders.
PREMISES OF CORPORATE STRATEGY
Any successful corporate strategy builds on a numberof premises. These are facts of life about diversifica-tion. They cannot be altered, and when ignored, theyexplain in part why so many corporate strategies fail.
Competition Occurs at the Business Unit Level. Di-versified companies do not compete; only their busi-ness units do. Unless a corporate strategy placesprimary attention on nurturing the success of eachunit, the strategy will fail, no matter how elegantlyconstructed. Successful corporate strategy must growout of and reinforce competitive strategy.
Diversification Inevitably Adds Costs and Con-straints to Business Units. Obvious costs such as thecorporate overhead allocated to a unit may not be asimportant or subtle as the hidden costs and con-straints. A business unit must explain its decisionsto top management, spend time complying with plan-ning and other corporate systems, live with parentcompany guidelines and personnel policies, and forgothe opportunity to motivate employees with directequity ownership. These costs and constraints can bereduced but not entirely eliminated.
Shareholders Can Readily Diversify Themselves.Shareholders can diversify their own portfolios ofstocks by selecting those that best match their pref-erences and risk profiles.3 Shareholders can oftendiversify more cheaply than a corporation becausethey can buy shares at the market price and avoidhefty acquisition premiums.
These premises mean that corporate strategy can-not succeed unless it truly adds value—to businessunits by providing tangible benefits that offset theinherent costs of lost independence and to sharehold-ers by diversifying in a way they could not replicate.
PASSING THE ESSENTIAL TESTS
To understand how to formulate corporate strategy,it is necessary to specify the conditions under which
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 3This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
EXH
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tions
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entu
res
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ent
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-ups
ALC
O S
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ard
221
165
99%
0%1%
5610
0%0%
0%A
llied
Cor
p.77
4967
1022
1765
629
Beat
rice
382
204
971
261
970
3Bo
rden
170
9677
419
3275
322
CBS
148
8167
1617
2865
2114
Con
tinen
talG
roup
7547
776
1719
7911
11C
umm
ins
Engi
ne30
2454
1729
1346
2331
Du
Pont
8039
3316
5119
370
63Ex
xon
7956
345
6117
296
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ener
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ectri
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847
2033
2948
1438
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eral
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6316
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4185
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r & G
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6
4 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
EXH
IBIT
1D
iver
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atio
nPr
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sof
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nies
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HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 5This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
diversification will truly create shareholder value.These conditions can be summarized in three essen-tial tests:
1. The attractiveness test. The industries chosenfor diversification must be structurally attrac-tive or capable of being made attractive.
2. The cost-of-entry test. The cost of entry mustnot capitalize all the future profits.
3. The better-off test. Either the new unit mustgain competitive advantage from its link withthe corporation or vice versa.
Of course, most companies will make certain thattheir proposed strategies pass some of these tests. Butmy study clearly shows that when companies ignoredone or two of them, the strategic results were disas-trous.
How Attractive Is the Industry?In the long run, the rate of return available fromcompeting in an industry is a function of its underly-ing structure, which I have described in another HBRarticle.4 An attractive industry with a high averagereturn on investment will be difficult to enter be-cause entry barriers are high, suppliers and buyershave only modest bargaining power, substitute prod-ucts or services are few, and the rivalry among com-petitors is stable. An unattractive industry like steelwill have structural flaws, including a plethora ofsubstitute materials, powerful and price-sensitivebuyers, and excessive rivalry caused by high fixedcosts and a large group of competitors, many of whomare state supported.
Diversification cannot create shareholder value
Where the data come from
We studied the 1950–1986 diversification histories of33 large diversified U.S. companies. They were cho-sen at random from many broad sectors of the econ-omy.
To eliminate distortions caused by World War II, wechose 1950 as the base year and then identified eachbusiness the company was in. We tracked every acqui-sition, joint venture, and start-up made over this pe-riod—3,788 in all. We classified each as an entry intoan entirely new sector or field (financial services, forexample), a new industry within a field the companywas already in (insurance, for example), or a geo-graphic extension of an existing product or service.We also classified each new field as related or unre-lated to existing units. Then we tracked whether andwhen each entry was divested or shut down and thenumber of years each remained part of the corpora-tion.
Our sources included annual reports, 10K forms, theF&S Index, and Moody’s, supplemented by our judg-ment and general knowledge of the industries in-volved. In a few cases, we asked the companies spe-cific questions.
It is difficult to determine the success of an entry with-out knowing the full purchase or start-up price, theprofit history, the amount and timing of ongoing invest-ments made in the unit, whether any write-offs or write-downs were taken, and the selling price and terms ofsale. Instead, we employed a relatively simple way togauge success: whether the entry was divested or shutdown. The underlying assumption is that a companywill generally not divest or close down a successful
business except in a comparatively few special cases.Companies divested many of the entries in our samplewithin five years, a reflection of disappointment withperformance. Of the comparatively few divestmentswhere the company disclosed a loss or gain, the divest-ment resulted in a reported loss in more than half thecases.
The data in Exhibit 1 cover the entire 1950–1986period. However, the divestment ratios in Exhibit 2and Exhibit 3 do not compare entries and divestmentsover the entire period because doing so would over-state the success of diversification. Companies usuallydo not shut down or divest new entries immediatelybut hold them for some time to give them an opportu-nity to succeed. Our data show that the average hold-ing period is five to slightly more than ten years,though many divestments occur within five years. To ac-curately gauge the success of diversification, we calcu-lated the percentage of entries made by 1975 and by1980 that were divested or closed down as of January1987. If we had included more recent entries, wewould have biased upward our assessment of how suc-cessful these entries had been.
As compiled, these data probably understate therate of failure. Companies tend to announce acquisi-tions and other forms of new entry with a flourish butdivestments and shutdowns with a whimper, if at all.We have done our best to root out every such transac-tion, but we have undoubtedly missed some. Theremay also be new entries that we did not uncover, butour best impression is that the number is not large.
6 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
unless new industries have favorable structures thatsupport returns exceeding the cost of capital. If theindustry doesn’t have such returns, the companymust be able to restructure the industry or gain asustainable competitive advantage that leads to re-turns well above the industry average. An industryneed not be attractive before diversification. In fact,a company might benefit from entering before theindustry shows its full potential. The diversificationcan then transform the industry’s structure.
In my research, I often found companies had sus-pended the attractiveness test because they had avague belief that the industry “fit” very closely withtheir own businesses. In the hope that the corporate“comfort” they felt would lead to a happy outcome,the companies ignored fundamentally poor industrystructures. Unless the close fit allows substantialcompetitive advantage, however, such comfort willturn into pain when diversification results in poorreturns. Royal Dutch Shell and other leading oil com-panies have had this unhappy experience in a numberof chemicals businesses, where poor industry struc-tures overcame the benefits of vertical integrationand skills in process technology.
Another common reason for ignoring the attrac-tiveness test is a low entry cost. Sometimes the buyerhas an inside track or the owner is anxious to sell.Even if the price is actually low, however, a one-shotgain will not offset a perpetually poor business. Al-most always, the company finds it must reinvest inthe newly acquired unit, if only to replace fixed assetsand fund working capital.
Diversifying companies are also prone to use rapidgrowth or other simple indicators as a proxy for atarget industry’s attractiveness. Many that rushedinto fast-growing industries (personal computers,video games, and robotics, for example) were burnedbecause they mistook early growth for long-termprofit potential. Industries are profitable not becausethey are sexy or high tech; they are profitable only iftheir structures are attractive.
What Is the Cost of Entry?Diversification cannot build shareholder value if thecost of entry into a new business eats up its expectedreturns. Strong market forces, however, are workingto do just that. A company can enter new industriesby acquisition or start-up. Acquisitions expose it toan increasingly efficient merger market. An acquirerbeats the market if it pays a price not fully reflectingthe prospects of the new unit. Yet multiple biddersare commonplace, information flows rapidly, andinvestment bankers and other intermediaries workaggressively to make the market as efficient as possi-ble. In recent years, new financial instruments suchas junk bonds have brought new buyers into the
market and made even large companies vulnerable totakeover. Acquisition premiums are high and reflectthe acquired company’s future prospects—sometimestoowell.Philip Morris paid more than four times bookvalue for Seven-Up Company, for example. Simplearithmetic meant that profits had to more than qua-druple to sustain the preacquisition ROI. Since thereproved to be little Philip Morris could add in market-ing prowess to the sophisticated marketing wars inthe soft-drink industry, the result was the unsatisfac-tory financial performance of Seven-Up and ulti-mately the decision to divest.
In a start-up, the company must overcome entrybarriers. It’s a real catch-22 situation, however, sinceattractive industries are attractive because their en-try barriers are high. Bearing the full cost of the entrybarriers might well dissipate any potential profits.Otherwise, other entrants to the industry would havealready eroded its profitability.
In the excitement of finding an appealing newbusiness, companies sometimes forget to apply thecost-of-entry test. The more attractive a new indus-try, the more expensive it is to get into.
Will the Business Be Better Off?A corporation must bring some significant competi-tive advantage to the new unit, or the new unit mustoffer potential for significant advantage to the corpo-ration. Sometimes, the benefits to the new unit ac-crue only once, near the time of entry, when theparent instigates a major overhaul of its strategy orinstalls a first-rate management team. Other diversi-fication yields ongoing competitive advantage if thenew unit can market its product through the well-de-veloped distribution system of its sister units, forinstance. This is one of the important underpinningsof the merger of Baxter Travenol and American Hos-pital Supply.
When the benefit to the new unit comes only once,the parent company has no rationale for holding thenew unit in its portfolio over the long term. Once theresults of the one-time improvement are clear, thediversified company no longer adds value to offset theinevitable costs imposed on the unit. It is best to sellthe unit and free up corporate resources.
The better-off test does not imply that diversifyingcorporate risk creates shareholder value in and ofitself. Doing something for shareholders that theycan do themselves is not a basis for corporate strategy.(Only in the case of a privately held company, inwhich the company’s and the shareholder’s risk arethe same, is diversification to reduce risk valuable forits own sake.) Diversification of risk should only bea by-product of corporate strategy, not a prime moti-vator.
Executives ignore the better-off test most of all or
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 7This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
EXH
IBIT
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8 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
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HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 9This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
deal with it through arm waving or trumped-up logicrather than hard strategic analysis. One reason is thatthey confuse company size with shareholder value.In the drive to run a bigger company, they lose sightof their real job. They may justify the suspension ofthe better-off test by pointing to the way they managediversity. By cutting corporate staff to the bone andgiving business units nearly complete autonomy,they believe they avoid the pitfalls. Such thinkingmisses the whole point of diversification, which is tocreate shareholder value rather than to avoid destroy-ing it.
CONCEPTS OF CORPORATE STRATEGY
The three tests for successful diversification set thestandards that any corporate strategy must meet;meeting them is so difficult that most diversificationfails. Many companies lack a clear concept of corpo-rate strategy to guide their diversification or pursue aconcept that does not address the tests. Others failbecause they implement a strategy poorly.
My study has helped me identify four concepts ofcorporate strategy that have been put into prac-tice—portfolio management, restructuring, transfer-ring skills, and sharing activities. While the conceptsare not always mutually exclusive, each rests on adifferent mechanism by which the corporation cre-ates shareholder value and each requires the diversi-fied company to manage and organize itself in adifferent way. The first two require no connectionsamong business units; the second two depend onthem. (See Exhibit 4.) While all four concepts ofstrategy have succeeded under the right circum-stances, today some make more sense than others.Ignoring any of the concepts is perhaps the quickestroad to failure.
Portfolio ManagementThe concept of corporate strategy most in use isportfolio management, which is based primarily ondiversification through acquisition. The corporationacquires sound, attractive companies with compe-tent managers who agree to stay on. While acquiredunits do not have to be in the same industries asexisting units, the best portfolio managers generallylimit their range of businesses in some way, in partto limit the specific expertise needed by top manage-ment.
The acquired units are autonomous, and the teamsthat run them are compensated according to the unitresults. The corporation supplies capital and workswith each to infuse it with professional managementtechniques. At the same time, top management pro-vides objective and dispassionate review of business
unit results. Portfolio managers categorize units bypotential and regularly transfer resources from unitsthat generate cash to those with high potential andcash needs.
In a portfolio strategy, the corporation seeks tocreate shareholder value in a number of ways. It usesits expertise and analytical resources to spot attrac-tive acquisition candidates that the individual share-holder could not. The company provides capital onfavorable terms that reflect corporatewide fundrais-ing ability. It introduces professional managementskills and discipline. Finally, it provides high-qualityreview and coaching, unencumbered by conventionalwisdom or emotional attachments to the business.
The logic of the portfolio management conceptrests on a number of vital assumptions. If a company’sdiversification plan is to meet the attractiveness andcost-of-entry test, it must find good but undervaluedcompanies. Acquired companies must be truly under-valued because the parent does little for the new unitonce it is acquired. To meet the better-off test, thebenefits the corporation provides must yield a signifi-cant competitive advantage to acquired units. Thestyle of operating through highly autonomous busi-ness units must both develop sound business strate-gies and motivate managers.
In most countries, the days when portfolio manage-ment was a valid concept of corporate strategy arepast. In the face of increasingly well-developed capi-tal markets, attractive companies with good manage-ments show up on everyone’s computer screen andattract top dollar in terms of acquisition premium.Simply contributing capital isn’t contributing much.A sound strategy can easily be funded; small to me-dium-size companies don’t need a munificent parent.
Other benefits have also eroded. Large companiesno longer corner the market for professional manage-ment skills; in fact, more and more observers believemanagers cannot necessarily run anything in theabsence of industry-specific knowledge and experi-ence. Another supposed advantage of the portfoliomanagement concept—dispassionate review—restson similarly shaky ground since the added value ofreview alone is questionable in a portfolio of soundcompanies.
The benefit of giving business units completeautonomy is also questionable. Increasingly, a com-pany’s business units are interrelated, drawn togetherby new technology, broadening distribution chan-nels, and changing regulations. Setting strategies ofunits independently may well undermine unit per-formance. The companies in my sample that havesucceeded in diversification have recognized thevalue of interrelationships and understood that astrong sense of corporate identity is as important as
10 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
slavish adherence to parochial business unit financialresults.
But it is the sheer complexity of the managementtask that has ultimately defeated even the best port-folio managers. As the size of the company grows,portfolio managers need to find more and more dealsjust to maintain growth. Supervising dozens or even
hundreds of disparate units and under chain-letterpressures to add more, management begins to makemistakes. At the same time, the inevitable costs ofbeing part of a diversified company take their toll andunit performance slides while the whole company’sROI turns downward. Eventually, a new managementteam is installed that initiates wholesale divestmentsand pares down the company to its core businesses.The experiences of Gulf & Western, ConsolidatedFoods (now Sara Lee), and ITT are just a few compara-tively recent examples. Reflecting these realities, theU.S. capital markets today reward companies thatfollow the portfolio management model with a “con-glomerate discount”; they value the whole less thanthe sum of the parts.
In developing countries, where large companies arefew, capital markets are undeveloped, and profes-sional management is scarce, portfolio managementstill works. But it is no longer a valid model forcorporate strategy in advanced economies. Neverthe-less, the technique is in the limelight today in theUnited Kingdom, where it is supported so far by anewly energized stock market eager for excitement.But this enthusiasm will wane—as well it should.Portfolio management is no way to conduct corporatestrategy.
RestructuringUnlike its passive role as a portfolio manager, whenit serves as banker and reviewer, a company thatbases its strategy on restructuring becomes an activerestructurer of business units. The new businessesare not necessarily related to existing units. All thatis necessary is unrealized potential.
The restructuring strategy seeks out undeveloped,sick, or threatened organizations or industries on thethreshold of significant change. The parent inter-venes, frequently changing the unit managementteam, shifting strategy, or infusing the company withnew technology. Then it may make follow-up acqui-sitions to build a critical mass and sell off unneededor unconnected parts and thereby reduce the effectiveacquisition cost. The result is a strengthened com-pany or a transformed industry. As a coda, the parentsells off the stronger unit once results are clear be-cause the parent is no longer adding value and topmanagement decides that its attention should bedirected elsewhere. (See the insert “An Uncanny Brit-ish Restructurer” for an example of restructuring.)
When well implemented, the restructuring con-cept is sound, for it passes the three tests of successfuldiversification. The restructurer meets the cost-of-entry test through the types of company it acquires.It limits acquisition premiums by buying companieswith problems and lackluster images or by buyinginto industries with as yet unforeseen potential. In-
An uncanny British restructurer
Hanson Trust, on its way to becoming Britain’s largestcompany, is one of several skillful followers of the re-structuring concept. A conglomerate with units in manyindustries, Hanson might seem on the surface a portfo-lio manager. In fact, Hanson and one or two other con-glomerates have a much more effective corporate strat-egy. Hanson has acquired companies such as LondonBrick, Ever Ready Batteries, and SCM, which the cityof London rather disdainfully calls “low tech.’’
Although a mature company suffering from lowgrowth, the typical Hanson target is not just in any in-dustry; it has an attractive structure. Its customer andsupplier power is low and rivalry with competitors mod-erate. The target is a market leader, rich in assets butformerly poor in management. Hanson pays little ofthe present value of future cash flow out in an acquisi-tion premium and reduces purchase price even furtherby aggressively selling off businesses that it cannot im-prove. In this way, it recoups just over a third of thecost of a typical acquisition during the first six monthsof ownership. Imperial Group’s plush properties in Lon-don lasted barely two months under Hanson owner-ship, while Hanson’s recent sale of Courage Breweriesto Elders recouped £1.4 billion of the original £2.1 bil-lion acquisition price of Imperial Group.
Like the best restructurers, Hanson approaches eachunit with a modus operandi that it has perfectedthrough repetition.
Hanson emphasizes low costs and tight financialcontrols. It has cut an average of 25% of labor costsout of acquired companies, slashed fixed overheads,and tightened capital expenditures. To reinforce itsstrategy of keeping costs low, Hanson carves out de-tailed one-year financial budgets with divisional man-agers and (through generous use of performance-related bonuses and share option schemes) gives themincentive to deliver the goods.
It’s too early to tell whether Hanson will adhere tothe last tenet of restructuring-selling turned-around unitsonce the results are clear. If it succumbs to the allure ofbigness, Hanson may take the course of the failed U.S.conglomerates.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 11This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
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This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
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HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 13This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
tervention by the corporation clearly meets the bet-ter-off test. Provided that the target industries arestructurally attractive, the restructuring model cancreate enormous shareholder value. Some restructur-ing companies are Loew’s, BTR, and General Cinema.Ironically, many of today’s restructurers are profitingfrom yesterday’s portfolio management strategies.
To work, the restructuring strategy requires a cor-porate management team with the insight to spotundervalued companies or positions in industriesripe for transformation. The same insight is neces-sary to actually turn the units around even thoughthey are in new and unfamiliar businesses.
These requirements expose the restructurer to con-siderable risk and usually limit the time in which thecompany can succeed at the strategy. The most skill-ful proponents understand this problem, recognizetheir mistakes, and move decisively to dispose ofthem. The best companies realize they are not justacquiring companies but restructuring an industry.Unless they can integrate the acquisitions to create awhole new strategic position, they are just portfoliomanagers in disguise. Another important difficultysurfaces if so many other companies join the actionthat they deplete the pool of suitable candidates andbid their prices up.
Perhaps the greatest pitfall, however, is that com-panies find it very hard to dispose of business unitsonce they are restructured and performing well. Hu-man nature fights economic rationale. Size supplantsshareholder value as the corporate goal. The companydoes not sell a unit even though the company nolonger adds value to the unit. While the transformedunits would be better off in another company that hadrelated businesses, the restructuring company in-stead retains them. Gradually, it becomes a portfoliomanager. The parent company’s ROI declines as theneed for reinvestment in the units and normal busi-ness risks eventually offset restructuring’s one-shotgain. The perceived need to keep growing intensifiesthe pace of acquisition; errors result and standardsfall. The restructuring company turns into a con-glomerate with returns that only equal the average ofall industries at best.
Transferring SkillsThe purpose of the first two concepts of corporatestrategy is to create value through a company’s rela-tionship with each autonomous unit. The corpora-tion’s role is to be a selector, a banker, and an inter-venor.
The last two concepts exploit the interrelation-ships between businesses. In articulating them, how-ever, one comes face-to-face with the often ill-definedconcept of synergy. If you believe the text of thecountless corporate annual reports, just about any-
thing is related to just about anything else! But imag-ined synergy is much more common than real synergy.GM’s purchase of Hughes Aircraft simply becausecars were going electronic and Hughes was an elec-tronics concern demonstrates the folly of paper syn-ergy. Such corporate relatedness is an ex post factorationalization of a diversification undertaken forother reasons.
Even synergy that is clearly defined often fails tomaterialize. Instead of cooperating, business unitsoften compete. A company that can define the syner-gies it is pursuing still faces significant organizationalimpediments in achieving them.
But the need to capture the benefits of relationshipsbetween businesses has never been more important.Technological and competitive developments al-ready link many businesses and are creating newpossibilities for competitive advantage. In such sec-tors as financial services, computing, office equip-ment, entertainment, and health care, interrelation-ships among previously distinct businesses areperhaps the central concern of strategy.
To understand the role of relatedness in corporatestrategy, we must give new meaning to this ill-de-fined idea. I have identified a good way to start—thevalue chain.5 Every business unit is a collection ofdiscrete activities ranging from sales to accountingthat allow it to compete. I call them value activities.It is at this level, not in the company as a whole, thatthe unit achieves competitive advantage. I groupthese activities in nine categories. Primary activitiescreate the product or service, deliver and market it,and provide after-sale support. The categories of pri-mary activities include inbound logistics, operations,outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service.Support activities provide the inputs and infrastruc-ture that allow the primary activities to take place.The categories are company infrastructure, humanresource management, technology development, andprocurement.
The value chain defines the two types of interrela-tionships that may create synergy. The first is acompany’s ability to transfer skills or expertiseamong similar value chains. The second is the abilityto share activities. Two business units, for example,can share the same sales force or logistics network.
The value chain helps expose the last two (andmost important) concepts of corporate strategy. Thetransfer of skills among business units in the diversi-fied company is the basis for one concept. While eachbusiness unit has a separate value chain, knowledgeabout how to perform activities is transferred amongthe units. For example, a toiletries business unit,expert in the marketing of convenience products,transmits ideas on new positioning concepts, promo-tional techniques, and packaging possibilities to a
14 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
newly acquired unit that sells cough syrup. Newlyentered industries can benefit from the expertise ofexisting units and vice versa.
These opportunities arise when business unitshave similar buyers or channels, similar value activi-ties like government relations or procurement, simi-larities in the broad configuration of the value chain(for example, managing a multisite service organiza-tion), or the same strategic concept (for example, lowcost). Even though the units operate separately, suchsimilarities allow the sharing of knowledge.
Of course, some similarities are common; one canimagine them at some level between almost any pairof businesses. Countless companies have fallen intothe trap of diversifying too readily because of simi-larities; mere similarity is not enough.
Transferring skills leads to competitive advantageonly if the similarities among businesses meet threeconditions:
1. The activities involved in the businesses aresimilar enough that sharing expertise is mean-ingful. Broad similarities (marketing intensive-ness, for example, or a common core processtechnology such as bending metal) are not asufficient basis for diversification. The result-ing ability to transfer skills is likely to havelittle impact on competitive advantage.
2. The transfer of skills involves activities impor-tant to competitive advantage. Transferringskills in peripheral activities such as govern-ment relations or real estate in consumer goodsunits may be beneficial but is not a basis fordiversification.
3. The skills transferred represent a significantsource of competitive advantage for the receiv-ing unit. The expertise or skills to be transferredare both advanced and proprietary enough to bebeyond the capabilities of competitors.
The transfer of skills is an active process thatsignificantly changes the strategy or operations of thereceiving unit. The prospect for change must be spe-cific and identifiable. Almost guaranteeing that noshareholder value will be created, too many compa-nies are satisfied with vague prospects or faint hopesthat skills will transfer. The transfer of skills does nothappen by accident or by osmosis. The company willhave to reassign critical personnel, even on a perma-nent basis, and the participation and support of high-level management in skills transfer is essential.Many companies have been defeated at skills transferbecause they have not provided their business unitswith any incentives to participate.
Transferring skills meets the tests of diversifica-tion if the company truly mobilizes proprietary ex-pertise across units. This makes certain the company
can offset the acquisition premium or lower the costof overcoming entry barriers.
The industries the company chooses for diversifi-cation must pass the attractiveness test. Even a closefit that reflects opportunities to transfer skills maynot overcome poor industry structure. Opportunitiesto transfer skills, however, may help the companytransform the structures of newly entered industriesand send them in favorable directions.
The transfer of skills can be one-time or ongoing.If the company exhausts opportunities to infuse newexpertise into a unit after the initial postacquisitionperiod, the unit should ultimately be sold. The cor-poration is no longer creating shareholder value. Fewcompanies have grasped this point, however, andmany gradually suffer mediocre returns. Yet a com-pany diversified into well-chosen businesses cantransfer skills eventually in many directions. If cor-porate management conceives of its role in this wayand creates appropriate organizational mechanismsto facilitate cross-unit interchange, the opportunitiesto share expertise will be meaningful.
By using both acquisitions and internal develop-ment, companies can build a transfer-of-skills strat-egy. The presence of a strong base of skills sometimescreates the possibility for internal entry instead of theacquisition of a going concern. Successful diversifiersthat employ the concept of skills transfer may, how-ever, often acquire a company in the target industryas a beachhead and then build on it with their internalexpertise. By doing so, they can reduce some of therisks of internal entry and speed up the process. Twocompanies that have diversified using the transfer-of-skills concept are 3M and Pepsico.
Sharing ActivitiesThe fourth concept of corporate strategy is based onsharing activities in the value chains among businessunits. Procter & Gamble, for example, employs acommon physical distribution system and sales forcein both paper towels and disposable diapers. McKes-son, a leading distribution company, will handle suchdiverse lines as pharmaceuticals and liquor throughsuperwarehouses.
The ability to share activities is a potent basisfor corporate strategy because sharing often en-hances competitive advantage by lowering cost orraising differentiation. But not all sharing leads tocompetitive advantage, and companies can encoun-ter deep organizational resistance to even beneficialsharing possibilities. These hard truths have ledmany companies to reject synergy prematurely andretreat to the false simplicity of portfolio manage-ment.
A cost-benefit analysis of prospective sharing op-portunities can determine whether synergy is possi-
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 15This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
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16 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
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HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 17This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
ble. Sharing can lower costs if it achieves economiesof scale, boosts the efficiency of utilization, or helpsa company move more rapidly down the learningcurve. The costs of General Electric’s advertising,sales, and after-sales service activities in major appli-ances are low because they are spread over a widerange of appliance products. Sharing can also enhancethe potential for differentiation. A shared order-pro-cessing system, for instance, may allow new featuresand services that a buyer will value. Sharing can alsoreduce the cost of differentiation. A shared servicenetwork, for example, may make more advanced,remote servicing technology economically feasible.Often, sharing will allow an activity to be whollyreconfigured in ways that can dramatically raise com-petitive advantage.
Sharing must involve activities that are significantto competitive advantage, not just any activity.P&G’s distribution system is such an instance in thediaper and paper towel business, where products arebulky and costly to ship. Conversely, diversificationbased on the opportunities to share only corporateoverhead is rarely, if ever, appropriate.
Sharing activities inevitably involves costs that thebenefits must outweigh. One cost is the greater coor-dination required to manage a shared activity. Moreimportant is the need to compromise the design orperformance of an activity so that it can be shared. Asalesperson handling the products of two businessunits, for example, must operate in a way that isusually not what either unit would choose were itindependent. And if compromise greatly erodes theunit’s effectiveness, then sharing may reduce ratherthan enhance competitive advantage.
Many companies have only superficially identifiedtheir potential for sharing. Companies also mergeactivities without consideration of whether they aresensitive to economies of scale. When they are not,the coordination costs kill the benefits. Companiescompound such errors by not identifying costs ofsharing in advance, when steps can be taken to mini-mize them. Costs of compromise can frequently bemitigated by redesigning the activity for sharing. Theshared salesperson, for example, can be provided witha remote computer terminal to boost productivityand provide more customer information. Jamming
Adding value with hospitality
Marriott began in the restaurant business in Washing-ton, D.C. Because its customers often ordered takeoutson the way to the national airport, Marriott eventuallyentered airline catering. From there, it jumped intofood service management for institutions. Marriott thenbegan broadening its base of family restaurants andentered the hotel industry. More recently, it has movedinto restaurants, snack bars, and merchandise shops inairport terminals and into gourmet restaurants. In addi-tion, Marriott has branched out from its hotel businessinto cruise ships, theme parks, wholesale travel agen-cies, budget motels, and retirement centers.
Marriott’s diversification has exploited well-devel-oped skills in food service and hospitality. Marriott’skitchens prepare food according to more than 6,000standardized recipe cards; hotel procedures are alsostandardized and painstakingly documented in elabo-rate manuals. Marriott shares a number of importantactivities across units. A shared procurement and distri-bution system for food serves all Marriott units throughnine regional procurement centers. As a result, Marri-ott earns 50% higher margins on food service thanany other hotel company. Marriott also has a fully inte-grated real estate unit that brings corporatewidepower to bear on site acquisitions as well as on the de-signing and building of all Marriott locations.
Marriott’s diversification strategy balances acquisi-tions and start-ups. Start-ups or small acquisitions areused for initial entry, depending on how close the op-portunities for sharing are. To expand its geographicbase, Marriott acquires companies and then disposesof the parts that do not fit.
Apart from this success, it is important to note thatMarriott has divested 36% of both its acquisitions andits start-ups. While this is an above-average record,Marriott’s mistakes are quite illuminating. Marriott haslargely failed in diversifying into gourmet restaurants,theme parks, cruise ships, and wholesale travel agen-cies. In the first three businesses, Marriott discovered itcould not transfer skills despite apparent similarities.Standardized menus did not work well in gourmet res-taurants. Running cruise ships and theme parks wasbased more on entertainment and pizzazz than thecarefully disciplined management of hotels and mid-price restaurants. The wholesale travel agencies wereill fated from the start because Marriott had to com-pete with an important customer for its hotels and hadno proprietary skills or opportunities to share withwhich to add value.
18 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
business units together without such thinking exac-erbates the costs of sharing.
Despite such pitfalls, opportunities to gain advan-tage from sharing activities have proliferated becauseof momentous developments in technology, deregu-lation, and competition. The infusion of electronicsand information systems into many industries cre-ates new opportunities to link businesses. The corpo-rate strategy of sharing can involve both acquisitionand internal development. Internal development isoften possible because the corporation can bring tobear clear resources in launching a new unit. Start-upsare less difficult to integrate than acquisitions. Com-panies using the shared-activities concept can alsomake acquisitions as beachhead landings into a newindustry and then integrate the units through sharingwith other units. Prime examples of companies thathave diversified via using shared activities includeP&G, Du Pont, and IBM. The fields into which eachhas diversified are a cluster of tightly related units.Marriott illustrates both successes and failures insharing activities over time. (See the insert “AddingValue with Hospitality.”)
Following the shared-activities model requires anorganizationalcontextinwhichbusinessunitcollabo-ration is encouraged and reinforced. Highly autono-mous business units are inimical to such collabora-tion. The company must put into place a variety ofwhat I call horizontal mechanisms—a strong sense ofcorporate identity, a clear corporate mission state-ment that emphasizes the importance of integratingbusiness unit strategies, an incentive system that re-wards more than just business unit results, cross-busi-ness-unittaskforces, and other methods of integrating.
A corporate strategy based on shared activitiesclearlymeets thebetter-offtestbecausebusinessunitsgain ongoing tangible advantages from others withinthe corporation. It also meets the cost-of-entry test byreducing the expense of surmounting the barriers tointernal entry. Other bids for acquisitions that do notshareopportunitieswillhavelowerreservationprices.Even widespread opportunities for sharing activitiesdo not allow a company to suspend the attractivenesstest, however. Many diversifiers have made the criti-calmistakeofequating theclose fitof a target industrywithattractivediversification. Target industriesmustpass the strict requirement test of having an attractivestructure as well as a close fit in opportunities if diver-sification is to ultimately succeed.
CHOOSING A CORPORATE STRATEGY
Each concept of corporate strategy allows the diver-sified company to create shareholder value in a dif-ferent way. Companies can succeed with any of the
concepts if they clearly define the corporation’s roleand objectives, have the skills necessary for meetingthe concept’s prerequisites, organize themselves tomanage diversity in a way that fits the strategy, andfind themselves in an appropriate capital market en-vironment. The caveat is that portfolio managementis only sensible in limited circumstances.
A company’s choice of corporate strategy is partlya legacy of its past. If its business units are in unat-tractive industries, the company must start fromscratch. If the company has few truly proprietaryskills or activities it can share in related diversifica-tion, then its initial diversification must rely on otherconcepts. Yet corporate strategy should not be a once-and-for-all choice but a vision that can evolve. Acompany should choose its long-term preferred con-cept and then proceed pragmatically toward it fromits initial starting point.
Both the strategic logic and the experience of thecompanies studied over the last decade suggest thata company will create shareholder value throughdiversification to a greater and greater extent as itsstrategy moves from portfolio management towardsharing activities. Because they do not rely on supe-rior insight or other questionable assumptions aboutthe company’s capabilities, sharing activities andtransferring skills offer the best avenues for valuecreation.
Each concept of corporate strategy is not mutuallyexclusive of those that come before, a potent advan-tage of the third and fourth concepts. A company canemploy a restructuring strategy at the same time ittransfers skills or shares activities. A strategy basedon shared activities becomes more powerful if busi-ness units can also exchange skills. As the Marriottcase illustrates, a company can often pursue the twostrategies together and even incorporate some of theprinciples of restructuring with them. When itchooses industries in which to transfer skills or shareactivities, the company can also investigate the pos-sibility of transforming the industry structure. Whena company bases its strategy on interrelationships, ithas a broader basis on which to create shareholdervalue than if it rests its entire strategy on transform-ing companies in unfamiliar industries.
My study supports the soundness of basing acorporate strategy on the transfer of skills or sharedactivities. The data on the sample companies’ diver-sification programs illustrate some important char-acteristics of successful diversifiers. They have madea disproportionately low percentage ofunrelated acqui-sitions, unrelated being defined as having no clearopportunity to transfer skills or share important ac-tivities (see Exhibit 3). Even successful diversifierssuch as 3M, IBM, and TRW have terrible recordswhen they have strayed into unrelated acquisitions.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 19This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
Successful acquirers diversify into fields, each ofwhich is related to many others. Procter & Gambleand IBM, for example, operate in 18 and 19 interre-lated fields respectively and so enjoy numerous op-portunities to transfer skills and share activities.
Companies with the best acquisition records tendto make heavier-than-average use of start-ups andjoint ventures. Most companies shy away frommodes of entry besides acquisition. My results castdount on the conventional wisdom regarding start-ups. Exhibit 3 demonstrates that while joint venturesare about as risky as acquisitions, start-ups are not.Moreover, successful companies often have very goodrecords with start-up units, as 3M, P&G, Johnson &Johnson, IBM, and United Technologies illustrate.When a company has the internal strength to start upa unit, it can be safer and less costly to launch acompany than to rely solely on an acquisition andthen have to deal with the problem of integration.Japanese diversification histories support the sound-ness of start-up as an entry alternative.
My data also illustrate that none of the concepts ofcorporate strategy works when industry structure ispoor or implementation is bad, no matter how relatedthe industries are. Xerox acquired companies in re-lated industries, but the businesses had poor struc-tures and its skills were insufficient to provideenough competitive advantage to offset implementa-tion problems.
An Action ProgramTo translate the principles of corporate strategy intosuccessful diversification, a company must first takean objective look at its existing businesses and thevalue added by the corporation. Only through suchan assessment can an understanding of good corpo-rate strategy grow. That understanding should guidefuture diversification as well as the development ofskills and activities with which to select further newbusinesses. The following action program provides aconcrete approach to conducting such a review. Acompany can choose a corporate strategy by:
1. Identifying the interrelationships among al-ready existing business units. A companyshould begin to develop a corporate strategy byidentifying all the opportunities it has to shareactivities or transfer skills in its existing port-folio of business units. The company will notonly find ways to enhance the competitive ad-vantage of existing units but also come uponseveral possible diversification avenues. Thelack of meaningful interrelationships in theportfolio is an equally important finding, sug-gesting the need to justify the value added by
the corporation or, alternately, a fundamentalrestructuring.
2. Selecting the core businesses that will be thefoundation of the corporate strategy. Success-ful diversification starts with an understandingof the core businesses that will serve as the basisfor corporate strategy. Core businesses are thosethat are in an attractive industry, have the po-tential to achieve sustainable competitive ad-vantage, have important interrelationshipswith other business units, and provide skills oractivities that represent a base from which todiversify.
The company must first make certain its corebusinesses are on sound footing by upgradingmanagement, internationalizing strategy, orimproving technology. The study shows thatgeographic extensions of existing units,whether by acquisition, joint venture, or start-up, had a substantially lower divestment ratethan diversification.
The company must then patiently dispose ofthe units that are not core businesses. Sellingthem will free resources that could be betterdeployed elsewhere. In some cases disposal im-plies immediate liquidation, while in others thecompany should dress up the units and wait fora propitious market or a particularly eagerbuyer.
3. Creating horizontal organizational mecha-nisms to facilitate interrelationships amongthe core businesses and lay the groundwork forfuture related diversification. Top manage-ment can facilitate interrelationships by em-phasizing cross-unit collaboration, groupingunits organizationally and modifying incen-tives, and taking steps to build a strong sense ofcorporate identity.
4. Pursuing diversification opportunities that al-low shared activities. This concept of corporatestrategy is the most compelling, provided acompany’s strategy passes all three tests. Acompany should inventory activities in existingbusiness units that represent the strongestfoundation for sharing, such as strong distribu-tion channels or world-class technical facilities.These will in turn lead to potential new busi-ness areas. A company can use acquisitions asa beachhead or employ start-ups to exploit in-ternal capabilities and minimize integratingproblems.
5. Pursuing diversification through the transferof skills if opportunities for sharing activitiesare limited or exhausted. Companies can pur-sue this strategy through acquisition, althoughthey may be able to use start-ups if their existing
20 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987
This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
units have important skills they can readilytransfer.
Such diversification is often riskier becauseof the tough conditions necessary for it to work.Given the uncertainties, a company shouldavoid diversifying on the basis of skills transferalone. Rather it should also be viewed as astepping-stone to subsequent diversification us-ing shared activities. New industries should bechosen that will lead naturally to other busi-nesses. The goal is to build a cluster of relatedand mutually reinforcing business units. Thestrategy’s logic implies that the companyshould not set the rate of return standards forthe initial foray into a new sector too high.
6. Pursuing a strategy of restructuring if this fitsthe skills of management or no good opportu-nities exist for forging corporate interrelation-ships. When a company uncovers underman-aged companies and can deploy adequatemanagement talent and resources to the ac-quired units, then it can use a restructuringstrategy. The more developed the capital mar-kets and the more active the market for compa-nies, the more restructuring will require a pa-tient search for that special opportunity ratherthan a headlong race to acquire as many badapples as possible. Restructuring can be a per-manent strategy, as it is with Loew’s, or a wayto build a group of businesses that supports ashift to another corporate strategy.
7. Paying dividends so that the shareholders canbe the portfolio managers. Paying dividends isbetter than destroying shareholder valuethrough diversification based on shaky under-pinnings. Tax considerations, which some com-panies cite to avoid dividends, are hardly legiti-mate reasons to diversify if a company cannotdemonstrate the capacity to do it profitably.
CREATING A CORPORATE THEME
Defining a corporate theme is a good way to ensurethat the corporation will create shareholder value.Having the right theme helps unite the efforts ofbusiness units and reinforces the ways they interre-late as well as guides the choice of new businesses toenter. NEC Corporation, with its “C&C” theme,provides a good example. NEC integrates its com-puter, semiconductor, telecommunications, and con-
sumer electronics businesses by merging computersand communication.
It is all too easy to create a shallow corporatetheme. CBS wanted to be an “entertainment com-pany,” for example, and built a group of businessesrelated to leisure time. It entered such industries astoys, crafts, musical instruments, sports teams, andhi-fi retailing. While this corporate theme soundedgood, close listening revealed its hollow ring. Noneof these businesses had any significant opportunityto share activities or transfer skills among them-selves or with CBS’s traditional broadcasting andrecord businesses. They were all sold, often at signifi-cant losses, except for a few of CBS’s publishing-related units. Saddled with the worst acquisitionrecord in my study, CBS has eroded the shareholdervalue created through its strong performance inbroadcasting and records.
Moving from competitive strategy to corporatestrategy is the business equivalent of passing throughthe Bermuda Triangle. The failure of corporate strat-egy reflects the fact that most diversified companieshave failed to think in terms of how they really addvalue. A corporate strategy that truly enhances thecompetitive advantage of each business unit is thebest defense against the corporate raider. With asharper focus on the tests of diversification and theexplicit choice of a clear concept of corporate strat-egy, companies’ diversification track records fromnow on can look a lot different.
1. The studies also show that sellers of companies capture a largefraction of the gains from merger. See Michael C. Jensen andRichard S. Ruback, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Sci-entific Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics (April 1983): 5,and Michael C. Jensen, “Takeovers: Folklore and Science,” Har-vard Business Review (November–December 1984): 109.
2. Some recent evidence also supports the conclusion thatacquired companies often suffer eroding performance after acqui-sition. See Frederick M. Scherer, “Mergers, Sell-Offs and Manage-rial Behavior,” in The Economics of Strategic Planning, ed. LacyGlenn Thomas (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 143,and David A. Ravenscraft and Frederick M. Scherer, “Mergers andManagerial Performance,” paper presented at the Conference onTakeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Columbia LawSchool, 1985.
3. This observation has been made by a number of authors. See,for example, Malcolm S. Salter and Wolf A. Weinhold, Diversifi-cation Through Acquisition (New York: Free Press, 1979).
4. See Michael E. Porter, “How Competitive Forces ShapeStrategy,” Harvard Business Review (March–April 1979): 86.
5. See Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York:Free Press, 1985).
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May–June 1987 21This document is authorized for use only in EMBA Corporate Strategy May - July 2016 by Professor Jack Goodwin, Melbourne Business School from April 2016 to August 2016.
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