fiscal redistribution in low and middle income countries · nora lustig tulane university cgd and...

FiscalRedistributioninLowandMiddleIncomeCountries

NoraLustigTulaneUniversityCGDandIAD

DevTalksDevelopmentCentre

OECDParis,October10,2016

Lustig, Nora, editor, Commitment to EquityHandbook. A Guide to Estimating the Impactof Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty,Brookings Institution Press and TulaneUniversity, forthcoming.

The image part with relationship ID rId2

• Comprehensivestandardfiscalincidenceanalysisofcurrentsystems• Harmonizeddefinitionsandmethodologicalapproachestofacilitatecross-countrycomparisons• Usesincome/consumptionpercapitaasthewelfareindicator• Allocatorsvary=>fulltransparencyinthemethodusedforeachcategory,taxshiftingassumptions,taxevasion• Secondarysourcesareusedtoaminimum

LustigandHiggins,TheCEQAssessment:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.“ChapterinLustig(editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimating theImpactofFiscalPolicy onInequalityandPoverty, BrookingsInstitutionPressandTulaneUniversity,forthcoming.

CEQAssessment:FiscalInterventions

• Currentlyincluded:• Directtaxes• Directcashtransfers• Non-cashdirecttransferssuchasschooluniformsandbreakfast• Contributionstopensionsandsocialinsurancesystems• Indirecttaxesonconsumption• Indirectsubsidies• In-kindtransferssuchasspendingoneducationandhealth

• Workingon:• Corporatetaxes

MARKETINCOME

DISPOSABLEINCOME

PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES

PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES

CONSUMABLEINCOME

PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH

FINALINCOME

CEQAssessment: IncomeConcepts

LustigandHiggins,TheCEQAssessment:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.“Chapter inLustig(editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimating theImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty, BrookingsInstitution PressandTulaneUniversity, forthcoming.

FiscalIncidenceinCEQAssessments

§ Accountingapproach• nobehavioralresponses• nogeneralequilibriumeffectsand• nointertemporal effects• butitincorporatesassumptionstoobtaineconomicincidence(notstatutory)

§ Point-in-time§ Mainlyaverageincidence;afewcaseswithmarginalincidence

LustigandHiggins,”The CEQAssessment:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.“ChapterinLustig(editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimating theImpactofFiscalPolicy onInequalityandPoverty, BrookingsInstitutionPressandTulaneUniversity,forthcoming.

Monetizingin-kindtransfers

§ Incidenceofpublicspendingoneducationandhealthfollowedso-called“benefitorexpenditureincidence”orthe“governmentcost”approach.

§ Inessence,weuseperbeneficiaryinputcostsobtainedfromadministrativedata(andscalethemdown)asthemeasureofaveragebenefits.

§ Thisapproachamountstoaskingthefollowingquestion:Ø Howmuchwouldtheincomeofahouseholdhaveto

beincreasedifithadtopayforthefreeorsubsidizedpublicserviceatthefullcosttothegovernment?

CommitmenttoEquityInstitute(CEQI)

Objective:Tomeasuretheimpactoffiscalpolicyoninequalityandpovertyacrosstheworld

• Research-basedpolicytools• DataCenter• Advisoryandtrainingservices• Bridgestopolicy

ØGrantfromBill&MelindaGatesFoundationUS4.9millionfor5yrs

9www.commitmentoequity.org

Threemainmessagesfromtheory

1.Analyzingthetaxsidewithoutthespendingside,orviceversa,isuseless

ØTaxescanbeunequalizingbutspendingsoequalizingthattheunequalizing effectoftaxesismorethancompensated(weknewthis…)

ØTaxescanberegressive(Kakwani index)butwhencombinedwithtransfersandothertaxes,thefiscalsystemismoreequalizingthanwithouttheregressivetaxes(Lambert,2001)(surprised?)Ø VATinChile

ØTransferscanbeprogressive(Kakwani index)butwhencombinedwithtaxesandothertransfers,thefiscalsystemismoreunequalizingwiththeprogressivepensionsthanwithoutthem(generalizingLambert)(surprised?)Ø Contributory pensions inColombia

Enami,Lustig andAranda.“AnalyticalFoundations:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.”ChapterinLustig(editor) CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimating theImpactofFiscalPolicy onInequality andPoverty, BrookingsInstitution PressandTulaneUniversity, forthcoming.

2.AnalyzingtheimpactoninequalityonlycanbemisleadingØFiscalsystemscanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing(surprised?)

3.AnalyzingtheimpactontraditionalpovertyindicatorscanbemisleadingØFiscalsystemscanshowareductioninpoverty(headcountratio,gaporsquaredgap)…

Ø….andyetasubstantialshareofthepoorcouldhavebeenimpoverishedbythecombinedeffectoftaxesandtransfers(surprised?)

LustigandHiggins,“TheCEQAssessment:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.“ChapterinLustig(editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimating theImpactofFiscalPolicy onInequalityandPoverty, BrookingsInstitutionPressandTulaneUniversity,forthcoming.

Lustig, Nora. 2016. “Fiscal Policy, Inequality,and the Poor in the Developing World.”Tulane University, Economics Working Paper1612, October.

https://ideas.repec.org/p/tul/wpaper/1612.html

• Empiricalresultsfor25countriesbasedonfiscalincidencestudiesfromtheCommitmenttoEquityInstituteforaround2010• Twolow-incomecountries:Ethiopia (Hilletal.,2016)andTanzania(Youngeretal.,2016)

• Ninelowermiddle-incomecountries:Armenia (Younger andKhachatryan,2016),Bolivia (Paz-Arauco etal.,2014),ElSalvador (Beneke,LustigandOliva,2014),Ghana (Youngeretal.,2015),Guatemala (Cabrera,LustigandMoran,2015),Honduras (Castañeda andEspino,2015), Indonesia (Afkar etal.,2016),SriLanka (Arunatilake etal.,2016),andTunisia (Shimeles etal.,2016)

• Elevenuppermiddle-income countries:Brazil (Higgins andPereira,2014),Colombia (LustigandMelendez,2016),CostaRica (Sauma andTrejos,2014),DominicanRepublic (Aristy-Escuder etal.,2016),Ecuador (Llerena etal.,2015),Georgia (Cancho andBondarenko, 2016), Jordan (Alam etal.,2016),Mexico (Scott,2014),Peru (Jaramillo,2014),Russia (Lopez-Calva etal.,2016),andSouthAfrica (Inchauste etal.,2016)

• Twohigh-income countries:Chile (Martinez-Aguilaretal.,2016),andUruguay (Bucheli etal.,2014).

• Oneunclassified:Argentina (Rossignolo, 2016),

SIZEANDCOMPOSITIONOFGOVERNMENTREVENUESAND

SPENDING

Moresocialspending,moreredistribution

15Source:Lustig(2016)

ARMBOL

CHLCOL

GHAGTM HNDIND JOR

URYy=0.9399x***- 0.0283*

(6.89)(-1.88)R²=0.6734

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%

Redistrib

utiveeffect

Socialspending

Socialspending/GDPincreaseswithincome(GrossNationalIncomepercapita)

CHLCOL

DOMECUSLVETH

GHAGTM

JORMEX

y=6E-06x***+0.073***(3.09)(3.51)R²=0.3027

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000Socia

ndingp

luscon

tributoryp

GNIpercapita(2011PPP)

SocialSpendingpluscontributory pensions/GDP

Directtransfers/GDPvs.GNIpercapita

ARMBOL

CRIDOM

ECUSLVETH

GHAGTMHND IND

JOR MEX

TZATUN

y=1E-06x*+0.0045(1.97)(0.64)R²=0.1498

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000

Directtran

sfers/GD

GNI percapita(2011PPP)

Directtransfers/GDP

Educationspending/GDPvs.GNIpercapita

ECUSLV

IND JOR

y=-3E-07x+0.0465***(-0.47)(6.36)

R²=0.01

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000

Educationspen

GNIpercapita(2011PPP)

Educationspending/GDP

Healthspending/GDPvs.GNIpercapita

DOMECU

GEOGHA

JORMEXPER

LKATZA TUN

y=1E-06x**+0.0164**(2.43)(2.72)R²=0.2122

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000

Healthsp

ending

GNIpercapita(2011PPP)Healthspending/GDP

CompositionoftotalgovernmentrevenuesasashareofGDP(circa2010)

Source:Lustig(2016)

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

50%(rankedbytotalgovernmentrevenue/GDP;GNIrighthandscale)

Directtaxes Indirectandothertaxes Socialsecuritycontributions Otherrevenues GNIpercapita(2011PPP)

CompositionofsocialspendingasashareofGDP(circa2010)

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

(rankedbysocialspendingpluscontributorypensions/GDP;GNIrighthandscale)

Directtransfers Education Health Othersocialspending Contributorypensions GNIpercapita(2011PPP)

FISCALREDISTRIBUTION

MARKETINCOME

DISPOSABLEINCOME

PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES

PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES

CONSUMABLEINCOME

PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH

FINALINCOME

CEQAssessment: IncomeConcepts

LustigandHiggins,TheCEQAssessment:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.“ChapterinLustig(editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimatingtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty,BrookingsInstitutionPressandTulaneUniversity,forthcoming.

Inequality

Marketincomepluspensions Disposableincome Consumable income Finalincome

GiniCoefficient

Argentina(2012) Armenia(2011) Bolivia(2009)Brazil(2009) Chile(2013) Colombia(2010)CostaRica(2010) DominicanRepublic(2013) Ecuador(2011)ElSalvador(2011) Ethiopia(2011) Georgia(2013)Ghana(2013) Guatemala(2011) Honduras(2011)Indonesia(2012) Jordan(2010) Mexico(2010)Peru(2009) Russia(2010) SouthAfrica(2010)SriLanka(2010) Tanzania (2011) Tunisia(2010)Uruguay(2009)

Marketincome (pluscontributory pensions)

Disposableincome Consumable income

Finalincome

FiscalPolicyandInequality–Contributorypensionsasdeferredincome

Source:Lustig(2016)

Market income Disposable income Consumable income Final income

Gini Coefficient

Argentina (2012) Armenia (2011) Bolivia (2009)Brazil (2009) Chile (2013) Colombia (2010)Costa Rica (2010) Dominican Republic (2013) Ecuador (2011)El Salvador (2011) Ethiopia (2011) Georgia (2013)Ghana (2013) Guatemala (2011) Honduras (2011)Indonesia (2012) Jordan (2010) Mexico (2010)Peru (2009) Russia (2010) South Africa (2010)Sri Lanka (2010) Tanzania (2011) Tunisia (2010)Uruguay (2009)

Consumable incomeDisposableincomeMarketincome(pluscontributory pensions)

Finalincome

FiscalPolicyandInequality–Contributorypensionsasdirecttransfers

Redistributiveeffect(ChangeinGinipoints:marketincomepluspensionsandmarketincometodisposableincome,circa2010)

0.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.700.800.90

-0.20-0.18-0.16-0.14-0.12-0.10-0.08-0.06-0.04-0.020.00

Redistrib

utivee

ffect-m

arketincom

etodisp

(rankedbyredistributiveeffect(lefthandscale);Ginicoefficientsrighthandscale)

Contributorypensionsasdeferredincome ContributorypensionsasdirecttransferGinimarketincomepluspensions Ginimarketincome

Moreunequal,moresocialspending/GDPNo“RobinHoodParadox”

BOLBRA

SLVETH

GHA GTM

JORMEX

LKATZA

y=0.2131x***+0.002(2.87)(0.06)R²=0.2637

0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80

Ginimarketincomepluspensions

Moreunequal,moreredistributionNo“RobinHoodParadox”

Source:Lustig(2016)

BRACHI

CRIDOMECU

SLVETH

GHA GTM

HNDINDJOR

TZATUN

y=0.0952x*- 0.0184(1.76)(-0.70)R²=0.1183

0.20 0.35 0.50 0.65 0.80

Redistrib

utivee

Ginimarketincomepluspensions

Insum…

• InNO country,inequalityincreasesasaresultoftaxes,subsidiesandsocialspending

ØFiscalpolicyisalwaysequalizing

ØThemoreunequal,themorefiscalredistribution

Whichfiscalinstrumentsareequalizingandwhicharenot?

• Relyonthesignofthe“marginalcontribution”• Themarginalcontributionequalsthedifferenceinthereductionininequalityobservedwithoutthefiscalinstrumentofinterest(andalltheothersinplace)andwithit(andalltheothersinplace)• Positivemeansitisequalizing• Negativemeansitisunequalizing• Zeromeansitleavesinequalityunchanged• ThefollowingtablesusesthechangeinGinipointstomeasurefiscalredistribution

Low-incomeEconomies

Lower-middle-incomeeconomies

Tanzania(2011)

Armenia(2011) Bolivia(2009)

ElSalvador(2011)

Ghana(2013)

Indonesia(2012)

SriLanka(2010)

Redistributiveeffect(fromGinimarketincomepluspensions tofinal income) 0.0534 0.1125 0.0646 0.0356 0.0349 0.0238 0.0278MarginalcontributionDirecttaxes -0.0012 0.020 -- 0.0039 -0.0057 0.0000 0.0025Directtransfers 0.0009 0.091 0.0099 0.0057 0.0011 0.0037 0.0041Indirecttaxes 0.0175 0.000 0.0004 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0022 0.0006Indirectsubsidies -0.0033 -0.001 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0008 0.0014 0.0051Education 0.0116 0.013 0.0340 0.0141 0.0085 0.0194 0.0105Health 0.0016 0.003 0.0237 0.0105 0.0073 0.0031 0.0056

KakwaniDirecttaxes 0.4789 0.096 -- 0.3574 notavailable -- 0.5458Directtransfers 0.2791 0.660 0.0713 0.5001 0.8066 0.6397 0.7572Indirecttaxes 0.0992 -0.129 -0.1259 -0.0182 0.0021 -0.0420 -0.0063Indirectsubsidies -0.2126 0.381 0.1311 0.1666 -0.0115 0.0560 0.3056Education 0.2641 notavailable 0.5076 0.5655 notavailable 0.3630 0.3892Health 0.2064 0.500 0.5360 0.3126 notavailable 0.2730 0.3963

RelativesizeDirecttaxes 1.3% 4.5% -- 1.7% 4.6% -- 0.5%Directtransfers 0.4% 18.4% 2.1% 1.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.6%Indirecttaxes 13.1% 12.0% 7.8% 7.3% 6.3% 6.8% 7.4%Indirectsubsidies 1.2% 0.0% 0.7% 0.9% 2.1% 8.2% 2.0%Education 7.5% 3.1% 7.7% 2.6% 6.0% 6.2% 3.2%Health 2.3% 1.5% 5.2% 3.6% 3.1% 1.6% 1.6%Alltaxes– alltransfers 3.1% -6.5% -7.9% 0.8% -0.5% -9.8% 0.4%

MarginalContributions(contributorypensionsasdeferredincome)– Low-incomeandlower-middle-incomeeconomies

Source:Lustig(2016)Theunequalizing effectappear inredfontandcaseswheremicrodata isunavailableandmciscalculatedbasedonthe informationbydeciles arehighlighted inblue.

The image part with relationship ID rId2 MarginalContributions (contributorypensionsasdeferredincome)– Upper-

middle-incomeandhigh-incomeeconomiesUpper-middle-incomeEconomies High-income

Economies

Brazil(2009)

Colombia(2010)

CostaRica(2010)

Ecuador(2011)

Georgia(2013)

Jordan(2010)

Mexico(2010)

Peru(2009)

Russia(2010)

SouthAfrica(2010)

Chile(2013)

Uruguay(2009)

Redistributiveeffect(fromGini marketincomepluspensions tofinal income) 0.1221 0.0677 0.1307 0.0747 0.1244 0.0230 0.0831 0.0418 0.0629 0.1758 0.0740 0.1018MarginalcontributionDirecttaxes 0.0143 -0.0003 0.0139 0.0047 0.0221 0.0071 0.0151 0.0061 0.0139 0.0430 0.0120 0.0186Directtransfers 0.0148 0.0057 0.0095 0.0157 0.1002 0.0052 0.0094 0.0044 0.0203 0.0517 0.0190 0.0199Indirecttaxes 0.0113 -0.0004 0.0118 0.0062 -0.0141 -0.0014 0.0053 0.0069 -0.0009 0.0127 0.0040 0.0019Indirectsubsidies 0.0005 0.0049 -- 0.0056 0.0004 0.0042 0.0032 -- 0.0001 -- 0.0023 --Education 0.0509 0.0268 0.0393 0.0283 0.0199 0.0155 0.0326 0.0175 0.0207 0.0490 0.0321 0.0289Health 0.0292 0.0265 0.0342 0.0119 0.0077 -0.0087 0.0163 0.0084 0.0127 0.0433 0.0135 0.0348

Kakwani

Directtaxes 0.2490not

available 0.1052 0.4017 0.1819 0.5941 0.2411 0.3853 0.1042 0.1254 0.4520 0.2245Directtransfers 0.5069 0.7831 0.9104 0.8385 0.7063 0.5497 0.7931 0.9612 0.5927 1.0421 0.8243 0.9367Indirecttaxes -0.0179 -0.0961 0.0053 0.0363 -0.2298 -0.0664 0.0129 0.0527 -0.0724 -0.0828 -0.0273 -0.0753Indirectsubsidies 0.8373 0.5316 -- 0.2131 0.3716 0.1512 0.2457 -- 0.2128 -- 0.4969 --

Education 0.7087not

available 0.5644 0.6930 0.5414 0.4784 0.5816 0.6566 0.4978 0.8169 0.6641 0.5888

Health 0.6914not

available 0.5442 0.5910 0.6360 0.0557 0.4608 0.3109 0.3740 0.8275 0.5930 0.5813RelativesizeDirecttaxes 4.2% 0.2% 6.6% 1.6% 9.8% 1.3% 5.0% 1.4% 0.0704 15.0% 2.3% 6.1%Directtransfers 5.1% 0.9% 1.3% 2.1% 19.4% 1.3% 1.3% 0.5% 0.0467 5.4% 2.7% 2.3%Indirecttaxes 12.9% 1.9% 10.0% 6.3% 12.8% 3.1% 6.0% 7.6% 0.0803 14.1% 10.3% 7.9%Indirectsubsidies 0.1% 1.1% -- 4.1% 0.4% 3.5% 2.0% -- 0.0009 -- 0.5% --Education 10.6% 4.7% 8.7% 4.6% 4.3% 3.6% 6.3% 2.7% 0.0445 6.9% 5.2% 5.6%Health 4.8% 7.1% 8.0% 2.4% 1.9% 3.4% 4.3% 2.9% 0.0419 5.5% 3.2% 6.8%Alltaxes- alltransfers -3.6% -11.7% -1.5% -5.4% -3.4% -7.5% -2.9% 2.9% 0.0169 11.2% 1.0% -0.8%

Source:Lustig(2016)33

Unequalizing effectappearsinredfont.

Insum…

• DirecttaxesareequalizingexceptinColombia,GhanaandTanzania(surprised?)• Directtransfersarealwaysequalizing(phew!)• Indirecttaxesaremoreoftenthannotequalizing(surprised?),exceptinColombia,Georgia,Indonesia,JordanandRussia• Indirectsubsidiesaremoreoftenthannotequalizing(surprised?),exceptinArmenia,Ghana,andTanzania• Educationandhealthspendingarealwaysequalizing

Poverty

• Fiscalpolicycanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing(intermsofthepoor’sabilitytoconsumeprivategoodsandservices):Ø1.25/dayline:Ethiopia,Ghana,Guatemala,Tanzania

Ø2.50/dayline:Armenia,Bolivia,Ethiopia,Ghana,Guatemala,Honduras,SriLanka,Tanzania

Ø4/dayline:alloftheaboveplusArgentina,Brazil,CostaRicaandTunisia

• Thisworrisomeresultstemsmainlyfromconsumptiontaxes

36Lustig, Nora. 2016. “Fiscal Policy, Inequality, and thePoor in theDevelopingWorld.” TulaneUniversity, EconomicsWorkingPaper 1612,October.

FiscalPolicyandPovertyReduction(ChangeinHeadcountRatiofromMarkettoConsumable Income(Povertyline$1.25/day

2005ppp;Contributory Pensions asDeferredIncome;in%)

-0.2%-1.7%-3.3%-8.3%-10.3%-11.5%-16.1%-16.5%-18.0%-18.5%

-24.9%-31.8%-33.9%-34.6%

-44.9%-45.5%-45.9%-50.6%-56.4%

-69.6% -69.8% -70.7%

-88.2%-97.0%

-36.2%

17.8%13.3%

4.2% 2.4%

-12.7%

-8.8%-2.3%

-14.1%-14.1%

-24.6%

-7.5%-15.7%

-35.0%

-53.8%

-37.8%

-22.7%

-53.8%

-36.2%-42.7%

-76.4%

-66.2%

-54.2%

-82.0%-82.6%

-29.4%

20%(rankedbypovertyreductionin%;povertyline$1.252005PPP/day)

Marketincomepluspensionstodisposableincome Marketincomepluspensionstoconsumableincome

FiscalPolicyandPovertyReduction(ChangeinHeadcountRatiofromMarkettoConsumableIncome(Povertyline$2.50/day

2005ppp;ContributoryPensions asDeferredIncome;in%)

1.5% 1.1% 0.9%

-1.0%-1.8%-2.8%-3.3%-6.5%

-7.0% -7.3%-7.7%-8.3%-10.1%-10.4%-14.9%

-21.4%-22.0%-24.0%-27.8%-28.5%

-35.9%-40.6%

-58.4%-61.0%

-71.4%

-18.7%

9.1%5.7% 3.1%

1.1%5.5%

-9.0%-4.4%

-25.2%

-15.1%-10.6%

-34.8%

-22.2%

-35.1%-29.1%

-23.3%

-51.8%

-35.4%

-51.1%

-12.6%

20%(rankedbypovertyreduction in%;poverty line$2.502005PPP/day)

FiscalPolicyandPovertyReduction(ChangeinHeadcountRatiofromMarkettoConsumable Income(Povertyline$4.00/day

2005ppp;ContributoryPensionsasDeferredIncome;in%)

4.3% 2.0%1.0% 0.7% 0.4%

-0.1%-0.2%

-0.4% -1.7% -2.1%-2.7%-2.7% -2.9% -4.7% -5.6% -6.2%

-8.0% -8.5%-12.9%-13.9%

-26.8%

-41.0%-41.2%-42.0%

1.0% 1.9%

4.1% 4.9%

3.8%0.4% 1.9%

-3.5%-0.3%

-15.6%

-12.5%

-24.2%-21.8%

20% (rankedbypovertyreductionin%;povertyline$4.00 2005PPP/day)

Netpayersandnetreceivers(bydecile;Contributorypensionsasdeferredincome)

Ghana(2013)Tanzania (2011)Argentina(2012)CostaRica(2010)ElSalvador(2011)Guatemala(2011)

Peru(2009)Russia(2010)

Armenia(2011)Brazil(2009)Bolivia(2009)Chile(2013)

DominicanRepublic(2013)Ethiopia(2011)

Honduras(2011)Tunisia(2010)

Uruguay(2009)SriLanka(2010)Mexico(2010)

SouthAfrica(2010)Colombia(2010)Ecuador(2011)Georgia(2013)Jordan(2010)

Indonesia(2012)

Netreceivers Netpayers

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Source:Lustig(2016)

Netpayersandnetreceivers(byincomegroups;Contributorypensionsasdeferredincome)

Source:Lustig(2016)

Ghana(2013)Tanzania (2011)Armenia(2011)Ethiopia(2011)

Guatemala(2011)Bolivia(2009)

Honduras(2011)DominicanRepublic(2013)

ElSalvador(2011)Peru(2009)

SriLanka(2010)Argentina(2012)

Chile(2013)Colombia(2010)CostaRica(2010)Georgia(2013)Mexico(2010)Russia(2010)

SouthAfrica(2010)Tunisia(2010)

Uruguay(2009)Brazil(2009)

Ecuador(2011)Jordan(2010)

Indonesia(2012)

Netreceivers Netpayers

y<1.25 1.25<=y<2.5 2.5<=y<4 4<=y<10 10<=y<50 y>=50

Analyzingtheimpactontraditionalpovertyindicatorscanbemisleading

ØFiscalsystemscanshowareductioninpovertyandyetasubstantialshareofthepoorcouldhavebeenimpoverishedbythecombinedeffectoftaxesandtransfers

42HigginsandLustig (2016)

HigginsandLustig.2016.Canapoverty reducingandprogressivetaxandtransfersystemhurtthepoor?JournalofDevelopmentEconomics122,63-75,2016

DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor

Howfrequentlyfiscalsystemsmaybeinequalityreducingbutatthesametimeleavethepoorworseoffintermsoftheirpurchasingpowerofprivategoodsandservices?

FiscalImpoverishment(MarkettoConsumableIncome)

45HigginsandLustig (2016)

Country(surveyyear)

Marketincomeplus

pensionsPoverty

headcount(%)

Changeinpovertyheadcoun

t(p.p.)

Marketincomepluspensionsinequality(Gini)

Reynolds-Smolensky

Changeininequality(▲Gini)

Fiscallyimpoverished

as%ofpopulation

FiscallyImpoverishedas

%ofconsumableincomepoor

PanelA:Upper-middle incomecountries,usingapovertyline of$2.52005 PPP perday

Brazil(2009) 16.8 -0.8 57.5 4.6 -3.5 5.6 34.9

Chile(2013) 2.8 -1.4 49.4 3.2 -3.0 0.3 19.2

Ecuador(2011) 10.8 -3.8 47.8 3.5 -3.3 0.2 3.2

Mexico(2012) 13.3 -1.2 54.4 3.8 -2.5 4.0 32.7

Peru(2011) 13.8 -0.2 45.9 0.9 -0.8 3.2 23.8

Russia(2010) 4.3 -1.3 39.7 3.9 -2.6 1.1 34.4

SouthAfrica(2010) 49.3 -5.2 77.1 8.3 -7.7 5.9 13.3

Tunisia(2010) 7.8 -0.1 44.7 8.0 -6.9 3.0 38.5

Brazil(2009) 16.8 -0.8 57.5 4.6 -3.5 5.6 34.9

Chile(2013) 2.8 -1.4 49.4 3.2 -3.0 0.3 19.2

Country(surveyyear)

Marketincomeplus

pensionsPoverty

headcount(%)

Changeinpovertyheadcoun

t(p.p.)

Marketincomeplus

pensionsinequality(Gini)

Reynolds-Smolensky

Changeininequality(▲Gini)

Fiscallyimpoverished

as%ofpopulation

FiscallyImpoverished

as%ofconsumableincomepoor

Panel B:Lower-middle incomecountries,usingapovertyline of$1.252005PPPperday

Armenia(2011) 21.4 -9.6 47.4 12.9 -9.3 6.2 52.3

Bolivia(2009) 10.9 -0.5 50.3 0.6 -0.3 6.6 63.2

DominicanRepublic(2013) 6.8 -0.9 50.2 2.2 -2.2 1.0 16.3

ElSalvador(2011) 4.3 -0.7 44.0 2.2 -2.1 1.0 27.0

Ethiopia(2011) 31.9 2.3 32.2 2.3 -2.0 28.5 83.2

Ghana(2013) 6.0 0.7 43.7 1.6 -1.4 5.1 76.6

Guatemala(2010) 12.0 -0.8 49.0 1.4 -1.2 7.0 62.2

Indonesia(2012) 12.0 -1.5 39.8 1.1 -0.8 4.1 39.2

SriLanka(2010) 5.0 -0.7 37.1 1.3 -1.1 1.6 36.4

Tanzania(2011) 43.7 7.9 38.2 4.1 -3.8 50.9 98.6

FiscalImpoverishment(MarkettoConsumableIncome)

HigginsandLustig (2016)

• Fifteenoftheeighteencountrieswithareduction inpovertyandinequalityduetothetaxandtransfersystemexperiencedvariousdegreesoffiscalimpoverishment.• Intencountries—Armenia,Bolivia,Brazil,ElSalvador,Guatemala,Indonesia,Mexico,Russia,SriLanka,andTunisia—betweenone-quarterandtwo-thirdsofthepost-fisc poorlostincometothefiscalsystem.• Inthethreecountrieswheretheheadcountratiorose(Ethiopia,GhanaandTanzania),theproportionofthepoorwhowereimpoverishedbythefiscalsystemisstaggering(above75percent).• InArmenia,Ethiopia,Indonesia,Tunisia,andRussia,between25and50%arestillfiscallyimpoverishedwhenthemonetizedvalueofeducationandhealthservicesareincludedastransfers

47Lustig.2016.“TheSDG’s,DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMeeting:“Strategiesforeradicatingpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall,”UnitedNations,NewYork,June.

ØExtremecaremustbetakenwithemphasizingdomesticresourcemobilizationtoachieveSDGs

ØMustassesstheimpactonthepooroftaxandsubsidyreforms,otherwiseonemaybetakingawayfromthepoormorethanistransferredtothem

ØImpactonthepoorofincreasingtaxesrequirestheuseofadequateindicators;conventionalmeasuresofinequalityandpovertycanbeawfullymisleading

ØFiscalImpoverishmentIndexfulfillsalltherequirementstoobtainanaccurateassessmentoftheimpactoffiscalchangesonthepoor

48Lustig.2016.“TheSDG’s,DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMeeting:“Strategiesforeradicatingpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall,”UnitedNations,NewYork,June.

Howpro-poorisspendingoneducation

andhealth

ClassificationA= Pro-poorandequalizing,percapitaspendingdeclineswithincome

B= Neutralinabsolutetermsandequalizing,samepercapitaforall

C= Equalizingbutnotpro-poor,percapitaspendingasashareofmarketincomedeclineswithincome

D= Unequalizing,percapitaspendingasashareofmarketincomeincreaseswithincome

Progressivityandpro-poornessofeducationandhealthspending-Low-incomeeconomies

Source:Lustig(2016)

Low-incomeEconomies EducationPre-school Primary Secondary Tertiary Health

A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C D A B C

Ethiopia(2011) + -- + + + +

Tanzania(2011) -- + + + + +

-- =notavailable

Progressivityandpro-poornessofeducationandhealthspending-Lower-middle-incomeeconomies

Source:Lustig(2016)

-- =notavailable

Lower-middle-income

Economies EducationPre-school Primary Secondary Tertiary HealthA B C A B C A B C A B C A B C D A B C

Armenia(2011) + + + + +Bolivia(2009) + + + + + +ElSalvador(2011) + + + + + +Ghana(2013) + + + + +Guatemala(2011) + + + + + +Honduras(2011) + + + + + +Indonesia(2012) + + + + +SriLanka(2010) + -- -- -- + +Tunisia(2010) + -- -- -- + +

Progressivityandpro-poornessofeducationandhealthspending–Upper-middle-incomeeconomies

Upper-middle-income

Economies EducationPre-

school Primary Secondary Tertiary HealthA B C A B C A B C A B C A B C D A B C D

Brazil(2009) + + + + + +Colombia(2010) -- + + + + --CostaRica(2010) -- + + + + --DominicanRepublic(2013) + + + + +Ecuador(2011) + -- + + -- +Georgia (2013) + + -- -- + +Jordan(2010) + + + + + +Mexico(2010) + + + + + +Peru(2009) + + + + + +Russia(2010) -- -- -- -- -- --SouthAfrica(2010) + + + + + +

-- =notavailable

Source:Lustig(2016) 53

Progressivityandpro-poornessofeducationandhealthspending–High-incomeeconomies

Source:Lustig(2016)

High-incomeEconomies Education

Pre-school Primary Secondary Tertiary Health

A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C D A B CArgentina(2012)* + + -- -- + +Chile(2013) + + + + + +Uruguay(2009) + + + + + +

-- =notavailable*unclassified

Mainresults

ØEducationspendingonprimaryandsecondaryschoolingperpersontendstodeclinewithincome(“pro-poor”)orbethesameacrosstheincomedistribution…

Ø... withtheexceptionofEthiopiawherealthoughequalizing,percapitaspendingonsecondaryeducationincreaseswithincomeØAremiddle-classesoptingoutinmiddleandhighincomecountries?

ØTertiaryeducationspendingisnotpro-poorbutitisequalizingexceptforEthiopia,Ghana,GuatemalaandTanzania,whereitisunequalizing

55Source:Lustig (2016)

Mainresults

ØHealthspendingperpersontendstodeclinewithincome(“pro-poor”)orbethesameacrosstheincomedistribution….

Ø….exceptforElSalvador,Ethiopia,Guatemala,Indonesia,Jordan,PeruandTanzaniawherealthoughnotunequalizing percapitaspendingincreaseswithincome.

56Source:Lustig (2016)

Inconclusion…

• FiscalsystemsarealwaysequalizingbutcanoftenreducethepurchasingpowerofthepoorØWarning:unintendedconsequenceofthedomesticresourcemobilizationagendacanbemakingthepoorworseoff

• Spendingoneducationandhealthisoftenpro-poorandalmostuniversallyequalizingØWarning:isthisfavorableresultbecausemiddle-classesandtherichareoptingout?

• ReassuringresultsØRedistributiveeffectincreaseswithsocialspendingØSocialspendingasashareofGDPincreaseswithinequalityØThemoreunequal,themoreredistribution

The image part with relationship ID rId2 Teamsandreferencesbycountry:

(inparenthesis:survey year;C=consumption&I=income)

1.Argentina (2012-13;I):Rossignolo,D.2016.“Taxes,Expenditures,PovertyandIncomeDistribution inArgentina.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.45,CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.(forthcoming).

Rossignolo,D.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook: Argentina,February29.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

2.Armenia (2011;I):Younger,StephenD.,andArtsvi Khachatryan.forthcoming.“FiscalIncidenceinArmenia,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lustig,N.(Eds.),TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).

Younger,S.andA.Khachatryan.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook: Armenia,May31.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

3.Bolivia(2009;I): PazArauco,Verónica,GeorgeGrayMolina,WilsonJiménezPozo,andErnestoYáñez Aguilar.2014.“ExplainingLowRedistributiveImpactinBolivia.”InLustig,Nora,Carola PessinoandJohnScott.2014.Editors.TheRedistributiveImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLatinAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(September22,2014).

PazArauco,V.,G.Gray-Molina,W.JimenezandE.Yañez.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook: Bolivia,September22,CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

4.Brazil(2008-09;I): Higgins,SeanandClaudiney Pereira.2014.“TheEffectsofBrazil’sTaxationandSocialSpendingontheDistributionofHousehold Income.”InLustig,Nora,Carola PessinoandJohnScott.2014.Editors.TheRedistributiveImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLatinAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(November4,2014).

Higgins,S.andC.Pereira.2016CEQMasterWorkbook: Brazil,January4.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

5.Chile (2013,I):Martínez-Aguilar,S.,A.FuchsandE.Ortiz-Juarez.2016.“TheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPovertyinChile.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.46,CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandWorldBank.(forthcoming).

Martínez-Aguilar,S.andE.Ortiz-Juarez.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook: Chile,inprogress.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandWorldBank.

6.Colombia (2010, I): Lustig,NoraandMarcelaMelendez.2015.“TheImpactofTaxesandTransfersonInequalityandPoverty inColombia”.CEQWorkingPaperNo24,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.Forthcoming.

Melendez,M.andV.Martínez.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook: Colombia,December17.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank.

7.CostaRica(2010;I): Sauma,JuanandDiegoTrejos. 2014.“Socialpublicspending,taxes,redistributionofincome,andpoverty inCostaRica.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.18,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.

Sauma,P.andJ.D.Trejos.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook: CostaRica,February.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

8.DominicanRepublic(2006-07,I):Aristy-Escuder,J.,M.Cabrera,B.Moreno-Dodson andM.E.Sánchez-Martín.2016.“FiscalpolicyandredistributionintheDominicanRepublic.”CEQWorkingPaperNo37,CEQInstitute.(forthcoming).Note:budgetarydatawasfor2013.

Aristy-Escuder,J.,M.Cabrera,B.Moreno-Dodson andM.E.Sánchez-Martín.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook: DominicanRepublic,May10.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

9.Ecuador (2011-12,I):Llerena Pinto,FreddyPaul,María ChristinaLlerena Pinto,RobertoCarlosSaá Daza,andMaría AndreaLlerena Pinto. “SocialSpending,TaxesandIncomeRedistributioninEcuador.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.28,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.

Llerena,F.,M.C.Llerena,M.A.Llerena andR.Saá.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook: Ecuador,November7.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

10.ElSalvador(2011;I):Beneke,M.andJ.A.Oliva.2015.CEQMasterWorbook: Elsalvador,July10.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandInstitutoCentroamericano deEstudios Fiscales andInternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.

11.Ethiopia (2011;C): Hill,Ruth,GabrielaInchauste,NoraLustig,EyasuTsehaye andTassewWoldehanna.forthcoming.“AFiscalIncidenceAnalysisforEthiopia,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lustig,N.(Eds.),TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).

Hill,R.,E.Tsehaye andT.Woldehanna.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook: Ethiopia,September28.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

Teamsandreferencesbycountry:(inparenthesis:survey year;C=consumption&I=income)

12.European Union (2011,I): EUROMODstatisticsonDistributionandDecompositionofDisposableIncome,accessedathttp://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/statistics/usingEUROMODversionno.G2.0.

13.Georgia(2013;I):Cancho,CesarandElenaBondarenko.forthcoming.“TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicyinGeorgia,"in:Inchauste,G.,Lustig,N.(Eds.),TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).

Cancho,C.andE.Bondarenko.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Georgia,December31.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

14.Ghana(2012-13;C):Younger,S.,E.Osei-AssibeyandF.Oppong.2015.“FiscalIncidenceinGhana.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.35,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversity,IthacaCollege,UniversityofGhanaandWorldBank.

Younger,S.,E.Osei-AssibeyandF.Oppong.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook: Ghana,February10.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

15.Guatemala(2011; I): Cabrera,MandH.E.Morán.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Guatemala,May6.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity,Instituto Centroamericano deEstudios Fiscales andInternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.

16.Honduras (2011; I):Castañeda,R.andI.Espino.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook: Honduras,August18.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity,Instituto Centroamericano deEstudios Fiscales andInternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.

Castañeda,R.andI.Espino.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook: Honduras,August18.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity,Instituto CentroamericanodeEstudios Fiscales andInternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.

17.Indonesia (2012;C):Afkar,Rythia,JonJellema,andMathewWai-Poi.forthcoming.“TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicyinIndonesia,”in:Inchauste,GabrielaandNoraLustig (Eds.),TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).

Jellema,J.,M.Wai_Poi andR.Afkar.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook: Indonesia,February26.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

Teamsandreferencesbycountry:(inparenthesis:survey year;C=consumption&I=income)

18.Jordan (2010-11;C):Alam,Shamma A.,GabrielaInchauste,andUmarSerajuddin.forthcoming.“TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicyinJordan,” in:Inchauste,G.,Lustig,N.(Eds.),TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).

Abdel-Halim,M.,S.Adeeb Alam,Y.Mansur,U.Serajuddin andP.Verme.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook: Jordan,March8.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

19.Mexico (2010;C&I):Scott,John.2014.“RedistributiveImpactandEfficiencyofMexico’sFiscalSystem.”InLustig,Nora,CarolaPessino andJohnScott.2014.Editors.TheRedistributiveImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLatinAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(September2013).

Scott,J.2013.CEQMasterWorkbook:Mexico,September2.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

20.Peru (2009;I):Jaramillo,Miguel.2014.“TheIncidenceofSocialSpendingandTaxesinPeru.”InLustig,Nora,Carola Pessino andJohnScott.2014.Editors.TheRedistributiveImpactofTaxesandSocialSpending inLatinAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(May1,2013).

Jaramillo,M.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Peru,August7.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

21.Russia(2010;I):Lopez-Calva,LuisF.,NoraLustig,MikhailMatytsin,andDaria Popova. forthcoming.“WhoBenefitsfromFiscalRedistributioninRussia?,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lustig,N.(Eds.),TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicy:Experience fromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).

Malytsin,M.andD.Popova.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Russia,March17.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

22.SouthAfrica(2010-11;I):Inchauste,Gabriela,NoraLustig,Mashekwa Maboshe,CatrionaPurfield andIngridWollard.forthcoming.“TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicyinSouthAfrica,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lustig,N.(Eds.),TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicy:Experience fromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).

Inchauste,G.,N.Lustig,M.Maboshe,C.Purfield,I.Woolard andP.Zikhali.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook: SouthAfrica,March6.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

23.SriLanka(2010;C):Arunatilake,Nisha,GabrielaInchauste andNoraLustig.forthcoming.“TheIncidenceofTaxesandSpendinginSriLanka,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lustig,N.(Eds.),TheDistributionalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).

Arunatilake,N.,C.Gomez,N.Perera andK.Attygalle.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:SriLanka,March10.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

24.Tanzania(2011-12;C): Younger,Stephen,FloraMyamba,andKennethMdadila.2016.“FiscalIncidenceinTanzania.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.36,Center forInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversity,IthacaCollegeandREPOA.

Younger,S.,F.Myamba,andK.Mdadila.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook: Tanzania,June1st.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

25.Tunisia (2010,C):Shimeles,Abebe,AhmedMoummi,NizarJouini andNoraLustig.2016.“FiscalIncidenceandPoverty Reduction:EvidencefromTunisia,”CEQWorkingPaperNo.38,CommitmenttoEquityInstitute,TulaneUniversity.(forthcoming).

Shimeles,A.,A.Moummi,N.Jouini andN.Lustig.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook: Tunisia,October1.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversityandAfricanDevelopmentBank.

26.UnitedStates(2011,I):Higgins,Sean,NoraLustig,WhitneyRubleandTimothySmeeding (2015),“ComparingtheIncidenceofTaxesandSocialSpendinginBrazilandtheUnitedStates”,ReviewofIncomeandWealth,forthcoming.

27.Uruguay(2009;I):Bucheli,Marisa,NoraLustig,Máximo Rossi,andFlorenciaAmábile.2014.“SocialSpending,TaxesandIncomeRedistributioninUruguay.”In:Lustig,Nora,Carola PessinoandJohnScott.2014.Editors.TheRedistributiveImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLatinAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(August18,2014)

Bucheli,M.,N.Lustig,M.RossiandF.Amábile.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook: Uruguay,August18.CEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

The image part with relationship ID rId2 AdditionalReferences:

• Enami,LustigandAranda.“AnalyticalFoundations: MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.”ChapterinLustig(editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimatingtheImpactofFiscal PolicyonInequalityandPoverty,BrookingsInstitutionPressandTulaneUniversity, forthcoming.

• Higgins,S.andN.Lustig. 2016.Canapoverty-reducing andprogressive taxandtransfersystemhurtthepoor? JournalofDevelopmentEconomics122,63-75.

• Higgins,S.,N.Lustig,W.RubleandT.Smeeding.2015.“ComparingtheIncidenceofTaxesandSocialSpending inBrazilandtheUnitedStates.”ReviewofIncomeandWealth,Published OnlineMay24,2015,DOI:10.1111/roiw.12201

• Lustig,Nora.2016.“FiscalPolicy, Inequality, andthePoorintheDevelopingWorld.”TulaneUniversity,EconomicsWorking Paper1612,October.

• ----------. 2016.“TheSDG’s,DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMeeting:“Strategiesforeradicatingpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopment forall,”BacgroundpaperfortheWorldDevelopmentReport2017GovernanceandtheLaw.

• ---------- “InequalityandFiscalRedistribution inMiddleIncomeCountries:Brazil,Chile, Colombia, Indonesia,Mexico,PeruAndSouthAfrica.”JournalofGlobalizationandDevelopment.Forthcoming.

• --------- “TheRedistributive ImpactofGovernmentSpending onEducationandHealth:Evidencefrom13DevelopingCountries intheCommitment toEquityProject”Chapter17in Gupta,Sanjeev,MichaelKeen,BenedictClements andRuuddeMooij, editors,InequalityandFiscalPolicy,Washington:InternationalMonetaryFund, 2015.

• ----- andS.Higgins.Forthcoming.“TheCEQAssessment:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.”InLustig,editor,CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimatingtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty,Brookings InstitutionPressandCEQInstitute,TulaneUniversity.

Thankyou!

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