fisheries management; problems - solutions sarah b. m. kraak university college cork marine...

Fisheries management;problems - solutions

Sarah B. M. Kraak

University College CorkMarine Institute

Ireland

Problems in fisheries management

Fig. from Fulton et al. 2011. Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management. Fish & Fisheries.

• The regulations are viewed by the fishers as opposing rather than supporting their interests and this manifests itself as a reduced compliance to ‘the letter’ as well as ‘the spirit’ of the regulations.

• sustainability

Solon (Athenian statesman and lawmaker, c. 638 BC–558 BC).

He was challenged by the problem how his countrymen’s greed could be kept

within bounds by means of laws.

He resolved that he should frame his laws in such a way as to make it to

everybody’s advantage to follow them to the letter and the spirit.

‘perverse’ incentives

• By-catch limits / catch composition rules as percentage:

– E.g. a lower cod percentage may be achieved by increasing the catches of other species … promoting use of smaller mesh gears…

‘perverse’ incentives

• Landings quota rather than catch quota (discarding is legal):

– discarding of overquota catch in mixed demersal fisheries.

Fishing effort

Species A

Species B

TAC or quota

TAC or quota

Fishing effort

Species A

Species B

TAC or quota

TAC or quota

Fishing effort

Species A

Species B

TAC or quota

TAC or quota

Fig. modified from Ulrich et al. 2011. Reconciling single-species TACs in the North Sea demersal fisheries using the Fcube mixed-fisheries advice framework. ICES Journal of Marine Science

Real Time Incentives (RTI)

• Each vessel gets an (annual) quota of RTI credits;– RTI-credits or RTIs can be seen as fishing-impact

equivalents

Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

Real Time Incentives

The fisher is free to fish where and when he wants, given the tariffs…

No catch/landingsQUOTA

Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

Real Time Incentives

0.1 RTI 0.5 RTI 1 RTI 2 RTIs 5 RTIs Closed

Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

Discards of vulnerable sharks and rays/skates

Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

Discards of vulnerable sharks and rays/skates

Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

Real Time Incentives

• RTI system does not prescribe and forbid

• allows fishers to fish wherever and whenever they want

• ‘costs’ internalized and have to be ‘paid’ by the fishers (in ‘reduced fishing opportunities’)

Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

Real Time

Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

Advantage• Costs of ‘overfishing’ and other costs to ecosystem

are internalized: fishers have to take them into account in their business decisions– no perverse incentives

Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science