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Aristotle's Rhetoric
First published Thu M
ay 2, 2002; substantive revision M
on Feb 1, 2010
Aristotle's Rhetoric has had an enormou
s influ
ence on the developm
ent o
f the art o
f rhetoric. N
ot only authors writin
g in the
peripatetic tradition, b
ut also the famou
s Rom
an te
achers of rhetoric, such as Cicero and Quintilian, frequ
ently
used
elem
ents stemming from
the Aristotelian do
ctrine. N
evertheless, th
ese authors were interested neither in
an authentic
interpretatio
n of th
e Aristotelian works nor in
the philosophical sou
rces and
backgrounds of the vocabulary th
at Aristotle
had introd
uced to
rhetorical theory. Thu
s, for two millennia the interpretatio
n of Aristotelian rhetoric has becom
e a matter
of th
e history of rhetoric, not of philosophy. In the most influential m
anuscripts and
editio
ns, Aristotle's Rhetoric was
surrou
nded by rhetorical w
orks and even writte
n speeches of other Greek and
Latin authors, a
nd was seldom in
terpreted in
the context o
f the who
le Corpus Aristotelicum
. It w
as not until the last few
decades th
at th
e philosophically salient features
of th
e Aristotelian rhetoric were rediscovered: in construing a general th
eory of the persuasive, Aristotle app
lies numerous
concepts and
argum
ents th
at are also treated in his lo
gical, ethical, and psycho
logical w
ritin
gs. H
is th
eory of rhetorical
arguments, for example, is only on
e further application of his general doctrine of th
e sullogismos, which also form
s the
basis of dialectic, logic, a
nd his th
eory of demon
stratio
n. Ano
ther example is the concept of em
otions: tho
ugh em
otions are
one of the m
ost important top
ics in th
e Aristotelian ethics, h
e no
where offers such an illum
inating account o
f single
emotions as in the Rhetoric. F
inally, it is th
e Rhetoric, too, th
at in
form
s us about th
e cognitive features of language and
style.
1. W
orks on Rhetoric
2. The Agenda of th
e Rhetoric
3. Rhetoric as a Cou
nterpart to
Dialectic
4. The Purpose of Rhetoric
4.1 The Definition
of Rhetoric
4.2 The Neutrality
of Aristotelian Rhetoric
Aristotle's Rhetoric (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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4.3 Why W
e Need Rhetoric
4.4 Aristotelian Rhetoric as Proof-Centered and Pertin
ent
4.5 Is There an Inconsistency in Aristotle's Rhetorical T
heory?
5. The Three M
eans of Persuasion
6. The Enthy
mem
e6.1 The Concept of Enthy
mem
e6.2 Fo
rmal Requirements
6.3 Enthy
mem
es as Dialectical Argum
ents
6.4 The Brevity of the Enthy
mem
e– Su
pplement o
n the Brevity of the Enthy
mem
e6.5 Different T
ypes of Enthy
mem
es7. The Top
oi7.1 The Definition
of ‘Topos’
7.2 The W
ord ‘Topos’ and
the Techn
ique of Places
7.3 The Elements of a Topos
7.4 The Fun
ction of a Topos
– Su
pplement o
n the Topoi of th
e Rhetoric
8. Style: H
ow to
Say Things with
Words
8.1 The Virtue of Style
8.2 Aristotelian Metapho
rsGlossary of Selected Terms
Bibliography
Other Internet R
esou
rces
Related Entries
1. Works on Rhetoric
According to
ancient te
stim
onies, Aristotle wrote an early dialogue on rhetoric entitled ‘Grullos’, in which he pu
t forward
the argument that rhetoric cann
ot be an art (technê); and
since this is precisely th
e positio
n of Plato's Gorgias, th
e lost
dialogue Grullos has tradition
ally been regarded as a sign of Aristotle's (alleged) early Platonism
. But th
e evidence for th
epositio
n of th
is dialogue is too
tenu
ous to sup
port such strong con
clusions: it a
lso could have been a ‘dialectical’ dialogue,
which listed th
e pros and
con
s of th
e thesis th
at rhetoric is an art. We do
not kno
w m
uch more about the so-called ‘Technê
Aristotle's Rhetoric (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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Sunagogê’, a collection of previou
s theories of rhetoric th
at is also ascribed to
Aristotle. Cicero seem
s to use th
is collection
itself, or at least a
secondary source relying on
it, a
s his main historical sou
rce when he gives a sho
rt survey of th
e history of
pre-Aristotelian rhetoric in
his Brutus 46
–48. Finally, A
ristotle once mentio
ns a work called ‘Theodecteia’ which has also
been sup
posed to be Aristotelian; but m
ore prob
ably he meant th
e rhetorical handb
ook of his follower Theod
ectes, who was
a form
er pup
il of Isocrates.
What h
as com
e do
wn to us are just th
e three bo
oks on
rhetoric, which we kn
ow as The Rhetoric, though the ancient
catalogue of th
e Aristotelian works, reported by D
iogenes Laertius, m
entio
ns only tw
o bo
oks on rhetoric (perhaps our
Rhetoric I &
II), a
nd tw
o further book
s on
style (perhaps ou
r Rhetoric III?). W
hereas m
ost m
odern authors agree that at
least the core of Rhet. I &
II presents a coh
erent rhetorical th
eory, the tw
o them
es of Rhet. III are not m
entio
ned in th
eagenda of Rhet. I &
II. The con
ceptual link betw
een Rhet. I &
II and Rhet. III is not given until the very last sentence of th
esecond
boo
k. It is quite understandable that th
e authenticity
of this ad hoc com
positio
n has been questioned: we cannot
exclud
e the possibility th
at th
ese tw
o parts of th
e Rhetoric w
ere no
t put to
gether until the first editio
n of Aristotle's works
completed by And
ronicus in the first century. In the Poetics (145
6a33
) we fin
d a cross-reference to a work called
‘Rhetoric’ which obviously refers to Rhet. I &
II, but excludes Rhet. III. R
egardless of such do
ubts, the systematic id
ea that
links th
e tw
o heterogeneou
s parts of the Rhetoric does no
t at a
ll seem
to be un
reasonable: it is not enough to
have a supply
of th
ings to say (the so-called “tho
ught”), the th
eorist of rhetoric m
ust a
lso inform
us about the right way to
say th
ose things
(the so-called “style”).
The chron
ological fixing of the Rhetoric has tu
rned out to
be a delicate matter. At least the core of Rhet. I &
II seem
s to be
an early work, writte
n du
ring Aristotle's first stay in Athens (it is un
clear, how
ever, w
hich chapters belong to
that core;
regularly mentio
ned are the chapters I.4–15 and II.1–17). It is true th
at the Rhetoric refers to historical events that fall in the
time of Aristotle's exile and
his secon
d stay in
Athens, but m
ost o
f them
can be foun
d in th
e chapters II.23
–24, and
besides
this, e
xamples cou
ld have been updated, which is especially plausible if we assume that th
e Rhetoric formed th
e basis of a
lecture held several times. M
ost striking are the affin
ities to
the (also early) Topics; if, a
s it is widely agreed, the Topics
represents a pre-syllogistic state of Aristotelian logic, th
e same is true of the Rhetoric: w
e actually find no hints of syllogistic
inventory in it.
2. The Agenda of the Rhetoric
The structure of Rhet. I &
II is determined by tw
o tripartite division
s. The first division consists in
the distinction am
ong the
three means of persuasion
: The speech can prod
uce persuasion
eith
er throu
gh th
e character of th
e speaker, th
e em
otional
state of th
e listener, or the argument (logos) itself (see below
§5). The secon
d tripartite division
concerns the three species
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of pub
lic speech. The speech that ta
kes place in th
e assembly is defined as the deliberative species. In this rhetorical
species, th
e speaker either advises th
e audience to
do something or warns against doing som
ething. A
ccordingly, the
audience has to
judge things that a
re going to
happen in th
e future, and
they have to decide whether th
ese future events are
good
or bad for the polis, w
hether th
ey will cause advantage or harm
. The speech that ta
kes place before a cou
rt is defined
as th
e judicial species. T
he speaker eith
er accuses som
ebod
y or defends herself or som
eone else. Naturally, this kind of
speech treats th
ings th
at happened in th
e past. T
he aud
ience or rather jury has to
judge whether a past e
vent was ju
st or
unjust, i.e., whether it was according to
the law or contrary to the law. W
hile th
e deliberative and judicial species have their
context in a controversial situ
ation in which th
e listener has to decide in favor of on
e of tw
o op
posing parties, the th
ird
species do
es not aim
at such a decision: the epideictic speech praises or blames som
ebody, it tries to
describe things or
deeds of th
e respective person
as ho
norable or shameful.
The first boo
k of th
e Rhetoric treats th
e three species in succession. Rhet. I.4–8 deals with
the deliberative, I.9 with
the
epideictic, I.10–14
the judicial species. T
hese chapters are un
derstood
as contributin
g to the argum
entative mode of
persuasion
or—
more precisely—
to that p
art o
f argumentative persuasion
that is specific
to the respective species of
persuasion
. The secon
d part of the argumentative persuasion
that is com
mon
to all three species of rhetorical speech is
treated in th
e chapters II.19
–26. The secon
d means of persuasion
, which works by evok
ing the em
otions of the audience, is
described in the chapters II.2–11. Tho
ugh the following chapters II.12
–17 treat d
ifferent types of character these chapters
do not, as is often assum
ed, develop the third means of persuasion
, which depends on the character of th
e speaker. The
underlying th
eory of this m
eans of persuasion
is elaborated in a few
lines of chapter II.1. The aforementio
ned chapters
II.12–
17 give inform
ation abou
t different typ
es of character and their disposition
to em
otional response, which can be useful
for those speakers who
want to arouse the em
otions of the audience. W
hy the chapters on the argum
entative means of
persuasion
are separated by the treatm
ent o
f em
otions and
character (in II.2–
17) remains a riddle, especially since th
echapter II.18 tries to give a link between the specific and the common
aspects of argumentative persuasion. R
hetoric
III.1–
12 discusses several questions of style (see below
§8.1), R
hetoric III.13
–19 is on the several p
arts of a speech.
3. Rhetoric as a Counterpart to Dialectic
Aristotle stresses that rhetoric is closely related to
dialectic. H
e offers several formulas to
describe this affinity
between the
two disciplines: first of all, rhetoric is said to be a “cou
nterpart” (antistrophos) to
dialectic (Rhet. I.1, 1
354a1); (ii) it is also
called an “ou
tgrowth” (paraphues ti) of dialectic and
the stud
y of character (Rhet. I.2, 1356a25f.); finally, A
ristotle says
that rhetoric is part o
f dialectic and
resem
bles it (Rhet. I.2, 1
356a30
f.). In saying th
at rhetoric is a counterpart to
dialectic,
Aristotle obviously alludes to Plato's Gorgias (464
bff.), where rhetoric is iron
ically defined as a counterpart to cookery in
the soul. S
ince, in this passage, P
lato uses the word ‘antistrophos’ to designate an analogy, it is likely th
at Aristotle wants to
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express a kind
of analogy too: what d
ialectic is for th
e (private or academ
ic) practice of attacking and m
aintaining an
argument, rhetoric is for th
e (pub
lic) practice of defending oneself or accusing an opponent.
This analogy betw
een rhetoric and
dialectic can be substantiated by several com
mon features of both disciplines:
Rhetoric and dialectic are con
cerned with
things th
at do no
t belon
g to a definite genus or are not the object o
f a
specific science.
Rhetoric and dialectic rely on
accepted sentences (endoxa).
Rhetoric and dialectic are not dependent on the principles of specific sciences.
Rhetoric and dialectic are con
cerned with
both sides of an op
positio
n.Rhetoric and dialectic rely on
the same theory of dedu
ction and indu
ction.
Rhetoric and dialectic sim
ilarly apply the so-called topoi.
The analogy to
dialectic has im
portant implications for th
e status of rhetoric. P
lato argued in his Gorgias that rhetoric
cann
ot be an art (technê), since it is not related to
a definite sub
ject, while real arts are defin
ed by their specific subjects, a
se.g. m
edicine or sho
emaking are defin
ed by their prod
ucts, i.e., health and
sho
es. H
owever, though dialectic has no defin
itesubject, it is easy to see that it n
evertheless rests on
a m
etho
d, because dialectic has to grasp the reason
why som
earguments are valid and
others are no
t. Now
, if rhetoric is nothing but th
e coun
terpart to dialectic in
the do
main of public
speech, it m
ust be grounded in an investigation of what is persuasive and
what is no
t, and th
is, in turn, q
ualifies rhetoric as
an art.
Further, it is central to
both disciplines th
at th
ey deal w
ith argum
ents from accepted prem
ises. H
ence th
e rhetorician who
wants to
persuade by argum
ents or (rhetorical) proofs can adapt m
ost o
f the dialectical equipment. Nevertheless, persuasion
that ta
kes place before a public aud
ience is not only a m
atter of argum
ents and
proofs, but also of credibility and em
otional
attitud
es. T
his is why
there are also remarkable differences betw
een the two disciplines:
Dialectic can be applied to every object w
hatsoever, rhetoric is useful especially in
practical and public m
atters.
Dialectic proceeds by questioning and
answering, while rhetoric for the most p
art p
roceeds in contin
uous form.
Dialectic is con
cerned with
general questions, w
hile rhetoric is con
cerned for th
e most part with
particular to
pics (i.e.,
things about w
hich we cann
ot gain real kno
wledge).
Certain uses of dialectic apply qualified endoxa, i.e., endoxa th
at are approved by exp
erts, w
hile rhetoric aims at
endoxa th
at are pop
ular.
Rhetoric must take into accou
nt th
at its target group
has only restricted in
tellectual resou
rces, whereas such concerns
are totally absent from dialectic.
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While dialectic tries to te
st th
e consistency of a set of sentences, rhetoric tries to achieve th
e persuasion
of a given
audience.
Non
-argum
entative metho
ds are absent from
dialectic, w
hile rhetoric uses non
-argum
entative means of persuasion.
4. The Purpose of Rhetoric
4.1 The Definition of Rhetoric
Aristotle defines th
e rhetorician as som
eone who
is always able to
see what is persuasive (Topics VI.12, 1
49b25).
Correspon
dingly, rhetoric is defined as the ability to
see what is possibly persuasive in every given case (Rhet. I.2,
1355
b26f.). T
his is not to
say that the rhetorician w
ill be able to
con
vince un
der all circumstances. Rather he is in
a situ
ation
similar to th
at of the physician: th
e latte
r has a complete grasp of his art only if he neglects no
thing that m
ight heal h
ispatient, tho
ugh he is not able to heal every patient. S
imilarly, th
e rhetorician has a complete grasp of his m
etho
d, if he
discovers the available means of persuasion
, tho
ugh he is not able to con
vince everybody.
4.2 The eutrality of Aristotelian Rhetoric
Aristotelian rhetoric as such is a neutral to
ol th
at can be used by person
s of virtuou
s or depraved character. This capacity
can be used for good
or bad purposes; it can cause great benefits as well as great h
arms. There is no doubt that A
ristotle
himself regards his system
of rhetoric as something useful, but the good
purposes for which rhetoric is useful d
o not d
efine
the rhetorical capacity
as such. T
hus, Aristotle does no
t hesitate to concede on
the one hand th
at his art of rhetoric can be
misused. B
ut on the other hand
he tones do
wn the risk of misuse by stressing several factors: G
enerally, it is true of all
good
s, except virtue, that th
ey can be misused. S
econ
dly, using rhetoric of th
e Aristotelian style, it is easier to convince of
the just and
good than of their op
posites. Finally, the risk of m
isuse is com
pensated by the benefits that can be accomplished
by rhetoric of th
e Aristotelian style.
4.3 Why We eed Rhetoric
It cou
ld still b
e ob
jected th
at rhetoric is only useful for th
ose who
want to ou
twit their audience and conceal th
eir real aim
s,since someone who ju
st wants to
com
mun
icate the truth could be straightforward and wou
ld not need rhetorical to
ols. This,
however, is not Aristotle's point o
f view
: Even those who
just try to establish what is just and true need the help of rhetoric
when they are faced with
a pub
lic aud
ience. Aristotle te
lls us that it is im
possible to
teach such an audience, e
ven if the
speaker had the most e
xact kno
wledge of th
e subject. O
bviously he thinks th
at th
e audience of a public speech consists of
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ordinary people who are not able to follow an exact proo
f based on
the principles of a science. Further, such an audience
can easily be distracted by factors that do no
t pertain to
the subject a
t all; som
etim
es th
ey are receptive to flatte
ry or just try
to in
crease their own advantage. And
this situ
ation becomes even worse if th
e constitution, th
e laws, and
the rhetorical
habits in
a city
are bad. F
inally, m
ost of th
e topics th
at are usually discussed in
pub
lic speeches do not allow of exact
know
ledge, but leave room
for dou
bt; e
specially in
such cases it is im
portant that the speaker seem
s to be a credible person
and that th
e audience is in
a sym
pathetic m
ood. For all those reason
s, affectin
g the decisions of ju
ries and
assem
blies is a
matter of persuasiveness, not of kn
owledge. It is true th
at som
e peop
le m
anage to be persuasive eith
er at rando
m or by
habit, bu
t it is rhetoric th
at gives us a metho
d to discover all m
eans of persuasion
on any to
pic whatsoever.
4.4 Aristotelian Rhetoric as Proof-Centered and Pertinent
Aristotle jo
ins Plato in
criticizing contem
porary m
anuals of rhetoric. B
ut how
does he m
anage to distin
guish his ow
n project
from
the criticized manuals? The general id
ea seems to be this: P
reviou
s theorists of rhetoric gave m
ost o
f their attention to
metho
ds outside th
e subject; th
ey ta
ught how
to sland
er, h
ow to
arouse em
otions in
the audience, o
r ho
w to
distract the
attention of th
e hearers from
the subject. This style of rhetoric prom
otes a situ
ation in which ju
ries and assem
blies no
longer
form
rational judgm
ents about th
e given issues, b
ut surrend
er to
the litigants. A
ristotelian rhetoric is different in this respect:
it is centered on th
e rhetorical kind of proof, the enthy
mem
e (see below
§6), w
hich is called the most important m
eans of
persuasion
. Since people are most stron
gly convinced when they sup
pose th
at som
ething has been proven (Rhet. I.1,
1355
a5f.), th
ere is no need for the orator to con
fuse or distract the aud
ience by th
e use of emotional appeals, e
tc. In
Aristotle's view
an orator will be even m
ore successful when he ju
st picks up the convincing aspects of a given issue, th
ereby
using common
ly-held opinions as prem
ises. S
ince people have a natural dispositio
n for the true (Rhet. I.1, 1
355a15f.) and
every man has som
e contributio
n to m
ake to th
e truth (Eudemian Ethics I.6, 121
6b31,) th
ere is no un
bridgeable gap
betw
een the common
ly-held op
inions and
what is true. T
his alleged affin
ity between the true and th
e persuasive ju
stifies
Aristotle's project of a rhetoric that essentially relies on
the persuasiveness of pertinent a
rgum
entatio
n; and it is ju
st th
isargumentative character of Aristotelian rhetoric th
at exp
lains the close affin
ity between rhetoric and dialectic (see above
§3).
4.5 Is There an Inconsistency in Aristotle's Rhetorical Theory?
Of course, A
ristotle's rhetoric covers no
n-argumentative tools of persuasion as well. He tells th
e orator how
to stim
ulate
emotions and
how
to m
ake himself credible (see below §5); h
is art of rhetoric in
clud
es consideratio
ns about delivery and
style (see below
§8.1) and
the parts of a speech. It is un
derstand
able th
at several in
terpreters found an insoluble tension
betw
een the argumentative means of pertinent rhetoric and
non
-argum
entative tools that aim
at w
hat is outside the subject.
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It does no
t seem, h
owever, that A
ristotle him
self saw a m
ajor con
flict between these diverse tools of persuasion
—presum
ably for th
e following reason
s: (i) H
e leaves no do
ubt that the sub
ject that is treated in a speech has the highest
priority (e.g. Rhet. III.1, 1
403b
18–27). T
hus, it is not surprising that th
ere are even passages that regard the
non-argumentative tools as a sort o
f accidental con
tribution to th
e process of persuasion, which essentially proceeds in th
emanner of dialectic (cp. R
het. I.1, 1
354a15
). (ii) There are, h
e says (III.1, 140
4a2f.), m
etho
ds th
at are not right, b
utnecessary because of certain deficiencies of th
e audience. H
is point seems to be that th
e argumentative metho
d becomes
less effective, th
e worse th
e condition
of the audience is. This again is to say that it is due to
the badn
ess of th
e audience
when his rhetoric in
cludes aspects th
at are not in
line with
the idea of argumentative and pertinent rhetoric. (iii) In dealing
with
metho
ds of traditional rhetoric, Aristotle obviously assum
es th
at even metho
ds th
at have traditionally been used in
stead
of argum
entatio
n can be refined so that th
ey sup
port the aim
of an argum
entative style of rhetoric. The prologue of a
speech, for example, was tradition
ally used for appeals to th
e listener, but it can also be used to set out th
e issue of th
espeech, thu
s contributin
g to its clearness. Sim
ilarly, the epilogue has tradition
ally been used to
arouse em
otions like pity
or
anger; but as soon
as the epilogue recalls the con
clusions reached, it w
ill m
ake the speech m
ore understandable.
5. The Three Means of Persuasion
The systematical core of Aristotle's Rhetoric is the doctrine that th
ere are three technical m
eans of persuasion
. The attribute
‘techn
ical’ im
plies tw
o characteristics: (i) Techn
ical persuasion must rest o
n a metho
d, and th
is, in turn, is to
say th
at w
emust k
now th
e reason
why
som
e things are persuasive and some are no
t. Fu
rther, m
ethodical p
ersuasion must rest o
n a
complete analysis of what it m
eans to
be persuasive. (ii) Techn
ical m
eans of persuasion m
ust b
e provided by the speaker
himself, whereas preexistin
g facts, such as oaths, w
itnesses, te
stim
onies, etc. a
re non
-technical, since th
ey cannot b
eprepared by the speaker.
A speech consists of three things: the speaker, the subject that is treated in the speech, and
the listener to who
m th
e speech
is add
ressed (Rhet. I.3, 13
58a37ff.). It seems that th
is is w
hy only three technical m
eans of persuasion are possible:
Techn
ical m
eans of persuasion
are eith
er (a) in
the character of th
e speaker, or (b) in th
e em
otional state of the hearer, o
r(c) in th
e argument (logos) itself.
(a) The persuasion is accom
plished by character whenever the speech is held in such a way as to render the speaker worthy
of credence. If the speaker appears to be credible, the aud
ience will form th
e second
-order ju
dgment that p
ropositio
ns put
forw
ard by
the credible speaker are true or acceptable. T
his is especially im
portant in cases where th
ere is no exact
know
ledge but roo
m for dou
bt. But how
does the speaker manage to app
ear a credible person? He must d
isplay (i) practical
intelligence (phronêsis), (ii) a virtuou
s character, and
(iii) good
will (Rhet. II.1, 137
8a6ff.); for, if he displayed none of them,
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the audience wou
ld dou
bt that h
e is able to give good
advice at all. Again, if he displayed (i) w
ithout (ii) and (iii), th
eaudience cou
ld dou
bt whether th
e aims of the speaker are goo
d. Finally, if he displayed (i) and
(ii) with
out (iii), th
eaudience cou
ld still d
oubt whether th
e speaker gives the best suggestion, th
ough he kn
ows what it is. But if he displays all of
them
, Aristotle con
clud
es, it c
anno
t rationally be do
ubted that his suggestions are credible. It m
ust b
e stressed th
at th
espeaker must a
ccom
plish these effects by what h
e says; it is no
t necessary th
at he is actually virtuou
s: on the contrary, a
preexisting good character cannot b
e part of the technical m
eans of persuasion
.
(b) The success of the persuasive efforts depends on the em
otional d
ispositio
ns of the audience; for we do not ju
dge in th
esame way when we grieve and
rejoice or when we are friend
ly and
hostile. Thu
s, th
e orator has to
arouse em
otions exactly
because em
otions have the power to
mod
ify our ju
dgments: to a judge who
is in
a friendly moo
d, th
e person about whom he
is going to
judge seem
s no
t to do wrong or on
ly in
a small w
ay; b
ut to
the ju
dge who
is in
an angry mood, th
e same person
will seem to
do the op
posite (cp. R
het. II.1, 137
8a1ff.). M
any interpreters writin
g on
the rhetorical emotions were misled by
the role of the em
otions in
Aristotle's ethics: they suggested that th
e orator has to
arouse the em
otions in
order (i) to
motivate the audience or (ii) to make them
better person
s (since Aristotle requires that virtuou
s person
s do th
e right things
together with
the right emotions). Thesis (i) is false for th
e simple reason
that th
e aim of rhetorical persuasion is a certain
judgment (krisis), n
ot an actio
n or practical decision (prohairesis). Thesis (ii) is false, b
ecause m
oral educatio
n is not th
epurpose of rhetoric (see above §4), n
or cou
ld it be effected by a pu
blic speech: “Now
if speeches were in th
emselves
enou
gh to
make men goo
d, th
ey wou
ld ju
stly, a
s Theognis says, h
ave won
very great rew
ards, a
nd such rewards should
have been provided; b
ut as things are …
they are not able to encou
rage th
e many to nob
ility and
goodness.” (EN X.9.
1179
b4–1
0)
How
is it possible for the orator to bring the audience to
a certain emotion? Aristotle's techniqu
e essentially rests on the
know
ledge of th
e defin
ition
of every significant emotion. Let, for example, anger be defin
ed as “desire, accom
panied with
pain, for conspicuo
us revenge for a con
spicuo
us slight th
at was directed against o
neself or those near to
one, w
hen such a
slight is und
eserved.” (Rhet. II.2 137
8a31
–33). A
ccording to
such a defin
ition
, som
eone who
believes that he has suffered a
slight from a person who
is not entitled to
do so, e
tc., will becom
e angry. If we take such a definitio
n for granted, it is
possible to
deduce circum
stances in which a person will m
ost p
robably be angry; for example, we can dedu
ce (i) in
what
state of m
ind peop
le are angry and
(ii) against who
m th
ey are angry and
(iii) for what sorts of reason
. Aristotle deduces
these three factors for several emotions in
the chapters II.2–11
. With
this equ
ipment, the orator w
ill be able, for example, to
highlight such characteristics of a case as are likely to
provoke anger in
the audience. In comparison with
the tricks of
form
er rhetoricians, th
is m
etho
d of arousing em
otions has a striking advantage: The orator who
wants to
arouse em
otions
must n
ot even speak outside the subject; it is suffic
ient to
detect aspects of a given sub
ject th
at are causally con
nected with
the intend
ed emotion.
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(c) We persuade by the argument itself when we demon
strate or seem
to dem
onstrate th
at som
ething is th
e case. Fo
rAristotle, there are tw
o species of argum
ents: ind
uctio
ns and
deductio
ns (Posterior Analytics I.1, 71a5ff.). Ind
uctio
n(epagôgê) is defined as the proceeding from particulars up
to a universal (Topics I.12, 1
05a13ff.). A deductio
n(sullogismos) is an argument in which, c
ertain th
ings having been sup
posed, som
ething different from th
e suppositions
results of necessity
throu
gh th
em (Topics I.1, 100
a25ff.) or because of their being true (Prior Analytics I.2, 24b18
–20). T
heindu
ctive argument in rhetoric is th
e exam
ple (paradeigma); unlike other indu
ctive arguments, it d
oes not p
roceed from
many particular cases to
one universal case, but from one particular to
a sim
ilar particular if both particulars fall un
der the
same genu
s (Rhet. I.2, 1
357b
25ff.). T
he deductive argument in rhetoric is th
e enthym
eme (see below
§6):
but w
hen, certain th
ings being th
e case, som
ething different results beside them
because of their being true,
either universally or for the m
ost part, it is called dedu
ction here (in dialectic) and enthym
eme there (in
rhetoric).
It is rem
arkable that Aristotle uses the qu
alificatio
n “either universally or for the most p
art”: o
bviously, h
e wants to
say th
atin som
e cases the conclusion follows un
iversally, i.e., by necessity, while in
other cases it follows only fo
r the most part. A
tfirst glance, th
is seems to be inconsistent, since a non
-necessary in
ference is no longer a deductio
n. How
ever, it h
as been
disputed whether in
argum
ents from probable prem
ises th
e form
ula “for the m
ost p
art” qualifies the inference itself (“If for
the most p
art such and such is th
e case it follows for the most part th
at som
ething different is the case”), o
r on
ly th
econclusion
(“If for the most part such and such is th
e case it follows by necessity th
at fo
r the m
ost part som
ething different
is th
e case”). If the form
er in
terpretatio
n is true, then Aristotle con
cedes in th
e very definition
of the enthym
eme that som
eenthym
emes are not deductive. But if the latte
r interpretatio
n (w
hich has a parallel in An. post. 87
b23–25) is correct, a
nenthym
eme whose premises and con
clusion are for the most p
art true wou
ld still b
e a valid deductio
n.
6. The Enthymeme
6.1 The Concept of Enthymeme
For Aristotle, a
n enthym
eme is what h
as th
e functio
n of a proof or demon
stratio
n in th
e domain of public speech, since a
demon
stratio
n is a kind of sullogismos and the enthym
eme is said to be a sullogismos too. The word ‘enthymeme’ (from
‘enthumeisthai—
to con
sider’) had already been coined by Aristotle's predecessors and
originally designated clever sayings,
bon mots, and
sho
rt argum
ents in
volving a parado
x or con
tradictio
n. The con
cepts ‘proof’ (apodeixis) and ‘sullogismos’
play a crucial role in Aristotle's logical-dialectical theory. In applying them to
a te
rm of conventio
nal rhetoric, Aristotle
appeals to a well-know
n rhetorical te
chniqu
e, but, a
t the sam
e tim
e, restricts and
cod
ifies th
e original m
eaning of
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‘enthy
mem
e’: p
roperly un
derstood
, what p
eople call ‘enthy
mem
e’ should have the form
of a sullogismos, i.e., a
deductive
argument.
6.2 Formal Requirements
In general, A
ristotle regards deductive arguments as a set o
f sentences in which som
e sentences are prem
ises and one is th
econclusion
, and
the inference from
the prem
ises to
the conclusion
is guaranteed by th
e prem
ises alone. S
ince enthymem
esin th
e proper sense are exp
ected to be dedu
ctive arguments, the m
inim
al requirement for the form
ulation of enthy
mem
es is
that th
ey have to display th
e prem
ise-conclusion
structure of dedu
ctive arguments. T
his is why
enthymem
es have to in
clude
a statem
ent a
s well as a kind of reason
for th
e given statem
ent. Typ
ically th
is reason is given in
a conditio
nal ‘if’-clause or a
causal ‘since’- or ‘for’-clause. Examples of the form
er, c
onditio
nal typ
e are: “If not even the gods know everything, hum
anbeings can hardly do so.” “If the war is th
e cause of present evils, things sho
uld be set right by making peace.” Examples of
the latte
r, causal typ
e are: “One should no
t be educated, for one ought not be envied (and educated people are usually
envied).” “S
he has given birth, for she has m
ilk.” Aristotle stresses that the sentence “T
here is no man among us who is
free” taken for itself is a m
axim
, but b
ecom
es an enthym
eme as soo
n as it is used together w
ith a reason such as “for all are
slaves of mon
ey or of chance (and
no slave of m
oney or chance is free).” Som
etim
es th
e requ
ired reason may even be
implicit, as e.g. in
the sentence “As a mortal, do
not cherish im
mortal anger” the reason why
one should not c
herish m
ortal
anger is im
plicitly given in the phrase “immortal,” which alludes to th
e rule th
at is not app
ropriate for m
ortal b
eings to have
such an attitud
e.
6.3 Enthymemes as Dialectical Arguments
Aristotle calls th
e enthym
eme the “bod
y of persuasion”, implying th
at everything else is only an add
ition or accident to
the
core of the persuasive process. T
he reason why
the enthy
mem
e, as the rhetorical kind of proof or demonstratio
n, should be
regarded as central to the rhetorical process of persuasion
is th
at we are most e
asily persuaded when we think that
something has been demon
strated. Hence, the basic id
ea of a rhetorical dem
onstratio
n seem
s to be this: In order to m
ake a
target group believe th
at q, the orator must first select a
sentence p or some sentences p1 …
pn that a
re already
accepted by
the target group; secon
dly he has to
sho
w th
at q can be derived from
p or p1 …
pn, u
sing p or p1 …
pn as prem
ises. G
iven
that th
e target persons form th
eir beliefs in
accordance with rational stand
ards, they will accept q
as soon as they
understand
that q can be demonstrated on
the basis of their ow
n op
inions.
Con
sequ
ently
, the con
struction of enthy
mem
es is primarily a m
atter of deducing from
accepted opinions (endoxa). Of
course, it is also po
ssible to use prem
ises that a
re not com
mon
ly accepted by th
emselves, b
ut can be derived from
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common
ly accepted op
inions; o
ther premises are only accepted since th
e speaker is held to be credible; still other
enthym
emes are built from
signs: see §6.5. That a
deductio
n is m
ade from
accepted opinions—as opposed to deductions
from
first and
true sentences or principles—is th
e defin
ing feature of dialectical argum
entatio
n in th
e Aristotelian sense.
Thu
s, th
e form
ulation of enthy
mem
es is a m
atter of dialectic, and the dialectician has the competence that is needed for the
constructio
n of enthy
mem
es. If enthym
emes are a sub
class of dialectical argum
ents, then it is natural to
exp
ect a
specific
difference by which one can te
ll enthym
emes apart from all other kind
s of dialectical argum
ents (traditionally,
commentators regarded logical incom
pleteness as such a difference; for some ob
jections against th
e traditional view, see
§6.4). Nevertheless, this expectation is som
ehow
misled: The enthy
mem
e is different from other kinds of dialectical
arguments, insofar as it is used in th
e rhetorical con
text of pu
blic speech (and
rhetorical argum
ents are called
‘enthy
mem
es’); thus, no further form
al or qu
alitative differences are needed.
How
ever, in the rhetorical con
text th
ere are two factors that th
e dialectician has to keep in m
ind if she wants to
becom
e a
rhetorician too, and if th
e dialectical argum
ent is to
becom
e a successful enthy
mem
e. First, the ty
pical sub
jects of public
speech do no
t—as th
e subject of dialectic and
theoretical philosophy—
belong to the things th
at are necessarily th
e case, b
utare am
ong those things th
at are th
e goal of practical deliberation and can also be otherw
ise. Second, as op
posed to
well-trained dialecticians the audience of pub
lic speech is characterized by an in
tellectual insuffic
iency; above all, the
mem
bers of a jury or assembly are no
t accustomed to following a longer chain of inferences. T
herefore enthy
mem
es m
ust
not b
e as precise as a scientific demon
stratio
n and shou
ld be shorter than ordinary dialectical argum
ents. T
his, how
ever, is
not to say that th
e enthym
eme is defined by incompleteness and brevity
. Rather, it is a sign of a well-executed enthymem
ethat th
e content a
nd th
e nu
mber of its prem
ises are adjusted to th
e intellectual capacities of the public aud
ience; but even an
enthym
eme that failed to in
corporate these qu
alities wou
ld still be enthym
eme.
6.4 The Brevity of the Enthymeme
In a well k
nown passage (Rhet. I.2, 1
357a7–
18; sim
ilar: Rhet. II.22
, 139
5b24
–26), A
ristotle says that th
e enthym
eme often
has few or even few
er premises th
an som
e other dedu
ctions, (sullogismoi). S
ince m
ost interpreters refer the word
‘sullogismos’ to
the syllogistic theory (see th
e entry on
Aristotle's logic), a
ccording to
which a proper deduction has exactly
two prem
ises, those lines have led to th
e widespread un
derstand
ing that Aristotle defines th
e enthym
eme as a sullogismos in
which one of two prem
ises has been suppressed, i.e., as an abbreviated, in
complete syllogism
. But certainly the m
entio
ned
passages do no
t atte
mpt to
give a defin
ition
of the enthym
eme, nor does the word ‘sullogismos’ necessarily refer to
dedu
ctions with
exactly two prem
ises. P
roperly un
derstood
, both passages are abou
t the selectio
n of appropriate premises,
not a
bout lo
gical incom
pleteness. The rem
ark that enthy
mem
es often have few or less premises con
cludes th
e discussion of
two possible m
istakes the orator cou
ld m
ake (Rhet. I.2, 13
57a7–10): O
ne can draw conclusions from th
ings th
at have
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previously been dedu
ced or from th
ings th
at have no
t been deduced yet. T
he latte
r metho
d is unpersuasive, for th
e prem
ises
are no
t accepted, nor have th
ey been introd
uced. T
he former m
etho
d is problem
atic, too: if the orator has to
introd
uce the
needed premises by another dedu
ction, and
the prem
ises of this pre-deductio
n too, etc., one will end up with
a lo
ng chain of
dedu
ctions. A
rgum
ents with
several deductive steps are common
in dialectical practice, but one canno
t expect the audience
of a pub
lic speech to follow such long argum
ents. This is why
Aristotle says that th
e enthym
eme is and should be from
fewer premises.
Supplement o
n The Brevity of the Enthy
mem
e
6.5 Different Types of Enthymemes
Just as there is a difference between real and
apparent o
r fallaciou
s dedu
ctions in
dialectic, w
e have to
distin
guish betw
een
real and
apparent o
r fallaciou
s enthym
emes in
rhetoric. The to
poi for real enthy
mem
es are given in
chapter II.23, for
fallaciou
s enthym
emes in
chapter II.24
. The fallaciou
s enthym
eme pretends to
includ
e a valid deductio
n, while it actually
rests on
a fallaciou
s inference.
Further, Aristotle distin
guishes between enthym
emes ta
ken from
probable (eikos) premises and enthymem
es taken from
signs (sêmeia). (Rhet. I.2, 135
7a32
–33). In a different context, he says th
at enthy
mem
es are based on probabilities,
exam
ples, tekmêria (i.e., proofs, evidences), and
signs (Rhet. II.25, 140
2b12
–14). S
ince th
e so-called tekmêria are a
subclass of signs and the exam
ples are used to establish general p
remises, this is only an extension of the form
erclassific
ation. (Note that neither classification interferes with
the id
ea th
at premises have to be accepted opinion
s: with
respect to the signs, th
e audience m
ust believe that they exist a
nd accept that they in
dicate th
e existence of som
ething else,
and with
respect to
the probabilities, people must a
ccept that som
ething is likely to
happen.) How
ever, it is no
t clear
whether th
is is m
eant to be an exhaustive typology. T
hat most o
f the rhetorical argum
ents are ta
ken from
probable prem
ises
(“Fo
r the most p
art it is true th
at …
” “It is likely that …
”) is due to
the typical sub
jects of pub
lic speech, which are rarely
necessary. W
hen using a sign-argum
ent o
r sign-enthy
mem
e we do
not try to exp
lain a given fact; we just in
dicate th
at
something exists or is th
e case: “…
any
thing such th
at when it is ano
ther th
ing is, o
r when it has come into being, the other
has come into being before or after, is a sign of th
e other's being or having com
e into being.” (Prior Analytics II.27,
70a7ff.). B
ut th
ere are several typ
es of sign-argum
ents to
o; Aristotle offers the following exam
ples:
Rhetoric I.2
Prior Analytics II.27
(i)Wise men are ju
st, since Socrates is ju
st.
Wise men are goo
d, since Pittacus is
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good
.
(ii)
He is ill, since he has fever./ Sh
e has given birth, since she has
milk.
This wom
an has a child, since she has
milk.
(iii)
This man has fever, since he breathes rapidly.
She is pregnant, since she is pale.
Sign-argum
ents of type (i) and
(iii) can always be refuted, even if th
e prem
ises are true; th
at is to
say th
at they do not
includ
e a valid deductio
n (sullogismos); A
ristotle calls th
em asullogistos (non
-deductive). S
ign-arguments of type (ii) can
never be refuted if th
e prem
ise is true, since, for example, it is not possible that som
eone has fever with
out b
eing ill, or th
atsomeone has m
ilk with
out h
aving given birth, etc. T
his latte
r type of sign-enthy
mem
es is necessary and is also called
tekmêrion (proof, evidence). N
ow, if some sign-enthy
mem
es are valid deductio
ns and
som
e are not, it is te
mpting to ask
whether Aristotle regarded the no
n-necessary sign-enthy
mem
es as apparent or fallacious arguments. H
owever, there seems
to be a more attractive reading: W
e accept a fallaciou
s argument o
nly if we are deceived about its logical form. But we
could regard, for example, th
e inference “She is pregnant, since she is pale” as a good and
inform
ative argument, even if we
know
that it does no
t include a lo
gically necessary in
ference. So it seem
s as if Aristotle didn't regard all n
on-necessary
sign-argum
ents as fallaciou
s or deceptive; but even if this is true, it is difficult for Aristotle to
determine the sense in which
non-necessary sign-enthy
mem
es are valid argum
ents, since he is bou
nd to
the alternative of deductio
n and indu
ction, and
neith
er class seems approp
riate for no
n-necessary sign-argum
ents.
7. The Topoi
Generally speaking, an Aristotelian topos (‘place’, ‘locatio
n’) is an argumentative scheme that enables a dialectician or
rhetorician to con
strue an argum
ent for a given conclusion
. The use of so-called topoi or ‘loci communes’ can be traced
back to
early rhetoricians such as Protagoras, Gorgias (cp. C
icero, Brutus, 46–
48) and Isocrates. But while in
earlier
rhetoric a to
pos was understoo
d as a com
plete patte
rn or form
ula that can be mentioned at a certain stage of the speech to
prod
uce a certain effect, m
ost of th
e Aristotelian topoi are general instructio
ns saying that a conclusion of a certain form
can be derived from premises of a certain form
; and
because of this ‘form
al’ or ‘semi-form
al’ character of Aristotelian
topoi, one to
pos can be used to con
strue several d
ifferent argum
ents. A
ristotle's book
Topics lists som
e hundred topoi for
the constructio
n of dialectical argum
ents. T
hese lists of to
poi form
the core of the m
ethod by
which the dialectician shou
ldbe able to formulate dedu
ctions on any prob
lem th
at cou
ld be prop
osed. M
ost o
f the instructions th
at the Rhetoric gives for
the compositio
n of enthymem
es are also organized as lists of to
poi; especially the first book of th
e Rhetoric essentially
consists of topoi concerning th
e subjects of the three species of pub
lic speech.
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7.1 The Definition of ‘Topos’
It is striking that th
e work that is alm
ost e
xclusively dedicated to
the collection of to
poi, th
e bo
ok Topics, does not e
ven
make an atte
mpt to define th
e concept o
f topos. At a
ny rate the Rhetoric gives a sort o
f defining characterization: “I call the
same thing elem
ent a
nd topos; for an elem
ent o
r a topos is a heading und
er which m
any enthym
emes fall.” (Rhet.
1403
a18–
19) By ‘element’ Aristotle does no
t mean a prop
er part o
f the enthym
eme, but a general form under which m
any
concrete enthy
mem
es of the same type can be subsum
ed. A
ccording to
this definition, the to
pos is a general argum
entative
form
or patte
rn, a
nd th
e concrete argum
ents are in
stantiatio
ns of the general topos. That the to
pos is a general in
struction
from
which several argum
ents can be derived, is crucial for Aristotle's un
derstand
ing of an artful m
ethod of argum
entatio
n;for a teacher of rhetoric who m
akes his pup
ils learn ready samples of arguments wou
ld not im
part th
e art itself to th
em, b
uton
ly th
e prod
ucts of this art, just as if som
eone pretend
ing to teach the art of sho
e-making on
ly gave samples of already
made shoes to his pup
ils (see Sophistical Refutations 18
3b36
ff.).
7.2 The Word ‘Topos’ and the Technique of Places
The w
ord ‘topos’ (place, lo
catio
n) m
ost p
robably is derived from an ancient metho
d of m
emorizing a great n
umber of item
son
a list by associating them
with
successive places, say the hou
ses alon
g a street, o
ne is acquainted with
. By recalling the
houses along th
e street we can also rem
ember the associated item
s. Full d
escriptio
ns of this te
chnique can be found in
Cicero, De O
ratore II 86
–88, 351
–360
, Auctor ad Herennium III 16–
24, 2
9–40
and
in Quintilian, Institutio XI 2, 11–33). In
Topics 16
3b28
–32, Aristotle seems to allude to
this techn
ique: “For ju
st as in th
e art o
f remem
bering, the m
ere mentio
n of
the places in
stantly
makes us recall the things, so these will m
ake us m
ore apt a
t deductio
ns throu
gh lo
oking to th
ese defin
edprem
ises in
order of enum
eration.” Aristotle also alludes to th
is te
chniqu
e in On the soul 427b
18–20, On M
emory
452a12
–16, and On Dreams 45
8b20
–22.
But th
ough th
e name ‘topos’ m
ay be derived from
this m
nemotechn
ical con
text, A
ristotle's use of topoi does not rely on th
etechniqu
e of places. At least w
ithin the system of the bo
ok Topics, every given problem
must b
e analyzed in
term
s of som
eform
al criteria: Does the predicate of th
e sentence in
question ascribe a genu
s or a definition or peculiar or accidental
prop
erties to th
e subject? Does the sentence exp
ress a sort o
f op
positio
n, eith
er con
tradictio
n or contrariety, e
tc.? Does the
sentence exp
ress th
at som
ething is m
ore or less th
e case? Does it maintain identity or diversity? Are the words used
linguistically derived from words th
at are part o
f an accepted prem
ise? Depending on such formal criteria of th
e analyzed
sentence one has to
refer to
a fitting topos. For th
is reason, th
e succession
of topoi in th
e book
Topics is organized in
accordance with
their salient formal criteria; and
this, a
gain, makes a further m
nemotechnique superflu
ous. M
ore or less the
same is true of th
e Rhetoric—except th
at m
ost o
f its topoi are structured by material and not by form
al criteria, as we shall
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see in sectio
n 7.4. Besides all this, there is at least one passage in
which th
e use of th
e word ‘topos’ can be explained
with
out referring to
the previously m
entio
ned mnemotechn
ique: In Topics VIII.1, 155
b4–5 Aristotle says: “we must find the
locatio
n (topos) from which to
atta
ck”, where th
e word ‘topos’ is obviously used to m
ean a startin
g point for atta
cking the
theses of the op
ponents.
7.3 The Elements of a Topos
A typ
ical Aristotelian topos runs as follows: “Again, if the accident of a thing has a contrary, see whether it belongs to
the
subject to which th
e accident in
question has been declared to belon
g: for if the latte
r belongs, the former cou
ld not belong;
for it is im
possible th
at con
trary predicates sho
uld belong at the sam
e tim
e to th
e same thing.” (Topics 113a20
–24). Like
most topoi, it in
cludes (i) a sort o
f general instructio
n (“see, whether …
”); further it m
entio
ns (ii) an argumentative
scheme—
in th
e given exam
ple, th
e scheme ‘if the accidental predicate p belon
gs to
the subject s, then the op
posed P*
cann
ot belon
g to s to
o’. F
inally, the to
pos refers to
(iii) a general rule or principle (“for it is im
possible, …
”) w
hich ju
stifies
the given scheme. O
ther to
poi often includ
e the discussion
of (iv) examples; still o
ther topoi suggest (v) how
to apply th
egiven schemes.—
Tho
ugh these are elem
ents th
at regularly occur in
Aristotelian topoi, there is nothing like a standard form
with
which all topoi comply. Often Aristotle is very brief and leaves it to
the reader to
add th
e missing elements.
7.4 The Function of a Topos
In a nutshell, the functio
n of a to
pos can be exp
lained as follows. First of all, on
e has to select an apt topos for a given
conclusion
. The con
clusion is eith
er a th
esis of ou
r op
ponent th
at w
e want to refute, o
r our ow
n assertion we want to
establish or defend. Accordingly, there are tw
o uses of topoi: they can eith
er prove or disprove a given sentence; som
e can
be used for both purposes, others for on
ly one of them
. Most topoi are selected by certain form
al features of th
e given
conclusion
; if, for example, th
e conclusion
maintains a definition
, we have to
select our topos from
a list of topoi pertaining
to definition
s, etc. W
hen it comes to
the so-called ‘m
aterial’ to
poi of the Rhetoric, the appropriate to
pos must b
e selected
not b
y form
al criteria, but in
accordance with
the con
tent of the conclusion
—whether, for example, som
ething is said to be
useful or ho
norable or ju
st, e
tc. O
nce we have selected a topos that is appropriate for a given conclusion, th
e topos can be
used to
con
strue a prem
ise from
which th
e given conclusion
can be derived. If for exam
ple the argumentative scheme is ‘If
a predicate is generally true of a genu
s, th
en the predicate is also true of any species of that g
enus’, we can derive th
econclusion
‘the capacity of nu
trition belon
gs to plants’ using the prem
ise ‘the capacity
of nutrition belongs to
all living
things’, since ‘living thing’ is th
e genu
s of th
e species ‘plants’. If the construed prem
ise is accepted, eith
er by the oppo
nent
in a dialectical debate or by the audience in
pub
lic speech, we can draw
the in
tend
ed conclusion.
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It has been disputed whether th
e topos (or, m
ore precisely, th
e ‘if …, then …’ scheme that is in
cluded in
a to
pos) th
at we
use to con
strue an argum
ent m
ust itself be regarded as a further premise of th
e argument. It could be either, a
s some say,
the prem
ise of a propo
sitio
nal schem
e such as the mod
us pon
ens, or, as others assum
e, as the conditional premise of a
hypothetical syllogism
. Aristotle him
self do
es not favor one of these interpretatio
ns explicitly. But even if he regarded the
topoi as add
itional premises in
a dialectical or rhetorical argum
ent, it is beyon
d any doubt that h
e did not u
se th
em as
prem
ises th
at m
ust b
e explicitly mentio
ned or even approved by the op
ponent or audience.
Supplement o
n the Topoi of th
e Rhetoric
8. Style: How to Say Things with Words
Rhet. III.1–12 introduces th
e topic of lexis, u
sually translated as ‘style’. This topic was not ann
ounced until the fin
al passage
of Rhet. II, so that m
ost scholars have com
e to th
ink of th
is sectio
n as a m
ore or less self-contained treatise. The in
sertion of
this treatise into th
e Rhetoric is m
otivated by the claim th
at, w
hile Rhet. I &
II dealt w
ith th
ought (dianoia), i.e., about w
hat
the orator sho
uld say, it rem
ains to
inqu
ire into th
e variou
s ways of saying or formulating one and the same thing. In the
course of Rhet. III.1–1
2 it turns ou
t that A
ristotle tackles th
is ta
sk by using some qu
ite heterogeneous approaches. After an
initial exp
loratio
n of th
e fie
ld of delivery and style (III.1) Aristotle tries to determine what g
ood prose style consists in; for
this purpo
se he has to go into the differentiatio
n and the selection of various kinds of nouns, one of which is defined as
metapho
r (III.2). The following chapters III.3–6 feature to
pics th
at are at b
est loo
sely con
nected w
ith th
e them
e of good
prose style; amon
g these topics is th
e op
posite of good
style, n
amely frigid or deterring style (psuchron) (III.3), th
e simile,
which tu
rns ou
t to be con
nected with
the metapho
r (III.4), th
e issue of correct Greek (III.5), the appropriateness (III.7) and
the means by which one's style becomes lo
ng-w
inded and dignified (III.6). Chapters III.8–9 introduce tw
o new approaches
to th
e issue of style, w
hich seem to
be un
related to everything that has been said so far: These are th
e topics of the
rhythm
ical shaping of prose style and of periodic and no
n-period
ic flow of speech. C
hapters III.10
–11 are dedicated to how
the orator can ‘bring things before on
e's eyes’, w
hich amou
nts to som
ething like m
aking the style more vivid. Again
metapho
rs are sho
wn to play a crucial role for that purpo
se, so th
at the to
pic of m
etaphor is ta
ken up
again and
deepened
by extended lists of exam
ples. C
hapter III.12 seem
s to m
ake a new start by distinguishing between oral and writte
n style
and assessing their suitability for the three genres of speech (see above §2
). The philosophical core of Aristotle's treatise on
style in Rhet. III.1–12 seems to be includ
ed in
the discussion
of the good
prose style (see below §8.1), h
owever it is th
etopic of m
etapho
r (see below
§8.2) th
at has attracted th
e most attention in th
e later reception up to the present d
ay.
8.1 The Virtue of Style
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Originally the discussion of style belon
gs to
the art of poetry rather than to
rhetoric; the poets were the first, a
s Aristotle
observes, to give an im
pulse for the stud
y of style. N
evertheless he adm
its th
at questions of style or, m
ore precisely, of
different w
ays to formulate the same subject, may have an im
pact on the degree of clarity
: “What c
oncerns the topic of
lexis, how
ever, has some sm
all n
ecessary place in
all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another m
akes som
edifference in
regard to clarity; a
lthou
gh not a great difference…
” (Rhet. III.1, 14
04a8–10). C
larity again m
atters for
comprehension
and com
prehensibility contribu
tes to persuasiveness. Ind
eed Aristotle even claims that th
e virtue or
excellence (aretê) of prose style ultimately depend
s on
clarity, b
ecause it is th
e genu
ine pu
rpose of a speech is to
make
something clear. In prose speeches, the goo
d form
ulation of a state of affairs must therefore be a clear one. How
ever,
saying this is not yet enough to accou
nt for th
e best or excellent prose style, since clear linguistic exp
ressions tend to be
banal o
r fla
t, while goo
d style shou
ld avoid such banality. If the language becom
es to
o banal it w
ill not be able to attract the
attention of th
e audience. The orator can avoid this te
ndency of banality by th
e use of dignifie
d or elevated expressions and
in general by all formulations th
at deviate from com
mon
usage. O
n the on
e hand
, uncom
mon
vocabulary has the advantage
of evoking th
e curiosity
of an aud
ience. On the other hand
the use of such elevated vocabulary bears a seriou
s risk:
Whenever the orator m
akes excessive use of it, th
e speech m
ight becom
e un
clear, th
us failing to m
eet the default
requ
irem
ent o
f prose speech, n
amely clarity
. Moreover, if th
e vocabulary becom
es to
o sublim
e or dignifie
d in relation to
prose's subject m
atter (A
ristotle assum
es it is m
ostly
everyday affairs), the audience will notice that th
e orator uses his
words with
a certain in
tention and will becom
e suspicious about the orator and his intentions. H
itting upon th
e right w
ording
is th
erefore a matter of being clear, b
ut not to
o banal; In trying not to
be too banal, one must u
se uncom
mon, d
ignified
words and
phrases, b
ut one m
ust b
e careful n
ot to
use th
em excessively or inapprop
riately in relation to prose style and the
typical sub
ject m
atter of prose speeches.
Bringing all these con
sideratio
ns to
gether Aristotle defines th
e good
prose style, i.e. the virtue of prose style, a
s follows: “Let
the virtue of linguistic form be defin
ed as being clear, for since th
e logos is a (linguistic, sc.) sign, it w
ould fail to bring about
its proper functio
n, w
henever it do
es not m
ake clear (w
hatever it is th
e sign of, sc.)—
and neith
er banal/m
ean/fla
t (tapeinên)
nor above the deserved dignity, but a
ppropriate (prepon).” (Rhet. III.2, 1
404b
1–4; sim
ilar at III.12, 141
4a22
–26) According
to th
is definition, the virtue of prose style has to
avoid tw
o op
posed tend
encies, b
oth of which are excessive and
therefore
fallaciou
s: The goo
d style is clear in
a way th
at is neither to
o banal n
or to
o dignified, b
ut appropriate (in propo
rtion to th
esubject matter of prose speech). In this respect th
e definition of stylistic virtue follows the same scheme as th
e defin
ition of
ethical virtues in
Aristotle's ethical w
ritin
gs, insofar as both th
e stylistic virtue and the virtue of character are defin
ed in
terms
of a m
ean that lies between tw
o op
posed excesses. If the virtue of style is defined as a mean betw
een the banality involving
form
of clarity
and
overly dignified (and
hence in
approp
riate) speech, it is with
goo
d reason that A
ristotle speaks of only
one virtue of prose style, and not of clarity
, ornam
ent (by dignified exp
ressions) and approp
riateness as th
ree distinct virtues
of style. H
owever, from
the tim
es of Cicero and Quintilianus on, th
ese three, along with
the correctness of Greek or Latin,
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became the cano
nical fou
r virtues of speech (virtutes dicendi). R
eading Aristotle th
rough the spectacles of the Rom
an art of
rhetoric, scholars often try to id
entify tw
o, th
ree or fou
r virtues of style in
his Rhetoric.
Finally, if the virtue of style is about finding a balance between banal clarity, w
hich is dull, and attractive dignity
, which is
inapprop
riate in public speeches, how
can the orator manage to con
trol th
e different degrees of clarity and dignity? Fo
r this
purpose Aristotle equ
ips the orator with
a classificatio
n of words (more or less th
e same classificatio
n can also be found in
Poetics chapter 21
): First of all A
ristotle distin
guishes between the kuria onamata, the standard expressions, and
the glôtta,
the borrow
ed words, idiom
s or vernacular expression
s. M
ost e
xamples that A
ristotle gives of this latte
r class are taken from
the different G
reek dialects, and m
ost e
xamples of this ty
pe are in
turn ta
ken from
the language of the Hom
eric epos.
Further classes are defin
ed by metapho
rs and
by several exp
ressions that a
re som
ehow
altered or m
odified, e
.g., new
lycoined expressions (pepoiêmena), com
posite exp
ressions (especially new
or un
usual com
positio
ns (ta dipla)), a
ndlengthened, shortened or otherwise altered expression
s. Som
etim
es Aristotle also uses th
e term
kosm
os under which he
collects all epithets and otherw
ise ornamental exp
ressions. T
hese different typ
es of words differ in accordance with
their
familiarity
. Most fam
iliar are th
e usual o
r current w
ords, the least fam
iliar words are th
e glôtta or words th
at are new
lycoined. T
he m
etapho
rs are also un
know
n and un
usual, because a usual, well-kn
own word is used to designate som
ething
other than its usual d
esignatio
n (see below
§8.2). T
he best e
stablished words, the kuria, m
ake their subject c
lear, b
ut do not
excite th
e audience's curiosity
, whereas all other types of w
ords are not established, and hence have the sort of attractio
nthat alien or foreign th
ings used to have. Since rem
ote things are adm
irable (thaumaston) and the admirable is pleasant,
Aristotle says, one sho
uld make the speech adm
irable and
pleasant by th
e use of such unfamiliar words. H
owever one has
to be careful n
ot to
use in
appropriately dignified or poetic words in
prose speech. Thu
s the virtue of style is accom
plished
by th
e selection and balanced use of these variou
s types of words: F
undamental for prose speech is th
e use of usual and
therefore clear words. In order to m
ake the speech pleasant a
nd dignified and
in order to
avoid banality
the orator m
ust
make mod
erate use of non
-fam
iliar elements. M
etapho
r plays an im
portant role for prose style, since m
etapho
rs contribute,
as Aristotle says, clarity as well as the un
familiar, surprising effect th
at avoids banality and tediousness.
8.2 Aristotelian Metaphors
According to
Aristotle Poetics 21
, 145
7b9–
16 and
20–
22, a
metapho
r is “the application of an alien name by transference
either from genus to
species, o
r from
species to
genus, o
r from
species to
species, or by analogy, th
at is, p
roportion”. T
hese
four ty
pes are exem
plified as follows:
Type
Example
Explanation
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(i)From
genus to
species
There lies m
y ship
Lying at a
ncho
r is a species of the genus “lying”
(ii)
From
species to
genu
sVerily te
n thou
sand
nob
le deeds
hath Odysseus wrought
Ten th
ousand
is a species of the genu
s “large num
ber”
(iii)
From
species to
species
(a) With
blade of bron
ze drew
away th
e life
(a) “T
o draw
away” is used for “to cleave”
(b) Cleft th
e water w
ith th
e vessel
of uny
ielding bron
ze(b) “T
o cleave” is used for “to draw
away.” Both, to
draw
away and
to cleave, are species of “taking aw
ay”
(iv)
From
analogy
(a) To call the cup “the shield of
Dionysus”
(a) The cup
is to
Diony
sus as th
e shield to Ares
(b) To call the shield “the cup of
Ares”
(b) The shield is to
Ares as th
e cup to Dionysus
Most o
f the exam
ples Aristotle offers for types (i) to (iii) wou
ld not be regarded as metapho
rs in
the modern sense; rather
they wou
ld fall u
nder the headings of m
eton
omy or syn
ecdo
che. The examples offered for ty
pe (iv) are more like modern
metapho
rs. A
ristotle him
self regards the metapho
rs of grou
p (iv), w
hich are built from
analogy, a
s the most important type
of enthy
mem
es. A
n analogy is given if th
e second
term
is to
the first as the fourth to the third. Correspondingly, a
nanalogou
s metapho
r uses th
e fourth te
rm for th
e second
or the second
for th
e fourth. T
his principle can be illustrated by th
efollowing Aristotelian exam
ples:
Analogy
Metaphor
(a)The cup
to Diony
sus as shield to Ares.
To call the cup “the shield of D
ionysus” or
the shield “the cup of Ares” is a m
etaphor.
(b)Old age to
life as the evening to day
To call old age “the evening of the life” or
the evening “old age of the day” is a
metaphor
(c)So
wing to seed as X to
sun
rays, w
hile th
e actio
n of th
e sun in scattering
his rays is nam
eless; still this process bears to th
e sun the same relatio
n as
sowing to th
e seed.
To call (a nam
eless) X “sowing of sun
rays” is a m
etapho
r by analogy
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(d)= (a)
To call the shield “a cup with
out w
ine” is
also a m
etaphor by analogy.
Examples (a) and
(b) obey the op
tional instructio
n that m
etapho
rs can be qu
alified by adding th
e term
to which th
e proper
word is relative (cp. “the shield of Ares,” “the evening of life”). In example (c), th
ere is no proper nam
e for the thing that
the metaphor refers to
. In exam
ple (d) the relatio
n of analogy is not, a
s in th
e other cases, in
dicated by th
e do
main to which
an item
is referred to, b
ut by a certain negatio
n (for example “w
ithou
t nam
e”); th
e negatio
ns m
ake clear that th
e term
is not
used in
its usual sense.
Metapho
rs are closely related to
sim
iles; but as op
posed to th
e later tradition
, Aristotle does no
t define the metaphor as an
abbreviated simile, b
ut, the other way aroun
d, th
e simile as a metapho
r. The sim
ile differs from th
e metaphor in th
e form
of
expression
: while in
the metaphor something is id
entified or sub
stitu
ted, th
e simile com
pares tw
o things with
each other,
using words as “like,” “as”, etc. For example, “He rushed as a lion” is, a
ccording to
Aristotle, a
sim
ile, b
ut “The lion
rushed” is a m
etapho
r.
While in
the later tradition
the use of m
etapho
rs has been seen as a matter of m
ere decoratio
n, which has to
delight th
ehearer, A
ristotle stresses the cognitive fun
ction of m
etapho
rs. Metapho
rs, h
e says, b
ring about learning (Rhet. III.10,
1410
b14f.). In order to und
erstand a metapho
r, th
e hearer has to
find something com
mon between the metaphor and the
thing the metapho
r refers to
. For example, if som
eone calls th
e old age “stubb
le”, we have to fin
d a common genus to
which old age and
stubble belong; w
e do
not grasp th
e very sense of the metapho
r until we find th
at both, old age and
stub
ble, have lost th
eir bloo
m. Thu
s, a m
etapho
r no
t only refers to
a th
ing, but sim
ultaneously describes the thing in a
certain respect. This is why
Aristotle says that th
e metapho
r brings abo
ut learning: as soon as we understand why som
eone
uses th
e metapho
r “stubble” to refer to
old age, w
e have learned at least o
ne characteristic of old age.
Glossary of Selected Terms
Accepted op
inions: endoxa
Argum
ent: logos
Art: technê
Character: êthos
Cou
nterpart: a
ntistrophos
Credible: axiopistos
Decision (practical): prohairesis
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Deductio
n: sullogismos
Emotions: pathê
Enthy
mem
e: enthumêma
Example: paradeigma
For the most part: hôs epi to polu
Indu
ction (epagôgê)
Judgem
ent: krisis
Location: to
pos (an argumentative scheme)
Maxim
: gnômê
Means of persuasion
: pistis (in pre-Aristotelian use this word also designates a certain part of the speech)
Metapho
r: metaphora
Persuasive: pithanon
Place: topos (an argumentative scheme)
Practical in
telligence: phronêsis
Premise: protasis (can also mean ‘sentence’, statem
ent’)
Probable: eikos
Proof: a
podeixis (in th
e sense of ‘demon
strative argument, demon
stratio
n’)
Proof: tekmêrion (i.e. a
necessary sign or sign argument)
Sign: sêmeion (can also m
ean ‘sign argument’)
Style: lexis
Specific topoi: idioi topoi (A
ristotle refers to th
em also by ‘idiai protaseis’ or ‘eidê’)
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suggestions.]
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