existential security and the gender gap in religious values the gender... · and become less...
Post on 21-Jun-2018
213 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
1
[1st Draft: Total length 11,606 words]
Existential security and the gender gap in religious values
Pippa Norris (Harvard University) and Ronald Inglehart (University of Michigan)
Pippa Norris Ronald Inglehart McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics Institute for Social ResearchJohn F. Kennedy School of Government University of MichiganHarvard University Ann Arbor,Cambridge, MA 02138 Michigan, 48106-1248Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu RFI@umich.edu www.pippanorris.com www.worldvaluessurvey.org Synopsis: A pervasive generalization in the social sciences suggests that women are universally more religious in their attitudes, values and behavior than men ‘around the world and across the centuries’, leading Stark (2002) to propose a physiological or biological root cause. Yet a recent comparison of a wide range of world faiths suggests that the standard view needs revision. Far from a universal phenomenon, Sullins (2006) reports that the size of the gender gap in religiosity varied by type of indicator and by type of culture. In particular, among those of Jewish and Muslim faith, compared with women, men were significantly more active in collective religious rituals, not less. Moreover Miller and Stark (2002) found that, contrary to expectations, the gender gap in religiosity was weaker in societies where traditional sex roles predominated. Reframed in this light, the puzzle becomes how to explain variations in the gender gap in religiosity. This study develops the argument that disparities in existential security can help to explain this phenomenon, and then analyzes structural and attitudinal indicators to test this account. Data is derived from five waves of the World Values Survey from 1981-2006, covering almost half the world’s countries, and most major types of religious cultures. The conclusion draws together the main findings and considers their implications for understanding religious practices and behaviors. Draft chapter for the SSRC conference on Religion & International Affairs, New York, February 15-16, 2008 and the edited volume by Timothy Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Toft
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
2
Are women more religious than men? For many decades the standard perspective in the
literature has asserted that they are, whether gauged by religious identities, values, or practices.
Over the years a wealth of empirical studies in the scientific study of religion have demonstrated
that, at least in predominately Protestant and Catholic cultures, church congregations are
disproportionately female, while women were also more likely to express faith in God and to hold
religious beliefs (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975; Walter and Davie 1998; Miller and Hoffman
1995; Francis 1997). A number of alternative explanations have been proposed to account for
this long-standing pattern, based on structural and cultural theories of sex-role differentiation.
The apparent ubiquity of this phenomenon led Stark (2002) to speculate about a physiological or
biological root cause, with testosterone encouraging men to take greater risks, including
discarding the threat of eternal damnation in religions promising an afterlife.
Much of the systematic empirical evidence supporting the standard claim has been
gathered from historical censuses and social surveys, mainly conducted in predominately
Protestant and Catholic cultures in post-industrial nations. Until recently, however, little
systematic cross-national survey data has been available to test whether similar patterns hold
across a wider range of world faiths and in developing societies. The conventional wisdom was
recently challenged by Sullins (2006) who found that gendered patterns of religiosity varied both
by type of culture and by type of indicator, suggesting a more multifaceted reality. The study
expanded the comparative framework by analyzing 71 societies included in the 2nd and 3rd waves
of the World Values Survey conducted in the early to mid-1990s. In particular, Sullins confirmed
that women were indeed usually more religious than men in many religious cultures, especially in
the affective forms of religious expression reflecting personal spirituality, exemplified by feelings
of religious identity and the importance of religious values. By contrast, in many societies the
traditional gender gap was found to be far smaller, or even negligible, in collective forms of
religious rituals, such as church attendance and church membership in Protestant and Catholic
societies. Among Jews and Muslims, by contrast, the gap even reversed, with men being
significantly more active in religious practices than women. In addition, Miller and Stark (2002)
examined the gender gap in religiosity against several societal-level indicators of traditional and
egalitarian sex roles, such as the proportion of women in the paid workforce and the fertility rate,
and found that the gap was weaker in societies where traditional sex roles predominated.
Reframed in this light, if these findings are indeed confirmed as robust in a broad range of
contexts and time-periods, universal physiological explanations become implausible, and the
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
3
puzzle becomes how to explain more complex variations in the gender gap in religiosity around
the world.
To account for differences in the size and significance of the gender gap in religiosity,
Part I of the present analysis builds upon a theory of human existential security, originally
developed to explain cross-national patterns of religiosity and trends in secularization (Norris and
Inglehart 2004). The concept of ‘existential security’ is a broad and multifaceted notion but its
core meaning reflects the degree to which survival is seen as secure or uncertain. The degree to
which survival is seen as precarious or safe varies widely, which generates a series of testable
propositions. This argument is compared with accounts based on the psychological propensity to
take risks, as well as the standard sociological theories based on common structural differences
in men and women’s lives, such as patterns of child-rearing, marital status, and engagement in
the paid work-force, and cultural explanations based on sex-role socialization and attitudes
towards gender equality. The key research questions are whether the gender gap in religious
values is universally evident across most nations, religious cultures, and types of society, and
whether the effect of gender on religious values weakens once models control for indicators of
existential security, social structure and cultural attitudes?
Part II describes the survey evidence, comparative framework, and measures.
‘Religiosity’ is understood here as a multi-dimensional concept open to many different indicators,
but nevertheless not all of these are equally suitable for comparative studies covering many
different world religions. In particular, the comparison of specific spiritual beliefs and particular
sacred rituals are problematic to interpret cross-culturally, as it remains difficult to establish
indicators which are functionally-equivalent in diverse world religions. For this reason, in this
study we decided to focus on the religious values gender gap, defined and measured as the
difference in the perceived importance of religion in the lives of women and men. This is one of
the most important indicators of spirituality, it is universal across all types of world faith and all
forms of New Age spirituality, and religious values are also a strong predictor of other religious
practices and attitudes (Norris and Inglehart 2004). To replicate, update, and expand many other
comparative studies, empirical evidence is derived from the World Values Survey, including all
five waves conducted from 1981-2006, covering over 85 percent of the world’s population and
most of the major world religions (with a total sample of 342,737 individual respondents). Part
III compares the descriptive bivariate correlations for structural and cultural factors associated
with religious values, estimating the size of the gender gap with each, and then uses multivariate
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
4
OLS regression models to test the factors driving the gender gap in religious values. The
conclusion in Part IV draws together the major findings and considers their implications for
understanding social differences in religious practices and behaviors.
I: Theories explaining the gender gap in religiosity
A recent literature review by Francis (1997) noted that many studies have observed the
traditional gender gap in religiosity, but nevertheless the reasons underlying this phenomenon
continue to prove puzzling. Sociological accounts emphasize structural differences in men’s and
women’s lives which are thought to influence religiosity, such as patterns of child-rearing,
psychological versions emphasize female personality traits, while socio-biological explanations
propose physiological characteristics, such as levels of testosterone, which differentiate behavior
in women and men. The core argument advanced in this study is that the gender gap in
religious values should not be understood as sui generis; instead it can be explained most
satisfactorily by patterns of existential security, which also illuminate broader cross-cultural
differences in religiosity and secularization. Women often give higher priority to religion not
because of their sex per se but because they usually experience less security in their lives, due to
enduring and persistent disparities in physical strength, economic resources, and political power.
Elsewhere we have developed the argument that economic and political changes go
together with cultural developments in coherent and consistent ways (Norris and Inglehart 2004).
We have demonstrated that the process of human development has significant consequences for
religiosity; as societies transition from agrarian to industrial economies, and then develop into
postindustrial societies, the growing economic and physical security that usually accompany this
process tends to reduce the importance of religious values in people’s lives. The main reason, we
believe, is that the need for religious reassurance becomes less pressing under conditions of
greater existential security. These effects operate at both the societal-level (socio-tropic) and at
the personal level (ego-tropic), although the former seems to be more important. The concept of
‘existential security’ is complex and multidimensional, as many different types of threats may
engender perceived dangers and hardships in different contexts (Paris 2001; Ogata and Sen
2003). The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report argued that human security is shaped by
multiple threats arising from economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and
political dimensions.1 Most postindustrial nations are characterized by conditions of widespread
social protection and control, high life expectancy, health and welfare services, a functioning and
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
5
stable state, as well as conditions of enduring peace and security from external invasion, which
mean that although perceived dangers remain, existential security is maximized. Under these
conditions, the thesis predicts that fewer people in these societies will regard traditional spiritual
values, beliefs and practices as vital to their lives, or to the lives of their community. This does
not imply that all forms of religion necessarily disappear as societies develop; residual and
symbolic elements often remain, such as formal adherence to religious identities, just as church
buildings and cathedrals remain long after congregations have shrunk away, even when their
substantive meaning has faded away. But we expect that people living in advanced industrial
societies will often grow increasingly indifferent to traditional religious leaders and institutions,
and become less willing to engage in spiritual activities. Contrary to the assumptions of the
supply-side religious markets school (Finke and Stark 1992, 2000), we assume that the ‘demand’
for spirituality is far from constant; instead striking variations are evident in different societies
and groups due to experience of the basic living conditions, poverty, inequality, and freedom
from fear common in rich and poor nations.
Virtually all of the world's major traditional religious cultures provide reassurance that,
even though the individual alone can not understand or predict what lies ahead, a higher power
will ensure that things work out. Both religion and secular ideologies assure people that the
universe follows a plan, which guarantees that if you follow the rules, everything will turn out
well, in this world or the next. The rains will come, life will prosper, and (for religions believing in
an afterlife) the good will be rewarded and death will not end our contact with loved ones. This
belief reduces stress and uncertainty, enabling people to shut out terrifying anxieties and focus
on coping with their immediate problems. Without such a belief system, extreme stress and pain
tends to produce withdrawal reactions. Under conditions of insecurity, people have a powerful
need to see authority as both strong and benevolent-- even in the face of evidence to the
contrary. The theory is not mechanically deterministic: perceptions of threats can generate
increased fears even in affluent societies, as exemplified by the events of 9/11 and their
aftermath in the US. The thesis advanced in this study therefore predicts that the people of
poorer societies and more vulnerable sectors of society will usually regard religion as far more
important than more those of affluent nations and people living in states with generous welfare
safety-nets and with deeper reservoirs of household savings, private insurance, and investments,
which usually experience greater freedom from fear in their lives. Levels of social and individual
security are expected to lead towards predictable probabilistic variations in religious values
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
6
(reflecting the vital importance of religion in people’s lives), although at the same time residual
religious beliefs, ritualistic practices and institutions will continue to bear a strong imprint
stamped by each specific type of faith.
How does this theory help to explain to the gender gaps evident in religious values? The
existence of enduring and deep-rooted differences in the way that women and men experience
existential security are widely recognized, as illustrated by unequal levels of economic resources
derived from subsistence farming, disparities in income, credit loans and debt, and the
feminization of poverty; by disparities in access to clean water, nutrition, and health care in
developing societies; by lack of power, representation in elected office, and voice in the public
sphere; and by the physical and social vulnerabilities which women face against threats from
aggression, the use of force, crime, and violence (including domestic violence). In short, feminist
perspectives call attention to the way that girls and women experience existential security
differently from boys and men, in large part because of enduring disparities in status and power
(Lammers 1999; Bunch and Carillo 1998). This is most vividly demonstrated in some of the
bloodiest civil wars, such as in contemporary Darfur, where reports by Amnesty International and
others have documented how far rape and other forms of sexual violence are being used as a
weapon of war in order to humiliate, punish, control, inflict fear and displace women and their
communities.2 But the contrasts in existential security experienced by most men and women go
far beyond the most extreme cases, and the international community, bilateral aid agencies, and
UN peace-building initiatives have increasingly come to recognize important contrasts in the way
that women and men experience development, military interventions, and civil conflict, with
important implications for effective development programs and policy interventions. The
argument developed here therefore builds on and extends our previous work by suggesting that
women generally give higher priority to religion in large part because of the disparities in safety,
protection, and security which they experience in their lives.
Is there convincing evidence that existential security is linked with religious values? And,
if so, does this help to explain the gender gap in religiosity? Despite the complexity of the core
concept of existential security, the thesis generates a series of clear hypotheses that can be
tested empirically. One central prediction is that the salience of religious values will tend to be
strongest in the least developed societies; the fact that this holds true has been demonstrated in
considerable detail elsewhere (Norris and Inglehart 2004). The people of low-income countries
are relatively vulnerable to life-threatening socio-tropic threats arising from sudden natural and
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
7
man-made disasters, such as floods, famines, and social instability, and the appeal of religious
values is strongest in this context. The existential security thesis has attracted considerable
interest, with subsequent studies replicating the findings (Zaidise, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur
2007).
Building upon this foundation, the thesis has a number of additional implications. Does
the salience of religious values vary according to the degree of existential security that different
groups within a given society experience? Of particular interest for the present analysis, does the
salience of religious values reflect the relative economic status, power, and sense of safety of
women and men living within given societies? This can be examined empirically by analyzing a
series of indicators, comparing the strength of religiosity against gender disparities in household
income, household savings, and the perceived importance of living in secure conditions. In
particular, underprivileged females living in households with a minimal income are predicted to
prove most religious in their outlook. Another test of the hypothesis can be made by examining
contrasts in household savings and debt. Here again, we would expect the most vulnerable
individuals with the least financial resources (a group that includes disproportionate numbers of
females) to give the highest priority to religion. The poor are most vulnerable to sudden
catastrophic economic risks, especially in the least developed societies, as they lack a safety-net
of personal savings to cushion the shock of bad times, such as a health crisis, crop failure, or lay-
offs. Educational and age patterns are also expected to prove important, with the less educated,
and the oldest (and thus most infirm) sectors of the population, giving the highest priority to
religious values. Existential security can also be monitored more directly by examining the
attitudes and priorities of those who say they give the greatest emphasis to living in safe
conditions which are free from danger; we would expect this group to be disproportionately
female—and to place relatively strong emphasis on religion.
Risk analysis and physiological differences
The existential security thesis can be compared with a growing series of studies which
link religiosity to more instrumental and individualistic notions of preferences for risk-taking. This
proposition was first outlined by Miller and Hoffman (1995), and subsequently developed by
Miller and Stark (2002) and Stark (2002). In religious cultures which emphasize the reward of life
after death for the devout, especially in Christianity, Islam, and Orthodox Judaism, their
argument suggests that to be irreligious is to risk divine punishment. It is well-established that
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
8
men have a greater propensity to engage in risky behavior such as crime and delinquency,
drinking and drug use, whether due to male socialization processes or to socio-biological drives
linked with different levels of testosterone. This tendency, they argue, means that men are also
more likely to engage in risky behavior by being less religious. By contrast, women are generally
more risk-averse and therefore also more religious. The reasons why men are usually more
willing to take risks were not addressed by Miller and Hoffman (1995), but later Stark (2002)
proposed the socio-biological explanation, where higher testosterone levels in men encouraged
riskier behavior.
This risk preference thesis has received mixed support from the available empirical
survey evidence, however, in part because of alternative ways that risk preferences can be
operationalized and modeled. Miller and Stark (2002) observed significant correlations, while later
studies by Freese (2004), and by Roth and Kroll (2007), reported no relationship between risk
preferences and the gender gap in religiosity. The risk preference theory suggests an
instrumental notion, where individual men and women consciously weigh the costs and benefits
of alternative choices; for example, in Pentecostal churches, whether sins are worth the risk of
eternal damnation. By contrast, the existential security thesis offers a far broader framework
which relates to the generic threats and dangers facing societies, communities, and individuals.
The theoretical framework is also preferable because it offers a more comprehensive explanation;
it does not just seek to account for the gender gap in religiosity but it also provides insights into
many observable contrasts in patterns of secularization and religiosity. The results of the analysis
of existential security can also be directly compared empirically with the risk aversion thesis: if
the risk aversion thesis is correct, those who express a propensity for adventure and taking risks,
and for living an exciting life, should prove less religious in their values, as well as being
disproportionately male.
Structural differences in gender roles and cultural attitudes towards gender equality
In addition to testing these hypotheses, we can also test the implications of the
existential security thesis against those of other standard factors emphasized in the literature.
One of the most common structural theories in sociology emphasizes differences in the life-styles
of women and men, particularly the traditional roles of women as the primary child-rearer in the
home and the predominance of men in the paid labor-force and the public sphere (Becker and
Hofmeister 2001). A strict division of gender roles and responsibilities in the home, patterns of
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
9
marriage and divorce, and the size and composition of the typical family unit, have changed
substantially over time, especially in post-industrial societies, but nevertheless women continue
to bear the primary responsibility for care of children and dependents (Mason and Jenson 1995;
Scott et al 1993, 1998). In particular, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) hypothesize that church
attendance may be higher for women if this represents an extension of the division of labor in
the home. Previous attempts to test these relationships, however, have reported mixed results;
De Vaus and McAllister (1987) examined Australian public opinion and found that mothers with
dependent children attended church more frequently than women without dependent children.
Similar patterns were also evident, however, for men with and without children. If the structural
proposition is true, however, it implies that the size of the gender gap in religiosity should shrink
among women who are in (full or part-time) paid employment, while it should expand among
women who are full time home-makers, especially if they care for dependent children. These
propositions can be tested empirically by examining whether the size of the gender gap in
religious values varies systematically according to marital status, the presence of children in the
household, and the respondent’s participation in the paid workforce, after controlling for other
important factors, including age and education.
Lastly, the cultural attitudes of women and men towards gender equality could also play
a role in determining patterns of religiosity (Walter and Davie 1998). If socialization patterns
encourage traditional roles for women and men, in which women accept that their primary
reward comes from being a wife and mother, then we would expect that these attitudes would
also contribute towards a gender gap in religion. Religious authorities often advocate that women
should remain in traditional roles in the domestic sphere and female fertility is encouraged, as
exemplified by Papal encyclicals in the Catholic Church banning abortion and the use of artificial
contraceptives. One of the central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen
the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise
children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of
reproduction. In this respect, greater adherence to religious beliefs and practices may encourage
women to adopt traditional roles as full-time mothers and careers of dependents. Moreover those
who accept traditional gender roles may also feel that this includes engaging in religious values
and practices. This hypothesis can be tested by examining whether the size of the gender gap in
religious values expands among those women who accept the idea of traditional gender roles,
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
10
while the gap diminishes among women who adhere to more liberal notions of gender equality in
the home, workplace and school.
II: Evidence, data and measures
Despite considerable debate, many of the theoretical arguments that have been
proposed over the years have not yet been tested empirically through multivariate analysis that
reveal whether given generalizations prove robust when controlling for different cultural contexts,
socioeconomic indicators, and time-periods. Moreover even where reliable empirical correlations
have been established, the direction of causality proposed in many accounts remains difficult to
interpret, in recursive relationships. Evidence for religious beliefs, values and behavior in many
different societies is available in the World Values Survey (WVS-5) which covers a wide range of
countries from all world regions, as well as many different types of faiths. The World Values
Surveys is a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change. This project has carried
out representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the publics in more than 90
independent countries, containing in total almost 5.5 billion people or over 85% of the world’s
population and covering all six inhabited continents. It builds on the European Values Surveys,
first carried out in 22 countries in 1981. A second wave of surveys, in 41 countries, was
completed in 1990-1991; a third wave was carried out in 55 nations in 1995-1996; and a fourth
wave, with 59 countries, took place in 1999-2001. The fifth wave took place in over forty
countries in 2005-6.3 The total sample from all combined waves contains 342,737 individual
respondents.
The WVS survey includes some of the most affluent market economies in the world, such
as the U.S., Japan and Switzerland, with per capita annual incomes as high as $40,000; together
with middle-level industrializing countries including Taiwan, Brazil, and Turkey, as well as poorer
agrarian societies, exemplified by Uganda, Nigeria, and Viet Nam, with per capita annual incomes
of $300 or less. Some smaller nations have populations below one million, such as Malta,
Luxembourg and Iceland, while at the other extreme a billion or more people live in both India
and China. The survey contains predominately Protestant societies such as Australia, Sweden,
and the United States, Catholic societies including Belgium, the Philippines and Mexico, as well as
Orthodox countries such as Russia and Greece, and a few with diverse Eastern religions, such as
Japan, Viet Nam, and China. The survey also includes some of the first systematic data on public
opinion in many Muslim states, including Arab countries such as Jordan, Iran, Egypt, and
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
11
Morocco, as well as Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The most comprehensive
coverage of countries in the surveys is available in Western Europe, North America and
Scandinavia, where public opinion surveys have the longest tradition, but countries are included
from all world regions, including several Sub Saharan African nations.
Measures of religiosity
Since religiosity is a multidimensional phenomenon, studies have focused on many
different aspects (Shiner 1966; Dobbelaere 1981; Swatos and Christiano 1999). Many sociologists
have emphasized trends in religious participation, monitored through church and census historical
records of congregations and through social surveys of reported churchgoing. It can be argued
that behavior provides a concrete indicator of the importance of religion for social norms and
habitual practices. Yet each major religion emphasizes its own distinct practices in spiritual
rituals, ceremonies, and observances, often associated with the life-changes of birth, marriage
and death, as well as celebration of certain holy days, and there are multiple variations within
each religion’s sects, denominations, and communities. Christian religious practices are
exemplified by habitual church attendance on Sundays and special holidays, as well as by the
role of prayer, charitable giving, the significance of communion, and the rituals of baptism,
confirmation, and marriage. But within this common repertoire, Anglicans, Methodists, and
Baptists each emphasize their own specific rituals. Elsewhere meditation rituals and ceremonies
are central to Buddhism, along with the observation of festivals, blessings and initiations, and the
role of monastic communities. For Muslims, the Qur-an specifies the five Pillars of Islam,
including public profession of faith by recitation of the shahada, daily performance of the salat
prayer ritual, annual giving of obligatory alms (zakat), fasting during Ramadan, and performance
once in a lifetime in the rituals of the Great Pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj). Alternative New Age
forms of spirituality involve an even wider range of diverse activities, including psychic, pagan,
metaphysical, personal growth and holistic healthcare, with practices exemplified by yoga,
meditation, aroma therapies, channeling, divination, and astrology. Given these differences, it
does not seem to be appropriate to use measures of participation in collective religious services
in cross-national studies covering many different types of faith and religious cultures. The
frequency of attendance at collective church services, for example, is widely used to compare the
size of Christian congregations in the United States, but this concept does not travel well as an
indicator of the strength of religious involvement in other faiths.
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
12
Other commentators, such as Greeley (2003), give greater attention to the strength of
common religious beliefs, such as faith in an afterlife or in metaphysical beings, on the grounds
that people can continue to adhere to these beliefs even if they no longer participate regularly in
services of worship. But beliefs about specific theological doctrines, creeds, and injunctions vary
even more substantially across the major world faiths, as well as differing among specific sects,
denominations, and communities. The predominant religious cultural traditions in any society,
such as the legacy of Protestantism and Catholicism in Western Europe, are expected to leave a
distinct imprint upon the contemporary moral beliefs and social attitudes that are widespread
among the public in these nations. Predominant religious cultures are understood here as path-
dependent, adapting and evolving in response to developments in the contemporary world, and
yet also strongly reflecting the legacy of the past centuries. Yet the major faiths of the world
express divergent teachings and doctrines on many moral values and normative beliefs, such as
those surrounding the roles of women and men, the sanctity of life, and the importance of
marriage and the family. As a result, comparing the strength of religious beliefs is also
problematic for comparing like-with-like in cross-national studies.
The expression of subjective religious identities can also be compared across different
societies although their social significance remains unclear. Belonging to a particular sect, such as
the Shi’a or Sunni in Baghdad, or being part of Protestant or Catholic neighborhoods in Belfast,
may express genuine deeply-held membership of a community with a common shared culture.
But religious identities may also function as formal labels devoid of spiritual meaning; in Britain,
for example, a plurality of the population habitually report on official census forms that they are
nominal Anglicans, but beyond baptisms, weddings and funerals, this does not mean that they
are active, practicing members who regularly fill the pews in the Church of England (Furlong
1999).4
Yet others emphasize religion as a societal institution. Dobbelaere (1999), for example,
regards secularization as a broad process reducing the societal significance and meaning of
religion, notably how far the public regards spiritual values as important to their lives and how far
they listen to religious leaders as an important source of moral authority and spiritual guidance.
In this study, we do not examine direct evidence of the power and status of religious institutions
and authorities, such as the role of evangelical churches in the ‘bible-belt’ American South,
ideological divisions within the Anglican synod, the influence of radical Islamic parties in the
Middle East, or the structure, resources and leadership of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy.
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
13
Nor do we focus primarily upon the relative organizational strength of different denominations
and sects within specific countries, and the way that this may affect women and men, such as
attempts to build churches and expand congregations by US evangelicals in South Korea, or
rivalry for hearts and souls between Catholic clergy and Pentecostal missionaries in Guatemala
and El Salvador. These are important matters, but it remains difficult to establish functionally-
equivalent survey items that would compare these issues among types of faith which encourage
different types of spiritual expression and rituals of behavior.
While recognizing that religiosity is multidimensional, in cross-national analysis, values
are most easily treated as functionally-equivalent indicators of this phenomenon. In general, the
study of values refers to the goals that people believe to be important for themselves, their
families, their community or the nation, such as the value of wealth and material prosperity, of
collective solidarity and social equality, of security and freedom from fear, and of individual
competition, hard-work, and enterprise. Religious values can be gauged by how far respondents
believe in the importance of God in monotheistic religions, or in the importance of the gods in
pantheistic religions. This is an important indicator since it has been established elsewhere
(Norris and Inglehart 2004) that religious values are strongly related to active participation in
collective religious services and to the frequency of individualized prayer or meditation. Not
surprisingly, where people thought that God was important in their lives, they were more likely to
engage in religious rituals and practices. Moreover religious values are also an important proxy
for societal patterns of secularization; we established that the strongest decline in religious values
has occurred in affluent and secure nations, where the importance of religion has faded most.
Secularization involves the lessening importance of religion in people’s lives, and growing
indifference to spiritual matters among the public. By contrast, where religious values continue to
remain a vital part of people’s everyday lives, in poor agrarian societies, where people are also
most active in worship and prayer. The 10-point ‘importance of God’ scale was carried in all five
waves of the World Values Survey, facilitating the broadest comparison over time and across
societies. To double-check on the robustness of this indicator, since 1990 the survey has also
monitored ‘the importance of religion’, using a 4-point scale. Models were replicated using this
indicator but this did not substantially alter the outcome of the analysis, lending greater
confidence to the results.
Identifying the predominant religious culture in each country is important because the
values and beliefs of Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Muslim and Eastern religions are
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
14
expected to imprint themselves on each society, via the major channels of cultural transmission
and socialization, irrespective of how far individuals actively participate in religion. The
classification of the predominant religion in each society is drawn from the Encyclopedia
Britannica Book of the Year 2001, using a dataset on religious pluralism derived from this source
collected by Alesina and colleagues (2003).5 The classification of all the countries contained in
the combined WVS under this categorization is given in Table A1. Of all these, the categorization
of ‘eastern’ religions remains the most heterogenious, given the vast diversity of religions and
sects contained within this group. In addition, the classification is less useful in pluralistic
societies containing highly heterogeneous religious populations. The reliability and consistency of
the classification was crosschecked against alternative reference sources that are widely cited in
the research literature.6 The type of society was also classified into three categories using the
UNDP Human Development Index 2004, combining literacy and education, longevity and per
capita income (UNDP 2007). Details about the measures and classifications used for all variables
are given in the technical appendix. It should be noted that important differences in the countries
and the questions included in each wave of the survey limit the multivariate analysis, for example
the Schwartz value scales for the importance of ‘security’ and ‘risk’ were only contained in the
most recent (2005-6) wave. The earliest surveys were conducted mainly in Protestant and
Roman Catholic societies, so that time-series analysis over successive surveys is limited for other
types of religion.
III: Gender gaps in religious values
As a first step, to get a sense of the cross-cultural contrasts, we can start by comparing
the size of the gender gap in religious values by aggregating all five waves of the World Values
Survey from 1981 to 2006. The gender gap in each society is measured as the mean position of
women on the 10-point ‘importance of God’ scale minus the mean position of men. A positive
coefficient indicates that women are more religious in their priorities. An alternative comparison,
using the 4-point ‘importance of religion’ scale, generated similar contrasts, which increases
confidence in the results of the comparison, although this measure was not included in the first
wave of the survey.
Cross-cultural comparisons
Figure 1 illustrates the main cross-cultural contrasts, confirming the long-standing
observation that women tend to attach greater importance to religion than men in almost all
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
15
societies under comparison, and the gender gap is often fairly substantial in size. Nevertheless
despite this generalization, the societies vary in the size of the gender gap on the 10-point scale,
with the largest gender gap evident in Orthodox societies such has Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and
Belarus, where the church had been suppressed for decades by the Communist state; in Italy,
Portugal and Spain in Catholic Europe, as well as in Norway and Finland, two relatively secular
Evangelical-Lutheran cultures. A wide range of faiths and levels of development are evident in
the middle range of the scale while at the opposite pole there is a minimal gender gap in
religious values, and even a modest reversal, found in some Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Jordan, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco and Egypt. Many of those living in Muslim cultures
express such a universally high level of religiosity that a ‘ceiling’ effect may operate in the scale,
flattening any social differences.
[Figure 1 and Table 1 about here]
To examine the societal-level factors linked with religious values more broadly we can
compare the salience of religion at aggregate level by type of society, by the major types of
world religion, and by world region, starting with bivariate descriptive statistics. Confirming the
existential security thesis, Table 1 illustrates that religion was generally regarded as far more
important in agrarian societies, classified by the UNDP as the lowest level of human
development; on the 10-point scale of the importance of God, there was a 3-point gap between
people living in the more affluent post-industrial nations (mean 6.35) and those living in agrarian
societies (mean 9.45). This is consistent with what we have documented elsewhere (Norris and
Inglehart 2004) where we have shown that similar disparities exist between rich and poor nations
in many other indicators of religiosity, such as in patterns of participation in collective religious
rituals and practices. Religion is almost universal in some of the poorest developing countries
under comparison, such as Pakistan, Ghana and Indonesia, while by contrast, although there are
a few notable exceptions such as Italy, Ireland, and the United States, many other affluent
societies such as Sweden, Japan, Australia, and France are among the most secular around the
globe. The comparison by the major type of world religious culture also shows significant
differences, with the predominately Muslim cultures attaching by far the greatest importance to
spiritual values, while Jewish and Catholic cultures proved moderate, while Protestant and
Orthodox religious cultures generally proved more secular.7 The comparison by world regions
confirmed the patterns observed for development, with Scandinavia and Western Europe proving
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
16
the most secular, which the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, were the most
religious.
[Table 2 about here]
At the same time, when we examine the gender gap in religious values, the opposite
patterns can be observed; as Miller and Stark (2002) noted, the gender gap is greatest in post-
industrial societies while it diminishes to insignificance in poorer agrarian societies. The gap is
also strongest in the more secular Orthodox and Protestant cultures, while shrinking in Muslim
nations. And the gap is also largest in Scandinavia and Western Europe. All of these patterns
suggest that processes of secularization and human development, diminishing the importance of
religion in people’s lives in many of the most affluent societies, have affected men more than
women, widening the religious gender gap. Table 2 describes the bivariate correlations at
societal-level between the mean importance of religion for women and for men, as well as the
size of the gender gap, compared against a range of standard indicators of human development
and existential security, including per capita GDP (in purchasing power parity), the Human
Development Index, the Gender-related Development Index, and measures of infant mortality,
life expectancy, fertility rates and female literacy rates. All the indicators prove to be strongly
correlated in the expected direction; women are far more religious in developing societies with
higher poverty, shorter life-spans, greater fertility and lower literacy for women. But at the same
time these factors also proved to be equally or even more strongly correlated with male
religiosity. As a result the gender gap is reversed; women remain more religious than men in
more affluent societies that have experienced greater human development. Thus religiosity for
both men and women tends to be far stronger in developing societies, but the religious gender
gap seems to expand with processes of modernization.
[Table 3]
Within-society comparisons
To explore these phenomena further, let us compare men and women’s religiosity within
given societies. Table 3 provides similar comparisons of the mean importance of religion scale
among men, women, and the resultant gender gap, across a range of social sectors and
demographic groups in the pooled sample across all waves of the World Values Survey.
Household income was classified into deciles in each society. Consistent with the existential
security thesis, the level of household income on the 10-point scale was strongly correlated with
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
17
the distribution of religious values, with a 1.5 point gap between rich and poor. This means that
the across-nation contrasts between agrarian and post-industrial societies was therefore roughly
twice as strong as the within-nation comparison of rich and poor social sectors, but both point
consistently in the direction expected by the existential security thesis. Religion was seen as more
important for poor women than for rich women and similar contrasts by household income group
were also observed among men. Nevertheless women were under-represented (46%) in the
more affluent group, while they constituted 56% of the lowest income group. We also find a
relationship with reported household savings, where those who reported saving money were less
religious than those who experienced debt. Health showed similar patterns, with those reporting
that they experienced poor health proving more religious than those saying that they were in
very good condition. Similarly with age, the elderly were more religious than the young, as were
the less educated compared with those with greater education. Those looking after dependent
children were also more religious than those without children at home, as well those engaged in
home-care compared with those in the paid workforce. By contrast, marital status did not prove
to be significantly related to religiosity. In short, across most of the standard social and
demographic variables, relatively strong religiosity was consistently found among the less well-off
sectors of society, who tend to be more vulnerable to threats and dangers, including the poor
and indebted, the elderly, the less educated, and those in poor health. Moreover there are more
women than men in each of these populations; women are roughly 51.5% of the total population
in the database as a whole, but they constitute 56% of the elderly, 56% of the poorest income
group, and 59% of those with ill-health, and 98% of the home-makers in the world.
[Table 4 about here]
Cultural attitudes and religiosity
All the social and demographic indicators which we have compared, and which are
associated with the underlying concept of existential security, are therefore consistent predictors
of the salience of religious values, but is there more direct attitudinal evidence? If we examine
the cultural indicators, in Table 4, we can monitor attitudes towards security, risk and the gender
equality scale. The Schwartz values scales contained in the fifth wave of the WVS asked
respondents how well given values described themselves. As Table 4 shows, people who
expressed a strong propensity to seek secure living conditions away from danger were also highly
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
18
religious, while those who did not, proved more secular. This provides direct evidence in support
of the existential security thesis.
We can also compare these results with the Miller and Stark (2002) thesis which predicts
that in religions promising an afterlife, the propensity to take risks will be associated with more
secular orientations, as well as being a more male characteristic. The Schwartz value scale asked
respondents about the value of adventure, taking risks, and having an exciting life. Contrary to
the Miller and Stark thesis, the results in table 4 show that those who were attracted to risks and
adventure were more religious on average than those who were not. Therefore although women
were disproportionately more likely to give high priority to security, while men were far more
likely to value taking risks, emphasis on security proved a better predictor of the gender gap in
religiosity than did one’s emphasis on risk-taking. Lastly, the gender equality scale is also
strongly correlated with religiosity; those expressing the most traditional views of women’s roles
in education, employment and political leadership also give the highest priority to spiritual values.
This relationship, however, is probably recursive; many religious faiths and spiritual authorities
emphasize a traditional division of sex roles in the home, family and public sphere, so that
participation in religious activities is likely to reinforce these values, while at the same time those
holding more egalitarian values may be less likely to be attracted to participate in religious
organizations.
To summarize the bivariate analysis in the pooled WVS across all waves, Figure 2
illustrates the size of the gender gap in religious values (the 10-point importance of God scale)
across the range of societal-level and individual-level factors discussed here. As the bar chart
shows, the gender gap was strongest in post-industrial societies, especially in relatively secular
Scandinavia and Western Europe, as well as among the lowest income sectors of society, those
with the worst state of health, the elderly, those who actively prioritize security, and those with
egalitarian values towards gender equality. Women predominate in all these groups, associated
with long-standing and well-established patterns of female poverty, inequality, and status,
greater longevity, and men and women’s cultural attitudes. By contrast, it is worth noting ‘the
dog that did not bark:’ the religious gender gap is relatively small or inconsistent according to
marital status and the propensity to take risk.
The Schwartz value items were only included in the fifth wave of the WVS survey so the
multivariate analysis is limited to this wave, currently containing 44 societies and 61,618
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
19
respondents.8 To analyze the relationship between the religious gender gap and these structural
and cultural factors, these were entered into successive multivariate OLS regression models, with
the religious values (importance of God) scale as the dependent variable. Similar models were
run for the 4-point ‘importance of religion’ scale, for replication, and the results proved robust.
The models present provisional results as it should be noted that the complete model reduced
the total number of cases substantially, due to problems of missing data. The first model entered
gender without any other factors. Model 2 enters the structural factors that were discussed
earlier, while Model 3 entered cultural attitudes, and Model 4 added the predominant religious
culture. The successive models provide a progressively better fit to the data (indicated by the
strengthening adjusted R2 coefficient). The key question is whether the impact of gender reduces
over successive models, once additional controls are introduced. Interestingly the significance
and size of the gender coefficient remains stable, so that the additional variables do not sharply
reduce the strength of the relationship. These are preliminary results and further analysis is
required but they suggest that the religious gender gap cannot be explained away by the
structural or cultural factors contained in this analysis. The other factors associated with religious
values prove largely stable and consistent in the strength, direction and significance of the
coefficient of association (B), across successive models. As observed earlier, religious values
are associated with living in poorer developing societies, with lower income households, with
lower education and household savings, with age, with not being married or in the paid
workforce, although it is with having children. The value of security is strongly and significantly
linked to religiosity in successive models, while the propensity to take risks is usually insignificant.
Overall the models suggest that the value of security is a stronger and more consistent predictor
of religious values than the propensity to take risks.
Conclusions
The religious values gender gap is an intriguing phenomenon which has been widely
observed over the years and yet often poorly explained. The standard accounts emphasize the
structural constrains on men and women’s roles in the home and workforce, as well as
psychological predispositions or characteristics, such as the propensity to seek risk. Often these
explanations have been examined in particular contexts and national studies, but the comparative
evidence provides important variations in different types of societies, religions and world regions.
There are many sociological and psychological accounts which have sought to attribute the gap
to structural and cultural characteristics of women and men. The argument developed here
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
20
suggests that in general patterns of religiosity are driven by the need for existential security;
where lives are vulnerable, risky and dangerous, religion fills a void and provides a sense of
safety and well-being. The evidence presented here gives further confirmation that security is
strongly related to feelings that God is important in people’s lives. The religious gender gap is
less about sex per se, but more about the way that many women’s lives are more vulnerable to
problems of endemic poverty, debt, poor health, old age, and lack of physical safety, all of which
mean that women give higher priority to security – and religion.
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
21
Figure 1: The gender gap in religious values by society
Note: Q: ”How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.” The ‘gender gap’ is the difference between the mean score for women and for men in each society. A positive gender gap indicates that religious values are more important for women than for men. Source: World Values/European Values Survey 1981-2006.
-0.40 -0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80
M aliSaudi Arabia
PakistanRwandaJordan
PhilippinesNigeria
ColombiaGhana
IndonesiaM orocco
IraqZambia
TanzaniaEgypt
A lgeriaIran
BangladeshVenezuela
Burkina FasoEl SalvadorGuatemala
Trinidad and TobagoM alaysia
BrazilPuerto Rico
PolandTurkeyChina
KyrgyzstanEthiopia
South Korea Azerbaijan
Viet NamSouth Africa
UgandaBosniaJapan
ZimbabwePeruIndia
Dominican RepublicM acedonia
SingaporeHong Kong
M exicoNetherlands
M altaEast Germany
TotalGeorgia
Czech RepublicUnited States
LuxembourgCyprus
SloveniaIsrael
FranceSerbia
BelgiumM ontenegro
ChileCroatiaTaiwanIreland
EstoniaRomania
SwedenGreeceAustriaA lbania
New ZealandM oldova ArgentinaDenmark
Northern IrelandGreat Britain
West GermanyAustralia
IcelandBulgaria
LatviaCanada
SwitzerlandNorway
ItalyLithuaniaAndorraUruguay
SlovakiaArmeniaUkraine
SpainFinlandBelarus
PortugalRussia
Hungary
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
22
Figure 2: Variations in the size of the gender gap in religious values
Note: Q: ”How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.” The ‘gender gap’ is the difference between the mean score for women and for men in each society. A positive gender gap indicates that religious values are more important for women than for men. For details of all items, see Technical Appendix A. Source: World Values/European Values Survey 1981-2006
0.990.40
0.07
1.020.90
0.820.73
0.520.17
1.181.06
1.030.76
0.470.41
0.170.16
0.720.64
0.700.73
0.620.54
0.580.54
0.530.57
0.530.54
0.460.47
0.840.76
0.630.53
0.280.65
0.79
0.590.71
0.690.74
0.460.52
0.70
0.540.56
0.600.76
0.751.06
0.230.51
0.630.63
0.861.27
0.550.600.62
0.760.65
0.60
0.380.490.510.53
0.640.70
0.810.96
1.02
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40
Post-industrialIndustrialAgrarian
OrthodoxProtestant
CatholicJewish
EasternMuslim
ScandinaviaW.Europe
C. & E. EuropeNorth AmericaSouth America
Asia PacificM.East & N. Africa
Africa
Highest decile9th8th7th6th5th4th3rd2nd
Lowest income
Saved money Just got by
Spent savings Debt
PoorFair
GoodVery good
In paid workforceHome-care
Retired
Without dependent childrenWith dependent children
Married/living togetherNot married/living together
High educationMedium
Low education
TwentiesThirtiesFortiesFiftiesSixties
Seventies+
Much like meLike me
Somewhat like meA litt le like me
Not like meNot at all like me
Much like meLike me
Somewhat like meA litt le like me
Not like meNot at all like me
Most traditional2345678
Most egalitarian
Type
of
society
Type
of relig
ious
cultu
reRe
gion
Inco
me
HH S
avings
Hea
lthW
orkfor
ceCh
ildren
Marita
l
status
Educ
ation
Age co
hort
Seek
sec
urity
Take
Risks
Gen
der eq
uality sc
ale
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
23
Table 1: Societal-level variations in the gender gap in religious values % Female
Gender Gap
Men Women All Sig.
51.60 Type of society Post-industrial 0.99 5.84 6.83 6.35 52.40 Industrial 0.40 7.96 8.36 8.16 49.10 Agrarian 0.07 9.38 9.45 9.42 54.10 Type of religious
culture Orthodox 1.02 5.96 6.98 6.47
52.90 Protestant 0.90 5.74 6.64 6.19 51.70 Catholic 0.82 6.80 7.62 7.21 55.00 Jewish 0.73 7.37 8.10 7.74 49.30 Eastern 0.52 5.57 6.09 5.83 50.40 Muslim 0.17 9.28 9.45 9.37 49.8 Region Scandinavia 1.18 4.25 5.43 4.84 52.2 Western Europe 1.06 5.55 6.61 6.10 53.4 Central & Eastern
Europe 1.03 5.62 6.65 6.17
50.6 North America 0.76 7.69 8.45 8.07 51.7 South America 0.47 8.71 9.18 8.95 49.4 Asia Pacific 0.41 6.74 7.15 6.94 50.2 Middle East and N.
Africa 0.17 9.46 9.63 9.55
49.0 Sub-Saharan Africa 0.16 9.30 9.46 9.37 51.4 ALL 0.65 6.76 7.41 7.08 Note: Q:”How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.” The ‘gender gap’ is the difference between the mean score for women and for men in each society. A positive gender gap indicates that religious values are more important for women than for men. ANOVA was used to test the coefficient of association (Eta) and the significance of the mean group difference between men and women. P.*** =.001. For details of all items, see Technical Appendix A. N. societies 90. Source: World Values/European Values Survey 1981-2006
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
24
Table 2: Societal-level variations in the gender gap in religious values correlated with indicators of existential security Religious values scale For
women For men
Gender gap
N. countries
GDP per capita (ppp) 2005 (World bank 2007) -.414** -.441** .377** 86
Human development index 2005 (UNDP 2007) -.556** -.614** .612** 86
Gender-related development index (GDI) value 2005 (UNDP 2007)
-.564** -.625** .627** 82
Gender empowerment measure (GEM) value 2005 (UNDP 2007)
-.449** -.513** .551** 67
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 2005 (World bank 2007)
.478** .534** -.553** 88
Life expectancy at birth (in years) 2000-2005 (UNDP 2008)
-.419** -.473** .506** 85
Total fertility rate per woman, 2000-2005 .447** .514** -.587** 85
Female adult literacy rate, 2002 (UNDP 2004) -.483** -.555** .613** 64
Note: Religious values are measured by the ‘Importance of God’ 10-point scale aggregated at national
level in the pooled World Values Survey 1981-2006 for women, for men, and for the gender gap. **.
Pearson correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). N. societies 67-88.
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
25
Table 3: Social variations in the gender gap in religious values % Female Gender Gap Men Women All Si
g. 45.9 Income Highest income decile 0.72 5.91 6.63 6.27 45.7 9th 0.64 6.24 6.88 6.56 48.0 8th 0.70 6.54 7.24 6.89 48.4 7th 0.73 6.61 7.34 6.98 48.9 6th 0.62 6.85 7.47 7.16 50.5 5th 0.54 7.04 7.58 7.31 49.9 4th 0.58 7.13 7.71 7.42 52.0 3rd 0.54 7.20 7.74 7.47 54.8 2nd 0.53 7.46 7.99 7.73 56.5 Lowest income 0.57 7.71 8.28 8.00 47.3 HH Savings Saved money last year 0.53 7.23 7.76 7.50 51.6 Just got by 0.54 7.54 8.08 7.81 52.2 Spent some savings 0.46 7.53 7.99 7.76 52.6 Spent savings+borrowed
money 0.47 7.80 8.27 8.04
59.2 Health Poor 0.84 6.90 7.74 7.40 55.0 Fair 0.76 6.83 7.59 7.25 49.6 Good 0.63 6.98 7.61 7.26 46.9 Very good 0.53 7.04 7.57 7.29 41.4 Workforce In paid workforce 0.28 6.71 6.99 6.85 98.2 Home-care 0.65 7.15 7.80 7.48 50.8 Retired 0.79 6.31 7.10 6.71 44.7 Children Without dependent children 0.59 6.52 7.11 6.82 53.5 With dependent children 0.71 6.84 7.55 7.20 50.1 Marital
status Married/living together 0.69 6.75 7.44 7.10
53.8 Not married/living together 0.74 6.76 7.50 7.13 46.8 Education High education 0.46 6.56 7.02 6.79 50.4 Medium 0.52 6.56 7.08 6.82 54.4 Low education 0.70 7.09 7.79 7.44 50.6 Age cohort Twenties 0.54 6.35 6.89 6.62 51.4 Thirties 0.56 6.24 6.80 6.52 50.9 Forties 0.60 6.14 6.74 6.44 51.5 Fifties 0.76 6.17 6.93 6.55 52.2 Sixties 0.75 6.31 7.06 6.69 56.0 Seventies+ 1.06 6.45 7.51 6.98 51.5 ALL 0.71 7.46 6.75 7.12 Note: Q: ”How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.” The ‘gender gap’ is the difference between the mean score for women and for men in each society. A positive gender gap indicates that religious values are more important for women than for men. N. 342,737. The correlation (R) and significance. P.*** =.001. For details of all items, see Technical Appendix A. Source: World Values/European Values Survey 1981-2006
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
26
Table 4: Cultural variations in the gender gap in religious values % Female Gender Gap Men Women All (Sig.)
55.3 Seek security Much like me 0.23 8.02 8.25 8.14 52.0 Like me 0.51 7.18 7.69 7.45 49.6 Somewhat like me 0.63 6.60 7.23 6.92 48.9 A little like me 0.63 6.34 6.97 6.66 44.5 Not like me 0.86 5.99 6.85 6.42 45.7 Not at all like me 1.27 6.13 7.40 6.77 42.1 Take Risks Much like me 0.55 7.75 8.30 7.98 43.3 Like me 0.60 7.31 7.91 7.57 45.9 Somewhat like me 0.62 6.97 7.59 7.25 49.4 A little like me 0.76 6.65 7.41 7.03 56.3 Not like me 0.65 6.74 7.39 7.10 61.7 Not at all like me 0.60 7.11 7.71 7.48 35.4 Gender equality scale Most traditional 0.38 8.61 8.99 8.80 37.6 2 0.49 8.01 8.50 8.26 41.1 3 0.51 7.99 8.50 8.25 44.0 4 0.53 7.89 8.42 8.16 48.9 5 0.64 7.52 8.16 7.84 51.7 6 0.70 7.24 7.94 7.59 55.9 7 0.81 6.90 7.71 7.31 62.3 8 0.96 6.61 7.57 7.09 66.7 Most egalitarian 1.02 6.13 7.15 6.64 51.5 ALL 0.71 7.46 6.75 7.12 Note: Q: ”How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.” The ‘gender gap’ is the difference between the mean score for women and for men in each society. A positive gender gap indicates that religious values are more important for women than for men. The correlation (R) and significance. P.*** =.001. For details of all items, see Technical Appendix A. Source: World Values/European Values Survey 1981-2006
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
27
Table 5: Multivariate models of the gender gap in emphasis on religion, 2005-6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B Std. Error
Beta P B Std. Error
Beta P B Std. Error
Beta P B Std. Error
Beta P
(Constant) 7.48 0.03 0.000 10.71 0.13 0.000 9.01 0.17 0.000 7.71 0.16 0.000
Female gender 0.59 0.04 0.10 0.000 0.63 0.04 0.11 0.000 0.59 0.04 0.10 0.000 0.59 0.03 0.10 0.000
SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Human development index, 2005 -4.97 0.11 -0.31 0.000 -4.69 0.12 -0.30 0.000 -4.82 0.12 -0.30 0.000
Income (10 pt scale) -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.000 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.000 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.006
State of health 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.000 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.000
Education scale -0.09 0.01 -0.06 0.000 -0.09 0.01 -0.06 0.000 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.000
Household savings -0.14 0.02 -0.04 0.000 -0.14 0.02 -0.04 0.000 -0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.000
Age in years 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.000
R in paid workforce -0.14 0.04 -0.02 0.000 -0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.001 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.721
Married -0.34 0.04 -0.06 0.000 -0.34 0.04 -0.06 0.000 -0.26 0.04 -0.04 0.000
With children 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.000 0.42 0.06 0.05 0.000 0.51 0.05 0.07 0.000
CULTURAL ATTITUDES
Impt to live in secure surroundings 0.34 0.01 0.14 0.000 0.27 0.01 0.12 0.000
Impt to have adventure & take risks 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.253 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.039
Gender equality scale -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.523 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.000
RELIGIOUS CULTURE
Protestant culture 1.03 0.06 0.14 0.000
Catholic culture 2.78 0.05 0.44 0.000
Muslim culture 1.94 0.06 0.26 0.000
Orthodox culture 1.76 0.07 0.19 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.109 0.13 0.24
Note: The dependent variable is religious values, measured at individual-level by Q: ”How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.” The columns represent theunstandardized (B) regression coefficients, standard errors, standardized Betas, and their significance (P). See Appendix A for details in the technical appendix. Source: World Values/European Values Survey fifth wave (2005-6). N=44 societies.
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
28
Appendix A: Variables and codings SOCIETAL INDICATORS AND CLASSIFICATIONS Human Development Index
The Human Development Index (HDI) is based on longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational achievement; and standard of living, as measured by per capita GDP (PPP $US). UNDP Human Development Report 2006.
Type of society ‘Postindustrial societies’ were defined as the twenty most affluent states around the world, ranking with a HDI score over .900 and mean per capita GDP of $29,585. ‘Industrial societies’ are classified as the 58 nations with a moderate HDI (ranging from .740 to .899) and a moderate per capita GDP of $6,314. Lastly, ‘agrarian societies’ are the 97 nations with lower levels of development (HDI of 739 or below) and mean per capita GDP of $1098.
Type of predominant religious culture
The classification of the major religion (adhered to by the largest population) in all 193 states around the world is based on the CIA. The World Factbook, 2001. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency). Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
Type of religion V185: “Do you belong to a religious denomination? [IF YES] Which one?” Coded: No, not a member; Roman Catholic; Protestant; Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.); Jewish; Muslim; Hindu; Buddhist; Other.
CULTURAL INDICATORS Gender equality scale
The combined gender equality scale is based on the following 3 items: MENPOL Q118: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.” (Agree coded low); MENJOBS Q78: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” (Agree coded low); BOYEDUC Q.119: “A university education is more important for a boy than a girl.” (Agree coded low) Source: World Values Surveys, pooled 1995-2006
Security “Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be dangerous.”
Risk propensity “Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.”
STRUCTURAL INDICATORS Paid work status “Are you employed now or not?” Coded full-time, part-time or self-employed (1),
other (0). Education ” What is the highest educational level that you have ever attained?” Coded on a 9-
point scale from no formal education (1) to university level with degree (9). Source: World Values Surveys
HH Income V253. “On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the “lowest income decile” and 10 the “highest income decile” in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.”
HH savings V251. “During the past year, did your family: Save money (4); Just get by (3); Spent some savings (2); Spent savings and borrowed money (1).”
State of health All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Very good (1), good (2) fair (3), or poor (4).”
Age V236. Coded from date of birth in continuous years. Married V55. “Are you currently: 1 Married, 2 Living together as married.” Children V56. “Have you had any children?” Yes 91), No (0)
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
29
Table A1: Classification of countries in all waves of the World Values Survey by type of predominant religious culture Roman Catholic Protestant Muslim Orthodox Eastern Jewish Total
Andorra Australia Albania Armenia China Israel
Argentina Denmark Algeria Belarus India
Austria Estonia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Japan
Belgium Finland Bangladesh Cyprus Korea, Republic Of
Brazil Germany Bosnia & Herzegovina Ethiopia Singapore
Canada Ghana Burkina Faso Georgia Taiwan
Chile Iceland Egypt Greece Viet Nam
Colombia Latvia Indonesia Macedonia
Croatia Netherlands Iran Moldova
Czech Republic New Zealand Iraq Romania
Dominican Republic Norway Jordan Russian Federation
El Salvador South Africa Malaysia Ukraine
France Sweden Mali Yugoslavia
Hungary Switzerland Morocco
Ireland Tanzania Nigeria
Italy Uganda Pakistan
Lithuania United Kingdom Saudi Arabia
Luxembourg United States Turkey
Malta Zambia
Mexico Zimbabwe
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Rwanda
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Total nations in WVS 31 20 18 13 7 1 90
Total nations in world 63 37 50 13 15 1 181
% included in WVS 49.2 54.1 36.0 100.0 46.7 100.0 49.7
Note: Nation states classified from predominant religion, (see text for details)
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
30
References Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg. 2003.
‘Fractionalization.’ Journal of Economic Growth. 82: 219-258.
Becker P.E. and H. Hofmeister. 2001. ‘Work, family, and religious involvement for men and women.’ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40 (4): 707-722.
Bunch, Charlotte and Roxanna Carillo. 1998. ‘Global Violence against Women: The Challenge to Human Rights and Development.’ In Michael Klare and Yogesh Chandrani (eds.), World Security: Challenges for a New Century, third edition. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
de Vaus, David A., and Ian McAllister. 1987. ‘Gender differences in religion: a test of the structural location theory.’ American Sociological Review 52:472–81.
Dobbelaere, Karel. 1981. ‘Secularization: a multidimensional concept.’ Current Sociology. 29(2): 1-21.
Feltey, K.M. 1991. ‘From Sex-Differences to Gender-Role Beliefs - Exploring Effects On six Dimensions of Religiosity.’ Sex Roles 25: 181.
Flere, S. 2007. ‘Gender and religious orientation.’ Social Compass 54 (2): 239-253.
Francis, Leslie J. 1996. ‘Religion and gender orientation.’ Personality and Individual Differences 20: 119.
Francis, Leslie J. 1997. ‘The psychology of gender differences in religion: A review of empirical research.’ Religion 27 (1): 81-96.
Freese, Jeremy. 2004. ‘Risk preferences and gender differences in religiousness: Evidence from the World Values Survey.’ Review of Religious Research 46 (1): 88-91.
Furlong, Monica. 2000. CofE--The State It's In. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Greeley, Andrew M. 2003. Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers
Halman, Loek, Veerle Draulans. 2006. ‘How secular is Europe?’ The British Journal of Sociology 57:2, 263
Hertel, B.R. 1988. ‘Gender, Religious Identity and Work Force Participation.’ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 27: 574.
Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change around the World. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. ‘Modernization, Globalization and the Persistence of Tradition: Empirical Evidence from 65 Societies.’ American Sociological Review. 65: 19-55
Lammers, Ellen. 1999. Refugees, Gender and Human Security: A Theoretical Introduction and Annotated Bibliography Utrecht: The Netherlands: International Books.
Mason, K. and A-M. Jenson. Eds. 1995. Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mayer, Lawrence and Roland E. Smith. 1985. 'Feminism and Religiosity: Female Electoral Behavior in Western Europe'. In Sylia Bashekin Women and Politics in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass.
Miller Alan S. and Rodney Stark. 2002. ‘Gender and religiousness: Can socialization explanations be saved?’ American Journal of Sociology 107 (6): 1399-1423.
Miller, Alan S. and J.P.Hoffmann. 1995. ‘Risk and Religion: An Explanation of Gender Differences in Religiosity.’ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34: 63.
Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ogata, Sadako and Amartya Sen. 2003. Human Security Now. Final Report of the Commission on Human Security. http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
31
Paris, Roland. 2001. ‘Human Security - Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ International Security, 26(2).
Plutzer, Eric. 1988. ‘Work life, family life and women’s support for feminism.’ American Sociological Review. 53: 640-49.
Roth, Louise Marie and Jeffrey C. Kroll. 2007.’Risky business: Assessing risk preference explanations for gender differences in religiosity.’ American Sociological Review 72 (2): 205-220.
Schwartz S.H. and T. Rubel. 2005. ‘Sex differences in value priorities: Cross-cultural and multimethod studies.’ Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology 89 (6): 1010-1028.
Scott, Jacqueline, Michael Braun and Duane Alwin. 1993. ‘The Family Way’. In International Social Attitudes: the 10th Report. Ed. Roger Jowell, Lindsay Brook and Lizanne Dowds, with Daphne Ahrendt. Aldershot, Hants: SCPR.
Scott, Jacqueline, Michael Braun and Duane Alwin. 1998. ‘Partner, Parent, Worker: Family and Gender Roles.’ In British – and European – Social Attitudes: the 15th Report. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate/SCPR.
Sharma, Arvind and Katherine K. Young. Eds. 1999. Feminism and world religions. Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press.
Shiner,L. 1966. ‘The concept of secularization in empirical research.’ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 6: 207-20.
Smith, R.D. 1990. ‘Religious Orientation, Sex-Role Traditionalism, and Gender Identity: Contrasting Male and Female Responses to Socializing Forces.’ Sociological Analysis 51: 377.
Stark, Rodney. 2002. ‘Physiology and faith: Addressing the "universal" gender difference in religious commitment.’ Journal for the Scientific Study Of Religion 41 (3): 495-507.
Sullins, D. Paul. 2006. ‘Gender and religion: Deconstructing universality, constructing complexity.’ American Journal of Sociology 112 (3): 838-880.
Swatos, Jr, William H. and Kevin J. Christiano. 1999. ‘Secularization theory: The course of a concept.’ Sociology of Religion. 60 (3): 209-228.
Thompson, E.H. 1991. ‘Beneath the Status Characteristic: Gender Variations in Religiousness.’ Journal for The Scientific Study of Religion 30: 381.
UNDP. 2007. Human Development Yearbook. New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press.
Walter, T. and Gracie Davie. 1998. ‘The religiosity of women in the modern West.’ British Journal of Sociology 49 (4): 640-660.
Zaidise, Eran, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, and Ami Pedahzur. 2007. ‘Politics of god or politics of man? The role of religion and deprivation in predicting support for political violence in Israel.’ Political Studies 55 (3): 499-521.
THE GENDER GAP IN RELIGIOUS VALUES – NORRIS AND INGLEHART 2/10/2008 1:10:07 PM
32
Notes
1 1994. UNDP Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press/UNDP. 2 Amnesty International. 2004. Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war: sexual violence and its consequences. http://www.amnesty.org/en/report/info/AFR54/076/2004. 3 Full methodological details about the World Values Surveys, including the questionnaires, sampling procedures, fieldwork procedures, principle investigators, and organization can be found at: www.worldvaluessurvey.org 4 As an indicator of the meaningless of religious identities, in the 2001 UK Census, due to an internet write in campaign, 0.7% of the population reported in the religious question that they were "Jedi Knights", equivalent to the proportion in England who reported that they were Sikhs. 5 The dataset is available at www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/papersum.html
6 David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian and Todd M. Johnson. 2001. World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For details see Table 1.1. See also Philip M. Parker. 1997. Religious Cultures of the World: A Statistical Reference. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press; David B. Barrett and Todd M. Johnson. 2001. World Christian Trends AD 30-2200. Pasedena, CA: William Carey Library; Global Evangelization Movement. 2001. Status of Global Mission 2001. www.gem-werc.org/; CIA The World Factbook,. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
7 The ‘Eastern’ religions also proved less religious in their values according to this measure but it is difficult to interpret this category given the diversity of types of religion, and the existence of pantheistic religions in this group.
8 It should be noted that the 5th wave of the World Values Survey remains under development and further countries will be added to the final dataset and analysis.
top related