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Th E 1itic,ri cf t1 Rc,mri Army
d tir I r t Ii t Ii i r d c ri t tir y AD
by
MICHAEL C. IBEJI
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY
IN THE SCHOOL OF ANTIQUITY
AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
Faculty of ArtsUniversity of Blrmthgham
EdgbastonBirmingham
B15 2TT
October 1991
M. C. Ibeji
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROMAN ARMY IN THE THIRD CENTURY
ADDENDA
This thesis was written without access to Hoffman's Die SpätrömischeBewegungsheer das Römischen Heeres (1967), which addresses several of the pointsdiscussed concerning the late Third Century. It is recommended reading.
p.24 'Julius Verus' should read 'Lucius Verus'.
MAP 2: I am grateful to Dr Roger Tomlin for clarifring certain points: Aquileia(unit #3) was a vexillation staging post, and the reference probably alludes tothis; Unit #5 dates from the reign of Marcus Aurelius; Unit #7 is mostprobably numeri from a Constantinian battle. This in no way invalidates mycentral point that the so-called 'flying columns' were more likely to havebeen part of a long-standing tradition of ad hoc vexillation for defensivepurposes than a systematic precursor to the Comitatus.
p.159 The Equites Campani actually date from the Fourth Century BC (Tomlinpers. ref).
p.190 1RT88 is the same inscription as that discussed by Goodchild.
p.214 cf. Kennedy in Britannia 14 about Vellius Rufus.
p.303 itauta is more likely to read ircxu'rcov.
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M.C.Ibe,ji. C3 Army
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Current thinking concerning the third century Roman army is coloured byen over-reliance upon fourth century sources. This dissertation rectifiesthat imbalance by examining each individual institution from a third centuryviewpoint. Part 1 examines the math trends, with a necessarily speculativelook at the role of manpower, and a refutation of the concept of a mobilecavalry field army. Parts 2 and 3 describe how these trends affectedindividual troop types within the Roman army; in particular the extent towhich late Roman institutions, such as the equites of the Notitia Dignitatum,limitanei and barbarian foederati, can be identified in the third century.They also chart the rise of 'ethnic' units during the period, Part 4discusses the rise of the viz-i militares and their encroachment intoprovincial government. It outlines the development of the protectores withinthis background. Finally, virtue Illyrici is placed into its proper context.
In military terms, the reign of Gallienus is seen as the turning point ofthe century. He streamlined the Roman career-structure, allowing experiencedequestrians to rise into vital military posts, and integrated cavalry andpermanent vexillations into the existing army, utilising a strategy ofdefence-in-depth. The unconscious adherence to his principles by hissuccessors is seen as a major factor In the restabilisation of the empire.
M,C.Ibeii. C3 Army
To Mum, for faith.
M.C.Ibejl, C3 Army
Ac K ri cwl d mri t
The structure and function of the Roman army, and the monumentalchanges that were occurring within Roman society during the third centuryAD, have long been a subject of fascination for me. It seemed only natural,therefore, that Dr Simon Esmonde-Cleary should suggest the development ofthe Roman army during the third century as a fit study for his supervisionof my Doctoral dissertation. Throughout the subsequent five years ofresearch, the freedom he has given me to follow my instincts have beengreatly appreciated. Always freely available with advice, suggestions andexhaustive criticism, his wholehearted support of some of my morecontroversial attitudes has at times added courage to my convictions whichmight otherwise have been lacking.
I would also like to express my thanks to Dr Martin Goodman, whosecontinued encouragement was at times an anchor which held me to my task.Dr Stephen Halliwell was kind enough to read several of the more importantGreek inscriptions in order to clarify some detailed points of translationwhich had troubled me, though any errors of interpret&ion which arise fromthis are mine alone, Dr Nick Mimer in Oxford showed great patience at myconstant barrage of questions concerning Vegetius, and Andy Briggs providedchats beyond number, always therapeutic, at times inspirational. Manymembers of the School of Antiquity at the University of Birminghammaintained a friendly interest in my work, most especially Dr Chris Wickham,Dr Susan Limbrey, and our stalwart secretary, Valerie. Special thanks is dueto Dr Susan Fischler, who since her arrival In the department has providedevery support and who was Instrumental in introducing me to thepostgraduate community at Oxford.
From Oxford, Dr Hugh Elton read and commented upon some of my materialand kept me informed of events which were to prove both interesting anduseful. The members of the Oxford Late Roman Seminar and the BirminghamAncient History Postgraduate Seminar heard and discussed a draft version ofmy chapter Contra Comitatum. Their stimulating conversation was to promptsome of the points made in my chapters on the cavalry.
Outside the academic world, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to LynnJackson, whose encouragement and friendship have been the mainstays thatheld me to my course. To her and the many friends who expressed aninterest in my "essay thingy", I give my heartfelt thanks.
Finally, I would like to thank Miss Adams, my old maths teacher; RJ.Unstead; Peter Connolly; Mary Renault; Rosemary Suttcliffe; Henry Treece andMessrs. Goscinny and Uderzo, each of whom played no small part in setting myfeet upon the road down which I have embarked.
M.C. Ibeji. C3 Army
C ONrENTS
Introduction 1
PART 1: THE TRENDS
I: Historia 26
II: Manpower 42
III: Contra Comitatum 57
PART 2: THE TRADITIONAL UNITS
IV: Legiones 76
V: Auxilia Numerique 96
PART 3: THE 'NEW' UNITS
VI: Vexillationes 135
VII: Equites 159
VIII: Limitanei 182
IX: Foederati 194
PART 4: THE OFFICERS
X: Viri Militares 202
XI: Protectores 244
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
XII: Virtus Illyrici Gallieni 294
APPENDICES
1: The Antiqua Leglo of Vegetius 306
2: Traianus Mucianus 309
Addendum 312
BIBLIOGRAPHY & Abbreviations
M.C.tbeji, C3 Army
TABLES
Al: Auxiliary units first appearing after AD 161 124
A2: Auxiliary units of dubious date or provenance 127
A3: Auxiliaries surviving into the notitia Dignitatum 128
A4. : Units in the Notitia possibly related to earlier Auxilia_132
AS: Results from Tables A3 & A4 134
Vi: Vexillatioris prior to Marcus Aurelius 154
V2: Vexillations of Marcus and Commodus 156
V3: Vexillations of Severus & Caracalla 157
V4: Vexillations from AD 217-284 - 158
El: Equites units in the Notitia Dignitetum per Orientern_179
E2: Equites units in the Notitia Dignitatum per' Occidentezn_180
E3: The equites Promoti and the Legions 181
VM1: Provincial Governors 235
VM2: Praefecti Legionum 241
VM3:Duces 242
VM4: Survey Results 243
P1: Protectores Gallieni Augusti Nostri 287
P2: The Generals of Galllenus 288
P3: Ducenar'ii Protec'tores 289
P4: Centur'io Protector 290
PS: Protectores Diocletiani 291
P6: Other protectores for whom some career record survives2g2
P7: Non-protectorate Equestrian Careers c.250-284 293
M,C,Ibeji. C3 Army
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Map 1: The Roman Empire and it Neighbours in the C3 AD
preceding p.1
Map 2: The Garrison of Italy In the Late C3
facIng p.66
Map 3: Attested Garrisons and Fortifications AD 253-c.284
between pp.300 & 301
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I NTROD UC TI OM
A History of Rome by M, Cary and H.H. Scullard is a standard student
text, over 500 pages long, spanning the period from Pre-Roman Italy to the
deposition of Romulus Augustulus In AD 476. The third century, from the
reign of Septimius Severus to the accession of Diocletian (AD 193-284), is
covered in Just twenty-six short pages, from page 490 to page 516. Yet
within that span, the Roman empire had undergone such an earth-shattering
crisis that In order to survive it had been forced to modify the very
foundations upon which it was based. Not least among them was the Roman
army, the development of which was to have direct repercussions upon other
institutions, most notably taxation and provincial government.
That the history of such a transitional century should receive such
cursory treatment is hardly surprising given the nature of the evidence.
Only two contemporary histories are extant, both of which terminate after
the Seven, and their contlnuators survive only in fragments or in epitomes.
Other methods of investigation are equally unrewarding. Archaeology has
yielded little until recently; the epigraphic record remains a mainstay, but
is much sparser than for previous centuries; and numismatics, while lauded by
some, remains severely limited as a tool of research 1 . Faced with such a
dearth of material, early investigators were forced to rely on later sources
of information, dating mainly from the fourth century but extending as far
as the twelfth, with predictable consequences.
1, All types of evidence are discussed below, p 4ff1—1--
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
Scholarly interest among military commentators turned to the third
century in the early 1900s. The German historians most active in the field
were especially concerned to identify the roots of the later Roman army in
this period. They saw a military institution transformed under Diocletlan
and Constantine from a predominantly infantry force arranged along the
frontiers, into a two-tier structure, with mobile elite troops stationed in
the hinterland (the comitatenses) and second-class soldiers remaining on the
frontiers (the limitanei and ripenses). Naturally, given the nature of thefr
sources which freely used late Roman terminology when talking about earlier
institutions, they assumed that this structure had taken shape 1n the mid-
third century. Two seminal works, by Ritterling and Grosse', gave voice to
that assumption and were swiftly followed by other scholars 2 until the ideas
they embodied became the orthodox canon. That canon has been transmitted to
the present day by a series of eminent historians, who did not think to
question the basis upon which it was made.
That basis is unsound, though through no fault of those early pioneers.
Ritterlthg and Grosse had meagre resources upon which to rely. The
authorship of the Historia Augusta had only Just come into question, and the
debate about its date and historical reliablility was still raging into the
193Os. Their only other useful sources were the Greek epitomators, Zosimus
1, Ritterling, 'Zue römischen Heerwesen des ausgehenden III Sahrhunderts', Pest, 0, Hirsc/?feIds(1903), 345ff; Grosse, Röaische Militärgescli/chte on ealileiws b/s zwi BegLn der byzantin/shenTheaenverfassung (1920),
2, eg: Alföldi, 'Der Usurpator Aureolus und die Kavalleriereform des Gallienus', Z(N37 (1927),
156ff; Aitheim, Ole Soidatenkaiser (1939),3, For an indication of the confused state of thought in 1939 cf, CA//UI (1939) 710f & 730,
Key papers in the argument of the time are: Dessau in Heaes 24 (1889), 337ff, & Heraes 27(1892),561ff; Mommsen in 6e5, Scrift, 7 (1909), 302ff; and N, Baynes, The Historla Augista, its date andpwrpose (1926),
—2-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
and Zonaras, whose work was coloured by later Roman thinking. It was little
wonder, then, that they were to take those typically late Roman documents,
the Notitia Dignitat urn and the Epitoma Rei Militaris of Vegetius 1 and
swallow them wholesale, transporting their institutions back into the third
century.
Current thinking concerning the third century is therefore coloured by
an over-reliance upon fourth century sources. This dissertation has set out
to rectify that imbalance by examining each individual institution from a
third century viewpoint, before looking to see how it relates to the later
Roman empire. Part 1 is an examination of the main trends which dominated
the century, with a necessarily speculative look at the role of manpower in
the third century equation, and a refutation of the concept of a mobile
cavalry field army. Parts 2 and 3 describe how these trends affected
individual troop types found within the Roman army. They are particularly
concerned with the extent to which late Roman institutions, such as the
equites of the Notitia Dignitat urn, and the limitanel and barbarian foederati,
can be identified in the third century. As a secondary theme, they chart the
rise of 'ethnic' units during the period. Part 4 discusses the tangential
topic of the rise of the vir-i milit ares and their encroachment into
provincial government. It outlines the institution and development of the
protectores within this background. Specific conclusions have been reached
throughout the document. A general conclusion rounds it off by placing
virtus Illyrici into its proper context. Various topics proved outside the
scope of this study in its final form, most especially the effect of the army
on the economy of the empire and the development of the Primipilate with
1. Vegetius had not yet come into question, Ct, App 1: 'The Antiqzia Leg/c of Vegetius',
—3-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
reference to the annona mi1itarie I hope to pursue these studies at a later
date.
With such a premise as Its starting point, the first task of this study
must be to examine the source material in an effort to determine what can
be trusted, what cannot, and just how much different types of evidence can
tell us about the subject in question.
A note of caution Is in order, best expressed by Millar In the
introduction to his Study of Cassius Dic
In plain terms, we do not know enough about how ancient historians worked, We have no grounds
for general assumptions about what an ancient historian would do when using one or more existing
works as sources of material, or how he would redeploy that material in composing his own
narrative,,,,,,Source-criticism is mere speculation, and its results often no more than the
product of the assumptions with which the examination of a text was begun.1
This was never more true than in the postulation of lost sources upon
which extant ancient historical texts are thought to have relied. Five such
sources are suggested for writers about the third century. Three are named,
with independent corroboration, and can therefore be inserted into the
chronological framework on which this discussion will hang2 . The two
remaining anonymi require a brief discussion now, before they can be used
with reference to later, known, works.
The first of these is the lost Kaisergeschichte (KG) postulated by
Enmann In 1883. This has been seen as the main source for Aurelius Victor,
1, Millar, Study of Cassius Dio (1963), viii,2, Marius Maximus, discussed below p,1Of Dexippus, ph: Eunapius, p13?,
3 Enmann in Deutsche Literuturzeitung4 (1883), 861, & Philoiogus, Supp,4 (1884), 335ff,—4-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
Eutropius, and the Histoi-ia Augusta. It also seems likely that it was known
by Festus, Jerome and the Epitome of Victor. The argument hinges upon a
comparison of Victor and Eutropius, whose work is so similar in content and
form that one must either have copied the other, or both must have been
relying on a single main source. Victor cannot have copied Eutropius, who
was writing after him, and since Eutropius contains the bare bones of
Victor's account without any of his accretions, the existence of the KG seems
the most likely hypothesis. It probably went as far as AD 337, since the
similarities between Victor and Eutropius stop at the death of Constantine,
Nor was it entirely accurate, its most blatant mistakes being the existence
of two Gordians instead of three, and a fictitious battle at the Milvian
Bridge in AD 193 (which strongly advocates its placement after 312)1,
The influence of the KG upon the Latin epitomators seems to me proven;
but I am less convinced that it was known to the Historia Augusta. Barnes'
arguments are unconvincing, proving only that, contrary to his unsupported
assertion, the Histor'ia Augusta probably did know Jerome 2. Only his third
point, the independently corroborated extra information in the I-Li st aria
Augusta's account of Carus' Persian war, can be used to prove that it had an
independent source. Since "Victor, Eutropius, Festus, Jerome and the Histaria
Augusta describe Carus' expedition in closely similar wording, It should be
1, The best and most convincing summary of this argument can be found in Barnes, Sources of the
//istoria Augusta, Collections Latcius 155 (1978), 91ff,
2, Barnes states baldly that 'there is no sign that the Historia Augusta knows Jerome': Sources
of the HA, 91, However, Syme had already demonstrated that, while one could not prove the S/IA drew
extensively from Jerome, it was likely that it was familiar with his work: Aaiianus and the Historia
Augusta (1968), 80ff, With the single exception of S//A Aur, XXXV • 4, all references cited by Barnes in
his first two points merely strengthen the view that the S//A had read Jerome and the other Latin
epitomators, Barnes' statement that this reference 'may be accepted as authentic even in default of
explicit confirmation,' simply will not do, given the S/IA's proven track record,
—5-
M.C,Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Introduction
deduced" not "that the Historia Augusta has consulted the KG directly" 1 , but
that any information not common to all four epitomes (believed to have used
the KG) came from a completely different source, and that the Hist aria
Augusta used the epitomes as the basis for the account, onto which it
grafted the added information it had gleaned.
The other lost source, Ignotus, also relates to the Historia Augusta.
Syme and Barnes maintain that the early Vitae of the H/st aria Augusta
contain a core of sober and conscientious biography which must have been
drawn from a "good biographer" writing up to the death of Caracalla, whom
they have styled as 'Ignotus' 2. The main challenge to their hypothesis comes
from a school of thought which believes that Ignotus is rendered unnecessary
by the known biographer, Marius fvlaximus, and that it was he who was the
main source for the early Vitae3. The proponents of Ignotus have
demonstrated convincingly that this was not the case. Marius Maximus was a
secondary source grafted onto the early lives to liven them up, and any
assumption to the contrary requires "a large number of ad hoc hypotheses if
its inherent difficulties are to be surmounted" 4 , However, the argument in
favour of Ignotus and against Marius Maximus also requires a number of ad
hoc hypotheses and is in places both thin and contradictorys.
1, Barnes, Source5 o1 114 97,2, Syme, ,aaianus and the MQ, 92f &iperors and Biography (1971), 30ff; Barnes, op. cit,, 101ff,3, A, Birley, Septielus Severus (1971), 308ff: A, Cameron in IRS 61 (1971), 262ff: J
Schiumberger, Die Epitoie de Caesar/bus (1974), 124ff,4, Barnes, locc, cut,; Syme, 4aianus and the 114 90ff; Eaperors and Biography, 45ff & 112; Z,
Rubin in IRS 64 (1974), 233 summarises both arguments,5, Compare Syme, Eaperors and Biography, 46f to Barne5 lOif on Marius Maximus and the Macrinus,
The provision of dates by Ignotus is 'to be presumed accurate', except where they are manifestly wrong(ie, the birth of Severus: Syme, op. cit,, 42; Barnes, 19f), and the erratic nature of his genealogies
are automatically put down to abridgement, NB: Ignotus is never named as a source by the SHA, which
names Maximus 29 times, This discrepancy cannot just be ignored.
—6-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
Perhaps the most dangerous of these hypotheses is best expressed by
Barnes:
,,Given his observable inclinations, he (the Scriptor Historiae Q/gustde3 will probably have
transcribed a single source, or series of sources, to which he added as he pleased, often from
his own head, sometimes on a later revision, and sometimes from another source or from the
recollection of what he had read or heard, 1
This hypothesis, attributing a minimum number of sources to a 'bad'
ancient historian, seems to me simply illogical when applied to the Historia
Augusta. Both Byrne and Barnes have demonstrated that the author of the
Historia Augusta was erudite and highly literate, with a wide-ranging taste
and a classical education which included all the major Latin poets along with
Greek poetry and most of the main historical writers of the third and fourth
centuries. Despite paring the Historia Augusta's main sources down to six
major works in his conclusion, Barnes' entire study demonstrates that Its
author had knowledge of, and was probably drawing upon, a vast number of
other histories2. Therefore it seems to me Illogical to claim that while
Ignotus "could no doubt consult archives, documents, inscriptions. The habit
of erudite enquiry was nothing novel", the author of the Historia Augusta is
simply assumed to have relied on this one unkown and unheralded source --
especially since he names his secondary source, Marius Maximus 29 tirnes.
As Green said:
It is certainly neater for Ignotus to be the HA's main source and Maximus a quarry for addition5,
but perhaps too neat for a writer who in the Life of Hadrian can not merely duplicate but
1, Barnes, $ouces of HA, 18,
2, For the main sources of the SHA see below, p,14f.
3, Syme, Eiperors and Biography, 41 & 461 Barnes, lOU,—7-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
quadruplicate material, and who uses Victor both in his main narrative and for additions
thereto
I find it difficult to reconcile the the concept of a single main source
for the early Vitae of the Historia Augusta with the idea that for the
later Vitae, their author is assumed to have used at least six named sources
and can be argued to have knowledge of almost every known historian from
the third and fourth centuries AD (even writing in opposition to the
annalistic history of Ammianus Marcellinus) -- especially since he is so
obviously familiar with the poets of the early Principate. Would it not be
neater to discard the ad hoc hypothesis of Inotus in favour of a simpler
hypothesis which takes into account the Scriptor Historiae Augustae's obvious
erudition?
Millar observed that:
It was indeed the attempt at originality of form, as opposed to that of content, which was
characteristic of ancient historians; the essential thing was not the discovery of new facts 1 but
the retelling of known facts in a certain style,2
Is this not exactly what the Historia Augusta has achieved: the retelling
of known facts in the new form of 'historical romance'? Perhaps Ignotus was
the Scriptor Historiae Augustae himself; a "sober biographer" who discovered
that his dry and lifeless accounts were better received when the salacious
material of Marius Maximus was grafted on. After trying his hand at some
sensationalism of his own, he found he had a taste for it, getting "bolder
and better, ending with elegant parody of erudition and polite letters."
This, in essence, is Syme's view, with the postulate of Ignotus removed. In
1, Green, review of Barnes in JRS69 (1979), 227f,
2, Millar, Study of Cassius Di4 28,
3, Syme liperors and Biography, 76,—8-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
deference to the scholarship of both he and Barnes, Ignotus as a source for
the His toria Augusta cannot be discounted out of hand, but the evidence in
favour of him is not yet strong enough to eradicate all doubt.
Having examined the likelihood and influence of these lost histories, we
can now begin to look at the known sources for the period. The literary
authorities will be examined In chronological order, by century, and will be
followed by a discussion of other types of evidence.
THE THIRD CENTURY
Cassius DIO Coccelanus was a senator whose conservative and
uncontroversial attitudes gained him a series of important posts during the
reign of Severus Alexander. Born at Nicaea In Bithynia circa 163/4, he
received a classical education and entered the Senate in the final years of
Commodus. His history, in eighty books, composed between 197 and 219 (the
first ten years were spent making notes> covered the history of Rome from
its foundation up to AD 222, with a brief epilogue going up to AD 229, and
was written in his native Greek. He was in a position to witness events at
Rome from c.180 until 214 (when he spent the winter at Nicomedia) and from
216-218. His account is that of a politically aware man, circumspect enough
to curry favour with the power of the time 1 , and Is concerned mainly with
the actions of emperors. Detailed expositions of policies and wars are only
undertaken where he disagreed with them, and are often subject to hearsay
evidence (though he does seem to have made some effort at verification). As
such, he is a good indicator of the opinions of a conservative senator in the
I, He sent a pamphlet of prophetic dreams and portents predicting Severus' accession to the
emperor on his coming to power: i11ar, Study of Ca5sius Duo (1963), 16 & 24,
-9-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
early third century AD. The text of his history is preserved only in books
XXXVI-LXIV. Books LXXIII-LXXX, which narrate events after 180 survive only
in fragments and epitomes. Exerpts appear in the Exerpta of Constantinus
Porphyrogenitus and the epitomes of Xiphilinus and Zonaras, of which
Xiphilinus is the more literal but Zonaras seems the more reliabl&.
I-iERODIAN was a contemporary of Cassius Din, who wrote a history of his
own time, from the death of Marcus Aurelius to the accession of Gordian III
(AD 180-238), also in Greek. He specifically states that he had a personal
share in some of the events he portrays during his imperial and public
service, which has prompted some debate as to his position and status. He
was probably an equestrian civil servant of some indeterminate intermediate
grade. His place of origin is equally obscure, and "by an unsatisfactory
process of elimination" western Asia Minor presents Itself as the least
unlikely location. Despite his claim to have checked all his information, his
chronology is at times confused, and he contains some errors of geography
and fact. Nevertheless, certain parts of his text are demonstrably superior
to Dio2.
The lost biographies of MARIUS MAXIMUS are independently attested in
Ammianus MarcellInus and elsewher&'. A senator and general of Septimlus
Severus against Pescennius Niger, he achieved high office, gaining the
consulate for the second time in AD 223. He began writing after March 222,
and is believed to have written twelve biographies of the main emperors from
I, i11ar, Study or Cassius D14 passim; Barnes, Sources of //4 Blf; on the date of writing cf,
Bowersock in 6noion3l (1965), 471ff contra Millar,
2, Whittaker, Introduction to the Loeb edition of Herodian (1969); Barnes, op, cit,, 82ff,
3, Ammianus XIYIII . 4 . 14, The scholiast on Juvenal mentions him in IV53, and the SHA mentions
him 29 times,
—10-
M,C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Introduction
Nerva to Elagabalus. The contention that he was the main source for the
Historia Augusta up to Elagabalus has been disproven by Syme and Barnes, who
have shown that he was used in a secondary capacity, though it seems that
he was probably the main source for the HaZiogabalus'.
P. Herennius DEXIPPIJS was prominent in Athenian city politics during the
mid-third century. Probably an equestrian (he was styled xptwtoç by IG
112 3670), he held several posts, the most important of which was Eponymous
Archon. He wrote three works, of which the latter two, the Chronica and the
Scyt hi ca, were accounts of the history of his day. The Chronica was an
annalistic history as far as the reign of Claudlus (or possibly Aurelian),
while the Scythica was an account of the Gothic wars in which he himself had
played a minor part 2 . Sadly, both only survive in fragments and epitomes,
and "we have to proceed largely on a priori assumptions to determine which
fragments of Dexippus relating to this period come from which of his two
major worksltB. His work forms the basis of the epitome of Zosimus down to
270, when his continuator Eunaplus takes over. Eunapius praised him for his
analytical methods in the writing of his history4.
THE FOURTH CENTURY
Sextus Aurelius VICTOR, an African probably of equestrian birth, was the
first and most independent of the fourth century Latin epitomators. He
1, Syme, A,ii,ianus and the I/A 89ff; Eaperors and 8iography, 45ff & 113ff; Birley, SeptialusSeei'us,' the African taperer (1971), 309ff; Barnes, Sources of the HA, 99ff.
2, He led a small band of 2000 Athenians in a guerrilla war against the Heruli after they had
sacked Athens in AD 267, Dexippus frag,28 reproduces an address to these troops attributed to
himself: Millar, 'P, Herrenius Dexippus', IRS 59 (1969), 26ff1 speech translated on 27f,
3, Millar, op. cit, 1 23,
4, Eunapius frag,l; on Dexippus, Millar, op. cit, 1 12ff esp,2Off; PLREDexippas2,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
composed his Liber de Caesar-i bus some time between AD 358 and 360.
Dufraigne does not believe that he drew upon the KG, but can offer no
concrete refutation. A pagan and an admirer of Julian, his main
preoccupat ions were the decline of moral standards and the barbarisation of
the army, which obtrude strongly from his work. His villains were the
persecutors of the Senate (except Severus who was a fellow African), though
he does not hesitate to blame the Senate for its own downfall. Often
sloppy, he added to the mistakes of the KG, most obviously with the
attribution of the Constitutio Antoniniana to Marcus Aurelius1.
EUTROPIUS, a fellow pagan, served under lulian and attended his eastern
campaign. He dedicated his Breviariurn ab Urbe Condita to the emperor Valens
no later than 369 (deduced from the office held, given on the title page).
It is believed that he reproduces the text of the KG virtually unchanged2.
FESTUS OF Tridentum produced a Breviarium also dedicated to Valens.
Eadie believes that Eutropius was the only possible main source for the
entire Breviarium, which dates it to the late 360s; possibly as late as 372,
since Tomlin has shown that the ommission of Valentia from his provincial
list proves nothing about the dating, there being no allusion in the work to
events after the accession of' Valens in AD 364. Books XX-XXIV cover our
period, and probably used the KG among other unspecified sources3.
Two other epitomes deserve mention. Jerome's Chronicle is a translation
of the Chronicle of Eusebius, produced in 380/1. He has added to the church
history by excerpting passages from Victor and Eutropius. Barnes' arguments
1. Dufralgne, Aurelius 'ictor,' Livre des Csars (1975), Introduction, xvff,2, Watson, Justin, Cornelius Nepo5 end Eutropius (1897), Introduction, xivff Dessau in /Iree5 24
(1889), 361ff; Barnes, Sources of H 90ff esp,90 n2,
3, Eadie, The 8reviuriui of Festu5 (1967), 1ff, 70ff & 88ff; reviewed by Barnes in /RSS8 (1968),263ff; Tomlin, 'Date of the 'Barbarian Conspiracy'', Britanpia5 (1974), App,B, 308f,
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M,C.IbeJl: C3 Army. Introduction
concerning the KG and the Historia Augusta seem to me to show that the
Historia Augusta was drawing on Jerome, who had probably independently used
the KG 1 . Finally, the anonymous Epitome de Caesaribus is a series of
biographies from Augustus to Theodoslus, which draws heavily upon the Liber
of Victor for its early biographies, often simply transcribing him. Its later
sources are arguable, but probably included the KG and Marius Maxlmus among
others2.
Two lost histories are known from the century; one of them being the
lost books of Ammianus Marcellinus. These were written between 382 and 397,
continuing the annalistic history of Tacitus down to Aminianus' day in thirty
one books. Books I-XIII have perished, and Book XIV begins in AD 353, which
suggests that his treatment of the history before his time was cursory at
best. In the preface to Book XV, Ammianus states that he had related events
he himself had been able to witness or he that had ascertained by careful
questioning; the inference being that prior to Constantine, his knowledge
(and therefore his history) would have been sketchy. There is no hint of the
lost books' survival in any other sources.
The other lost history was by EUNAPIUS of Sardis. A pagan apologist, he
wrote a Vita Sophistorum in direct opposition to the popular Lives of the
Saints, which continued Dexippus from AD 270-404. Two versions of his
history were known. Barnes would like Eunapius to be a source for the
1, Barnes, SoQrces of /1 90, 94 & esp,96 point I, t'ita Aiexano'd IV . 5, XXlY3 & XXVI.9correspond almost directly with Jerome C/iro, p215i & p,215d in Helm's edition, but differ slightlyfrom the other epitomes, According to Barnes, the first clause of XXVI • 9 corresponds word for word
with Jerome,
2, Dufraigne, Livre des Césars, xvii; Barnes, op. cit,, 94,3, Syme, 4aajanus and the H,, chil, Sf f; Matthews, Roaan Lap/re of Aaiiarnis (1989), ch,II,
esp,27ff, he rejects the Tacitean connection,
4, Photios BIb!, 77,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
Historia Augusta, and so argues that the first of these works was completed
circa AD 380, and acted as a source not only for the Historia Augusta but
for Aznmianus. The latter case had been argued by earlier scholars 1 . The
argument is sound, and I can find no reason to doubt the hypothesis. One
need not even demolish the two references to events following AD 380, as
Barnes endeavours to do, since it is equally valid to maintain that Eunapius
added these to his second version. As the continuator of Dexippus, Eunapius
was used by Zosiinus to continue his history after 270,
THE HISTORIA AUGUSTA
It is now generally accepted that the professed date and authorship of
the Sc.ript ores Historlae Augustae (SHA) cannot be trusted. They were
probably all the work of one man s', writing during the late fourth century,
perhaps some time after 395. A series of sensationalist biographies
stretching from the emperor Hadrian to the emperor Car-us, their author has
been characterised as "a kind of rogue scholiast", both mischievous and
erudite, with an eclectic taste in literature and an audacious sense of
humour. A man of his time, he may have been writing in direct opposition to
the recent sober history of Anunianus, claiming to be a serious researcher
vindicating biography against history. As such, he delights in the parody of
other biographers, scourging them for their follies and fraudulence while
liberally inventing sources and creating bogus names which are at times
1, EA, Thompson in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (1970), 52; WR, Chalmers in CQNeW Series 10(1960), 156ff; A, Cameron in CQ13 (1963), 133,
2, Barnes, Sources of the H, 114ff; Matthews, Eipire of ,qasaianus, 504 n, 67,
3, The computer studies of Marriott, 'Authorship of the HA', IRS 69 (1979) are accepted as
conclusive, but see the cautionary note of Sansone, 'The Computer & the HA', .1R580 (1990),
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
little more than deliciously erudite puns 1 . Yet it would be wrong to discard
the SHA out of hand. Behind the historical romance, there lurks a core of
fact which can be extracted through rigorous examination, Barnes has
dissected the SHA for Just such a purpose, and while he himself admits that
he cannot always have been right, his work forms a good platform from which
to view the SHA2. Overall, a healthy scepticism should be maintained. The
SHA makes little effort to hide its mendacious nature, and faced with such
blatant falsehood, we are right in mistrusting Its information except where
independent corroboration can be achieved. Nevertheless, the list of sources
which can be attributed to it is impressive. It Is known to have used
Herodian, Menus Maximus, Dexippus, Victor and Eutropius. In addition,
influences have been detected from Eunapius and Jerome, and it was probably
familiar with the works of Dio and Ammianus Marcellinus, Two things should
be remembered. The first is that the SHA became bolder as time progressed:
the Vitae of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius are quite sober biographies, with no
more than two fictitious names between them, while the Vita Aur'eliani of
'Vopiscus' has been hailed as a masterpiece of historical fiction s. Secondly:
"Season and society at Rome fostered fraud and imposture as well as
erudition. Combining both, the author of the great hoax concords with his
own time."4 One should always bear in mind that, like most fourth century
1, eg, S//A 6ord, XXY • 6 perverts the name of Timisetheus into Misithel, 'God Hater', obviouslyJuxtaposing him with Philip the Arab, who murdered Gordian and was notoriously tolerant of the
Christians: Barnes, Sources of HA, 37,2, Barnes, op. cit,, ch4: 'The Factual Content of the Historia Augusta', 38ff3, Syme, AMM12QUS and the HA, 2f, 97ff & 192f; faperors end 8iography, 14, 36ff & 76 Barnes,
Sources of HA, 38ff, NB: even in the Aurelianus, Beneath much fluent fiction, there is a factualframework' which can be Independently corroborated: Barnes, op. cii,, 75,
4, Syme, Eøperors and Biography, 77,
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M.C.Ibeji; C3 Army. Introduction
writers, the Scriptor Historiae Augustae was prone to interpret things in
terms familiar to himself and to his audience, Where the relaxed attitude of
the SHA is concerned, such terms should be treated with the greatest of
caution1.
LATER HISTORIES
Among the most important of the post-fourth century historians is the
Greek epitomator ZOSIMUS. Photios, the bibliophile, tells us that Zosimus
was a comes and advocatus fisci, and was renowned for his militant
paganism2 . He wrote his Nea Historia in the late fifth or early sixth
century, using Eunapius as his source for events between 270 and 404. Since
Eunapius was the continuator of Dexippus, it is assumed that Dexippus was
the source for events prior to 270, and there does seem to be a marked
emphasis in Zosirnus' history of the mid third century on the Gothic wars in
which Dexippus had such a personal interest. Photios charges him with being
a slavish copyist, and there are several examples within his work of this
mindless approach leading to contradictions. This serves us well, for it
suggests that what Zosimus has chosen to record is close to his original
sources. Unfortunately, the carelessness of his compilation at times makes
it difficult to construct a clear chronology. His major themes are the
I, The most useful and informative bibliography of research on the SHA is to be found in Barnes,
Sources of // ch,3: 'Bibliographical Excursus', 23ff, My own view of the SHA has been defined byBarnes 1 op. cit,; and Syme, Qtwianus and /e HA (1968), and Eeperors and 9iograp/iy (1971), Ny
disagreements with them on sources have been outlined in the text above & p,Gff, Honor&, 'Scriptor//isforiae Augustee', IRS 77 (1987), 156ff argued that the SHA was a sort of Aesopian history, writingpolitical fables, Such a possibility fits easily with the mischievous nature of the SHA,
2, Phot, 8Th), 98,
3, Most markedly his critical opinion of Stilicho in Book V, when he is drawing on Eunapius,
contrasted with the mildly eulogistic approach of the same subject In V34 after he had switched to
Olympiodorus,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
decline of paganism and the barbarisation of the empire, both of which he
saw as contributing to the downfall of the western empire. The close
similarity of some of his passages to parts of the SHA is best explained by
the reliance of both on Dexippus. There is no indication that Zosimus was
using the SHA as a source1.
loannes ZONARAS produced an epitome of history from Creation to AD
1118, which drew upon Dio and Eusebius among others. Direct comparison
between his work and Dio shows that he was adept at condensing his material
whilst retaining the sense. The contents of his Book XII, covering events in
the mid third century, serve as a useful confirmation of other histories2.
Other later historians with information pertinent to our subject are:
Giorgius Syncellus, writing in the ninth century and drawing on Dexippus and
Eusebius; Giorgius Cedrenus (Kedrenos), writing in the late eleventh century;
loannes Malalas from the sixth century, who contains some useful information
about the east; and his contemporary Jordanes, whose Getica provides material
concerning the Gothic wars. Confirmation of related events can be found
from a host of minor historians, among them Orosius (C5), Petrus Patricius
(C6) and loannes Antiochus (C7).
OTHER DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL
At first glance, the Notitia Dignitatum and the Epitoma Rel Militaris of
Vegetius would seem a godsend to military students of the third century,
1, Ridley, Zosii,us,' New History, Byzantina Australiensia 2 (1982), Introduction; CAM XII (1939),711; Paschoud, Zosias,' Histoire Nouvelle (1971), Introduction; Barnes, Sources of HA, 111,
2, CAM XII, 712 & 722f; Millar, Cassius Oi 2f & App,1 on 195ff,3, CAMXII I 711ff,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
yet they should both be treated with the utmost caution if the mistakes of
the pioneers in the field are not to be repeated.
The NOTITIA DIGNITATUM Oranlurn tam Civiliurn quam Miii tai-ium is in
essence a fourth century army list, probably compiled just after the division
of AD 395'. It lists the administrative and military posts within the
empire, giving the titles of all units under each specified military command,
and has long been a standard point of reference for late Roman military
specialists. For our purposes, it suffers from several disadvantages. The
first and most obvious is that it is a late fourth or eary fifth century
document, coming after the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine. As such,
its value for third century research is severely limited. It is invaluable as
an indicator of the survival into the later Roman army of units
independently corroborated in the third century, but it can tell us nothing
about the origins of any units in its lists. This seemingly obvious caveat
has all too often been overlooked in the quest for the army of the third
century. Its second major disadvantage is that it is incomplete, and what we
have Is an agglomeration of entries from disparate and indeterminate dates.
It is also simply a bare list of unit names, which can tell us little about
their composition. It is a useful corroborative tool, allowing us to project
what we know about the third century army into the later Roman empire, and
to see how It developed; but it cannot be used as a starting point in the
1, A comparison of 5hield devices for the two western Praesental armies shows that their division
had occurred recently enough for an almost exact correlation between them to remain, This split fits
neatly with the division of the army for Theodosius' campaign against Eugenius in 394: Matthews, pers,
coim, cf, also van Berchem, 4r,e de Dioc/fien,,, (1952), 7 and Jones, LRE III (1964), App2,
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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
search for the army one-and-a-half centuries in its past1.
The Epitorna Rel Militaris of VEGETILJS is a military manual produced some
time after AID 383. It has extremely limited value, and is notable only for
its representation of an antiqua legio which has only come into serious
question in recent decade&2.
EPIGRAPHY
Given the second-hand nature of most of our literary information, the
evidence of inscriptions has taken on paramount importance in this study. A
thorough review of CIL, ILS, AE and IGRR has been supplemented with the
more parochial collections of RIB, IGBR and other local corpora. In all
cases, reference has been made to the major collections in preference, so
that the material presented In this study is easily accessible to everyone.
Only when important evidence would otherwise be missed has recourse been
made to the local archives.
The material gathered is most useful when examining military careers,
terminology or unit deployment; but even here its information is limited.
For example, when talking about vexillations, it can be used to chart their
developing importance throughout the century; but it can shed little light
upon the vexed question of numbers, nor can it give any but a general
indication of the age of the units concerned. The presence of a unit on a
datable inscription gives a usable terminus post quem, but this is no
I, Van Berchem, Ariie de Dioclëtien,,,, 7ff, 94ff & 117; Seeck, Notitia Dignitatuas (1962),Praefatio; Jones, LRE III, App 2; ed, Goodburn & Bartholemew, Aspects of the Notitia Oignitafua. BARS15 (1976),
2, cf, Appi: 'The Antique Leg/oaf Vegetius',
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
more than a date of first appearance. Simply because, for instance, a
vexillat ion appears in Aquileia under Philip the Arab, we cannot say with any
certainty that it was placed there by that emperor. The presence of
different vexillations in the area prior to Philip might indicate that, at
some time between their attestation and the attestation of the units under
Philip, they were replaced; however, it might equally be true that the units
existed side-by-side with one another, and that one is simply not mentioned
on the other's inscription. The greater probability is that the units
changed, given the known penchant of the Roman military for naming all units
present in the area on such dedications. This probability increases when we
have separate instances of multiple units named on inscriptions, and the
names of these units change. Therefore, we can say with some degree of
certainty that units A and B were in Aqulleia under, say, the Seven, and
were probably replaced by the time of Philip by units C and D. However, if
the inscription is fragmentary (as, in fact, all vexillary inscriptions from
Aquileia are), we can never be sure that the names of units A and B have not
simply been lost, though the odds are against this.
The above discussion highlights two of the main problems with third
century inscriptions. Most are fragmentary and at times difficult to
interpret, and this exacerbates the already awkward problem of dating. For
the early Principate, a whole series of useful markers have been established
to aid the dating of inscriptions, especially tombstones. The development of
formulas such as IOM, DM and HSE on early imperial tombstones has been
charted and enables one to say with a certain degree of accuracy into what
era a stone can be fitted'. No such complementary conventions developed
1, On such criteria cf, Holder 1 Studies in the Auxilia of the Roaan Arsiy, BAR S70 (1980), 16Sf,—20-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
during the third century, other than the placing of the imperial gentilicium
in the genitive after the name of a military unit, While this can be a very
useful aid to dating, often placing an inscription within the limited span of
a third-century emperor's short reign, it has its limitations. Units were
sometimes tardy at changing the gentillc.ium, and in the case of the
gentilicium 'Antoniniana', It could date anytime from AD 198, when Caracalla
became co-emperor with Septimius Severus, to AD 222, the death of Elagabalus
who may also have used the name. It does not help either that several
emperors suffered the damnatio memoriae during our period, so that we
sometimes find the name of an emperor erased from an inscription, and have
more than one option when trying to restore it.
Attempts to date Inscriptions on stylistic grounds have been accepted
within this study only as a last resort, and with severe reservations. The
characteristics of stonecutting which are used for such dating, in particular
the degenerate, ligature-strewn style which is often associated with third
century inscriptions, are not of themselves a strong enough basis upon which
to date most stones. Bad workmanship can be as much a function of regional
variation as It can of the era in which the stone was produced. While It is
true that the quality of stoneworking seems to have degenerated during the
century, sloppy inscriptions are not unique to the period by any means.
Such problems have combined with a decline in the number of inscriptions
extant for the century to make statistical surveys almost impossible.
Discussion of the protect ores under Gallienus, for instance, Is based on less
than 10 InscrIptions. The exact number cannot even be firmly set because
doubts concerning two of the inscriptions still remain 1 . Though this is the
1, Cf. C h, XI Pro tec tores,
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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Introduction
most severe example, the problem is universal. In no area of discussion
within these pages is the body of epigraphic material large enough to be
seen as a statistical sample, Yet, for the study of the legions, the Auxilia,
vexillations and equestrian officers, the epigraphic corpus Is the best and
at times the only body of evidence which we have. Even for the cavalry and
the limit anei it provides a valuable source of information divorced from the
fourth century perspective of the literary sources1.
PAPYRI
Where available, papyri can form an invaluable adjunct to information
gleaned from inscriptions and histories. Their occurrence is so rare and
usually so parochial that the information they provide can tell us little
about general trends (except in localised terms), but it is their very detail
that is most valuable. Virtually all our information about unit pay and
numbers comes from papyri. Usually this information occurs in Isolation with
single chance finds, but we are extremely fortunate in having a large archive
of military records from the fortress town of Dura Europos on the eastern
frontier, which came to prominence under Septimius Severus and was destroyed
in AD 256. This archive gives us a unique insight into the composition and
activities of its main garrison unit, the cohors XX Palmyrenorum. Another
important find was a series of correspondence from the military commander of
1, The decline in epitaphs during the century may be as5ociated with the decline in the value of
citizenship according to Meyer, 'Explaining the Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire: the Evidence of
Epitaphs', IRS 80 (1990), though this will not explain the falling numbers of imperial dedications or
career inscriptions (especially considering the rising status of the equestrians), Cf. also MacMullen
in .PhIj 103 (1982), 233ff and Mann in IRS 75 (1985), 204ff,
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M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Introduction
Panopolis in the Thebaid (Egypt), dating to the reign of Diocletian, which
tells us how units in the province stood immediately after our period1.
LEGAL CODES
The rescripts of third century emperors and their jurists (mainly dating
from the Seven), preserved in the codex of Justlnlan, give us some direct
access to the thought processes of imperial policy makers. They can tell us
something about status and privilege, but are provided in a slightly
abbreviated form which sometimes makes them difficult to interpret. Nor is
it entirely clear to what extent the constant repetitition of a law was a
testimony to its waning efficacy. The Codex Theodosianus is less useful,
providing laws from 312 to 437 of which the first fifty years are
incomplete. Reading these back into the third century can cause confusion2
The great champion of numismatics was Andreas Alfdldi. Imperial coinage
was in his view a consistent tool of imperial propaganda and as such
provided a direct insight into imperial policy, and even the movements of
imperial troops. Such views can be taken too far. Numismatics has a
limited value, defined by a whole set of variables. The simultaneous minting
I, Diira Final Report V'l: The Parchments and Papyri (1959); Skeat, Papyri froi Panopol/s (1964);cf, also Fink, Rwan Military Records on PapyrUs (1971) Grenfell & Hunt, Greek Papyri II (1897);Duncan-Jones, Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army', Chiron8 (1978), 541ff,
2, Most especially with reference to 1in.itanei, cf, ch,VIII: Liiitanei for more deiail,3, Alföldi in ZIN37 (1927), 158ff; Nuti, Chron,, ser,5 vol,9 (1929), 218ff; C4H XII, 713ff, cf,
also surnary of Maria Alfôldi (1957) in Cooper, C3 Origins of the Ne' .tiperial 4raty (1967), 234ff &266ff,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
of different coin issues in separate mints does not prove any link between
the two, and the imperial propaganda stamped onto their reverses does not
necessarily depict the true state of affairs. Gallienus, for instance, was
minting coinage that styled him Restitutor Gal.Uarurn even as the Gallic
Empire slipped from his grasp 1 . Coin evidence is exceptionally useful in
telling us what individual emperors and usurpers deemed as important to
them, but it can only be used to tell us of the cornpostlon of armies and the
status of the empire in the most general of terms.
ARCHAEOLOGY AND ARTISTIC REPRESENTATION
Archaeology and art are of very limited use in a study such as this
which is concerned primarily with the organisation of the army and imperial
motivation. Work such as that of Strickland at Chester can give some
indication of the detailed effect of certain trends or imperial reforms that
occurred within the century, while more general surveys of archaeological
work can provide useful information, such as the detailed changes in Roman
military equipment, or an empirewide overview of fortification trends. Like
papyri, most archaeological evidence is extremely parochial in nature2.
The artistic record is only really useful when talking about Roman
military equipment. It is dominated by the monumental art of the columns of
Trajan and Marcus Aurelius, and the triumphal arches of Sept imius Severus,
Constantine and Galerius; but often more useful information can be gleaned
1, Orinkwaier, The 6allic Eapirej 1/istoria 52 (1987), 157,
2, Strickland, 'Third Century Chester', BAR S109, 415ff; Coulsion, 'Roman Military Equipment on
Third Century Tombstones', BAR S336, 143f & nil concentrates on the archaeological record von
Petrikovits, 'Fortifications in the North-Western Roman Empire', JRS61 (1971), 180ff,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction
from depictions on tombstones and elsewhere. Of specific usefulness is the
graffito of' a Persian clibanar'ius from Dura Europos, and some of the
illustrations in the Notitia Dignitatum depict late Roman equipment1.
This has been a brief overview of the main sources of evidence for the
Roman army in the period under discussion, examining their usefulness and
limitations. Certain pieces of evidence, such as the testimony of Galeri on
the plague of Marcus Aurelius, or the Res Gestae Dlvi Saporis, have been left
out of the equation as pertaining only to very specific circumstances (such
as a discussion of the plague, or the capture of Valerian).
Our examination of the trends begins with a narrative history, which
outlines the paramaters of' the period under discussion and seeks to place
the major trends and events within their chronological framework.
1, Couleton, op. cit. (above),—25-
PART 1:
Th TrrkcI
M.C,Ibeji, C3 Army
I: STORIA
On 28 March AD 193, the emperor P. Helvius Pertinax was murdered by the
Praetorian Guard, who immediately put the empire up for auction, The
highest bidder was one M. Didius Julianus, an elderly senator whose ambition
was only exceeded by his wealth. His price was 25,000 sesterces to each
member of the Guard, Julianus was not a popular emperor. Within a month,
both the governors of Syria and Pannonia Superior had been proclaimed in
opposition by their legions 1 and the latter, L. Septimius Severus, was
marching on Rome.
The city mob stood by and watched as Julianus desperately barricaded
himself in the palace, not even commanding the power to arrange the city's
defence, and was finally condemned to death by the Senate and executed. A
deputation of 100 senators met Severus in his camp at Interamna, 50 miles
north of Rome, of ferring him the purple, which he graciously accepted. He
*, To avoid endless repetition, the main secondary works referred to for this history are cited
here: Aitheim, Die $ojdatenkaiser (1939); van Berchem, L'Ar,áe de Dioc.látien,, (1952), pt,I;Besnier, L'Eapire Roiain de l'avennet#ent des &vères au Candle o'e Nftée (1937), 169ff; Birley, A, R,,Marcus Aurelius (1966), The African Fiperor,' Septiiius Severus (1988); The Ceabridge Ancient History(hereafter CAM), vol,XI (1936) & vol. XII (1939), esp, Alfãldi, Enssljn, Mattingly & Miller in CA/I X11
Dc Blois, The Policy of the Eperor Gaiiienus (1976), ch,1 & 2; Dc Regibus, La Monarchic Militare diGallieno (1939); Demougeot, La foreation de l'Europe (1969); Drinkwater, The eallic Eipie, Historic52 (1987); Grosse, Roat/sche Militärgeschichte von 6aliienus bis zuat Beginn der 8yzantinischenTheaverfassung (1920); Jones, A,H,M,, The Later Roatan Lipire (1964) (hereafter LRE), 'The Anarchy' &Decline of the Ancient florId (1966), ch,2; Jones & Martindale, Prosopography of the Later Roatan (aspire(1971) (hereafter PLRE); Luttwak, The 6rand Strategy of the Roasan Eapire (1976), ch,3; MacMullen,Enea'ies of the Roatan Order (1966); Manni, L'Iepero di Gallieno (1949); Mocsy, Pannonia and (/ppeHoesia (197fl, 184ff; Platnauer, The Life and Reign of the Emperor Lucius Septimius Severus (1918);Syme, Emperors and 6'iogaphy (1971), ch,9-15; Williams, Olocletian and the Roman Recovery (1985), ch,1,2 & 7,
All primary sources discussed in the introduction have also been used, Further reference to
•inor works both primary and secondary, will be found in the relevant sections of the main thesis,
Cross reference has only been made here to the most controversial subjects,
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M.C,Ibeji: 03 Army. Historia
entered Rome at the head of his Danube legions, making a point of changing
from military regalia Into civilian dress at the gates of the city, and set
about the consolidation of his position. The Praetorians, who had been the
fickle arbiters of the empire's fate, were disbanded and punished, with
selected veterans from the loyal Danube legions taking their place. So began
the reign which officially heralds the start of the third century; but the
roots of that century's troubled history lie some thirty years before, with
the reign of Marcus Aurelius.
What follows Is a general history of the major events in the third
century which pertain In some way to the development of the Roman army. In
essence it is a bare bones account. No effort at analysis has been made,
for it is simply intended to provide a chronological background against which
the discussion that follows can be set, avoiding continual historical asides.
Marcus Aurelius was a conscientious ruler. A stoic, a philosopher, and
peaceful man, he inherited an empire on the brink of crisis. After years of
peace, the empire's complacency was about to be shattered by a wave of
disasters which would send it staggering into the third century poorly
prepared for the troubles that lay ahead, Within a year of his accession,
the Parthians had invaded Armenia, there were disturbances on the Antonine
Wall and in Germany, and the Marcomanni had begun stirring on the borders of
the Upper Danube.
Remaining In Rome, presumably to oversee events in the west, Marcus
despatched his co-emperor, Julius Verus, east to deal with the Parthian
threat, Despite his lack of experience, Verus was able to push the Parthians
out of Armenia and pursue them to the gates of their capital, Ctesiphon, but
in the ensuling seige his army contracted a plague which forced him to
withdraw, bringing the pestilence back into the empire, where it was to rage
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sporadically for the next 15 years, almost certainly weakening the empir&.
In the wake of this disaster came the uprising of the Marcomanni which
had been looming since the start of the reign. Prompted by population
pressures from within and exacerbated by the southward movement of the
northern barbarian tribes, the Marcomannic movement took advantage of the
recent weakening of the frontiers and poured over the Danube 2 , penetrating
as far as Italy, and prompting the recruitment of two new legions, II and III
Italica, as well as the conscription of slaves and gladiators into the
province's defence, The ensuing wars dragged on for 13 years (AD 167-180),
and were fought by Rome largely with legionary detachments (vexillations)
commanded by equestrian officers3.
Marcus died in 180 -- just before the final push intended to settle the
Marcomannic question once and for all. His work was abandoned by his son,
Commodus, whose reign witnessed another plagued. His successor, Pertinax,
ruled for 87 days before his murder by the Praetorian Guard and the events
which ushered in the reign of Septimius Severus.
After a series of wars in which he eradicated his opposition and
bloodied the nose of Parthia, which had laid seige to Nisibis in 196, Severus
set about reorganising the empire to meet the challenges that faced it. In
the east, he created the new province of Mesopotamia, placing it into the
charge of equestrian officers instead of senators, and garrisoned it with two
1, On the severity of the plague, cf, chil: Manpower, p,47ff, and Duncan-Jones, Structwre and
caie in the R,ien Econoiy (1990), 72ff; contra Gilliam, 'The Plague Under Marcus urelius', 14/Phil 73
(1961), 227ff Roiian Any Papers (1986) 229ff who doubts its severity,2, On the causes of the Marcoannic wars, cf, Mócsy, op. cii, (p26 n,1),
3 cf, chh,VI & X: Yex/Ilationes & Yi p! Militares for further discussion,4, Dio LXXIII . 14 . 3-4 (Loeb ed),
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of his newly raised Farthian legions 1 . The third, II Part hi ca, he brought
back to Italy, and placed in Albanum, just outside Rome, where it
complemented the newly revamped and increased Praetorian Guard 2. He
increased the garrison of Africa, possibly in response to trouble from the
native tribes, and revitalised the Auxilia with ethnic units mainly drawn
from Moorish and Osrhöenian contingents. In order to make army service more
attractive, he granted several new privileges to soldiers, among them the
right to marry and to wear the gold ring. He also began to split the
larger provinces, ensuring that no governor had more than 2 legions under
his command, in an attempt to prevent the events of 193-199 recurring;
though this was done in a haphazard fashion and was probably not completed
until the reign of Caracalla (see below).
After 199, his reign was relatively peaceful. There was some trouble in
Africa and possibly Egypt, and he had to deal with the depredations of a
brigand named Bulla Felix in 206/7, but his final campaign in Scotland may
have had as much to do with keeping his bickering sons occupied as it did
with any serious troubled . He died in York in 211, adjuring his sons not to
disagree among themselves, give money to the soldiers, and despise everyone
else.
The animosity between the siblings made the first injunction impossible
to uphold. Caracalla murdered his brother Geta at the feet of their mother
1, Cf. chh,IV & I: Legiones & 'iri Mu/fares for the Parthian legions and the role of theequestrians.
2, On II Part/iica ci, ch,IV: Lepione5, p,85ff; on the Praetorians cf, Durry 1 Co/ortesPrâtorienne5 (1938), 81ff.
3, In addition to various works cited above (p26 n,1), see Birley, 'Septimius Severus and the
Roman Army', Ep, Stud, 8 (1969), 63ff,4, Her, 111 . 14 . 1; Murphy 1 The Reipn of $'everus froø the E yidence of Inscriptions (1945), 77;
Miller, CAI/XII, 38f; Saiway, Poean Britain (1981), 223 & 227,
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in 212; but he religiously followed the rest of his father's advice.
Donatives and pay increase8 were given to the soldiers, and he surrounded
himself with a German bodyguard called the Leones. It was probably he and
not Severus who oversaw the partition of Britain and Pannonia', while the
most important act of his reign was the institution of the Constitutlo
Antonin.Lna, which granted the citizenship to almost all members of the
empire and which was to have unforseen long-term effects upon the army2.
Apart from a short German war, the first Roman contact with the new
Alemannic confederation, Caracalla's main military concern was an abortive
invasion of Parthia. After several false starts, he was murdered on the
march towards the Euphrates, and for want of a better candidate, the purple
was conferred by the army onto his Praetorian Prefect, Macrinus. The reign
of this, the first equestrian emperor, was as ignominious as it was short.
Apart from experimenting with the armour of his Praetorians3 , he did nothing
of note. He suffered a reverse against the Parthians near Nisibis, and when
a young scion of the Severan dynasty, the priest-king Elagabalus, was raised
in opposition by the women of the Severan household, he was defeated,
captured arid executed. Elagabalus reigned for 4 short years (218-222)
before he too was maneovred out of the purple by the Severan matriarchs who
had tired of his excesses, transferring their favour onto his cousin, Severus
Alexander. The relative peace during the reigns of these last two
1, Graham, 'The Division of Britain', /R556 (1966), 92ff; Miller, CAHIll, 48; Murphy, SeverusIrca Inscriptions, 43f; Môcsy, Pannonia Ipper Iloesia, 198f; Fitz, Great Age of Pannonia (1982),50ff; cf, ch,V: Auxilia, 21f,
2, Salmon, 'The Roman Army and the Disintegration of the Roman Empire', Trans. R, 5cc, Can, 52,ser,3 sec,2 (1958), 56fl watson, The Ropian Soldier (1969), 137,
3, Dio LXXIX'37 . 4, This is indicative of the changing style of Roman armour, first seen in AD
211: Coulston, 'Roman Military Equipment on Third Century Tombstones', BAR 3336 (1987), 141ff esp,143;Robinson, Ar,our of Iriperial Poaie (1975), 183, NB Maximinus still seems to be using the old Romanorder of battle in 238, Her, VIIl•12-3,
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representatives of the Severan dynasty was the calm before a storm of
mounting crises.
Forces in the east had been massing against the empire since the start
of the third century, exacerbated in part by the actions of the Roman
emperors themselves. The waning prestige of the Parthian Arsacid régime had
not been helped by its reverses against Verus and Septimius Severus, and the
activities of the Seven and Macrinus had served to distract the Parthian
emperor's attention from vital events occurring within his southern
provinces. The new Sassanid dynasty of the kingdom of Persis in southern
Iran had been consolidating Its power base to such an extent that in the
years between 224- and 227, the Sassanid Ardashir I was able to defeat the
Parthian emperor Artabanus V and replace the Arsacid with the Sassanid
empire. This was much more dangerous than the complacent Parthian empire
had been. Centred around the state religion of Zoroastrianism, the Sassanid
state was vigorous and expansionist, dedicated to regaining the lands of
Syria and Asia Minor which it regarded as Persia's by right, since the great
days of the Achaemenid hegemony. This aim was to be pursued with single-
minded purpose from AD 232 onwards, interrupted only by internal struggles
and events on the eastern frontiers of Persia.
Meanwhile, the northern barbarian tribes had rearranged themselves into
large confederations of Marcomanni, Alemanni and Franks, seemingly intended
to coordinate attacks against the Roman empire 1 . This was prompted in part
by pressures from the northern steppes, as Gothic tribes, themselves pushed
1, PrestIge accrued through contact with the eapire may have had something to do with the
confederating process also, as tribal groups gathered around particularly influential leaders,
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west by a realignment of the Hunnic Hsiung-Nu and Sien-Pi in Mongolia,
penetrated to the Roman frontiers, pushing Vandals, Cerpi and luthungi before
them. The late Antonines had encountered the first of these realignments in
the Marcomanni. Now groups of Goths, Carpi and Vandals flooded over the
Danube looking for loot and land, prompting the reinforcement of Illyricuin
from other frontiers, which in turn were penetrated by opportunistic raids of
Franks and Alemanni. The whole Rhine and Danube limes became a series of
unpiuggable salients over which barbarians would pour the minute their
defences were relaxed,
Severus Alexander was murdered by his troops in the wake of an
unsuccessful Persian war for trying to negotiate with the Alemanni. His
death and its aftermath exemplified the forces which were to dominate the
empire's fate for most of the century. His successor, Maximinus Thrax, was a
soldier proclaimed by the troops, and was frustrated In his attempts to curb
the barbarian invasions by the advent of civil war. From 235 onwards, the
leaders of the empire were to spend most of their time on campaign, either
against barbarians, Persians, or their own subjects. Until Gallienus came on
the scene, they were to have no time in which to reform the defences of the
empire, and many of their successes would be rendered null and void by the
actions of their Immediate successors,
Maximinus Thrax (235-238) was forced to cut short a successful Danube
campaign to fight the Senate in Italy. Their ultimate candidate, Gordian III
(238-244) was a minor dominated by his Praetorian Prefect, Timesitheus,
whose successes against the Persians were thrown away by his successor,
Philip the Arab, who abandoned all Rome's gains in the east to rush west and
secure his claim to the purple. Philip (244-249) saw the millennium of Rome
ushered in by a domino sequence of barbarian invasions, usurpations and
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mutinies all along the Danube. When his agent, Decius, succeeded In
restoring order, he had the purple forced upon him by the mutinous troops he
had been sent to discipline and Philip proved unable to stand against him.
Decius (249-251) was outmaneovred and killed by a dangerous new
confederation of the Gothic tribes, led by the charismatic Kniva. His
successor, Trebonlanus Gallus (25 1-253), was in no position to stop the
Goths returning home loaded with booty. During his reign, plague hit the
empire once again, and was to recur at regular intervals over the next 25
years killing one emperor and forestalling at least one campaign. In 253,
the usurpation of ft Aemilius Aemilianus was swiftly followed by the
usurpation of P. Llcinius Valerianus, and in the civil war that followed,
Valerian came out alive.
He inherited chaos. The abandonment of the Rhine and Danube In pursuit
of civil war had left the floodgates open for Franks, Marcomanni, Quadi,
lazyges and Goths, which poured into Germany and Illyricum. In the east,
Armenia, which had been abandoned to Persian attack since Philip's volte face,
hcid finally caved In, allowing Shapor to launch a prolonged offensive against
Rome's possessions, spearheaded by his son, Hormizd. Dura-Europos on the
Euphrates was destroyed, and the Persians punched through into Syria, taking
Antioch by treachery. The chronology Is so confused that it is unclear
whether there were two separate Invasions, with Antloch sacked twice, or
whether this was one long war lasting from 253 to c.264. The only firm
anchor-point seems to be the sack of Dura, which is generally fixed at AD
2562.
1, Vict, Caes, XXX . 2, On the plague and other disasters at this time cf, ch,II: Manpower, p,50f,2, Gilliam, 'Garrison of Dura', Dura Final Report V . 1, 27; De Blois, Policy of 6allieruis, 2 &
nn,5 & 6,
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Va].erian is believed to have been in the east from 256 at the latest,
but had done nothing, egonised by indecision caused by an inability to trust
any of his generals. Persian activity forced him into action, which may
have been partially successful, but his army was wracked by plague and he
was In no position to fight. Seeking a peaceful solution, he was lured into
a meeting with Shapor and taken prisoner in AD 259. An emperor had fallen
into Persian hands.
He had left the defence of the west under the supervision of his son,
Gallienus, who proved to be an able and innovative ruler. I-fe had partially
solved his father's problem concerning trustworthy generals by promoting
equestrian officers to the fore under imperial patronage. These vfrl
militares were career soldiers and capable commanders able to command armies
in their own right, with a debt of loyalty to their patron arid (for the
moment) without the prestige to get themselves independently proclaimed by
their troops. With their help, and using a series of strategic innovations
designed around the concept of defence-in-depth, Gallienus was able to
achieve some measure of stability in the west1.
This stability was shattered in 259 with the news of Valerian's capture.
Gallienus had been distancing himself from his father since 257, now he
broke completely with his memory, but the empire-wide reaction against the
disaster-tainted régime was violent and hostile. In the east, the commanders
of Valerian's army united with Odaenathus, king of Palmyra, to rally against
the Persians, before usurping and marching into Pannonia where they were
defeated by Gallienus' most trusted general, Aureolus. Odaenathus remained
1, The measures of Gallienus and their significance have proven to be the main topic of this
study, See especially chh III, VI, X & XI: Conira Coiitatirn, 'exiIJationes, V/ri MilUares JPro fec fores,
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in the east, ostensibly loyal to Gallierius, but now the de facto ruler of the
eastern Roman empire. Even before the coming of the Macriani from the east,
the Pannonians had expressed their resentment against what they perceived to
be the neglect of the Danube frontier in favour of the Rhine by raising two
pretenders of their own, Ingenuus and Regalianus, also put down by Aureolus.
Ironically, a similar resentment welled up in the Rhine provinces when
Gallienus was forced to move his army into Italy to deal with a dangerous
Alemannic invasion that overran the Agri Decumates and penetrated as far as
Milan. Sparked by a dispute, the causes of which are not entirely clear,
Postumus, the commander of the Rhine legions, rebelled, beseiging Gallienus'
son Saloninus in Cologne and killing him. It was a blow Gallienus was not to
forgive. The situation in Africa also seems to have become quite serious at
this point 1 . When the smoke cleared, Gallienus found himself in charge of a
sundered empire. Gaul, Spain, Britain and Germany were in the hands of the
Gallic Empire of Postumus, and the east was under the 'protection' of
Odaenathus. Only the Danube provinces, Achaea and Africa remained in
legitimate imperial hands, along with Italy. These were in a state of
turmoil.
By 263, Gallienus had stabilised the situation enough to attempt a
reckoning with Postumus. Penetrating deep into the Gallic Empire, he
defeated him on the field of battle, but the Gallic Emperor was allowed to
escape by Aureolus, It seems that only Gallienus was not convinced of his
general's guilt. Postumus was bottled up in an unspecified Gallic city, and
it seemed only a matter of time before he would be forced to surrender.
However, Fortuna was on his side. Gallienus was struck by a chance arrow,
1, cf, chX: Viri Miiitares1 p226 for discussion & references,
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and forced to withdraw, seriously wounded. He would never regain the
opportunity to force the Gallic Empire back into the fold. Postumus was to
remain independent, faced by his own fair share of barbarian incursions and
employing remarkably similar concepts to Gallienus 1 , until killed by his
troops in 269. He was followed by a short-lived series of successors, the
last of whom, Tetricus, quite literally handed the Gallic Empire back to Rome
under Aurelian.
Gallienus seems to have been militarily quiescent in the years between
263 and 2672 . As well as recuperating from his wound, he had a host of
reforms to put in operation. It must be at this time that the
equestrianisation of the provinces was put into motion s, and in the military
sphere he strengthened the garrisons of Italy, Pannonia and Achaea, largely
at the expense of Dacia, while fortifying whichever parts of the empire
seemed to need it. Many of his measures were continued by his successors4.
In AD 267, Odaenathus of Palrnyra was murdered with the connivance of
the local Roman officials. Gallienus seemed to have been about to launch a
bid to regain control of the east, when he was forestalled by an invasion of
the Goths which swept over the Black Sea and ravaged the provinces of Asia
Minor and Achaea. Gallienus marched to meet them, defeating them at Nassus
in Moesia, but was prevented from following this up by the fateful news that
Aureolus, left in command of the cavalry at Milan to guard against the Gallic
1, Drinkwater, 'Gallic Empire', 89 cites some dubious literary evidence for Postumus' use of
barbarian mercenaries, His concept of fortification closely matches that of Gallienus, cf, chhIX &
XII: Poederati & Virfus Ilipici, plus Map 3,2, Though continued skirmishes may have occurred on the borders of the Gallic Empire: De Blois,
Policy of 6aJ)ienus, 7 & n21,3, cf, ch,X: V/ri Militare5, p220f,4, cf, chIll: Virtus Ilipid,
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Empire, had rebelled and declared in favour of Postumus. Once again a
crucial campaign had been stalled by treachery. Leaving command of the
Gothic war in the capable hands of his general Marcianus, Gallienus rushed
west to deal with the revolt, but was murdered in AD 268 by a cabal of his
officers as they laid seige to Milan. An excellent judge of ability,
Gallierius had proved a terrible judge of character. The man he had trusted
to defend Gaul for him had rebelled and killed his son. The man he had
trusted to guard Italy against this man's depredations had instead gone over
to his side. Now, the men he had raised from nothing to command his armies
turned against him, perhaps tired of his mistakes, perhaps feeling that now
their time had come.
The Illyrian soldier-generals of Gallienus shared a sense of comradeship
and purpose which was to serve them well. Even Aureolus surrendered to the
mercy of his peers once Gallienus was dead. Whether his execution was a
just and angry punishment for his disloyalty, or whether it was a salve to
pacify the angry troops remains unclear. Despite his successful continuation
of the Gothic war, Marcianus did not rebel either. Perhaps the troops did
not force the purple upon him, as they had done so many other emperors,
because there was an obvious soldiers' choice among the generals of
Gallienus. The candidate of the cabal, Claudius Gothicus, certainly proved
his worth against the Goths in the next two years, but was sadly cut down
by the plague in AD 270.
The soldiers' choice for his successor was his compatriot, Aurelian, who
ousted Claudius' brother, Quintillus, to carry on the line of Gallienus'
generals, employing the techniques they had developed with their mentor.
During his rule, Dacia was finally abandoned and two new provinces, Dacia
Ripensis and Dacia Mediterranea, were carved out of Moesia and Thrace. With
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this move, he was able to pacify the Balkans and Pannonia, rationalising the
frontier and preparing the ground for the reconquest of Palmyra.
Pairnyra had openly split with Rome after the death of Odaenathus. His
son, Vaballathus Athaeriodorus, was little more than the pawn of his mother
Zenobia, who had extended direct Palmyrene control throughout much of Asia
Minor, and southwards into Egypt, That the Palmyrenes were setting
themselves up as an alternative Roman empire seems in little doubt.
Vaballathus adopted Roman forms and Roman manners, maintaining a hostile
posture towards Persia and even striking coins in his name, They seem to
have enjoyed extensive support in Syria and Egypt, though the troops of
Mesopotamia joined Aurellan against them.
Aurelian marched east in 272, defeating the Palmyrene army in two
pitched battles at Irnmae and Emesa. Palmyra surrendered after a short seige
and was placed under the control of the praefectus Ivlesopotamiae, Marcellinus,
with the title rector Orientis. The city was initially treated with leniency,
but when it attempted to subvert Marcellinus, without success, Aurelian
returned at his call and sacked the city with a vengeance, destroying its
walls and carrying off its populace into slavery.
In 273, after suppressing a revolt in Egypt, Aurelian marched Into Gaul.
There, Tetricus surrendered the Gallic Empire to him without a fight, though
some token resistance was put up by Tetricus' betrayed generals. By 274,
Aurelian was able to style himself restitutor orbis, and lead the captive
heads of both breakaway empires through the city of Rome in triumph. His
attention immediately turned eastwards, where It seems he intended to deal
with the Persian menace, but he was assassinated before he could do so. A
group of officers, tricked into believing themselves on an imperial hit-list
by Aurelian's scribe (himself fearful for his life after some misdemeanour)
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took preemptive action. It is a measure of the soldiers' firm belief in the
wrongness of his murder that they reacted to It with such revulsion, shying
away from immediately choosing a successor themselves. It is also a measure
of the weakness of the Senate that the only candidate It could come up with
at this juncture was an aged senator, Tacitus, with his half-brother Florian.
Their brief interlude was ended in 276 by the natural successor to
Aurelian, his protege, Probus, who had been In Egypt when the emperor was
murdered. He was immediately called to Gaul in response to a series of
German invasions, probably prompted by the neglect of that frontier over the
last two years, since Tacitus and Florian had been occupied In Illyricum
against the Goths before marching east to meet Probus. He was so successful
there that it is claimed he could have established a new Roman province
across the Rhine, had he not been called away to deal with troubles In
Raetia and Illyricum -- the repeat of an old refrain. In 279, he suppressed
brigandege in Isauria and put down a series of revolts in Gaul and Germany,
before celebrating a triumph In Rome In 281 and turning his attention east
as Aurelian had done. However, the soldiers were disaffected by his strict
reimposition of discipline and his Implication that their usefulness was
nearly over. He was not a soldier's soldier as the generals of Gallienus had
been. They killed him at Sirmium, en route to the east. The year was 282.
Within 2 years his successor, Carus, was dead, along with his sons, and
the purple had been taken by Diocletian. Tradition has made Diocletlan
commander of the pro tectores domes tici at the time of his accession; but the
dornestici did not exist until 350 at the earliest 1 , so this must be
1 Haldon, Byzantine Praetarians (1984), 134ff; nes LRE 636ff,
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historical interpolation. He was probably a dux, with the title of protector,
in command of part of the army, which would explain his popularity1.
He inherited a military machine which had been extensively reshaped to
meet the new needs of imperial defence, and had withstood all the tests
thrown against it, The task was not yet over: there were uprisings in Gaul
and barbarian incursions along the Danube; but the worst was past. If he
could refine the structure he had inherited and bring an end to the
pernicious cycle of usurpation, he would guide the empire intact out of the
darkest century it had yet experienced.
A better judge of character than Gallienus, he was able to establish the
Tetrarchy with loyal colleagues, so removing for a time the prime cause of
strife within the empire. This bought him the time to initiate the
refinements of state military structure that were so vital. Hard times
were still ahead. Within 2 years, Carausius had set up a rival state in
Britain. In Illyricum, the barbarian threat had only partially abated, and in
the east the Persian empire had achieved a revival of its own under Vahram
III and was to remain a thorn in the side of Rome. Still, thanks to the
unstinting work of his predecessors, Diocletian was now in a position to face
these threats with new vigour and an army which only vaguely resembled the
one which had carried Septimius Severus to power some ninety years before.
It had been shaped by internal pressures as much as external, forced to
respond to the new demands of defence-in-depth at the same time that its
1, He was 600'Mrsa'ç, probably under Probus: Zon, XII31,
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traditional bases of manpower were drying up. It had also become more
politically aware, recognising its ability to make and break emperors, who
often came from its own ranks. Not all of the changes it underwent took the
form in the third century to which they had evolved in the fourth. What
they were, and how they developed, is what this thesis is about.
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I I: MA NP 0 WER
Throughout this dissertation, one recurrent theme underlies the whole
work. It has developed out of the individual study of each aspect of the
Roman army in the third century, and simply put, it is this: that shortage of
manpower, and the compromises which this entailed, was a unifying factor
which can be identified in almost every aspect of third century military
reform. By this, I do not mean to argue that it was the only factor; nor
that it was the most important. As we shall see, countless forces reforged
the Roman army into the shape in which it emerged from the third century AD.
Yet underlying them all was the constant awareness, mainly implicit, that the
army was stretched to its limit and that the reforms which needed to be
made, for whatever reasons, had to be implimented with this in mind.
The thesis demands a certain circularity of argument, mainly due to the
nature of the evidence. Direct demographic evidence with which to chart
such a lack of manpower is hard to come by and largely unreliable; so Eie
possibility of such a shortage is first brought to our attention by
observing its effects on Roman military reforms.
These effects have been manifold. We shall see that large-scale use of
the vexillatiori came into being during the 160s, almost as a direct result of
the plague of Marcus Aurelius'. It became the standard strategic unit of
the third century because of the need to spread the limited resources at the
1, Ch,VI: Vexiilationn, p,I3Bff, Since the campaign of Lucius Verus which is universally blamedfor bringing back the plague was the last campaign of the Antonines to employ full legions rather than
vexillations, this conclusion seems inevitable,
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army's disposal over an increasingly large area within the hinterland'.
Coupled with this was the growth in importance of cavalry, The equitea
Dalmatae of Gallienus came into being partly as a reconnaissance in force, by
which the movements of the enemy could be located and at least partially
controlled, and partly due to a lack of any other available resources within
his truncated empire2. Other units of equites, most notably the promot.4 the
stablesianl and perhaps the scutarlZ were drawn from existing units and
converted into independent cavalry formations 3. These and the ethnic units
such as the equites Mauri and sagittarli, along with various units of ethnic
numeri, seem gradually to have replaced the Auxilia of the early Principate,
which had gone into a drastic decline, caused at least in part by endemic
attrition and the unpopularity of military service4. Efforts were made to
counteract this unpopularity by increasing military pay and introducing new
privileges, but the decline continued, to the extent that no new legions were
raised after the creations of Septimius Severus until the reforms of
Diocletian; and ethnic units and barbarians continued to replace the AuKiliaS.
Reforms among the officer classes, resulting in the rise of the yin
militares, were also undertaken because of a failure of the senatorial order
to live up to its military responsibilities, and an increasing need for
competent military men in positions of importance throughout the empire6.
1, Ch,VI: Yexi1Iatione2, Chh,III, VII & VI: Contra Coaitatui, Equites& 'exi1Jationes, Both factors are representative
of a stretching of resources with which adequately to defend the empire,
3, Ch,VII: Equites, The prosoti seem to have retained some sort of link with the legions fromwhich they were drawn.
4, Ch,Y: uxi)ia.
5, Ch,IV: Legione on barbarians cf, Ch,IX: Foederati,6, Chh,X & XI: 1/fri Ifilitares & Protectores,
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Taken in isolation, each of these admits to other, equally valid,
interpretations not directly linked to a shortage of manpower. The
vexillation provided greater flexibility with which to face the changing
circumstances of the later Roman empire. Cavalry came to the fore because
of its mobility, enabling it to catch and harass barbarian invaders within
the new strictures of defence-in-depth. Furthermore, the equltes promoti,
for which the strongest argument concerning a redistribution of military
resources can be made, seem unlikely to have been created earlier than the
reign of Diocletian, by which time other new units were being raised1.
Ethnic units can be seen as a resurgence of the early imperial practice of
military diversification around the core force of legions, replacing the
outmoded Auxilia which had lost its original ethnic Identity. Even the use
of barbarian troops can be viewed less in the light of manpower resources
than in terms of political expediency 2. Political expediency of a different
sort has also been seen as the driving force behind the rise of the equites
within the officer class, though this is less convincing3.
Yet throughout, there remains a constant and consistent refrain: that
each of these measures, taken for a variety of reasons, was implemented
under the implicit understanding that resources of manpower were at a
premium. A.E.R. Boak was severely criticised for laying too much emphasis on
the role of manpower shortage In the fall of the western Roman empire, and
rightly 60dm Lack of human resources was never the cause of the problems of
1, Ch,VII: Equites, p,166ff,2, Ch,IX: Foederati,
3, Ch,X: '/ri Mi1itiu contra the traditional view of imperial animosity towards the senate,
4, Boak, Manpover Shortage and the FaIl of the Roaan Eapire (1955); scathingly criticised in areview by Finley, IRS 48 (1958), 157ff: herefter cited as Finley, IRS,
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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower
the third century 1 nor for that matter the later Roman empire. In fact, I
would go so far as to quote Finley when speaking of the later Roman economy:
Merely to invoke a formula, manpower shortage • declining production • impoverishment, will
explain neither the fifteenth century nor the very different fourth (or fifth) century, A
difficult and sophisticated analysis is necessary, involving prices, wages, productivity -- and
social and political factors too -- before even tentative relationships can be established,
Jones, Indeed, argued the antithesis to Boak's concept2. In his view,
late Roman Imperial reforms generated an excessive economic burden which
weighed down the peasantry and dragged them below subsistence level,
creating a vicious downward spiral which brought about famine, depopulation,
Inflation end all the other factors associated with the decline of the
empire. In this model, shortage of manpower was not the cause of the
empire's decline, but rather an exacerbating effect. The empire's problems
were not created by a lack of manpower, but by the failure of the Roman
government to recognise that its resources were finite, so overburdening
them. This model, in a military context, can be transferred to the third
century, where by changing the variables we can demonstrate how an imperial
recognition that the resources were limited staved off the subsequent
decline.
Not even Finley would deny "that the plagues and disorders of the third
century cut the population of the western empire"3. Warfare was so endemic
that it would be pointless to chart the civil wars and invasions of the
century. More instructive are the periods of relative peace to be found
I. Finley, IR 163,
2, Jones 1 L,W(1964), 1040ff; cf, also Jones, A/7cient Econoaic History (1948), 14ff,3, Finley, /R 162,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower
in the ninety years between AD 193 and 284. In all, only seventeen years
can be safely construed as 'peaceful', and even this number can only be
arrived at by ignoring known periods of brigandage and counting interregnal
years arid periods of special celebration (such as the celebration of the
Millennium) 1 . In this period, only one emperor, Sept imius Severus, was to die
a timely death of natural causes. Claudlus Gothicus died of plague in 270,
and Decius and Valerian were killed by the enemies of Rome. The remaining
20 'legitimate' emperors were all killed by assassination or civil war2.
Indeed, if we were to include all known usurpers throughout the century, the
average life-expectancy of someone who had taken the purple in the third
century was approximately 2 years. When one considers that this includes
the reigns of Septiinius Severus, Severus Alexander and Diocletian, which
account for 52 of the 112 years between 193 and AD 305, the truly horrific
nature of civil unrest throughout the century becomes apparent3.
The plague statistics are not much better. Three great plagues hit the
empire between the years 165 and 275, raging for a combined total of more
than 40 years. The first and most famous was the plague of Marcus Aurelius,
otherwise known as the Plague of Galen, which was brought back from the
east after the campaign of Julius Verus. Fourth century sources say the
plague began among the army at Seleuceia on the Tigris In the winter of 165,
1, AD 199-203: Severus in Egypt and Rome; AD 205-207: Severus returns to Rome from Africa (Bulla
Felix terrorises 8, Italy in 206/7); AD 212: Caracalla withdraws from Britain, murder of Beta: AD 222-
231: period of relative peace under Severus Alexander AD 247: Millenary celebrations at Rome, After
the Gothic invasion of 249, the empire was troubled by civil war and invasion on a continuous basis
until the end of the century (with one possible respite in the year 290),
2, Counting ioint emperors as a single entity,
3, Severus ruled from AD 193-211 (18 years), Alexander from AD 222-235 (13 years) and Diocletian
from AD 284-305 (19 years), Diocletian was the only emperor ever to retire (along with his colleague,
Maximian), and these three emperors were the only ones whose reigns reached double figures,
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though epidemics were reported at Nisibis and Smyrna in that same year.
Certainly, the plague had reached Rome by 166, and was raging among the
soldiers at Aquilela in 168/9, when the physician Galen noted its effects1.
Gilliam has expressed doubts over the severity of these effects. He
notes that Galen seemed unperturbed by the pestilence, though he referred to
the plague as a great and long-lasting one2 . Yet, as one recent commentator
has put it "Gilliam's rigorous discussion carries agnosticism to extremes"9.
His main objections seem to be that the plague was taken far less seriously
by contemporary commentators than by later Roman historians; that there is
little demographic evidence for the plague; and that what evidence there is
is open to alternative explanation.
On the first count, Gilliam's main objection lies in the comment of
Cassius Dio, that the epidemic which broke out in 189 was the worst he had
experienced4 . He combines this with comments from Galen, Lucian and
Aristides to show that the plague was not the major preoccupation of
contemporary authors. Aristides was far more concerned with the earthquake
which hit Smyrna in 178, and Lucian makes no mention of the plague in his
description of the Olympic Games in 165s. Yet in the mid-160s, Dio was an
infant in Bithynia, far from the pestilential confines of Rome. Even though
the plague of Galen continued into the 170s, its effects were uneven, so it
I, S//A Itpus Y1II . 1-3; Aim, Marc, IXXI . 624; Vict, Epit, XVI . 3; Calpurnianus, Fe// 118, N9 208;
Aristidea, Orat, XXXIII'6, XLVIII38-9, 1 . 9, 11 . 25 (K); Cf. Gilliam, 'The Plague Under Marcus
Aurelius', A,J,P/il, 73(1961), 227ff Rotan Arty Papers (1986), 229ff for a full chronology andfurther references, For its effects on the army cf, Galen XIX in Scripta Ninora 11, 98(M); SHA Marc,X1II'3-6, XVII . 2 & XXI • 6-7; Eutropius YI11 . 12; Jerome C/iron, p.205; Qrosius VII'I5'5-6,
2, Gilliam op. cit., 227f,
3, Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roaan Econoty (1990), 72, n,37,4, Dio LXXII'14'3-4 (LXXIII in the Loeb edition); cf. also LXXI.2.4,
5, Gilliam, 227ff, esp, nn,16, 18 & 19,
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is hardly surprising that a major epidemic in the crowded capital of the
empire, witnessed with the full understanding of adulthood, should affect the
historian more deeply than the sporadic pox with which he had grown up1.
Furthermore, it is not impossible that the plague of 189 could have been a
recurrence of the plague of Galen, though it is treated as the second of the
major plagues discussed here. Equally unsurprising are the preoccupations of
Aristides and Lucian. The Smyrna earthquake may well have been a worse
calamity to hit the city than the plague. Even if it were not, Aristides is
making a rhetorical point in his repeated juxtaposition of the city's
prosperity before the earthquake and the devastation after, and we should
not expect him to mention the plague, which would only have blunted his
argument. The same can be said of Lucian, who only seems to have referred
to disease when he could turn it to dramatic advantage s. Neither was a
historian, so neither should be expected to sacrifice good rhetoric in the
interests of historical accuracy. It is also of interest that while Galen's
reaction to the plague has been portrayed as almost blasé, the physician
declined to accompany Marcus on his Marcomannic campaign because Asclepius
forbade him to go. Whether this was out of fear of the plague, or because
he was required to stay and treat it is not clear, though he is known to
have left Rome soon after the plague reached it and returned to his native
Pergamum4.
Demographic evidence of any value concerning the Roman world Is
I, Boak, Manpower Shortage1 19; Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale, 72; Millar, A Study of 'asiusDic (1963), 13 & n4,
2, Aristides XVIII-XXII, He does comment on the plague elsewhere, cf, above p47 ni
3, cf, Lucian Peregrinus XIX,
3, All references in Gilliam, 'Plague of arcus', 227f nn, 10-13; Duncan-Jones, bc, cii,- 48 -
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower
extremely difficult to come by, therefore it is hardly surprising that what
little evidence exists for depopulation at the time of the plague is open to
alternative explanation. Certainly warfare could have as much to do with the
unusually high enlistment figures for legionaries at the end of the reign of
Marcus Aurelius. Gilliam himself makes the point that recruitment figures
fluctuated drastically due to a whole series of variables, and that the seven
examples he provides cannot actually prove anything 1 . He is on firmer
ground when he suggests that evidence for depopulation in Egypt in the late
160s could have more to do with vaxprIcrLc (the abandonment of land) than
with the plague. Wilcken, who first suggested that the dramatic decline
exhibited in the Mendesian nome could have been caused by the plague,
retracted his explanation when P. Graux 2 was published by Henne in 1923,
showing that a similar decline in At) 55/59 was due entirely to desertion2.
Yet there is one crucial detail In the Mendeslan papyri which may suggest
that abandonment was not the sole cause. The format of the figures given
states the number of villagers originally In occupation, followed by the
I, Gilliam, 'Plague of Marcus', 236ff citing 111 . 6178; AE,1955,238; 111 . 8110; YI1I•18067;
111 . 6580; 111 . 14507 VIlI'18068 which list legionary veterans at time of discharge for the legions '
Macedon/ca, II T,afana, VII CJadja & III Augusta, His postulated average of 100 men disharged peryear Is slightly low, and if it is going to be used as a benchmark, it should be fixed at 126, On
this benchmark, the latter three Inscriptions, listing men who 5etVed from 168-194, 169-195 & 173-198,
give figures of 100, 240+ & 330, This indicates that the survival rate of men recruited into Legio IITralana in 166 was slightly (but not significantly) below average, while the number of men enlistedinto Vii Claudia & III Augusta in 169 & 173 was significantly above average, As indicated in the textabove, the figures are statistically worthless and may have as much to do with warfare as with plague.
However, if these figures are going to be used to refute the plague, Gilliam has failed to explain why
the number of men recruited at the epidemic's height was below the norm, while the numbers recruited
in its aftermath, to replace losses from both plague and warfare, were way above ii, NB: Gilliam, 239
on XI Palayrenorut, showing that fluctuations in recruitment are such that average assessments arevirtually meaningless; cf, the table In ch,V: Auxilia, p104 which illustrates the point.
2, Wilcken on 8811 902 & 903 In Fast, 0, HirschfeJds (1903), 123ff; retracted in Arch/v furFapyrusforach, VIII (1927), 311; Henne in Bali, Inst, Fr, Arch, Or, XXI (1923), 189ff; cf, Gilliam,op. cit., 239ff for a full discussion and further references,
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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower
number now extant, of whom a certain number had fled! '. This number
usually included the whole of the remaining populace. If the picture was
one of agri deserti created by abandonment, would not the numbers who had
'fled' be included among the figure for 'former occupants'? By
differentiating 'former occupants' from 'those fled', the papyri are explicity
stating that the desertion of the villages has been caused by something
other than the flight of the peasantry, This could have been the plague. In
this picture, the plague ravaged the village populace to the extent that only
a handful of villagers remained. Faced with the overwhelming burden of
taxation not just for themselves, but for their dead compatriots, this
handful then took the only other option open to them, and abandoned the
land. A recent analysis of Egyptian document totals has shown a virtual
collapse in output under the reign of Marcus Aurelius, which indicates that
the pestilence may have had a great effect 2. It would seem that the coin-
output of Marcus Aurelius also suffered a severe drop in 167, immediately
after the recorded arrival of the plague at Rome3.
The plague of Marcus Aurelius has exercised so much interest among
commentators, both ancient and modern, that other natural disasters during
the following century have often been overshadowed. The plague which Dio
described at Rome in AD 189 killed as many as two thousand people in a
single day4. The earthquake at Smyrna was followed in 242 and the early
260s by a massive series of 'world-quakes' which rocked large tracts of the
1, Figurem given by Gilliam, op. cli, 240: formerly 55, now 10, of which 8 have fled; formerly
27, now 3, fled 3; formerly 54, now 4, fled 4,
2, Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale, 71ff,
3, Duncan-Jones, op. cit., 73ff,
4 Dio LXfl'2'4 & LXXII . 14'3-4, discussed above, p.47,
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M,C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Manpower
Mediterranean 1 . Famine swept the empire In the wake of these disasters2,
the most devastating of which was the great plague of 25O-275. Whether
this was one great plague which reccurred sporadically throughout these
twenty-five years, or whether it was a series of separate epidemics is still
open to debate4. The fact still remains that plague ravaged the empire
during the reigns of Trebonianus Gallus, Gallienus and Claudlus Gothicus,
killing the latter, and leaving witnesses shaken by its severity6.
The effect on the population of these combined disasters, coupled with
the depredations of constant warfare, cannot have been slight. Burn equated
the mortality rate of Roman Africa with that of early twentieth century
India (among others), and was followed by Jones 7. Here, infant mortality was
high, and the life expectancy of males was significantly greater than
females, Burn declines to give proper 'expectation of life' figures for
reasons of statistical purity, but the figures he does provide show that the
probable duration of life in Roman Africa did not exceed the age of 5Q8,
Soldiers in the Roman army also had a generally lower life expectancy than
1, Dc Blois, The Policy of f/ic Esperor Gallienus (1976), 10; 8/14 Gord, XXVI . 1-2, GaIl, V•2-6,2, flacNullen, Eneties of the Rosen Order (1966), Appendix A, 251ff,3, Zos, 1 . 26 . 2, 37'3 & 46 . 2; Zon, XII • 21; Vict, Cees, XXX2 & XXXIII • 5; S//A Gail, V • 5; Eusebius
Mist, (cci, VII21-22: Joh, Ant, frag, 151; Cedrenus I p.452; Jerome C/iron, p.219; Orosius VII.21'4-5,22 .2-3 & 2?1O; Iordanes Get/ca XIX'104 IM); Pontivs 1 Cypt, 1X Cyprian Dc Hart, XIV . 16, Ad Dci.',
V'lO,
4, Boak, Manpover Shortage, 136 n,11 Alfôldi, CA//XII, 1671 & 227f; Jones, IRE, 1043,
5, los, I46 • 2; S//A Claud, XlI'2-3,
6, Contemporary accounts come from Cyprian and Eusebius, Zosimus, drawing on the contemporary
account of Dexippus, graphically illustrates the shock felt by those who experienced the plagues: refe
in n,3 above,
7, Burn, 'Hic Breve Vivitur', Past end Present4 (1953), 11ff; Jones, LRE 1041,
8, Burn, 1411, esp, Table I on p.16, Half of the inhabitants of the civil districts of Africa
could expect to reach the age of 4811 they were male, and 44 ii they were female, Among the imperial
slave population of Carthage, the duration of life drops to 38 and 33 respectively, In Europe and on
the Danube, probable duration was between 40f33 and 44/36 for males/females, Of those tha , ched
those ages, half could expect to reach the age of 600r more in all categories except souther
M.C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Manpower
their civilian counterparts, though their chances of reaching middle age
were significantly higher, presumably due to the régime of fitness required
of them'. The important factor here is the high female mortality rate. To
maintain its numbers, the Roman population would have needed a very high
birth rate2, According to Finley:
Low life expectancy obviously restricts the rate of reproduction by the mere fact that a large
percentage of women do not live through the entire period in which they are biologically fertile,
Given that limit, however, In a stable life-expectancy pattern (whether high or low) the
reproduction rate can vary greatly from generation to generation according to many factor5, The
argument must proceed from these factors to the population curve, not the other way round,
In the third century, these factors -- war, pestilence, famine,
catastrophe -- seem incontrovertibly calculated to disrupt the normal
pattern. Even after discarding Boak's assumptions about the long-term
effects of plague upon the population base 4, we find the empire still faced
by a continuous series of disasters, both natural and man-made, which
progressed with almost no let-up to a feverish crescendo in the middle of
the third century. From 240 onwards, the empire suffered the depredations
of earthquake and plague at regular ten-year intervals, linked by continuous
warfare, until the cycle of disaster (but not warfare!) ceased after 275.
Iones spoke of the resilience of the Roman population, highlighting its rapid
recovery "from any but the severest checks caused by massacres, famines or
epidemice lls . If thirty-five years, something like a generation, of continuous
1, Burn, op. cit. (above, n,7), 10 & 16,
2, Jones, bc, cit 1 (above n,7),
3. Finley, IRS, 157,
4, Boak, Manpove Shop tage, 19, 31, 56 & 113; refuted by Finley, IRS, 158 & 162,
5, Jones, bc, cit.
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attrition was not a 'severe check', what is?
Thanks to a recent study, it is now possible to make some crude
comparison of life-expectancy in the early and later Principate. Figures
produced by Duncan-Jones from an, admittedly dubious, statistical base
purport to show that expectation of life within the Roman empire in the
early third century could have been slightly below 20 years for the servile
population, and slightly above 30 years for the urban middle classes 1 . Both
these figures are very low when compared to Burn's calculations. Direct
comparison can be made only with one of Burn's tables: that for the slaves
and freedmen of the imperial household in Carthage. All others are either
too late, or include figures from the third century in their calculations.
Since Burn's figures are not 'expectation of life' statistics, a more valid
comparison may be between the infant mortality rates assessed by both
studies. Duncan-Jones has estimated this at between 278 and 329 per
thousand for the middle classes in the third century, while Burn approximated
a minimum of 200-250 per thousand for the Principate as a whole, believing
it to be proportionately worse for the slaves of Carthage 2. What this tells
us is that the life-expectancy of the middle-class in the third century may
have been little better than that of imperial slaves in the early Principate.
I, Duncan-Jones, Stucturi and $j/ 91ff, His figures are based upon the Album of Canusiva,
which lists a town council of 100 members, of whom 68 had held a magistracy by AD 223; and a
comparison of the Ulpian Table (listing official calculations for life-annuities in the early third
century) with the models of the Princeton series, 8y dividing the Canusium figures by the regular
magisterial intake of 2, he arrives at a mean life-expectancy from age 0 of 32 years; the Ulpian Table
is less simple, arriving at a life-expectancy from 0 of under 20, which may be due to the inaccuracy
of the Table's own calculations, The Album of Canusium therefore provides figures for the magisterial
classes of an Italian town, while the Ulpian Table provides a Roman estimate of life for the servile
population, Neither is very reliable,
2, Duncan-Jones, 94; Burn, 14,
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M,c.rbeji: C3 Army. Manpower
The picture drawn so far equates with Boak's image of a declining
population, which may have plummetted in the mid-third century as natural
disasters took their toll 1 . However, a manpower shortage in military terms
does not necessarily require such a drop. In fact, I do not believe that the
empire sufferred any significant long-term 1086 in manpower until the period
of crises which followed the great quake of AD 242. Previously, the empire
had enough surplus manpower with which to create five new legions within
the space of some thirty years, despite the plagues of Marcus Aurelius and
Gommodus. It was these creations which in my belief stretched citizen
manpower to its limit, as evidenced by the reforms of the Seven and the
fact that no further legions were recruited until the reign of Dlocletian2,
The reforms may have had a dual purpose, increasing the popularity of the
emperor in the soldiers' eyes as well as increasing the attractiveness of
military service, but it was the latter which was of greater long-term
importance, and which ultimately failed. With regard to non-citizen
manpower, the recruitment of auxiliary units does not tail off significantly
until after the reign of' Caracalla, and does not die out until the mid-third
century. Yet it is noticeable that even among these there is a large number
of 'ethnic' troops, drawn mainly from the eastern and African provinces4.
Even if there was no decline in population, the third-century Roman army was
obviously stretched to its limit and forced to look to new methods of
defence in order to cover the ground it had to protect.
I, Soak, Manpower Shortage, 109ff,2, Cli, LY: Legiones,
3, Ch,IV: Legiones,4, ChY: 4uxi)ia, Table Al,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower
This is what prompted the activities of Gallienus. By his reign, there
Is no gainsayirig that the empire's human resources were a].rnost exhausted,
Quite apart from the hammer-blows which the population had sufferred up to
that point, Gallienus was left with an empire that had lost control of both
Its eastern and western provinces, and with them that valuable source of
oriental troops upon which the empire had been drawing since the late second
century. Simultaneously, he had gained an extra frontier, looking westwards
towards the Gallic Empire, which required defence and which had removed the
troops dedicated to that part of the empire. With the death of Odaenathus,
he was also forced to look east. He had lost two of his main recruiting
grounds, gained two extra frontiers, and within them was faced with
rebellion, Invasion, famine and plague. The full burden of maintaining his
present army at its current level had fallen on his Illyrian and African
recruiting grounds, yet to hold this truncated empire together, he had to
find enough new troops with which to hit back. His solution was to
reorganise the way the army worked, and we shall see how he drew upon the
equites Dalma tee, as his only source of fresh manpower, to create a
coordinated cavalry/infantry strategy which could be built upon by his
successor&.
Cheesman has been quoted as saying: "The extent to which a ruling race
can safely use the military resources of its subjects and the effect on both
parties of such a relation is a question of universal historical lnterest."
In its limited scope, this work cannot answer the second question, but it can
1, Chh, iii a vii: Con Crc Coal Ca tua a Eqwi tes2, Cheesman, 1/ic AwxiJia of the Roam Icperial Arir (1914), 7,
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M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army. Manpower
endeavour to answer the first. The military resources of the empire in the
third century were limited. The repeated disasters which afflicted the
empire during that century must have limited them even further. Yet by
their tacit acceptance of these limitations, and by working around them,
rather than by legislating against them, the emperors of that century were
able to weather the storm and bring the empire into calmer waters. The
damage done to the population was not irreversible, and by the time of
Diocletian it had recovered enough for him to essay his reforms. It is
generally believed that he increased the size of the army, though what this
meant in numerical terms is debatable 1 . Since the recent findings of
Duncan-Jones suggest that the size of Diocletianic units may have been
considerably smaller than was previously believed, all earlier estimations
may have to be revised2. It may be that the actual number of men in the
army under Diocletian was not significantly greater than those under the
standards in the mid-third century. If this is the case, then he had enough
manpower with which to cope, but only because his predecessors had astutely
juggled the resources at their disposal to stave off the manpower crisis
which had been looming throughout the entire century.
1, Van Berchem believed that Diocletian doubled the size of the aray, Jones estisated a figure
of approx, 600,000 men, and Boak arrived at a figure anywhere between 400,000 and 650,000: Van
Berchem, Armée de Qloclètien, 113; Jones, LRE 679ff; Boak, /Yanpover Shortage, 86ff,
2, Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army', Chiron8 (1978), 541ff,
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I I I: CONTRA C OMI TA TUM
This chapter is deliberately controversial. It examines the evidence
both for arid against one of the most cherished preconceptions of third
century military studies: that of the mobile cavalry field army believed to
have been created by Gallienus. The subject is inextricably linked to that
of the equltes Dalmatae and the introduction of cavalry vexillations which
occurred at some time in the latter part of the century. On the following
pages, I shall review the evidence concerning the mobile field army. I
intend to illustrate the meagre foundations upon which the hypothesis has
been based, and to explore alternative possibilities equally supportable by
the present evidence. I shall end with an history of the growth of the
units termed equltes
The idea of a mobile field army arose from an assumption made by Emil
Ritterlthg in his excellent article, of 1903, on aspects of the later Roman
army 1 . Identifying Gallienus as the creator of the equites Dalmatae, in
which Ritterling had the greatest interest, he made the following statement:
Gallienus ist in der That der Schöpfer einer siets kampfbereiten, von den Besatzungen der
Provinzen und aus den alten Verbanden Iosgelôsien, für den Krieg im grossen verwendbaren Reiterei
ii römischen Heere geworden,2
His evidence for this was slim 1 but sufficiently convincing to persuade
others to search for more. This seemed forthcoming in 1927, when Andreas
1, Riiterling, 'Zurn rämischen Heerwesen des ausgehenden dritten Jahrhunderis', Pestschrift zuOtto Hirsch!elds (1903), 345ff,
2, Ritterling, 349: 6allienus is in fact the creator of an always battle-ready unit, resoved !ro,.provincial garrisons and old units, turning the Rosan ai'ey in to a versa tile cavalry force,
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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum
Alföldi produced numismatic evidence of a cavalry force present in Milan
under the generalship of the usurper Aureolus 1 . Since then, the existence of
a mobile field army ha8 achieved the status of accepted fact, such that
respected scholars can refer to it en passant when discussing topics upon
which it touches; and its very existence can be seen as an answer to some of
the knottier problems of the period. Indeed, the idea of a Gallienic field
army has become so ingrained that it is now legitimate to search for its
precursors In the reigns of earlier emperors3.
At its most extreme, the field army is seen as an elite force of cavalry
under an independent command, with its operations completely separate from
either provincial forces or the imperial army and "wholly independent of the
Infantry"4. More conventional opinion still emphasises the mobility of the
cavalry, and its freedom of action under an independent cavalry commander.
The field army Is seen as "a landmark In the development of the Roman
army...anticipating the fourth century system for which Diocletian and
Constantine between them had previously been given the credit"6. In effect,
It Is viewed as a precursor of the comitatus with its substantial
components of shock cavalry.
Both views essentially rely on the assumptions made by Ritterllng:
1, Alföldl, 'Der Usurpator Aureolus und die kavallierereform des Gallienus', Stud/en zurfieschichfe der Ueitkrise de5 3 Ialirlwnderts nach Christus (1967), 1ff If/I, XIXYII (1927), 156ff,
2, Alföldi, CAN XII (1939), 216f (who attributed to it praeiorian status); Aliheim, DieSoldatenkaiser (1939), 178f; Christol, 'La CarriIre de Traianus Mucianus et l'Origine desProtectores', C/i/ron 7 (1977), 393ff (who viewed the protectores as centurions in the field army)Eadie, 'Developffient of Roman Nailed Cavalry', IRS 57(1967), 168; Speidel1 'Stablesiani', Cuì/ron IV(1974), 541ff Rotan Arty Studies I (1984), 391ff, and 'Rise of Ethnic Units', NRV II'3 (1975),202ff Ro4an Arty Papers, 117ff (who assumed that the equites had elite status as part of the fieldarmy),
3, E, Birley, 'Septimlus Severus and the Roman Army', Ep, $two 8 (1969), 661 discussed furtherin chIV: Legiones,
4, So Alfôldi, locc, citt, (above),
5, So Birley, bc, cit. (above),
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum
assumptions which have never been questioned. Ritterling was concerned
primarily with the development of the equites Dalinatae. He saw in them the
origins of the equites Illyriciani listed among eastern units in the Notitia
Dignitatur&, Working with the minutest of scraps from the histories, he
pieced together a convincing picture of the equites Dalmatae in existence
under the emperor Gallienus, and commanded by the general Aureolus.
However, he immediately assumed that they were part of a field army, on no
stronger grounds than that they had their own commander and a few equites
Dalmatae were comita tenses in the Notitia2. It is this assumption which has
created the present orthodoxy. Remove this assumption, and the evidence --
both that with which Ritter]J.ng was working, and all that has been produced
since -- takes on a very different colour.
There seems little doubt that the equites Da1matae in whatever form
they took, were the creation of Gallienus. With the single exception of the
Vita Albini, which must be historical interpolation on the part of the SliP,
they do not appear in the sources until this emperor's sole reign, The
medieval historian, Cedrenus, claimed that:
Pi.1avoç rproç tflsAT ra'fiara xrrcv,'1( 1(o1 xari co TOAD Ut O1ftT&1S 1&V 1PaJIQIV
t3,Q,XOV,'
Zonaras described their crucial role in the campaign against Ingenuus,
while Zosimus spoke of their operations both before and after the battle of
I, Ritterling, op. cit. (above, p.57),
2, Ritterling, 34Sf, Only 6 equite5 Daliatae out of 37 in the Notitia were coiitetenses,3, S/M ,Qlb. VI . 2; Ritterling, 345 n,3: Albinus is said to have been 'trthunus equites Daliatas
(sic) Such an early date runs contra to all other evidence, and given the SHA's penchant for
importing institutions from its own time, it cannot simply be taken on face value,
4, Cedrenus 1, 454(B): Gallienus first introduced units of hor5e: for the Roean soldiers beganlainly as infantry.
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatuni
Naissus'. In both commentaries, the name of Aureolus figures highly.
Zonaras calls him hipparch and claimed he was appointed steward of the
'Royal Horse'2. He was in command of the cavalry stationed at Milan when he
rebelled against Gallienus, setting frito motion a series of events which were
to end th the deaths of both himself and the emperor 3. The passages which
describe his status at this time are important in unravelling the nature of
the cavalry:
Zonaras XII'25, P I 633(D): aQ#s ft hcpr xart ro rAqvo, ha'virtTra'oç rcrovv iv ApsoAoç
0Pv(cll/cIrO, tarqç 1tv riiq tiiov Xd'i /1('i iova'pcvoç,
ZO51NUS I'40'1 ,,,lyyAlza's f'a'L1sqv c rpoç !xokç Iyrqupoovri roAqi, ro y rc hrov rac
s TOPflcvoY Apaoov, h /fiioav rp roAi rqv ?ra rv 1za'A:a'v iipodov lloro,ioo rra'yjicvov
iapq'Aarusv dç ro vcsrc,scav rcrpapks xaa pvijcla'i rqv ra y 3A&v Ipiiv It.rp,
Victor Ccci, XXXIII'17: Masque Aureolus, cut per Ractias legionibus praesset,,,,suipto i.perio,
Roses con tendeba t,'
Aureolus is depicted as a powerful general, in charge not only of the
Milan cavalry, but also the forces in Raetia. Alföldi has demonstrated that
he had control of the mint in Milan, which extolled the virtues of the
cavalry, first for Gallienus and later on behalf of F'ostumus 7. His study has
proven that Aureolus did not in fact revolt in his own name, but declared
I, Zon, XII . 24, P I 631(D); Zo5, 1.43.2,2,Zon, ktI • 24, P 1 631<8) & 631(0),
3,Zon, XII'25, P 1 633(D); Zos, 1 . 40 . 1; cf, also Vict, Caes, XXXIII • 17-18; 5H44 Gall, 11 . 6, 111.1
& XIV'6-7, Trig, Tyr, XI • I & XII'2,
4, Zonaras: igain there arose another rebellion against 6'allienus, to which Aureolus, cossander
of all the cavalry end a very powerful tan, linked /,iaself,,,
5, 2osi,aus: ,, , Nit's t'as not' brought to 8aJJiernis, involved in f/ic war against the Scythians, that
aQureolus, cosiander of all the cavalry posted at Milan to prevent Postusus invading Italy, had
revolted and was seeking suprese power,
6, Victor: Now Aureo!u5, cossander of the Raetia, legion5,,,, took up the purple and sarched on
Rate,
7, Alföldi, 'Usurpator Aureolus', 4ff, esp,l2ff,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatuni
for the Gallic Emperor, and indeed the vast majority of his coins were struck
in the name of Postumus' Earlier in the reign, he led the cavalry against
Ingenuus, and also campaigned against PostumuB and the Macriani2.
Yet we must not fall into the trap of automatically linking Aureolus to
the cavalry. All too often, the presence of Aureolus is seen to signify the
field army in action. In fact, the names of Aureolus and the equites
Dalmatae are never explicitly linked. True, Zonaras named him as the
commander of the cavalry ('tv tnov) which put Ingenuus to flight at the
battle of Mursa and pursued him to his death, but it was the Moorish troops
which that author singled out for praise when he came to name forces from
the campaign3 . In the war against Postumus, though Aureolus was acting like
a cavalry commander, pursuing the Gallic emperor after his defeat by
Gallienus4 , no explicit mention of cavalry is made. Nor do they figure in
his expedition against the Macriani, and it would be certain folly to assume
that he fought this campaign with nothing but a force of horsemen 5 . Even in
Milan, he is historically attested to have controlled the Raetian legions, and
it is likely that his authority extended to the legionary vexillations in
Aquileia. So similarly, when campaigning against the battle-tested eastern
army which had salvaged the situation after the capture of Valerian, he
1, 20 dIfferent types were struck in Milan in the name of Postumus, as opposed to 2 in the name
of Gallienus: RIC V, Posttrnus, 366-389 (excl,382-384) EaJllenws (sole), 445 & 472, I have not
included the a1acitatus coin cited by Alföldi, since it does not seem to me that the presence of a
flying Pegasus and the verso ALACRITATI are in themselves strong enough indicators to link it to the
cavalry: the assumptions implicit in its Inclusion serve only to confuse the issue, cf, Alföldi1
'Usurpator Aureolus', 13f.
2, Zon, XiI . 24, P1631(D), 632(B) & 632(D),
3, Zon, XII . 24, P I 631(0),
4, Zon, XII . 24, P I 632(8),
5, Zon, XII . 24, P I 632(0),
6, III'954 V • 808; cf, ch,VI: VexilIaiones, p,142f,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum
can hardly have been anything other than a dux exercitus in charge of a
powerful combined force of western troops loyal to Gallienus. In this
respect, he was no different to other generals campaigning on behalf of the
emperor. Marcianus taking over the emperor's Gothic war in AD 268
immediately springs to mind'. Simply because Aureolus was linked to the
cavalry at certain times, it does not follow that the cavalry was always
linked to him, nor that he was always linked to the cavalry.
It is equally mistaken to make too much of the hipparchos references in
Zonaras. The historian calls Aureolus hipparch in the campaign against
Irigenuus. Elsewhere, he says he was steward of the 'Royal Horse' and also
commander of "all the cavalry"2. Yet in this very same chapter we find
another general, Aureliani, following the emperor to Milan "with the cavalry"
(auv t inteua t )2, so it is obviouB that not all the cavalry were under the
control of Aureolus. The cavalry brought up by Aurelian were, by inference,
part of the army Gallienus was leading against the Goths when he heard of
Aureolus' rebellion. Why they did not accompany him immediately is unclear.
Perhaps they took some time to reorganise, or maybe they were needed to
complete some crucial manoeuvre before being freed for the emergency. It is
almost certain that they were in part equites Da1matae since tradition has
it that a tribune of this corps played a direct role in Gallienus' murder4.
On top of this, Aureolus is not the only hippar'ch named in Zonaras' account.
The same term is applied on behalf of' the Macriani to their fellow
1,Zos, 1.40.1,2, Zon, XII'24, P I 631(C): ,,, m yAaxv h,Gv /oYrio'v,iç ,poxqciporc XII . 25 P1633(D):
raiTç a,%GY rç
3, Zon, X1I25, P I 634(A): roAsopA'oPvwç TOD PJnACOç fil IfräoAa'va QpiiAsvoç ay
,por g' y hr&, Note also Zon, X1I . 26, P I 635(B) which calls Claudius hipparchos,
4, Zos, I'40 • 2-3; Zon, XII'25, P I 634(A-B); SHA Gall, XIV 6-7, which names the man Cecropius and
call5 him dux Daliatarua, Note that he could have been on secondient away from his unit,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Coniitatum
conspirator and Praetorian Prefect, Callistus 'Ballista' 1 . This may, In fact,
have some substance, since Ballista's tactics in wearing down the Persians
possessed the flavour of a mounted guerrilla campaign. At any rate, no
matter how highly he figures in the recorded tradition, Aureolus was not
unique in his titles, nor in his command of cavalry.
Are we then to credit the claim that he was steward of the 'Royal
Horse'? I think we can do so In at least two ways, without applying elite
status to the equites Dalma tea The first possibility is that he was
commander of the equites singulares at some point in his career. The title
is known to have been held by another of Gallienus' favourites, L. Petronius
Taurus Volusianus3, so the idea is not unprecedented. Equally probable,
considering the circumstances, is a command of the Moorish javelinmen. Two
units of equites iteinque pedites Mauri are known, organised into formations
of seniores and luniores. The epigraphy strongly suggests that this command
was given to a praepositus in the rank of a former tribune of the urban
cohorts, before proceeding on to the praetorians 4 . The unit therefore had
some sort of 'household' status, and indeed the Mauretanian horse are ranked
alongside the praetorians in at least one commentary5 . This makes tharn
equally, if not more, likely to have been t 9catAtxoL trffot of Zonaras than
the equites Dalma tee which were, no matter what their status, always regular
units of the later Roman army.
I, Zon, 111 . 24, P1632(D): S/IA Sal!, 1 . 2-3 & III'2, Trig, Tyr, XII, XIV . l & XVIII'13,2, Zon, X1123; S//A Va), IV'S. Tr/g, Tyr, X1I'1 but remember that he had command of the remnants
of Yalerian's army which cannot have all been cavalry,
3, XI'1836 ILS 1332,4, VI1I . 20996 ILS 1356: l6RRI'1496 IL$9479 : A19O8,259,5, Zos, I52'4; Alföldi believed they had praetorian status, CAM XII, 215; Speidel, on the other
hand, claimed their elite status came from their position in the cotitatus, 'Ethnic Units', 215,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum
In fact, the equltes Dalmatae do not appear in the sources until AD 268,
when Zosimus place8 them at the battle of Naissus 1 . They are only
explicitly named by this author and the Hlstoriae Augustae and while it is
likely that they made up the bulk of the equites at Milan, they are
specifically attested only in the beseiging force2,
What, then, of the equltes in Milan? Such a strong body of evidence for
their presence indicateB that they must have been important 3 . Alfdldi
believed Milan was the headquarters of the mobile armyd, but if this
convenient explanation is not to be taken for granted, how else can we
explain the presence of such a large concentration of cavalry?
Zosinius provides us with a clear answer. He explicitly states that the
cavalry were: ". . .posted at Milan to prevent Postumus invading Italy." The
numismatic material confirms this, since the first types extolling the
virtues of the equites appear at Milan in AD 259 s . This was a year of great
events. Not only did Postumus rebel, but earlier a large force of Alemanni,
which had been on the rampage in Gaul, crossed the Alps and were eventually
caught outside Milan6.
Alföldi was convinced that this was the first year of production for the
Milanese mint, making it impossible for these coins to have appeared any
earlier7 . However, typological evidence strongly suggests that the
1, Zos, 1.43.2
2, Zos, I4O2-3; S/IA Gall, XIV'4 & 9, In spite of this, other evidence from the Notitia and
non-literary sources suggests that the Equites Dalaatae made up a significant proportion of the new
cavalry units available to Gallienus and his generals: ci, chYIl: Equites,3, Zon, XII'25, P I 633(D) Zos, I'40 . 1 Vict, Caes, XXXIII'17-18, discussed above, p,60f:
numismatic evidence supplied by Alföldi, 'Usurpator Aureolus', llff RIC equivalents cited above, p.61
n, 1,
4, Alföldi, op. cit,, 3,5, RICV, Gall, sole, 445 & 472,
6, Alföldi, CAM XII, 154f,
7, Alföldi, 'Usurpator Aureolus', 4.
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M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum
Viminaciurn mint in Moesia was moved wholesale to Milan at around AD 255 or
256 1 , suggesting that plans for the protection of Cisalpina had been
underway some time previously. It is obvious that until 259 Fostumus was
not the enemy against whom such preparations could have been made. Instead,
they were to provide for the defence of northern Italy against incursions by
the Alemanni. This Germanic people had been troubling the empire since the
time of Caracalla, and had become a serious menace following the troubles of
the early 250s. Around AD 256, they overran the Agri Decumates, and
followed this with the extended campaign which Gallienus brought to an end
outside Milan2 . Their main line of attack was southwards through Raetia and
across the northern Alps, to enter the Po Valley at precisely those points
covered by Milan and Verona, which were fortified circa 265g . After 259, the
Alemanni did not attempt to penetrate into Italy until a full decade later.
This is crucially significant since it came ,Just at the time when the
defences of northern Italy and Raetia had been plunged into turmoil by the
usurpation of Aureolus4 . That the Alemanni remained historically quiescent
throughout the period in which cavalry are attested at Milan must be an
indication of the effectiveness of the garrison. It is worth bearing in mind
that measures for the defence of northern Italy had been under way since
approximately 255, and while cavalry probably formed a part of that picture
from the very beginning, they do not come to prominence until after the
usurpation of Postumus.
From this, the purpose of the Milan cavalry is clear. It was part of a
1, RICV1, pp.21-22,
2, 1fö1di, CAM XII, 153ff.
3 ILS 544 & 6730; V'3329
4, Alföldi, op. cii,, 156; Vict, (p/t, XXXIV'2,
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MAP 2: THE GARRISON OF NORTHERN ITALY IN THE LATE C3
/
--- .-
p- \ I /
!# 3_J;--..-.c 444
--/
S.
- -
I - -I
Pt
D
'4 g
I
.4' b5'
"'
KEY:Fortified city S Garrison A Fort
1. Milan: fortified city with cavalry & possibly legionaries; Cedrenus I454(B); Zos. I401; Zon. X1125 P I 633 CD); Alföldi, ZfN 37, 156ff; Vict.
Caes. XXX11117; RIC V1, Gall. (sole), 447, 475, 477-48 1.
2. Verona: fortified city, garrison unkown.
3. Aquileia: vexx, of Legg. XIII Gernina & 11111 ?J; V'808.
4. Poetovio: vexx. of Legs'. V Macedorilca & XIII Gernina; A1936,53, 54 & 57.
5. Praetentura Ita.Uae et Alpiurn: line of fortlets; ILS 8977.
6. Eporedia: vex, catafractariorurn; V'6784.
7. Turin: numerus Deirnatarum; V'7000 & 7001.
Map 2
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum
static garrison providing for the defence of northern Italy and tied to the
Clsalpthe territories. After the revolt of Postumus, its initial brief
against Alemannic raids was by necessity widened to include the Gallic
Empire, tying the garrison even more firmly to the Po Valley, since It was
now forced to keep watch in two directions. The force In Milan was only
part of the whole package. Eastern access Into Cisalpina was covered by
vexillations stationed at Aquileia 1 and screened by a line of forts called
the praetentura Itallae et Alplum2. A garrison at Poetovio further protected
the route from the Pannonian limes into northern Italy3. To the west, a unit
of cataphracts was stationed at Eporedia on the exit from the St. Bernard
Pass4, and a numerus Deliiatarum was eventually stationed at Turin, guarding
the Mt. Genèvre Pass, though this may have been at a later date9. The
existence of fides militum, exercitum and legi on urn series from the mint
under Gallienus also suggests that the Milan force was Itself a mixed one6,
The Raetlan troops also figured in this defensive scheme. Aurelius
Victor is emphatic upon this point, claiming that Aureolus not only
commanded the 'legions' In Raetie, but that he W85 present In the province at
the time of his rebellion'. Considering the initial purpose of the Cisalpine
garrison, this claim should hardly come as a surprise. Raetia In fact formed
the first line of defence against Alernannic incursion. Yet, given the
distances involved, it would be ludicrous to assume that the units in Milan
I, V.808,
2, ILS 8977,3, 4E,1936,53, 54 & 57,
4,V•6784,5, V . 7000 & 7001: dated to the late empire by the presence of an exarch in the unit, but the
dating can be no more precise, ci. Fiebiger, Exarc/ios, RE 1554,6, RJ'CV . I, 6a1!, (sole), 447, 475, 477-481,7,Vici, Caes, XXXIII.17,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Couiitatum
were able to react across the Alps in response to a message from Raetia,
before the Alemanni had themselves taken one of the Alpine passes. Unless
we are going to believe that the 'mobile field army' split itself into two
parts and advanced down the passes above Milan and Verona simultaneously,
we cannot assume that the force in Milan was expected to advance into
Raetia. Even without these logistical problems, once the Gallic Empire came
onto the scene, its ominous presence would have served as a deterrent to
mobility. With the Gallic Empire on its doorstep, Cisalpina had become in
effect a frontier province. If the 'field army' reacted into Raetia, it would
leave northern Italy wide open to invasion from the west; even more so If
the above point about speed of communication is rejected, since this applies
as equally to the Gallic Empire as it does to the Milan garrison. Aureolus'
jurisdiction in Raetia must have been intended to coordinate the defensive
scheme. Such a unified command will have ensured that no conflict of
purpose existed between the operations on either side of the Alps. Some
communication will have existed, if only to warn the Cisalpine troops that a
raiding party was on its way. The testimony of Aurelius Victor implies that
at the very least he was required to inspect the Raetian 11me in person,
and may have been responsible for punitive expeditions to keep the Germanic
tribes under control. Yet the fact that the commander of the troops in
Milan was also the nominal commander of the troops in Raetia was not In
Itself an indication of the mobility of the former.
In that case, why was the Milan garrison made up of cavalry? The
coinage of Aureolus so obviously labours the point that no genius is
required to identIfy it as his crucial bargaining chip. If they were not a
mobile field army, why were the cavalry in northern Italy so important? The
answer, in my opinion, lies in the geography of the situation. The Alpine
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M,C.Ibe.Ji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum
passes all debouched into the Po Valley which was dominated by two main
geographical features. The first was the River Po itself, which combined
with the River Adige and its own large tributaries to dissect the north
Italian plain, providing a series of natural obstacles which could only be
forded at specific points. Herodian testifies to the inconvenience this
caused an invading army'. The second was the very flatness of the terrain
making it perfect cavalry country. On the approach of any invasion force,
the cavalry could race ahead of it, destroying the vital bridges and
interdicting the fording places, constantly harassing the enemy in an attempt
to wear it down and influence it into a position of disadvantage where it
could be brought to battle. This is the way we see the Dalmatian cavalry
acting before and after Naissus, when they were credited with destroying
over 50,000 barbarians in a series of ambuscades2. To this extent, and to
this extent only were the Milan cavalry a mobile force. For all other
intents and purposes, the cavalry stationed in Milan and northern Italy were
no more than a highly specialised provincial garrison, tailored to take the
maximum advantage of their local environment with the minimum necessary
manpower. No wonder, then, that the single engagement attempted by the
usurper Aureolus before he hid himself in Milan was to interdict a bridge
which was later to bear his name9.
As a provincial garrison, the Milan cavalry were largely independent.
Like legionary forces elsewhere, they would have come under the control of
the emperor or his representative whenever a large-scale campaign was
conducted in the region. The material above indicates that the Imperial
1, Her, V1II'4'3,2, Zos, I'43'2,3,Vici, Caes, XXXIII'18,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatuni
representative was Aureolus himself, who sacrificed overall command only in
the presence of the emperor. This did in fact happen in AD 259 and 269
when Gallienus and Claudius campaigned against the Alemanni 1 . So even this
'independent provincial garrison' became an adjunct of the imperial army when
the emperor commanded in person.
It is also clear that the Milan cavalry cannot have been the same force
of equ.ites Dalinatae that was present at Naissus, since it was the emperor's
very preoccupation with that campaign which afforded Aureolus the
opportunity for rebellion2. Could it be, therefore, that the force at Naissus
was the 'mobile cavalry field army', which later became confused in the
sources with the 'Independent cavalry garrison' of Aureolus? To find out, we
must attempt to discover how the cavalry operated outside northern Italy, by
looking at the pattern of its use in the third quarter of the century.
Our most important source i.n this respect Is the sixth century
epitomator, Zosimus. He gives detailed accounts of every major cavalry
battle in the period, which are generally upheld by the incidental references
of other commentaries. Unfortunately, his treatment of the battle of Naissus
Is not one of his more impressive achievements. His chronology seems to
have become muddled during the chaotic circumstances of 259, causing him to
confuse the events at Naissus with similar incidents that occurred under the
emperor Claudlus IL As a consequence, the two accounts which come out of
this jumble should be taken not to describe individual engagements, but as a
general representation of the battles which occurred during the campaign.
1, Alföldi, CAM XII, 15Sf 1 Note that Aureolus was dead by 269, but his successor (Aurelian?) was
subordinate to Claudius,
2, Zos, 1 . 40 . 1; Vict, Caes, XXXIII'1S-17,
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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum
At 'Naissus', the Dalmatian cavalry constantly harassed the enemy on
their approach to the battle. The engagement itself was lost by the Romans,
but the Gothic raiders were seriously weakened and worn down by continued
cavalry harassment in the wake of the defeat 1 . Similar events preceded 'Mt.
Haemas'. Once again the cavalry skirmished with the raiders, driving them
towards the chosen battleground. Once there they were engaged by the Roman
infantry, for whom the battle went disastrously, and the Romans were only
able to escape due to the timely intervention of the cavalry2 . The picture
is of a series of unsuccessful engagements, mitigated only by a mounted
guerilla war carried out in coordination with the imperial army. A couple of
comments from the Historla Augusta serve only to add to this impression2.
Aurelian's campaigns against the Palmyrenes are depicted in a more
successful light. If we were to hazard any reason for this, it must be due
to this emperor's superior experience in command of cavalry, since Zoslinus
makes it clear that the Palmyrenes were certainly no easier to defeat. At
both Immae and Emesa, Aurellan attempted the same tactic. He knew that his
cavalry was outclassed in every respect by the Palmyrene cataphracts. They
were less skillful, less well armoured and fewer in number. Therefore, he
ordered his cavalry to skirmish with the Palmyrenes, avoiding engagement for
as long as possible, in an attempt to exhaust their heavier armoured
cli.banarii and turn the superior manoeuvrabillty and endurance of his cavalry
to advantage. At Immae, the tactic worked. Once the Pa].myrenes had been
worn down, the Romans turned on them and destroyed them. However, at Emesa,
1, Zos, I.43•2,
2, Zos, 1.45,
3, S//A, Ga/I, XI1I . 9 & Claud, IX.1-2,
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the Palmyrene cava]ry was able to catch the retreating Romans, and a
disaster was only averted by the timely intervention of the infantry'.
Several points of interest arise from these depictions. Most important
is the overriding impression that the Roman cavalry were lightly armed
skirmishing troops, which excelled at harassing their enemy but were less
capable of facing them in a knock-down, drag-out fight. Even at Mt. Haemas,
when they are supposed to have rescued the Roman infantry from disaster, it
seems probable that they engaged the Gothic force from the flanks and rear,
In the time-honoured tradition of ancient horse soldiers. In addition,
Zosimus consistently states that the Roman cavalry was inferior, both
qualitatively and quantatively, to their Palmyrene counterparts. Therefore,
the cavalry contingent cannot have been a large one. Nor was it likely to
have been an elite force, with the notable exception of the Moors (and
perhaps the Osrhoenians) for whom the sources seldom have anything but
praise2.
In most cases, neither the cavalry nor the infantry proved strong enough
to win an engagement by themselves. One usually had to support the other.
Even at Immae, it seems likely that the cavalry were actually trying to draw
the Palmyrenes towards the infantry who had been placed In reserve 3 . The
infantry should certainly not be discounted. True, it proved less than
successful against the Goths, but it was infantry which turned the tide at
1, Immae: Zos, I . 5O'2-4 Festus Breviariva XXIV'3-6, Emesa: Zos, 1 . 52 . 3 - 53 • 2; SI/A, Aur, IXV•3
tells the same story, especially if one replaces the 'supernatural agency' which is 5upposed to have
heartened the cavalry with 'Infantry support',
2, cf, Alföldi, CAM XII, 21Sf for a list of references and a somewhat over-eulogistic appraisal
of their merits,
3, But note that Zosimus says they were set apart somewhere over the Orontes River, and believes
that the cavalry achieved this victory independently: Zo5, I • 50 • 3 & 4,
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Emesa; and an earlier incident at Antioch, when the infantry was forced to
storm the heights of the suburb at Daphnae, proves that the Roman legions
were still capable of disciplined, close-order manoeuvres under fire1.
The pattern that emerges is of a lightly armoured cavalry contingent,
linked to the imperial exercitus and acting as a powerful skirmishing force.
Nobody would deny that cavalry were being used in greater numbers and more
extensively than they had been previously, but it seems clear that they were
not acting independently. They were constantly linked to the infantry
operating under imperial command, arid were most successful when operating in
conjunction with these. In this respect, the new equites of the third
century were neither independent, nor mobile, since they were always tied to
the army on campaign.
The vast bulk of the evidence comes from Zosimus, albeit with
independent confirmation. So it is vital to establish that the pattern he
has described was not a literary topos, nor a reflection of the situation in
his own day. Zosimus was essentially an epitornator. According to the ninth
century bibliophile, Photius, he copied his sources slavishly; an observation
on which modern scholars agree 2. In this we are fortunate, since his first
major source was the contemporary Athenian historian, Dexippus.
Unfortunately, the history of Dexippus only goes down to 270, and his
Scyt hi ca covered only the wars against the Goths, So for Aurelian's
campaigns against the Palmyrenes Zosimus turned to Eunapius, the self-
proclaimed continuator of Dexippus from 270 onwards. This explains the
1,Zos, I'52.1,2,Phot, &bJ, cod,98; Ridley, Zosiaus, 8yrntina flustroliensia 11(1982), intro, xiif,3 Ridley, bc, cii,
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distinct change of style which occurs in the history at approximately this
Juncture. From our point of view, the emphasis on the use of the cavalry
switches abruptly, changing focus from its activities off the battlefield to
its activities on the battlefield. Yet the image it produces remains a
consistent one of lightly armoured skirmishing troops. One further check can
be run, Eunapius was the main source for Zosimus up to AD 404, so a quick
scan of the battles described in book II should tell us whether Eunapius was
himself employing a formula.
Four battles are described between AD 312 and 324: the Milvian Bridge1;
Campus Ardiensis, called Cibalis by Zosimus2; Hadrianopolis, called the battle
of the River Hebrus by Zosimus 3; and Chrysopolis4. Since fourth century
cavalry was in general well armoured, we would expect mounted engagements
to be pitched battles, rather than the hit-and-run skirmishes favoured by
third century equite& This is exactly what we do find. At the Milvian
Bridge, both cavalry wings engaged one another, swiftly followed by the
infantry. The battle continued until Maxentius' cavalry broke, fleeing onto
the bridge which collapsed under their weight. Even though he was
outnumbered 10:1, according to figures given earlier by Zosimus, Constantine
did not skirmish with Maxentius' cavalry, but met them head-on. The figures
are obviously exaggerated, but the point remains the same; the cavalry simply
charged home. Events at the Milvian Bridge bore no resemblance to the
sophistication of Inimae or Emesa. At Campus Ardiensis, the cavalry did not
1,Zos, 11.16,2, Zas, 11.18-19,
3, Zos, I122'3-7.
4, Zos, I1.26'3,
5, 2os, fl.)5'1-2,- 73 -
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatuni
even line up on the flank, but was placed in front of the infantry and
engaged the enemy with arrows, spears and javelins. The last two accounts
are confused and lacking in comprehensible detail. Yet we have learned
enough. Eunapius was not repeating himself. Each battle was being treated
on its own relative merits, and the patterns we have established are not the
result of a literary topo&
The equites Dalmatae outside Milan were, if anything, less independent
than the cavalry under Aureolus. They operated under the direct orders of
the commander in the field, supporting and supported by the infantry on the
battlefield, and maintaining a reconnaissance in force off it. A very
definite change in the role of cavalry had indeed come about, but it has
been misinterpreted and obscured by images of the fourth century comitatus.
The mobility of this new cavalry was certainly of very high importance1.
However, the equites were not yet powerful enough to carry out the
interception role which the cavalry of the comitatus were later to achieve.
Instead, the major innovation in the third century use of cavalry was to
integrate existing methods into the traditional Roman order of battle,
employing their capacity for extended reconnaissance and swift strikes in
combined cavalry/infantry strategy, Faced with barbarians seemingly raiding
at will along the borders of the empire, Gallienus was forced to restructure
the way in which the existing army worked. The cavalry was expanded and
1, Ii should be noted that the mobility of the barbarian invaders is not a 5ignificant factor in
the equation, Only the luthungi (Vandals) of Dexippus are depicted as having a large cavalry
contingent, and even this was outnumbered by the infantry at a ratio of 2:1, The Goths were more
noted for their seaborne raids, and It is significant that when they were on land they were often
engaged in prolonged seiges, They are also depicted as having large baggage trains, which will have
slowed them down enormously, as an army can only march as fast as its slowest component: Zos, 1.24.2,
42-43 & 45'1 Dexippus frag,6; Zon, XII . 26 Syncellus p. 717ff,
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organised into new units of equltes, charged with the Job of finding the
enemy and goading it in the direction of the main imperial army. It was
mobile in that it ranged far afield to find its target. It was independent
in that it had the traditional freedom of an extended scouting force. Yet it
was not a field army. It was a loose agglomeration of individual units
subordinated to and operating from a traditional Roman army on campaign.
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1__l-1 Trditicri1 Uri1t
M,C.Ibeji. C3 Army
I V: L.EGIONE
In the earlier chapters, we established the general trends of
development which came about during the third century. Now it is time to
examine the effects of these trends upon individual troop types within the
Roman army. In the traditional manner, we shall begin with the legions.
Existing studies of later Roman legionaries usually contain the implicit
assumption that their importance was somehow diminished by the changes that
occurred within the Roman army. The image conjured up is of the empire
switching to a defensive posture for which the legion was unsuited, causing
it to lose its predominant position. As cavalry rose to the fore and the
vexillation became a permanent feature, splitting the legion into several
parts, the legion began to lose its tactical supremacy and consequently its
status. The argument is best summarised by Alföldi in his indispensible
article on the crisis of the empire; though it is put most forcefully by
Cooper, who went so far as to see this as the end of the legion, and by
MacMullen, who blamed the reforms of Septimius Severus for precipitating the
decline 1 . On the following pages, we shall examine the validity of this
assumption for the legion of the third century, merging it with the themes
of lack of manpower, the role of vexillations and the increased importance of
*, cf, also Appendix 1: 'The Antiqua Legioof Vegetius',
1, Alfôldj, CMXII (1939), 208ff; Cooper, C3 Origins of the New Roean Arwy, unpub, Oxford diss,(1967), chapter VII, entitled 'The End of the Legion' views the rise of the vexillation as the
harbinger of the legion's demise; MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian (1963), 21f, 154ff & 161ff wasconcerned more with the long-term effects of the legion's decline, but believed the rot set in at the
start of the third century,
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cavalry, which will be established later1.
A good starting point would be to determine how many new legions were
raised within the nominal timespan of our study. The end of the second
century saw a drastic need for troops, brought about by prolonged warfare
and the first (and probably worst) of a series of plagues which were to
strike the empire2. This manifested itself in part with the recruitment of
five new legions: II and III Italica, and the three Parthian legions of
Sept imius Severus. Each series was raised for different reasons; the Italian
legions were a desperate measure in response to the great barbarian invasion
of AD 167, while the Parthian legions were by comparison a less hectic
recruitment in preparation for Septimius' Parthian wars.
Ritterling observed that the raising of the Parthian legions was the
largest single recruitment of troops yet witnessed in the empire, with the
notable exception of the measures taken during the Year of the Four
Emperors4 . On the face of it, such massive recruitment would seem to
contradict the picture of manpower problems painted in the earlier chapters,
but a deeper analysis hints at complications probably caused by the
difficulty in finding the number of men required to fill the complement of
three entirely new legions.
Mommsen believed that Leglo I Parthica was raised prior to the other two
legions, basing his assumptions on the inscription of C. Iulius Pacatianus,
probably the first commander of the legion. This cites Pacatianus as:
I. ci', chh, II, VI & VII: Manpower, Vex//la tiones & Equites,2, ci', ch,II: Manpower,
3, Ritterling, 'Legio', RE 13001,4, Ritterling, op. cit., 13081,
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praefectus legionis Parthicee, the omission of the numeral suggesting that no
other Parthain units had yet been raised 1 , This would explain Septimius'
extended pause in Rome after his defeat of Clodius Albinus, since it would
be at this point that the other two legions were raised. While Septiinius'
only objective had been the subjugation of Osrhoene and Adiabene, only one
extra legion may have been felt necessary; but the goalposts were moved by
the punitive action of the Persian king, Volgaeses, who had overrun
Mesopotamia and laid seige to the city of Nlsibis 2. Suddenly, a full scale
expedition had become necessary in response to Volgaeses' activity. However,
Septimius did not immediately march east, but remained in Rome for a period
of at least six months3 . He cannot have been occupied with reprisals
against the senate for so long, and if he had already raised the troops
needed for the campaign he is hardly likely to have tarried in face of the
seige of Nisibis. His vigorous response to all other threats encountered
during his reign runs counter to such a delay. Only if he was forced to
wait for the recruitment and training of more men can we explain this lack
of decisiveness,
The raising of a further Italian legion, IV Italica, has been posited in
the reign of Severus Alexander, however evidence for such a legion is
1, XII . 1856 & p230; but cf, Murphy 1 Reign of Severus froe the Evidence of Inscriptions (1945),66 for an argument against this on technical grounds, which I believe is invalidated by the chronology
outlined in my text,
2, Dio LIIV . 9; Miller, CAll XII, 16,
3, Albinus was defeated on 19 Feb. 197, Septimius may well have celebrated a triumph on his
return to Rome, as well as the quinquenelia, though the Ludi SeecuIere5 were not celebrated until May204, Both Dio and the S/IA refer to reprisals against the supporters of Albinus while in Rome, and the
coinage of 191 shows that Septimius departed sometime during the year, presumably for the relief of
Nisibis at the end of the summer Her, IlI • 8-9; Dio LXXY • 84; S/IA 5ev, XIIl . l-7; VI . 32326-32329; RIC
IY . 1, 103ff; Miller, bc, cit.
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extremely tenuous. The only explicit reference to a Leglo IV Italica is in
the Notitia Dignit at urn, where it is listed among the legiones
pseudocornitatenses of the magister miUturn per orIentem 1 . Herodian spoke of
special levies from Italy and all the Roman provinces In preparation for
Alexander's Persian campaign; there is also epigraphic testimony of a
dilectus in Transpadanum during the reign2. The Historia Augusta claimed
that the later emperor Maxiininus was made tribune of a legion numbered IV
at this time by Severus Alexander3 . Ritterllng took this to refer to either
a Legio IV Italica or IV Parthica, and plumped for the former on the basis of
ILS 478, which refers to the novae Italicae suae of Maxirninus4 . Yet this
inscription must surely be referring to the reign of Maximinus Thrax himself,
and has no valididty for the reign of Severus Alexander. If any credence Is
to be given to the Historia Augusta whatsoever, we should follow Megle In
assuming that it has confused this tribunate with Maximinus' command of
troops on the Rhine and is referring to Legio IV F1avia, Without this to
give it direction, the other evidence could equally well indicate the creation
of an exercitus from forces in Italy and the provinces, or even more likely
an extraordinary levy to cope with the emergency. Since another inscription
attests to a recruiting drive in Italy which was definitely not linked to a
legion, the likelihood of a IV Italica having been raised at this time seems
extremely slim6.
1, Not, 01g. Or, VII•54,2, Her, V13 • 1; X . 3856 ItS 1173,3, S/IA, Mix, V.5,4, Ritter1ing RE 1329f,5, Magie Scrlptores Hlstoria Augustae III, Loeb ed,, 323 n,2,6, XIII6763 ItS 1188,
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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Legiones
Ritterling also believed that Legio I fllyricorum was raised in the third
century, by the emperor Aurelian. It appears in the Notitia Dignitatum
alongside the equites Illyriciani, which Ritterlirig assumed were placed in
the east by that emperor following his defeat of Palmyra in 272 1 . However,
I Illyricorum is not epigraphically attested until 316, and until firmer
evidence comes to light, I see no reason for dating it earlier than the
military reorganisation which took place under Diocletian2.
On similar grounds, I am lath to attribute .Zegio I Noricorurn and the
three Legiones Isaurae to a date earlier than Diocletian. I Noricorurn does
at least have one inscription which can be dated stylistically to the third
century 3 , though since all tegulae referring to the legion are of
indisputably late origin, there seems no reason to place it earlier than this
emperor4 . However, the earliest reference to the Legiones I&aurae comes
from Ammianus Marcellinus, who says Isauria was garrisoned by three legions
in AD 354g . In view of this, Ritterlirxg's assumption that these legions were
raised by Probus for his Isaurian campaign seems somewhat fanciful6.
Diocletian, as we well know, initiated a massive restructuring of the
Roman army. Contribution to the debate on the number of new legions he
created is outside the scope of this discussion, and has been dealt with in
greater detail elsewhere7 . Cooper named eight new legions definitely
1, Ritierling, RE 1406 and 'rämischen Heerwesen', Fest, C, Hirsch!elds (1903), 347; on theequites Illyriciani cf, ch,VII: Equites,
2, III6661; C/C 11 . 2941 = 1LS8875; ILS 8882,
3. 111.4803,
4, III . 4655a, 5756, 6489 & 11349.
5, Ama, Marc, XIV'2'14,
6, Ritierling, RE 1348,7, Van Berchem, L'Arse o'e Oioc]tien et la Re/one Consta/tinielrne (1952), 24ff; Parker,
'Legions of Diocletian and Constantine', IRS XXIII (1933), 175ff; A, H, M, Jones, Later Rosan Eepire(1964), 56ff; Seston, Diochtien el/a Tetrarchic (1946), 302ff; Williams, Diocletian and the RosanRecovery (1985), cap,7, 91ff,
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M.C.IbeJi: 03 Army. Legiones
created by him, and included three more probables1.
It would seem that, until Diocletian, no fresh recruitment of legions
occurred after the creations of Septitnius Severus. Even In the darkest
hours of the third century, the emperor looked elsewhere for troops with
which to meet the crisis, The question we must now attempt to answer is
whether this was due to a lack of willing citizen manpower with which to
construct new legions, or because the legions had had their day.
There were two main Incentives to join the legions: money and the social
status inherent in a lifetime career in the army. Money came in the form of
pay, regular donatives and a gratuity on discharge; the praemia mi1itia&.
The chronology of Herodian suggests that the reforms instigated by Septimius
Severus to improve conditions of service were introduced during the short
period between his defeat of Clodius Albthus and the start of the second
Parthian war3 . This is highly suggestive of measures taken to increase the
attractiveness of enlistment at precisely the point where Septimius needed
large numbers of legionary recruits. Such measures were indubitably
necessary. Salmon has demonstrated that the Roman army was constantly
plagued by problems of recruitment4 , and by the late second century these
problems had become exacerbated by hopelessly outdated rates of pay and
restrictive terms of service, not least the prohibitive length of enlistment.
Septimius could not do away with the latter if he wanted to retain a viable
fighting force, but he could and did come to terms with the other problems
1, Cooper, Origins, Appendix IV,2, Watson, Roaan Soldier (1969), 89ff, 108ff & 147ff,3, Her, 111.8-9,
4, Salmon, 'Roman Army and the Disintegration of the Empire', Trans. Royal Sac, Canada 52,ser, 111 . 2, 43ff,
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of service. Pay was increased for the first time in 100 years, and the
soldiers were granted a whole series of privileges, among them the right to
marry'. By the time of Caracalla, it would seem that both legionary pay and
the praemia rnilitiae had risen in line with inflation 2. However, inflation is
a dynamic process, and by the late third century, soldiers' pay was largely
worthless, Even as early as AD 217, free rations were being introduced to
offset the declining value of military pay, and Dio speaks of the problems
encountered by Macrinus and Elagabalus in trying to meet the wage bill of
their army4.
By contrast, the social standing of the average soldier seems to have
improved during the chaos of the third century. Septimius' oft-quoted
advice, to 'enrich the troops and scorn everyone else' 8 , was indicative of the
underlying trend wherein the military had become the harbingers of the
empire's fate. The social avenues this opened to the more able veterans
were a reflection of this fact. In a later chapter I shall show how
Septimius Severus set into motion a snowballing process which turned the
army into a springboard of advancement for anyone with the requisite
ability6. It was now possible for the son of a peasant to enter the army
and progress by this route to the very heights of power, even achieving the
purple7.
1, Her, III8 • 4-5; Birley, 'Septimius Severus and the Roman Army', Ep, Stud, 8 (1969), 63f;Murphy, Severus fro. Inscriptions, 67ff; Wai5on, Roisan Soldier, 91,
2, Dio LXXVIII • 36; Watson, bc, cii,; Webster, Roisan lisper/al Any (1979), 257,3, Callu, 'Approches Numismatiques', A//RU 11 . 2 (1975), 602ff; Cravford, 'Finance, Coinage and
Money', AiVRU 11 . 2 (1975), 568,
4, Dio LXXVIII • 36 • 2-3; Birley, 'Economic Effects of Roman Frontier Policy', BAR S109 (1981),41ff,
5, Dio LXVI'15'2, 6, cf, ch,X: Wni Militares,7, The best examples are Maximinus Thrax and Aureolus: CA/I XII, 72; PLRE Aureolu Brunt,
'Princeps and Equites', IRS 73 (1983), 48f; Gage, Classes Soda/es (1964), 259; MacMullen, Soldier andCivilian, 96f,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Legiones
There is another side to this coin, however. While, as Watson put it,
"the direction of social mobility for the soldier was normally upward"1,
especially in the east, where prior to 212 men were often granted
citizenship on recruitment due to the lack of citizen manpower 2 ; service
within the army was hard. Burn has shown that the average life-expectancy
of veterans was lower than that of their civilian counterparts, indicating
that the Roman army had "considerable success in squeezing the best out of
its men before getting rid of them." 3 , adduced by Tacitus as one of the
reasons for the mutiny of AD 14. Salmon has suggested that enlistment in
the east suffered badly from the introduction of the Constitutio Antoniniana
in 212, removing as it did the principal inducement to military services.
His thesis Is in part borne out by what is admittedly an auxiliary example.
A study of the Dura rosters by Gilliam showed a severe tailoff in
recruitment for cohors XX Palmyrenorum which immediately followed the high
spate of Aurelii that heralded the introduction of the Constitutlo
Antoniniana. This came in the wake of Caracalla's preparations for the
Parthian war of 2 14/16, and was in marked contrast to the continued regular
recruitment which had followed the war of 203/4, seeming to indicate a lack
of interest in military service once the citizenship became an automatic
right, though it should be noted that even after 216 there was a constant
trickle of Aurelli into the army6.
I, Watson, Ro.an Soldier, 154,2, Salmon, 'Army and Disintegration', 49ff
3, Burn, 'Hic Breve Vivitu p ', PP4 (1953), 10 & 16,4, Tac, ,nn, I'17,5, Salmon, op. cit,, 56,
6, Gilliam, 'Dura Rosters and the Con5titutio Antoniniana', llist pj 14 (1965), 7Sf & 83f = Ro,anAny Papers, (1986), Discussed more fully in ch,V: Auxiiiae p.lO4ff,
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M.C.Ibeji: 03 Army. Legiones
The reforms in the earlier part of the century seem to have been an
acknowledgement of the unattractiveness of military service. That they
ultimately failed Is clear from the introduction of compulsory service by
Dlocletian 1 . While the improvement of career prospects for capable recruits
may have served as inducement enough to maintain the legions at strength,
with the majority of recruits now being drawn from the Illyrian provinces2,
the system of voluntary enlistment still broke down in emergencies. At such
times, the emperor was forced either to resort to dilectus, or to use even
more drastic measures. The emperor Gallienus even went so far as to create
a new form of cavalry. Yet it is by no means clear that this action was
intended to replace the legion as the mainline unit of the Roman army. I
have already shown that the cavalry of Gallienus was designed to operate In
conjunction with, not instead of, the infantry of the legions. We shall see
that the legionary vexilletion assumed exceptional importance in the
defensive structure of the empire3.
Cooper has argued that the emergence of the vexillation as the strategic
unit of defence heralded the decline and disintegration of the classic legion
of the Principate4 . From one point of view, this makes a lot of sense. As
we shall see, the vexillat ion did play a key role in the latter part of the
third century. Cooper makes the interesting point that no legions were
recorded as destroyed during the century, despite the disastrous campaigns
1, Jones, Decline of the Ancient Vorid(1966), 213,2, Cooper, Origins, 284,3, As we have seen above (p.79), dilectus were called in Italy by Severus Alexander and during
the war against Maximinus, In the later part of the century, the usual response was to vexillate
legions from elsewhere; Gallienus responded to the problem by creating the equites DaJaatae cf,chh, III, VI & VII: Contra Coiitatwi, 'exillationes and Equites,
4, Cooper, op. cit., chapter VII: 'The End of the Legion', 288ff,
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of Severus Alexander 0 Decius and Valerian, indicating the universal use of
vexillat ions since the Marcomannic wars1.
However, the predominance of the vexillation does not automatically
prove the disintegration of the legion. In the Notitia the majority of
legions are posted wholly in the same province, though there are numerous
exceptions4 , Furthermore, even when vexillated, they usually retained the
unit title , indicating that the Roman military mind was still thinking in
terms of 'leglo' rather than 'vexillatid3. Nor should we forget that the
standard vexillation was a detachment of legionarles, so that even if the
legion was indeed losing its supreme position, the legionary soldier was
still the standard 'grunt' of the Roman army. Nevertheless, the role of the
legion had changed, and the equipment used by its individual components had
evolved with it, This is illustrated nowhere more graphically than in the
history and function of a creation of the third century era itself; that of
Leglo II Parthica.
Recruited for the second Parthian war of Sept imius Severus, II PartMca
did not remain in the newly created province of Mesopotamia as did the other
Parthian legions, but accompanied Severus back to Italy, where Albanum was
to be its official base for most of the century 4 . Modern scholars have read
a great deal into this move, seeing It either as a means of browbeating the
I, Cooper, Origins, 246f,
2, eg, V Macedonica & XIII 6eaina whose vexillation had begun in the C3, They had components
in Dacia Ripensis, Egypt and also two different comitatensian armies: Not, 01g. Or, XLII•31-39;
IXVIII . 14-15: YIl39; VIII . 38, The ratio of 'single-province' legions to 'multi-province' ones is
27:19,
3, eg, the Dac Ian legg, P Mac, & XIII Gel,, can be found within the Notitia in Dacia Ripensis,Egypt, Italy, Thrace & the field army of the eagister ailitua per orientee, The title of XIII Gee, isomitted once, though it is cited 6 times (V//ac is cited 7): Not, Dig, Or, VII•39; VIIl . 38; XXYIII•14& 15; XLII'31-39, Legio XIII is unnamed in VIII.38,
4, Dio LV . 24 . 4; Ritterling, RE 1308 & 1478; Durry, Cohorte5 Prétoriennes (1938), 35 & 169,
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senate and "depressing the status of Italy" 1 , or as a "significant
foreshadowing" of the comitatensian armies of Diocletian 2. Neither view is
attractive, though it will be necessary to illustrate why before we can go
on to examine its true function in the scheme of things.
By AD 198, Septimius had nothing to fear from the senate. His purges
following the death of Albinus had removed all those likely to stand in his
way3, and it is moot point whether the senate had ever posed any real threat
to him. Even if such enforcement had been necessary, he hardly needed to
bring a legion back from the east to do the job, since he had on his
doorstep the men of the newly reconstructed Praetorian Guard, each of whom
owed him a personal debt of gratitude for their advanceinent. On his
victorious accession, Severus had made a point of removing his armour before
entering the gates of the city, despite the triumphant circumstances of his
arrival. This was hardly the action of a man contemptuous of Rome, If
Severus had wanted to snub the Senate, he had other more profitable means
at his disposal than bringing a legion onto Italian soil.
Platnauer in 1918 saw the existence of a legion at Albanum as a
precursor to the defensive field armies created by Diocletian. The argument
hinges upon the increase in numbers of the Praetorian Guard mentioned by
Herodian and quantified by Durrr. It views this, coupled with the Parthain
legion, as a force of some 30,000 troops within easy reach of the emperor
and acting as a central defensive reserve. The prosopographical records of
1, Miller, C.QH XII, 24; Fluss 1 'Septimius Severus', RE 1981; Besnier, VEipire Rouin,,, (1937),114,
2, Platnauer, Septilius Severus (1918), 162f Birley, 'Severus & the Roman Army', 66ff,3, Oio LXXV . 8; Herodian III8 . 6-8; SHA Severus XlII'1-7,4, Ourry, Priioriennes1 81ff,
5, Herodian 111 . 13 . 4; Durry, bc, cit,
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several of Septixnius' most prominent generals have been used as a "further
indication of the de facto field army in being", and two passages from Dio
are also taken to illustrate the Severan use of cavalry as an "independent
striking force" in the manner of Gallienus and his successors1.
The main factor against this argument is the sheer immobility of the
Roman legion. The legionary was siinpiy not equipped to act as the member of
a mobile task fore, his panoply being too heavy and cumbersonie 2. Septimius
and his successors were most successful against accessible enemies who
either came out to meet them, as in the civil wars, or had an immobile focal
point which could act as a strategic objective, such as Ctesiphon in Parthia.
Against the more fluid tactics of the barbarians, they had to forgo the
power of the legions for the mobility of native troops such as the Osrhoeni
or the Moors. Only when the barbarians stopped to fight could the legions
be put to good use3. If II Parthica had been intended as a defensive force,
it would have been stationed In northern Italy, as was the cavalry of
Gallienus some fifty years later, As it was, a force of heavily arinoured
infantry stationed near Rome was in no position to provide quick help to any
likely trouble spot.
The prosopography cited In support of this theory merely names the dux
of a particular army for a particular series of campaigns. They provide
reasonable evidence for the use of vexillations during the civil wars, in
much the same way that Trajan or Marcus Aurelius had used detachments in
1, Oio LXXV • 7'4 LXXVI'6'8 Birley, 'Severus and the Army', 66ff,
2, cf, below (p.91) for a lull discussion of the changes undergone by Roman legionary equipment
during the century,
3, Dio UXVIII . 14 on Caracalla's campaign against the Cenni in 213 AD,
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their wars. In no way do they suggest the permanent retention of such a
force after the crisis had passed 1 . The passages from Dio are also
concerned with the civil wars, and simply show L. Valerius Valerianus
outflanking Pescennius Niger at the battle of Issus, a standard ancient
cavalry tactic, and a certain Laetus In command of the cavalry holding back
until he could see who was going to win the day, also standard practice if
you take a cynical view of the world. Later in the reign Laetus was
executed for his pains2.
The real function of II Parthica was, however, very similar to the idea
of a defensive reserve. As Luttwak showed, the old system of 'preclusive'
defence on which Septimius was forced to rely assumed that all threats would
be met by sufficient force on the outer cordon of the empire3. The
campaigns of the Seven were mainly intended to defuse the threat of
invasion by carrying the war to the potential aggressor 4 , but for this they
needed troops. In bringing back II Parthica to Italy, Septimius created not a
defensive reserve, but en offensive onet a nucleus of troops, sade up of the
Praetorians and the Parthian legion, which could be taken by the emperor on
campaign to satisfy the need for troops over and above those in the border
provinces concerned. Of these, II Parthica was by far the most important,
since the primary function of the Guard on campaign, even during the third
century, was to safeguard the person of the emperor5.
I, P1,? II, C 823, C 878 & I 1566; 1L52935 & 1141; AE1957,123 all cited in Birley, 'Severus and
the Army', 67, Also cf, ILS 1153 n,6 and AE 1890, 82 which go some way towards clarifying the problems
identified by Birley with Claudius Gallus and C, lulius Castinus,
2, Herodian lII7 . 4 and note I,
3, Lutiwak, grand Strategy of the Roean Lip/re (1976), ch, 2,4, With the probable exception of Caracalla's Parthian war, cf, Miller, CHXII, 48ff,
5, Campbell, fiperor and the Roian 4ray (1984), 114f,- 88 -
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Apart from the Parthian war, Septimius never needed to use this reserve
himself. There were enough local troops available to satisfy the
requirements for his British campaign, with additional troops being drawn
from Germany, which was more convenient than transporting an entire legion
from Italy 1 . His successors, on the other hand, made full use of the legion.
its presence is attested at Antioch under Macrinus2, where it must have been
participating in Caracalla's Parthian war. Similarly, it was caught up in the
conflict between Maximinus Thrax and the senate. Some of its soldiers were
responsible for the assassination of the former3 , The legion had obviously
been part of his Dacian army prior to h18 march on Rome. It would also seem
to have been used across the Danube by Severus Alexander 4 . The legion was
also one of four mentioned on the V P(la) V F(idells) coinage of Gallienus,
which Maria Alföldi believed dated to that emperor's campaigns on the Rhine
in 257/86. There are therefore good instances of II Parthica being used as
an offensive core to which vexillatlons could be attached, and it is clear
that its presence in Italy was not of paramount importance.
Under Gallienus, a vexillat ion of the legion is found alongside a
detachment from III Augusta, sub cura Au,-. Augustiani ducis iustissimi at
Lychnidus on Lake Ochrid in Macedonia6 . It has been suggested that they
were part of an exercitus campaigning against the Gothic invasion of AD2677.
1, XlII'3494; Her, III'14'3, ri 'a1eria Pictrix does not seec to have been involved, Breeze,Northern Frontiers of Rosaii 8ritain (1982), 135ff,
2, Dio LXXIX'34,
3, Ensslin, CAHXII (1939), 80,4, Ensslin, op. cit., 71,
5, M, Alföldi, Liies Congress 1957 (1959), summarised in Cooper, Orig/ns, 234ff & 266ff, cf,ch,Vl: Vexiliationes, p.147 for a full discussion,
6, AE 1934, 193; ,,, vex/il, leg, Ii Perth, III Aug. sub cure Aur, Atigustiani duds iustissiei et', tRYJuII Syn for/an, praep, vex/I/a I 10 Inue,,,
7, PLRE, August/anus 2 Pflaum, Carriêpes Procuratoriennes (1960), 919ff,
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Yet while a vexillat ion of II Parthica could plausibly be involved in such a
campaign, it seems inconceivable that the African legion could have been
transported to the area fast enough to respond to such an emergency. The
only reasonable explanation is that the vexillation of III Augusta was
already at Lychnidus before the Gothic troubles erupted. If this is so, it
is also more probable that II Parthica had been vexillated into the area at
the same time, in accordance with the custom of stationing vexillations in
pairs which seems to have been prevalent 1 . This then leads to the
inescapable conclusion that, far from being moved into the area in response
to the Gothic threat, the force in Lychnidus was part of a garrison force
established to defend the Illyrian passes. Like Aureolus in Italy2,
Augustianus would have had responsibility for the protection of the
Macedonian hinterland, charged with preventing incursion from Illyricum into
Greece. As such, this marks a distinct change In the role of Leglo II
Parthica, with significant consequences for the role of legions as a whole.
II Parthice was the core of imperial offensive capability. By vexillating
this into a defensive mode, Gallienus had unconsciously signalled a
fundamental change in imperial thinking. No longer was the army expected to
protect the empire through a series of punitive measures. Instead, it was
being converted into the first approximation of what Luttwak classified as
'defence-in-depth's . The punitive wars of Aurelian were the last truly
offensive operations of the third century, and even these were in response
to Gothic invasion and Pa].myrene usurpation.
1,111 . 954 & 3228; V808; 419O1,154; 41935,164; AE,193653,54 & 57,2,Zos, I . 40 . 1 cf, chil: Contra Coiltatwi,
3, Lutiwak, 6rano' strategy, 132ff,4,Alföldi, CA/IXII, 152 & 302ff.
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In response to these changes, the equipment of the legionary soldier
evolved to meet the new demands. To date, the only systematic study of
these changes has been In a short article by J. C. Coulston, though I am
reliably informed that a thorough study of third century military equipment
Is currently underway in Oxford'. Such a study Is long overdue.
Coulston relies heavily on funerary monuments because, as he puts it:
The sculptural monuments of Rome are quite useless for thIrd century equipment studies, The
arches of Severus are very heavily stylised in the large panels and hopelessly conservative in
the soldier-prisoner pedestal rel:ef5, The Constantinian panels on the Arch of Constantine are
for the most part the product of sarcophagus sculptors and the style is not concerned with small
details,,, 2
Where the Arch of Constantine is concerned, one can go further and show
that certain of its representations were direct copies from the column of
Marcus Aurelius, completely nullifying their usefulnes&. By contrast,
Coulston's study highlights the close parity between funerary monuments and
the archaeological record. In particular, he noted the absence of round
chapes (scabbard trimmings) on British tombstone depictions, which do not
occur in the province's archaeological record, though they are common
elsewhere in the empire4.
The rise of the vexillation seems to have coincided with the development
of a new panoply, markedly different from that of the early Principate. The
infantry paenula is replaced by the shorter cavalry cloak, the sagum. A
1, Coulston, 'Roman ilitary Equipment on Third Century Tombstones', &QR $336 (1987), 141ff,
Simon James' study in London has never been published: Esmonde-Cleary & Tomlin perse, coma,
2, Coulston, op, cit., 145,
3, RobInson, Ariour of J'speriai Roie (1975), plates 498 & 499 on p.185,4, Coulston, 143 & nil,
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long-sleeved tunic is worn, gathered at the waist by a wide belt (the
cingulura) which Is fastened at the front by "an almost ubiquitous 'ring-
buckle" 1 , This buckle was to become the distinguishing feature of military
dress to the extent that the Praetorians cashiered by Septimius Severus had
their belts removed2.
The sword was of variable length, though the spa tha may have become
more prevalent as the century wore on. Of greater importance was its
method of attachment. No longer was it suspended statically from the right
hip, but it was now slung on a baidric from the left, and was attached to
the cingulum by a slide3. Such a suspension suggests a more open style of
fighting. Traditional Roman close order tactics required that the soldier
put his weight behind the shield, which was obviously designed to shoulder-
barge an enemy. When such a method Is adopted, it is clearly more sensible
to suspend the sword from the right hip, where it will not be impeded by the
pushing and shoving of the shield. Consequently, a shift of suspension to
the left hip, coupled with the lengthening of the sword, is indicative of a
change in tactics to a more open, fencing style of combat. Since the shields
depicted progressively lose the distinctive shape of the scuturn becoming
broader and squatter, and pila are gradually replaced by hastae or shorter,
barb-headed weapons, such a switch of tactics seems assured4.
Consistent with such a change would be the abandonment of lorica
segmentata. This classic suit of Roman armour seems always to have been
1, Coulston, op. cit (n,l above), 141f,
2, Her, II'13'1O Coulston, 149,
3, Coulston, 143 & 147f,
4, Couleton, 141 & 148, Note that the neck guards of legionary helMets also increased in size:
Robinson, Ariour of LeperiI Roae,
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more difficult to maintain than other types of lorica, and Robinson's study
has illustrated how it had become increasingly less elaborate throughout its
history 1 . Various furierary depictions suggest that lorica hamata (chain
mail) was never completely phased out of fashion, and while Robinson is of
the opinion that the Tropaeum Tralani depicts chain- and scale-clad
legionaries because of the peculiar weaponry used by the Dacians 2 , my own
personal belief is that it is a more accurate representation of the true
state of affairs than the classic public monuments at Rome. The last
depiction of a suit of lorica segmentata comes from the Arch of Severus
dated AD 203, and the first datable evidence for the third century panoply
comes from AD 211, on which the sagum and ring-buckle are represented4.
Lorica segmentata seems specifically tailored to the classic Roman order of
battle, wherein the lower part of the torso and the legs were covered by the
scutum and therefore did not have to be protected. It is therefore highly
likely that as a more open style of combat began to be practised, this
somewhat quirky mode of protection should fall by the wayside. Certainly, by
the late fourth century the only remnants of laminated armour were banded
protections for the limbsB.
As the history of II Part hi ca has illustrated, the function of the
legions had changed dramatically by the later third century. No longer
I, Robinson, Ariour of liperial Roae 177ff & 181,2, Robinson, op. cii,, 159f & 169ff,
3, For an article in support of my own particular prediudices, cf, Coulsion, 'The Value of
Trajan's Column as a Source for Nilitary Equipment', 9AR S476 (1989), 31ff, Lepper & Frere concur
with Richmond's view that the Tropaeui was roughly hewn by local sculptors, This does not negate itsvalue as evidence compared to Trajan's column in Rome 1 which despite the Maestro's conscientious
approach still adopted 'artistic convention to clarify the narrative': Trujan's Coluan (1988), 266 &298ff,
4, Robinson, 183; Coulston, 'Equipment on C3 Tombstones', 143,
5, Not, Dig, Or, Xl'2; Not, Dig, 0cc, IX'2,
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expected to undertake continual punitive campaigns across the frontiers, they
had become heavily vexillated, spread thinly over the empire in an attempt to
cover as many major routes of access into the hinterland as possible. The
emperors were unable to rest on their laurels however. They were if
anything even more busy than they had been in earlier centuries, required to
respond to incursions throughout the empire which gradually escalated to
endemic proportions. To face these threats, they would hastily assemble an
army of vexillations, later coupled with cavalry, and move to intercept the
invader. It is worth reiterating that nowhere is there firm evidence that
the same force of equites or vexillationes was being used for each campaign,
In fact, what little evidence we have is precisely contrary to this
assumption'. Nonetheless, the legions were required to change in response
to their new circumstances, and their equipment became tailored to a freer-
flowing, more open style of combat.
This should not be taken to indicate a fall in discipline or capability2.
Nor does it herald the end of the legion9. As late as 272, when combined
cavalry/infantry tactics would seem to have become the normd, the emperor
Aurelian was still able to command his infantry to storm the suburb of
Daphnae in Antioch (a steep height occupied by Palmyrene soldiers) in tight
formation, with their shields held close togethers. This sounds extremely
I, All relevant material is cited and discussed throughout chapters III & VI: Contra Coaifatusiand Vexillationes, in which I have proven that the equifes at Milan were not the same force of equitescampaigning in the Danube, and questioned the validity of numismatic evidence for determining the
composition of armies,
2, MacMullen, bc, cit, (above p76),
3, Cooper, Origins, cap,VII,4, ci, ch,III: Contra Coiitatua 70ff,5, Zos, I.52'l-2,
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like a test udo In action. Even If It is not, the success of the operation
proves that the Roman legions were still capable of tightly disciplined
close-order marioeuvres under fire. Cooper himself showed that as late as
Valerian and Gallienus, the unity of the legion was still assured 1 . When
Legio III Augusta was recalled, It set up inscriptions commemorating the
reintroduction of several of its traditions. A retiring Pr-linus Pilus
dedicated a statue to Mars In the time-honoured way 2 , and the tabularium
principis was restored by the optiones of the first cohort s . At the same
time, a further inscription Illustrates that the system of shuffling optiones
up the file of cohorts In order was still in operation 4. This indicates that,
despite being vexillated into Macedonia on a semi-permanent basisE, Legio III
Augusta still retained Its own unit identity and customs. The legion had
not come to an end, but It had come to a watershed, and had developed
accordingly. The fact that Diocletlan was still creating units which styled
themselves Legio (albeit of a possibly smaller size6 ) illustrates the
continued importance of the legion into the fourth century, both as an
organisation and as a fighting unit.
1, Cooper, Origins, 2751,
2, ILS 2296,
3, ILS 2446,4, ILS 531, linked to ILS 2446 above by naming the lowest ranking optic of the latter as an
optio in a different cohort,5, Al, 1934, 193 discussed above, p.901,6, Duncan-Jones has shown that the size of legions within the Panopolite nome of the Thebaid
could have been as little as 500 men, One should remember that III Diocletiana, his main example is
listed in five places within the Notitia (three within the Thebaid alone), It is entitled 111
Olocletiana Thebaeorwa in the coiltatus of the aagister cilifu, per Thracias which is more likely tohave been a vexillation of the legion than a separate citation of the legion, If each known
detachment of the legion was approx, 500 strong the legion would be half the size of a legion of the
Principate, If, however, vexillations were of variable size (which seems more likely) the stump of
the legion could have been somewhat larger, Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Oiocletian's Army',
Chiron 8 (1978), 541ff; Not, Dig, Or, YIII • 37; XXVIII . 18; XXXI'31, 33 & 38.- 95 -
V: AUXIL.IA NUMERIQUE
The development of the Auxilia following the reign of Trajan is a topic
of such enormous scope that one cannot hope to do it just ice in the space of
a single chapter. Ideally, it should be the subject of an independent study,
wherein the creations of Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, the Seven and their
successors would be discussed, and their movements along with those of
already existing units could be charted. As it is, this chapter can only
scratch the surface of the monster by trying to answer those questions which
are pertinent to the subject in hand. No attempt has been made at
comprehensivity, nor do I make any claim to definitiveness. I merely hope to
have provided some general answers to general questions which have relevance
to the third century as a whole.
In his study of the Auxilia, Cheesman concluded that the pressures of
the third century resulted in the breakdown of old distinctions between the
legions and auxiliaries, as permanent field armies came to the fore and those
units which remained on the frontier diminished in status'. In this vein,
the Auxilia and the 'old style' numeri have become eclipsed In modern
commentaries by what is variously termed 'the rise of the ethnic units' or
'the barbarisation of the army', so much so that by the time of Gallienus,
they have been completely discounted in favour of the new 'elite' forces of
ethnic cavalry which have become ubiquitous In any discussion of the later
1, Cheesman, Auxilia of the Roian laperial Any (l914) 133ff esp, 136f,
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third century 1 . The main function of this chapter is to view this
assumption from the perspective of the Auxilia, I shall attempt to ascertain
when 'true' auxiliary units ceased to be recruited, where they were
stationed, and how they were used. Some discussion of their size must needs
be included, as must an analysis of the effect of the Constitutio Antoniniana
upon auxiliary recruitment. I shall end by charting the survival of pre-
Diocletianic units into the Notitia Dignita turn, before going further in a
following chapter to use this document as a basis upon which to found a
study of the equites supposed to have replaced the old order.
As with the legions, I shall begin by identifying those units newly
raised in the late Principate. Given the deplorable state of the evidence, it
seems a minor miracle that any records of new units survive at all. Around
the date AD 145, a drastic downturn occurs in the epigraphic record, and the
previous flood of inscriptions concerning the Auxilia becomes a niggardly
trickle. This is partially offset by the more detailed evidence now produced
by third century papyri, such as the Dura archive and the Beatty papyri from
Penopolis; but even here the evidence is perforce parochial, and largely
limited to the first and last quarters of the century respectively. The
emphasis provided by such a corpus is of heavy recruitment under the
Antonines and the Seven, followed by a severe tail-off in the mid third
century. If this is a truly accurate picture, it is an important confirmation
of the generally held thesis outlined above. Yet it could be a view
distorted by the lack of relevant material. A closer look is required before
, Mö1di, C48 (1939), 210; Cheesman, bc, cit. (p96); Dc Bbois, Policy of Me(iperor 6allienus (1976), 26ff; Speidel, 'The Rise of Ethnic Units in the Roman Imperial Army', ANR'11 . 3 (1975), 202ff, RoianArayPupers(1984), 117ff,
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any conclusions can be reached.
The high spate of units with the kaiser'beiname 'Aurelia' are mainly
clustered in the south-eastern provinces of Illyricuni, centered upon Moesla
Superior 1 . Why this should be so is a mystery. It cannot have been in
preparation for the Marcomannic war, since for that they should have been
gathered in Pannonia, and it is clear that certain of these units remained in
Moesia for decede8. The only known creation of Marcus in Pannonia was cob.
II Aurelia Dacoruir1', and that was stationed in Poetovio, well away from the
front. It is also unlikely that they were raised in response to losses from
the greet plague of the 160s, for though we know that the plague swept
throughout the empire, there is no indication that it was especially bad in
Moesia. If, as is believed, it was brought back from Farthia by the
expedition of Lucius Verus, we would expect the brunt of Its effect to have
been felt in the eastern provinces, yet there is no indication of any great
Antonine recruitment in the east,
It is possible that since Moesia Superior was the closest well-
garrisoned province to Pannonia, its legions, IV Fla via and VII Claudia, were
required to provide more troops to the Marcomannic war than was the norm.
I, cf, Table A1 Awxiiia first appearing after AD 16/, and A2: Auxilia of dubious date orprovenance, Due to the limited scope of this study, the units of the C2 have not recieved thedetailed analysis they deserve, The creations of Marcus Aurelius have recieved only the most
perfunctory treatment, and those of his predecessors have not been examined at all,
2, Coh, 11 Aur°.Iia nova ii), eq. CR, first appeared on the Moesian/Dal3atian border in 179, Itwas still there, in Sto j nik ( j ust south of Singidunum) under Caracalla, though there are indications
that at least part of the unit had been moved to Thracia by Marcus: 111 . 14537 & 14541; AF,1901,24;
1910,98 & 1955,65, Cob, II Aurelia Dardanorwi iii, eq. was in the area around Ravna (slightly northof Naissus) from the time of Its first appearance until AD 242: 111 . 14556 & 14576; AF,1902,31;
1903,288 & 290; 1904,92; 1910,93, 94 & 97; 1952,189-191,
3, 1I115l84", Poetovzo in Pannonia Superior,
4, For a good synthesis if the sources on the plague, cf, Gilliam, 'The Plague Under Marcus
Aurelius', A/PM!, 73(1961), 227ff Roean Any Papers (1986), 229ff cf, ch,11: Manpover,- 98 -
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
Despite being sheltered behind the buffer of Dada, the province was still
open to barbarian incursion: the Marcomannic war had been ushered in by
troubles all the way along the Middle Danube'. Marcus may have felt it
prudent to replace the drain on Moesia's legionary garrison with newly
created auxiliary units. This would explain the large proportion of milliary
units found in the area1 and also the appearance of coh. II Aurelia nova inil.
eq. CR. in 179; which probably acted as the counterbalance to a suggested
extra levy of legionaries required for the push planned Just prior to Marcus'
death2.
By far the largest recruitment came under the Severan dynasty. Thirteen
out of the twenty-six new units recorded come from the period between 198
and 238. Nine of these are 'ethnic', in that they have been drawn from
recruiting grounds hitherto tapped only for numeri if at all. Prominent
among them are the Moorish units and units of eastern archers, both of which
first became part of the regular Auxilia at this juncture. Septirnius Severus
created the milliary units coh. I 1-lemesenorum sag. and cob. I nova
Severiana Surorum sag., and probably recruited the series of Moorish cohorts
of which we know cohortes 11 and 1X4. Under his successors, these troops
became so important that they may have gained household status, and even
acted as kingmakers on more than one occasions, In particular, Osrhoenian
1, Weber, 'The War in Germany', CA/I XI, 349ff,
2, Weber, op, cit.
3, This does not include 'dubious' units such as the ala Paiyrenorui in Dacia, the alaAtectorigiana in Pamphylia and the cob, Partborui on the Jiies Tingitana, which should probably bedated to the Seven: AE,1974,565b; 1926,74 & 75; 1956,62,
4, Cl, Table Al, ii Mauroriii is first atested in 235, but must surely be part of the seriesincluding II Haurorue from AD 208,
5, Her, VI1'1 • 8 & VIlI • 1 . 9; S//A iYa IIl; Syncellus p674; Alfäldj, CA//XII, 73 & 199f; Speidel,'Ethnic Unhi g ', 211ff; on the eqwite.c iteeque pedites Maur cf, chh, III & VII Contra Coeltatirn andEqute5pp,63 & 164,
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archers and Moorish Javelinmen figure promInently in the accounts of all
wars from 213 onwards 1 . Yet the last known recruitment of these into the
regular Auxilia is the coh. mi.Z, Maurorum eq. first attested in Aquincum i-n
2352 . The lack of numerals for this and another less securely dated coh.
quingenaria Maurorum eq.3 suggest that they were not part of the sequence
created by Septimius Severus. The milliary cohort bears the gentilicium
Maxirni(nlian(a) on one of its corroborating inscriptions 1 which suggests that
it may have been stationed in the area by that emperor in the wake of his
successful Alemannic war, though it seems most likely that it was originally
raised by Severus Alexander or his predecessors.
Indeed, the high numerals on some of the Severan inscriptions are
unusual. Throughout the early Principate, most large sequences were in the
region of eight units strong: the only exception to this being the cohoi-tes
Gallorum. Yet even these only went as high as XI 4 . In contrast, under the
Seven we find the cohortes IX Maurorum, XII Palaestinorum and X.'(
Palmyrenorum mu. In the latter case, the large numbers, especially linked to
a milliary unit, have prompted commentators to posit a composite series in
support of which not only the units already mentioned are cited, but even
alae and cohortes from the Notitia Dignitatuffls.
1, Dio LXXVIII'J41; 32; Her, 1I13 • 4-5; 92; IV'lS • I; VI7 • 8; VlI'2 . 1-2; Vl1l • 1'3; Zon, XIJ•24;
Zos, 1 . 15; 20 5l'2-3,
2, IIL3444, 3542, 3545, 20673 & 10375,
3, 111 . 3324, Lusonium, Pann, Inf, Mention should also be made of 111 . 9539 from Dalmatia,
containing the title ,.,Hairorus,,,, though without any further corroborating evidence ii is
impossible either to date it or state what kind of unit these Moors were,
4 Holder, Sfiio'ies in the Auxilia of the Roaeii Any fros Augustus to Ira/an, BAR S70 (1980),Appendix III, esp, 221, I have discounted the many cohortes Yolwntanioniia which were recruited atdifferent times throughout the history of the empire,
5. Gilliam, 'The Cohors IX PaThyrenorut its History', Oura Final Report V . 1: The parcheents aPapyri (1959), 27 Rocan Any Papers (1986), 212; E, Birley, 'Septimius Severus and the Roman Army',(p. Stua 8 (1969), 68,
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M.C.IbeJi; C3 Army. Auxilia
Gilliam claimed that:
,,,it is quite Incredible, first, that so many cohorts would have been raised at one time from
the territory of Palmyra, especially sinc, it continued to supply men for units of other types
and, secondly, that nineteen other Palmyrene cohorts should have left no trace of their
existence,
Yet we know from its later history that Palmyra was quite capable of
raising an army which could see off the Persians and challenge the Romans,
proving that its manpower base was strong2. Southern has shown that while
occasional levies of Pelmyrenes may have been sent to maintain the eastern
flavour of numer'i elsewhere in the empire, troops in these units were also
recruited locally3 , so that Palmyr&s commitments to units of other types was
negligible in terms of manpower.
Mann made the suggestion that the cohort was a native Palmyrene unit
stationed at Dura which was seconded into the Roman army when Syria was
split into two, and Dura and Palmyra found themselves In different
provinces4 . This has the virtue of explaining why there are no other extant
cohortes Palmyrenorum, as well as giving a reason for the unusual
organisation of the cohort 6 . However, it does not explain why coh, XII
Palaestinor'um, recorded in P.Dura 30, should be the only extant unit in
1, Gilliam, bc, cit (n,5 above),
2, Zos, 1 . 39; l'44 & 1 . 50-61, while it is clear that the raising of an army for campaign is
something of a different order to providing a permanent standing force of 10,000-20,000 men, Zosimus
doe5 make it clear that the Palmyrene army was itself a sizeable force before its combination with the
remnants of Valerian's eastern troops,
3, Southern, 'The Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army', Britannia XX (1989), 90 & 91,4, cf, Isaac, Litits of Eapire (1990), 144 n,221, In a similar vein, Augustus cobbled together
the Leglo XXII Delotariana from 2 native legions created by King Deiotarus of Galatia, to aid Caesaragainst Pharnaces after the battle of Pharsalus: Caes, Bell, Qle. XXXIV . 4; Parker, Roaa Legions, 64&88f,
5, cf, below p,T21f
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
the Palestinian series1.
A composite series is certainly not the answer, since it creates more
problems than it solves whilst flying directly in the face of Roman
convention. Why, we must ask, were the cohortes I Septimia Bel&arvm, I mu.
Hem esen orum and I mu, nova Severiana Surorum sag. not included in the
composite sequence, especially since the latter two are found in the same
province? How does this explain XX' Palmyrenorum being a milliary unit? It
does not.
My own point of view favours a partial acceptance of Mann's hypothesis.
The suggestion that the unit was part of the native Pa]inyrene militia simply
solves too many associated problems to be overlooked. The hypothesis
assumes that at some point at least nineteen other units existed under the
Palinyrene standard. In view of what has already been said about Palmyra's
capability for warfare, I do not see this as a problem, especially since the
city had maintained a long-term military presence to secure its caravan
routes as early as AD 54. Nor need its units have been all as large as XX
Palmyrenoz-um, since we are not dealing with a Roman convention here2. In
view of the discussion in earlier chapters about the third century military
situation, it would seem only natural for Septimius Severus to incorporate
Palmyrene forces into the Roman army on Its elevation to a coloni&. As to
1, A co/,ors /111 ?alaestinorus is cited in the Notitia (Or, XXXIV . 46, Palaestina), and if we take
this into account, we must also explain the presence of an ala VIII Palayrenoru. in Not, Dig, Or,XXXI . 49, the Thebaid,
2, On the Palmyrene presence along the Euphrates, both before and after Roman intervention 1 cf,
Isaac, Liiits or Eapire (1990), 150f, esp, n,239, Only on their incorporation into the Roman armywould the units need to be organised along vaguely Roman lines, as was IA' PaIiyrenorue, ISRR 1033
mentions a vex, Paliyrae a'egentibus in the city itself in AD 242/3, On the internal structure, cf,
below p.121,
3, cf, chh,Il, VI & IV Manpower, Vexillationes a Legiones, Palmyra was given the colonia tunaIta/ici some time during the late 190s, though whether this was before Severus' Parthian war or after
i5 debatable: Isaac, Liiits of Empire, 144; Miller, CAM XII I 18,
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M.C.Ibe,Ji: C3 Army. Auxilia
their survival into the epigraphic record, approximately 510 auxiliary units
are recorded throughout the first two centuries AD, When, compared to this,
only 26 unequivocal references can be found to units created in the third
century, it seems to me more inconceivable that we should expect to find
records of other Palmyrene units than the fact that we do not, Indeed, we
should consider ourselves lucky that the Dura rosters have revealed to us
another two hitherto unknown series, rather than begrudging the dearth of
information concerning them. We shall see later that only one post-Hadrianic
unit is actually recorded as having survived into the Notitia Dignitatum, and
even that only tentatively 1 . To reiterate my comment at the start of this
section, it is a minor miracle that any records survive at all.
Nevertheless, the relatively high influx of auxiliary units posited under
the Seven remains unusual. There may have been a heavy recruitment to
replace the losses of the late second century. In the forty years between
160 and the end of the century, the empire had experienced two great
plagues, a civil war, two Persian wars and a barbarian war which had dragged
on for fifteen years; not to mention the internecine raids and usurpations
which had to be stamped out. Parts of the army were probably battered
almost beyond recognition, and Sept imius Severus was the first emperor since
Marcus Aurelius who either cared enough or had the time to put it back
together again. Added to this general state of decline, new recruits were
probably needed to meet with the strategic requirements created by
Septimius' actions in the east and in Africa. He had already raised three
I, Coh, I Ai,eIiana, which was possibly the coh, Piaasens(iva) iure(1iana) of ñ19O8,136: Not,
01g. Or, XL48.
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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
new legions to cope with the situation, and the high numerals of his
auxiliary levies probably reflect the large amount of new troops brought in
to support these and fill the gaps elsewhere. We shall see later how this
related to Africa.
The effect of the Constitutio Antoniniana is of importance here. Thanks
to the sterling work of Gilliam on the Dura rosters, Salmon's thesis that the
grant of citizenship removed the principle inducement for service can now be
tested 1 . An analysis of Gilliam's figures show the following enlistment
pattern:2
DATES MAJOR IV1ENTS
PEDITES EQUES DROMEDARII
192-196 civil wars & let Parthian war 16 62 12
197-201 second Parthian war 29 114 2
202-206 Severus in Africa 135 131
1
207-211 Severus in Britain
53 12
1
212-216 Constitutio & Caracalla's PW 282 19 13
217-221 Macrinus and Elagabalus 14 0 1
Too many external factors are in operation for any definitive statements
to be made. Caracafla's Parthian expedition was abortive, so that despite
the heavy recruitment of AD 214 to 216 there was no corresponding upswing
in casualties, meaning that the unnaturally low enlistment figures for the
five year period 217-221 may be simply the cause of the unit's natural
recruitment patterns. On the other hand, the emperor Macrinus did suffer a
1, 6ilIiam, 'Dura rosters and the Cons^iiutio Antoninalana', H/utopia 14(1965), 74ff = RosanAny Papers (1986), 289ff; Salmon, 'Roman Army and the Disintegration of Empire', Trans. Royal Soc,Canada 52, ser, 111 . 2, 43ff,
2, Based on the figures extrapolated by Billiam from P,Dura 100 & 101,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
reverse near Nisibis in Mesopotamia soon after his accession 1 , so some
casualties may have been incurred, It should also be borne in mind that
even after the unit had recovered from the losses of Septimius Severus' wars
with the recruitments of 202-206, it was still recruiting over 50 people
while Severus was otherwise occupied in Britain.
What cannot be ignored is the fact that the figures for 217-221 are the
first post Cons titutlo statistics which were not directly affected by the
preparations for Caracall&s Parthian war, and they show the lowest rate of
enlistment in the entire sequence. According to Gilliam's calculations 2, the
figures for the equites are lagging ten years behind those for the pedites,
so that they actually represent the state of a specific group of veterans
and should be removed from the calculation, Even were this not the case,
the rate of enlistment for equites in AD 222, the last year covered by the
rosters, has still not increased above zero. The number of pedites enlisted
in 222 was 10. Prior to the Constitutio, only the years 192, 194, 197/8 and
211 had worse figures, and of those all the dates in the 190s are times at
which the unit was likely to have been away on campaign, unable to
concentrate on enlistment 9 . The annual fluctuations downward are only
significant in the extended period immediately following the death of
Caracalla, and these exhibit a marked shortfall which may be explicable in
terms of the Constitutio Antoniniana, though certainty is sadly unobtainable,
We can only lament the lack of any firm figures for the five year period
following 221, which would have indicated whether this trend was
1, Miller, CAHXII, 50,
2, Gillia., 'Dura Rosters', 76ff,
3, Gilliam, op. cii,, 751,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
temporary or permanent1.
The latest period at which new units are recorded in the regular Auxilia
is during the joint reign of Valerian and Gallienus. Most of the units at
this point are first attested circa 253, and it should be noted that two
cohortes numbered VII & VIIi Fida are known, implying a sizable influx of new
troops2. Following this, references to new auxiliary units dry up completely
until the reign of Diocletian, when three new auxiliary units appear in the
Beatty papyria. Since the papyri date from late in the reign, we can assume
that Diocletian had completed his overhaul of the army by this point, and
that the units were probably his own creations4 . These observations lend
some validity to the idea that the role of the Auxilia was being usurped by
the new 'ethnic' units of the later third century, especially since their
disappearance from the record coincides so neatly with the appearance of
Gallienus' equites Dalmataes. Yet before we condemn the Auxilia to
obscurity, we should take note that new units were appearing under
Diocletian. We should also bear in mind that over 100 units termed elae and
cohortes appear for the first time in the Not itia Diffnita turn, with no
1. Since we do not know the purpose for which the partial roster of AD 222-228, P,Dura 102, waswritten, we cannot use this with any confidence to continue the sequence, On the other hand, a
compari5on of P,Dura 3, 9, 100 & 101 show that the strength of the unit had dropped steadily from over1000 to 781 by AD 239, Once again, external factors may be to blame,
2, 41979642-644; 1902,46 cf, E1895,l7, All units for this period are listed on Table Al,
3, Ala I Hiberorue, P,Beatty II • 37; ala II Herc, Droiedariorua P,Beafty 11 . 29 & 169; co/i, XlChaiavoruai P,Beatty I1'292, As a point of interest relating to the survey later in this chapter,both the alae survive into the Not/tie Oigiiitatue, occupying the same station as in the Beattypapyrus, No co/iortes Chaiavorwi survive, though the cob, I Apaaenoru. of P,Beatty 1 . 46 is also foundIn the NotitM Not, Dig, Or, XXXI'46, 54 & 60,
4, The papyri are dated to AD 298 & AD 300 respectively, P,Beatty intro,viii, On the reforms ofDiocletian, cf, Ensslin, CAN XII, 396ff; il1lams, Dioclet/an and the Rosen Recovery (1985), 91ff, Onthe reforms as they related to the Thebaid, Cf. van Berchem, L'Ariëe de Oioclètien ef la RtoreeCons fanfinienne (1952), 66f,
5, cf, ch,III: Contra Cositatus,-106-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Auxilia
discernible link to any units of the first two centuries AD 1 , so the Auxilia
did not simply roll over and die.
To understand what was actually happening, we must now begin to look at
how these units were being used. This is best done through examples. We
shall look at the nature of the Roman military presence in three areas
attested to have recleved specific attention at varying times throughout the
third century. Starting with Mesopotamia and the east, we shall go on to
examine the Roman presence in Africa before finishing on the reorganisation
of the Pannonian garrison.
In his new study of the eastern frontier, Isaac has laid great emphasis
on what might be called the non-military responsibilities of the Auxilla in
the area. In particular, he has highlighted the importance to Rome of
controlling the eastern trade routes, most notably the caravan route which
ran through Dura-Europos to Palmyra2. A direct Roman military presence was
maintained In Pa].myra from approximately AD 165, when a-la I Ulpia
Singula.rium was in occupation, to be replaced early in the third century by
cob. I Fla via Chalci den orum eq.3. Once Septinhius had extended Roman
suzerainty into northern Mesopotamia, Dura became the keystone to the Roman
frontier with Persia, as the strength of its garrison implies4. Prior to
this, cob. II Ulpia eq. had been stationed there under Coinrnodus, and some
1, The precise figure is 119, counting the units in the Beatty papyri as fourth century units,
since they are essentially a part of the post-crisis revival, The figure is extrapolated from the
calculations made in Tables A3 to AS, discussed later in this chapter.
2, I5aac, Lisits of Eipire, 141ff ISOf,3, Isaac, op. cit., 143f, 155 & nn,217 & 218 for references,
4, It contained vexillations of the Syrian legions and III Cyenaica from Arabia, along with
accompanying auxiliaries, cf, Gilliam, 'Garrison of Dura' Dun Pine.! Report V . 1, 24ff Roaan /r1y
Papsrs (1986), 209ff & ch,VI: PexillaUonesp.142 nn,1 & 2 for references,
5, Isaac, 151, It was accompanied by a native unit of Palmyrene archers,
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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
time before AD 245, Dura became the headquarters of the new dux ripae1.
The main function of the dux ripae seems to have been to monitor the
trade routes mentioned above, though the size of the garrison at his
disposal lends force to Gifliem's conclusion that his was the first line of
defence against a sudden Persian attack2. An important part of that
monitoring brief must have been to keep himself informed of Persian
movements along the Euphrates, and for this the extended watchposts spread
along the Euphrates beyond Dura will have fulfilled a dual role: traffic
control and forward observation. Gilliam seems to have viewed this
espionage function as incidental, but he himself admits that despite its
garrison, Dura could not delay a determined Persian force for long; so the
main military function of the dux ripae must needs have been
reconnaissance4 . His situation on the trade route will have facilitated this,
since such routes are historical lines of communication for spies, and much
incidental information could be learned simply by keeping an ear to the
rumours brought in by passing merchants. Similar reasons have been put
forward by Isaac for the presence of coh, IX Naurorum in Hatra under Gordian
II'S.
Many of the auxiliary units attested in this area were either new or
native. The frontier posts of Ana and Gamla seem to have been occupied by
1, Gilliam, 'flux Ripae at Dura', Trans, J Frocs, iaer, Philological A5s, 72(1941), 172ff Rosan4riy Papers (1986), 38ff,
2, Isaac 1 iSif & 155 Gilliaa, op. cit., 168ff, esp, 171,3, On these fortlets ci, Isaac, 147ff & ISOf,
4, Gillia. 171,5, Isaac 1 152ff,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
detachments of Palmyrenea, as were possibly the forts of Biblada and BiJan1.
Of the known Roman auxiliary units in the area, three units from the early
Principate accompanied XX Palmyrenorum in or around Dura at different
times2 , and another was stationed in Osrhöene3 . New units in the area were
XX Palmyrenorum, XII Palaestinorum and 1K Maurorum, all discussed earlier.
Another new unit appears in the 250e at Dumeir in Syria 4 . What we know of
the pre-third century units suggests that they were constantly chopping and
changing5 . However, the only force in the area for which we have much
information Is XK Palmyrenorwm With the evidence as it stands, all we can
say is that a large proportion of the garrison covering the new Severan
frontier in the east was made up of units first attested during this period,
possibly reinforced by detachments of native troops.
Dura was destroyed in AD 256 by the invading Persian army, graphically
confirming what has been said above about Its inability to hold the
PersIans6 . With the capture of Valerian, defence of the east fell under the
auspices of Palmyra7 . The Palmyrene army seems to have been a combination
of the Roman garrison in the east and native Pelmyrenes, who formed an
indeterminate but highly important proportion of the force5 . It is unclear
1, Isaac, 1501, esp, nn,239 & 241,
2, Cob, 11 i.iipia eq. was in the fort under Commodus, and may have still been present in 251,though the altar attesting the presence of a oicpa $ rixq light be referring to co/i, 11 Equestris,Co/i, 1! Pap/ilagoni. Is also attested in 251 by a twin altar set up in the Dolicheneum, and III Aug.Thracua is known from P. Dura 26 to have been on the Lower Chabur in 227: 6illiam, 'Garrison of Dura',2Sf,
3, Co/i, I 6eeiu1opua V111.7039,4, Ala Epuo(lui?), 111.130,
5, Gillia., bc, cit,
6, Gilliam, op. cit., 27,
7, Alfäldl, CAHXII, 171ff,
8, Zos, .39; I • 44; 1 • 503; 1 . 523-532; Festus, 8reiariui, XXIV . 3-5; SHA, Aur, IXV.3,
—109-
what new troops Aurelian brought in following his destruction of Palinyra.
Ritterling believed he established units of equites drawn from the Iflyrian
army 1 but we have no firm evidence for their existence prior to the reign of
Diocletian 1 . By this point, the nature of the garrison had changed radically,
to the extent that only three pre-fourth century units can be found among
the Auxilia of the eastern provinces2 . A large proportion of the remaining
twenty-eight lend weight to the idea of the 'barbarised' army, bearing titles
such as Saxonum, Alamannorum, luthungorum, Gothorurn and so on3.
Fentress has commented at length upon the superficial similarities
between the Syrian limes and that of Nunildia, sounding several notes of
caution in the process 4 . With the new view of the eastern frontier espoused
by Isaac, many of her objections have been laid to rest, and indeed the
similarities are quite striking. Both frontiers were essentially porous,
designed, as Fentress puts it, as "a system of customs and surveillance
posts" rather than a preclusive defensive network. Each was garrisoned by a
collection of auxiliaries and numer.4 with backbone provided by legionary
detachments, and while the nature of the Persian menace was certainly more
threatening than the Moorish tribesmen, each had its own bugbear with which
to come to terms. This was never more true than in the third century.
Roman colonisation of Africa existed side by side with native
1, Ritterling in Pest, Li, Hirsthtelds (1903), 346f, For a full discussion cf, chYIl: Equite5,All we know for certain of Aurelian's arrangements are that he placed the area under the temporary
control of the practectus Mesopotaiiae, with the title of rector Urientis Zos, I•60•I,2, Coh, / 8aetuior€ie, still in Osrhöene, Not, Dig, Or, XXXV32; coh, I Wpia Dacoriiaj and an ala
Parthorus, Not, Dip, Or, XXXIII'33 & XXXV'30: van Berchem, Qrie Qe Dioclétiem 10ff, 15ff & 26ff,,3, Cf. Not, Dig, Or, chapters XXXII, XXXIII, XXXV & XXXVI I for Foenicia, Syria, Osrhôene and
Mesoptamia,
4, Fentress, Nuiiaia and the Roac,, Qray, 9ARS53 (1979), 117.
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
'unpacified' tribes occupying the mountains, and relied as much on their
support for the maintenance of its defensive structure as it was designed to
defend against them 1 . This seeming paradox was resolved by the permeable
nature of the fosatum Afrlcae, and reinforced in the reign of Septimius
Severus by a series of watchstations extending into the Saharan Atlas as far
as Castellum Dimmidi (Mesead), as well as a series of 'prestige' forts
governing the oases in southern Tripolitania, most notably Bou Ngem. The
system worked only as long as it was tolerated by the tribes whose
movements it was designed to control3, so that when rebellion flared, as it
did in the 250s, extraordinary measures were required to put it down4.
Auxiliaries and numeri played an increasingly Important role as the
century progressed. The provinces of Mauretania seem to have been
reinforced during the reign of Septimius Severus, suggesting that unrest was
brewing there from the very start of the century. Work by Speidel has shown
that a couple of units from Dada were transferred at this time, reinforced
by 1000 Thracian recruits6 , and to this company can be added the ala (Pia
Gernina) Sebastena from Syria, first attested in Africa in AD 2016. The
latter seems to have been based In the fort of Cherchel, and is later
1, Matthews, 'Mauretania In Ammianus and the Notitia', BAR S15 (1976), 163ff, 170ff & 177ff,
2, Feniress. Nutidia, 111ff & 114ff esp, 116,
3, Matthews, op, cii,, 177,
4, A coalition of Berber tribes, under their leader Faraxen, 'prcvinc.iaa Nwaida. vasfabant', itwas so serious that the praeses of Plauretania Caesariensis was made dux per Atricat Mutidiat
Maureaniaique, and was only able to fully pacify the area by 263: Pflaum, Carr, Proc, II, 374bis,
905ff; YII1'21000 AE,1954,136; VIlI'12296 = iLS 2774; A1907,4; 1920,108; Fentress, Nutidia, 109f;
Matthews, 'Mauretania', 16Sf,
5, Speidel, 'Numerus Syroru. Malvensium', Dada 17 (1973), 170f & 173f = Roman Arty Studies
(1984), 150f & 153f; 'Ala I Claudia Gallorum Capitoniana', in Metoriat Con5tantini Daicovidu (1974),319 ft. Arty Studs, 221; 'A Thousand Thracian Recruits for Mauretania Tingitana', Antiquites
Africaines 11(1977), 168 & 172 ft. Arty Studs, 342 & 346, Her, VII'9'2 talks of Moorish raids,
6, Dip, Roxan 3; YIII17900; AE,1954,143b,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
found participating in the suppression of the Berber revolt under Valerian
and Gallienus' • The forts in the Saharan Atlas established by Severus were
occupied not only by detachments of leglo III Augusta and the eastern
numez-.4 which had been garrisoning the fossatum Africae since at least the
time of the Antonines2, but also by a vexillation of legIo III Gallica from
Syria, and ala I Pannoniorum which had been in Africa since the Julio-
Claudjans3 . Numidia also recieved the new coh. II MaurorumL,
Despite trouble In AD 227, Severus Alexander seems not to have altered
the nature of the limes, but maintained the Severan structure, sending a
vexillation of Pa].myrenes to Castellum Dimmidi6. Even the removal of III
Augusta under Gordian seems not to have affected it greatly. Fentress
believed that the disbanding of the legion was marked by a withdrawal from
the Saharan Atlas, rationalising the frontier to facilitate its defence by the
Auxilia7 , but she stresses that there is no direct evidence for the legion's
replacement by auxiliaries. It would seem that the remaining garrison was
able to cope quite adequately, and it should be borne in mind that the
1, A1894,26; 1900,125; 1954,136, The unit is attested in Africa Proconsularis during the joint
reign of Valerian and Gallienus, but apparrently was not permanently transferred, since it is later
found back in Cherchel after Valerlan Jnr, had been raised to Caesar,
2, Fentress, Nialdia, 111ff & 117; Southern, 'Numeri', 90f,3, Feniress, op, cii,, 116f; Southern, op. cii,, 127; Holder, Stuo'ies in the AuxiJia, 225,4, VlII . 4323 & 18528,
5, ,W,1966,597 records a desperatissi.taa turL')ai et fact/one, in the vicinity of Auzia in 227,and further disturbances say have occurred in the 240s, VLil9288 = 20863, For discussion of the
evidence for iiaitanei in Alexander's reign, cf, ch,VII: Li.itanei,6, Southern, op. cii,, 91,
7 Fentress, op. cit,, 117; but cf, Le Bohec, La Troisiêae Legion Augute (1989) 453ff, wcautions against arguments from silence,
8, Feniress, 119,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
more troubled Mauretania had never recieved much support from the legion'.
Even after the troubles of the 250s, the African garrison remained
largely unchanged. The new coh. VII Fida appeared in Tripolitania at Bou
Ngem circa 253, presumably to bolster the forces in Tripolitania, and that
province seems to have remained peaceful throughout the Faraxen uprising2.
In the west, the nurnerus Surorurn was still at its post in AD 272.
By the late fourth century, all this had been transmuted into a series
of .Zirnitanei commanded by preepositi. Van Berchem believed this was the
work of the emperor Diocletian4 , but an inscription dated to the emperor
Philip suggests that the process may have been underway a great deal
earlier5.
The African frontier was unique in that despite its size and volatility
It maintained only the one legion throughout the history of the Principate,
and at times lost even that. This rendered the role of the Auxilia crucial
in maintaining peace within the country. Yet despite the influx of alae and
cohorts mentioned above, the overriding theme of the African garrison is the
use of nurneri. Several detachments of Palmyrenes have already been
mentioned. At El Kantara, they were accompanied by a nurnerus Hernesenorum,
which is also attested under Caracalla occupying burgi In the southwest of
Numidla7 . The numerus Suror urn guarded western Caesariensis, and was
I, Fentress, Nwiidia, 109, Numerus Surorum on the western edge of Caesariensis was the onlymilitary outpost within about 350km 1 and the size of the fort suggests a strong garrison (Speidel
guessed 1000) expected to fend for itself: Southern, 'Numeri', 127ff; Speidel, 'Numerus Syrorum', 171,
2, AE 1979,642-644,
3, Speidel 1 bc, cit.
4, Van Berchem, Ariée dE Oioci 3 tien, 39ff,
5, 4E,1950,128 discussed in ch,VI11: L/altanel,6, Apart from its disbandment by Gordian III, the legion was vexillated to Greece by the emperor
Gallienus: QE,1934,193 cf, ch,VI: 'exiiJationes, 7, Southern, 90f,
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M.C.Ibe,Ji: C3 Army. Auxilia
possibly as much as 1000 men strong 1 , while Speidel has illustrated that
Moorish lrregUlar8 may have been active in the suppression of the revolts in
AD 227 and the 250s. At certain times and in certain areas, the numeri
seem to have stepped beyond the role of "frontier police and customs guards"
with which they are usually associated 3, to take on the duties of the Auxilia
and at times the legion. Once again, we can see 'ethnic units' coming to the
fore.
In Parinonia, on the other hand, it was the regular Auxilla which gained
In importance during the first half of the century. As early as the reign of
Marcus, a new cohort, II Aurelia Dacorwn, was located In the vital strategic
crossing point at Poetovio on the banks of the Drava, where it was joined
(or replaced) later in the century by vexillations of the Dacian legions4.
Yet It was in eastern Pannonia that the greatest influx of auxiliaries
occurred. The cohors III Alpinorum is known from tile stamps, but the vast
majority were new units. The new coh. I mid. Hem esen orum sag. appeared at
Intercisa as early as AD 198, where it was accompanied by a numerus
Hosroenorum which may have been in occupation under the later Anton1nes.
They were Joined in the reign of Maximinus by the ala firma mu.
Katafractaria, arid the unit was still at Intercisa some time during the 240s
before it was moved to Cannstatt in Germania Superior7. In AD 230, the cob.
1, cf, n, 1 above,
2, Speidel, 'Ethnic Units' 1 216ff,
3, Sirley, 'Hadrianic Frontier Policy', Liies2 (1956), 25,
4, 111.1518416; E,1936,53,54 & 57,
5, 111 . 3759 & 4665; E,1966,301,
6, cf, Table Al for references; date provided by E,l973,437bis,
7, 111 . 99 ILS 2771; lII • 10307 = ILS 2540, cf, Speidel, 'Ethnic unit5', 229 n,89a; XII1'7323 &
7328; AE,1931,68; Eadie, 'Roman Mailed Cavalry', .1RS57 (1967), 168 n87,
-114-
M.C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Auxilia
I mu. nova Severiana Surorum sag. was first attested in Ulcisia Castra,
though Nagy has shown that it was brought into the province by Caracalla and
was redeployed to the east in AD 242', Just south of this, the legionary
fortress of Aquthcum received the coh. mu. Maurorum under Maximlnus, and
this may have been the time of arrival for the coh. quin. Maurorum attested
at Lussonium2. The final influx of auxiliaries known came during the reign
of Gallienus, when vexillations of the German and British legions were
stationed at Sirmium ...cum auxilis (elaruir?. Unfortunately, there is no
indication of the units Involved, nor have any units from the German and
British garrisons appeared in the later epigraphy of Pannonia Inferior. It
seems most likely that the auxiliaries mentioned were themselves
vexillations, since we have a reasonable corpus of evidence for auxiliary
vexillations both before and during the third century4.
A pattern can be discerned in this establishment, from which a couple of
important points emerge. The first is the location of these reinforcements.
Without exception, all of them had been stationed in eastern Pannonia, along
the southward flowing stretth of the river Danube between Aquincum/Ulcisia
Castra and the legioriary fortress of Sirmium. The second is their size,
With the single exception of XX Palmyrenorum, every milliary unit created
after the death of Marcus Aurelius was stationed along this stretch of
1, Between 212 and 222 ii was engaged in camp construction, The unit was probably created by
Septimius Severus for his Parihian expedition of 197: Nagy in Budapest Rgisgei 23 (1973), 39ff;
AE1973,439; date provided by 111 . 3638; cf, Table Al for other references,
2, 111 . 10375; 111 . 3324; ci, above p.5 & Table Al for references,
3, 111.3228,
4, Two C3 exaaples shall suffice, XIII • 6509 from Schlo5sau (Ger, Sup,) mentions the
yexil(Iatio) coli(ortis) I $eq(uanorue) et Raw'(icorua) eq.,,, Of greater interest, a career
inscription set up near Sarmizegetusa (Dacia) during the reign of Philip speaks of a ,,praep(osifu5)
vexiil(atiornrn) auxiiiar(iorua) Pann(oniae) Infer(ioris),,,, AE 1980,758 cf, 111 1464,—115-
M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
frontier at some point during the first half of the century, and if our
chronology is correct, none of them was removed until the 240s.
Such a strong reinforcement, at its height something In the region of
7,000 troops, including legionary vexillations 1 , suggests that the east
Pannonian frontier was not as secure as its history throughout this period
would have us believe. Following the Marcomrnanic war, no serious barbarian
incursion occurred in Pennonia until the 250s, and even then it seems to
have been limited to the upper province2 . Yet in AD 214 we hear of the
emperor Carracalla "completing his business with the garrison of the
Danube". This must have been the point at which he reorganised the borders
of Pannonia Inferior to bring the legionary fortress of Brigetio, and all of
northern Parmonia to the east of Arraboria and north of the Drava, into the
province. The revision of the frontier was a massive undertaking: it split
Pannonia in half, strengthening the lower province by the addition of a
legion and up to 4,000 auxiliaries4 . To do this, Caracalla seems to have
diverted from his journey eastwards to the Parthian war, The move has been
seen largely as a measure for internal security; removing the third legion
from Pannonia Superior to create a parity of forces between the upper and
lower province, in accordance with his father's policy. However, the
reinforcement we have charted does not look inward, but out towards the
1, AE,1901,154; cf, ch,VI: Vexi/latione5, p.144,2, Alföldi, CiTh' XII, 139 speaks of raids by the Quadi, Sar.atae and Marcomanni which plundered
Upper Pannonia and even penetrated Into northern Italy as far as Ravenna: Eutropius IX'7; Jerome
Chron, p220, Orosius VII . 22 . 7 & Jordanes Rotana 28Th confuse these raids with the Alemannicincursions,
3, Her, IV•8.1,4, Fitz, 6reat Age of Pannosila (1982), 50ff,5, Fitz, bc, cit, Miller, CAHXII, 48,
—116-
M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
barbarian threat. In a passage from Dio, Caracalla is heard to boast at
having created hostility between the Marcomanni and the Vandals 1 . We have
seen already that sometime during his reign, I mu. Surorum sag. probably
appeared at IJicisia Castra, where it was busily engaged in fortification. All
this evidence paints a picture, not of peace and harmony as Herodlan would
have us suppose, but of a frontier preparing for war 2 . Caracalla would seem
to have pre-empted a threat from the barbarian tribes on the north-eastern
frontier of Pannonia, playing them off against one another whilst shoring up
Pannonia's defences at the point of expected attack. The further
reinforcement under Maximinus Thrax illustrates that the danger did not
disappear, so the peaceful nature of the east Pannonian limes must have been
a product of these measures. Barbarian raids only start to recur in the
decade following the breakup of this garrison, resulting in similar pre-
emptive measures by Gallienus3.
Earlier in the century, Septimius Severus appears to have been anxious
to retain the strength of the garrison despite the need to vexillate part of
II Adiutrix into Aquileia4 , for we have seen that he not only placed I mu.
Hem esen or urn into Intercisa, but used the Dacian legions to cover for its
departures . it should be noted also that the reinforcement of Sirmium by
Gallienus was as much a protection agains the Goths, who were by now
penetrating deep into Illyricum, as it was against the tribes of the Middle
I, Dio LIXVII'20'3-4,
2. Her, IY7 Is at pains to stress the friendly relations between Caracalla and the trans-
Danubian tribes, The passage smacks of imperial propaganda at a time when all other evidence hints at
Roman/barbarian relations stretched almost to their breaking point.
3, Alfôldi, CAM XII, 214: A1935,164; III3228; cf, chh,X & IX: Viri Hi//fares, p.232, &Foedera fi,
4, 111 . 954 discussed fully In chYl: 'exi1lationes, p 142ff,
5, cf, above p.114.
—117-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
Danube.
The auxiliaries in Pannonia Inferior were performing a very important
function during the first half of the third century. A series of units, most
of them milliary, were arranged along the Pannonian border to ward off
barbarian attack. Despite, or most probably because of their effectiveness,
they were drawn upon to provide troops elsewhere as the century reached its
mid-point, so weakening the frontier. Gallienus, realising the importance of
a strong Pannonian garrison, reinforced it with legionaries from Dacia,
Britain, Germany and even Moesia. It is at this point, with permanent
vexillatlon becoming the norm, that we find the Auxilia disappearing once
again. Where once a cohort was found, now we find records only of a
legionary vexillation 1 . More importantly, in the Notitia Dignitatum, we can
find auxiliaries being replaced by units of equites which were themselves
eventually replaced by the cunei and new-style auxilia of Constantine2.
Throughout the empire, an important process was taking place wherein the
Auxilia of the Principate was gradually disappearing to be replaced by new
irregular units, often of 'ethnic' origin.
The picture from the Notitia Dignitatum is not a pretty one. Little
more than 137. of the Auxilia known to have been in existence before AD 250
can be found in its lists3 . Such a massive shortfall is nothing short of
cataclysmic, especially since pre-Diocletianic Auxilia account for just under
1, cf, n,3 above, Whether these vexlllation5 superceded the units already in place, or simply
reinforced them Is not clear, Either event exhibits an erosion of confidence in the Auxilia
2, In Pannonia, this occurred at Ulcisia Castra, Intercisa and Lussonium, The process has been
best illustrated by van Berchem, 4raóe de Dioclètien,,,, 95ff
3, The figure drawn from my own independent study is 71 out of approx, 536 units; cf Tables A3 —
A5, No units from the third century can be seen to have survived,
-118-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
38% of all auxiliary units listed In the document; meaning that the total
complement of auxiliaries found in the Notitia 18 three times smaller than
the establishment of the mid-third century1.
A geographical breakdown of the results might help to explain this2.
The lowest survival rate was In the areas which had endemic trouble
throughout the century. In Illyricum, only 6 out of 85 units known to have
occupied the area before AD 250 survived. Africa fared little better, with
an equally bad survival rate of 7%. Raetia retained 11%, while the eastern
provinces retained 10% (only one of these came from Osrhöene). The best
survival rate came from Asia Minor, where Isaurian brigandage forced an
Imperial response only twice throughout the century3 . Elsewhere, the
relatively untroubled provinces of Britain and Egypt had survival rates of
25% and over, while the figures for Spain are too small to be of any
statistical value. Little is known about the areas of the empire missed by
the Notitia, though It Is worth noting that the dux Mogontiacensis had
nothing but praefecti militum on his lists4.
Given the limitations of our material, such an analysis of the Notitia
can be little more than an academic exercise. Its lists are incomplete, and
what we have may be a mish-mash of information dating from Diocletian until
the end of the fourth century&. Our information concerning the pre-
Diocletianic Auxilia Is also nowhere near as complete as we would like it to
1, 188 a/ac and co/ioHes are listed by Seeck; 37 . 8% are pre-Diocletianic, and the total accounts
for only 35% of the 536 units known to have been in existence during the Principate,
2, cl, Tables A3-A5,
3, Once under Severus Alexander, and once under Probus cf, CAN XII. 68 & 31Sf,
4, Not, Dig, Oc, XLI, This part of Germany was constantly harassed by the Alemanni during the
C3,5, On this very subject cf, van Berchem, Araâe de Dioc/êtien,,,, 93ff,
—119-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
be; to the extent that the figure we choose to extrapolate from, no matter
what its exactitude, remains at best an educated guess. As if this were not
enough, another far more important consideration must be addressed: the
question of unit size.
It appears that by the late fourth century, auxiliary units throughout
the empire had suffered a drastic reduction In size. Where forts named In
the Notitia can be equated to remnants on the ground, they have often shrunk
to less than one fifth the size of those containing similar units under the
Principate. In many cases, they have actually been built inside the remnants
of an earlier site'. Material extrapolated from the Beatty papyri from
Panopolis indicates that auxiliary units with a complement of 165 or less
would seem to have been the norm in Egypt at the time of Diocletian 2. This
means that by the fourth century, not only had over 857. of units known from
the Principate disappeared from the record, they had also shrunk in some
cases to approximately one fifth of their original sizes . Whether this was a
universal trend remains unclear. If the trend in fort sizes is anything to
go by, the phenomenon was empirewide.
What we know of XX Palmyrenorum suggests that the unit was in a good
state of health during the first half of the third century. It should be
stressed that the state of this unit cannot be taken to indicate the health
1, All relevant evidence can be found in: Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army',
C/i/ron 8 (1978), Appendix I esp, 553ff; Johnson, Late Rocan Fortification (1983), 53f James, 'Britain
and the Late Roman Army', BAR 136 (1984), 165f,2, Duncan-Jones, op. cit., 546ff,
3, Figures calculated by Duncan-Jones from P,Beatiy make the ala I //iberorua 118 strong and the
co/i, II C/iaaavorua 165 strong at most, The most recent calculations on auxiliary size in the earlyPrincipate give between 436-512 men to an ala quingenaria, approx, 480 to a co/i, quingenaria and
approx, 600 to a coh, quin, eq.: Holder, Studies in ifle Auxilia, BAR S70 (1980), 7ff,
-120-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
of all the Auxilia in the third century. The unit itself was an unusual one,
in that it had 6 centuries and 5 turmae (plus dromedaril) instead of 10 and
8 which is believed to have been the norm for milliary cohorts 1 . Fink
believed it was impossible for 40% of the unit to have been on permanent
detachment, such that it was never included in any of the Dura rosters.
Considering the early date of the main rosters, he is probably correct.
Permanent vexillation did not become the norm until the mid third century,
and since the two main rosters of XX Palmyrenorwn give totals of 1210 and
1040 men respectively, the unit would seem to have been at full milliary
strength despite its organisation2. In fact, the earlier figure, for AD 219,
puts it seriously over-strength, best explained by recruitment for
Caracalla's abortive Parthian expedition3. Despite this apparent good health,
in AD 251, a partial list of the equites in the unit shows "a desperate state
of affairs, with a fourth of the cohort's horses having to be replaced in a
period of four months and a third of the personnel still lacking
mounts.....the papyrus itself is evidence of strenuous effort by both
government and the army to cope with the situation"4. Elsewhere, Holder
cites a pridiarium of AD 215 which shows a coh. quin. eq. from the east with
an infantry complement of only 350, "below strength even for a century
complement of 60 men". Its editors have pointed out that there were no new
recruits due to heavy fighting3.
I, Fink 1 Dw'a Final Report V . 1, 28ff; Holder, Studies in the Auxilia, 8, The unusualorganisation may be explained by the native origins sugge5ied by Nann above, p.101,
2, Fink, op. cit,, 30 on P,Oura 100 & 101 for AD 219 & 222 respectively, However, note Gilliam's
observation that the cohort had nine centurions in P,Dura 82 of Ad 233: cf, Gillaim, 'Dura Rosters',74 n,2,
3, cf, above, p,104f,
4, Fink, Roaan Milifay Reco,d5 on Papyrus (1971), N2 83 P,Dw'a 97,5, Holder, bc, cii, on Thomas & Davies, 'A New Hilitary Strength Report on Papyrus', IRS 67
(1977), 50ff,
-121-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia
The fate of cob. III Alpinorum may be of relevance here. Found in
Dalmatia during the second century, it was moved to Pannoriia sometime during
the third. From there its movements become confused, since the name appears
three times in the Notitia Dignitatum, once in Arabia and twice in Pannonia
Secunda. At one point it is called the cob. III Alpinorum Dardanorum. This
has led scholars to posit two or even three cohortes III Alp.inorum while at
present there remains evidence for only one'. Yet if, as we have already
determined, auxiliary units were being vexillated in the third century2,
might it not be most sensible to view these units as vexillations of the cob.
III Alpinorum? Like other vexillat ions that became fossilised in the third
century, the detachments eventually took on their own identity, until by the
time of the Notitia they could be seen as three separate units, distinguished
in Pannonia by the attachment of a nickname, possibly relating to its
location within the province. Other such vexillations could be the two alae
novae Diocletianae found in the east; the two alae milliariae in Palaestina;
the ala II felix Velentiniana located in that province and in Arabia; the cob.
I Ituraeorum found in Tingitena and Egypt; and possibly, though less likely,
the cobb. IV Gaflorum which appear in Britain and Rhodope in the Notiti&,
It would seem that at some point between AD 250 and AD 395 the Auxilia
of the early Principate suffered a severe decline. In view of the Egyptian
evidence provided by the Beatty papyri, It seems most probable that this
I, 111 . 14935; Not, Dig, Or, XXXVII . 35; Not, Dig, O, XUII'53 & 57 Alföldy, Qcta Qrch, Acad,
Scient, //ungaricae 14(1962), 263ff; Wilkes, Daliatia (1969), 140ff; Roxan, 'Auxilia in the Not/tie',
66,2, cf, above, p115 & n,4,3, Not, Dig, Oj XXXII . 34 & UXV . 31; XXXIV'36 & XXX1V32; XXXIV'35 & XXXVI1•30; Cc, XXVI . 16 & Or,
XXVIII • 42; Oc, XL'41 & Or, XL.46,
-122-
M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Auxilia
decline had occurred prior to or perhaps during the reign of Diocletian. Its
cause is unclear, but may have been a combination of ailing recruitment,
permanent vexillatlon and the endemic attrition associated with the problems
of the century. It seems likely that in the compromises which were made to
overcome these problems, the lowly auxiliaries suffered worst, Not
prestigious enough to be treated like the legions, and too inflexible to be
as useful as the numeri, the Auxilia were neglected until gradually they
became replaced by new units of equites and other 'ethnic' troops more
suited to the support role which they had enjoyed 1 . The rescripts of
Diocletian amply illustrate this new attitude towards the auxiliaries. Whilst
deprived of the privileges accorded to the legions and the new-style
vexillatioris of cavalry, the sons of auxiliaries were now tied by law to the
career of their fathers2 . These laws, and the appearance of new alae and
cohortes under Diocletian and his colleagues are evidence that the Auxilla
still retained some usefulness under the Tetrarchy. Yet by the age of
Constantine, the Auxilia of the Prthcipate had become third-class frontier
fodder, and their supercession by 'ethnic' equites and auxilia was complete.
1, Note there is no indication in the unit titles of the Not it/a that the Auxilia were being
transformed into these new unit5, but cf, ch,YII: Equites for discussion,
2, Cod, Just, X . 54 . 3 (55 . 3 in some editions); Cod, Theod, VII.22'I,
—123-
Tb1E A 1:AL1.c111ry trnit f1rt pptririg
ftr- AD 161.
Dates given are dates of first and last firmly datable attestation. Where thecreator of the unit is uncertai.n, It has been placed under the emperor in whichits first attestalon occurs.
Mr i_i At.ir1 i L1:N11Nfli PROVINCE
oai REFS
Coh, Pimasens(ium) AureCliana) Thracia
Marcus 4E,1908,136
Coh, I Aurelia Dardanorum (mu, eq?] Moesia Sup.
Marcus 111.8251
Coh, II Aurelia Dardanorum iii, eq. Moesla Sup.
Marcus/242 111 . 14556 & 14576;
41902,31; 1903,288 & 290:
1904,92: 1910,93, 94 & 97;
1952,189-191
Coh, I Aurelia nova
Pas(i]natui CR iii,
Moesia Sup,
Marcus 111.14545; qE1901,23
Coh, II Aurelia nova cii, eq. CR,
Moesia Sup,
179 111.14537 & 14541
Caracalla E191O,98
Dalmatia
179 E,19O1,24
Thrac ia
Marcus AE,1955,65
Coh, II Aurelia nova Sacorum
Moesia Sup,
Marcus 111.142176; E,1901,2l
Coh, II Aurelia Decorum
Pannonia Sup,
Marcus 111.1518416; SHQ Marcus XXI'7,
Spt. i_ nii i._L
V1LI1NNi PROVINCE
REEL
Coh, I Septimia Belgarum Germania Sup,
231/241 XIII'1042-1045, 6687, 7038, 11758 &
11759
Coh, I .11 Hemesenorum sag, eq. CR Pannonia Inf,
from 198 111.10303, 10304, 10306, 10307,
10315, 10316 & 10318;
AE,1891,59; 1909,148-ISO; 1910,131,
133, 136, 137, 140, 141, 144, 147,
& 148; 1912,7; 1914,99; 1929,49;
1971,334, 335, 345 & 476;
1973 437bis
Coh, I cii, nova
Severiana Surorum sag, Pannonia Inf,
230/242 111.3638,3639, 10518 & 15170;
AE,1947,31; 1973,439
Coh, II Maurorum Numidia
208 VIII'4323 & 18528
Coh, IX Maurorum Mesopotamia
238 A1958, 239 & 240
—124-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army
Svr1.i t d:
H11NPROVINCE
Coh, XX PalayrenoUl El, (eq. mag,) Syria
Auxilia
208/256 P,Dura misc, esp, 56, 100 & 101
A 1940, 240; 1948,124
C r r 1 1 :
VN11N
Coh, I Athoetorum
Coh, (I] Concord(ia)
Coh, II Conco(rldia
Coh, Treverorum
Coh, II Treverorum
PROVINCE
Dacia
Thracla
Moesia Sup,
Germania Sup,
Germania Sup,
QI
Caracal la
from c,269
Caracal Ia
222/c, 238
c,211/c,235
REEL
AE 1961,315
IGRRI'1496 = !L59479AE,1908,259 1688 1112 1570
cf, Domaszewski, Rangordnung,
LVIII-LX, 185f1 also my Appendix
Trajanus Mucianus
AE 1934, 212
(XIII . 7612 & 11971
(XII17615-7619; AE1 1898,9, 10 & 63
S , r t.i Al - ___rid
L!NJIN. PROVINCE
Nova ala firma iii, Katafractaria Pannonia ml,
Germartia Sup,
Coh, XII Palaestinorum
Syria
DME REEi
234/238 111.99 = JLS 2771; II1'10307 = ILS2540
238/256 XIII7323, 7328: AE 1931,68
cf, Eadie, /RS 57 (1967), 168 n,37
232 P,Dzira 30
M>c I ml ri ti 1h. rVN1IN PROVINCE
OAT
Coh, iii, Maurorum eq. Pannonia ml,
Maximinus
111 . 3444, 3542, 3545, 10673 & 10375
Coh, quin, Maurorum eq. Panonnia ml,
?Maxlminus
111.3324
V1riri & G1J_lriLi (,Jcirit):
1L Ni PROVINCE REEi
Ala Epuo(lum?) Syria 253/9 111.130
Coh, III Collect(arum) Moesia ml, c,253 41957,340
Coh, VII Fida Tripoiltania c253 AE,1979,642-644
-125--
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army
Auxilia
V]riri & G11iri td:NUNi
PROVINCE DRIB REFi
Coh, VIII Fida
Palaestina Gallienus AE,1902.46
Diocletian AE 1895 17
—12 6-
Tb] A2:Awci11r-y Lir1it cf dtibici cit cx-
U NflI PROVINCE DME EEI
Ala Sariatorum Britannia ? VII•229 & 230
Coh, I Sunicor(um) Britannic I AE,1914,293
Coh, I Aresac(um) Belgica 1 AE,1929, 173
C(o)h, Ruson(ianae) Germania mt. AE1956,169 cf, AE11939,130
Ala Fida Vindex Germanla Sup, I XIII'8307 (probable renaming)
Ala Vallensium Germania Sup . I XIIl.6361
Coh, Hel(vetiorum)
Germanla Sup,
IHadrian AE,l897,148
cf, Birley, His toia-Qugusta-Coi1oquiva(1972/74), hf
Coh, V Spanorum
Germania Sup,
?pre C3 4E 1899, 192 (probably V (Hi)spanorum)
Coh, II Crestarum
Dalmatia
?pre C3 AE,1961,303 (probably II Cyrrhestarum, cf,
III' 14934)
Ala Elec(torum)
Dada
I AE,1957,331
Ala Pal.(yrenorum)
Dacia
post 124 A 19741 545b
Coh, I Aurelia Brittonum iii,
Dada
201 AE1SO1,46 (possibly I (Ulp,) Brittonum
ill, CR eq,, cf, Holder, Atix//Ja, 217)
Ala Atectorigiana
Lyc ia/Pamphyl ia
?c,202 AE,1926,74: cf, AE,1926,75
Coh, Stablesianorum
Cappadocia
?late C3 f6VI187 cf, Speidel, C/,iron4 (1974),
545
Ala Herakliana
Syria
?pre C3 AE,1940, 166 (probably (Thracue) Herculiana
cf, Holder, Auxilia, 227)
Coh, III Cilicium eq.
Egypt
193 AE,1905,54; cf, Holder, Auxilia, 230 for aI (Flay ,) Cilicium eq, of AD 83- same
series?
Ala II Ammiorum
Nauretania
I AE,1898,74 (probably II Hammiorum)
[ala Expl(oratorum)] Pomet,
Nauretania
?pre C3 AE,1889,54 (reconstructed to Pomarensium,
Shares inscription with Flavio-Trajanic II
Sardorum)
Coh, Parth(orum)
Mauretania
7 A195662
-12 7-
Tb] A3:Awci11ri i,irig iritc t1i
ITc t i t i Di gr I t t tim.The following are the results of my own Independent study on the survival ofpre-fourth century auxiliaries into the Notitia. Most unit histories are derivedfrom the excellent appendices of Holder's Studies in the Auxilia of the RomanArmy from Augustus to Trajan, BAR S70 (1980), PP.167-240. Other sources
(mainly those with relation to post—Trajanic units) are cited where used.Unless a compelling link to an earlier unit can be shown, units with thepraenomina Herculia and Valeria have been taken as fourth century creations and
ignored.
Since the completion of this work, a similar study by N. Roxan, entitled 'Pre-Sevran Auxilia Named in the Notitia Dignitatum', BAR S15 (1976), pp.59-80 hascome to my attention. It has the luxury of being able to go into greater depththan my own study would allow, and is highly recommended to anyone wishing topursue this topic of discussion still further. Despite some minor differencesin interpretation, I have deemed it best to keep both studies entirely separatesince they were carried out independent of one another. Roxan includes severalalae in the Notitia believed to have been upgraded from cohortes equitata, yet
with these taken into account, along with the additional units provided to me byHolder, our results are substantively similar.
NQtiti DigrIittLIm pr r-iritm:Ujjj PROVINCi RECENT HISTORY
IXVIII'lB ala veterana Gallorum Aegyptus Changed name to Gallica & moved to Egypt
in 130.
XXVIII . 40 coh, I Sagittariorum
XXYIII'41 coh, I Augusta Pannoniorum
XIVIII . 44 coh, II Ituraeorum
XIVIII . 45 coh, II Thracum
1111 . 58 coh, I Lusitanorum
XXXI'59 coh, Scutata CR.
XXII60 coh, I Apamenorum
111111'33 coh, I Ulpia Dacorum
XXXIV'32 ala all, Sebasiena
Ac gy p tu S
Aegypti1S
AegyptuS
Aegypt5
Thebaid
Thebaid
Thebaid
Syria
Palaestifla
—128-
Knovn in 6cr, Sup, under Julio-Claudians,
In Syria from 88,
Coh, eq. in Egypt from 83, cf, I Itur, on
Table A4,
Coh, eq. moved to Egypt in 105,
I Aug. (Pr, ) Lusitan, eq. moved to Egypt
by 105,
In Egypt under Julio-Claudians,
Coh, eq. sag, moved to Egypt in 143,
Coh, eq. in Syria from 156,
In Africa from 201; cf, A!, 189426;
1900,125; 1954, 136 & 143b,
M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army
Auxilia
Nc, t I t I D I gr I t t Lixn p F r I r tm c t d:VNLLNANE. PROVINCE RECENT HISTORY
XXXIV'44 coh, II Galatarum Palaestina II Ulpia Galat, in Syria-Palaest, from 139
XXIIV'45 coh, I Flavia Palaestina Coh, eq, 1 cf, (6RR IV216; VIII'28,
XXIV'32 coh, I Gaetulorum
Osrhöene Cl, VIII'7039,
XIXVII'31 coh, I ml, Thracum
XXIVII'32 coh, I Thracum
XXXVII • 33 coh, VIII Yoluntaria
XXIVIII . 21 ala I Aug, Colonorum
XXIVIII • 22 ala Auriana
XIXVIII . 23 ala I Ulpia Dacorum
XIXVIII . 24 ala II Gallorum
XIXVIII'27 coh, III Ulpia
mu, Peiraeorum
XIXVIII'28 coh, IV Raetorum
XXIVIII . 29 coh, mil, Bosporiana
XXIVIII . 30 coh, iii, Germanorum
XIXVIII'34 coh, Apuleia CR
IXXVIII'35 coh, I Lepidiana
XXIVIII'36 coh, I Claudia eq.
Arabia Moved to Syria-Palaestina in 139,
Arabia Probably I Aug, Thracum eq,, 1QE11947,171,
Arabia VIII Voluntariorum in Dalmatia since
Jul io-Claudians,
Armenia Moved to Cappadocia by 135,
Armenia II Ulpia Auriana in Cappadocia from 1351
Armenia In Cappadocia from 135,
Armenia Moved to Cappadocia in 135,
Armenia Coh, eq, sag, moved to Cappadocia by 135,
Armenia Moved to Cappadocia in 135,
Armenia I Bosporanorum sag, moved to Cappadocia in
135.
Armenia I 6cr, mil, eq. in Cappadocia from 135,
Pontica I Apula CR, moved to Cappadocia by 135,
Pontica Coh, CR, eq, moved to Armenia by 199,
Pontica In Cappadocia, cf, 11.2958,
XL'48 coh, I Aureliana
KL'49 coh, III Valeria
Brac araugustanorum
Thracia
Thrac ia
—129-
Coh, Pimasensium Aur, in Thracia under M,
Aurelius 1 cf, AE,1908,136,
Probably the III Bracaur, moved to Raetia
in 156,
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Auxi].ja
Nctiti Diriitti..jm pr— Ocidrtrn:U1(E. VNIINAII.E. PROVINCE RECENT HISTORY
XXYI • 14 coh, II Hispanorum Tingitana Coh, CR, eq, In Tingitana by 109,
XXVI'16 coh, I Ituraeorum Tingitana Coh, sag, CR, moved to Tingitana in 109,
XXVI'19 coh, III Asturum Tingitana Coh, CR, eq, in Tingitana from 109,
XXXII'57 coh, III Alpinorum
Pannonia II
Coh, eq, moved to Pannonia in C3; cf,
Wilkes, Da/Nafia, l4Offl 6, Alföldy, AA$H14 (1962), 263ff,
XXXII'59 coh, I Thracum CR,
Pannonia II
Coh, CR, pf, in P, Inf, from 110,
XXXV'25
coh, III Britannorum
Raetia Coh, eq, in Raetia from 107,
XXXV '27
coh, VII Valeria Raetorum
Raetla Moved to Britain by 166,
XXXV'28
coh, I Herculia Raetorum
Raetia Probably the I Raetorum in Raetia by 107,
XL'33
coh, IV Lingonum
XL'36
coh, I Frisiavonum
XL'37
ala Sabiniana
XL'39
coh, I Batavorum
XL'40
coh, I Tungrorus
XL'41
coh, IV Gallorum
XL'42 coh, I Asturum
XL'43 coh, II Dalmatarum
XL'48
coh II Lingonum
XL'49
coh, I Hispanorum
XL '50
coh, II Thracum
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
Britannia
—130-
Coh, eq, in Britain from 122,
In Britain from 105,
I Pannonlorum Sab, in Britain from 122,
Coh, eq, in Britain from 122,
Coh, mu, in Britain from 103,
Coh, eq, in Britain from 122, though
attested in Raetia in 166,
Possibly II Asturum, known to be in
Britain by 105, though attested on
Dip,LXIX in P, Inf, 145/60,
Most likely II Dela, eq, in Britain from
105, though attested in Dalmatia along
with I Delm, eq, on III'1979 & 6374 dated
170,
Coh, eq, in Britain from 98,
Coh, eq, moved to Britain under Flavians,
Coh, eq, moved to Britain in 103,
M,C.IbeJl: C3 Army
Auxilia
Nc' t i t I Di ri I t t tim p r- C) I d r t mct d:UIIE. UNIINAIIi PROVINCE RECENT HISTORY
XL'52 coh, I Norinorum Britannia I for, et, Cersiacorum in Britain from
103,
XL . 53 coh, III Nerviorum Britannia In Britain from 122,
XL'56 coh, VI Nerviorum Britannia In Britain from 122,
XLII'30 coh, Celtibera
Gallaecea
I Celtiberorum coh, CR, eq, moved to Spain
by 132,
-131-
Fib1 A4-:Uriit In tli NtitI pib1y -1td
t r1ir Ai,ci1I.
These include units which do not provide enough detail in their titles tobe placed accurately, as well as units which are possibly part of anearlier known series but for which no pre—Notitia record survives. CetainUnits which may have been vexillations of pre—fourth century Auxilia are
also included.
Or-i r]:
L1ll UN11NA
XIVIII • 26 ala VII Saritarum
XXVIII'35 coh, III Galatarum
XXVIII . 38 ala II Ulpia Afrorum
XXVIII • 42 cot,, I Ituraeorum
IXYIII . 46 coh, IV Numidiarum
1111 . 45 ala IV Britonum
1111.49
ala VIII Palmyranorum
XXXI'66
coh, VI Sugambrorum
1111 . 57 ala I Yaleria Dromedariorum
1111 . 54 ala II Herculia Dromedariorum
XIXI48 ala III Dromedariorum
XX11V46 coh, Palaestinorum
X1X1V47 coh, II Cretensis
XXXV . 30 ala I Parthorum
XXXVII35 coh, III Alpinorum
PROVINCE
Aegyptus
Aegyptus
Aegyptus
Aegyptus
Aegyptus
Thebaid
Thebald
Thebaid
Thebaid
Palaestina
Palaestina
Osrhäene
Arabia
—132—
POSSIBLE LLN&
Ala Sarmatorum known in Britain, VlI . 229 &
230, date uncertain: part of series!
I & II Ulpia Galat, known in Syria-
Palaestina from 139: part of series?
Ala Afrorum vet, known in Ger, Inf, from
78: part of series?
Possible renumbering of II & III Itur,
known in Egypt from 83, but NB, coh, I
Itur, in Cappadocia by 135, cf, Table A3,
11 Itur,
I & II (Fl) Numid, eq (sag ) found
throughout empire: part of series?
I Brit, known in Dacia from 110: part of
series?
Ala Palm, known in Dacia some time after
124, ,QL1974,565b: part of series!
I & IV known in Noesia & Caesariensis from
26 & 107 respectively: part of series?
(Possibly all derived as vexillations from
(ala I Ulpia Dromedariorum ail,, last
(known in Syria in 156,
XII Palaest, in Dura in 232, P,Dw'a 30:
part of series?
I Cretum sag, in N, Sup under Julio-
Claudians: part of series?
Possibly any of 5 alae Parth, throughout
the empire,
Possibly a vex, of III Alp, in Pann, II,
Not, Dig, Oc, XXXII.57,
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army
Or—i c t d:LINi NILNAi
gL46 coh, IV Gallorum
Auxilia
PROVINCE POSSIBLE 111K.
Moesia II Possibly either of the IV Gall, known in
Thracia in 114 or in Raetia in 147,
i ci ra :
LINi U11NANi
XIXII . 53 coh III Alpinorum
Dardano rum
XL'51 coh, I Aelia Classica
XLII'29 coh Lucensia
PROVINCE POSSIBLE 111K.
Pannonia II Pos5ibly a vex, of III Alp, in Pann, II
Not, Dig, Oc, XXXII.57,
Britannia Possibly the I Class, pf, in Ger, Inf, by
80,
Gallaecea Probably one of 4 cohh, Lucensium
throughout the empire,
—133-
Tb1 A :Rti1t frcm tb1 A3 & 4
SURVIVALS IN THE NOTITIA:
Alee prior to AD 161Cohorts prior to AD 161
Alee created after 161Cohorts created after 161
Auxilia from Table A4Other known pre-C4 units
Total survivals
# UNITS SURVIVALSURVIVING OUT OF RATE
6 109 557.45 380 118%
0 3 01 23 537.
19c. 21
71 c.536 133%
GEOGRAPHICAL BREAKDOWN (in descending rates of survival):I UNITS SURVIVAL
SURVIVING Qf Q RATE
Asia Minor 11 19 57'g%
Egypt 7 21 33•3%
Britain 14 57 24•6%
Spain 1 6 16'7%
Raetia 2 17 11•7%
The East 6 56 107%
Africa 3 43 7%
Illyricum 5 85 5•97.
(I)
11/58%19/90%15/26%2/33%3/18%12/21%3 / 7%6/7%
(t) The calculation in this column includes units first found in the regionin the Notitia, giving the number of units found before the slash and thesurvival rate this generates after it. The rest of the table utilises onlythose units known to have been in the region prior to the Notitia, andtherefore to have survived as part of the area garrison since the second orthird century.
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M,C,Ibeji. C3 Army
PART 3:
Tl-i • Nw' Uriit
VI: Vci 11 t I cri
The history of vexillation can be divided into three distinct phases, two
of which occurred during the turbulent years of the third century. Whereas
the detachments of the first and second centuries AD had been used largely
on campaign, and very rarely engaged in garrison duties outside the province
of their mother unit, the manpower shortages of the third century
nece sitated the increasing employment of vexillary garrisons outside their
province of origin. By the end of the century, these garrison vexillations
had become permanent fixtures in their new positions, and a mould-breaking
evolution was taking place. As the permanent vexillation assumed an
independent unit identity, new units of cavalry, probably originating in part
as vexillary detachments, took on the term vexillatlo as a unit description.
The development of the permanent detachment, and the semantic change in the
term vexillati4 is what this chapter sets out to chart.
To understand whet happened to the vexillation in the third century, it
is necessary to have a clear picture of the nature of these detachments
during their earlier history.
The vexillations of the first and second centuries AD were detachments
of up to 2,000 men 1 , largely used to reinforce a specific campaign. A
cursory analysis of the epigraphic record reveals only 15 references to
vexillations being used as garrison troops in the period before Marcus
Aurelius, whilst on the same timescale there are 40 separate instances of
1, Hyginus V . 5i4; Saxer, 1eiJ1ationen, p , Stud, (1967), 119; Jones, LR 680; X'582,
-135-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
vexillary troops in the field1.
The practice of sending detachments of legionaries, often with attached
auxiliaries2 , from peaceful provinces to the war front became ever more
prevalent during the second century. Prior to Trajan, campaign vexillations
seem mainly to have been employed during the exigencies of civil war or
revolt . Under his reign, they may have received far wider use, taking part
in all his wars, whilst Hadrian employed detachments from the Danube, Syria
and Arabia to quell the Jewish revolt in 132". By the time of the Antonines,
expeditionary forces composed largely of vexillations seem to have become
standard practices.
Little can be said about vexillations as garrison troops during this
period, since the corpus of evidence is too small to allow any meaningful
analysis of their development. Yet one thing is absolutely clear. Whilst a
1, Refer to Table Vi listing the results of my own independent examination of C/LI AEand IGRR,
Saxer, VeAJJ/atlonen (1967), gives an even more comprehensive list, but includes many references ofuncertain date which I was less prepared to include than he,
2, III19i9; XIII . 4623, 7697, 7715, 7716 all attest legions with attached auxiliaries, See also
the Brohi series in CIL XIII, These are a series of dedications to Hercules Saxanus by a variety of
vexillations from the legions, the Auxilia, and even the c18551s 6erianica, dating largely from theFlavian period (the latest are most likely by units involved in Trajan's German campaign), The number
and variety of units would suggest that Brohi, in Upper Germany, served as a staging post for
vexillations about to embark on campaign, since garrison vexx tended to be less variable and more
static than this: 1111 . 7693, 7695-7698, 7700, 7703-7706, 7714-7718, 7720-7722 & 7727,
3, Tacitus Anna/es XIV38'1 and V . 1; Josephus V42-44; the Brohi inscriptions are most likely
dated to the Year of the Four Emperors (AD 69) and the revolts of Civilis and Saturninus, though they
could refer to Domitian's German campaign,
4, 1111 . 7704, 7715, 7716, 7718, 7727 for legions involved in Trajan's German campaign, VI
'IctriA, I 6eina and XXII Priiigenia all recieved the title Pia Fidelis Doiitianae for their loyaltyduring the revolt of Saturninus, but the lack of the Cognoaen on the inscriptions, or of its erasureby Ouanatio suggests a date after his reign, Since all three legions were transferred out of Germanyby Hadrian, the reign of Trajan is most likely, None of the three legions is attested in either his
Dacian or Parthian wars, so the campaign on the borders of their own provinces seem most likely,
AE,1901,50 & 1934,223 for Trajan's Dacian wars, AE1912,179 for his Parthian war, For the revolt
of 132, see 111.141552: VI3505; E 1894, 166 1896,53, also Parker, Ronian Legions (1928), 162,5, Parker, 163ff; VI . 3185; VIII6i9; IX • 2457; 1 . 5829; XI1I.3496,
-136-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
unit may have been vexillated to garrison the outlying areas of its own home
province, there are only two instances prior to Marcus Aurelius of
vexillations being used as garrisons outside these areas, Both were in
exceptional circumstances, and both were only temporary measures.
AE,1895,24 is from an aquaeduct constructed in Judaea by a vexillation
of Leglo III Cyrenaica during the reign of Trajan. At this time, X Fret ensis,
the normal garrison of the province, was involved in Trajan's Parthian war,
so III Cyrenaica had obviously been vexillated from neighbouring Arabia to
fill the gap.
The same can be said of vexillations from Leglo X Fret ensis, II Tralana
and XII Fuirninata found in Judaea at the time when detachments of VI Ferrata
were in Africa, dealing with a serious Moorish incursion circa 144/51. An
alternative explanation may be that they were concentrated here in response
to the Parthian crisis whith had developed at the end of the reign of
Antonthus. In support of this latter theory, IX'2457 shows one L. Neratius
Proculus sent by Antoninus to command just such a concentration of vexillary
troops established in Syria for this purpose.
A marked change in the pattern of vexillary employment occurred at the
end of the second century. It is difficult to define Its genesis, for while
the early Seven seem to have been the main innovators, it was during the
reigns of Marcus Aurelius and his son that this switch of emphasis began.
It is best illustrated during the Marcomannic wars, in which, as Parker
puts it: "all of the legions on the Rhine-Danube front were engaged, but not
as complete units (my emphasis). The permanent camps were not abandoned,
1, ,QL1904,91: Parker1 Roaan Legions 165; VIII'2490 1 10230,
—137-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
but the main body of the legions remained to garrison them, and sent
vexillationes to the actual scene of the fighting." In fact, there is
epigraphic evidence for the participation of detachments from not only the
Illyrian and Dacian legions, but of Legio III Augusta from Africa as well1.
The point is emphasised by the column of Marcus Aurelius, on which the
vexilla have taken the place of both the legionary aquila and the manipular
signa, in marked contrast with the reliefs on Trajan's column2.
AE,1910,161 is a different example of the phenomenon. It records the
occupation of Armenia by vexillations of XV Apollinaris and XII Fuirninata
during the reign of Commodus. Both legions were at the time stationed in
Cappadocia to the west, and detachments were obviously put into the
bordering province following its annexation by Lucius Verus in 161.
Both examples are indicative of a chronic shortage of manpower during
which the defence of the empire could only be achieved by the spreading of
existing forces as thinly as was feasible. The cause of this shortage may
have been the plague brought back from the east by Lucius Verus following
the Parthian war. It can be no coincidence that the last campaign of the
Antonines in which full legions were deployed was this conflicts.
Vexillation was not the only imperial response to this problem. Marcus
raised his two Italian legions, though both were immediately vexillated to
guard the access routes into Italy4 and the very use of Italian recruits is
indicative of the severity of the crisis. It is also likely that he raised
1, Parker, Roman Legions, 168; II1'14433; VI . 31856 AE, 188866; YIII . 619; QI92O,45,
2, Parker, bc, cit, Saxer, t'exillationen, 124,3, Ritterling, RE, 1427 & 1449; Parker, 166: cf, chIl: Manpower, p46ff4, 111.1980,
5, Dio LV . 24; Ritterling, 1300f; Salmon in r,ans, fl' Soc Can, 52 (1958), ser,3 sec,2, 52,—138-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
several new auxiliary units and recruited heavily into exist thg ones1.
However 1 the career inscription of L. lulius Iulianus 2 , who commanded
vexillatioris during the Marcomannic wars, the British campaign of Commodus,
led detachments in Spain against Moorish rebels, and also held two other
vexillary commands, is a clear indication of the extent of Antonine
vexillation.
The manpower situation can only have been exacerbated by the wars of
Septiinius Severus during the 190s. There are plenty of references to
vexillary commands in the various exercitus of the civil wars, whilst the
careers of L. Valerius Valerianus and L. Fabius Fulcianus 4 might point to
their use in Septimius' first Parthian war.
By 197, Septimius had raised three new legions with which to promote his
second offensive against Parthia, and had taken steps to encourage
enlistment and counter the negative effect on offensive capability which
seems to have been inherent in the use of vexillary armies. For while
vexillations were very effective in police actions against insurgents, the
lack of' full legions does seem to have been felt during the Marcomannic
wars, which dragged on without a satisfactory conclusion for fifteen years.
To this end, the Praetorian guard was increased fourfold's and II Parthica
1, cf, ch,V: AuIia,
2, VI . 31856 488866,
3, VI14O8; AE,1944,80; 1971,476, The 4 German legions of iE,189O,82 = FIR2 1 566 must be
involved in the war against Albinus, and not later as Birley suggests in (p. Stwo 8 (1969), 67, They
are probably the 4 legions which replace Coh, XIII Urbana in Lyons (ILS• 9493; cf, also 1143), ILS
2319 & 2345 of Leg, II Tr(uimna) Qer(ianica) Fort(/s) suggest that this legion was also involved,
4, E,1971,476; 1926,79, If an alternative reading to Birley (bc, c/f) is being taken 1 the
command of Claudius Gallus might also be dated to this war 1 cf, E',1957,123 & PIR2 C 878,
5, For a lull discussion of the chronology cf, ch,IV: Leg/ones, p,77f,6, Durry, Co/iorte5 Pr'foriennes (1938), 81ff,
-139-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
was established in Albanum. This provided a strong offensive nucleus, not
tied to any frontiers, which could be used on campaign and to which the
emperor could attach as many units and/or detachments as he deemed
necessary1.
Despite these measures, the empire was to remain stretched for manpower,
exacerbated by periodic recurrences of plague d , which placed it firmly on the
defensive and dominated the pattern of vexillary deployment throughout the
third century. The only truly offensive wars of the third century were the
British campaign of Septiinius and the Parthian war of Caracalla. The former
had the pretext of pacifying the tribes north of the Maeta&3 . In paradoxical
fashion, these two campaigns were made possible by the tacit acceptance of
the empire's defensive posture by both Septimius and his son. In Africa,
Syria and on the Danube, vexillations began to appear in garrisons wholly
divorced from the province of their mother unit 4 . One could also argue that
the Severan policy of limiting each province to two legions might have been
as much an attempt to spread available forces as it was a security measure;
especially since it was carried out in such dilatory fashions.
This shift in emphasis must in part be explained by the nature of the
evidence. The wealth of material produced by Cagnat from Africa and by
I, cf, ch,IY: Legionesp,85ff,
2, cf, ch,II: Manpover,
3, Dio LXXVII • 111; Herodian III'14 . 1-2; Miller, CAM XII (1939), 36ff; Murphy, St'verus Iroi
.[175CP1pfiOfl5 (1945), 77; Saiway, Roaan Br/tain (1981), 223 & 227, Caracalla's war was, in itself, a
bizarre and exceptional circumstance: Dio LXXVIII . 20-LXXIX; Herodian IV . 9 & 10; Miller, 48ff,
4, Vexillations of the Dacian legions are attested in Aquincum by AE,1901,154, The African and
Syrian evidence is discussed in more detail below,
5, It is highly likely that Septimius only supervised the reorganisation of Syria, and that
Britain was divided by his son, The division of Pannonia may have had more to do with local
circumstance than either policy: cf, ch,V: Auxilla, p. 116f
—140--
r
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
Rostovtzeff from Dura tends to overshadow the relative lack of anything else
from other areas. In Germany, for instance, the only references to
vexillations under the early Seven are of woodcutting details from Legio
XXII Primigenia'. Yet the picture even this unbalanced view provides hints
at an empire-wide increase in the use of vexillary garrisons.
In Africa, it would seem that the Numidian limes was garrisoned by small
detachments of between 5 and 15 men, commanded by a decurion 2, whilst the
castella on the more active frontiers of Tripolitania and Mauretania housed
somewhat larger groups. An epigrephical history of the cast ellum at Gholaia
cBou-Ngem) in Tripolitania shows that between 201 and 238 it was occupied
by a vexillation of Legia III Augusta with a numerus conlatus, under the
command of a centurion. After the legion's dissolution by Gordian, the
numerus remained on its own commanded by a decurion, until 253 from which
date it was replaced by cohors VII Fid&. Meanwhile, in Castellum Dimmidi
(Messad, Mauretania Caesariensis), a vexillat ion of III Augusta co-existed
alongside a detachment from the Syrian-based Leglo III Gallica throughout
the reigns of Septiinius and Caracalla4.
One might simply attribute this to the exceptional nature of Africa and
its garrisons, were it not for comparable events at Dura-Europos and, at a
later date, elsewhere in the empire. Situated at the apex of Roman
expansion along the Euphrates, Dura had great strategic importance for the
1, XIII • 6618, 6623, 11781; QE,191O,154,
2, 4E,1978,893,
3, QE,1972,677; 1979,642-644,
4, Al, 1939,213 & 215; 1948,214 & 217,
5, For the nature of the African iiees Fentress, Nuisidia and the Roasan Any, BAR S53 (1979), 115
& 139,
-141-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
Seven as a post of forward defence. Its garrison was drawn largely from
the Syrian legions and from III Cyrenaica, based in Arabia, arid was usually 3
vexillations strong, with accompanying auxiliaries 1 . In addition, a
dedication of 211/2 in honour of Septirnius' son Geta shows that vexillations
from Europe were also part of the garrison2.
This instance and that of III Gallica above, are indicative of the change
that was occurring under the Seven. No longer were units being detached
only to guard areas within their home province. With manpower at a premium,
the emperors were finding it increasingly necessary to take detachments from
areas which were adequately garrisoned and place them where they were most
needed; or to deploy units where and when they became available. One
possible example of this latter case comes from Aquilela, and briefly refers
o vexillations from the Pannonian legions I & II Adiutri'P.
The dating of this inscription is tentative at best. It has been
universally assumed that the approaches into Italy were not permanently
garrisoned until the mid third century. At this time, Dornaszewski4 maintains
that garrisons were established at Concordia and Aquileia by Philip. His
arguments for the Concordia garrison cannot be accepted, based as they are
on the inscription of Traianus Mucianus', who served in xi'i r'i xovxop8(.a)
at the start of his career. Even if we make allowance for Domaszewski's
1, 4E,1934,275, 276 & 280; 1937,239; 1940,220 & 240; 1948,124,
2, QE,984,921b 1934,276, revised by Speidel, Ro,san Any Studies I (1984), 301ff,3, III•954,4, Domaszewski, Rangordming des rös,ischen Heeres (1967), 185ff,5, 1LS9479 AE,1908,259,
-142-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
dating 1 , the fact that coh. I Concordlensvm was recruited from Concordia
does not prove that it was stationed there: if anything, it militates against
the possibility2 . His evidence for the Aquileia garrison is more reliable,
and shows that the town was garrisoned by vexillations of a Leglo 11111?] and
XIII Gemina circa 244, Yet while this does show that two legionary
vexillations were guarding the eastern approaches to Italy in the mid-third
century, it does not prove that the garrison was established by Philip, as
Domaszewski believed; nor does it explain where the mysterious vexillations
of the Pannonian legions fit in.
It seems unlikely that they co-existed with the other two legions in
Aquileia, since this does not fit the usual pattern of vexillary garrison,
broken only at Dura, in which the maximum number of detachments present was
two. Nor does it seem probable that they replaced the existing garrison at
a later date, since the history of Illyricum in the latter part of the third
century is one of constant barbarian incursion. Rather than withdrawing
detachments from the Danube provinces, Gallienus and the soldier emperors
were constantly on campaign with them and taking measures to strengthen the
Danube 1imes'. The only remaining possibility is that they were in Aquileia
1, As it stands, Mucianus would be ' rpocrop .lq, r' r(I! circa the reign of Gallienus, This
is hardly likely, since all securely datable references to the Protectorate in this reign follow the
format protector Augusti nostri, and have a far higher status than that of centurion, Without further
corroborative evidence, the inscription cannot be dated as early as Domaszewski would have us believe,
2, A quick perusal of Holder's Appendix III in BAR S70 (1980), 217ff will illustrate just how
rare it was for units to be stationed in their province of origin following the Batavian revolt of AD
69, Even the two Italian Legions of Marcus, raised specifically for the defence of the province, were
stationed on the opposite side of the Alps,
3, V . 808: dated by reference to V • 8237, XIII Gealna came from Dacia, The origin of the other
legion is more obscure, Mommsen suggested that the corrupted text should read Leg, 111(1?) P(Iaviae)fntoninianaeJ, but Domaszewski preferred Leg, III (Italicee) P,P. t/////////J, The former is morelikely, since the honorific of III Italica was Copcors, not Pie Fidel is,
4, cf, ch,X: Viri Miiitares, p2301,—143-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
at an earlier date, and were themselves replaced by the units stationed
there under Philip.
It is possible that these vexillations were part of the army of
Septimius in 193, and were left by him in Aquileia as a second line of
defence, in case the weakened Danube frontier should be penetrated while his
attention was elsewhere. At this time, two vexillations from Dada could
have been stationed at Aquincum to cover for the departed legions 1 . If this
is the case, the vexillations are likely to have been removed back to
Pannonia by Caracalla in 214, when he reorganised the province to bring
Brigetlo into the sphere of Pannonia Inferior 2 . There is some minor
epigraphic evidence to support this-. The garrison of 244 could then have
been placed In Aquilela any time from 214 onwards.
In doing this, Septimius would simply have been following in the
footsteps of his illustrious predecessor: just as Marcus Aurelius raised the
Italian legions to protect Italy during the Marcomannic wars, so Septiraius
was using the manpower available to similar ends. It was an ad hoc measure,
taken at a time of stress. Such measures colour the history of vexillation
throughout the century. Most affected by this were the Dacian legions V
Macedonica and XIII Gemina, which were continually weakened to provide
troops needed elsewhwere until the province was completely denuded by
1,4E,1901,154,2, This was probably done in response to tension on this frontier, Herodian IV . 8 . I speaks of him
'completing hs business,,,on the Danube', whilst in Dio LXXVII . 20 • 3-4 he claims to have created
hostility between the Marcomanni and the Vandals, It is probable that he reinforced the Pannonian
part of the Danube Iiaesat this time: cf, ch,V: Auxilia, p,llGf,
3, E,1944,121 shows I Qd, in Brigetio under Caracalla & three milestones from a later date list
the involvement of II d, on the Aquincum-Brigetio road: III.143544_6, Though bear in mind that we
are only talking in terms of detachments
—144-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
Gallienus to provide the strategic garrison at Poetovio 1 . It is at this point,
with the empire threatened on two fronts, and the East under the de facto
control of Palrnyra, that the crippling extent of the imperial shortage in
manpower can be seen. No longer able to draw on the Dacian legions to fill
his needs, Gallienus was forced to look elsewhere for the troops he needed.
Vexillations from Lower Moesia were moved to Aquincum, and detachments of
the German and British legions, which must have been In Illyricum prior to
259, occupied Sirmium. Most significantly, the main access from Illyricum
into Greece was garrisoned by vexillations of Legio II Parthica and III
Augusta. That Gallierius was reduced to drawing from the legion in Africa
was bad enough; but by vexillating II Parthica, the core of imperial
offensive capability, and placing it into a defensive mode, he proved beyond
any shadow of doubt that he was at the absolute limit of his resources'.
With the reign of Gallienus, there comes a turning point in the nature
of the Roman military response. The vexillation of II Part hi ca was
symptomatic of a greater change, one that had begun one hundred years
previously. It symbolised the final end of the era in which whole legions
were taken on campaign, and established the vexillation as the new strategic
unit of the later third century. At the same time, Gallienus had found a
I, Alfoldi, CAM 1I (1939) 214 & n,6 for references, Also 14E,1936,53, 54 & 57
2, AE,1935,164; 111.3228,
3, AE 1934, 193, These vxi/iationes were sub cira Aur, Augusizani duds iustissjii, which might
suggest that they were part of an exercitus, It has been suggested that they were campaigning againstthe Goths in 267: PLRE, 4ugustianus 2' Pflae,, Car p, Proc., 919ff, While I can accept that II
Pap thjca was likely to have been involved, it is hardly likely that the African legion could have been
transported to the area fast enough to respond to the invasion, A more reasonable explanation is
that, like Aureolus in Italy, Augustianus had responsibility for the defence of the Illyrian passes,
and the two vexillations were part of this garrison force: on II Parth, cf, ch,IV: Legiones, p87ff;
on Aureolus & the Nilan cavalry cf, chill: Contra Coaitatut, p 64ff,
—145-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
new source of manpower in the cavalry of Dalmatia 1 , and had set about
integrating this into his existing military force 2 . The results are visible
in the campaigns of his successors. Cavalry and infantry worked together to
harass, wear down and finally bring to battle the opposing army, be it Goth,
Vandal or heavily armoured Palrnyrene. Aurelian's army of reconquest against
Palmyra contained leglonaries from all the provinces of Illyricum and Asia,
which must perforce have been vexillations, unless he stripped over half the
empire of its defences.
One piece of epigraphy would seem to prove this point. CIL XII'2228
from Gallia Narbonensis (Grenoble) is a dedication to Claudius from the
'v xivatIones adque equites' which made a reconnaissance in force under the
command of lulius Placidianus, the Prefect of the Vig11es'-. Though no unit
titles are given, the above wording suggests that it was a composite force
of legionary vexillations and the new-style cavalry: the new exercitus of the
late Principate.
The new exercitus It may have been, but it was not a new comitatus.
Various attempts have been made to use numismatics and some epigraphic
material to show that the vexillatlon of the third century was a part of the
assumed mobile field army. Birley argued that the prosopographical records
of several of Septlinius' most prominent generals were an ". ..indication of the
1, Ritterling, 'Ro.ischen Heerwesen', Pest, 0, Hirschfelds (1903), 345ff; lföldi, 'Usurpator
Aureolus', %f// (1927), 11ff, Cooper draws on Mann's thesis to show that this recruitment began under
Marcus Aurelius, and suggests that Gallienus drew so heavily from Dalmatia because it was the only
fertile recruiting ground remaining: Cooper, C? Origins of the flew Roøan Ara y ( 1967), 284 & 373,
2, cf, ch,III: Contra Co,itatui,
3, Zosimus I • 43 • 2; I451; 1 . 50 . 3 & 1.52.3-53,
4, .IL$ 569, Saxer, Vexillationen, 108 & Domaszevski, Rangordnwng, N2 253,
-146-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
de faca field army in being...". He was supported by Cooper, who took Maria
Alföldi's claim, that the 'Pia Fide.Us' coinage of 259/60 was minted to pay
vexillatioris in Gallienus' field army, one step backwards and applied it to
Septimius' coin issues of 1932. It has also been argued that the distinction
found in some of the law codes between vex±Zlationes and the Auxilia was a
distinction between the higher status comitatensian troops and their lower
status counterparts on the frontiers.
Birley's arguments cannot be credited. The records he cites each merely
name the dux of a particular army for a particular campaign, or series of
campaigns. While this has provided reasonably good evidence for the
continuing u e of vexillary armies under the Seven, there is nothing In them
which can be construed as new or revolutionary. In no way do they suggest
the permanent retention of the force once Septimius' wars were over;
therefore in no way are they specials.
The hypothesis of Maria Alföldi is more tenable, but does admit an
alternative explanation. The argument stems from the problematic coinage of
Gallienus, which comrnemmorated legions from the Gallic Empire, as well as
imperial legIons'. AlföldI believed that since identical legions were
comemmorated on both the VI P(ia). VI F(idelis). and the VII P. VII F. issues,
they were vexillations in an identical field army which defeated the
Alemanni, first outside Milan, then later in a battle near Verona which she
I, Birley, 'Severus and the Army', 66f,
2, Cooper, 0r191n5, 234ff & 266ff summarising M, Alföldi (1957),
3, FIR2 C 823; C 878 ,1957,123; I 566; ILS 1141 & 2935, cf, also above pnn,3 & 4
4, RICV . I pp.92-97 & 34 cf, also Ritterling R 1341,
—147-
M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
inferred from a series of coin hoards. Furthermore, the V P. V F. issues
which comrnemmorated four legions of diverse origin' were taken to indicate a
similar field army operating on the Rhine between 257/8. Her chronology can
hardly be faulted, merely her interpretation. That the legions involved in
the Italian campaign were vexillations is not seriously in doubt, but the
coinage of 259 lists every single legion from the Rhine and Danube, including
II Parthica and the Praetorians. Such a force was certainly not in Italy at
the time of the Aleinannic invasion. The Alemanni were only repulsed from
Rome due to emergency measures taken by the Senate, and the force with
which Gallienus finally defeated them is believed to have been numerically
inferior2.
A more probable explanation is that, like the Rstitu tar coinage of his
reign, Gallienus was trying to minimise the loss In that year of the Gallic
Empire . A similar propo8anda move comes from the Gallic Empire itself, with
the coin series of Victorinus, which commemorate legions from as far afield
as Syria and Egypt, whilst ignoring certain of the British and German legions
known to be within Its borders 4 . The 193 issues of Septixnius were also
more likely designed to consolidate his position than to commemmorate the
vexillations in his exercitus, especially since they omit Leglo III Augusta
Vindex and X üeiaina, two legions which were manifestly loyal to hiin,
I, 'III wgust from Germania Superior; I Adiutrix from Panonnia Inferior; II Italica from
Noricum; and II Part/iica from Albanum,2, Zosimus I . 37 Alfóldi, CAN XII, 182,
3, On the Restitutor coinage cf, Drinkwater, Gall/c Eapire, Hi5tor/a 52(1987), 167,4, Cooper, Origins, 270,5, III Augwsta gained the title Vindex for avengeing the death of Pertinax, and I Ge.*ina was one
of the Pannonian legione that elected him, R1C IV'1 pp,65 93 p180 n,652,
—148-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillat iones
Conversely, the V P. V F. coinage, with its mention of only four legions,
does seem to be commemorating a particular campaign, and is a very good
example of II Parthica being used as the core for an expeditionary force
around which other units were vexillated. Gallienus was sent to Gaul in
response to Gallic pleas for help 1 , and his taking an exercitus with him can
hardly be seen as unusual.
Turning to the law codes, which refer to the cavalry vexillationes of
Dioclet Ian and the Tetrarchy, it Is true that one rescript granted immunities
to those equites who served in vexfllatione, whilst categorically denying
them to those in the a1ae; but It is not until Constantine that such a
distinction is drawn between comita tenses and ripenses3, Rather than
serving in the field army, several of these equites can be found in the
Notitia as garrison troops, stationed there during the later third century4.
What the law codes do illustrate is the semantic change In the term
vexillaticP. The Table of' Brlgetio provides us with a clear example of the
change in terminology when it extends privileges to: "...tam legionari.i milites
quam etiarn equites in vexillationibus constituti inlyriciani (sic)".
The change must have occurred some time in the last third of the
century, since the Table of Brigetlo dates to 311, and the Placidianus
inscription shows the old terminology still in effect at the time of
I, Drinkwaier, Gd//ic Eipire, 248,2, Cod, .1(/5t, X.5533, Cod, Theod, VII2O4: Cooper, Origins, 388,4, Ritterling, 'Romischen Heerwesen', 345ff who believed that the eqwtes garrisons found in the
Notitia Dignifatua were placed there by Aurelian after his defeat of the Paleyrenes, Against thisview cf ch,VI1: Eqiites,
5, Cod, ,Twst, VII649; Cod, Theoo', V'6'l,
—149-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
Claudius 1 . The clue lies in the status of the new cavalry units, as
indicated by the equites Promoti,
Ritterling2 believed that the equites Promoti were recruited from the
cavalry of the legions. This would neatly explain their name, since he
thought the eques in a legion was a pri.ncipalis and the ordinary miles
gregarius therefore had to be promoted to enter the legionary cavalry.
Cooper, following Gilliam-', corrected the status of the legionary eques to
that of irnmunis, and pointed out that the same was true of the eques in a
cohors equitata4 . The whole argument hinges upon a papyrus dated to 302, in
which one Aurelius Heron describes himself as:
riruç irpopotaw ZExouvrav ciro As'yuLvoç $ piavç Svixipevsç v T&vtaup
tno Mcixpa',8tov (rp.krLJrocn1.ov.6
Whatever reading of this passage you acceptG, the fact remains that
Heron had transferred from Legio II Tralana into the equites Prornoti Secund.Z
proving that some link between the Prornoti and the legions existed. Such a
measure is Just the sort of solution which Gallienus could have adopted in
his search for manpower, vexillating the equites out of the legions and
converting them from messengers and reconnaissance troops into fighting
1, XlI . 2228 discussed on p.146 above,
2, Ritterling, 'Römischen Heerwesen', 346f,
3, Cooper, Origins, 368 following Gilliam in Hisfria (1965), 77ff,4, 1LS2332,
5, P. Gre,,!, 74,6, Some controversy has existed about what It is the io is actually referring to, Ritterling
believed it referred to the unit and showed that the equies Proaoti were closely affiliated to thelegion of their origin, However, Cooper follows van Berchem in believing that the io referred to
Heron himself, who had just been drafted from the legion into the cavalry unit, For some reason, he
believed this proved that the eqiites Proioii were not recruited from the legions: Cooper, Origins,369; van Berchem, 4rie de Diociâtien,,, (1952), 104 n,3; cf, ch VII: Eqiites, 167ff,
—150-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
units. Though there is no evidenfce for the existence of equites Promoti
prior to Diocletian, the nomenclatures, Armigerui, Scutarli, Sagittaril, are
strongly suggestive of similar measures, and Speldel has argued convincingly
that the Stablesiani were raised from the stratores of provincial governors1.
If this Is the case, several of the new cavalry units could have started out
as vexillat ions, colourfully named to denote their origins, and gaining their
own unit Identity. Gradually the terminology and privileges which went with
these units were subsumed into the equites as a whole.
It was not uncommon for vexillatlons to take on their own identity after
a protracted absence from the mother unit. Saxer dealt with this subject at
great length2, and produced an excellent example in the vex. equitum
Illyricorum. This was a unit formed out of Illyrlan auxilliary detachments
during Trajan's Daclan war which lost contact with its origins and was
even ually turned into an a1. From the third century, Legia II Ital(ica)
Divitensiurrtt , stationed on the Rhine, had assumed Its independent status
after a protracted absence from its parent, II Italica in Noricum. The same
may be true of the legions commanded by Pompillus Piso, if Parker is
correct
In support of the equites Promoti, various attempts have been made to
prove an increase In the legionary cavalry from 120 men to 726, to little
1, Speidel, 'Stablesiani', C,iron4 (1974), 541ff: cf, ch,VII: Equifes, 169ff,2, Saxer, Vexii1ationei 124f,
3, Saxer, N2 48,
4, ILS 2316 & 2777,
5, IL$ 1l11 Parker, Roaan Legions, 164f,
—151-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
avail 1 . This only has relevance if vexillations are assumed to be of a
standard, fixed size, at which point the legionary cavalry do not hcive enough
men to vexillate. Yet all evidence points to the contrary. Far from being
of any fixed size, vexillations seem to fluctuate according to the task in
hand. Hunt's Pridianum is indicative of the extent of vexillation in even a
small, quirigenary unit. Soldiers are listed on supply missions, garrison duty
elsewhere, seconded as bodyguards and procuratorial staff, on reconnaissance,
participating in an expedition across the Danube, and in vexillatione. The
third century history of Gholaia3 is another illustration, showing how the
garrison of a fort could fluctuate with the circumstances of the century,
and the small garrisons on the Numidian limes illustrate that a vexillation
could as easily be five as five hundred men.
Hyginus spoke of vexillations which Cooper worked out to be 550 strong.
Based on this, he constructed an ingenious argument to show that the cohort
size in the Antiqua Leglo of Vegetius, given as 550, was in fact the
standard size of a vexillation4 . Great emphasis was laid upon the passage
In Cassius Dio when a junior officer promised to end the seige of Hatra with
just 550 men, and Septimius is said to have snapped "And where am I going to
find so many men?". Cooper went to great pains to explain why the number
550 was used, rather than a simple reference to a vexillation. He need not
have worried. Five hundred and fifty Is a very fortuitous number to have
fixed upon, since it was approximately one tenth of a standard legion. It
I, Besnier (1937), 194; Ensslin (1939), 379, based on the antiqwa /eioof Vegetius, cf, Appi,2, Fink Roaan Military Records on Papyrus (1971), 217ff,3, cf, above, p,141f,
4, Hyginus V . 5 . 4; Vegetius 11 . 6 & 11 . 8; Cooper, Orzgins 40ff,5, Dio LXXVII2•5
-152-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes
may well be that whenever they needed a vexillat ion, the Rornans simply
detached a cohort plus a few extra men (cavalry ?) and put them under the
command of a senior centurion or military tribune. The request of the
officer at Hatra was so exact precisely because there was no fixed
complement for a vexillation. The man in the story was a soldier. The
comment may be apocryphal, but the implication is still there. He was asking
for a finely Judged number of men, estimated to be the minimum required for
his purposes. The moral of the story is in Severus' reaction to the
statement.
Vexillations were exactly what the term implies: detachments of as many
men as were required to do a specific duty. In the case of strategic
detachments, they were almost certainly quirigenary and rnilliary vexillations,
since these were the standard building blocks which Roman commanders were
used to working with. Yet this did not preclude them from placing five men
in an unthreatened border fort, or enough men on the Rhine to be classed as
a legion by themselves. In the crisis of the third century, the very
flexibility of the vexillary unit was its great advantage. Only when
relative order had been restored, and the emperor had time to impose a rigid
structure on the existing status quo, was the ad hoc disposition of the
third century restructured into the new order of the Tetrarchy.
-153-
rABL.E V 1:
Vc i 11 t i cr pr i r t c Mr- c
AL1r1 I Li
Grr± ri
CIRCUMSTANCE UNIT(S1.
IN HOME PROVINCE:
iClaudlus Vexx, in Thracia XV
Flavians XIII Geuina
?Tra j an Vex, L(eg) Tr(aianae ?)
Hadrian X Fretensis
VI Ferrata
Anioninus Pius VI Victrix
IV Scythica & XVI Flavia
Uncertain date III Augusta
XV Apollinaris
REFERENCES
IQIRL
11.3272
4E,1903,218; 1910,66
2
XIII•8082a
4E, 1928, 136; 1974,656 & 657
AE 1928,131
4
A1912,199; 1975,563
SE 1903, 252
3
AE 1900,121
AE 1975, 783
2
IM NEIGHBOURING PRO VINCE
Trajan III Cyrenaica in Judaea AE, 1895, 24
Antoninus Pius X Fretensis, II Traiana,
XII Fulminata in Judaea 4 1904, 91
Cmpi ri V<c:
CIRCUMSTANCE UNIT(SJ
?CLAUDflJS:
British expedition Vexill, Leg IlL,,,,
in expe]diiione Briiann(,, VIII'14400
FLAVIAN:
?AD69 Civil war I Gemina XIII4624
Xliii Gemina E,l920,I18
XXI Rapax X11I'4623
VexilatiLo]
Germani[c]ianoruLi] XIi'5733
?AD69 revolt of Civilis Leg, XVI ci vle]x, XIII.7720
AD89 revolt of Saturninus X Gemina 1111.7717
VI Victrix 1111.8533
REFERENCES
15
1QIL
4
2
TRAJAN:
?German campaign
Dacian war
Unknown expedition
HADRIAN:
'Adversus Armloricano]s'
Exercitus Moesiaci
X Gemina + auxilia
XXII Primig, + auxilia
I lialica & V Nacedonica
4 Pannonian legions
VII Claudia
clohort(es) alaru]m
Britanici(n]iarum (sic)
vexillationi
exercitus Nloesiaci
XIII'7697, 7716 & 7718
XIII • 7704, 7715 & 7727
E 1901,50
QE 1934, 223
1912,179
III' 1919
XII .1358
6
2
-154-
M,C.Ibeji: 03 Army
CIRCUMSTANCE
HADRIAN CTD:AD132 Jewish war
ANTONINUS PIUS:
British expedition
AD145 vs doors
Parihian crisis
UNCERTAIN DATE:?A021
?Pre AD89
Pre C3,
Vexillationes
UNIUSI
IQIL
V Macedonica & XI Claudia 111 . 14155 2; AE,1894,l66; 1896,53
Trib, X Beam, missus
,,,,,ad vexilla(tiones VI'3505
4
VII Gemina, VIII Augusta
& XXII Primigenia X'5829
XXII Primigenia VII846; XIII'3496
II Augusta, VI Victrix, XX Valeria Victrjx
coniributi cx 6cr, duobus E, 1903, 360
Unnamed vexx, VII1I09 1110k
6
VI Ferrata VIII.2490; 10230
2
Unspecified vexx, IX.2457
Vexx Legg I, V, XX & XXI XIV.3602
VI Victrix XIII.7695 & 7696
X Gemina XIII.7698
XXI Rapax XIII7714
XXII Primigenia XIII•7703
5
Leg XV XIII•7700
C, Vellius Rufus, praef vexillariorum
I Adiutrix, II Adiutrix, II Augusta,
VIII Augusta, IX Hispana, XIII Gemina,
XX Victrix, XXI Rapax AE,1903,368
2
40
—15 5-
TABL.E V 2:Vci 11 t i c,x-i cf Mc1 iid GcrI1DdL1
Grri_ ri
REFERNCE PROVINCE UNIT(S)PURPOSE
Af,1910,5 Hispania VII Geminagarrison
AE1914,188 Britannia VI Victrix garrison
X1II7946 Germania Inf I Minerviagarrison
A1899 1 195 Raetia Ill lialica garrison
111.14370 2Raetia III Italica garrison
111 . 1980 Dalmatia II & III Italica Frumentarius in charge
1L82287 suggests a supply
Ii5SiOfl,
41,1910,161 Armenia XV Appollinaris & XII Fulminaia Armenia annexed in 161.
C mp i ri Sf c c:REFERNCE PROVINCE UNIT(S) PURPOSE
V1II . 7050 P. lul, arcianus leg, Augg, sulper] Verus' Parthian war?
PIA2 1340 vexillationes in Capp(ado]cia
4E1920,45 praepositus vexillationibus ex Illyrico Marcomannic war,
•issus ad,..,expeditionem Germ, et Sari,
VIII'619 praeposiius vexillationibus Ponticis Danube & Marcomannic
ILS 2747 aput Scythia et Taurica. + vex, III Aug. wars,
aput Marcorannos,
111 . 14433 Moesia Inf I Italica & V Macedonica 'Tropa(e]i (agens)'
During Marcomannic war?
YI'31856 praep, vexx, tempore belli Marcommanic war,
41,1888,66 Germanici et Sarmat,
praep, vexx, per Achaiam et Macedoniam Spanish war of Commodus,
et in Hispanis adversus Castabocas et
Mauros rebel les,
praep, vexx, tempore belli Britannici, British wr of 183/4,
— 15 6-
III Augusta
III Augusta
III Augusta
IV Scythica
& XVI Flavia Firma
misc,
III CyreflaiCa
& IV Scythica
XIII Geilna
V Macedonica
V Nacedonica
& XIII Lemma
XII Primigenia
XII Prmmigenia
I Nmnervia
& XXX Ulpia
REFERENCE
V1II8796
E,1939,2l3, & 2)5;
1940, 141;
1948, 214 & 217
VIII2465; 2466 & 4322
AE 1909, 151;
1922,53 & 54
4E 1962, 304
4E, 1976, 698 & 700
AE 1940, 220
AE 1934, 276; 1984, 921b
cf, Speidel Rian 1qr,,y
Styd. (1984), 301ff,
AE, 1934, 275 & 276;
1937, 239,
E1890,IO2; 1912,305
4E 1912, 73;
cf, 1909,35
4E 1901, 154
XIII . 6618 & 6623;
4fi 1899, 194
XIII.11781
AE 1898, 18
E 1944, 80
4 1890, 82
VI . 1408 & 1409
4E 1926,79
VIII'5349, 7978;
AE 1977, 858
X'5178, 5398;
AE 1985, 332
XIlI6104
AE 1985,37
cf, VI'lSSl & 1477,
rABLE V 3:
Vxi11tt icr cf Sr-ia & Crc1 1
Qr-r I x-i
W.E. PROVINCE FUNCTION
III Augusta Maur, Sitif, garrison of Messad under Severus
III Augusta Maur, Caes, garrison of Castellum Diromidi
& III Gallica under Severus
Numidia garrison of various forts
under Severus
Tripolitania vex, alongside coh, Syrorum Sag,
under Severus
Tripolitania garrison of $u-Ngem under Severus
Syria garrison of Dura under Severus
Syria
'(miUtes vex,] Ant, europa(eorum]
Syria
garrison of Dura under Caracalla
Dacia garrison of Deva under Caracalla
Dacia(!) 'vex, D(acorum) P(arihica) L(eg)
V M(ac) p,f,' at Potais5a under
Severus
Pannonia garrison of Aquincum under Severus
Ger, Sup, 'vex, leg, agens in lignaris'
Ger, Sup, 'vex, leg, agens ad abiegnas pilas
secundas'
Germanma tilestamps reading 'vex, ex(ercitus)
G(e)r(manici)
Crnpi ri V'c<:PROVINCE FUNCTION
Valerianus praep, vexx, exped, urbic(ae)
itemque Asianae adversus hosies
publicos p(opuli) R(omani)
(campaigns in Italy & vs Niger]
Felix praep, vex, agentium in Ital,
Castinus dux vexx, advers(us) defectores
et rebelles (Niger & Albinus]
Fulcianus dux vexx, per Italiam
praep, vexx Illyricianis in exped-
itione orientali
Claudianus praep, vexx, Daciscarum XIII G & V M,
(in first Parthian war]
Sabinus praep, vexx, Germanicae expeditionis
(Caracalla's German campaign]
IV Flavia agens expeditione Germaniae
XI Claudia in German, epedit,
& I Italica?
REFERENCE
AE 1971, 476
-157-
REFERENCE
1940, 162
cf, 1929,183
VIII . 10990;
AE 1979, 645
XIII'7944
AE 1940,153
AE, 1972,677
AE 1957, 341
V.8237
V.808
111.954
AE 1934, 193
AE,1936,53,54 & 57
AE 1977, 560
XIII'6668
REFERENCE
11 . 484 : ILS 1372
A 1978, 440;
cf, I1'3688
4E 1935,164
VI . 31871
VII '212
ThBLE V 4:Vci11t1cri fr-c,m AD 2 17-284-
Grj ri Vcc:NifiIE. hAlE. FUNCTIOPt
III Augusta 8ev, Alex, garrison of Castellue Dirimidi in
Mauretania Caesariensis
III Augusta 8ev, Alex, garrisons in Tripolitania
I Minervia
8ev, Alex, garrison at Iversheia in Ger, Inf,
III Augusta
Naximinus garrison at Castellum Diramidi
III Augusta
pre-Gordian garrison of Bu-Ngem in Tripolitania
I Italica
Gordian vex, in Moesia Inferior
XIII Gemina
AD 244 garrison of Aquileia
XIII Gemina
Philip? garrison of Aquileia
& Legio 111(1?]
I & II Adiutrix
I C3 garrison of Aquilsia
11 Parthica
Gallienus posted at Lychnidus in Macedonia
& III Augusta
V Macedonica
late C3 in Poetovio, Pann, Sup, commanded
& XIII Gemina
by L, Flavius Aper
XIX Ulpia
C3 garrison of Euskirchen, Ger, Inf,
XXII Priaigenia
C3 garrison at mogontiacum, Ger, Sup,
Crnpl ri Tcc:
NAE. QIE. FUNCTION
Similis early C3 praep, vexx, expeditionis per
Asiam, Lyciam, Pamphyliam et Phryiam
Urbanus AD 238 vet, princeps vex, VII Gem,
Gradivus
Gallienus aput VII Cl,,,,missus cum vexx,
Moe5iae Inferjoris,,,to Aquincum
Galliar, C3 praep, vexx, per Ital, ci Raei,
ci Noric, bello Germanico,
]nius
C3 praep, vex, Raetor, et Noricor,
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VII: Eqt.iit
During the late Roman period, a whole series of 'ethnic' units, many of
them cavalry, came to the fore, distinguished from the alae and cohorte by
a new nomenclature coupled to exotic names. Their titles were descriptive,
often seeming to denote their origins, and in several cases implied that
they had been vexillated from institutions already In existence. For some,
such as the equites ArmlgerZ we simpiy have not unearthed enough material
with which to construct a satisfactory history'. For others too numerous to
mention, a single Inscription or a reference in the Notitia Dignitatum is the
only evidence of their existence. They could have been named after the
place they were stationed2 , the peoples from whom they were recruited 3 , or
the manner in which they fought4 . Yet those which occur most commonly In
the Notitia have in general left behind some sort of imprint from which to
trace a sketchy picture of their creation.
The ubiquity of the Notitia in the study of late Roman cavalry units is
a problem in itself. Ever since Ritterling's study of the equites Iflyriciani
1 Seven units are mentioned in the Notitia, four of them comitatensian, and a nuaeriisAraigerorwi is mentioned on the tombstone of a ceiiturio protector in Concordia (Italia), which istentatively dated to the early fourth century: Not, Dig, Or, V . 35, VIl'26, XXXIX'17, XL'14 & 15 Not,Dig, Ccc, VI'54 & 80 VII . 173 & 198: V.8747,
2, Such as the equitas vex/list/ones Aegissensisat Aegyssus (floesia): AE,I976,637,3, Such as the comitatensian equ.ztes ifarcotanni, possibly recruited by Aurelian: Not, Dip, Dcc,
VI'GS = V1I . 183; 86'2074,II,5 (c,AD 286); Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 224,
4, Such as the equites Caapa'7i, which are believed to have fought on horseback 'in theHellenistic manner': AE 1963,81: Weege, ,Iahrbuch des Arch, fast, 24(1909), 99ff,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
in 1903 1 , scholars have taken units from the Notitia Di&nitatum and tried to
project them back into the previous century, sometimes successfully but more
often not. It is a worthwhile endeavour only if independent evidence for the
existence of such cavalry units can be attributed to the third century.
Otherwise, extrapolation from the Notitia is a misleading and pointless
exercise. In this chapter, I intend to explore the evidence for the most
common cavalry units In the Notitia in order to show which units will reward
such study and which units will not.
I shall begin with some comments on the equites Dalmatae. Their
history is so enmeshed with that of the supposed Gallienic field army that
it is impossible to speak of one without the other, end most of what could
be said has already been iterated above in my chapter Contra Comitaturri. An
examination of their place in the Notitia only serves to reinforce those
points. Forty-eight units of equites Dalmatae are listed In the Notiti&,
almost as many as the total number of equites promoti, Mauri and scutarli
put together4 . Thirty-one of these came from the west, of which only 2 were
comitatensian and 3 were cunei. In the east, 8 out of 17 units were cunei
and of the remaining 9, 4 were comita tenses. With no Palatinate units, and
only 1 in 8 of the Dalmatae being comitatensian, it is difficult to envisage
them as elite troops. There is little doubt that as vexillations of equites
1, Ritterling, 'Rômischen Heerwesen', Pest, 0, Hirsch!elds (1903), 346ff.
2, Above 1 ch,III,
3, Not, Dig, Ccc, YI . 174 & 175; XIVIII . 16; XXXII'23, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34 36 & 37 XXXIU'25, 29,
32-35 k 37 & 39-43; XXXIV'14, 18-20, 34 & 35; XXXVIII . 7 XL'19 Not, Dig, Or, V . 36 & 37; VI . 37 VII.27;
XXXIl . 21: XXXIII . 25; XXXIV . 18; XXXY'is; XXXVIIl6; XLI . 15, lB & 19; XLII'13, 14 & 15-18; cf, Tables El
& 2,
4 These are th. other types of equifes li/yriciani identified by Ritterling,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
they held a higher status than their auxiliary counterparts. This much is
spelled out in two rescripts of Diocletian 1 . The Placidianus inscription from
Grenoble in AD 269, with its reference to vexil.Zationes adque equ1tes shows
that the distinction was in place even before the new nomenclature had
become firmly established, and the equites were classed as the equals of
legionary detachments 2 . Yet this is as far as the distinction goes. No one
would dream of claiming that the vexillationes in Grenoble had elite status,
and any attempt to paint this as anything other than an expeditionary force
would be undoubtedly mistaken.
Speidel has put forward the suggestion that the equites Dalmatae were
not named for their national origin, but were vexillations of auxiliaries
stationed in Dalmatia as a strategic reserve 3 . This is unlikely, since it
involves the notion of an uninvolved rear-echelon force. We have already
established that the Dalmatae were extremely active throughout the empire,
and that the concept of a mobile field army to which this suggestion is
tantamount is not tenable. In all probability, the recruitment of the
equites Dalmatae was the act of an emperor desperate for manpower. We have
seen how Gallienus resorted to extensive vexillation in an attempt to cover
all fronts with adequate forces4 . He would seem to have been so short of
troops that he was willing to recruit any fighting men he could find.
Cooper was of the opinion that the recruitment of Dalmatian cavalry had
I, Cod, 1U5t, VII'64'9 & X . 54 . 3 (or 55 . 3 in certain editions),
2, XII'2228 1L5569,
3, Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 22Sf,
4, cf, ch,VI: Yexillationes, p 1451,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
begun in the reign of Marcus Aurelius 1 1 and it is worth noting that this
coincided with the start of large scale vexillation. The Dalmatian hill
tribes had been heavily drawn upon in earlier centuries to provide a whole
series of auxiliary units2 , If they were no longer capable of providing
anything but lightly-armed skirmishers, it is unsurprising that these
resources should remain largely untapped until the third century.
Skirmishers of exceptional quality could be obtained elsewhere, most notably
from Mauretania. Only when necessity became the mother of invention were
the equltes Dalmatae to come into their own.
The equltes Mauri often seem to be lumped together with the Dalmatae,
as aspects of the same thing, but their history is very different. Very few
units appear in the Notitia Dignitatum; of those which do, most were equites
Illyriclani?. Two units of equites Maurl are listed in the west, and the
magister equitum praesen tails had two units of comita tenses4. Nowhere in
the Notitia is there mention of the equites item que pedites Mauri known from
inscriptions5 , which seem to have been a phenomenon of the third century.
One cuneus equitum Maurorum scutar'iorum is known6.
The Moors were a highly esteemed adjunct of the Roman army throughout
1, Cooper, C3 Origins of the 'New' Roian Any, Oxford DPhil (unpub. 1967), 284 & 373,
2, Known coliortes are I, II, VI a VII Deliataru. eq., Jill Del,atarui, V Deliatarue CR, 11!Oal.aiarus p1, V Delia tarui and I Pannoniorui et Delia tarue CR eq. The sequences probably started inthe Jullo-Claudian period, since the earliest dated references come from the reign of Tiberius:
Xl I'11962, 1111 . 7581, 4E 1921, 31, VIII' 21040; Holder, Studies in the Auxilia of the Roian Any (roeAwgustu5 to Ira/an, BAR $70 (1980), 226 & 306f,
3, Not, Dig, Or, XXXII'18; XXXIII'26; XXXIV'21; XXXV17; XXXVII . 17; cf, Table El.,
4, Not, Dip, VI.58 & 61; XXXIII3l; XXXIV23: cf, Table E2,5, VIII'20996 ItS 1356; IGRRI'1496 ItS 9479 = Ql908,259,6, Not, Di;, Or, XXXI'23,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
the history of the empire, arid indeed before 1 . In the days of Trajan, the
native commander of an elite Moorish contingent gained such a powerful
position through this command that he achieved consular office and was
eventually removed by Hadrian on grounds of treason 2. A group of Maui-i
gentiles were raised by Antoninus Pius, as part of the tribute from his
Mauretarilan war according to Speidel, and were stationed in Dacia 3 . Another
Moorish unit from his reign can be found in Moesia Superior 4 . These may
have been the origins of the numeri Maurorum found in Dacia half a century
later, but the link has not been provens. A distinct change may have come
with the Maui-i equites of Marcus Aurelius which, if Southern is correct, were
clearly distinguished from the alae and were used in his Danubian wars.
Moorish cavalry were certainly a fully-fledged arm of the Roman army by
the time of the Seven. They fought for Pescennius Niger In AD 193, when
their ferocity was remarked upon7 . In AD 216 and 218 they took part in the
Parthian campaigns of Caracalla and Macrinus 6 , and fought for Severus
Alexander and Maxiininus against the Germans, invading Italy with the latter
in 238a• Under the Severan emperors, the Moors became a part of the regular
Auxilia 10 , while some units of mixed cavalry and infantry achieved household
I, Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 208ff,
2, Lusius Quietus: Speidel, op. cii,, 212.
3, XVI . 108 Speidel, 209,
4, XVI'114,
5, 111 . 6267; AE,1944,74; Speidel 1 210; Southern, 'Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army', Britannia11(1989), 93 sounds a note of caution,
6, Southern, op. cit,, 931,
7, Her, 111.4-5,
8, Dio LXX VIII'32,
9, Her, VI'7 .8, VII2'1 & VIII . 13; S//A Max, 11 . 1; Zos, 1.15,
10, cf, ch,V: Aixi1iae
—163-
M,C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Equites
status1,
In the mid third century, they defeated the Carpi under Philip and were
part of Valerian's eastern army 2. Speidel has argued that the vexillationes
equitum Maurorum in terr.itorio Auziensi praetendentium during the 250s were
detachments of the equites item que pedites !fauri which were at Auzia In AD
227. Against this, Southern pointed out that the phrase in territorlo
Auziensi praetendentium strongly suggested a non-permanent garrison, and
claimed that these units were instead detachments drawn from bodies of
auxiliary cavalry 4. The equites ite.mque pedites Mauri were probably sent to
the area by Severus Alexander to quell riots in Tingitana early In the
reign6, and it would seem strange for such an elite unit to have remained
once the troubles were over. On the other hand, an extensive fortification
effort In Caesariensis immediately followed these riots, so the unit may have
stayed to aid In this6.
An equally important contingent of ethnic troops drawn upon by the
Seven was the Oshroenian archers. Osrhoene was annexed as a province by
Sept imius for a very short while, with the town of Nisibis established as a
colonia on its borders, but he was forced to abandon it in pursuit of the
civil war against Albinus. On his return to the Parthian theatre, King
Abgar forestalled its reannexation by submitting to the emperor as a client
I, The equites iteique pedifes Mauri, discussed above, chill: Contra Coaitatu p63,2, Zos, 1 . 20; Petrus Patricius, frag, 1,
3, VIII . 9045 & 9047; Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 216ff,4 Southern, 'Numeri', 94,5, Alfaldi, CA/IXII, 68,
6, Carcopino, 'Castella de la Plaine de Setif', Revue Africaine LIX (1918), 5ff.
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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
king'. The troops they supplied were therefore technically symmachiar-il and
not part of the Auxilia. In fact, a numerus 1-losroenorum at Intercisa in
Pannonia is the only 'regular' unit of these troops known prior to the
Notitla. Even here, there is Just a single reference, listing the equites
sagit tar-li indigenae primi OsrhoenP. This links the Osrhoenians to the
larger series of equites sagittarli, of which they assumed the highest
profile in the early decades of the century,
Eastern archers have almost as long and chequered a history In the
service of the empire as do the Mauretanians, The primary source of
manpower came from Palmyra, which by the third century was supplying units
to the regular Auxilia4. The Osrhonenians were a small part of the vast
wells of specialist manpower In the east, first drawn upon in a systematic
fashion by the Seven. By the time of the Notitia, the equites sagit tar-il
seem to have adopted a similar role in the east to the equites Dalinatae in
the west, making up the main bulk of the equites in the theatre. Indeed, the
proportions are very similar. Thirty five units of sagittarii existed in the
east as opposed to seventeen in the west. Of these, 13 (a large proportion)
were comltatenses and only 2 were cune.L Most of the eastern units were
equites indigenae, an epithet designed to differentiate them from the equites
Illyriciani found on the eastern frontier, which indicates that they were
1, Dio LXXVIII . 12 . 1-2; Her, III9 • 2; Miller, CAR XII, 9ff.
2, Nuae,'us Hosroenorui, IlI'1O3O7 equites Osrhoeni, Not, Dig, Or, XXXV23,
3, Southern, 'Numeri', 89ff,
4, Most notably co/i, Xl palsyrenorua sag,; AE,1940,240 & cf, chV: Auxilia
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M,C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Equites
indigenous elements of the eastern garrison1.
Little more is known about the equites sagittariI Only one inscription
mentions them; a brickstamp from Viminacium in Moesia 2. Another inscription,
in Greek, mentions a .,,J ypav, which has been expanded to (numerus]
sa8'ittarlorum, but the interpretation is uncertain.
With the equltes sagittaril, we come to the end of the major cavalry
nationes listed In the Notitia Dignitatum, and it is now time to turn our
attention to the exotically-named units. By far the most numerous of these,
and probably the most important for our understanding of' them, were the
equites promoti Thirty-five units are listed In the Notitia, 2 palatine, 3
comitatensian and 3 cunei. RltterlJ.ng showed how the term promoti related
to legionary cavalrymen, and his thesis that the equites prornoti were drawn
from these still holds s. Gilliain corrected the status of the leglonary eques
from principalis, as Ritterling had assumed, to that of .immunis and pointed
out that such promoti could also be found in the cohortes equitatae6. In
this he was followed by Cooper, who took it to mean that the equites proinoti
were not linked to the legions7.
I, Not, Dig, Or, VII33; VIII'30 & 31; IX . 19; XXXI • 25-29; XXXII . 24-26 & 29; XXXIII . 18 & 20-22;
XXXIV25-29; XlXV20-23; XXXVI'25 & 27-28; XXVII'20 & 23; XXXYIII • 11 &12; XLI'14 & 17; 27 were
indigenu Not, Dig, 0cc, VI . 67-73, 77, 83 & 84; XXXII . 32 & 35; XXXIII . 38 & 44: XXXIV . 17, 21, 32 & 33;
cf, Tables El & 2,2, E,l903,298, The Moesian quites sagittarii in the Notitia are cwiei Not, Dig, Or, XLI . 14 &
17,
3, QE,l90O,29,
4, Not, Dig, Or, V'28 & 39; VII'31 XXXI • 30; XXXII'22 & 23; XXXIII'19 & 27; XXXIV'23 & 24;
XXIV'18 & 19; IXXVI'23 & 24; XXXVII'18 & 19; XLI'13 & 16; Not, Dig, 0cc, VI'44 & 76; XXXII'25, 30 &
38; XXXIII'30 & 36; XXXIV'16, 22, 31 & 36; cf, Tables El & 2,
5, Ritterling, 'Rômischen Heerwesen', 348,
6, Gilliam, 'Dura Rosters and the Constifufio Antoniniana', Britannia 14 (1965), 77ff,
7, Cooper, Origins, 369,
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M,C,Ibeii: C3 Army, Equites
This question of 'linkage' is, in my opinion, superfluous to the central
thesis. The debate is centred around a papyrus from AD 302, in which one
Aurelius Heron describes himself a8: ... rireuç rpopoav oExovviv Loro Aeyunvoç
Tperic'vrç...'. Ritterling believed this indicated that the equites promoti
were themselves closely affiliated to the unit of their origin, but was
contradicted by Van Berchem who argued that the word &Jro referred to
Aurelius Heron himself, indicating that he had just drafted from the legion
Into the cavalry unit 2 . Cooper seems guilty of a fundamental
misunderstanding. Simply because the equites promot.i secundi were not
necessarily linked to Leglo II Tralana i.n this passage, it does not
automatically follow that the equites promoti had nothing to do with the
legions. The papyrus as it stands is categorical proof that the prornoti did
draw upon legionary equites for their manpower, whether formally associated
or not. In fact, further evidence from the Beatty papyri in Panopolis
suggests strongly that Leglo II Trelana and the equites promoti secundi were
linked. Two letters order the strategos of the Panopolite nome to pay out
donatives to the "k,reucrt rpoparotc )teysvoç TpxIirvrc", under the command
of the praepositus Leontius. Skeat's translation: "the equites proinoti of
Legio II Tralana", seems the only one possible3.
This brings us on to the vexed question of numbers. Besnier and Ensslin
believed that to provide enough horsemen In the legions for the equites
proinoti, the leglonary cava]ry was increased from 120 to 726. They had as
1,P. Gre,ii'. II, 74,2, Ritierling, 'Rômischen Heerwesen', 348; Van Berche. Larift de Oiocltien et là Rfoie
Constantinlenne (1952), 104 n,3,3 P, Beattyil, 198 & 204, trans, p.89,
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M,C,Ibe.ji: C3 Army. Equites
their sole evidence the antiqua leglo of Vegetius, which bears no
relationship to the real world and should be discarded out of hand'. Since
the promoti could technically be drawn from the cohortes equitatae as well
as the legions, the problem would seem to solve itself. With legionary
cavalry as the core, the equites promoti could draw additional recruits from
wherever they liked and still maintain a link to the legion8. It should
also be borne in mind that according to Duncan-Jones, the very unit of
promoti for which we have the most Information, the equites promoti secundi
of Leglo .11 Traiana, was probably no more than 120 men strong in the first
place2
Ritterlthg noted the regular spacing of the equites promoti in the
Notitia Dignitatum. He assumed that, with the exception of the equites
prom oti Illyr'icianZ which were moved east from Illyricum, all the prom oti
were split from their parent legions in situ and stationed in the same
province 3. In general, this holds true as the table below will show 4. It
falls down only in Thebaidos, where there would seem to be vexillations of
six different legions; Palaestina, from where Legio VI Ferrata had been moved
before the Notitia was compiled; and Osrhoene. The cunel are a different
matter which will be dealt with in time. This does suggest that the equites
promoti were created no earlier than the emperor Diocletian, especially since
all of the eastern promoti were labelled as indigenae in their Diocletianic
1, Vegetius IL'G; Besnier, L'eapire Roiain,,, (1937), 194: Efl55ljfl, C// XII, 379, cf, App,1:'The Ant/qua Legioof Vegetius',
2, Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army', Chi,'on8 (1978), 546ff,3, Ritierling, 'Rômischen Heerwesen' , 348f,4, Table E3: The equites proeoti and the legions.
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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
provinces of occupation, and the earliest dated attestation of promoti is
from AD 2931. In this picture, the equites promoti Illyricieni fit neatly
with the six remaining legions from Illyricum2.
Legionarles would also seem to have been the source for another exotic
unit: the equites stablesiani. Speidel has constructed a convincing argument
to show that these units had been seconded from the strat ores of the
tribunus stab1ensis. He is on less firm ground when he tries to date their
creation to Gallienus. He notes that no stablesiani are listed In the
eastern provinces of the Notitia, and suggests that this is because Gallienus
did not have control of the east 4 . Yet we know for certain that the equites
Dalma tee and Maui-i were In existence under Gallienus, and both of these crop
up in the east, so this cannot be the case.
There were definitely very few of these cava]ry. Only 15 are extant in
the Notitia, and of these only five were simple equites (four of them in the
west). Four were comitatensian, and the rest were cunei8. what little there
is in the way of epigraphy militates for a later, rather than an earlier,
date since the only extant inscription of a vex.illatio equitum stablesianorum
is commanded by an exarchosE.
Even less can be surmised about the equites scutarii. Their name
implies that their distinguishing feature was the use of the legionary
I, P, Grent, II, 110; P. Beatt,vIl date5 to AD 300, AEI9O7,143 & XIII'8332 are of no real help,
2, cf, Table E3,
3, Speidel, 'Stablesiani', Chiron4 (1974), 541ff.
4, Speidel, 545f,
5, Not, Dig, Or, VlI'29 & 30; XXVIII . 16; XXXIX • 14 & 15: XL • 17: XLII . 19; Not, Dig, Oc, Vl'21 & 64;
Y1 . 39=82 :VII . 180; VII182; XXVIII . 17; XXX1II27; XXXIV . 15; XXXV . 14, 15 & 16,
6, V . 4376, For exarchos see Fiebiger, RE 1552 who Ca115 it a junior cavalry officer of the
later Roman empire, and can be no more precise, SEe VI'187, cited on Speidel, 545, is of little help
in corroborating dates,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
scutum instead of the cavalry parma. The existence of a cuneus equitum
Maurorum scutariorurn 1 can tell us little, except that a standard unit of the
equites could be equipped in this manner, Twenty two equites scutarii are
listed in the pages of the Notitia, most of them in the east. Six were
comita tenses and another half-dozen were cuneF. The earliest known
reference comes from the late third century, possibly Diocletian 3 . The only
other inscription is post-Constantine4.
Most Roman cavalry, certainly among the equites, were very lightly
armoured. The obvious exception were the equites catafractarii and their
heavier counterparts, the equites clibanaril. Only 14 of these units are
listed in the Notitia 7 catafractariP and 7 clibanarii6. Of these, of the
cataphracts were comitatensian and 1 was a cuneus, while all except one of
the clibanari.i were comitatenses, the exception being palatine. Only one of
each type is to be found in the west.
Eadie has cautioned that Roman catafractarli were not armoured cavalry
In the proper sense of the term, being Instead mailed contaril astride
unarnioured horses. This is borne out by the Tropaeum Traiani and the
column of Marcus Aurelius, on which Roman mailed cavalry are depicted
I, Not, Dig, Or, XXXI'23,2, Not, Dig, Or, V38; Vl • 39; VII • 28: XI'4, 5, 7 & 8 XXI . 23 & 24; XXXII • 18; XXXIII'16;
XXIIV . 20; XXXVI . 19; XXXVII . 14: XXXIX'12 & 13; XL . 11, 12, 13 & 16; XLI . 15; XLII'20 Not, Dig, Oc,
VI . 2063; VI . 3477:VII . l95; VI . 38: 81 :VIl . 197 VII'209 IX'4, 5 & 8 XXXII'23 XIXIII • 24: cf Tables El& 2,
3, QE,1976,634,4, E,1935,171,5, Not, Dig, 0,, V . 34; VI • 35 & 36; YII25; VlII'29; XXXIX16; Not, Dig, Dcc, XL • 21; cf, Tables El
& 2,6, Not, Dig, Or, V . 40; Vl'32 & 40; VII'31, 32 & 34 Not, Dig, Dcc, VI • 67 cf, Tables El & 2,
-170-
M,C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Equltes
wearing chain mall and wielding a lance (contu) from the backs of
unprotected mounts, in stark contrast to the fully-armoured nature of their
enemies'.
The Tropaeum Traiani at Adamklisi suggests that catafractaril of this
type were in existence from the early second century. The conventional
argument, that this was artistic licence, does not convince. It hinges on
three observations. First, it assumes that a convention existed wherein
Romans were depicted wearing armour, while barbarians were not. Second, it
maintains that the only known unit of con tarui from the period, the ala I
Ulpia con tariorum miliaria, was not armoured and this is a better indication
of the true state of affairs than artistic representation. Third, it cites
Arrian, who confirms the existence of contaril under Hadrian, but does not
indicate that they were armoured2.
However, the recent study of Trajan's column by Lepper and Frere has
pointed out that, while artistic convention was adopted, "to clarify the
narrative", the column's depiction of war-horses was a remarkable exception.
Cavalry mounts on the column were depicted in exceptionally subtle detail,
which "must surely be the result of observation, however transmitted" 3 . On
the other hand, the Roxolani cataphracts on the column were dressed
impossibly in scale mail body suits which covered both horse and rider from
head to toe4 . Even the graffito of a c.Zibanarius at Dura, which must have
been sketched to convey the full enormity of this new kind of cavalryman,
1, Eadie, 'Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry', INS 57 (1967), 168 & plates.
2, The argument is best represented by Eadie, 167, who admits that it is not conclusive,
3, Lepper & Frere, rra/an'5 Coluin (1988), 269,
4, Lepper & Frere, op. cit,, pl,XXXI/76 & XXXVIII93-4,
-17 1-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
pays more attention to practicality than does the column 1 . Nevertheless,
both representations indicate that, far from being conventionally depicted as
more heavily armoured than their barbarian counterparts, the opposite is true
of Roman cavalry. The Tropaeum Traianl is argued to have been sculpted by
local military stonemasons, who depicted on the reliefs the opponents most
familiar to them2. If this is the case, then it seems clear that they would
also have depicted the Roman cavalry panoply as they knew it, and that the
metopes of the Tropaleum Tralani are in fact a reliable indication of the
equipment belonging to the Lower Danube army in the early second century.
While I will agree that reconstructing equipment from artsistic evidence
is dangerous, it cannot be any more so than arguments from silence, which Is
essentially what the example of ala I Ulpia con tar.iorurn mu, amounts to.
This ala may be the only example to date of Roman lancers fighting for
Trajan, but there is always the potential for new evidence to come to light.
Nor can Arrian be cited as a trustworthy source, since his failure to speak
of armoured cavalry under Hadrian, when our first firm indication of
catafractaril comes in the ala I Gallorum et Pannoniorum catafractata from
this reign, is more prone to make this omission suspect rather than
conclusive3 . On the whole, since the Tropaeum Traiani does depict a new
departure in the Roman cavalry known to have occurred within that half of
the second century, it ought to be trusted as a legitimate source.
I, For easily accessible photographs of all cavalry type5 mentioned here 1 ci, IRS 57 (1967), p1,
I & XI and IRS 60 (1970), p1, XIV XV,
2, Lepper Frere, op. cit,, 298f,
3, Arrian, ractica IV; XI.5632,
-172-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
Herodian spoke of cataphracts in the army of Maximthus, and we have
epigraphic testimony of one such unit 1 ; yet it was not until the later third
century, arid possibly early into the fourth, that units termed equites
catafractarli came to the fore2 , Depictions of these resemble the
cataphracts from the column of Marcus Aurelius in that none wear full scale
or ride armoured horses. A couple of numeri catafractariorum have also been
epigraphically dated to the later third century on stylistic grounds3.
Of greatest interest is a vexillatio catafractariorum stationed at
Eporedia in the Po Valley4. Eadie was at a loss to explain why this unit
was not stationed in a frontier area8 . Since Eporedia was situated at the
eastern exit of the St. Bernard Pass, the most likely explanation would seem
to be that the unit was a detachment of the Milan garrison, stationed there
to provide advanced warning of an incursion from the west. Eadie very
tentatively suggested that one of the nuineri above, attested in Gallia
Lugdunensis, may also have seen service In Cisalpina6. So it may be that the
unit was, in fact, stationed in the area at the time when it formed a
frontier with the Gallic Empire. At any rate, the fortuitous coincidence of
the Milan cavalry, historically attested to guard against Postuznus invading
Italy, and a cataphract garrison at one of' the major passes, should not go
unnoticed.
I, 41a nova Piria ailliaria catafraciaria Phiiippiana1 111 . 99 ILS 2771; 111 . 10307 ILS 2540;
XIII7323; Her, YIII . 1 . 3; Eadie, 'Mailed Cay ,', 168 & n,37,
2, Equites catafractarii Pictavenses, III . 14406a eqziites catafractarli qL'bianenses, XIII • 3493 &
3495; Eadie, 1681, Note also vexillatione Ii'! catafractafriorual froa Histria (Moesia), 4E 1919, 18,3, XIII . 1848 & 6238,
4, V.6784,
5, Eadie, 169,
6, Eadie, bc, cit,
-173-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
Alföldi believed that the emperor Aurelian introduced clibanarii after
his experience of them ifl his Palmyrene war. These cavalry, as depicted by
Heliodorus and the 'charging c1ibanarius graffito at Dura, were much more
heavily armoured than cataphracts, completely encased in banded scale armour
and with a coat of scale mail draped over the flanks of the hors&.
However, Eadie has pointed out that the 'dlibanarif depicted on the Arch of
Galerius were little different to the catafractarll mentioned earlier:
sporting scale mail instead of chain, but otherwise mailed riders on
unarmoured horses2 . He is probably correct in arguing that Aurelian did not
create the equites prom oti clibanarii (nor, for that matter, the equites
Palmirenorum clibinariorurn), This was not due to any lack of respect for the
clibanar.Li on Aurelian's part. Zosimus makes it very clear that Aureliari's
tactics at Immae and Emesa were adopted to neutralise a cavalry force which
he deemed to be superior to his own3. Unfortunately, the use of fully-
armoured cavalry will have required stronger horses and completely different
tactics to those utilised by his own cavalry. The only handy proponents of
such warfare were the Palmyrenes, and Zosimus makes it abundantly clear that
they were not prepared to be either trustworthy or cooperative4.
It was not until the reign of Diocletian, or later, that clibanarla
(armament factories) capable of producing the armour worn by clibanaril were
1, He1iodoru Aet/ilopica 1X15; Excavations at Dura Europos, Fourth Season (1933), 207ff &pl,XXII; Eadie, 170,
2, Eadie, 171,3, Zos, 1'50 . 2-4 1 . 52 . 3 53.2,4, Zos, 1.60-61,
-174-
M.C.tbeji: C3 Army. Equites
attested. Since the Arch of Galerius is also dated to his reign, Diocletian
must be the obvious person to whom the recruitment of equites cli banarli
into the ranks of the Roman army should be attributed1.
We now come to the equites Illyriciani. These were units of Dalmatae,
promoti, scutaril and Mauri stationed along the eastern frontier and
distiguished from the equites indigenae by the epithet IllyricianL
Ritterling believed that they were drawn from the Illyriari army brought east
by Aurelian on his reconquest of Palmyra, and were dispersed along the
frontier to replace the disbanded Palinyrene forces. His only evidence for
this was the presence of the equites Da1matae created by Gallienus, and
Leglo I Illyricorunz which he believed had been created by Aurelian from his
Illyrian troops2. Other historians have argued for a later date on various
grounds. Alföldi could not bring himself to believe that Aurelian would
break up the 'field army', so argued that it was done by Diocletian; while
Seston was of the opinion that Carinus brought about the change for fear of
the growing power of the cavalry commander, though he did not believe they
were comitatenses.
There are no firm criteria by which we can date these Illyrician.L The
present arguments against Ritterling all rely on the mobile field army, which
we have shown did not exist. Yet Ritterling's own arguments are fatally
flawed. The presence of Dalamtae among the fllyriciani can provide a
terminus post quem, but can be used to prove nothing else. If I Illyricorum
had been created by Aurelian, there might yet remain some grounds for dating
I, Eadie, 171 & n,56,
2, Ritterling, 'Rônischen Heerwe5en', 346ff.
3, Alföldi, CA/I XII (1939), 217: Seston, Oiocitien t Ja retarchie (1946), 298ff & 305,—175-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
the Illyriciani to him, though the argument just adduced against the Dalmatae
remains pertinent in all cases. As things stand, I Illyricorum can only be
tentatively dated to the reign of Diocletian 1 . Since the same is true of the
equites promoti which are among the I11yriciani their presence in the east
cannot be placed any earlier than his reign. Galerius is known to have
drafted in contingents from the Illyrian army for his war against Narses in
AD 297/82, and this seems a propitious point at which to place the
Illyriciani. However, we can only confidently state that this Is the earliest
date at which the Illyriciani can be attested.
Before we finish this survey of the equites one final point needs to be
addressed. Frequent mention has been made of the cunel equitum noted in the
Notitia Dignitatum. With one exception3, these units always head the lists
of the Notitia, taking precedence over other equites. In the Illyrian
provinces, they supercede the equites entirely4. Van Berchem thought they
were a separate group of units created by Constantine, but this view is
over-simplistic as Southern has showns , Troops such as the equites
Dalmatarum Divitiensium can be seen to have predated the Notitia, usually in
the form of numeri6.
As usual, the nature of these formations is a complex mesh of
possibilities. Perhaps the cunei in the Notitia were the equites equivalent
of milliary units, or maybe the reforms of Diocletian or Constantine
I, cf, ch,IV: Leg/ones, p.80,
2, Eutropius IX24; Jordanes Roianap,301(N); Orosius VII'25.9,3, Not, Dig, Or, VII'34,
4, NoE, Dig, Or, XXXIX: Scyihia; XL: Moesia Secunda; XLI: Moesia Prima; XLII: Dada Ripensis,5, Van Berchem, sraIe de 0ioc1tien,,,, 93ff Southern, 'Numeri', 115,6, Southern, bc, cit.; Not, Dig, Or, XUI • 14; V . 7000, 7001 & 7012,
-176-
M.C.Ibe.ii: C3 Army. Equites
introduced a more pedantic scheme of troop designation requiring that
formations originally known by the blanket term numerus be redesignated to
reflect their mode of combat more accurately'. On average, the number of
cunel garrisoning a province in Illyricum was less than the number of
equltes to be found elsewhere, which might indicate that the cunel were
larger, but the difference is neither a significant nor a general one.
Southern is to be heeded when he warns that each incidence of cunei should
be taken on its own merits2.
The history of the equites is a chequered one and not without
controversy. Many of the horsemen involved would seem to have developed
out of earlier experiments within the Auxilia. Others, most notably the
Dalmatae seem to have burst out of the blue. Cooper has put forward an
interesting theory that the Dalmatians were drawn upon by Gallienus because
this was the only recruiting ground left open to him3. This makes a great
deal of sense, especially if one examines the probable ethnic mix of his
cavalry. Moors, Dalmatians and possibly some exotic units would seem to
have made up the bulk of it. The Gallic recruiting grounds were closed to
him by the advent of Postumus and his empire. The eastern troops were
under the de facto control of Palmyra (and we have already seen that most
sagittaril were equites indigenee). One glance at the Notitia will tell us
that the Moors could not provide manpower in the volume required to fill the
emperor's needs. However, over-reliance on the Notitia can provide a stilted
view. It is a snapshot in the history of the later Roman cavalry force and
1, It should be noted that no rnrneri exist in the lists of the Notitia, Also it should be borne
in •ind that cwisus could at least technically be applied to an infantry unit which adopted a wedge-
shaped formation and was not the sole preserve of cavalry: Yegetius 111.17-18,
2, Southern, bc, cit,
3, Cooper, Origins, 373,
-177--
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites
should not be taken as a homogeneous whole. Equites Mauri were active
within the Roman array decades before equites Dalmatae came onto the scene,
while equites promoti probably did not make their appearance until the very
end of our period. Stablesieni were a late addition, but cataphractarii of
one form or another had been around since the reign of Hadrian. Without a
doubt, each type of equites, be they Dalrnatae, promoti, sagittarli or
cataphracts, were recruited gradually over a vast number of years, and the
picture as we receive it In the Notitia Dignita turn is the culmination of this
gradual and constantly dynamic process.
-178-
TABL.E E 1:Eqziit L1r1it In tIi
sj ,titi Di ittt.tm pr Or-iratm
FQ(/ITE$;
CHAPTER Diii iw Sik Siul ii CflV: NM, Praesentalis I: CC PC C C C PC
VI: NM, Praesentalis II: C CC CC PC PPP
VII: N.M. Orieniem: C C C CC C C CCC CC
VIII: N.M. Thracias: CC C PC
IX: MN, Illyricum: C C
lxviii: Aegytus: e e
XXXI: Thebaid: CC j15 i c e
XXXII: Foenicla: I I i14 iii I ie
XXXIII: Syria: I i i14 Iii I
XXXIV: Palaestina; I I j15 Iii I Il
XXXV: Osrhoene: I I i14 Iii
XXXVI: Nesopotamia; ui iii Ii 112
XXXVII: Arabia: I I ii Iii I
XXXVIII: Armenia: ee
XXXIX: Scythia: cc c c cc
XL: Moesia Secunda:
XLI: Noesia Prima; ccc cc cc c
XLII: Dacia Ripensis: c15 C CC C
KEY:
P Palatine
C Comitatenslan
I equites 11Iyricinic = Cuneus
e equJe51 equites indigenac
same unit (eg, equites proloti clibanarli)
NOTES
1, equites Thaaudeni Ii!yrician2, equites ducatore5 lilyriciani & equites feud Honoriani Iiiyridian4 The latter is an honorificawarded for loyalty to the emperor honorius, and cannot be used for dating purposes.
—179-
TABLE E 2:EqLlit Lrn1t In tI-i
Nc, t I t I Di I t t im p x— C)c c I ci ri t m
EQWTES:
CHAPTER Diii lia Stab Si 1 Cli Mi
Y: M, Eq. Praesentalis:
Italia: C P P14
Gailia: CC C px3,C13
Britannia: C
Tingitana: cc c
Africa: C*C17 C CC C C CIS
kIVIlI: Lit, Saxonici: e e
lxxii: Pannonia: ceI7 ee cee c ccc
lxxiii: Yaleria; celil e ee ee c c cce
XIXIV: Panonnia Prima: cex5 e e14 e14 c
XXXV: Raetia: eee
XXXVIII: Belgica II: e
XL: Britannia: e e e
KEY:
P Palatine
C ' Comitatensian
c = Cuneus
e = eqwifes
z same unit (eq. equites clthanarii sagitarii)
—180-
Tb1 E 3:TI qL1ite Pr-mcti
rid th
NQLIL NUECHAPTER PROVINCE
IN PARTIBIJS ORIENTIS.
XXXI Thebaidos
XXXII Foenicia
XXXII! Syria
XXXIV Palaestina
XXXV Osrhoene
XXXVI Mesopotamia
XXXVI! Arabia
XLI Moesla Prima
IN FARTI8US OCCIDENTIS.'
XXXII Pannonla
XXXII! Valeria
XXXIV Pannonia Prima
N2QE
PRONOTI
2
2
2
2
2
2
(2 cwnei)
2
(#1 cune5)
2
4
LEGIONS
vexx,(?) III Diocletiana, II Traiana,
I Yalentiniana, I Haximiana1 II Flavia &
II Valentiniana,
I Illyricum1 III Gallica,
IV Scythica, XVI Flavia,
X Fretensis,
IV Parthica,
I Parthica, II Parthica,
II! Cyrenaica, IV Martia,
IV Flavia, VII Claudia,
IV !ovla, VI Herculea,
I Adiutrix, II Adiutrix,
X Geeina, XIV Geina, II Italica, I Noricum,
1Q11! TES PROHOTI ILL YR/ClAN!:
XXXII Foenicia
XXXII! Syria
XXXIV Palaestina
XXXV Osrhoene
XXXVI Mesopotamia
XXXVII Arabia
SPARE LEGIONS PRON ILL YRICUNL
I Io y ia (Scyihia)
1 II Herculia (Scythia)
I I Italica (Moesia Secunda)
1 XI Claudia (Noesia Secunda)
1 V Macedonica (Dacia Ripensis)
1 XIII Gemina (Dacia Ripensis)
—18 1-
VII: I I MIT-A J'JEI
I 1949 R. G. Goodchfld and I. B. Ward-Perkins published an inscription
from Tripolitania which threw the discussion of the nature and origins of
lirnitanel wide open'. Previously, the view of scholars, best summarised by
Miller in the Cambridge Ancient History, had seen the lirnitanei as a
militarised peasantry tied to the land by hereditary service and originating
from the various reforms of Septimius Severus2 . This view had been
gradually losing ground, to the extent that van Berchem felt confident in
asserting that .Zimitanei did not appear until the reign of Diocletian; yet
his views seemed to run contrary to the evidence produced by Goodchild and
Ward-Perkins which, as Matthews puts it: "...shows that the system of frontier
lirnites commanded by praepositi existed already in the mid-third century (at
least in Tripolitania) long before the Tetrarchic period with which it had
been previously associated"4.
The inscription In question came from a centenarium structure at Gasr
Duib in Tripolitania, dated quite firmly to the reign of Philip the Arab (AD
244-246), and reads:
Imp(erator) Caes(ar) (M(arcus) lulius Phlilipus invictuis Aug(ustus)3 et
M(arcus) Iul(ius) P(hilippus Cales(ar) n(oster) regionern .Zimit(is
I, Goodchi/o' 'apd-PepkJns, 'The Lthe5 rrJpoiitanu5 in the Light of Recent Discoveries', IRS 39(1949), 81ff esp, 91f, Hereafter referred to as Goodchild, IRS,
2, Miller1 CAM XII, 311 summarising the views of Lesquier, Cumont, Carcopino and Rosiovtseff
discussed below p.185ff, cf, also Momsen, 'Das römische llilitãrwesen seit Diocletian', Heres 24(1889), 195ff,
3, Van Berchem, L'Araóe de Dioclêtien et la Rëforaie Constantinienne (1952), 21, 46-48 & 86,4, Matthews, 'Mauretania in Ammianus and the Notitia', BARS15 ( 1976), 171,
—182-
M.C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Limitanei
Tenitheitani partitarn et feiusJ viam incursib(us) barbairoirum constituto
nova ce.ntenario (/////?////J//A/S praefdlluseru(ntl Cominio Cassiano
leg(ato) Aug(ustorum) pr(o) pr(aetore) Gallicanto ...7 letters...J v(iro)
e(gregio) praep(osito) limitis cura Numisii Maximi domo [...4 letters...Jsia
trib (uni).1
The centenarium had presumably been erected by the tribunus Nuinisius
Maximus under the orders of the praepositus limitis, Gallicanus, who was
subordinate to the provincial governor. Goodchild commented upon its
construction by a tribunus as opposed to a centenarius as would be expected,
and in the light of other inscriptions (discussed later) this may have been a
peculiarity of Tripolitania2. Since the limes Ten theitanus actually appears
In the Not itia Dignitatum under a praepositus, the match between this
inscription and the percieved system of later Roman lirnitanei had been seen
as conclusive3. Yet several notes of caution have already been sounded.
Fentress and le Bohec warned that no evidence for an organised military
peasantry deserving the term limitanel is forthcoming at such an early date,
while A.H.M. Jones has shown that the so-called limitanei of the African
frontier were in fact made up of native African gentiles, first referred to
in the early fifth century.
The only evidence for limitanei existing within Africa in the mid-third
century is this inscription and its close resemblance to the terminology of
I, Goodchild, .TR$, 91f, Cassianus is assumed to have been related to the N, Aurelius Cominius
Cassianus who was Legate of Numidia in 211/12: PIi C 1265; YIII.2611,
2, Goodchild, 92 & n,36 cf below p191,
3, Hot Dig, Cc, XXXI'19, limes Tenthetianus; Goodchild, 92; Matthews, 'Mauretania', 170f,
4, Fentress, Nwiidia and the Roaaii Any, 84R S53 (1979), 1)8f; le Bohec, La Troisirie Lgion
Awg,ste (1989), 454; Jones, LRE II (1964), 651ff; cf also Seston in Histonia 4 (1955), 286ff most
recently, Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Liaes& Liaitanei', /RS78 (1988), 125ff.—183-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Lirnitanei
the Notitia Dignita turn. The infamous reference in the Vita Alexandri1 which
seems to refer to limltanei during his reign and could have provided vital
corroborative evidence has been cast into considerable doubt by Isaac, Jones
and van Berchem, who quite rightly remarked upon the Historia Augusta's
propensity for fabrication and interpolation 2 . So the existence of lirnitanel
in the third century hangs entirely upon the implications of the Teritheltanus
inscription. If it can be shown that the occupants of the cente.naria were
not in fact a niilitarised peasantry under the control of Roman authority,
then the case for limitanel prior to the fourth century collapses.
The pioneering work of A.H.M. Jones has already paved the way for us3.
He has demonstrated that limitanei, in Goodchild's sense of a peasant militia
defending the land which they cultivated, do not appear in the source
material until the early fifth century. Prior to this, the limitanei do not
seem to have been much different to any other type of troops in the later
Roman Army. Service for them was no more or less hereditary than that of
the comitatenses, and like the cornita tenses they received recruits drafted
through conscription: some units of 1.Lznitanei were even upgraded to
comitatensian status. Most telling of all, the lirnitanei were wholly supplied
by rations in kind until the year 364, after which they were supplied for
nine months of every year. None of this seems at all compatible with the
concept of a self-sufficient hereditary militia tied permanently to the
1, $1/A Alex, LYIII . 4-5, Loeb translation: The lands taken froa the enecy were presented to the
leaders and soldiers of the frontier arcies (liiianei] with the provision that they should continue
to be theirs only if their heirs entered .ilitary service, and that they should never belong to
civilians, for, he said, ien serve with greater zeal if they are defending their own lands too,
2, Isaac, 'Liee5 & Liiitanei', 140; Jones, LR 650; van Berchem, Areâe de Diocltien, 21 n, 1
contra cf, MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian, 13 n,34,
3, Jones 1 LR 650ff,
—184-
M.C,tbe.Ji: C3 Army. Limitanel
frontiers.
Yet this view may have been created simply by a lack of evidence, and If
the archaeological material from Africa actually does show limitanel in
action during the third century, then a revision of the view is necessary. I
think it does not; and furthermore, I believe that enough evidence has been
accumulated from Africa for us to put together a skeletal picture of the
development of limitanel in that part of the Roman empire, from the start of
the third century to the end of the fifth.
Contrary to the beliefs of Miller and his sources, the Seven did not
create a peasant militia out of veteran soldiers. Carcopino, Cumont and
Lesquier believed that veteran colonies were used as a defensive network
founded upon vested interest 1 . Most specif1cally Carcopino showed that the
cast ella in Mauretania Sitifensis were built arid manned by veteran coloni
under government supervision, a conclusion later confirmed by Février2.
However, even if these colonies had retained much of their old functions
from Augustan times, their purpose and arrangement was not primarily
military. Isaac has demonstrated that the Augustan colonies in the eastern
provinces "were incapable of defending themselves in times of full-scale
warfare", and were hardly able to maintain Internal security on a local
level 3 . Rather than being seen as military outposts, they were "instrumental
in the consolidation of conquest and subjugation" as a "social, political
I, Carcopino, 'Lee Caste/Ia de la Pleine de Setif', Rev, Af 59(1918), 5ff; 'Le Idaes de Numidieet sa Garde Syrienne', Srria 6 (1925), 30ff; Cumont, 'Une Dedicace de Dura-Europos, Colonie Romaine',
Syria 5(1924), 351f; Lesquier, L'Arae Rota/ne o'Eqypte d'Qiiguste I Dioclétien (1918), 330ff,2, Carcopino, 'Castella de Setif', 8ff; Février, 'Inscriptions Inédites Relatives aux Domaines de
Ia Region de Setif', IfI/anges P/genial (1966), 220ff,3, Isaac, Litits of Eapire (1990), 311ff,
—185-
M.C.IbeJl: C3 Army. Limitanei
and economic complement to military power." His view is mirrored by Février
on the Mauretanian castella, who argues against Carcopino's purely military
interpretation of the structures and sees the circuit walls more as a sign
of Roman urbanisation and its administration than as a defensive measure1.
Matthews saw this as an overreaction against the traditional view and
tempered it somewhat by pointing out the equal validity of a civil and a
military interpretation2 . Yet he, too, made it clear that the defensive
capability of such colonies was largely dependent on the toleration of the
population they existed to control s . The fact that these particular
castella are limited entirely to Sitifensis, and stop abruptly at the border
with Nurnidia, suggests that any function they may have had in an overall
defensive plan took second place to the administrative considerations
associated with them. So, too, does their supervision by the imperial
procurator, whose function was civil rather than military4. A survey of
veteran settlement in Nurnidia has shown that its distribution owed far more
to the existence of good farmland than to the exigencies of defences,
In my opinion, the limited distribution of the castella in Sitifensis also
invalidates any attempt to link them with the advance into the Saharan Atlas
made by Septimius Severus6, The only true resemblance between the castella
of Sitifensis and the cast ella in the Saharan Atlas is their name. The
Saharan Atlas was garrisoned by the army with no recourse to veteran
I, Février in M1anges Piganiol, 223f,2, Matthews, 'Mauetania', 164,
3, Matthews, 177,
4, Février, 220ff,
5, Fentress, Nuildia, 138f 142ff,6, Matthews, 164,
-186-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanei
settlement, and this occurred much earlier than the 'fortification' of
Sitifensis which does not seem to have begun until the reign of Ceracalla.
Even this military advance into the Saharan Atlas owed more to the
administration of trade than it did to the defence of Africa1,
Centenaria did not appear in Africa until the mid-third century, and most
of these structures are not securely dateable before the fourth. At the
outset, a definite distinction should be drawn between centenaria as military
establishments constructed and occupied by the army, and the organic growth
of civilian structures which copied the centenarium design.
The centenarium at Gasr Duib stands on an isolated hillock overlooking a
tributary of the Wadi Sofeggin approximately 200km south-west of Lepcis
Magna in Tripolitania. Its sister fort, Gasr iJames, lies twenty-five
kilometres to the east of this, forming a line of outposts which guarded the
Roman road known to have run along the Upper Sofeggin from Zintan to Mizda.
Positioned as they are, they formed the first line of contact between Roman
Tripolitania and the nomadic tribesmen of the area. The location is
described by Goodchild as isolated, grim and barren 2 . Their military
function as described on the Tentheitanus inscription was to guard the road
against barbarian raiding parties, and to this end they were created by
order of the governor. Most significantly, the inscription was in Latin, as
opposed to the native Libyan script.
Other cente.naria sporting Latin inscriptions testifying to their official
creation can be found in equally strategic areas throughout Africa. At Aqua
Frigida in Mauretania, a centenarium guarding the exit from the Petite
I, Fentress, Nuildia, lUff & 136,2,Goodchild, IRS, 88ff, 93 & cf, ap p85,3, ,,, v/al incursib(us) barbatrojru.,,,,,, ,praeciusarunt,,,
-187-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanel
Kabylie into the Choba strip was restored under the auspices of Aurelius
Litva, praeses of Mauretania during the early 290s 1 . Another was built at
Bir Haddada north of the Hodna mountains by a governor of Constantine and
Licinius2 . South of the Chott e]. Hodna, the centenarium Aqua Viva, discussed
at length by Leschi, is attested In AD 303 and later under the control of
the praepositus 1imiti Thubuniensis, In northern Tripolitania, the
centenar'ium Tibubuci was also built on the orders of two provincial
governors4 . Like the centenaria on the Upper Sofeggin, these structures were
generally isolated, often in barren locales, and were set up by the Roman
authorities to serve a specific and local police function.
This contrasts dramatically with the civilian centenaria, found mainly In
eastern Tripolitanla, though a few have been identified in MauretanIa.
Their distribution is best described by Goodchild:
These buildings do not stand isolated in grim and barren areas, as do the Upper Sofeggin
outposts: they are found in chains along the banks of the more fertile wadis 1 and sometimes
grouped together as embryonic villages at the junction of several tributary wadis, Their density
varies according to the size and fertility of the wadi beside which they stand: sometimes we find
a long series scattered at intervals of only 1km but more often the interval is considerably
greater, Many of the buildings are accompanied by elaborate and well-built mausolea, which
contrast vividly with the 'gsur' themselves; and they are invariably associated with a complex
system of terrace walls across the width of the wadi, and with catchment channels and cisterns,
1, VIlI'20215 : ILS 6886: Matthews, 'Mauretania', 166 & 171, Litva also restored a war-damaged
bridge at Auzia VIIl . 904l = .IL$ 627,2, C'entene p lui Soils, VIll . 8713 Matthews, 171,3, 4E,194213,81; Leschi, 'Le Centenariva d'Aqua Viva', Rev, f, 87 (1943), 5ff Etudes
d'Epigraphie (1957), 47ff; Matthews, bc, cit14, VIII22763 ILS 9352; Matthews, bc, cit & n71,5, Matthews, bc, cit.
6, Goodchild, ,1RS 93.
—188-
M.C.Ibe,Ji: C3 Army. Limitanel
Of the "embryonic villages", the best example is Ghirza in the Wadi
Zeriizem. This is a group of some thirty 'gsur' "set close together without
communal planning or defences", containing a series of elaborate mausolea.
Goodchild viewed it as a "reductio ad absurdum of the whole 'gasr' system"1,
but he failed to recognise in this observation the key to the nature of
these settlements. For the 'gsur' of the Tripolitanlan basins, and the
centenar.ia and castella of the Mauretanian populace, were exactly what he
described them to be: a civilian reductio of a workable military structure.
Matthews showed how, in Mauretania, a permeable limes was maintained by
Roman authority through the cooperation of the local dynasts2 . Most of
Africa was in effect a fronier zone, and this was especially true of
Mauretania and Tripolitania, where tribal quarrels and nomadic raiding had
merely been given Roman trappings by its colonial observers (in much the
same way that the Roman occupation of Africa was given colonialist trappings
by the early French historians who studied it). Therefore, Matthews was able
to argue that the revolt of Firmus, described by Ammianus Marcellinus, was
in fact a tribal dispute which spilled over Into the Roman sphere of
influence precisely because it was a dispute between Romanised princes3.
These princes aped Roman forms and utilised those Roman practices which
superceded their own traditional methods. Among them was Roman Irrigation
and settled agriculture. In such circumstances, the Roman-style castella had
obvious security advantages in an area where feud and nomadic incursion was
a way of life.
1 Goodchild, IRSI 93 n37,
2, Matthews 'Mauretania', 174ff.
3, Matthews, op. cit.-189-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanei
Goodchild saw in the growth of 'gsur' villages, the seeds of what he
called "incipient feudalism". He saw the natives building centenaria on the
Roman model, and aping Roman forms by erecting inscriptions which, while in
their native Libyan, were written In the Latin alphabet and contained the
occasional Roman word such as CENTEINARI. All this evoked the aura of a
militarised peasantry 1 . Not unnaturally, he and his colleague automatically
assumed that the 'gsur' were the domain of limitaneZ and this assumption
was confirmed for them by the occasional (and very rare) relief depicting
their Inhabitants at war.
Yet the 'feudalism' exhibited was historical, stemming from the pre-Roman
tribal structures of the Inhabitants. The clearest example of this comes
from Bou AtellI in the Grande Kabylie, Mauretania. Here a local dynast
calling himself M. Aurelius Masaisilen founded a centenarium at his own
expense in AD 328, which acted as the focal point for a settlement including
tombs and a christian chapeF, almost like a medieval village clustered
around a Norman wotte.
In this context Masaisilen and his contemporaries built centenaria for
two reasons. First, they were a sign of prestige exhibited In a hybrid form
by a partially Romanised native aristocracy. Secondly, the cent enaria
themselves acted as the status symbol because of their obvious utility in
the context of the African frontier. The very fact that they were still
being used under the Islamic occupation speaks volumes for their functional
economy, Goodchild believed that Roman engineers had taught the natives
1, Goodchfld, IRS, 92ff,
2, Matthews, 'Mauretania', 171,
3 Goodchild, 95,-igo-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanei
how to construct the buildings 1 , but the original construction probably was
done by the natives themselves2 . The existence of words such as centenarius
or tribunus within several of the native structures is not particularly
significant. Goodchild himself pointed out that the title tribunus in native
Libyan use bore very little resemblance to its official Roman capacity, and
Matthews has argued a similar case against the official recognition of a
self-styled pr-aepositus and decurio from Mauretania3 . It seems likely that
the local chiefs took on Roman titles which they believed best suited their
native office, and this was tolerated as a function of Romanisation by the
provincial authorities. As for the word can tenarius, its recurrence is no
more significant than the present day use of the term 'pill-box'. A 'pill-
box' structure is equally likely to house an electricity generator for
civilian use as it is to contain a military gun emplacement. The name in
itself does not imply an official military function, it merely describes the
structure.
We can therefore distinguish between official military cent enaria and
organic civilian cent enaria, The latter arose separate from and anterior to
the former in a completely unofficial capacity, as the haphazard nature of
their distribution ought to Indicate. The very fact that each 'gasr' was an
independent fortlet in its own right, even when clustered into a small
communities, is testimony to the absence of Roman military planning.
Goodchild wanted to date the growth of civilian 'gsur' to the reign of
I, Three 'gsur' wentioned by Goodchild are fronted by well-dressed ashlar, and have distinctive
rounded corners, Goodchild saw thew as 'an early, official stage of 'gasr' construction"; Goodchild,
IRS, 93,
2, Barker Jones, UNE8O Libyan 'aIJeys Survey 1979-1981 (1982), 3ff,
3, Goodchild, IRS, 95 & n44; Matthews, 'Mauretania', 172 & n82; 1RT886,
—191-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Limitanei
Severus Alexander, on the basis of the proximity of certain centenaria to
the fort of that emperor at Gheria el-Garbia 1 . Yet recent surveys of the
Libyan valleys have indicated that the principal development of native 'gsur'
occurred during the second century, long before the centenarlum structure
was put to official military use2,
In the third and fourth centuries, 'the 'limitanel' in centenaria such as
Gasr Duib were probably garrisons of Auxilia and numeri, much like the
occupants of casteflum Dimmidi discussed in the previous chapter. Following
Yones, we should see them as regular units of the Roman army, drawing pay
and supplies of men and materiel like any other unit. However, as pressure
increased on the frontier in the later fourth and fifth century, Roman
authority was forced to rely more heavily on the cooperation of the native
geJ2tiles and we should see Matthews' picture of an integrated tribal limes
gradually coming into effect. By the early fifth century, the law codes show
that this transformation was complete and a iimitanei made up of native
African en tiles had taken the place of the Auxilia and numeri which had
defended the frontier during the Principate3.
Studies of the limitanei, like studies of other late Roman institutions
have sufferred at times from a failure to recognise that such institutions
could and did change. It is likely that there never was an official policy
of militarising peasantry within the Roman administration: it just happened.
In Africa, as a process of gradual attrition wore down the forces which had
1, Goodchild, 93f,
2, UNESCO Libyan Valleys Survey 1975-8/, 6,
3, Coo Theoo VII . 15 . l (AD 409); VII . l52 (AD 423), Isaac, 'Lii,es & Liaitanei', 144 is morecircumspect: "It is clear that we are faced with the organisation of some sort of militia, but it is
an organisation distinct from that of the lj,,itanei, who are not mentioned in this text,—192-
M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanel
originally carried the burden of defence, what had begun as a grass-roots
movement towards greater security among native agricultural settlements
found itself shouldering more and more responsibility for the protection of
the frontiers they cultivated. Whether the existing status quo was finally
recognised by Diocletian or Constantine, or in the later fourth century is
unclear, and will remain so until more and better evidence is forthcoming,
though the trend would seem to indicate a later date at present 1 . What is
clear from the inscriptions at Gasr Duib and other sites, is that a definite
distinction existed in the third century between the military function of
centenarium sites, and the civil one. Van Berchem believed that limitanel
existed by the time of Diocletian, and I would concur that by his reign we
can find limitanaei In Iones' sense of dedicated non-comitatenslan frontier
troops garrisoning the military cent enaria of Africa and the Strata
Diocletiana in the east. The Tentheitanus inscription indicates that this
system was in place by the mid-third century, but as Fentress puts it: "The
fact that one element of the Diocletianic reorganisation has been shown to
have its origins in the mid-third century does not necessarily imply that all
others might be similarly redated." 3 As with most Roman institutions, the
'limitanel' of the third century were a very different organisatlon to the
lirnitanel of the fifth. They were not a militarised peasantry, and until the
term was coined by Diocletlan, they probably did not even think of themselves
as limitanel.
I, Remember that until 394, the ililtanel were wholly 5upplied by the army: Jones 650f, Isaac,'Liaes & LThitanef, 148, concluded that !12/taPei who worked their own land did not appear until themid fifth century,
2, Van Berchem, ,4pie de Oiociitie 10ff, 17ff & l9ffl Jones, LRE 650ff; Isaac, bc, cit,3, Feniress, fiuiidia, 119,
—193-
IX:
It has been argus in some texts that the third century saw the start
of the Roman practice of bringing barbarian tribes into the empire and
settling them under foedus. Unofficial at first, the practise of using
barbarians is seen to h' become increasingly more common, until they began
to supercede the regular Auxilia, so that "the contingents bought from the
Germans under the cloak of a foedus gradually became indispensable".' In
order to determine how accurate a picture this Is, it will be necessary to
review all aspects of the Roman use of barbarians during the century.
The Roman use of 'barbarian' troops, that is troops drawn from outside
the technical limits of the empire, has a long history. Not forgetting that
the original purpose of the Auxilia, as early as the second century BC, was
to incorporate the national characteristics of Rome's allies into its military
pantheon2 , the systematic recruitment of ethnic troops into bodies of numeri
was developed under the Flavians'. Trajan made extensive use of such
Irregulars during his wars4 , but it is with Marcus Aurelius that what has
I, Alfôldi, CAM XIII 218f; Aliheim, Soidatenkai5er (1939), 188 & 204; Boak, Manpower Shortage and
the Fall of the Ro.an Eipire (1955), 97 & 115ff; MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian (1963), ch,8, More
cautiously NOcsy, Pannonia and Upper Hoes/a (1974), ch,6; Speidel, 'Rise of Ethnic Units', ANRU 11.3
(1975), 145ff; De Blois, Pa/icy of 6allienus (1976), 34f,
2, Cheesman, Auxilia of the Roian laperial Aray (1914), 8ff,
3, Southern, 'Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army', Rritannia XX (1989), 131,
4, He maintained an elite force of Moorish cavalry whose native commander, the sheikh Lusius
Quietus, was powerful enough to gain consular office and was eventually disposed of by Hadrian for
political reasons: Speidel, 'Rise of Ethnic Units in the Roman Imperial Army', ANRU 11 . 3 (1975), 212,
He may also have used Palmyrene and German irregulars in his Dacian and Parthian wars: Southern1
'Numeri', 89; Alföldi, CAM XII (1939), 219, Marcus Aurelius also used irregulars in the Marcomannic
ears, most notably Moors, A group of equites Afrorut et Haurorwa e/ectorua is attested under one
Valerlus Maximianus, and a nirnerus Maurorwm Awrelianorwa was raised which must date from Marcus and
not Caracalla as was suggested to Speidel, since the kaiserbeinaae of the latter was Antoniniana:
AE,1956,124; R182042; Southern, 'Numeri', 86 & 93f Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 210f & n,36,
—194-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati.
been seen as a large-scale incorporation of barbarian tribes Into the empire
is generally thought to have begun.
The reasons behind this are still open to discussion. Finley sounded a
well-argued note of caution against the unthinking assumption of a manpower
shortage, as did Gilllam 1 ; though one should not forget that during the
Marcomannic wars, the empire was still suffering the effects of the great
plague which began in 165 and to which the wholesale employment of
vexillations can almost certainly be linked. This indicates that manpower
was not in great supply2. On the other hand, Mócsy showed that the impetus
for settlement under Marcus Aurelius came not from the empire, but from the
barbarians themselves. He argues that many of the German tribes were
actually fighting for lebensraum within the empire, away from the pressures
of the Lomards, Obil and Vandals which were coming down from the north 2. To
this end, he cites several passages from Dio. The Marcomanni were required
to vacate a small strip of land which they had occupied along the Danube;
contingents of Quadi, Cotini and Naristae were allowed to settle within the
Danube provinces; and even a group of Vandals were admitted into Dacia 4. In
his view: "the settlement of barbarians in a threatened province was
1, Finley, /RS 48 (1958), 160f & Gilliam, 'The Plague Under Marcus Aurelius', A/Phil, 73(196)),
244ff Ro.aii Any Papers (1986), 246ff contra Boak, Manpower S/x'rtage and the Pall of the RoeanEmpire (1955), 97 & 115ff, Gilliam's point that settlement of barbarians within the empire wasnothing new bears reiterating, but despite the size of such settlements, it was never on such a large
scale as that under Marcus: Gilliam, 245 n,71 & 246 nn,72 & 73,
2, For the most recent analysis on the effects of the plague1 cf, Duncan-Jones, Structure andScale in the Roman Econo.y (1990), 71ff; on vexillations, cf, Ritterling, RE 1427 & 1449; Parker, TheRoian Legions (1928), 166; Cf. also chh,VI & II: ('exiJlationes p.138 and Manpower, p,46ff,
3, MOcsy, Pannonia and Upper Ifoesia (1974), 184ff,4 Dio LXXI . 15; 11'1-6 & 13 • 3; 121-2; Mócsy, op. cit,, 189ff,
—195-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati
permitted only when their pacification could be ensured by the very fact of
their admission", and here lies the crux of the matter. Under Marcus
Aurelius, the settlement of barbarians equated almost directly with their
pacification. This was not simply a matter of weakness, The empire was not
being forced to accept a fait accomp1i since Marcus usually permitted such a
settlement only after he had established the empire's position of superiority
by military means. Under Marcus, the barbarians were always supplicants,
usually in defeat, and their settlement was not just a matter of political
expediency (designed to keep the peace), but one of tribute to a victorious
empire.
When settlement was not the question, this tribute could take the form
of contributions to the imperial army. The lazyges were required to provide
8,000 men to the army, and the 5,500 Sarmatians sent to Britain by Marcus
may have been the result of this treaty2 . Similar measures were taken by
Aurelian and Probus after their defeat of the various tribes which invaded
the empire in the late third century. Two thousand Vandals were drafted
into the army in the wake of the great Invasion of AD 270, while Probus Is
supposed to have scattered small pockets of Frankish troops, 16,000 in all,
throughout the empire, as well as sending a group of Burgundlan and Vandal
captives across to Britain. Such contingents, formed into permanent units
of numer'i and vexillationes, performed much the same function as the
national numeri raised by foedus in the late Republic and early Empire, and
I, MOcsy, op. cit, (above n,3), 189,
2, Dio LXXI • 16; Southern, 'Numeri', 88,
3, Vandals: Dexippus 8e11, Scyth, 1 . 2; Zos, 1'46'2 & 48 . 2; Petrus Patridus frag,11 (F/Is, p,126);
Orosius VII . 23 . 4, Probus: Zos, 1 . 68 . 3; S/f4ProL', XIV.7-XV,
-1 Y6-
M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati
their echoes can still be found in the pages of the Notitia Dignitatum1.
While some may have broken faith 3 , others can be seen to have served the
empire well and faithfully3 , Some even volunteered4.
It is with Gallierius that a shift in emphasis can be found. Some time
after 255, he made an alliance with a German chieftain across the Rhine,
whereby the man created a buffer between barbarians and empire along his
part of the frontier, relieving the pressure on that part of the limes5.
Precisely what the terms of this agreement were, Zosimus fails to tell us,
but we do have quite detailed information concerning another such treaty
made circa 258/9 between Gallienus and a Marcomannic chieftain on the
Danube.
The information is confused and coloured by the bias in the sources
against Gallienus, yet it is possible to piece it together to form a coherent
picture. He is depicted as a debauched lecher, obsessed with the love of a
barbarian woman, variously named Pipa or Pipara6 ; and it is from the Epitome
of Victor that we gain the additional information with which we can slot the
whole puzzle into place:
Victor Epitome XXXIII1: Gallienus.....amori diverso pellicum deditus
Saloninae coniugis et concubinae, quam per pacationem con cessa parte
Superioris Pannoniae a patre, Marcomnannorum rege, matr'imonii specie
I, Southern, 'Numeri', 86; Not, Dig, Dc, VI . 22:65:VII . 183 (equites Marcoaanni) XL . 54 & XLII'46-
70 (equites Sariatee (gentiJes)); V . 49 : 198 & 50: 199, YI1 . 38 & XXXIV . 24 (pedifes Marcoianni)
V , 18162=VII . 13 (pedites Heruli); & Or, XXIX • 22 & 24 (pedites Scythici),
2, Alföldi, CAHIll, 299; Zos, I • 48 • 2; Petrus Patricius (rag, 12 (p.188),
3, Zos, 1 . 68 . 3; S/IA Ciauo', IX . 4; Dio LXXI . 16 on which Southern, op. cii,, 88,
4, Dexippus Scytfi, 1 . 2 (frag,6),
5, Zos, 1.30.3,
6, S//A Gail, XXI . 3; S//A Trig, Tyr, 111 . 4; Vict, Cees, XXXIII'6,
—197-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati
susceperat Pipam nomine.1
From his L.iber' de Caesaribus we learn that the man was called Attalus.
Here, he is depicted not as a Marcomannus, but as a German, and it may be
that the whole affair ha8 become confused in the histories with the
agreement on the Rhine mentioned above, and that in fact the two incidents
could be one and the seine. Clarity in this matter is sadly unobtainable.
All we can be sure of is that Gallienus seems to have made some form of
marriage alliance with a barbarian chieftain concerning the protection of the
frontier, which probably involved the ceding of land to the man's tribe. This
has been interpreted as some form of foedus, and there is little else that it
could be. Aitheim would see a policy of incorporating barbarians into the
empire in these moves, but De Blois is almost certainly right In his view
that such moves were made on an ad hoc basis, as circumstance demanded.
However, a subtle shift in emphasis had taken place. The position of
Attalus was not as a supplicant, but as an equal. Perhaps it would be
better to view him as a form of client king, yet even so it was Attalus who
was in the position of strength. The emperor had come to him, not the other
way round.
The reason is not hard to find. With Valerian occupied in the east,
Gallienus had found himself faced with a prolonged Alemannic raid which was
threatening Italy at the same time as the revolt of Ingenuus in Panonnia4.
1, Vict, Epit, XXXIII'l: fiallienus,,,,,was enticed by love different to that of his devoted 'ife,
Salon/na, and took a concubine in the sesbiance of larriage, by the naee of P/pa, for vhoe he conceded
by treaty part of Pannonia Inferior to her father, the king of the Marcocanni,
2, Vict, Cees, XXXIII.6,
3, ickert, RE 'Licinius', 355; A1földi CAM XII I 219; Altheim, Soldatenkaiser (1939), 188 &
204; De Regibus 1 Monarch/a Mi//tare di Gailieno (1939), 22f; Nanni, Inpero di 6allieno (1949), 21f &
26; De Slois, Policy of the (aperor a1Iienus (1976), 4 n,13 & 34,
4, Alföldi CAN XII, 158ff; De Blois, Policy of 6ailienus, 4 & n, 12, who believes the raid was
Marcoannic,
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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati
It is possible that the revolt had been triggered by news of Valerian's
death, which would mean that this burden and the secession of the Gallic
Empire should be added to the list of the emperor's woes 1 . Quite simply, the
emperor could not be everywhere at once. Even with Aureolus acting
independently to put down the revolt of Ingenuus'-, events were moving too
fast for imperial forces to keep pace. The revolt of [ngenuus had been
symptomatic of a deep dissatisfaction inside Pannonia with the emperor's
preoccupations elsewhere. Hot on the heels of Ingenuus' demise came a
second pretender, Regalianus, bearing the same grievances as his predecessor.
These stemmed from a deep-rooted fear of the trans-Danubian tribes, which
had never truly ceased to trouble the empire s. De Blois believes that the
threat of invasion was the spark that ignited both the rebellions at this
time4 . Gallienus could not afford to be continually looking over his
shoulder for the next Pannonian conflagration, nor did he have enough leeway
to mount a trans-Danubian expedition, yet he had to make some move to pacify
the Pannonian populace while he worked to stabilise the empire-wide crisis.
The agreement with Attalus was part of the solution. It was probably a
short-term measure designed to stabilise the situation until he could effect
a thorough reorganisation of the provinces, though it may have had more
lasting consequneces. At any rate, the province remained relatively
untroubled for the rest of his reign.
I, Alföldi, CAHXII I 184ff,2. Zon, 1I.24,
3 Alfoldi, CA/III, 181; MOcsy, Pannonia, 198f ch,V: Auxilia, p,2lff,
4, De Blois, Policy of Gallienus, 4ff
5, Made circa 262, cf, Alföldi, CAM XII, 186 & chh,VI & X Vexillationes, p145 & Viri Militares,p.232 for references,
—199-
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De Blois saw in Gallienus' actions a policy of barbarian alliances (albeit
an opportunistic one), and sought to extend it to cover his relations with
Palmyra 1 . However, it seems clear that the situation in the east was not
one of the emperor's making. Gallienus was never in any positon to challenge
the authority of the Palmyrene king, and could do little but cloak the fact
of Palmyra's supremacy in the guise of Roman clientship. The implication of
Roman officials in the assassination of Odaenathus probably reflects the
bitterness of Roman authority towards the situation it was forced to endure.
That it was Palmyra which eventually chose to drop the pretence only serves
to illustrate where the strength lay in the assoc1ation.
The agreements of Gallienus were individual treaties made at a time
when the empire was under its greatest strain. They seem to have been
extraordinary measures in response to equally extraordinary circumstances,
and were probably never intended as permanent or even long-term solutions.
Once the empire had regained its balance, the agreements we see being made
by Gallienus' successors have returned to the position of strength from
which Marcus Aurelius was bargaining. Claudius and Probus are credited with
bringing large numbers of Gothic tribesmen and Vandals onto Imperial soil.
Some are seen to have settled peacefully, while others are depicted as
breaking faith and ravaging the empire4 . Since both events occur equally in
the work of individual ancient writers, we can discount any suspicion of
political bias, though how much later Roman thinking colours their
1, De Blois, Policy of 6i1ienus 34f,2, Zos, 1 . 39; S/IA Val, IV • 2-4, Gail, X'1-8, Trig, Tyt, XV . 2-4 & XXX'6; CISem, II • 3971; BG(J
111 . 946; Alföldi, CANXII, 174ff,3, Zos, 1 • 46 • 2; S/IA Claud, IX • 4-7; S/IA Prob, XV.2-4,4, Zos, 1 • 71 • 2; S/IA Prob, XV1II1-4,
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interpretation of events remains a moot point. It would seem that from the
late second century barbarian migrations, prompted by pressure from the
north and east 1 , brought individual tribes across the borders of the empire
in search of a place to live. Whether they were granted i-eceptio depended
heavily upon the individual circumstances of both tribe and emperor, and
more often than not they were turned back, becoming yet another raiding
party in the catalogue of invasions that colour the third century. Only when
it was to the empire's advantage was such settlement allowed, and at times,
as with all human decisions, the emperor could get it wrong. These
barbarians were seen as another potential source of 'ethnic' manpower, and
were treated as such, yet their recruitment was piecemeal and opportunistic2.
Not even under Gallienus was there any systematic attempt by the empire to
create a body of foederati. That would come later.
I, cf, Alföldi, C/1XII, Cap, III: 'The Barbarian Background'1 96ff.
2, Alföldi, CQH XII, 218 is wrong when he speaks of the lasting effects of barbarians upon the
army, We have seen that Germanic dress (namely trousers) were adopted for reasons of convenience
(ch,IV: Legiones p,lGff), and there is absolutely no evidence for the adoption of any other Germanic
customs during the century, The h'anes of Caracalla may have continued serving as an 'ethnic' unitfollowing that emperor's death, and seem to have retained their privileged status, though this is no
more indicitive of the 'barbarisation' of Roman emperors than the presence of boors within the Guard,
I agree with Speidel that their continuation is more likely than disbandment, but his suggestion that
they returned to Germany and survived there as a unit to be re-recruited by Naximian 50 years later is
too far-fetched to be credible, It is far more likely that they remained within the empire, to be
incorporated into the barbarian auxilia after its creation by Constantine: Speidel, 'Ethnic Units',
226f; Dio LXIVIII . 5, LXIIX . 64 & I.XXX • 45; Her, V . 4 • 8; ,%'f, Dig, Oc, V . 26171 :VII . 65 &
y. 27: 172:VII . 19; On the Moors cf, ch,II: Contra ColitatuR, p63,
—20 1-
PART 4:
TI-i Off icr
M,C.Ibeji, C3 Army
X: VI RI MILl TA RE
The rise of the equites into posts previously reserved for senators is a
phenomenon of the third century which has prompted great debate. So much
has been achieved since Keyes produced his seminal work on the subject' that
few questions can still be asked 0 and even fewer permit answers. All that
remains is to reiterate old arguments and bring together relevant strands in
the tapestry of our understanding; confirming what we do know and
highlighting what we do not. Some aspects of the debate retain interesting
angles of approach. Where enough information survives, I have tried to fill
these gaps. Furthermore, I deemed it useful to combine the evidential
material provided by Keyes, Petersen, Malcus and Gilliam into one homogeneous
whole upon which a full study could be based 2 . Most of the material
tabulated under the title Provincial Governors has been drawn from these
four sources, as well as from the Prosopography of Iones and Mart indale.
Likewise, the analyses of this material merely echo what has gone before.
Only in the analysis of vexillary commands, and the incorporation of duces
into the picture, does this chapter take up threads that have not been
unpicked previously.
As with so much in the third century, a pivotal position is occupied by
the emperor Gallienus. Aurelius Victor, in two celebrated passages, claimed
1, Keyes 1 The Rise of the Equites, Princeton (1915),2, Keyes, op. cit.; Petersen, 'Governors in the C3', IRS 45 (1955), 47-57; Halcus, 'Système
Administratif', Opuscula Rosana 7 (1969), 213-237; Gilliam, 'Governor5 of Syria Code', Roeeii ArmyPapers (1986), 173-190 A/Phil 79(1958), 225-242; all collected in table YM 1: Provincial 6overnors,
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that he incensed the senators "by the outrage done to their order, since .....
fearing their indolence and wishing to pass power onto the best of the
nobility, he barred the senate from military service and access to the
army. " This 'edict' could have been revoked under Tacit us had not the
senators been so apathetic. As it was, they missed their chance.
In the past, the 'edict' has been taken to indicate imperial antipathy
towards the senate. Gallienus, like Septirnius Severus, was seen to have
resented senatorial opposition to his reign, and sought support among the
equestrian classes. It was thought that he deliberately replaced senators
with equites in key military positions, and even sought to deny the senate a
role in provincial government 3 . Such a view is no longer tenable. A quick
glance at the material compiled by Petersen and Gilliam proves that senators
remained in control of three times as many provinces as those given over to
equestrians by Gallienus4 , while the whole notion of an anti-senatorial
policy has come into question.
From the start, the concept of imperial enmity towards the senate has
been based on shaky foundations, drawn as it was from the anti-imperial
tradition of the histories 5 . These reflected the hostility of the senate,
both contemporary and subsequent, towards an emperor deemed to have
1, Vict, Caes, XXXIII'33-34: ft patres quidee, preeter coesune Rocani orbis ia/ui, stiau/abatproprii ordinis contuielia, quia priaws ipse (Ga/i/anus), iett.' socordiae suae, ie iiperiu. ad opt/sos
nobiliva transferre fur, senutu. ill/flu ye tuft ci adire exercitui,
2, Vici, Cues, XXVII'5-7,
3, Alföldi, CAM XII (1939), 183f; Den Boer, Lou H/nor Rosan Historians (1972), 7Sf; Homo,
'Galijen et la crise', Rev, Mist, (1913), 250ff & 257ff, and 'Privileges administratives du sénat',
Rev, Mist, (1921), 197ff; Jones 1 Later Rouan Lap/re (1964), 24; Nannl, L'iupero di 6'aiiieno, (1949),
51.
4, cf, table YM 1: Provincial Governors and table YM 4: Survey Re5uIfs,
5. Alfôldi, 223ff discusses this at length,
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deprived senators of their traditional rights 1 . As such, they attest the
strength of senatorial feeling against the prince, but they do not naturally
indicate a reciprocal animosity from his person. De Blols has pointed out
that Gallienus enjoyed personal friendships with several senators and drew
around himself a cultured coterie2. In fact, apart from the testimony of
Victor, there is nothing in the histories to substantiate a theory of hatred.
True, Gallienus faced several revolts early in his reign, either by senators
or with senatorial support, but there is no indication in the sources of
purges similar to those of Septimius Severus4.
Even had there been, equestrians would have featured prominently in the
death toll. The idea that the senate opposed the autocracy of the Princeps,
while the equites benefitted from an unholy alliance, is a fantasy belied by
the facts. In a study of the first two centuries AD, Brunt has established
that equites were implicated in as many plots as were senators, and both
classes equally paid the price of failure s. The same is true of the third
century. To illustrate the point, we need look no further than the reign of
Gellienus himself.
1, Victor and the 8/14 vilify Gallienus, while at the same time evincing disdain for the
5enatorial forefathers who forfeited their power, Here they must be voicing the general feeling among
the senators of their day, harking back to lost glories: cf, Ilalcus, 'Système administratif', 215f,
Vici, Cats, XXXIII . 31 & 34 tells of the persecution of Gallienus' family and friends after the news of
his death, a chilling testimony to the anti-imperial feeling among the senators of the day It is
also worth noting that while the Latin (senatorial) tradition generally excoriates the unfortunate
emperor, the independent Greek tradition prai5es him as cultured and humane: cf, Alföldi, bc, cit.
(above, n,5),
2, Dc Blois, Policy of the Eapero 6ailieiws (1976), 58,3, Alföldl, C4/IXII, 184ff De Blois, 82,4, And it is doubtful whether, following these purges, Severus himself had anything more to fear
from the senate, Indeed, the purges themselves were indicative of the dominant position of the
emperor: cf, ch,IV: Legiones, p.86,5, Brunt, 'Princeps and Equites', IRS 73 (1983), 63ff,
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M.C.Ibe.Ji: 03 Army. Viri Militares
Equestrians actually outnumbered senators at the head of the rebellions
which followed Valerian's capture. There can be little doubt about Callistus
'Ballista', prime instigator of the eastern revolt, or about L. Musslus
Aemilianus, the praefectus Aegypti who joined it 1 . The Prefect of Egypt was,
by definition, an equestrian, and it must be significant that Ballista did not
have the prestige to claim the purple for himself, but was forced to rely on
the Macriani. It would seem by this that he was an obscure equestrian who
could only achieve the Praetoriari Prefecture through rebellion 2 . T. Fulvius
Macrianus himself was possibly of equestrian stock. A confusion of titles
are attributed to him, which Alföldi interpreted to mean Quartermaster
General3 . As Jones and Martthdale correctly assumed, he was most likely
designated 'a rationibus', which, according to Pfleuin, was one of the most
prestigious posts in the equestrian cursus. It is worth noting that he
deemed it prudent to pass the purple over himself in favour of his sons, on
the grounds of physical infirinitys.
The situation in the west is more confused. The two Pannonian usurpers,
Irigenuus and Regalianus were probably senators. Ingenuus was definitely the
governor of a Pannonian province6 , and the likelihood is that Regalianus was
the same7 . Epigraphic testimony suggests that Pannonla was ruled by
1, Alfóldi, CAM XII, 17211, Ballista Is known only as a praefecfus who emerged after the
disastrous capture of Valerian to fight a successfull guerrilla campaign against the Persians: S/IA
Va!, IV'4, Trig, Tyr, XII'l; Zonaras XII.23,2, Though it is possible that he was PPO of Valerian: S//A Gall, 1 . 2-3 & 111 . 2, Trig, Tyr, XII,
XIV . 1 & XVIII . 13; Zon, XI1'24,
3, Alfôldi, bc, cit, Eusebius Mist, Fcc!, VII . IO . 5-6; Petrus Patricius Exc, de sent, frag, 159;
S//A Trig, Tyr, XII • 1; Zon, XII.24,
4, PLREMacrianus2; Pflaum, Proc, Eq., 294,5, Alföldi, bc, c/f,; Eusebius Mist, Fcc!, VI1'1O'8-9 Zon, XII'24; $84 Tr/g, Tyr, XII•4-12,
6, Alföldi, 184; Vict, Cacs, XXXIII'2 quei curantei Pannonio S//A Tr/g, Tyr, IX.I,
7, Alfaldi, bc, cit.; S//A Trig, Tyr, 1 . 1 & 9, This refers to dux and ducatiia1 but given the
S//4'5 propensity to borrow terms from its own time, I am disinclined to credit it without independent
support,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
equestrian praefectl while Gallienus was in power 1 yet this can hardly apply
at the instant of his accession. Regalianus was married to Sulpicla
Dryantilla, the daughter of an important senatorial gens, and is most likely
to have been a senator himself. If this was the case, the province was still
under senatorial control at that time.
No confusion exists over Aureolus, who rebelled in 267 and was possibly
the most favoured and influential of Gallienus' vfrl mi1itares. Yet debate
still surrounds the man in whose name he turned against the emperor: M.
Cassianius Latinius Postumus. Postumus was probably of humble origins and
rose through a military career to an important command in Gaul4 . This
command had obvious military undertones, yet its nature is unclear. Victor
says: barbaris per Gafliam praesidebat; Zosimus calls him &pv and the
Historla Augusta claims he was: Transrhenani limitis dux et Galliae praesess.
He seems to have been subordinate to Silvanus, the tuotor of Gallienus' son
Salonthus, who directed the government of the Rhine provinces in his name.
Drinkwater thinks that he acted as the military counterbalance to SilvanusG,
If this was the case, he is likely to have held a special command, such as
dux Transrhenani limitis, rather than the provincial governorship which
Alföldi and Drinkwater think he possessed. Such a command would have
matched the nature, if not the prestige, of Silvanus' position. On the other
hand, if Silvanus gained influence merely from his post as tutor to
I 111 . 4564; III'3424 1L5545: 111 . 15156; but cf, Petersen, 51 nn,60 & 65 contra.
2, Alfôldi, bc, c/f, (above, n,1),
3, His career as given in PLREureolus shall suffice,4, Eutropius Rrev, IX9,5, Vict, Cues, XXXIII . 8; Zos, I'38'2; Q Trig, Tvr, 1119,
6, Alfôldi, CA/I XII, 185: Drinkwater, The 6uliic (spire, Hi5tor(u 52(1987), 25,
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Saloninus, it is possible that Postumus was simply a praeses provinc1ae and
that the former had no official counterweight. A third possibility is that
Postumus was a dux or praeposltus In command of an exercitua campaigning on
the Rhine. This is the option which I favour for several reasons.
First, despite their confusion, the sources are unamimous in their belief
that Postumus held a military command. This command brought him into
conflict with Silvanus over the matter of some booty, an isolated incident
over which Post umus took the side of his soldiers'. The incident was a
catalyst for widespread disaffection with Silvanus' mode of government, and
it was his position as commander of the troops involved in the dispute which
transformed Postumus into the figurehead of the rebellion. In other words,
Postumus was proclaimed Gallic Emperor in opposition to the legitimate
government almost by default. This, at rock bottom, is the general consensus
of the histories, Secondly, the military bias in the material suggests
strongly that Postumus was a career officer. Hints of humble origins and
heavy emphasis on the man's military prowess are the standard indicators of
an equestrian career made in the army. If this was the case, it is highly
unlikely that Postumus would have been made praees of a German province,
since both provinces appear to have remained senatorial until late in the
third century2 . Finally, the sources are completely silent on the nature of
Silvanus' command, other than to name him as the guardian of Saloninus. This
makes me loth to invest him with an important and prestigious official
position against which Postumus could have been the counterwei8ht, though I
1, Alföldi, bc, cit.; Eutropius IX'9; $11.4 Sail, IV . 3, Trig, Typ, II1 • 2-4; Vict, Caes, XXXIII'8,Epit, XXXII'3; Zos, 1.38.2,
2, cf, table YM1: Provincial Goveppors,
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M.C.Ibeji C3 Army. Viri Militares
will concede that both men may have held unofficial influence. In view of
these points 1 I am most ready to believe that Fostumus was an equestrian
officer who held some important military position coinbatting barbarian
incursions on the Rhine. If he was a senator, it can only have been through
adlection (unless we discount Eutropius' statement), and will have followed a
successful career in the army.
All but one of these men rebelled at the start of Gallienus' reign,
providing him with ample reason to distrust equestrians as much as he may
have distrusted senators. Such considerations have prompted some historians
to doubt the credibility of Victor's statement. Arnheim and de Regibus
believe the edict to be a fictional device 1 , while a critique by Malcus has
indicated that the sources Victor drew upon were not entirely trustworthy2.
Victor produced the Historlae abbreviatae between 358 and 36O, and was
heavily influenced by the predjudices of resurgent paganism centred around
the emperor Julian4 . For his earlier history, he used an anonymous source
which he shared in common with Eutropius and possibly the Historia Augusta.
Where these could not help, it seems likely that he filled the gaps himself.
His account is loaded with moral ,judgements culled from his own time, and
makes several elementary mistakes which cast grave doubt on his independent
I, Ce Regibus, 'Decadenza del senato', Aft! Ac, Lig, IX'l (1953), 234ff points out that Victor'sis the only testimony we have of such an edici Arriheim, Senatorial Aristocracy (1972), 37 suggeststhat ii was a device of Victor's to explain gradual changes.
2, Malcus, 'Système administratif', 214ff.
3, He met Julian at Sirmium in 361: Malcus, 315; ed, Dufraigne, livre des Césars (1975), introp,xi,
4, On Julian, cf, Browning, The Eaperor Julia,, (1975), esp, cap, 9, Victor met Julian late in361, and made such an impression that he was appointed preeses Pannoniae SecundaL Browning, 120,
5, On this subject cf, Introduction, p4ff, The common use of a taisergesc/,ichteby Victor andEuiropius seems to me proven, but I am not convinced it was known to the S//A,
6, Malcus, Iocc, citt,—208-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
trustworthiness. The 'edict' could be discounted were it not patently
obvious from the epigrephic record that a great change had taken place.
Malcus shows the way forward. He admits that some kernel of truth must
exist within Victor's story, if only to explain the hatred of the senate
towards the emperor, and it was linked in some way to the increasing
importance of the equestrian class. Yet senators still held military
commends under Gallienus, and were never properly excluded from provincial
government with all the military responsibilities that implied 1 . He posits
that Gallienus did not exclude senators from military life, but instead
opened the way for the equestrian class to enter those offices which had
previously been the sole preserve of the senate 2 . The exclusion of the
senate became a de facto affair as senators lost posts for which they no
longer held much competence to the eager, career-conscious equites
(promoted, of course, by the emperor). By the time Aurelius Victor was
writing, the split had become as rigid as law. Gallienus did not pass a
negative edict agathst the senate, but created a positive one in favour of
the equites3.
Eric Birley pointed out long ago that a military career was no longer an
essential prerequisite for senatorial advancement 4 . More recently, de Blols
has added substance to this by establishing a trend in senatorial curricula
I, T, Flavius Postumius Yarus and C, lulius Sallustius Saturninus Fortunatianus were both Jegutus
Jepionis under Gallienus; though it is worth noting that they were simultaneously legatiis AugiI5ti pro
praetore Nalcus, 'Système administratif', 226 & 228, citing VIl'95 = RIB 1764 & ILS 2413. Note also
that praefecti legionis were technically subordinate to the provincial governor: Malcus, 227,
2, Malcus, 216,
3, Ii is possible that he simply employed equestrians without legislating, Nowhere does Victor
explicitly mention an edict, this is simply an assumption of modern historians, Since these governors
were the personal appointees of the emperor, legislation was not a prerequisite of the change
4, E, Birley, 'Senators in the Emperor's Service', PBA3( (1953), 207f,
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away from military posts and into an increasing number of civil appointments,
which may not simply be a trick of the extant material 1 . In essence, it
would seem that most senators held the bare minimum they could get away
with in military terms, and that as the third century progressed, this
requirement diminished. The last pure legatus leglanis was Vitulasius
Laetinianus at Caerleon in the 25062. Two other legati postdate him in the
reign of Gallienus, but both held their posts in conjunction with the
provincial governorship; a point to which I shall return 3. More indicative of
senatorial attitudes were the last senators to hold the military tribunate.
lunius Tiberianus was trib, mu, leg. X Geminae under Decius4, and P.
Balsamius Sabl.nianus was trib. inil. laticlavius circa 2626. Both were minors.
The essential fact to note is that the post of tribunus laticlavius was a
sinecure long before Gallienus came on the scene. Indeed, de Blois lists a
series of inscriptions from the collection of Dessau which show senators
pursuing careers with no military posts whatsoever, most of which predate
the edict6.
By the 250s, therefore, the senate would seem to have abdicated its
military responsibilities in favour of civilian careers. Campbell made the
point that the most prestigious posts in the senatorial cursus had long been
the least active ones militarily. In the second century, Syria, Spain and
1, De Blois, Policy of 6allienus 68ff & 72ff,
2, RIB 334 & ILS 537; leg, leg, II Aug.
3, Varus and Fortunatianu5, given above, p.209 n,1,
4, 111 . 4558 & p.23284°
5, 111.8571,
6, Os Blois, 70 n,197,
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Britain, relatively peaceful unless the emperor chose to campaign in the
area, were the provinces most sought after by senators1. The real prestige
was to be gained in the Eternal City Itself2. The senate was becoming less
suitable and less enthusiastic for military command. Part of the problem
may have been a steady reduction in the numbers of born senators eligible to
take on available posts. De Blois believes that the pool of senators was
shrinking even as the number of vexillations and other units they were
required to lead expanded3. If this was the case, it will have been another
contributory factor to their decreasing significance in the militia.
This is not, however, the whole story. In the procuratorial service, a
precedent already existed where equestrian officers impinged on areas
technically under the jurisdiction of the senate. By the second century,
procurators were found exercising legal powers within imperial estates4. In
general, this was only fiscal jurisdiction, and while they could usurp extra-
legal powers when dealing with privati or even in criminal cases, such action
was only possible where the case arose out of fiscal claims (disputes
between the fiscus and privati, and hearings over the sequestration of goods
pertaining to capital charges)5. The procuratorial service was expanded by
the Seven, and much of the power mentioned above was given their official
1, Campbell 'Who were the yin silitaresV, .IRS 65 (1975), 22,2, Campbell, 27,
3, De Blois, Policy of Suiiienus, 65f & 68, I am not entirely convinced, As we shall see,equestrians were equally able to command vexillations, even prior to Marcus Aurelius. and 5enators
were never required to lead auxiliary units or praetorian troops, Nor were they required for the new
legions of Septimius Severus, which were placed under the command of equestrian praefect/ cf, below,p216, For the growth of vexx, cf, ch,VI: 'ex/llationes.
4, Millar, 'Imperial Procurators: Further Evidence', H/stan/a 14(1965), 362ff,5, MIllar, locc, c/ft.; Brunt, Roaa,', lipenial T/ieies (1990), 169ff,
-2 11-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. yin. Militares
sanction'. Significantly, appeals in such fiscal cases were directed over the
head of the governor to the emperor himself, though this decision was
reversed by Severus Alexander. Yet, despite the dismantling by Alexander
and Gordian of several Severan measures regarding procurators, their right
to hear fiscal cases seems to have become de Jur.
Of importance here is the timing. Equestrians in the procuratorial
service were operating outside their legitimate sphere of influence long
before these activities were given the sanction of law. When Severus
created a series of new sexagenariate posts, there was no lack of
equestrians ready to fill them 4. The equestrian class was willing and eager
to undertake any job the emperor might provide, arid to exploit it to the
full. In the military sphere it was well suited to the task. Jarrett's work
on Africa has much to tell in this respect, for he has shown that as
military service came to involve more fighting, recruitment of equestrian
officers shifted into the militanised areas. Simultaneously, equites from the
more civilian localities entered the equestrian service at the level of
advocatus fisci and pursued a 'civilian' career5.
A dichotomy was forming, between military men and civilians. Jarrett's
African material emphasises the parallel between the equestrian cursus and
the senatorial in this respect. Where they differ is that senators still had
legitimate areas of non-military advancement, whereas ambitious equites were
ever more forced to rely on the army as their ladder to power. Even as the
1, Pflaum, Les Procuratelr5 Equestres (1950), 90ff; Brunt, Theaes, 171 & 18211,2, Brunt, 176,3, Brunt, bc, cit.4, Pflaum, bocc, cit t,5, Jarrett, 'African Contribution to the Imperial Equestrian Service', Historia 12(1963), 225
—2 12-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
proportion of ex-centurlon procurators remained no more than 25% throughout
the second and third centuries, men from the Prinilpilate could realistically
aspire to high office if they remained in the army and proved their worth in
the equestrian cursus militiae 1 , In one celebrated case, a man actually
accepted a demotion so that he could switch to a military career 2 . Men with
military experience were becoming valuable. Campbell tells us of the men
under Marcus Aurelius who were frequently re-posted at times of crisis to
positions on the northern frontier where they had firsthand experience, He
comments on the sense of the move, and we can only concur 3 . In the mid-
third century, the men with the experience were equestrian yin mill tares
I do not want to get bogged down in definitions. That a number of ex-
centurions can be found rising via the Primipilate into posts of military
responsibility is a fact of the third century. They became tribunes,
praefecti cestrorum and preepositi vexillationum. Eventually, they took over
command of certain legions and provinces, and some advanced even further4.
Certain of them gained the title protector, though discussion of its meaning
must waite . They were ambitious, experienced 1 and quite ready to fill the
vacuum left by the senate's indifference. At the same time other equestrian
officers with no record of service in the ranks can be found advancing into
similar posts. Yet even these seem to have pursued a predominantly
I, Brunt 1 'Princeps and Equites', IRS 73 (1983), 48f; Gage, CJasse5 Sociaies (1954), 259;MacMullen, Soldier and CiviIiai 69f,
2, III • 6075; Pflaum, Procuratew's, 261; MacMullen, bc, cit,3, Campbell, ' yin ailitares', 22, In the same vein 1 Severu5 would seem to have posted a
procurator skilled in intelligence work to northern Britain in preparation for the Scottish campaign;
the man eventually became PPO of Caracalla: Rankov, 'II, Oclatiniu5 Adventus in Britain', Britannic IS(1987), 243ff,
4, Pflaum, 'Procurator', RE col, 1278; Domaszewski, Rangondnung (1967), 81; Gage, bc, cit,Nagy, 'Aelius Aelianus', Kilo 46(1965), 339ff; a handful of examples will suffice: Marianus VI•1636
Mucianus 4E1908,259 = 1159479; Volusianus XI'1836 = /151332; cf, also AE1968,413 & PLRE.4ureoius,5, cf, ch,XI: Protectores,
—213-
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military career. Few of the equestrians named in the Provincial Governors
survey give a record of earlier posts held. All who do had seen active
military service, and most had no other posts to speak of 1 . While not yin
militares in the strictest sense of the term, these were military men in that
they exhibited a tacit recognition of the value to be gained by experience in
the army. For these men, a conjunction of circumstances was to make their
services invaluable, for the senate seems to have retreated from military
affairs at precisely the time (and possibly because) the empire entered a
state of virtually endemic warfare2.
The militarisat ion of the equites was a gradual process throughout the
first half of the third century. Its roots must lie partly in the growing
importance of vexillatlons. The tradition that legions should remain under
the command of senators was never a hard and fast rule3 . Experienced
pnimipili would sometimes be called upon to command substantial legionary
detachments. We know of one man who was put in command of nine
vexillations from different named legions, and who later went on to command
an exercitus In Africa under Vespasian 4 . At times of emergency, it seems
that veteran military men were a precious commodity, regardless of their
class. This was never more true than during the wars of Marcus Aurelius.
I, Table YM 1: Statilius Ammianus was preef, dee, 111 . 90 & IGRR III1287; C, Iul,Priscus waspruep, vexx, & praep, leg, prior to becoming proc. prov, vice pracs,, VI • 1638; Aur, Valentinus wastrib, Batavorua, AE,1900 1 169; Flavius Aper was preep, vexx,, 111 . 15156, AE,1936,53,54 & 57 Fl, Val,Constantius was protector et trib,, Excerpt, Pales, I .2 an anonymous preeses ee,', Sup, was Ypruef,a/ce et praef, ye/ic,, VI . 1641; Sabinius Timesitheus was preef, co/i,, In all the above mentionedcases, the entire known career prior to the governorship, both military and civilian, is cited,
2, Dc Blois, Policy of Gallienus, 60ff; CAHXII (1939), chapters 2,6 & 9,3, Saxer, Vexillationen, Ep, $tuo I (1967), 120ff4. C, Velius Rufus, priasus p1/us of Leg, XII Pu/a, and later trib, co/i, XIII 1/rb,, E,1903,368
cf, also X'5829 = 1LS2726; and possibly Y1.3505,
—2 14-
M.C,Ibejl: C3 Army. Viri Militares
Marcu8 relied on vexillatlons heavily. Circumstance had cursed him with
such a chronic shortage of manpower that he was forced to use any means at
his disposal, regardless of the traditional niceties'. He enlisted Italians
into two new legions2, he dragged vexillatlons from all over the empire to
fight his wars and defend his borders3, and in three cases he ignored
precedent to place equestrians in command of legionary forces 4. Nor was
this simply the customary transferral of command into the hands of capable
primipili The men whom Marcus chose were equites from the procure tela.
Two of them, Ti. Plautius Ferruntianus and L. lulius lulianus, had both been
praeIectus alee and tribunus militum In between procuratorial posts, and had
a wealth of military experience5 . The third seems to have been the
Procurator of the province involved, acting vice legati in nominal command of
the unit, though actual command in fact rested with another praefectus alae
named in the same inscription6. The break is clear and dramatic. Marcus
had ceased limiting the command of legionaries to senators and veteran
centurions. Presumably, he had no-one else he could rely on. All his other
commanders must have been tied down. Yet he needed more troops with
reliable men in charge of them. The very range of his actions speaks
volumes for the pressure he was under. Ferruntianus, for instance, was
withdrawn from a Tribunate in Moesia to lead part of III Augusta out of
1, Ritterling, RE 1427 & 1449; Parker, Rosan Legions (1928), 166; cf, chh,V1, IV & V:
Vexillationes p. 138ff, Legione5 & Auxilia2, II1'1980 Dio LV . 24; Ritterling, 13001; Salmon, 'Army and Disintegration', Trans, R, Soc,
Canada 52 III 11(1958), 52,3, 111 . 14433; VI'31856 • AE,I888,66; VI1I'619 = 11,52747; AE1910,l61; AE,1920,45; Parker, 168;
Saxer, 'exiIJationen, 124,4, VI'31856 • AE,1888,66; VIII'6I9 = 1LS2747; AE1910,5,
5, VI'31856 & YII1'619 above,
6, A1910,5 from Villalis in Spain.
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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. yin Militares
Africa against the Marcomanni! In another instance, a centurlo frumentarius
from Egypt was put in commend of a garrison force in Dalmatia, drawn from
the new Italian legions'. This broke with further tradition, that centurions
(as opposed to primipili) only be placed in command of vexillations from
their own unit2 . Both practices continued under Commodus3.
Marcus had established a new precedent. Members of the procuratorial
service were now eligible for legionary command. The next logical step was
to be taken by Septimius Severus who, on his creation of the Parthian
legions, did not place senatorial legati in command, but instead put them
under equestrian praefectL C. lulius Pacatlanus, the procurator of Osrhoene,
was probably the original commander of the first legion created 4 . He was
well qualified for the post, having served his time in the equestrian tres
militiae ('...militiis equestribus perfuncto...') prior to the procuratio. Above
all else, his appointment must have been a matter of expediency. Severus
wanted to make a settlement of the eastern frontier, but he had more
pressing problems to attend to 5 . Alblnus was massing troops in the west,
with strong senatorial support s . Severus had to respond and, like Marcus
before him, he could not afford to detach any of his available officers to an
I, lIl'1980 ILS 2287; the vexx, were from Legg, 11 Pta ef II! Cor/cor5, the cognac/na of
Marcus' Italian legions, The cognosen of II Tralana was fortis' Webster, Pocan leper/al Arty (1979),
lb.
2, This rule was bent in ju5t one case prior to 161, where an H, julius Cossutus is found making
a dedication to Herculius Saxanus on behalf of units from Yl V/ctr/x (his legion), A Gee/na, IV!!
Pricigenia plus the alae and cohortes attached to them, The whole force was in fact s(Lth) Q,
Acut(io), whose rank is not given: XlII • 7715; 7716 & 7697 (Brohi, Germany),
3, AE,1910,161,
4, XII . 1856 ILS 1353.
5, Miller, CAM XII, 9f,
6, Miller, 10ff,
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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Viri Militares
eastern command. Yet a new legion was under recruitment in preparation for
the future and needed a commanding off icer. Since it had become politically
advisable to relinquish Rome's direct claim to Osrhoene 3, the obvious
candidate for the post was the now redundant, and militarily competent,
procurator of that province.
Once he had made the decision to place the legion under equestrian
command, Severus apparently saw no reason to reverse it when the crisis was
over. Inertia cannot be a full explanation, for the other Parthian legions,
recruited later, were arranged along similar lines. Two of them were placed
in the new province of Mesopotamia, itself governed by an equestrian 4. Yet
the standard assumptions of antipathy towards the senate are not in
themselves entirely satisfactory. As I have argued earlier 6, Severus had
eradicated all active senatorial opposition by AD 198; those who remained
either supported him, were indifferent to him 1 or were afraid of him6. Nor
had the senators yet begun to abdicate their responsibilities, so the whole
answer does not lie here either 7. It must be a complex mix of all these
1, The vast majority can be placed with certainty in command of units against Albinus: X•5178,
5398 & El985,332; AE,1890,82; ILS 2935; PIR2 C 823, Of tho5e who cannot, one was occupied inAfrica with Dacian detachments, cf, AE,1977,858 & YII • 5349,7978; while the other commanded detachments
from Italy against the Parthians in 197 (A1926,79), and was praepositus vexiIlatioIli5 perinthi pergenfibtis,,, prior to this, VI.1408,
2, cf, ch,IY: Leiones for a full discussion of the chronology, The argument is somewhatcircular, due to the sparsity of the evidence, but makes sense in context, It assumes that Plommsen is
correct In his theory that the legion number on XII . 1856 has been omitted because the other two
Parthian legions are not yet in existence; but cf, Murphy, Sep flilus Severus hoe Inscriptions,Philadelphia diss, (1945), 66 for an argument against this,
3, Miller, CAHXII, 10,
4, 111 . 99; VIII'20996 XIV'3626 Dio LXIVIII'13 . 4 all show equestrian commanders of the Parthian
legions: Keyes, Equites, 30ff, For the governor of Mesopoiamia cf, Keyes, 30: Kennedy, 2PE36 (1979),255ff identifies the first known governor as Ti, Claudius Sabutianus Aquila,
5, cf, ch,IV: Legiones, p86,6, Oio LXXV'8 Herodian III . 8'6-8 SM Severus XIII . 1-7; Miller, AH XII, 15,7, It is worth noting that all the men referred to in note I above were senators, Excluding
Pacatianus, only 2 equestrians are know to have recieved extensive military commands from Severus,
both In AD 193: AE,1944,80; A1971,476,
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M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army. Viri Militares
possibilities. We have already seen that Severus expanded the procuratorialz,I
service and gave it a wider range of legal powers (above p). He also
opened up the equestrian service to men from the ranks, granting principales
the right to wear the gold ring'. These were measures designed to give the
equestrian order greater experience of government and increase recruitment
into it. Keyes has established an increase in the use of imperial
procurator'es vice praesidum arising out of Severus' measures, which paved
the way for equestrian praesides later in the century2 and illustrated the
active role equestrians had begun to take in the administration of the
empire.
As Miller put It 3 , Severus set in motion a 'systematic' unification of
imperial administration through the displacement of senators by equestrian
officers, and accelerated a process which had begun in the early Principate4.
His reasons for doing so must have been part fear -- a desire not to return
to the system which had created the chaos of the 190s -- and a partial
reluctance to rock the boat. Equestrians were faring well in the commands
they had been given. More men were required to restore order throughout
the empire after the upheavals of the civil war, and the equites were ready
to hand. Severus was above all a practical man. The practical thing to do
was to make use of them and ensure that there were enough of them to do
the job. The long-term consequences of his actions may never have occurred
to him.
These consequences had a knock-on effect. The procuratorial service was
1, Miller, CAHXII, 16; Birley, 'Severus and the Roman p ray', Ep, Stid, 8 (1969), 75f for a full
discussion of the evidence, The earliest dated instance he cites is 111 . 3237 from AD 212,
2, Keyes, Equite5, 4ff,
3, Miller, 26,
4, For the best dicussion of the earlier part of this process, cf, Brunt, 'Princeps and Equites'
—218-
not exploited to its full potential till the reign of the first 'soldier
emperor'; who had achieved the purple through a prestigious equestrian
career 1 . Keyes showed that the Seven used procuratorial vicar-il sparingly.
Dada had two under Severus and Caracal].a, but Keyes himself warned that
Dacia was a special case2 . Severus Alexander seems to have preferred
senators to equestrians, as did Septiniius Severus In the early part of his
reign3 . In only one case can a Severan procurator outside Dada be found
acting vice praesidis4. Vicar-li caine Into their own following the death of
Severus Alexander5 , Men such as Timesltheus and C. tulius Priscus were
imperial favourites employed extensively throughout the empire 6 . More
ordinary cases of procurator-es vices praesidum underwent an explosion
between 235 and 25O. In the military sphere, no senatorial praepositi
vexillatlonum are recorded after 217, though the use of vexillations
increased6.
Onto this scene came Gallienus. His actions In the five years preceding
his sole reign illustrate an intuitive grasp of the importance of the
I, Maxielnus Thrax, Cf. Ensslin, CIQH XII, Ch, II, 72,
2, Keyes, (quites 5 & lOf, In the third century, Dacia consisted of three 'provinces' under one
governor, Each individual province had a procurator, of which the procurator of Dacia Apulensis acted
vice legati in the absence of the legate,3, Keyes, 5 N9s 1,5 & 6; also Keyes, 7,
4, Keyes, 5 N2 2,
5, Keyes 1 5ff,
6, XIII • 1807; VI • 1638; Keyes, 5 NQs 7 & 11, Timesitheus was a form of financial troubleshooter
used extensively by Maximinus and Gordian III, He was eventually made Praetorian Prefect in 241 and
exercised de facto control over the running of the empire till his death two years later: Ensslin,85ff, Priscus was the brother of the emperor Philip, and recieved appointrients accordingly: Ensslin,
87,
7, Keyes, 6ff, Fully two thirds of his procuratorial material dates after 235, The remaining,
Severan, material has already been discussed in the text above,
8, In chronological order: 11 . 484 ILS 1372; Q(,1978,44O; VI'1638; ILS 8870 I6RR III•481:111 . 3228; AE1934,193 5223; AE,1935,164; E,1936,53,54 & 57 1908,259 ILS 9479 = 1611R I'1496;only the first three date prior to Gallienus, Cf. also ch,VI vexillationes,
— 2 19-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
equites. Campaigning in Gaul, he began to draw around himself a circle of
talented equestrian officers capable of independent action, on whom he could
rely to conduct a war successfully in his absence'. Foremost among these
was Aureolus, who proved his worth against the uprisings of Ingenuus and the
Macriani. The circumstances of these uprisings can only have confirmed the
young emperor in his assessment of equestrian prowess. For while the
senatorial revolts in Pannonia were a direct consequence of the chaos caused
by barbarian invasions, rectified only once the usurpers had been
eradicated9 , the equestrian pretenders in Gaul and the east were always
victorious commanders thrust to prominence by virtue of their success.
His 'edict' must have been introduced in the breathing space which
followed these rebellions, for its first direct evidence is the appointment
of an equestrian pr'aeses Arabicae either in 262 or 263. Evidence for Its
Immediate application in the empire is minimal, but very illuminating. Under
Gallienus himself, only four provinces were definitely affected: Arabia, to
which we shall return; Cilicia, which had no legionss; and both the Pannonian
provinces.
The Pannonian material Is fascinating, since it provides a clear
1, Certainly recruited it this time were: Aureolus, SHA Gail, 111 . 3, V . 6 Trig, Tyr, XI'l; Zon,
XII • 24; Alfoldi, 'Usurpator Aureolus', Stud/en (1967), 1ff: Postumus, S//A Trig, Tyr, 111 . 9; Vict,
Cae5, XXXIII . 8; Zon, XII • 24; Zos, I'38'2: and Volusianus, XI'1836 ILS 1332, It is pO5sible that he
also appointed Claudius to a command in Illyricum at this time: S//A Ciawo', XIY'2 & XV'1-2 attribute
this appointment to Valerian, but if they are to be given any credence what5oever 1 the appointee must
have been Gallienus who had control of the Danube at that time; Alfôldi, CAN XII, 181 & 'Krise',
Studie, 361,
2, Zon, XII • 24; S//A flail, 1I6-7; Trig, Tyr, XI . 2, XII'13-14, XIV'l & XV'4,
3, de Blois, Policy of Gallienus, 4f,
4. lunius Olympus in 262 may be senatorial or equestrian depending on the interpretation of ro
6saf--.7,uora'roo q'yqiovoç, Petersen, 48 & n8, Statilius Ammianus was definitely equestrian governor in
263, 1&S'RIII'1287, For a further discussion of Arabian pracs/des, see below, p222f,
5, A, Voconius Zeno, AE,1915,51,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
indication of the piecemeal nature of Gallienus' reform, A plethora of
inscriptions show that the legiones adiutrices came under the command of
equestrian agentes vice legatorum at this time and remained so for the rest
of the century, but there is no positive evidence for a similar takeover of
legions in Pannonia Superior. Simultaneous with this, Pannonia Inferior
seems to have come under the aegis of an equestrian praeses. T. Clementius
Silvius In AD 267, was v(ir) e(gregius) a(gens) v(ice) p&-aesidisP. Petersen
believes he was a procurator acting on behalf of a senatorial legatus pro
praet ore, since he lacked the rank of vir perfectissiinus9 . While
semantically correct, his interpretation misses the point.
Gallienus was using the old procuratorial vicariate as the agent of a
more far-reaching change, just as Severus had used the vexillary command
structure to enable the introduction of praefecti legi on urn. As was the
nature of such reforms, the emperor took whatever was to hand and remoulded
it to suit his own purposes. )ust, as Keyes pointed out, the formula a.v,1.
came to differentiate a ducenariate legionary commander from the lowly
preefectus (castrorum)", so the formula a.v.p. was appropriated to signify an
equestrian officer who had taken over the position of governor5. In the
early years of the change, Gallienus may have simply advanced men from the
procuratorial service into independent positions, in the same way that
I, Comaanders of I! Adiutrix in their probable sequence (with dates, where known) were: e1ianus,
111 . 3529, A1965,9; Marcellinus, 111 . 3424 ILS 545; Frontinus (268AD), 111 . 3525 = ILS 2457
AE,1944,85; Victorinus, 111 . 3426 AE1964,13; Paternianus (283/lAD), III • 3469; Firminus (290AD),
111 . 10406, Aur, Superinus was tpJrtaeJ, leg, I Adi, a, v.1, in 269AD: 111 . 4289 ILS 3656,
2, 111 . 3424 • 115545, cf, also 111 . 10424 & 10492.
3, Petersen, 'Governors in C3' 51 & n,60,
4, Keyes, Equites, 19ff & 36ff,5, Cf. Keyes, 37,
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Severus had advanced the procurator Osrhoenae into the command of I
Farthica1 . It is significant that Silvius has ommitted the term proc(urator)
from his title, when it is to be found in all the Latin examples of
procurat ores vice praesidum provided by Keyes2. As the 'independent
vicariate' gained importance and became more widely accepted, its holders
recieved the rank of viz' perfectissirnus. Eventually, this was all that was
required to differentiate the equestrian office from the senatorial, and the
formula a (gens) v (ice) p (raesidis) was dropped in favour of the more urbane
v (ir) p (e.rfectissimus) p (raeses) p (rovinciaeP.
Returning to the Pannonian evidence, an a.v.p. was also appointed in
Pannonia Superior by Gallienus', but on the semantic grounds above, the v.p.
praeses named in III'15156 cannot have been installed in the lower province
by him. Petersen is playing safe when he dates the man to the early 280ss,
since the term was in use at least a decade earlier. If we are to identify
the man with the L. Flavius Aper who was praepositus vexillationis under
Gallienus s, a date in the 270s would seem equally apposite, especially since
M. Aur. Valentinianus was almost certainly the governor of Parinonia Inferior
at the time of Carinus and Diocletian 7. Valentinianus was a senator. So was
an anonymous praeses pro vinciae of Pannonia Superior sometime in the
1, Cf, above p,216f
2, Keyes, Equites, 5ff,
3, ci', table VM1, There is a definite chronological progression from v.p a, v.p. to v,p,p,p,, as
was noted by Keyes, 37, The term priests seems to have been generic throughout the period,
4, N, Aur, Naximus: 111.4564,
5, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 51 & n65,
6, AE,1936,53,54 & 57, cf, PLREAper 2 & 3 whom I believe to be the same man, He progressed
from v,e, preep, ' (fec et XIII Gei, Gull, in the 260s to v.p. priests Penn, In!, in the 270s, and
finally became PPOof Numerian,
7, 111 . 3418 ILS 3654: v,c, leg, aug, p. pr, (sic,)
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late third century'. These men provide the most tangible, and possibly the
only clear, proof of a reversion to senatorial control in the later third
century2. That this occurred in Pannonia is unsurprising, since it was the
only province containing more than one legion placed under equestrian control
prior to Diocletian 3 . The motive for Gallienus' action needs no deep
investigation. The senatorial guardians of Pannonia had proven both
untrustworthy and incompetent. Pannonia was a key province for the defence
of the Danube and the protection of Italy. It required the competent
military government which experienced equestrians could give it. Therefore,
Gallienus gave it to them.
It is worth reiterating here that Pannonia was the only multi-legion
province to have come under equestrian control until the wholesale reforms
initiated by Diocletlan. According to Campbell, it was the least popular of
the consular provinces because of its military requirements 4. This made it
both the most obvious province to give to viz-i militar'es, and the province
least likely to be missed by senators. Nonetheless, we can see from Victors
that the placing of such a province under equestrian control was offensive
to the senatorial class. Perhaps it was restored to their control by
1, A 1957, 325; A 1959, 204b PLRE aQnonyioiis 55,
2. cf. table VMI, Despite Petersen's arguments to the contrary (50 n,65, & 55), Pannonia does
exhibit a clear reversion from equestrian to senatorial governors, Nacedonia and Dalmatia may also
have reverted, but they depend heavily on the dating of the Anonymous 55 and N, Aur lulius: 11.1938
8565 : ILS 3710, The overall pattern would be least disturbed if the Anon, 55 dated circa 275, but
without corroboration it would be inadvisable to assume this, The circumstances of Arabia are
discussed in the text above; Numidia Is dicussed below p224,
3, cf, table VMI, Germania Superior came under a v.p. praeses in Diocletian's reign: V1•1641
(cf, Petersen, 53); XI1I'5249, Britain had a v.p. praess in 297: AE,1930,114, Since Britain came
under the control of Carausiug In 296, the appointment must have been early in Diocletian's reign,
4, Campbell, bc, cii,
5, Vict, Caes, XXXIII'33-34 & XXXVlI5-7
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Tacitus, though the idea is somewhat fanciful. At any rate, even after
Gallienus, while single-legion provinces were considered fair game for
equestrians 1 the big consular provinces remained sacrosanct.
The situation in Arabia is slightly confused, Before 262, Gallienus
appointed at least one senatorial governor. The praesidium of Vfrius Lupus
is also likely to have been held at this point, and not after 270 as Malcus
believes 1 . Petersen is undoubtedly correct in attributing equestrian status
to the Bassaeus Rufus who governed the province sometime in the 26062,
which establishes a probable, if uncertain, line of continuity for equestrian
officers from 262/3 onwards. So why did Gallierius appoint equestrians here?
Arabia seems to have remained untouched by the depredations of invasion and
civil war in the early 260s. Even the events in Egypt seem not to have
concerned it s . Its legion, III Cyrenaica, had provided vexillations to
garrison Dura Europos, which were presumably destroyed in the seige of 256g.
Perhaps the legion was not brought back up to strength due to manpower
shortages, and it was felt beneath the dignity of a senator to govern the
province. The supposed loyalty of the equestrian class can hardly have been
a consideration, since equestrian officers of Valerian had initiated the
trouble. More personal loyalties may provide an alternative explanation.
1, Coc, Rufinus was 47yqi9v under Sallienus: PLR( Ru/'1nu5 13, Lupus was preetectus un'! 278-80,consul ordinanius 278, pontifex Del Soils post 274 and charged with special judicial missions in theeast, probably under Aurelian, He was therefore pnaees Synlee Coeles sometime before 272, and willhave held his Arabian governorship during the 260s: VI . 31775 ILS 1210; Keyes, Equites, 16f;Gilliam, 'Gov's of Syria', N2 16; but contra cf, Malcus, 'Système administratif', 222,
2, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 48 & n,12, contra FLRE Astur 1, citing 192O,73, who call himBassaeus Astur,
3, Alfãldi, CAM XII, 1731, The Egyptian revolt was put down by a naval expedition under Aurelius
Theodotus,
4, AE,1934,275, 276 & 280; A1937,239; A194O,220 & 240; AE,1948,124,
5, SInce these most likely caused the vexillation In the first place, cf, ch,VI; ('exillationes,6, See above, p.205,
-224-
M.C.Ibeji: 03 Army. Viri Militares
If our chronology is correct 1 , the senator Virius Lupus was Gallienus' chosen
replacement for Coc. Rufinus, who was governor at the time of the Egyptian
revolt. Shortly after, he was moved to Syria Coele, and is the only known
governor of that province for Gallienus. GilUam believes he took up this
post circa 2652, but his praesidium may have started earlier, Is it not
possible that, at the time of the edict, Lupus was moved to Syria where a
trusted senator was needed and was replaced in Arabia by an equally trusted
equestrian?
Numidia presents another problem, and at the same time exposes another
facet of the argument. It has been claimed that the province shifted to
equestrian governors at the very end of Gallienus' reign, and later reverted
to senators. This is based on the identification of a Numidian governor,
Tenagino Probus, with a certain praefectu Aegypti of Claudius II posessing
the same gentiJlcl urn3 . In support, another praeses of the province, an
equestrian called Severthus Aprorilanus, is Linked to Probus through a man
who occurs in both their inscriptions4. Petersen disputes this claim on the
grounds that the governorship of Numidia ranked above that of Egypt at the
times . Yet the evidence he cites can only prove that this was the case from
278 onwards. He is on firmer ground placing Apronianus in the last quarter
of the century due to the terminology used, and is certainly Justified in
arguing that the existence of a man common to both inscriptions does not
1, See above, n, 1,
2, Gilliam, 'Gov's of Syria', N9 16,
3, VlII . 2571 + 18057; E,l936,58; E1941,33; 4E1934,257; Stein, 'Tenagino Probus', Kilo 29
(1936), 237ff; Halcus, 'Système administratif', 222,
4, Severinus Apronianus, YIII'2661 • ILS 5788, linked by Domitius Secundinus to E, 1936, 58,
5, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 54f,
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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. yin Militares
automatically date them to a similar period 1 . At best, we can date
Aprorilanus to any point following 268, and we simply cannot be certain
whether Probus was an equestrian or a senator.
If he was an equestrian, we have a similar situation to that in Arabia,
but with a different emphasis. Unlike Arabia, the African limes was not at
peace. It had been troubled by Berber tribesmen since the early 250s.
Around 258 the situation became so serious that Gallienus despatched a dux
per Afri cam Numidiam Mauretaniamque to oversee the defence of the
provinces2 . The measure seems to have worked in part, since at some point
after 260 III Augusta had reverted to the control of the provincial legate,
though this man may also have been entrusted with a military portfo1io (in
itself an indication that Gallienus was not averse to placing competent
senators in military positions). We know that once some measure of peace
had been restored in Africa, Gallienus stationed detachments of III Augusta
in Greece'. Tenagino Probus took over near the end of the reign. Could it
be that, like Arabia, once its legion was vexillated Numidia was no longer
thought worthy of senatorial dignity? In that case, we would expect it to
revert to senatorial control when the legion was returned to full strength.
The first such opportunity came after the successful campaigns of Aurelian,
when he could proclaim himself restitutor orbiss, and indeed the next
senatorial governor is attested at this time6 . If the Historia Augusta is to
1, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 55,
2, Pflaum, Carr, Proc. II, 374bis, 905ff; YIII21000 q 1954,136: VIII . 12296 = IL$2774,
3, 41917/18,52; VIII • 2797 ILS 2413 which calls him coies et leg, iig, p,, pr,
4, QE,1934,193; cf, ch,VI: Vexi!lationes p145,5, Hunter coil, QureJian, 8, 100,108,111,112/3,114 ' RICY • 1, Aurellin, 53,288,369,386,6, L, Ovinius Pudens Capella Malcus, 'Système administratif', 222 & n,7; PLRECapeIla,
-226-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
be believed, another dux .Zimitis Africani was appointed along with hi.ni1
The position of duces in this new order is a highly important
consideration. The thesis so far has been that, as senators abdicated their
military responsibilities, the emperor was forced to look to the equestrian
order for experienced people to replace them, In militarily delicate
provinces, competent equestrian officers were placed in command arid remained
there until the crisis was over. Elsewhere, the emperor was happy to retain
the status quc and even took account of senatorial sensibilities as long as
the security of the empire was not at stake. Yet the first priority was
always the army. So long as the commander in the area was a capable
officer, the emperor was unconcerned whether he was an equestrian or a
senator and had little stake in which class actually governed the province.
The ideal way to test this theory would be to review the early careers of
every governor concerned, but in this we are frustrated by the evidence, All
equestrians for whom some record survives had military experience, as did
some, but not all senators2 . A quick review of the known dates of
changeover for the provinces provides some general confirmation for the
thesis3 , Yet large areas of the empire were governed by senators despite
military pressures, and all the major provinces, with the exception of
Pannonia discussed above, remained under senatorial control.
If these areas were controlled by duces, then the thesis remains sound,
for the duces will have had overall military control: not In the formally
1, SHA Fin, et a!, 111 . 1, uncorroboraied,
2, Equestrian5: I6RR III1287; 111 . 90;, AE,1900,169: AE,1936,53,54 & 57; 111 . 9860; Ex, Va!, I•2;
VI'1641, Senators: X • 1705: VII95; AE,1957,325; AE,1959,204b, cf, table VN 1,
3, cf, table VII £, and text below,
-227-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
delineated terms of Diocletian, but in more ad hoc, localised measures
tailored to parochial circumstance. We have already seen this in effect for
Numidia under Gallienus, where a dux per .Africara Numidiam Mauretaniamque
dealt with Berber incursions and afterwards handed over military control to
the provincial legate 1 . It will now be necessary to review the rest of the
empire in search of similar circumstances.
By the last quarter of the third century, the eastern provinces had
already undergone major sea changes. Mesopotamia had been established as an
equestrian province from its inception; its circumstances and those of Arabia
have been previously discussed2. In Asia Minor, Cilicia was equestrianised
by Gallienus, while the dual provinces of Pontus et Bithynia and Lycia et
Pamphylia were changed by Probus once his attention was drawn to them in
278. Each conversion, even that of Arabia, was internally consistent with
the priorities of security. Mesopotamia was the new frontline province with
Persia; Arabia's governor, and troops, were transferring to Syria; and the
Asia Minor provinces, though they had no legions, covered the main
thoroughfares over the Taurus mountains and across the Hellespont. In
addition, Lycia et Pamphylia had been the battleground over which Probus had
fought the Isaurian brigands 3. On the other hand Syria, the most important
and prestigious of the eastern provinces, remained a firm senatorial
preserve, even after its reorganisation by Septimius Severus4, since the dux
ripae at Dura-Europos seems to have held a position subordinate to the
1. See above, p.226,
2, See above, pp.217 & 224ff,
3, S/iA Prob, XVI4; Zos, 1.69-70,
3, Keyes, Eqiiites, 14; Petersen, 'Gov'5 in C3', 49 & n,30; AE,1900,128 = .IGRR iii434QE 1915, 53,
4, Syria Phoenice: Petersen, 48 & nn,18 & 19, Syria Coele: Gilliam, 'Gov's of Syria', 176ff,
5, Gilliam, 'The dux ripas at Dura', Roan Any Papers, 23ff.—228-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
governor, However, the situation was altered radically in the late 250s by
the destruction of Dura and the rise of Palmyra. Here is where the military
control lay. Odaeriathus of Palmyra had been feted by Valerian following his
rejection by the Persian king, and remained loyal to the former's son during
the revolt of the Macriani 1 . In 261 he assumed military authority in the
east under the auspices of Gallienus, who had little choice but to exploit
his implacable hostility towards Shapor2. The titles Alföldi credits him
with are merely literary devices, though he is UJcely to have been styled
corrector totius Orlentis in the same manner as his son, Vaballathus
Athenodorus, and may have been dux Romanorum since Vaballathus is hailed
with the Greek equivalent3 . For ten years Palmyra lorded over the eastern
provinces, even breaking with Rome after Odaenathus' death, until its defeat
by Aurelian4 . Aurelian originally made little change to the military
situation, placing control into the hands of the praefectus Mesopotamiae,
with a similar title to that of the Palmyrene klngss . He may have scrapped
this arrangement after the sacking of Palmyra, though the loyalty of his man
was never in questions . At any rate, military responsibility seems to have
reverted to the governor of Syria, if not at the end of Aurelian's reign, at
least sometime during that of Probus, While the Historia Augusta must be
overstating when it attributes the ilinitis Oriental.is ducatum to Julius
Saturninus, the man was the governor of Syria and is called inagister
I, CISea, II'3945 ' IGRRIIII031; S//A Gall, 111 . 1-2; S//A Trig, Tyr, XIV • 1, XV'4, & XVIII'l,
2, Alföldl, CAM XII, 174ff; Zos, I'39; S//A Yal, IY . 2-4, Gall, X . 1-8, Trig, Tyr. XY . 2-4 & XXX.6,
3, Alföldl, 175; CiSea, 11 . 3971; B6'1II•946,
4, Alfôldl, 302ff: Zos, 1 . 50-56; Zon, XII • 27; S//A Aur, XXV'2-3, Trig, Ty,', IXX . 2-3; Jer, Chico,
s.c. 273; Syncellus p.721,
5, His title was rector Orienti Zos, I'60'1,
6, Marcellinus stalled the Palmyrenes while warning the e.peror of their revolt: Zos,I'60,
-229-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
exercitus or its equivalent in several independent sources 1 . If, as Jones
and Martindale believe, the man was identical to the lulius Saturninus
Fortunatianus who was leg. Aug. pr. pr. of Numidia under Gallienus, his
military competence is unquestioned2.
Illyricuni remained unchanged throughout the century, Moesla staying
under senatorial legati. Da].matia, on the other hand, switched to equestrians
after the death of Aurelian, since Petersen makes a convincing case for
dating the senator M. Aur. lullus prior to 277. Macedonia had an equestrian
governor in 276g . Keyes has shown that Dada remained technically under
senatorial control 1 but was governed largely by imperial procurators5 . This
may have been for similar reasons to those posited for Arabia and Numidia,
with heavily vexillated legions. The anonymous senator believed to have
governed Pannonia Superior, Dalmatia and Macedonia simultaneously is most
likely to have done so around 27415 6 , since the pattern of government is
least disturbed by fitting him here. Why he was given such a widespread
command is unclear. He had some military experience, so the appointment
might be viewed as a form of ducatus. illyricum received personal attention
from the emperor under Gallienus, Claudius and possibly Probus 7 . When the
emperor was elsewhere, a series of eminent duces were deputed to take his
place. Aureolus is said to have commanded an army in Illyricum during the
early 26Os. Marcianus pursued the war in the emperor's name late in 268,
1, SHA Fire eta!, VII . 2; 205, 1 . 66; Jer, Chron, s,a,281; Jord, Roe, p.293; Syncellus p.723,
2, PLRE $etiirnimis 12 & Fortunatianus 6,
3, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 50,
4, AE,1900,169,
5, Keyes, Equites, 101,
6, A 1957, 325; dQE 1959, 204b PLRE Anoflylou5 55,
7, Gallienus, Zos, 1'39'I & 40 • i; fi/M Gail, XII1 . 9; Claudius, Zos, I'43'2 & 45 Zon, XII . 26; S/IA
Claud, vi-Xi; Probus, XII178; Zos, 1.68.2.
8, $114 Gail, III'3 & V . 6, Trig, T,vr, XI'!,-230-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Viri Militares
until he was relieved by Claudiu&. Diocletian was 5ou Muuia'c, probably
under Probus2. No duces were to be found in Illyricum under Aurelian, which
is hardly surprising, since the area remained uncharacteristically quiet
during his reign. This must be a direct consequence of the abandonment of
Dada and the relocation of its remaining troops around Serdica, The
measure so strengthened the Illyrian border that trouble was reduced to
sporadic raids and Aurelian was able to carry the war across the Danube to
the Gothic tribes. Under Gallienus, an Aur. Augustianus was dux lustissimus
charged with guarding the passes into Macedonia 5 . His brief will have
extended into northern Greece as a matter of course, and may have included
preemptive maneouvres into Illyricum. In Achaea itself, a certain
Pan)athenaeus was hegemon under the same emperor, with the task of
fortifying endangered cities 5. Such circumspection was vindicated during the
great naval raid of the Goths in 268/9w. Claudlus campaigned here until his
death5, and the measures of Aurelian in Illyricum seem to have made Greece
secure. The entire area was therefore under imperial control, or that of the
emperor's personal agents, for most of the century's third quarter. Only
once the military crisis had abated were the provincial governors left to
their own devices, and this is approximately the point at which equestrian
praesides were first attested.
1, l965,1l4; Zos, I . 40'l $1/A 6a11, VI . 1 & XIII'lO, Claud, VI . l & XVIII'l,
2, Zon, XII.31,
3, Alföldi, CA/I XII I 1521 & 301; SMQ Au,', XXXIX . 7; Malalas XII, 301: Eutrop, IX'IS,4, Alfôldi, 152; S/IA Aur, XX11'1-2; Orosius VII • 23'4; Eutrop, IX'13'1: Jord, Roe, 290; Aiim, Marc,
XXXI'5.17,5, A11934,193, Cf, ch,VI: Vexillationes, p.145 n,3 for the reasoning behind this,6, SHA 6aII, XIII'6 Zon, XII'26 19111 ed, mm, 5201,7,Zos, 1'43'2 & 46'l,8,Zos, 1.45-46.
—231-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares
With the possible exception of the anonymous senator mentioned above,
Pannonla was devoid of duces throughout the period. Gallienus set out to
make a thorough settlement of the province's security. Not only did he
'equestrianise' the province, he garrisoned it with vexillations from Britain,
Germany, Dada and Moesla 1 . At the start of his reign, he also came to a
defensive agreement with a chieftain of the Marcomanni 2. His measures were
so effective that apart from an Invasion of Vandals which was summarily
crushed by Aurelian3 , the province was not troubled by serious barbarian
incursions for the rest of the century, though Diocletian may have been
forced to take some preemptive action early in his reign4.
It is difficult to determine when Raetia and Noricum were returned to
equestrian governors, as none of the important inscriptions is securely
dated. The form and content of the known equestrian praesides of Noricurn
suggest a date under Gallienus or his immediate successors 5 . The opposite
is true for the governors of Raetia, whom Petersen must be correct in dating
to the later third century 6 . These provinces were avenues for Alemannic
incursions which penetrated south into Italy, so their defence was a matter
of priority to most emperors7 . Gallienus placed Aureolus in Cisalpina with
jurisdiction over northern Italy and Raetia, specifically to defend the Alpine
passes5 . The pretender, Bonosus, was also dux limitis Retici under either
1, Alfoldi, CAMXII, 214; AE,1935,164; 111.3228,
2. De Blois, Policy of 6allienus 4 & 34; Vict, Cat's, XXXI1I6, Epit, XXX1II1; cf, IX:
Foederati,
3, Dexlppus frag,6 & 7; Zos, I'48; Petr, Pat,, P1/6' IV 188,
4, Alfôldi, CAM XII, 327 & 328,
5, A1955,119; Petersen, 'Bo y 's in C3', 51 & n,69 who disagrees,
6, Petersen, 52.
7, Zos, 1 . 38 . 1 & 481; 51/4 Au,", XVIII, Prob, XVI • t; Alföldi, 299f
8, Vict, Cat's, XXXiii . i7; cf, also Zos, 1 . 40 . 1; Sf14 Gall, IV . 6 & VII . 1, Irig, Tyr, XI•3,
—232-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri. Militares
Aurelian or Probus1.
Gaul, Germany and Britain fell out of imperial control for a large
portion of the later third century 1 and their defence under the Gallic Empire
Is a matter for debate elsewhere. Once they had returned to the imperial
fold, they seem to have remained under senatorial control at least until the
280s. Only Germanla Superior has attested equestrian governors, and these
both date to Dioclet Ian2. According to Alföldi, Aurelian left Probus in Gaul
after the surrender of Tetricus, and only moved him when an emergency in
Egypt required hi8 able attention 3. Probus himself was campaigning against
the Germans from 277-8 g. He may have left Bonosus in charge of more than
just the Rhine fleet, for when the man went into revolt, he was only
defeated after a difficult struggle 6 . At any rate, the emperor's German
campaigns had cowed the Transrhenian tribes to such an extent that they
were paying tribute to the Roman Empire6. There was therefore little need
for militarily experienced governors In the short term.
Spain was also part of the Gallic Empire. It was permanently
'equestrianised' by Diocletian, though the only known governor of Beetica was
a v.p.a.v.p. under Florianus and Probus7.
It would seem that the material above upholds the thesis. Where
senators retained control of key frontier provinces, military responsibility
I, S/IA Fin, etal, XIV'2,
2, VI . 1641, ci, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 53; XI1I'5249,
3, Alföldi, CAHXII I 316,
4, Zos, 167-68; S/IA Frob, X11I.5-XIV,
5, S/IA Fir., et a!, XY . 1-2; Vict, Cees, XXXVII'3,
6, Alfãldi. 315,
7, Spain1 11 . 4104; Baetica, 11 . 1115 & 1116,
-233-
M.C.Ibeji; C3 Army. Viri Militares
lay in the hands of the emperor or his representatives. This is perfectly
Illustrated in Raetia, where equestrian governors reappeared only once duces
were no longer attested, but in general the situation holds true throughout
the empire. Of particular Interest are those few senators, such as
Fortunatlanus/Saturninus and the Anonymous 55, who were left to their own
devices In militarily delicate provinces. They Indicate categorically that
the emperor was quite prepared to entrust the empire's security to senators,
as long as they had a record of military competence. Malcus must be
correct. Senators were not debarred from military service, they simply lost
interest. In the face of such apathy, Gallienus had only one real choice. He
opened the door to the men capable of defending the empire, and gave
senatorial posts to the yin milit ares. For this he was vilified by the very
class which had let down both empire and emperor in their hour of need. Yet
the history of Pannonia, the achievements of Odaenathus, and the survival of
the empire prove that in his actions he was justified.
-234-
CIbei: C3 Army
Yin militares
TABLE VM 1: PrQ,1ri1 Gcr-
The following lists the changes in provincial governors from the reign ofPhilip till that of Diocletian. Philip provides the starting point sincehe is in several cases the last named emperor to whom a senatorialgovernor can be attested. Governors of uncertain date are inserted inthe most likely position in the sequence where possible, otherwise theyare placed at the end of the sequence. In both cases, they areitalicised. The list follows those given by Keyes, Petersen, Malcus andGilliam. Where information was not forthcoming from those sources, theappropriate secondary source is given. Governors are given by the Romanversion of their name, where this is translated from the Greek, the nameis placed in triangular brackets. The provincial order established byKeyes and Petersen is maintained..
KEYi S - senator, E - equestrian, K = Keyes, P = Petersen, M = Malcus,VM = discussed in this chapter, RUFINUS 13 = PLRE ref.
Arbi: 1 legIon; largely peaceful. Bordered Egypt and ward ofPalmyra 260-272, cf. VM 224f
SOCIAL MILITARY
PERIOD GOVERNOR U1LE LEI. EIPERIENCE REERENCES
253/260 Ad, Aur, Theon leg, Aug. pr, pr, S unknown 111.89,90; k8 P487
Gallienus <Coc, Rufinus>
pnaeses
C, C 1eV S unknown RUFINUS 13
pie 262' Virius Lupus praises $ none fisted P5 .31115 ILS 1210,' VH225
Are a 15ff; P48 M222
262 <lunlus Olympus) sos 6u(__)pocasos E unknown IGRR 111 . 1286; K9; P488
ycpovoç
263 <Statillue Ammianus> 6tciovsoç SnV C)iOii.v E prief, alae IGRR III'1287 111190; K9
P48'1
Gallienus Bassaeus Rufus
praeses E unknown
AE,1920,73; P4812
274 ?(11, Aelianus)'
JJsioijporro (AT% rY £ Unknown
A 1522, 130 & /33; AE
,h'iiov, top I, ., /953, 234/ P48 ''AAVh' 134 6 AEL JANUS 12
278 <Mar/Aur, Petrus>
soc btaa(__] cp, E unknown
IGRR III1324: CIG 4649;
K9: P48'4
post 262 (fuJius Ileraclitus) role 6, E unknown
HERA CLJTUS
Syr-i Cc1; 2 Legions; main target of Persian invasions.Ward of Palmyra. This list follows that given by Gilliam, 176ff. It isincluded as an example of a militarily active major province.Philip? U, Simonius Proculu5 (leg, Aug.) S unknown VI.1520 ILS 1189
lul ianus
-235-
N,CIbeji: C3 Army Yin militare5
(SYRIA COELE CTD)
PERIOD GOVERNOR IB,.Philip <Flavius Antiochus> vp(ca) t, !c,
Decius Atilius Cosuinus y,c, tunc cos,
c,265! Vi,igis Lupus
praes,
275-276 Maximinum
c,278 lulius Saturninus
290 Charisius
plalies
SOCIAL MILITARY
EIPERIENCE
REFERENCES
S unknown
F, Dura 38 ' mv. D,P,27
S unknown P, Dura 97 = mv, D,P,3
S none listed ci, Arabia above,
79 unknown Zos, I'63; Zon, 111.28
S legate III Aug,Zos, I • 66: ci, Numidia
below; SATURNINUS 12;
VM2291
7 unknown Cod, lust, 11.41.9
11.55.1
298 ?Prisosius
pi'aeses
7 unknown 'od, lust, Wl'33'6
Syr— i PhQr1ic: 1 legion; threatened by Persia. Ward ofPalmyra. Earliest equestrian governors known under Diocletian, P48a..
Ci1icL; No legions; main access from east into Asia Minor.Ward of Palmyra.Gallienus <A, Voconius Zeno> ótu powoç ycpav E unknown AE,1915,51; P4922
LdVi t PmpI-iy1±: No legions; threatened by Gothicfleets; Probus campaigned here vs Isauran brigands, cf. VM228.
flrobiis' (Terentius Marcianus) 3 uituorroç 4ycpav E unknown ,2E, /900, 128I6RR IIl131;AE, /915, 5.Z P192'
Pcritt t Bvthirki: No legions; covered access to theHellespont from Asia Minor; threatened by Gothic fleets.
269 <Velleiui Macrinus> rpcaa, xs v apauoo S unknown I6RR 111 . 39, 40:CIG 3747 &
w Z€, 3748; K14; P4929
Aurelian ISilvanus ?( xopç) 79 unknown SILVANUS 1
279 Ad, Casinus Atianus v.p. pr, pr, E unknown K14 P493°
Mdcrii: No legions; threatened by Goths.271/5' Anon, 55, praes, provr, $ ?trib, Ia tic, AE, /957, 825; if, 1959,20db
leg. 17.1 Vict, ANON. 55; ('ff230
276 <Aur, Valentinus> bIcIov%u u cpq qç E trib, AE, 1900, 169; P49
ycpovtaç Batavorum
-236-
CIbeJ1 C3 Army
Yin •ilitare5
Mc:L Irifricr; 2 legions; Lower Danube limes.SOCIAL MILITARY
PERIOD GOVERNOR t.I1L. L1 EIPERIENCE REFERENCES
Aurelian (M, Aur, Sebastianus> T]a(c]vovk)o(ç iç] S unknown IGRR 1 . 591; K12; P56
Tap( x€tU c ] wv s(p]-
Aurellan Anon, 114 leg, Aug. pr, pr, S unknown III14460; K12; P5039
272 Anon, 113 praesem pnov, ? unknown III'1586 P4938
late C3 (Cl, An, Nataliarnis) rpc8, IcP, vrsiT rp, $ unknown ISRR I'582; K12/ P50'°
Dci: 2 legions; Transdanubian province. Most numerous instancesof procuratores vices praesidis prior to senatorial/equestrian transition(K10). Progressively abandoned by Gallienus and Aurelian.23$ 25 Siconiws lulianwi v, c, preeses $ unknown IIIl513; K/a; P50"
D1mti: No legions; hinterland province behind Pannonia andM esia.
247 Cl, Herennianus v,c, leg, Augg, pr, pr, S unknown III10174; P5047
271 5' Anon, 55, prues, provr, $ Ytrib, latic, ,W, /551,325; AE, /959,2011'
277 Aur, Marcianus
280 M, Aur, Tibenlanus
282-284 Flavius Valenlus
Constantius
late C3 N, Aur, Julius
leg, I') i/ic t, ANON, 55,' VM2SO
v.p. praeses prov, E unknown III'8707 Ku; P50'
V.P. praeses prov, E unknown 111.1805 : ILS 5695:Ku; P5049
(,p3p,p, E protector & III'9860; Ex, Va!, 1.2;tribune K11 P505°
praesidi pro v, $ unknown III 1938-8565 : ILS 37101P50
P r i—i r i I ri f r- i r-: 2 legions; Middle Danube 1 .imes, c f.VM 220ff & 232
252 P. Cosinue Felix leg, pr, pr, S unknown P5059
6allienusP L, Flavius Aper v.p. praeses £ praep, vexx, III. 15!56;AE, 1936,53, 51 aV Mac, J XIII & 571 APEP 2 a 3 i; contra
PSI55
267 1, Clementius Silvius v,e, a,v,p, E unknown
c,283 M, Aur, Valentinianus v,c, leg, Aug. p. pr , S unknown
111.3424 = ILS 545, cf,111 . 10424 & 10492; K14;P516°
111 . 3418 = uS 3654; K14;PS'"
-237-
C,IbeJi: C3 Army
Yin militares
P r rr r. i S i p r- i r-: 2 legions; Middle Danube limes, cf.VM 220ff & 232. Eastern barbarian access into Italy.
SOCIAL MILITARY
PERIQO GOVERNOR fILE. QII1 EXPERIENCE REFERENCES
260 Ingenuus S unknown Vict, Caei, XXXIII S//A
Trig, Tyr, IX' I
Gallienus M, Aur, Maximum a,v,p,
E unknown III'4564 K14; P5167
271/5! Anon, 55, praes, provv, S Ytrib, la tic, At, /551, 325 At, /959, 20dbleg, 11) Vict, ANON, 55,' I/M230
Ncr'i_1m: 1 legion; Upper Danube limes. Northern barbarianaccess into Italy. Threatened by Gallic Empire.pne. 260 C, Macninum Declanus leg, Aug. pr, pr, S unknown VIII'2615; P5168
aid/late C3 (N,) Qur, ,,,,flu, v.p. i, V.P E unknown At, /955,119,' ,, , ,LIUS
late C3 Ad, Restutus v.p. agens vices E unknown fl5/69
praesidis
Rti; 1 legion; as Noricum. Main barbarian access into Italy.late C3 Valerius Venustus V,p,,O,p, E unknown 1I1'5862; P52
late C3 Traianus Mucianus' v.p,p,p, £ ,'protector, I1l5185;praep, vexx ci, ILS 9175/ also thispraei, legg, thesis a,00-Mucianus
late ca early Ci Anon, .92 V.p,p,p, £ unknown 111.1137012
290 Septimius Yalentio v,p,p,p, E unknown 111.5810 : ILS 618; P5273
Grmrii Stiprir-: 2 legions; suffered from barbarianincursions. Part of Gallic Empire.
Philip (Q, Caec, Pudensi? legatus pro praetore S unknown XIII.6562; P528°
c,260 anonymous praeses prov, ? unknown XIII'5203; P528'
pre, Dioc, P anonyaous fpraeses proviinciae £ Ppraef, alae PI'1511,' K/i,'6er.aniae Superioris v.p. contra P53
Diocletian Aurelius Proculus v.p. praeses E unknown XIII • 5249; ku 21 ; P5283
G r- m r i I ri f r i r: 2 legions; as Germania Superior.No known equestrian governors.
B1.ic: No legions; as Germanise.pre aid Ca Priscus leg, Aug. pr, pr, $ trib, liii, I I' 1705/ P53'°2(see be/ow)
-238-
CIbei1: C3 Army
Viri militares
(BELGICA CTD)
SOCIAL MILITARY
PERIOD GOVERNOR
Li EXPERIENCE
REFERENCES
pe aid C3 anonyaous
iJeg, Augt,,, $
XI1'5991; P53'°2(see abv)
ritrrii; 3 legions (split by Seven). Part of GallicEmpire.
253/260 Des Sicius hthai v, c, lega tus Aug. pr, pr, S unknown WI' 101,' t'9' P54?O4
262/266 Cc ta viws Sabir,is v, c, praeses n, $ unknown YI1.221:RIB I'605-IL 52519
C, 211? T, P1ev/us Postuaius v, c, leg, $ lega tus (prov, P11. 55; KS,' P51Virus or legion?)
late C3 (/li&rocles Perpetuus praeses S unknown PI'/223
c,297 Aur, Arpagius v.p. prieses E unknown AE11930,114; p54106
H i. p ri i T r r i : 1 leg ion. Part of Ga 111 cEmpire.
259 lAemiltanus ?praeses 75 unknown AEMILIANUS I
279-280 (Allius Maximus) (vic, leg, lur,) S II•3738; K12; p54108
(subordinates to provincial legate)
282 (,,,lus Flaminius (v,c, tur,) S AE,I923,102 & 103; p54108
Pr i scus)
283 M, Aurelius p,p, leg, Aug. pr, pr. S unknown II'4102 ILS 599;
Yalentinianus II41O3; KU; P54
Diocletian lulius Yalens & v,perf, praes, prov, E unknown II4lO4: P5L'°
Postumui Lupercum VALEMS 11 & LUPERCUS 2
Btic: No legions. As Hispania.276 Aurelius lulius v.p. a,v,p. E unknown 11.1115 & 1116; K9' 6 P54
Ni..im1di: 1 legion; tribal incursions, crisis c.258, VM 225fc,260 C, Macrinius Decianus v,c, leg, Augg, pr, pr, S unknown VIIl.2615; K13
Gallienus C, lulius leg, Aug. pr, pr, prov, S unknown AE,l917/18,52;
Sallustius Saturninus Numidiae et leg. III Aug, VIII'2797 = ILS 2413
Fortunatianus 6a11,/ comes et leg, Aug. M228
pr, pr,
268/9 Tenagino Probus r] prov, Nu(midiae 7 unknown VIII'2571 4 18051 M222
Aurelian L, Ovinius Pudens leg, Aug. pr. pr, c,v, S unknown
Capella
-239-
AE, 1936,58; AE,1941,33:
p54 f
M222 7 ; CAPELLA
SOCIAL ILITARY
EXPERIENCE
E unknown
S unknown
E unknown
S unknown
REFERENCES
VII12661 = ILS 5799; P53
P1If'2573, 2574', 2575/
AS, 1503,213; g/3; p55729
VIII '2529 2530, 2643, 4221
4578,7007; K13; p55128
Al, 1509, 210/ K13; P55'3°
MC Ibeji: C3 Aray
Viri militares
(NUNIDIA CTD)
PERIOD GOVERNOR LL1L.
po5t 268 $Everinu5 Api'onhanus v,p,p,p,
post Probus ur, Dioge'ne5 Y.pp,
283-284 N, Aureliui Deciaus v,pp,p,
late C3 Flavius eiius p. v, praesidi prov,Vic torirnis
-240-
II Adiutrix Aur, Frontinus
II Adiutrix Ad, Pate nianus
II Adiutrix Aur, Firiinus
praef. leg, sc, II Adiutricis
Claudianae
praef, leg, II Adiut, a,v,l,
pref, (sic) leg, 11 A(diJ cx
protec tore
Tb1 VM 2:Pr— fct1 Lirizm
(FROM GALLIENUS TO DIOCLETIAN)
LEGION COMMANDER LIILE.
I Adiutrix Aur, Superinus [p]r[ae]f, leg, I Adi, a,v,l,
II Adlutrix P. Ad, Aelianus praef, leg, II Adiut, protector
Gallieni Aug. n, a,v,l,
II Adlutrix Clementius Valerlus praef, leg, prot, Rug, n, a,v,l,
Marcel linus
II Adiutrix T. Flavius 'ictorinui praefetctwsl leg, 1! ild,
Q.hI REFERENCES
269 II1'4289 = ILS 3656
Gallienus III'3529 AE1196519
Gallienus II13424 ILS 545
PGaIlJenu5/ 45 1961, /3: 111.3126,'Claudius ci', Nagy, Act, Arch,
Hung,, 1W! (/965)
268 AE,1944,85 = 111 . 3525 =
ILS 2457
Carinus 111.3469
290 111.10406
III! Ge ma N, Aur, Yeteranus
praef, leg, XIII 8, Gailmenus III'l560 = ILS 3845
Gallenian, (sic)
III Augusta N, Aur, Fortunatus praef, leg, III Rug, Rurelianae Aurelian VIII'2665 = ILS 584
III Augusta Clodiws Honoratus prief, leg, III Aug. 286/293 VI1! .2572 : ILS £S6
IV F/avis aQur, Maxiaianws ,x prae!, leg, elusdea 286/293 111 . 1616 : ILS 2292
I flmnervia Aur, S,,,,us pr(aef) leg, I Mi, 295 XII1'8019
Pa tiuca? Traianu5 ifucianus r,1pov Aqiavoç ,,,,, rJ,avnr late CS I6RR J•1196h Hcrofrortrpsa = AE, /908,259
III! 6eaina saic tan hd-ftxov Icy, lyl late CS = ILS 917168R2 1570
II Trajana sate tan trqov .IJq, fi T#'tsn late CS = Rang,, 185ff,
—24 1-
4urefjaing ililil, Or/entaIls Eastern limes 7 SHA Firm, et al, W!'2;oucatu, deo'it, .Ter, Cron, 2297; lord,ifagister Exercitu5 Roe, 293/ Syncelius 273
Illyriclanos exercitus regens Illyricu. 5Y14 6a11, 111 . 3 & V•6.Trig, Tyr, X1.1,
êov xa ipuii}.siqç Illyricum AE,1965,114; Zos,1'40'I
(& Macedonia) $114 OaiI,V1'l & X1II'lOClaud, VI'l & XVIII.1,
Ioc( Mwstç Moesia ion, I1I•31,
dux iustissimus
C
Macedonia
(. Hoes/a7)
Achaea
AE. 1934. 193
Zon, XII26; 5/14 GaIl,XI1I6; 16 III ed, mm.
5201,
T b 1 VM 3: D ti c(FROM GALLIENUS TO THE ACCESSION OF DIOCLETIAN)
SPHERE OF
rIII.E. INFLUENCE REFERENCES
c,260-261 Sepiiaius Odaenathus (<Corrector Totius Orientis>) Eastern flies Zos, 1.39.1;Sync, $HB p,382(B)
267-272 Vaballathus (Corrector Toiius Orlentis> Eastern flies CiSem, II3971;
Athenodorus epoç'Pwiat.v BGU 111.946
272 Narcellinus (Rector Orientis> Eastern flies Zos. 1.60.1
Aiirelian IIIJJQS Sat W'/7lflUI
Gallienus Aureolus
Gallienus Marcianus
& Claudius
?pp C, 4w', Vii,
Diocletianus
Gallie us Aur, Augustianus
Gallienus (Pan Athenaeus
Gallimnus Aureolus
Probus Bonosus
258/9 N, Cassianius
Latinius Postumus
c,258 N, Cornelius
Octavianus
Aurelian Firmus
cu. per Reetias legionibus
Cisalpina &
praesset
Raetia
Dux limitis Retici Raetia
Transrhenani limitis dux ci Gallia &
Galliae praeses, Gereania ?
v KcXoç pue.v
('Iflh,orcp'ucyoc
barbaris per Ga/lie. prees-ideba t,
dud per Africam Numidiam African 111e5
Mauretaniamque
Dux limitis Africani ideeque African flies
proconsule
—242--
Yict, Cacs, XXXI1I'7;cf, Zos, 1'40'1 & $114
Gall, IV'6 & YII.I,Trig, Tyr, XI'3,
$114 Fin et a], IV•2,
$114 Trig, Tyr, Ill '9:Zos, I'38'2
Vict, Caes, XX1II1'8;
ci, a.150 ion, 1II'24,
Pflaum Cern, Proc, II347bis, 905ff:
V1II'210O0AE, 1954. 136
cf,VIII . 12296: ILS 2774
$114 Pint et ii, 111.1,
Tb1 VM 4: Sirzy R9et11t
Below are the results extrapolated from the preceding tables. They illustratethe general circumstances of each province examined during the century. Aprovince is classed as a frontier province if it was on a limes, and ahinterland province if it was not, but was In a troubled area. Otherwise, it isclassed as peaceful. All governors in Table VM 1 have been included, arid thedate of transition from senatorial to equestrian government is calculated fromthe first equestrian praeses given there, Where an equestrian praefectus isknown for the provincial legion(s), the date of first appearance has been given.
GOVERNORS DATE OF DATE OF
PROVINCE SEN. EQ. Z. IBA1 SECURITY ILEGIONS LEANS. KNOWN DUCES
ARABIA 3 6 - c.262 Hinterid I PaI.yra (260-272); Narcellinus (272)
SYRIA COELE 6 - 2 - Frontier 2 1 Palayra (260-272); Marcellinus (272)
?Saturninus (Aurelian)
CILICIA - 1 - GallienusHinterid 0 - Palmyra (260-272); Narcellinus (272)
LYCIA El PAMPHYLIA - 1 - ?Probus Hinterid
PONTUS El BYTHINIA 2 1 - 279 Hinterld
MACEDONIA 1 1 - 276 Hinterid
NOESIA INFERIOR 3 - 1 - Frontier
DALNATIA 3 3 - 277 Hinterid
PANNONIA INFERIOR 2 2 - Gallienus Frontier
only
PAWNONIA SUPERIOR 2 1 - Gallienus Frontier
only
NORICUM 1 2 - late C3 Frontier
RAETIA - 4 - late C3 Frontier
GERNANIA SUPERIOR I 2 I late C3 Frontier
BEL6ICA 2 - - - Hinterid
BRITANNIA 4 1 - c,297 Frontier
HISPANIA 4 1 - Oioclet'n Peaceful
BAETICA - 1 - 276 Peaceful
NUNIDIA 3 4 1 ?post Frontier
Aurelian
0 -
0 -
o - Augustianus (Gall); Marcianus (268/9)
2 1 Aureolus & ?Augustianus (Gall,);
Marc ianus (268/9); Diocletian (Prob)
o - Aureolus (Gall,)
2 IAd,269
II Ad, Gall,
2 1
I ?Aureolus (Gall,)
I Aureolus (Gall,); Bonosus (Probus)
2
1 Gallic Empire
0
- Gallic Empire
3
I Sallic Empire
I Gallic Empire
0
- Gallic Empire
Aurelian Octavianus (c,258)
Firaus (Aurelian)
-243-
XI: .P.rt ct
Among the various puzzles of the third century, one of the most
intriguing is the growth and evolution of the title Protector. A great deal
of effort has gone into its interpretation, much of which has been obscured
or distorted by a failure to recognise the dynamic nature of the institution
it represented. )ullian believed the prot ect ores to be an imperial guard,
possibly replacing the Equites Singulares'. He was followed In essence, by
Mommsen; though the latter did make a distinction between the early
protectorate and its later counterparts2. A similar distijcti.on was made by
Babut, who, like Domaszewskl, believed that the the protectores had replaced
the centurlonate in the later imperial army3: Domaszewski even went so far
as to claim it formed a collegium with a Princepa Protectorum at its head.
Cooper, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the protectorate replaced
the various special duties and administrative officers of the Principate4,
while the most recent theory was espoused by M. Christol In 1977, who argued
that the title protector was reserved for centurions in the assumed mobile
field army of Gallienus.
Each of these theories essentially views the protectorate as a uniform
structure, formed by Gallienus and fulfilling the same role in the fourth
century as it did In the third. Such a failure to account for the vast
1, C, Jullian, Di protect oribu, it doiesticis, Pail. (1883),2, Mommien, 'Protector.. Augusti', fp/ea, Epig, V (1884), 121ff,
3, Babut, 'Recherchea lur l'orginasation de ii guarde Impériale et sur Ia corps d'officier5 de
l'armée romaine aux IV .t V siêcles', Rev, Mist, 114 (1913), 225ffl and 116 (1914), 225ff,Domaszewskl, Die Ringordriung dci Röiiicben Heere5, ed B, Dobson (1967),
4, Cooper, Thi Third Century Origins of The Hew liperial qr.y (1967), 209.
5, Chriatol, 'La Carriére de Traianus Nucianus,,,,', Chironl (1977), 393ff. 17—244-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Protectores
differences In terminology, status and function of the office has stifled
any real progress In understanding Its complex nature. As I hope to show,
the protectorate of the later third century underwent changes so profound
that in its final form it bore virtually no relation to the institution
Inaugurated by Gallienus. Only by accepting this can new life be breathed
Into an otherwise moribund debate.
The history of the protectorate does not even start with Gallienus. An
inscription from Dalmatla has come to light relatively recently, which reads:
A1979,448: I(ovi) O(ptlmo) M(aximo), T. F1(avius) Pompelus (centuria)
coh (art is) III Alpinorum Ant oninianae cur-am agens (sic) Fab (ius) Amp.
men (sor ?) et Vibius Vibianus protector cos.
I have left the title of Vibius Vibianus deliberately abbreviated, since
It Is the meaning of this and the dating of the inscription which form the
crux of its Interpretation. Until now, the earliest certain record of a
protector was the cursus honorum of L. Petronlus Taurus Volusianus', dating
from 258. However, the Viblanus inscription above seems unequivocally dated
to the early third century by the gentilicium attached to the unit. This can
only refer to Caracalla or Elagabalus, both of whom sufferred the darnnatio
memorlee at the dissolution of their reigns. In the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, it is inconceivable that the unit would claim such an
honorific after the deaths of these emperors. It is true that various
auxilia are known to have used the gentilicia of both Marcus Aurelius and
Caracalla during the reIgn of Septimius Severus, cohors I mifliaria
Hemesenorum Aurelia Antoniniana is one such example; but even this unit
I, XI . 1836 • ILS 1332,
2, A197I,334
-245-
M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Protectores
is known to have abandoned the title in 199, and can be found sporting the
ge.ntilicia of Maximinus and Gordian during their respective reigns 1 . The
unit therefore only used these names under the Severan dynasty, which was
attempting to claim legitimacy through association with the Antonines before
it, and was trying to gain the personal loyalty of the soldiers in order to
ensure its continuation.
So the office of protector preceded Gallienus, but in what form? If we
accept, as I think we must, that the terms protector and cos. are linked in
the inscription, then the only feasible reading of the phrase is that of
protector co (n)s (ularis.). Vibianua himself was never a consul, so it would
seem that he was part of the consul's staff, acting as a protector. in the
literal sense of the word as a guardian. The protector consular-is was
therefore a consular bodyguard, and we are fortunate In having a second
inscription, from Apamela in Syria, which may give us a clue to its status:
A.1974,648:(.... . vix(it) ann(i&J XXXXIII m(ensibus) V d(iebus) VIII,
mu (itevit) eq (ues) ann (is) 1111, protector ann (is) 1111, opttiol ann (is)
XIII, (centurio) ann(is) I. Marcia Vivia Crescentine coniux et her-es
mar-ito incomparabill fecit.
Van Rengen, who produced this inscription, believed that it dated to the
Farthiari campaign of Severus Alexander since it was found in the same
sarcophagus as a similar epitaph to one Probius Sanctus, a soldier of Legio
II Farthica3. Yet that legion was also present in the east under Caracalla,
1, AE,1975,701 III'33312. A1974,647.
-246-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
as well as the eastern wars of Aurelian 1 , so it could equally well date to
either of these instead.
The anonymous soldier is believed to have joined the Praetorian Guard,
serving as an eques for four years, before becoming a protector and
subsequently a centurion, possibly in II Parthica. In this context 1 the title
protector has been explained away as a misnomer for speculator. This is a
very weak argument. For the soldier to have become a speculator at this
point In his career would necessitate a rapid rise in his status, since a
wait of up to 8 years was usually required for an eques to achieve the
of fice2. Furthermore, such an explanation does not take into account the
soldier's thirteen years as an optlo between the protectorate and the
centurionate.
A more feasible explanation must be that he joined the army as an eques,
probably in II Parthica. After four years service, he was seconded into the
officium of the consul as a bodyguard. Having remained a beneficiarius
consularis for another four years, he was promoted to the rank of optio on
his return to the legion. This accorded with his status as a principalis
After a further thirteen years, he had finally worked his way up the
tortuous promotion ladder to the centurionate, only to die one year later.
In this way, one need not resort to difficult arguments that require
extraordinary circumstances to explain what was obviously an all too
ordinary career. One need only accept that, if these two Inscriptions are to
be believed, the protectorate did in fact precede Gallienus, and began as a
grade of principa.Lis presumably added to the Rangordnun during the
1, Though by thu ii.. II Pirthica was being vexillated to provide garrisons elsewhere 1cf,
ch,VI: I4xiIJaiionej p,1L4,2, Durry, Cohortes Prótoriennes (1938), 109,
-247-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
elaborations of the Severan period 1 . Indeed, the Vibiarius inscription itself
adds strength to such an interpretation since his fellow trustee in the
inscription was probably a mensor, yet another grade of principalis. The
terminology of the inscription suggests that they were fulfilling an official
obligation in the absence of any next of kin.
The protectorate of this date bore very little relationship to that of
the later third century, though the structure may appear familiar. Any
attempt to link the above material to the protectores mentioned In the Vita
Antonini would be mistaken2 . Here, the Historia Augusta is undoubtedly
attributing to the leones of Caracalla3 a status in proportion to the
bodyguards of his own time; if indeed he is using the word protector for
anything other than its literal meaning. For the true protectores august.4
we must still look towards the actions of Gallienus himself.
The change in status of the protectorate under Gallienus was a marked
one, best illustrated by the change in its terminology. This took the
formula protector Augusti nostri4. The men involved were marked as the
personal protectores of the emperor, to such an extent that Gallienus himself
is specifically named in three of the seven inscriptions which mention the
office.
What this meant to each individual may be deduced from an examination
I, For Severan elaboration cf, Watson, Roian Soldier (ii.4, - .., .., . iufl9 Uo.azeviki,
ed,(1967), 29ff,
2, S//A Carr, V'8 VII'!,3, Named in Dlo LIHX'6'4,
4, To be strictly accurate; AE,1920,108. Victor reads: protector eius, refering to up, caes, P.LJd,,j Sal/len! invictI p11 Iii, Aig, earlier in the Inscription; 1965,!14, Narcianus reads:
,porxrap ro lveiA'qro, hcioro piv PaAAqvov (fltrop), which literally translates into Latin as:
protector invic tI isperi tons nostni Sal/len! A&(us SI),
—248-
M.C.tbeji: C3 Army.Protectores
of their careers. There are only six people we can name with absolute
certainty as protectores of Gallienus. They can be clearly separated
into two distinct classes: those for whom the protectorate was a
stepping-stone on the way to important civil appointments, and those who
remained within the military. Each Is worth looking at In detail, as each
Illustrates both the type of person who could enter the protectorate as
well as the influence this had on their career.
1) L. PETRONIUS TAURUS VOLUSIANUS: X11836 = ILS 1332
Consul in 2612, he rose from the prlinipilate to command the equites
singulares under Valerian and Gaillenus. This puts the last eight posts of
his career between the years 253 and 261, so his rise to high office was
consequently very rapid. From the start, his was an extraordinary career.
His appointment to the equites singu1ares which were usually commanded by a
former tribune of the vigi1es was in Itself exceptlona]. as was his
promotion directly from the praetoriana to praefectus vigilum, possibly In
259. He was made protector Augg. nn. around 257/8, and it Is usually
believed that this title was somehow linked to his trlbunate of I Praetori&.
2) MARCIANUS: AE1965,114
The brief outline of his career given in the inscription suggests that
I, XI'1836 • ILS 1332: L. Pstronio L(uci) f(ilio) Sab(atina tribu) Taw'o Volusiano, v(iro)co(n)s(uiari) ordinari, praef(ecfo) praet(orio) e.(inentissiao) v(iro), prae(ecto) yigiI(ua)p(erfec tis5iso) r(iro), trth(wno) coh(or ti,) prisie prue t(oriae) pro tec t(ori) Aup(us torus)n(os trorus), I tes trib(uno) coh(or tis) 1111 pree t(oriae), trib(uno) cak(or tis) I.! urb(anae), trth(uno)coh(or tie) III vig(uIus), ieg(ionis) A' e S Il/I b'es(inie) pro v(inciae) Panrioniae superiori(s) / S/i(sic) Ieg(ionis) Dacias, prieposito equi Sm singu!arior(u.) Aug(us torus) n(o5trorus), p(riio) p(iIo)
leg(ionis) XX! U/p/se, ccii turioni depute to, eq(uo) pub(Iico), cx V Decur (us), Laur (enti) La vun(a ti)ordo Arre tinorus patrono op f/so,
2, Patti XI 5749. 3, PLRE Volus/anus 6,
4, AE1965,114: A'aPqs TPgqa ro y Jiaoporarov ffa.xiavov, rovpropt ro avc1Rlroc iCOICTOD uavf'a'4Aaovov 4'c(a0roo), rpSBOPYOY zparapitsv xa loexe xas r,sri7Arrqv Aajirportrq 6ppsv ,iqrporoAç0,1s rioroAsç TOY !eols7C ItfpCTQ v xa u rpa' Iy rtrcyEh.aç, lips rapocvroç /'eppo uotJp%Jqevv4ç za, Joyitrro,
-249-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
Marcianus gained the protectorate whilst in the praetorians, like Volusianus
above. He became one of GallienuB' most trusted generals, and took command
of the Gothic campaign following the usurpation of Aureolus in 2681
3) V17ALIAMJS: 1113228 = JLS 546 2
It has been suggested that this inscription should be revised to read:
Viltallanus (praeflect (us) Aug. n. (somno monlitus v. p. However, the term
preefectus Augusti nostri is a highly unusual one. As the commander of avexillatlon, we would expect Vitalianus to be termed praepositus or dux31
rather than praefectus, which was usually reserved for equestrian legionary
commanders. Under the circumstances 1 the term protector fits the formula of
the inscription more comfortably. On this reading, he was a protector when
in commend of the German and British vexillat ions at Sirmium. Other than
that, little is known about him
4) CLEMENTIUS VALERIUS MARCELLINUS: IU'3424 = 11.3 545
Praefectus of Leglo II Adiutrix acting vice legati, he was succeeded by
Aurelius Front inus by June 268. His protectorate is inextricably bound into
the terminology of the commend, showing that he held the title simultaneous
with the office. He went on to become preeses of Mauretania Tingitana
between 277 and 28O.
I, PLREHarciar,uil; Zosimus I'40 S//A, 6allienusXIII'lO,2, 111 . 3228 • ILS 546: (loh'i Honitorl (piro salute adque incolusitate d(oeini) n(ostri)
6ailleni Aug(usti) et iilitua vexiil(aiiornii) leg(g(iornis) 6Jeraanicianafr(ui) elf Brittanincin(aru.)(jc) (cuja auxilis (clviii t,,,, VII taliar,us (pro flec t(or) Azig(us ti) n(os tn) (praeposli tus v(otui)p(osui t),
3,.The two terms seem freely interchangeable, though oix might imply a higher rank, cf, Tables
Yl-4, p,1541f.
3jPflaum, Carrilnes procuratoniennes,,,, (1960), 919,4, 111 . 3424 • ILS 545: Senio 1ep(eraionls) P(ubLi) tLIc(/n/) 6a/lJieni invicti Aug(usfi),
Cluentuus Silvanus v(ir) c(greguus) a(gens) v(ice) pfraesidis) it Va/enuus /larcellinies praef(ectus)leg(ionis) prof (cc for) Aug(us II) n(os tn) a (geiis) v(ice) I (ega I/), uunicipefsl cx pro vir,cia Rae tias(ol yenunt) l(aeti) J(thentcs) i(enito), Palerr,o ef Arc/iesilao co(n)s(uuibus),
5, PLRE Harcellinus 23,—250-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
5) P. AELIUS AELIANUS: III•3529 and A1965,9
As praef'ectus .legionls a.v.1. II Adiutr1cis his command must follow the
accession of Gallienus as joint emperor in 255, but precedes Marcellinus
above. His career was almost identical to that of Marcellinus, especially if
he was the Aelienus of VflI'21486 (ILS 4495), who was praesea of Mauretania
Ceesariensis prior to 2772.
6) 14. AURELIUS VICTOR: A51920,108
This, the last certain reference to a Gallienic protector, acts as a
complement to the two above. Here we see a preeses of Mauretania during
Gallienus' lifetime referring to himself as a protector Gailleni. This
in cription shows that the title protector was not just linked to the
military commands, but was retained by Its holders on their transfer to
civilian office.
Each of these six protectores was In a position of some responsibility
whilst holding the title under Gallienus. Volusianus was at the top of the
praetorian tribunate, Marcellinus and Aelianus were legionary commanders, and
Victor was the governor of a preetorian province. About Marcianus we cannot
be sure, but it would seem likely that his entry into the protectorate was
at approximately the same juncture as Volusianus. The reference to
Vitalianus is the least informative, since we do not know where in his career
he held the command attributed to him, nor do we know where his career went
1, 111 . 3529: 0(u) Manibus) tesorlac P(ubli) Ael(i) Martial/s q(uon)dai) vet(erani) exfc)(ustode) a(rsorus) leg(ionis) 11 Adi(utricis) patris ci Fla y/ac 4guthes salt/i, hi/us hi/anus
prae(ectus leg(ionis) s(ipra) s(cripfae) protector Aug(usti), parent/bus CdP1551115 regresus ad /uieS
patros f(aciendui) c(uravf I),
4 1965, 9: Herculi 4ug(usto) P. hi/us 4eiiamis prier (cc tus) leg(ionis) 11 4diut(r/ci5)protector Eallieni Aug(usti) n(ostri) a(gens) v(ice) i(egati) v(otus s(oivit) /(thens) s(erito),
2, PLRE 4,1/anus 10, Possibly hi/anus 8 also.3, 4E,1920,108: Oils ptatlr/is deabuique Fortun!aje Reduci pro salute atque incolusitate
d(oaini) n(os In) /'(era ion/i) Caes(anis) P(ubll) Licini Gailieni mv/c I/ tp)ii felt/c/i) 4ug(usti),
H(ircus) 4urei(ius) Victor v(ir) e(gregius) pt(a)eses pro(rinciae) Nauretaniae Caesar/ens/i, protector
c/us, Mnno) prov(inciae) CCIII!!! ,t(alendis) I(anuaniis/uniis/uliis),-251-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
from there. If the status of any of the other protectores is anything to go
by, his rank at the time of the command must have been at least the
equivalent of a legionary prefecture. Certainly, it can be argued that the
command of a combined force of German and British legions, with their
auxilia, was more than a run-of-the-mill vexillery appointment.
One other, less certain, inscription might be added to this liBt. It
refers to an anonymous officer in the Guard, who was designated protector
Auggg'. The most likely date for this is 25 9/60, when Saloninus was briefly
promoted to Augustus in defiance of the mutiny of Postumus, and before the
news of Valerlan's capture had filtered back to the west. The terminology
and juncture of the officer's elevation to the protectorate is closest to
that of the Gallienic protectors, making a date that falls within his period
of influence seem the most favourable.
A good deal of information can be gleaned from these careers. First, it
is clear from the Marcellinus inscription, in which the titles of the
provincial governor are set alongside the titles of the legionary prefect,
that the protectorate was a military appointment. Marcellinus is termed
preefectus legionis protector Augusti nostri agens vice 1egati while at the
same time Clementius Silvius, the equestrian governor of Lower Pannonia, is
simply vir egregius egens vice praesidis. The trend is maintained in other
equestrian provinces under Gallienus 2. The only exception is M. Aurelius
Victor, above. Since the protectorate was a military appointment, he is
1, 111 . 3126: 1,,,, trib(wii) coh(ortis)J XI w'banae, trth(uni) coh(ortis) VI praet(oriee) cipro fec tor(ii) Aig(ui torua tri g.) n(o, trorim) patron! spiendissisee civ! Ia Ifs Curic lard ob mnsigne.benivolenizas italuie pont anxeriint, Psi (idler), A further two inscriptions, containing theerasures of dunatic, might be dateable to Gallienus for Just this reason: XI'4082 ILS 4002(Aurelius Faustus). with the formula prot, divini lateris n, (discussed below p. 2zis corecertain than 111 . 8571 1 1985 (Aur, Sabinianus), trib, proi.ectt,.,.,,,,,,,,Jn,, where the erasure mustsurely contain some unit designation (probably Prietorian), possibly followed by .,,Aug.Jn.
2, Coc(c,jus) Rufinus In Arabia, FLaW Rufinu, 13 A, Yoconius Zeno in Cilicia, PLRE Zenon 9 N,Aurelius Maximus In Pannonia Sup,, III'4564,
—252-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
likely to have received the title during a military command prior to his
governorship of Mauretania Caesariensia, like Marcellinus and Aelianus after
him. This was probably not a prefecture, since we would expect such an
off ice to be recorded, in accordance with the Marcellinus inscription; and it
may have had sufficiently low status to be missed out altogether. One
should also bear in mind that the nature of the Victor Inscription, which was
an official dedication by the governor of the province to the emperor, was
such that details of his previous career could have been superfluous.
Victor shows that the title of protector was an honorific. It was held
in perpetuity by its recipients, all of whom can be seen to have borne It
with pride. The point is reinforced by the testimonial of Marcianus in which
the title protector is highlighted above all his other achievements. It was
bound into the careers of its holders at various junctures. Aelianus and
Marcellinus received it while holding the equestrian prefecture of 11
Adiutri while the terminology in the cursv.s of Volusianus and the
an nynious preetorian suggests that the grant of protector status was
somehow linked to the praetorian tribunate.
The implication is that under Gallienus the title protector was symbolic,
an equestrian badge of privilege, of which the title was more important than
the duties. Its grant seems limited to equestrian officers who had reached
a certain degree of status within the military career structure. It was not
a blanket grant, since there are at least two instances of legionary
commanders under Gallienus who did not receive it 1 . This in itself Is
L 1, Flavius Postumius Virus was Ji'gitwi Iqionis II Augustas in Britain c,262, PLR( Virus 2
RIB 316 • Vl1'95. Even more convincingly, M, Aurelius Veteranus was Prief(ecfus) Ieg(iens) XIII
6(ea/nae) EaJIieniin(ae) (sic), I1l'1560 • ILS 3845,-253-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
important, since it indicates the special significance of the office. Each of
the protect ores was specifically chosen to receive the honour; something
which is strongly indicated by the personal nature of the title, its special
links to the emperor0 and the esteem in which its owners seem to have held
it. The title was therefore a mark of personal recognition from the emperor.
Any duties which it carried must have been symbolic in nature, since it was
held in conjunction with military (and civil) posts of responsibility that
required the recipient's full attention.
The similarity between the title and that of the protector consularis is
hardly likely to have been coincidental. What better way for Gallienus to
honour those men of merit whom he favoured than by making them honorary
beneficiarli of the emperor? Diesner put forward years ago the idea that
the protect ores had existed in some form prior to the sole reign of
Gallienus, but in the absence of any substantial evidence, he was only
prepared to date the institution to the 25061. It would now seem likely
that the roots of the protectorate date even earlier, and that Gallienus
manipulated the already established office of protector consuleris to fit his
own ends.
These were somehow linked with the so-called Edict of Gallienus. Though
the complexities of the edict need not be discussed here, it is necessary to
understand that under Gallienus a great change occurred in which the
senatorial elite surrendered most of their military functions and some of
their civil ones to equestrian control. This change, referred to among
I, Diesner, R col, 1113ff,
-254-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
other things as the rise of the yin militares, has been extensively
discussed in a previous chapter, so that only the basic points need be
reiterated here1.
By the mid-third century, the senatorial elite had almost completely
abdicated their military responsibilities in favour of the more lucrative and
prestigious civil posts in the senatorial cureus. The imperial response to
this was to give command of the legions and certain militarily delicate
provinces over to the equestrian classes. This rise of the equestrians had
been occurring gradually throughout the century, but under Gallienus arid his
successors the pace of change was greatly accelerated. By substituting
senators with equestrian agentes, vice praesidis and vice le&ati, Gallienus
streamlined the immutable career structure that had been slowing the rise of
the yin milit ares and opened the way for the able men he needed, both
equestrians and senators, to take over the positions that required their
skills.
It is tempting, here, to view the protectorate as an agent for that
change. At first glance it would seem designed to facilitate the bypassing
of the traditional ordo. Yet the emperor had no need for such a system.
One already existed in the agentes themselves. Moreover, most equestrians
in positions of command under Gallienus were not protect ores. The most
powerful of these was Aurelius Augustianus: Dux Macedonicae Another
example is Clementius Silvius, the a.v.p. of Pannonia mentioned in the
Marcellinus inscription2. These are just two among many. Nevertheless, the
I, Ch.X: V/ri Miiitare
2, AuguBtianus, 1934,)93; Silvius, II1'3424 ' 1LS545, cited on pn,4,
-255-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
probable nature of the pro tectores was linked to this change.
It is based upon the assumption that the generals of Gallienus were
protectores themselves: a point impossible to prove or disprove with the
evidence to hand, yet given the nature of those few protectores we know, an
extremely likely one. The key figure here is Marcianua: protector, Praetorian
tribune, dux and general'. He is the only general of Gallienus for whom a
first hand epigraphic career record survives. For him, we do not have to
rely upon the watered-down end distorted testimony of second- or third-
hand literary material. Despite its brevity, his inscription is, at the least,
an uncorrupted source. He was also a highly important man; more important,
possibly, than either Claudius or Aurelian by whom he is eclipsed in the
sources. For it was he who received sole command of the Danube armies, and
was charged with the continuation of the emperor's Gothic war 2. In contrast,
the two later emperors were merely subordinates within the hastily assembled
imperial army which faced Aureolus at Milan3. Since this, the only detailed
record we have for an important general of Gallienus, firmly establishes him
as a protector, it is not beyond the realms of probability that the other
generals were prot ect ores as well. The silence of the sources on this
matter can signify nothing, for the source material is notoriously
uninformative about the early careers of these men. What little they can
tell us is, if anything, positive. The general consensus is that Claudius was
a tribune of some kind at a crucial stage in his career, and that this
I, cf, p.249 above, text & note 4 AE,1965,114,
2, SHA, 6a11, Viii & XIII1O; £'iQ, Claud, YI'i & XViiii; Zos, I'40'I-2,
3, Eutrop, iXiii; SHA, Claud, IV; 5H4 Gal), XV . 3; Vict, Caes, XXXIY • i; Zos, i • ii; Zon, XII'26,
-256-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
acted as his springboard to success'. In the period between Gallienue and
Diocletian, six men can be seen to have risen from tribuniclan rank to
positions of relative importance. Five of these were protectores2. The
source material, therefore, provides at least circumstantial evidence that the
great generals of Gallienus held protector status.
The sources are unanimous on only one point concerning the backgrounds
of these men. They all agree that his favourites were of humble origins.
Tradition makes Aureolus a Getan shepherd who worked his way through the
ranks under Valerian to gain a position of great power from that emperor's
sons. Eutropius speaks of Postumus rising through a military career to the
attention of Gellienus4, though like Aurelian and Claudius, his origins are
obscured by his achievement of the purple (albeit through secession). The
imperial careers of the latter two have tended to overshadow their earlier
achievements, making details of their rise difficult to come by. The major
source for both is the Historla Augusta, with its tendency to over-
romanticise, but it seems clear from what little evidence we have that both
were yin mflitares of outstanding ability. Aurelian was a peasant from the
Danube who worked his way up in the armys, while Claudius was perhaps an
Illyrian born in Dalmatia6.
1, SHA, C1ad, X1'9 & XVI . 2; Vict, Cies, XXXIII28; Zon, 11.26,
2, Yoluslanus, XI'1836 ' ILS 1332; Narcianus, A(,1965,114; Tralanu5 Nucianus, 19O8,259 ' ILS
9497 ' I6RR 1 . 1496; Sabinlanus, III • 8571 1985; Harianus, VI . 1636 (non-protector, his career is
discussed below, p,263);Constantius Chiorus, (xcerpfa Palesiana 1.2,
3, Syncellu. p.717; S/IA, Trig, Tyr, X14 Vict, Cees, XXXIII & (pit, XXXII; Zon, III,
4, Eutrop, IX'9'I,
5, Eutroplus and Victor place him In Dada Ripensis, whilst the SHA believes he came from Moesia:
Eutrop, IX'13'1 Vict, (pit, XXXVl; S&Q, Aur, I1I'1-2,
6, S//A, Claud, XIY'2 & XY'1-2, recorded in fictitious letters,
-25 7-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
The named protectores of Gallienus also seem to have had humble birth.
Volusianus rose from the centurionate, Aelianus was the sOn of P. Aelius
Mertielis, armorum custos of Leglo II Ad1utrix, and Marcianus rose from
obscurity in the Danube provinces2. About Victor we cannot be sure3, and
Vitalianue is only known from the Inscription bearing his name. Clementius
Valerius Marcellinus is generally believed to be related to T. Clementius
Silvius, praeses of Parinonia Inferior, since they shared a name and appear on
the same inscription as fellow-townsmen from Raetia 4. Whatever the truth of
this may be, the position of the shared name as praenomen in Marcellinus'
case and gentiliciwn of Silvius suggests that Slivius was the senior. His
position as praeses over Marcellinus, merely the legionary praef'ectus,
confirms this. Nothing is known about their earlier status or origins,
except that they hailed from Raetia. Only Marcellinus, the younger of the
two, at the point where his career was taking off, was a protector.
All the men above, for whom we have enough information, shared certain
distinguishing characteristics. They had successful military careers; they
were yin milit ares to a man; and those few for whom the epigraphic record
survives bore the title of protector.
Most illustrative of this is L. Petronius Taurus Volusianus, whose
meteoric rise from the centurionate to the consulate can have taken him no
1, Nagy, 'Aelius Aelianus', Kilo 46 (1965), 339ff,
2. Gerov, 'Narciano', 4t/,enuui 43(1965), 333ff,3, Di Blois believed ho was a native of the Danube provinces 1 and cited Thomasson, 5'tatthaiter I
(1960), 102 n,263, in support of this, However, this seess to me to bear no relevance whatsoever to
Victor's origins, since it ii concerned only with the changing semantics of the title denoting the
governor of Mauretania, cf, DeBlois, 56 & n,147,
4, Huniclpu ex provincia. Raetla cf, PLRE Harcellinus 23,
-258-
M.C.tbeji: C3 Army. Protectores
longer than eight years at most 1 . If Domaszewski is correct, he will have
come to the emperor's attention whilst serving as a liaison officer (centurlo
deputatus), and it is significant that his career started to accelerate soon
after that point2.
The elevation to protector appears late in his inscription, linked as it
is to the most prestigious tribunician rank he achieved. Yet it may have
been received before this 1 applying to several of his earlier posts. As we
have seen, the title was honorific. It could be held by praefecti legionis
and even extraordinary praeposltP. In this case, the title may have been
placed alongside the highest rank to which it had any relevance. The point
is borne out by the inscription of the anonymous praetorian 4, where the
wording et protector Auggg. n. follows the list of tribunates held, Since we
have established earlier that protector status was somehow linked to these
commands, the implication is that it applied to all of them.
Volusianus received his first unusual appointment at the lowest stage in
the cursus where protector is found: that is at the point where he would
usually receive a command as praepositus or preefectus. In his case, he
was made praepositus equitum singuleriurri an unprecedented appointment,
I, cf, p.249 above, text & n.h
2, Do.,, Rangordnwng 104,
3, cf, YI . 1636 and the Yolusianus inscription itself, where the comeand of vexx, Legg, X i XII!!
Gea were held prior to the urban tribunates,
4, 111.3126,
-259-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
since the Equ.ites Sinu1ares were usually commanded by a former tribunus
vigil urn'. His second unusual appointment came around 259, when he was
promoted directly from trib. coh, I Praet. to the post of preefectus Vigilwr4
exactly at the stage where the protectorate comes In his inscription. Here
we have a classic vfr inilitaris who rose from the centurionate, and whose
career bypassed the accepted ordo equester at just those points where the
pro tectores of Gallienus are known to have held the title. The coincidence
must mean something. Unfortunately, Volusianus is the only protector of
Gallienus for whom we have a well documented cursus
Therefore we can only hypothes:[se. It Is worth reviewing at this point
what was special about the protect ores We know that they were yin
mflitares yet this does not mark them out, since equestrians had been rising
through the ranks since the Seven. Some of them reached positions of great
importance within the empire, but this is also true of men such as Aurelius
Augustlanus, for whom no trace of the protectorate can be found. Those who
did rise high rose fast, but this is by no means true of all the protector-es.
Victor and Vitalianus disappear without a trace, while the protectorate
commanders of 11 Adiutrix had to wait a decade before they were qualified to
take up equestrian governorships. Only in one respect are the protector-es
unique. All for whom we have adequate information were of humble origin.
Here, if anywhere, is the key to the protector-es of Gallienus. They
cannot have been centurions 1 of any kind, since the office was held in
1, PLRE 'oIuiiJrN1i 6, note c,
-260-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
conjunction with praetorian tribunates and legionary commands. The latter
rank and the preesidlum of Victor preclude8 their having been staff officers,
since neither prefects nor governors will have been seconded for such work.
Their distribution, both under Gallienus and his successors, is so random
that no geographical explanation can be put forward, nor is there any
evidence for more than one protector in a given location at any one time,
which severely hampers the likelihood of their having formed a coflegium1.
The title suggests they were some kind of bodyguard, but the few detailed
careers for third century protectores provide no space in which this could
occur.
All the evidence points towards the title being a ceremonial badge of
privilege. Its holder was marked as a beneficlarius of the emperor, to whom
he owed not only the protectorate, but his promotion to high office. Under
Gallienus, the office seems to have been held by men of ability from whom
great things were expected. Of the six certain protectores in his reign,
five are known to have gained ducenariate appointments of the fourth echelon
or above. We know nothing of the sixth due to lack of evidence. All for
whom there is enough background material came from the centurionate. This
means that all the well documented protectores of Gallienus rose from humble
origins to positions of great responsibility within the new equestrian career
structure he had created2.
I, In fact, the only occasion in which more than one protector can be found is attested on thetombstone of on. Claudiui Herculanius, protectoris ,fireiiani eugusti, set up by his brother, anotherprotector aiigusti: 111 . 327, Nicomedla, 27015AD, It may be possible that a collegiuc existed among theprotectorci in the Praetorians, though the argument will stretch no further,
2, Enough ii known only of Yolusianus, Marcianus and Aelianus to provide an accurate outline of
their careers, and since there are extant only six unequivocal protectores we obviou5ly do not have astatistical sample, Despite this, with the inclu5ion of Gallienus' generals, the careers of these men
are strongly indicative of the trend outlined above,
-26 1-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
Most of them rose to prominence with great speed. Men like Volusianus
and Marcianus will have benefitted from accelerated promotion to get them
into the commands for which they were most suited. The grant seems to have
been a recognition of ability, a statement that the holder's promise had been
noted and that he was earmarked for promotion as long as he lived up to
that promise. This explains why not all equestrians had protector status,
and why not all protect ores achieved the exalted ranks of the consulate.
Some men, such as Augustianus, would have already progressed through the
ordo equester into positions of importance by the time the protectorate came
into being. Others, of higher status, would not have needed to progress so
far to attain the prestige posts that were their due 1 . Most simply would
not have been good enough to qualify for the title, and only the cream of
those that were would rise to the very top.
Of the 17 known equestrians who achieved a leglonary command or more
Important post In the latter half of the third century without the aid of
the protectorate2, only two achieved the status of Gallienus' favourites.
The ubiquitous Augustlanus was Dux Macedonicae and L. Flavius Aper, the
father-In-law of Numerlan, was Praetorian Prefect 3. Too little is known
about Augustianus to do more than hint at his probable experience, but Aper
was a man of high status for whom anything less than the position he
achieved would have been a considerable snub. It is worth noting that only
1, ag L. Flavius Apr, PLRE Aper 2 & 3,, discu5sed in th. text below,
2, cf, Table P8,3, Augustianu., 4E1934,193 for Apr cf, note 1 above,
-262-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
the former held high office under Gallienus.
The sample is, of course, too small to be truly representative. Only two
of the seventeen are known from more than one inscription. However, in the
absence of any other evidence, it is highly suggestive, especially since the
most detailed cursus among them is that of P. Vibius Marianus 1 . In what
would seem a fairly prestigious but typical career, Marianus rose through
the centurionate to become primus pflus of Legio III Gaflica and subsequently
preefectus cast rorum of II Italica. From there, he worked his way through
the tres militiae in Rome, and became primipflaris bis before ending his
career as procurator et preeses Sardiriiae. In the absence of the
protectorate, no unusual or out-of-place commands are found. His career
simply follows the standard ordo equester one step at a time, ending with a
third echelon provincial governorship, less prestigious than the posts
achieved by the prot ect ores. His career ranks among the top two thirds of
our sample.
It would appear that the protectorate, as instituted by Gallienus, was a
symbol of imperial recognition and favour granted to equestrians of largely
humble origin, which marked them out as men to watch. If they did well, its
recipients could expect to achieve the most important posts in the empire.
In doing this, Gallienus began to discriminate not according to class and
status, but according to ability, which would explain the seeming
inconsistencies in his policy towards equestrianised provinces. He did not
care whether the provinces were governed by senators or by equestrians, as
long as they were properly maintained and adequately defended.
Is it any wonder that the militarily defunct senate, faced with such a
I VI.1636,
-263-
tacit acknowledgement of their inadequacies and seeing the usurpation of
some of their traditional responsibilities by upstart novi hornines 1 should
react against this with such hostility?2
Following the death of Gallienus, a fragmentation occurred in
protectorate terminology. The term protector Augusti nostri did not drop
out of use altogether3, but it was overshadowed by a series of new
designations 1 the most common of which were the titles protector ducenarius
and centurlo protector. The change is best illustrated by two important
inscriptions, one for each of the designations above, which must be examined
in some detail.
The first of these comes from Grenoble (Cularo) in Gallia Narbonensis,
and reads:
XII •2228 = .115569: Imp(eratori) caesarW M. Aur(eiio) Ciaudio plo feud
invicto eug(usto) Gerrnanico max(irno) p(ontifici) rn(exirno) trib(uniciae)
potestatis II co(n)s(uil) petr.i patr'iae proc.C?) vexiliationes adque equites
iternque preepositi et ducener(ll) protect(ores) tendentes in Narb(onensi)
prov (inciae) sub cure lul (ii) Pie cidiani v (in) p (erfectissirni) preefect (1)
vigil (urn) devoti nurnini rnalestatlq(ue) elus.
It is a key inscription since, as the first securely datable instance of
the ducenaril protectores, it proves they were in existence immediately after
1, For senatorial snobbishness towards these ci, Millar, Cissis Olo, 161f,
2, Reflected in th. literary tradition, Gallienus is depicted as weak-minded and indolent 1 and
accused of deserting the Roman people: Eutrop, Irev, IX . 11'l, '8aIiieno rea publicaa deserente,.,
Lactantius Oe iop tibus,,,V'5 Orosius Hig t, cdv, peg, VI1 . 22'13, The SH4 reflecting the senatorial
tradition, vilifies him, Victor Cees, XXXIII'31 & 3i tells of the persecution of the emperor's family
and friends by the senate on the news of his death,
3, Two inscriptions, securely daieable to the 270s, illustrate this point: 111 . 327 reads
protectoris #ureI1a pf Aigusfi and III'10488, dated to 279 by Te, Paternus cos,, reads plrotetcf(or)
-264-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
the reign of Gallienus.
The phrase vexillationes adque equites item que praepositi et ducenaril
prot ect ores 18 of interest here, since it can go some way towards
Illustrating the position of the ducenarii protectores. The praepositi in the
inscription were surely the commanders of the vexillat.iones adque equites,
and therefore the term ducenarli protectores Is left to stand on its own.
This seems both confirmed and refined by the careful use of the conjunctions
linking these components. Three separate words meaning 'and' are used,
implying that the author wished to make a clear distinction between each
individual component. Furthermore, by placing item que in the pivotal
position he has drawn another distinction; one between the units involved on
one side and their commanders on the other. In the light of this, a fair
translation of the phrase might read: "..the detachments along with the
cavalry, and also their commanders and the ducenarli protect ores... ". The
ducenarli prot ect ores, by this reading, were part of the command structure,
on a par with the commanders of the detachments but somehow differentiated
from them.
A further inscription, the funerary monument of one M. Aurelius
Processanus goes a little way to support this. The man was listed as a
v(iro) e(gregio), ex cent(urione) praet(oriae) cohort Us) VI, prot(ectori)
ducenario'. As an ex centurion of the Guard, he must have progressed beyond
the Primipilate (whether he held it or not), and his status as vii- egregius
confirms this. Presumably, in the absence of any other titles on his
1, XI'837 ' ILS 2178.
-265-
M.C.IbeJl: C3 Army. Protectores
tombstone, he was a protector duce.narius when he died.
Six other inscriptions mention ducenarli who were protectore&, yet they
fall to give any useful Indication as to the function of the office or its
postlon in the Ranordnun. Therefore it Is on the inscriptions above that
we are forced to rely. Taken together, they form a very hazy picture In
which the protector ducenarius was a symbol of status, possessing military
undertones, and equivalent in rank to that of a vexillary praepositus. In
speculating further on the nature of the position we now enter dangerous
territory, since such enigmatic Inscriptions form no sort of basis on which
to mount an argument.
Having made this qualification, we can examine certain references with a
particular terminology that suggest a partial explanation for the term. M.
Aurelius Valerius and Aelius Aellanus are referred to as ducenarius ex
protectoribus3. Both titles were honorary, and it would seem that they were
separate from one another. Indeed, the emphasis of the text suggests
I. cf Table P3,
2. 1 have ignored AE1908,259 : ILS 9479: IGRR 1 . 1496 at this point, since it is not entirely
clear whether Mucianus was a protector ducenarius Line 15 has been restored by Domaszewski, Rang,,p.185 as trpa8, iau. i,orqxr. J Io,x,,vap,, On this reading, the rank of a protector ducenariu5 wasfixed, and ranted above that of both the praefectz,s Jegionis and the trthunu5 praetoriae. However,both the reading, and the inscription as a whole, are untrustworthy and extremely problematic, The
restoration rpsI, r,r, Is Inconsistent with the other praetorian references in the inscription,
which enumerate the cohort to which Nucianus was attached, A more accurate restoration must read
r,s, 'apr, r,ass. This restoration is in line with the previous praetorian references in the
Inscription, By this, I do not mean to argue against Nucianus' being a protector ducenarius, butmerely to highlight that any assumption either way is inadvisable, For Doaaszewski's text of the
inscription and a full discussion of its problematic nature, cf, below p,271ff, Appendix 2 gives my
own recension of the inscription, which I believe best solves most of the problems inherent in its
restoration,
3, 111 . 1805, dated AD 280 by the consulates of Nessala and Gratus, reads ,,,H, Qur(eiius)Valerius vür) p(eri'ectissiivs) ducentariJus ex profectorib(us) JateritsJ diini,,,; 41907,70 =1915,75 • ILS 9478 reads • ,,A.lia aQAstvs 6oq(vapioç) x ltpJarQxropev,,,, He is not to be confused
with P, Aelius Aelianus, protector 6aJJieni augusti,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
that the protectorate was held prior to the ducenariate. It may be that the
term protector ducenarius simply denoted a protector who had become eligible
for the salary of HS 200,000, the traditional qualification for ducenariate
status. Matthews, paraphrasing Mommsen's examination of the term, believed
that it evolved from here until it lost its monetary meaning and became
nothing but a definition of status, completely interchangeable with the title
protector1 . Just how far this argument can be taken, given the paucity of
the material, is debateable.
The Aelianus inscription is alone in providing some direct, though
unsatisfactory, information as to the level of ducenariate rank he achieved.
In discussing it, I shall use the Roman equivalents of the Greek terms
employed, since by default it has universal relevance to the ducenarii
prof ect ores as a whole. His first minor appointment was the sexigenariate
censitor NoricL He then held three procuratela, the last as governor of
Epirus, one of four centenariate governorships identified by Pflaum2. This
is the highest post named in the inscription, and yet the text clearly
entitles him ducenarius. The title is obviously honorary, As such, it cannot
have had any great importance, and can safely be ranked alongside, or even
below, the lowest grade of appointments in the ducenariate. It seems hardly
worth saying that a lowly ex-procurator of Epirus would lack the stature of
a man with four or five preesidia under his belt.
1, Matthews, (spire 01' Aia'ianus (1989), 77 4 n, 19,, paraphrasing Moamsen, Epheaeris Epigraph/ca V
(1884), 12111, *5,8,11,12,14,22 & 39 also notes preceding 449-52, NB: 45 : /LS569, and #11 = ILS
2778, our two main fnscrlpions above,
2, Pflaum, Procurafeuri Equesfres (1950), 235,
-267-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
Aelianus was obviously a ducenarius of the lowest level, yet can his
experience be taken as typical of the prot ect ores ducenarli as a whole?
Clearly it cannot. It would be absurd to assume that all ducenaril
protector-es pursued identical careers. Yet there is one man, with a very
different style of career, who can at least support the Aelianus inscription.
Aurelius Sabinianus was a tribunus and protector, possibly under Gallienus'.
He subsequently rose to the position of procurator ducenarius pro vinciae
Dalmatiae, as a vir egregius. Therefore, he can technically be termed a
ducenarius, ex protectoribus, though the phrase was never officially attached
to him. According to Pflaum, the post of procurator Da.Zrnatiae was among the
lower grades of ducenariate appointment 2. This is at least oblique
testimony that protectores ducenarli held some of the lower order posts in
the ducenariate cur-sue. Since pr-a epositus vexillation.is was at best the
third promotion of a ducenarius3, all available evidence places the ducenarli
protector-es on the lower rungs of that career ladder.
If this is a pattern, however circumstantial, and not simply a series of
isolated circumstances, it indicates that the protector-es ducenarli were of a
lesser order than the protectores Gallieni AugustL Among the latter, both
Victor and Marcianus were undeniably protector-es at the pinnacle of their
careers, which in Victor's case provides a direct comparison with the
ducenarli protectores. Pflaum's material4 shows that the praesidium of
I, 1II8571 • 1985, The dating of this inscription is tentative at best, cf, above p.252 n,I,
2, p fjaum, Procuriteurs, 236ff & 276 where he cites Sabinianus himself, N2,351,
3, Pflaum, 284, N2324 is the highest placed ducenariate praep, vex, cited,
4, Pflaum, 285ff,
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M.C.Ibe.Ji: C3 Army. Protectores
Mauretanie Caesariensis was ranked among the fourth echelon of promotions
for ducenar.ii, and on occasion could even rank as fifth level appointments.
This was achieved by Victor, P. Aelius Aelianus, and Marcellinus. Marcianus
and Volusiarius progressed even higher, while Vitalianus quite clearly held a
high grade vexillary command, which puts him on a par with the protectores
ducenari.i. If we take the comparison further, it becomes clear that a
universal downgrading of the prot ect ores occurred after the death of
Gallienus. Very few later pro tectores achieved the status of those men who
mounted the career ladder under this emperor. In the early fourth century a
Vietorinus protector was a vicarius1 . The emperor Constantius I was
protector primurn, exin tribunus, postee praeses Dai.matarum, according to the
Excerpta Valesiana, and the SI-IA claims he subsequently became a dux under
Probus2 . Diocletian commanded the Domestici though what this means is
debateable , and it was he who may have placed an ex-protector, Traianus
Mucianus, in the preesidium of Reetia, though this is uncertain 4. In the
early principete, Raetia had been on a par with Mauretania Caesariensis, but
this seems to have changed in the latter's favour some time in the third
centurr. Finally, certain abbreviated inscriptions have been taken to read
protector, p(raefectus) p(raetorio) on completely unsubstantiated grounds.
They could Just as easily read p (rirni)p (ilariu&, though I personally favour
I, Al889,65,2,Lx, Yal, 1 . 2; SM, ,°rob, XXII•3,
3, Ct, below p.282,4, III'5785, cf, below p.278,
5, Pflaum, Iocc, r/ft,
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M.c.rbeji: C3 Army. Protectores
the reading p(raeses) p(rovinciae)'.
The above is a complete list of all protectores who achieved high office
between the reigns of Gallienu8 and Diocletian. It shows that under
Diocletien, membership of the protectorate may have regained some of its
earlier kudos, but prior to his reign, the only protect ores who achieved
stardom were those who had started their careers as prot ect ores Gallieni
Augusti.
Most illu8trative of this reduction in status is the appearance of the
other common designation in the period: the cent urio protector. Though
several of its occurrences are cryptic in the extreme, a little evidence
survives to help form some picture of its position in the cursus Among
this is our second key inscription: the career record of Tralanus Mucianus.
It is extremely problematic, in places fragmentary, and containing numerous
repetitions. Yet it is cited in modern treatises without exercising the
slightest caution; most recently by M. Christol, who based upon it an
argument for the prot ect ores replacing centurions in the assumed mobile
field army . It contains a wealth of detail -- almost too much -- and
cannot be ignored, but requires minute end sceptical examination before any
conclusions can be drawn from it. The version here is the original
I. aurelius Severus, VI'3238 ILS 2208, protect, pr, pr,; lulius Spectatus, X1II'7535a, prof. p.
p. PLRE Severus 18 disagrees with the original reading in the text above and cites this as the only
instance known of a protector pr(aefectoru.) pr(aetoro), It reads Spectatus 2 as p(riii)p(ilarzus).It Ii my opinion that the two Inscriptions are abbreviations of the same title, Since they are both
thumbnail descriptions of the men's Clreer5, the expansion pr(aeses) pr(ovinciae) does not seem out of
place, despite the lack of a specified province, For a similar thumbnail description, cf, Flavius
lulianus, 111 . 8741, reading cx protectore it cx praepositus with no mention of the unit commanded,For Spec titus, however, I will concede that p(ric/)p(//arius) could be an equally valid reading,
2, Christol, 'Traianus Mucianus', Cbironl (1977), 393ff, cf, also Cooper (1967), 189ff. and deBlois (1976), 46 for other recent citations,
-2 70-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
reading given by DomaBzewski. The line breaks have been preserved. My own
interpretation differs somewhat 1 . The inscription comes from Tralana
Augusta (Stera Zagora), In Thrace, which was the man's home town2. Its date
is debeteable.
IGRR I •1496 = ILS 9479 = A.g1908,259 = IGBR 1112 1570. (cf. also vonDomaazewski, Rangordnung (1967), LVIII-LIX, 185ff):Tpatcrov Mouxtavov Sotx(rv-rpwv)aTpeuaa'pEvov ypir (&7 Kov-xopS(trjvauiv) xai v Aey(uvL) fi I7crpG(Lxr), br,rcr xt)p'r(r1c)
(rJpcxt rip (uç), 8oxa'r Coy), (xaiovrcrpov) irpoxvopa5 As(un.oc) ' ! ' p(viç), (xaiovicrpXov) youA(av),
(xcrrovvt2p%ov) np(o-Jixr (opa) oip (avix w.vv), xat (xcnovixzpov) 7rpor (spcwpa) pr (zç)
rp&rLi1 (ptac),(xJa rpLvx 171cr 71por(rptopv), ffpELJ.Lo71(IActplov) (xcrl.7 x wvtgcrvta'J öLEp%opeWA)v ir(porx to-i(pv, triap(ov) AEy(tawoç) 8 Aa(urç), cr(rperrryovJ
10 tAey. < KAJaV5(Lcrç) xai 5 Aa(urç), (tp8. BtyouA.i(rp$. opP.i vp8(ouvov) Al(fliovp(vøv, 71per1ffoctovJftav ,rrxA g vi urpa (u1ofpEwv 71EJChvJ(xat tnirev McrJu(pv xcni 'Oupoi7vv, x(crLJ(71peruroaitov raw BplrJr(ovoiv) xci irAxxi.(opaw)
15 (rpfl. 7rpalr. nporqxt.J 5ouxtvap (vov), rctEp-JtX0V AEyiawoç ......rrJpacxvtcz v Mecro&o-)frapic, apov Ae-y. yJ Tp(ivic), uvpaiq'yo(vJI .... xcii w (v) rcrAiv o-'rpcereufo—J(pEva)v reav xci i'nirka (v) Mcwpv xci b(c,-i
20 (poqwv, tirapxov Ae.ly (itvoç) B Tpcxicv (ç), crrpfrz-i(riyov Aey. c A?au& xci) S Aa$ (icc) xcv. B(pirr.J[xci wA xztopaw npiaEjzvtcr ev 9p(axiJI .7 xci c'pervLixx ......II I auvov ircr(Aiv ......I
25 xci raAiv Acx9ovrcr .....C
sic rrv uinipeotav ..... (q cwtov .....narpi EDtu(xcoci.
Almost half of the appointments mentioned in the inscription are either
unusual or controversial. Christol's examination of these is at times
I, ci', above, p.266 n,2 for a revised restortion of line 15, A complete, annotated version of my
own reading can be found in App,2: 'Traianus Mucianus',
2, t' ahoJ urpiç,, ci', 1,26,
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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
brilliant, but his Interpretation of their meaning fails to convince.
He is probably correct in dating the start of the man's career to the
last years of the emperor Gallienus, and In identifying the hand of the
Praetorlan Prefect, Heraclian, in its advancement 1 . However, by his own
argument, the agent of that change cannot have been the centurionate of XIII
Gemina as he believes, but must have been entry into the evocat4 from which
the appointment to cent urio protector legionis XIII Geminae will have been
the natural consequence. As he himself shows, a position in the evocati
often acted as a springboard into the ceriturionate 2. It matters little that
for some this move was a dead-end 3, since for Muciarius it was patently not
the case. Therefore, service in the evocati was the starting point for
Mucianus' advancement, and it Is here, not in the centurionate of Xlii Gemina,
that the intervention of Heraclian must be placed.
If Mucianus was an evocatus just prior to the murder of Galllenus4 , he
will not have become a centurio protector until the accession of Claudius,
tying in neatly with the advent of the protector ducenarius. This would
suggest that the centurlo protector was introduced by Claudius, which seems
I, Chrjstol, 'Traianus Mucianus', 397ff, The existence in Traiana Augusta of two dedications by
a Nuclanus, one to Heraclian, and one to his brother, N, Aurelius Apollinaris, strongly suggests that
Nucianus was a beneficiary of the Prefect's patronage: 168R 11I 1568 & 1569,2, Chrlstol, 399: '.,ceux-ci (the evocati) eta/eat les soidats les plus aptes a's is garnison a's
Roie, qui pouvaient, i l'issue de Jeur teaps a's service none!, poursuivre une carniêre iii service dii
prince en occupant des functions três vaniCes, souven t upon tan tes, et par fois seas recoasencar mebelie carniêne dans Is centurions is puis les pastes de confiance, ' Also Ourry, Cohortes pretoniennes(1938), 117ff; E, Birley, Rosan Britain and f/ic Rosan Arty (1953), 104ff; Dobson & Breeze, 'RomeCohorts and the Legionary Centurionate', (pig, Stwd, 8 (1969), 101 & 105,
3, ChrIstol, 400: Julius Nartialis conspired against Caracalla because of this, Cassius Dio
LXXVIII52; S/iA, Car, viii; Herodian IV'13, Also Dobson and Breeze, op. cii,, 106; Breeze, 'Careerstructure,,,', ANRYII'l, 439,
4, Christol, 398, dates IGBR 1112 1568 & 1569 above to the year 267, when Gallienus was involvedin his Gothic campaign,
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M.C,IbeJi: C3 Army. Protectores
most likely. Technically nothing militates against its introduction by
Gallienus; but the vast difference in the type of personnel who received the
office, and in the terminology it employed, seems more explicable if viewed
as a reorganisation of the protectores by his successor. The appearance of
the protector ducenarius and the centurlo protector at just this point cannot
be merely coincidental.
As a centurio protector, Muclenus appears to have benefitted from the
title in much the same way as the protect ores Ga11ien4 but on a more
mundane scale. Dobson and Breeze noted that those who progressed from the
evocati usually went in one of two directions. Either they entered the
legionary centurionate, where they remained; or they were promoted into the
garrison of Rome, through which they progressed to the Primipilate1.
Mucianus was unusual in doing both.
Beginning as cent urlo protector legionis XIII Geininae, he was then
centurio protector vigi.lum, centur.io protector urbanicianus and centurio
protector cohortis V praetoriaa Much has been made of the lack of unit
numbers for the cohortes vigilurn and urbanae. Pflaum believed this meant
the posts were not effective, and Christol argues that they were sinecures
designed to keep Mucianus within the field army while rising through the
cursus. However, as the career of Volusianus illustrates 3, the emperor had
no need for such convoluted measures, If he wanted to bypass the natural
ordo for a particular favourite, he simply did so. I also find it very
difficult to believe that the emperor would concern himself so greatly
I, Dobson and Breeze, locc, citt, (above),
2, Pflaum, 168R 1112, 42; Christol, 'Traianue Mucianus', 401,
3, XId836 ' /LS)332; discussed in detail above on pp.249 & 258ff,—273-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
with the career of an individual NCO, since even the favoured Volusianus had
to progress beyond the Primipilate before Gallienus started to take a hand
in his career.
Yet we should not discard Pflaum's hypothesi8 out of hand. The very
fact that Mucianus was marked as a protector indicates patronage of some
sort. The most likely patron in this case is Heraclian. Mucianus' later
career suggests that he had entered the centurionate very young, since he
held in all twenty-one posts after his evocatlo of which only the first six
preceded the Prirnipilate. The urban appointments are unusual in not having
unit numbers attached to them 1 , and the simplest explanation is that they
were fictional posts. While the emperor may not have needed to preserve the
niceties of the career structure, perhaps the Preetorian Prefect did. Yet
this suggests that the centurlo protectorate was under his jurisdiction, for
which there is not a shred of evidence 2. If anyone was hoping to preserve
the niceties, it is more likely to have been Mucianus or the inscriber
himself, Ironing out the percieved incongruities in the inscription. However,
it is worth noting that at one other point, and maybe a second, the
inscription lacks unit numbers where they might have been expected3,
1, cf, Pflaum, bc, cit,; 111 . 3126 & Xl'1836 ' ILS 1332 are already cited examples of the usual
terminology for the urban cohorts, though these are of tribunician rank and not centurions, Could it
be that the urban centurionate did not follow the same conventions? It seems unlikely,
2. Though it is worth noting that the protectores of the later empire came under the authority ofthe various lagistri ai1itia in whose districts they served: Haldon, Byzvitine Praetorians, 130,
3, ,,sr,s,a' ipor,, discussed below in the following paragraph, The title r,i, At$)oeptvevJ,
might also require a unit number, though not enough is known of the Liburnae to be sure, Domaszewski,Rangodmin 189,
-274-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Protectores
indicating a certain amount of sloppy workmanship,
The next appointment of Mucianus was that of ,rpvxurct rpo. Domaszewski
read this to mean 7tLXLJt porOptopciw), and was under the assumption that
a coflegium of protectores existed among the praetorians, with a princeps
protectorum at its head 1 . This has been unanimously refuted, and the more
logical reading IrpLvxiira' rrpoi(tperoper) put in its place2. Christol would like
to interpret this as (cent urlo) pri.nceps protector, arguing that the post of
princeps preceded the Primipilate on occasion 3. It is a perfectly reasonable
explanation, as long as one accepts that the next post in the cursus must be
primus pilus. However, Christol does not want Mucianus to be a primus pilus,
since this would remove him from the field army, and argues that the Greek
npeipot. should be completed rpsLpovr(tthpIov)4. This alters nothing, since
irpEIporr lJ. QLOV is simply the Greek equivalent of prirnipilaris, and the
primipilaris was nothing more than a man who had been a prim us pilus5.
Therefore, in the natural order of things, Mucianus should have become a
primus pilus', at which point he must either have been a (cent urlo) princeps
1, Oomasewski, Raiigordning, 188,2, Babut, 'la garde impêriale,,,', Rev, Hisi, 114 (1913), 244 n,4 Keyes, Equites, 43f n,16
Pilaus, 168R 1112, 42; iii cited in Christol, 'Traianus Nucianus', 403f nn,30-41,
3, Christol, 404, citing XI'5215 1LS2650,
4, Christol, op. cit., 405, The priaipiiares were a corps of veterans who could be seconded tothe emperor and important commanders on campaign; Domaszewski, op. cit., 116f; Durry, cchortespritoriennes, 21f; Dobson, '.,,Primipilaris in the Roman Army,', ANRU 11 . 1, 399ff; all cited in
Christol, 405 n,44,
5, Dobson, op. cit., 396ff,
6, Dobson and Breeze, 'Rome Cohorts', 106f,
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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
protector et primus pilus 1 , or a primus pilus protector et primipi1ar1.
The one post we cannot reasonably omit is the Primipilate. The Greek sits
most comfortably with the former interpretation, for which Christol himself
provides the perfect Latin parallel in XI5215. However, it is worth noting
that an example of a primipilaris protector exists In AE,1954,135 from Aioun
Sbiba in Algeria.
At this point, just as he was rising above the hierarchy of a career
soldier into the wider vistas of the equestrian cursus honorum, Mucianus
'passed out' of the protectorate4 . This was a complete departure from all
that had gone before in two fundamental ways. First, it meant that Mucianus
left the protectores earlier than any of his predecessors is known even to
have joined them. Secondly, his very leaving established that the
protectorate was no longer a permanent office. In effect, Mucianus had
become ex pro tectoribus.
These waters are muddy. It is possible that the terminology on most
protectorate inscriptions is simply imprecise, and that by protector the
formula ex protectoribus is intended. Yet with regard to the early
protectores this does not entirely convince. By the late third century the
terminology had become undeniably sloppy. Under Diocletian the terms
1. Greek: ,'svxau ror(roa) (irs) ipsjio,(sov),2, Greek: ravA1ia ror4'xroa) (tvs) rpcsj'o,(a'pov),3, XI . 5215 ' ILS 2650: ,,,cent, frui, subpriricipi peregrinorua adsfato et prinicip etpriiipiio
Jig, V/I 6ei, ph (sjc) Ii!,,,4 Line 81: ...ix rev t..,..) äiticopcv&v itporqrropav.,,
-276-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
protector, protect or-i, ex protect ore and ex protect on bus seem freely
interchangeble'. However, it bears repeating that under Gallienus all known
protectores were protectores Augusti nostri and even in the post-Gallienic
period, the terminology remained reasonably precise. One was either a
protector, or ex protectoribus. Only the anonymous primipilaris of Aloun
Sbiba2 was protectorL On the other hand, the existence of two ducenaril ax
pro tectoribus does suggest that the title of the protectores ducenari.i was
not entirely fixed. A progressive deterioration in the mode of address for
prot ect ores seems to have occurred, such that more than one term for a
specific situation had come into use a decade after the death of their
founder.
An alternative explanation is available. It is possible that a division
ocurred within the protectorate after the accession of Claudius, creating on
the one hand the cent un ones prot ect ores and on the other protect ores
ducenarli By this argument, the two ducenarii ex protector-thus would be
centurions who had advanced to ducenariate appointments after mustering out
of the protectores while the other protector-es ducenaril would still be in
the protectorate. However, a couple of inscriptions confuse the issue. Our
man from Aloun Sbiba held at least one other post as a protector
following his elevation into the Primipilate. He is supported by M. Aurelius
'1I ' i'io; , g0z sTJ.L ri I-i$-iqr' e ia. au ; ?.Zi.
2, A195i,135 mentioned above, p276,3. 111 . 1805; AI907,70,
-277-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
Processanue, who Wa8: ...ex cent(urione) praet(oriae) cohort(is) VI
prot(ectori) ducenario... 1 . The term protectori here has a pivotal position,
where it could apply either to the centurionate or to the ducenarlate or to
both. If it does apply to both, it provides a link between the centuriones
prof ect ores and their ducenariate counterparts. Failing this, on the
strength of these two Inscriptions we must exercise caution, since they
indicate that not every centurio protector left the office on passing the
Primipilate.
The ex pro tectoribus career of Tralanus Mucianus was a confused and
repetitive hotch-potch of appointments. As such, it cannot be viewed as
typical. In certain cases, he seems to have held the same extraordinary
commands more than once2 . On other occasions, he was the praefectus
legionis of at least three, and maybe four, separate legions 3. It is not
even certain whether he held all the usual urban tribunates, and he
definitely did not hold them in succession 4. It is clear, however, that while
his employment was wide-ranging, it was not getting him very far. The most
prestigious post he is thought to have achieved was that of praeses
provinciae Rae flee5 . This was at best a third echelon appointment, and herein
I, XI'837 • ILS 2778,2, fffll7y0V 1q', K4aol, its I •a$,, lines 9-10 & 20-21; frparI'o rev iaAsv trr,otccQopcvaY
icev its tllceY Map.v its Jrpoqvev, lines 11-13 (where Doe, has wrongly restored ,pai,ocirov inplace of fr,arqyov) & 15-20; urpa'ryoy rev Bpsrr, its epic, lines 14 (wrongly restoringipi'sioairov again) & 21-22,
3, Legio III 6eaina, line 17; Leglo 11 Tralana, line 20; and an unspecified legion inMesopotamia, lines 15-li, He was also iiapx, 4cj, 6 AiI, on line 9, but this was more likely to havebeen as praefecus castrorue than as priefectus Jegionis a, i', I,, assuming of course that the two postswere not identical,
4, rps, 8yovi, and rpsB, dpB, on lines 10-11 are sensible restorations by Doaaszewski, giventhe context, They are separated from the praetorlan tribunate (also a restoration, line 15) by threeextraordinary commands,
5, 111 . 5785, Line 23 of our inscription might be restored as apftvtra'Pasrsiç,-278-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
11e8 the importance of the Mucianus inscription. For all its foibles, it
clearly thdicate8 that a man who started as a centurio protector might gain
rapid and preferential promotion up to the Primipilate, but could still only
hope for a mid-level appointment in the ducenariate cursus, despite having
held a multiplicity of equestrian posts prior to this.
Several problems remain. It is not clear whether Mucianus occupied so
many positions due to competence or incompetence, and his obvious pride in
his achievements militates neither way. By this coin, it is impossible to
tell whether his final promotion was above or below the norm for his class.
Comparison with the ducenerli protectores puts it on a par with their best
achievements, and opens another can of worms. As an ex centurlo protector,
was Mucianus a protector ducenarius, or had he left the protectorate
completely? The question has already been discussed above, with no
satisfactory conclusion. Since the qualification ex protectoribus obviously
meant something to its holders, and since Mucianus so fortuitously ended his
career at the same point as most ducenarii prot ect ores, I am inclined to
believe that he was one, and that a protector ducenarius was simply a member
of the protectorate 'club' who had gained ducenariate status. In the absence
of further evidence, the point must remain debateable.
It is clear, though, that sometime, probably under Claudlus, the
protectorate was downgraded to come into the reach of centurions. We can
guess that Claudius was responding to pressure from below. Those brilliant
few who were brought into the officer ranks by Gallienus must have acted as
beacons beckoning to the mass of less fortunate NCOs who saw this as a new
way forward. With Gallienus deed, Claudius may have seen an expansion of
the protectorate as an easy means to several ends. On one hand, it improved
his standing with the centurions, who were a key to controlling the army,
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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
irate at the murder of their commander'. In addition, it was a sweetener to
the Senate 1 with whom he wanted friendship2, since by downgrading the
protectorate in this way, it diminished the prestige of the appointment and
relegated the privilege it accrued to advancement within the centurionate as
opposed to within the equestrian cursus. This must have distanced the
emperor from the protectorate in some way, even if it did not go so far as
to place its administration into the hands of the Praetorian Prefect. By
doing this, it depersonalised the protectorate and removed the cabal, of
which he had been a part, that had decided the previous emperor's fate. It
may not be coincidence that no protectores Augusti are extant from the reign
of Cleudius.
Whether these thoughts passed through the emperor's mind is a moot
point. Yet any one of them is a valid reason for the reorganisation of the
prot ect ores. On the whole, this was a downward move, destroying the elite
nature of the protectorate but retaining some of the mystique. Men were
now proud to call themselves protector who had not even equalled the lowest
achievements of the title's pioneers. In many cases, protector was the only
achievement engraved upon their epitaphs3.
Under Diocletian, a few men appear holding offices equivalent to those
of the average protector Gall1eni Viatorinus was the most successful of
these, as vicerius Divit (i)e ch)sI (s). Aurelius Flrmthus became praef. leg. II
Adi. ex pro tectore, and Flavius Julianus was heralded as ex protectore et ex
I, los, 1 . 11; M4, 6a11, IV'3,2, Alfoldi, CARX! (1939), 191.
3. cf, Tables P3 4,
-280-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
praeposito1 . The bias of the sample against pre-Diocletianic examples may
be circumstantial. At the same time 1 it is worth noting that even If
Mucianus were to ignore his two Urban centurionates and hold each of his
promotions for just one years he would still only just be eligible for an
appointment as praefectus leglonis by 2842.
In equating the term ex protectore alongside the term ex preeposito,
lulianus' reference reinforces the suspicion that there was now a definite
point at which one ceased to be a member of the protectorate; though the
proliferation of terms in the period makes it Impossible to tell when that
was. Considering the material discussed above (p.V'), it seems likely that
the point was not fixed in any definite way. The tenacity with which people
held on to their association with the office is testimony to its continuing
importance9.
The notion of a split in the protectores, with regard to ducenaril and
centuriones, has already been discussed and cautiously discarded. Yet at
some point in the fourth century a split did occur between the protectores
and a new corps entitled protectores domestici The domestici of the late
empire were, as the title implied, a corps of protector'es stationed at court.
Their duties seem originally to have been as guards or aides to the emperor,
and by dint of their privileged position, they came to have a higher
1, Viatorinus, Al889,65; Firminus, 111 • 10406; lulianus, III'8741, insecurely dated, All have
been discussed above, p.269,
2, This somewhat frivolous statistic assumes that he held his first centurion's post in 270, and
achieved both Urban tribunates, Vhile his career is indubitably abnormal, it is still the only
'Protectorate' career froa the Claudio-Aurelianlc period which terminated in a reasonably prestigious
ducenarlate appointment, Even under the most auspicious circumstances, that appointment still dates
to Diocletian,
3, cf, T!: '. p.2.7? .i. I.
-28 1-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
status than that of the ordinary protector-es and guard unitsl. They are
generally assumed to have come into being some time after 3502.
This date may be somewhat late, if a furierary monument from Moesia
Inferior is to be credited. The monument, erected by one M. Bitianus
prot(ector) domes(ticue) in memory of his mother and father, was discovered
by Dobrusk at Comakovci (Bulgaria), and has been tentatively dated in the
PLRE to the late third or early fourth century. This is the only
attestation I can find to the domestici at such an early date, discounting
the literary references to Diocletian, which are surely apocryphal 4. Given
the dubious nature of its date, I am disinclined to give it credence
With the exception of the above, little can be said about the
pro tectores of Diocletian that has not been said before.
There remains one other protectorate designation which requires
di cussion. The title protector divini later-is appears three times in the
corpus, with complete disregard for period but otherwise conforming
absolutely to the patterns described above.
Aurelius Faustus is termed prot. divini lateris Aug. n. in a dedication to
an unknown emperor found at Ocriculum in Umbrias. Given that the emperor's
name has been erased, and the term is a permutation of the pr-ot. Aug. n.
I, Haldon, lyzantine Praetorlans (1984), 134ff: Jones, Later Rotan Eapire (1964), 636ff,2, Haldon, 130,
3, Qobrusk, $bornik 18, 798; AE,1902,141 111 . 14412'; PLRE H. Bitiarnis, presumably on the5trength of 0obrusk's report,
4, Victor Caci, XXXIX'I, doa'eg ticos regeiis Zon, XII'31, ouiç doucorixa $/M, Carl, XIII'l,doiesticoi twic regentea, All must be extrapolating from their own period, and knowing thatDiocletian was a protector assume that he was in command of the doaesticl,
5, XI'4082 • !LS4002,
—282-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
formula, it seems most probable that the subject of the dedication was
Gellienus.
M. Aurelius Valerius, v.p. ducen(ar-iJus ex protectorib. lateri(sJ divi.nl
paid for the restoration of the public baths at Naroria (Dalxnatia) in AD 280;
dated by the consulate of Messala and Gratus1.
Aurelius Malor, ex protectoribus divini later-is, erected a monument to
his dead wife at IJipiana in Moesia Inferior, sometime during the reign of
Diocletian, though the dating is unsure2.
The only thing special about any of these is their terminology. The
phrase protector divini .Zateris seems to highlight the guardian's function of
the office. Perhaps the addendum divini later-is differentiated between the
ordinary protector, holding an independent command simultaneous with the
ff ice, and the actual bodyguards of the emperor, the 'protectors of the
divine flank' who were required to attend his person and quite literally
watched his back. Unfortunately, this seems exactly what the protector-es
domes tici were created to do. Even discounting the possibility that the
domes tici were in existence under Diocletian, which would have generated two
identical offices under different names, it seems unlikely that the they
would have been created to replace the protector-es divini later-is.
Considering the preoccupation of the Dominate with the trappings of office,
the divinity of the household and the adoratici3, what would effectively be
the renaming of the grandiloquently styled protector-es divini later-is as the
rather more mundane protector-es domes tici seems Increasingly less probable.
I, 111.1805,2, ,Q(,198),731,3,Jones, LR 636ff,
-283-
M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army. Protectores
A simpler explanation is that the term protector divini .lateris was the
full title of the original Gallienic office. The short form protector was
usually used on inscriptions and official documents for reasons of space, and
the somewhat cumbersome longer form was only used by those of a pedantic
nature, with enough money and space to Include it.
We have now reviewed the full corpus of material concerning the early
prot ect ores. Few definite conclusions can be reached, but it is possible to
make some general comments.
It would seem that Diesner was right in assuming that the protectorate
preceded Gallienus, though it dates even earlier than the 250s and can have
resembled the protectores Augusti in structure only, perhaps solely in name.
What began as a grade of principalis may have been converted by Gallienus
into a beneficiarius of the emperor. The process was linked in some way to
the rise of the yin m.LZit ares, and was probably a badge of privilege for
humble equestrians in whom the emperor had a personal Interest. Certainly,
the pro tectores Gallieni had no common feature other than humble origins in
those for whom an origo can be deduced. Those who had the ability rose to
great prominence as provincial governors and generals. Voluslanus, perhaps
the greatest of them all, achieved the consulate after becoming praefectus
prae t orb.
The nature of the office was radically altered by Claudius. Opening it
up to centurions seems to have been a deliberate move to reduce the
importance and permanence of the position. Until Diocletian, no protector
gained the heights of the great men who had held the title in its heyday.
The resurgence of the protectores under that emperor was probably less a
matter of policy than a function of the career structure. Lacking the
-284-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
helping hand of the emperor, any protector who rose through the centurionate
during the 270s was unlikely to have progressed far along the equestrian
cursus by 284. Dobson was of the opinion that without imperial favour few
primipilares attained procur'atela within twelve years after the Primipilate1.
Therefore no amount of preferential treatment within the ceriturionate was
going to make a centurio protector of Claudius eligible for high office
before the reign of Diocletian.
At fir8t an honorific for privileged yin militares, the term must have
fulfilled the same sort of function for centurions after its downgrading by
Claudius. This would explain why not all centurions in the last quarter of
the century received the title, since it remained a badge of privilege, to be
earned by those worthy of it. Whether it still denoted imperial patronage is
a moot point. It seems to have retained something of its original aura of
influence, since in the latter part of the century people were still aping
the forms that had gone before, though with far less precision. By this
time, the office had become institutionalised, but was a pale reflection of
the original creation. At some point, it became a guard unit, possibly with
the creation of the protectores domes tici and gradually lost all resemblance
to the office of Gallienus, so that by the sicth century it was simply one of
the many scholee within the Paletinate2.
Yet one need not follow its history quite so far to illustrate its
dynamic nature. Even under Diocletian, the protectorate resembled the
institution created by Gallienus in superficial terms only. The office was
1, Dobson, 'Primipilaris' 425 & nn,80 & 144,
2, Haldon, 8yzantine Praetorians, 130ff,
-285-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores
no longer permanent, its terminology no longer precise. In form it more
closely resembled the protectores ducenarli of Claudius than the protect ores
Augusti of his predecessor. No more than fifty years had passed, yet any
attempt to di8cern the nature of the original protectores from the examples
found under Diocletian would be doomed to failure. Only by identifying each
individual phase of their evolution, end examining these phases as discrete
entities, can the complicated and confusing nature of the protectores finally
begin to unravel.
-286-
mABL.E P 1:
G11irii AL<i Mc,tri
N. . C. Ef. P. Th. E. CAl 11 BL Il. E. .VI. Q.B EQUESTER
Aelianus -----------p praes, Maur, Caesariensis
Marcellinus -----------p praes, Maur, Catsariansis
Marc Linus ------------ 600 xai ,rpavAa'riir
Victor ------------praes, Maur, Caes, prot.
CV]italianus --------_______________________
REFERENCES
111 . 3529; gE,1965,9
111 . 3424 1LS545
1965, 114
4E 1910,108
III3228
Volusianus x x 2 x - x x p - - praef, vigilum; PPO; cos, X1•1836 = ILS 1332
arn, --------x p - - II1•3126
7 Sabinimnus ---------?p - - proc. duc, Dalmatia 111.8571 = 1985
NOTES.
1, As (ptaepos)itus rexx, itgg, 6ari, et, Brit,, he is •ost likely to have held the command at any point within thisbracket, though he could have held it earlier: cf, App,2: 'Traianus Mucianus',
2, praepoiitus equitue singiilarior(u&, This is his first extraordinary command: PLRE Voiusianus 6,
p fIrs attestation of protectorate; x post attested; 9 post uncertain,
M miles eques; C centurio; PP primus pilus; PC praef, coh,; TM = trib, uil,; PA praef, alae CAS praef,
castrorum; TV ' trib vigilum TU = trib, urb,; TP = trib, praet,; PB primus pilus bis; AVL = praef, leg, a,v,1,
-287-
Claudius
Ma cianus
Postu us
TABLE P 2:TI-i Gr r- 1 c f G 111 ri t.i
NAME
Aureolu
Aurellan
N. . E. PC. t. EA. C.I LL BL I. Ei i& ATTESTED MILITARY APPOINTHENTS
x -----------dux exercitus in Illyricum vs rebels;
hipparch; dux Alpium
- - - x - - ? 1 7 - - hipparch of cavalry from Danube exercitus detache
to fight Aureolus at Milan
- - - - x - - ' I I - - I dux Illyrici
x - - 60D( xai rrpac7Aar7ç
I dux/praeses in Gaul
KEY:
p fi m attestation of protectorate' x ' po5t attested 7 post uncertain,
N ' miles iques, C ' cm tu lo PP • primus pilus; PC z praef, coh,; TN : trib, .i,; PA = praef, alae; CAS praef,
castroru ' TV ' trib vigilu.; TV • tub, urb,; TP tub, praet,; PB primus pilus bis; AVL = praef, leg, a,v,l,
-288-
Florus
Hatena
Pate rnus
Processa us
Roaanus
Valerius
TABLE P 3:Di-iri I Prct ct cr
NAN
Aellanue
E. E. I. A. 1 I. IJL If. Et .VL QR.EQUESTER REFERENCES
censitor Norici 1907, 70 = !L$94
proc. in Italia; proc. argent, Pann,
proc. Epirus; ducenarius ex protectoribus
prot, ducEen,] AE1964,256
pro(t,) duc, 111.6439
ducenario protE V'5833
- 1 ----------ye, prot, ducenario X1'837 ILS 2778
protector ducenarius XII.2576
ducenarius ex protectoribus 111.1805
lateris divini
NOTES.
I v iro gregio s cent(urione) prut(orae) cobort(s) WI prot(ec tori) ducenario,
p fIre attestation of protectorate; x • post attested; ? = post uncertain,
ii lee eques, C centu lo, PP • prisus pilus, PC praef, coh,; TN = trib, .11,; PA praef, alae; CAS = praef,
castroru., TV ' trib, igilu. TU trib, urb, IP = trib, praet,; PB = pri.us pilus bis; AVL praef, leg, a, v.1,
-289-
NN
Cons tans
Kalandinus
axi sinus
Mucianus
Rosanus
anon,
rABLE }' 4:Cr2t LiFi Pt X
M. . E. P. Itci a a ia EB. A'& RDC1 EQUESTER
- -----
- ------
2p 3p - - - 4 1 1 5- 6 7 V.P. praes, Raeiia
- -----------
7p p 8
REFERENCES
X1I1'8291
111.10509
1919 74
IQRRI . 1496 = ILS
94792 A19O8,259
1658 1112 1570; als
111.5785
XIII'8273
AE1954 1 135
NOTES.
I ii 1e5 Ccb, I ConcordIen5m 5 leg, II Par thica', eqiies cob, VII Praetoriae, e roca tus,2, cenfurio protector leg. XIII 6einae, cob, Vigilut, cob, Urbaniciani ef co/i, V Praetoriae,3, (centuno) princeps protector et prisus pilus, cx protector/bus,4. pracl, leg, IV Flav,ae, praep, legg, VII Claudiae et IV Flay/ac,5, trib, Liburnorui praep ped. et eq. Haur, et Osrh,, praep, Butt, et explor,, fr/b, cob, P Praet,6 pract. leg, agens in Hesop,, prae!, leg, 1111 6e., a, v, I,, praep, ped. e t eq. flaur, e f Osrb,, praci', leg, II It,,praep, Iegg, VII Cl, et Iv Fl,, praep, Sri ft. ef explor,7, centu,io IV Fl, et protect on ilea ceinturilo leg, 111 A, lid tpraep,J a/ac Parthorutal,8, The top of the inscription has broken, leaving: ,. , ,,,,,,Jil protec(fori1
p firs attestation of protectorate; x = po5t attested; ? = post uncertain,
N •iles/eques, C ' centurio; PP primus pilus: pc = praef, coh,; TN trib, iii,; PA praef, alae; CAS praef.
castroru.; TV trib, vigilum; TU trib, urb,; TP = trib, praet,; PB primus pilus bis; AVL praef, leg, a,v,l,
—2 90-
TABLE P :Pr-t t cr Di cc1 t I ri
ef. . II. aa. A1 IiL L If. EL . TITLE/ORDO EQUESTER REFERENCES
Firiinui -----------p ex prot(ectoribus) 111.10406
Viatorinus ------------protector/vicarius divit- ,qE, 1889 65
(i)e(n)sl(s)
p • hr. attestation of protectorate; x post attested: ? • post uncertain,
• alles/aques; C centurio; PP • primus pilus; PC ' praef, coh,; TM trib, iii,; P praef, alae; CAS praef,castroru.; TV • trib, vigIlus; 1(1 ' trib, urb, IF • trib, praet,; PB prisus pilus bis; AVL praef, leg, a, v.1,
-29 1-
TABL.E P 6:o t i-i r pr-c, t t c, f r- wi-i m c, m
c - r- r- r- ci i r s I s,
N. C. E. E IN. Fl CA. tIL UL If. Fl YL. QBDQ. EQUESTER
Conitantlus C P? I - - 1 1 7 - - praes, Dal.atia; dux;
imperator
Dioc lea
comiander of the doiesticiimperator
REFERENCES
SHAProb, XXII'3;
(xc, Va!, 1.2
Vict, Cues, XXXIX'l,Zon, XII.31;
$H1q Car, XIII.1
Herodes
1 ----------- cx protec(toribus)
iQE19O7,48 IGRR
1.1481
Severus
protector pr(aeses) p(rov,?) V1.3238
Spec titus
x I Ip III'7535a
•., , tivlua
- I ----------cx protectoribus V1'32945
kOTES
I, ,,,, ii ro cx protecloribus (centurio) classis Rabennatiiia,
p • fin, attestation of protectorate; x • post attested; 1 post uncertain,
• illes/eques; C • centunlo; PP • prl.us pilus; PC • praef, coh,: TM • trib, iii,; PA • praef, alae; CAS praef,castroru.; TV trib, vlgllia TU • trib, urb,; TP • trib, praet,; PB • pri.us pilus bis; AVL praef, leg, a,v,1,
-292-
Augustlinu. ------------dux Nacedonica
Deciaus -----------princeps peregrinorum
v.p. praes, Numidia
Flavianus I -----------vp praes, Numidia
Frontinus x
- x x - - - x x x x x - proc.; praes, Sardinia
praes, Pannonia Sup,
V. p. praes, Arabia
Plarlanus
Plaxisus
Olyipus
mABL.E P 7:Ncr—prct tr-t Eq tx-1ri
. 250-284.
. C. Ef. E.C. IN. E& CA. IiL II IE. EB & QRQ. EQUESTER
REFERENCES
Aniinus -----x ------praes, Arabia
OGI 614; 111,90;
IGRRIII'1287 Syri
6 (1925), 2321,
Aper ------------ v,e, praep, V Nac, et XIII
PLREAper 1 & 2;
Ge.,; PPO
11I'15156: A1936,
53, 54 & 57,
AE 1934,193 inferre
PLREDeci.us 1
VII1'2481, 4325 &
17970; AE,1916,18 &
21
41,1944,85 = III'32
1L2457
VI' 1636
111.4564
IGRRI1I1286; Syn
39(1952), 312,
Paternianus -----------x 111.3469
Silvius --------- - v,e, praes, Pannonia Inf, 111.3424 !L$545
Superinus -----------X 111.4289 !LS3656
Synforlanus ------( 2 1 4 1934, 193
Veteranus -----------x 111.1560 ILS 3845
Ael, Victorinus ------------p,v,(sic) praes, Numidia 41,1908,240
Fl, Victorinus -----------x 1II'3424 = A1964,
Zeno ------------ v.p. praes, Cilicia 4E1915,51,
KEY:
p fir. attestation of protectorate; x = post attested; 7 : post uncertain,
N • .iles/eques; centurio; PP primus pilus; PC • praef, coh,; TM trib, mil PA praef, alae; CAS = praef,castroru.; TV trib, vigilum; TU = trib, urb,; TP trib, praet,; PB pri.us pilus bis; AVL = praef, leg, a,v,l,
-293-
M.C.Ibeji. C3 Army
Grir 1 C 1 L11 cri
XII: VI R TU IL.L. YRI CI AL.LIIJI
It has become a truism of third century studies that the empire was
saved by virtus Illyrici.
As the empire tottered towards destruction, a caste of officers emerged
which was given access to power by the reforms of the emperor Gallienus, and
which by its military genius brought the empire back from the brink. These
officers were distinguished by humble Illyrian origins and almost exclusively
military careers. Quite why the Illyrian soldier emperors should have been
able to achieve what their predecessors had not has never been adequately
explained. Instead, their success has been cloaked In woolly terms such as
genius Illyrici and virtus IllyricZ founded upon a firm assumption of the
military excellence of Illyrian soldier stock1.
The Genius Illyrici Is displayed as a new revelation of Roman patriotism, Roman virtue and Roman
self-sacrifice -- as was only Just, for It was Illyricum that restored the unity of the Empire,2
Such assumptions are founded upon sand. The Illyrian soldier emperors
were as human, as vulnerable and as prone to error as any of their
predecessors, end to date the rise of their caste to the second half of the
third century is blatantly to ignore those less successful Illyrians who had
gone before. Both Maximinus Thrax and Decius were of Illyrian stock, though
neither of their reigns is covered In glory 3. One can partially duck the
I, AlfOldi, CA/I XII, 193 & 2001: Altheim, So/daterikaiser (1939), 265ff esp,275f1 & 286ff; DcBlois, Policy of Gallienus (1975), 86 & 207; Williams, Diocletian and the Rosan Recovery (1985), 24;G, Brauer, The Age of the Soldier Esperors (1975) takes this assumption to extremes,
2, Alfôldl, op, cit,, 200,
3, PuRl 619; Enselin, CAHXII, 72ff: Alfôldi, CAHXII, 165ff,-294-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici
accusation by maintaining that Declus was not of humble origin, but there
can be no such excuse for Maximinus. Even after 250, the number of
Ulyrians whose reigns can be measured in months equals those who are
lauded as the saviours of the empire. True, some had great success in the
short time allotted them, but what of Quintillus, or the hapless Numerian1?
How many of the short-lived emperors and usurpers whose power-base was in
Danube provinces, both before and after Gallienus, came from the same
Ulyrian stock as Claudius, Aurelian, Probus or Diocletian? Even these
restorers of the empire had their own fair share of problems. It is worth
remembering that of them all, only Diocletian managed to last more than five
years.
Virtus Illyrici is not in itself an adequate explanation for the recovery
of the empire, military or social. Too many exceptions, or possible
exceptions, abound for it to be seen as the all-embracing panacaea some
would have us believe. The question must be asked: what is it that
distinguishes Claudius, Aurelian, Probus (and possibly Carus) from their
contemporaries end their predecessors that enabled them to pave the way for
Diocletian to create the Tetrarchy?
Historical accident is no more adequate an explanation than virtus
Iflyrici itself. The cycle of plague and disaster which had been ravaging
the empire since AD 240 did not let up at this point, on the contrary it
removed Claudius Gothicus from the empire's service2. That this was the
last recurrence of the great plague will have been little solace to Aurellan
as he strove to reunite a sundered empire; for who could tell that this
1, Alfoldi, C4HXII, 192; Mattingly, CAHXII, 3221,
2, Zos, I46 . 2; $114 C1ud, XII'2-3 ci, ch,II: /fanpciver, p.52,
-295--
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtue Illyrici.
would be the case, and how could such knowledge have mitigated its immediate
effects? The absence of plague In the mid-280s may go some way to explain
why Diocletiari was able to maintain the stability that had been created, but
cannot explain how that stability came about. The cycle of warfare had
certainly not let up. Claudius was immediately faced by an Alemannic
invasion of Italy and was embroiled for the rest of his reign in an
interminable Gothic war 1 . As if the reconquest of Palmyra and the Gallic
empire were not enough, Aurelian was faced with another invasion of Italy 60
traumatic that it prompted the fortification of Rome itself, and he also had
to deal with Vandals on the Danube2. Probus fought Franks in Gaul, Vandals
and Goths in Illyricum, Isaurians in Asia Minor, usurpers in the West and was
assassinated as he turned his attention eastwards 3. The end of each reign
was punctuated by a series of vicious civil wars, as minor players Jockeyed
for position4. The situation had not become any easier than in earlier
decades: with the restoration of the empire as an added burded it had in
some respects become more difficult.
Therefore, it is in the individual abilities of these emperors, their
virtue I11yrici. that the empire's salvation must be found. Yet this genius
would have availed nothing if it was exercised in isolation. The third
century abounds with measures that came to naught due to their abandonment
by later emperors. Caracalle discarded all his father's work In Scotland the
minute he was dead; the excesses of Elagabalus and the caution of Alexander
1, Alfóldi, CAMXII, 156; Vict, Epit, XXXIY'2,2, Hatiingly, CAM XII, 298ff,3, Nattingly, op. cit., 314ff,
4. op. cit., 192, 311ff & 321ff,
-296-
M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtue Illyrici
sacrificed all the loyalty to their house carefully nurtured by the early
Seven; and Philip the Arab abandoned all of Gordian III's gains in Persia by
rushing back to Rome in his bid for the purple'. These are the most blatant
examples, yet the whole of the century is permeated by more subtle
variatione on the theme2.
The distinguishing factor of virtus Illyrici is one of continuity. This
is what marked its success. Unlike the emperors who preceded them, the
successors of Gallienus seem to have had a unity of purpose, a concordance
of ideas, which was to serve the empire well. Though not an Illynian,
Gallienus himself should be included in the list, for it is his reign and his
reforms which created the climate in which virtue Iflyr'ici could flourish.
He gathered around himself a group of able soldiers in whom he placed his
trust and with whom he could formulate and enact the revolutionary changes
which were to save the empire. The career structure was streamlined to
bring able men to the fore. Those able men were given command of new
units, cavalry, permanent vexillations and strategically vital provinces. The
most able of them were gathered around the emperor, forming an entourage of
highly skilled generals who can almost be seen as a general staff. Whether
they helped the emperor to formulate his ideas of defence, or whether they
were simply indoctrinated into them does not really matter; it is enough to
know that men like Aureolus, Claudius, Aurelian and Marcianus were an
integral part of the great military upheaval which occurred at this time.
From this group of men were to come two emperors with very similar
I, CAWXII, iii; 56 & 71; 88,
2, Such as the withdrawal froc the Saharan Atlas under Bordian, or the events on the Pannonian
frontier following the reorganisation under Caracalla, cf, ch,Y: Auxilia, pp.112 & 118,
—297-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici
methods of defence, the latter of whom was to pass on these concepts to his
protegé, Probus. Taken together, the reigns of Gallienus, Claudius Gothicus,
Aurelian and Probus span a period of some twenty-six years (c.255-282), a
quarter of a century interrupted by less than eighteen months of interregna,
during which it is possible to see some form of continuity in defensive
thought.
I have very deliberately been avoiding the term 'policy', since to talk in
terms of defensive 'policy' would be highly misleading. De Blois has argued
convincingly that the majority of Gallienus' defensive measures were ad hoc
responses to threats 88 and when they arose, and owed little or nothing to
forward planning 1 . This is certainly true from a geographical and temporal
standpoint. Major access routes were fortified and garrisoned only when
their vulnerability became apparrent. Equestrians came to the fore because
senators were no longer doing their job. Cavalry and permanent vexillations
speak more of stretched resources than of grand strategy. Yet behind these
mea ures there runs a very strong concept of what was needed to defend the
empire, and of the paramount importance of that empire. Defence-in-depth
may not have been a 'grand strategy' in Luttwak's sense2, but it was an
ideology which can be found firmly ingrained in the reactions of Gallienus
and his 8uccessors. Other revolutionary concepts were equally strongly held.
The rise of the equestrians may not indicate imperial antipathy towards the
Senate, but it would be a foolish historian who missed the strong belief of
these soldier-emperors in the worth of the equestrian class. The continuity
J. Di Blois, Policy of &ilienui 32,2, Lutiwak, 6rand $tategy of the Roian Eapire (1976), ch,3, 127ff,
-2 98-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Virtus I1].yrici
is there, but it is not a continuity of policy, it is a continuity of concept,
of ideas and belief. No system was followed; each emperor responded fluidly
to the circumstances of his time. Yet the manner in which they responded
was remarkably similar, and followed patterns laid out during the formative
reign of Gallienus.
Continuity of thought is hard to prove. Who can say that, in their
continued use of the equites, Claudius and Aurelian were continuing and
refining an idea which they had helped to formulate, rather than simply
poaching a good idea from an earlier reign? We know that Aurellan had
first hand experience as a cava]ry commander, and there is some
circumstantial evidence that the Milan garrison continued to include cavalry
during his reign, perhaps even into the fourth century 1 . Unfortunately,
Zosixnus omits to describe the battles fought by Probus in anything but the
sketchiest of details, and though we might see shades of' Aurelian in the
methods used to defeat the Burgundians, the evidence for cavalry in his
reign can hardly be termed as conclusive 2. Claudius' rapprochement with the
Senate and his downgrading of the protectores might be seen as a direct
contradiction of this supposed continuity. Yet we have seen that he had
alternative motives for the move, and the protectorate did not lose its
importance, though Its status was reduced. It has already been noted that
friendship with the Senate does not automatically mean enmity towards the
I, Two coma expounding virius equii(d) come from the ilan-Ticinum mint under Aurelian: R.ICV.1
Aur, 100 & 115, A nuierus Iiliafarwa in Transpadanum was commanded by an exarchos which Fiebiger
identified am a Junior cavalry officer of the later Roman empire, though a si;nifer and a centurlo are
also mentioned: V . 5823, 7000 & 7001; Fiebiger, RE 1552,2, Zom, l'68, Probum, outnumbered, split the barbarian force by luring some across the river,
Later, he attacked the barbarians as they retreated from the empire, Does this indicate that he was
harassing them with the cavalry?
3, cf, ch,XI: Proiectoresp,279f,
-299-
M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici
equites. Equestrians did not stop being praesides on the death of
Gallienus'.
Despite such ambiguities, it is still possible to identify the same
concept of empire, and similar ideas for the defence of that empire, in the
actions of Gaflienus and his successors. Even Gallienus, who was forced to
accept the de facto shrinkage of his empire, can be seen to have striven for
its restoration to the best of his restricted ability. He pursued the
reconquest of the Gallic Empire almost to the point of his death, and was
preparing to return Palmyra to the fold, only to be forestalled by the
massive Gothic invasion of AD 2672. The expedition of Placidianus indicates
that Claudius also, swamped as he was by invading barbarians, had not given
up entirely on the Gallic Empire3 The reconquering fervor of Aurelian and
Probus has never been in doubt. None of this should be any more surprising
than the indications in their day-to-day defence of the empire that these
emperors were using identical techniques.
Among such techniques was the pattern of fortification initiated by
these men. The limes facing the most active enemies was strengthened
wherever it was necessary, and all major routes of access into the hinterland
commonly used by invaders were fortified and garrisoned. This was not an
overall policy of empire-wide defence, it was a series of knee-jerk reactions
to circumstances in which the knees all jerked the same way. While Gallienus
strengthened the defences of northern Italy, Pannonia and Macedonia; Aurelian
and Probus fortified the Gallic hinterland and Rome 4. Perhaps the best
I, cf, ch,X: Viri Militates,
2, Alfôldi, CMXII, 117 & 186,
3, Aflöldi. op, cii,, 192; XI1'2228 ' uS 569,
4, ct, ap 3: 4ttasted 6arrisons and fortifications of the C7,
-300-
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.
15.16.17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.
25.26.
27.28.
29.30.31.32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.
r°........
I1çJ V
MAP 3: ATTESTED GARRISONS AND FORTIFICATTONS. AD 253-c.284
0 Gallienus o Aurelian 0 ProbusGallic Empire V Uncertain late C3
•AFort
• U A Leg. garr, 90 Fort ifd city
Med lolanurnVeronaColonia AggripinaAthensNicaeaPoetovioSirmiumLychri idusMontanaAquilelaCenabum AurellanaDivioSainarobrivaRornaBurdigalaLiberchies (pre 275)Taviers (pre 275)Braives (pre 275)luliacum (late C3)Heidenberg (late C3)Villerthaus (post 270)Rigomagus (post 275)St. Laurent (c.259/275?)Mandacher Egg (c.260)VindonissaVemana-Betmauer(pre 283)Baisweil (260/273)Rostrum-Nemav lee(270/283)Ratiara (259/268?),Oescus (259/268?)Transmarlsca (259/268?)Durostoruin (259/268?)Troesmls (259/268?)SttlrmenkopfCeesaromagusAgedlnicuinQuadriburgiumFanumBagacumLiesen Ich
kucrcI' r114
I
0
0
SOURCES FOR MAP 3: De Blois, Policy of 6aliienus 36 n,58; von Petrikovits, IRS 61 (1971), pp.180-219;
Saxer, Vexillationen, N2s 102-105 & 107; Sesion, Dioclêtien, p,130 II1 • 12376: V . 3329 & 5869;VII1 • 22765; X11I • 8261; ILS 544 6730 & 8923; 16R8 111.39.
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici
indication that the impetus came fom the mind of Gallienus lies in the Gallic
Emperor, Postumus, another one-time subordinate of Gallienus, whose pattern
of fortification matches and anticipates that of his Illyrian successors.
That such actions were not obvious, despite the barbarian incursions of the
earlier third century, is proven by the fact that they did not begin until
Gallienus came to the throne. Even the permeable frontiers of Africa in the
early third century were largely garrisoned on the periphery, with the legion
at Lambaesis acting as an anchor point'.
The actions of Gallienus and his successors in the Balkans are
especially interesting. The gradual abandonment of Dacia and the relocation
of its troops strengthened not only the provinces on the Lower Danube, but
Pannonia as well. Gallienus had established a dux iustissimus in the passes
to guard Macedonia, and charged a certain (Pan)athenaeus with the task of
fortifying endangered cities. The whole Moesian border was fortified in the
later third century, and Aurelian even took the war across the Danube into
the lands of the Gothic tribes 2. In part, these measures were pre-emptive.
Aurelian must have aimed to cow the Gothic tribes before he turned his
attention eastwards towards Palmyra. Whether Gallienus established his
measures prior to AD 267 is unclear, but would seem likely, since he can
hardly have found the time to so so afterwards. Similar pre-emptive measures
may have been undertaken by Probus in Gaul if the sources can be believed3.
These emperors were also using strikingly similar methods of gaining the
additional troops they needed. No new auxiliary units are to be found after
AD 253, except in the lists of the Notitia Dignitatum. Instead, their place
1,ci, ch,V: uxi1ia, p,llOfi,2, ci, ch,X: Viri MiJItres p.231 for refs: cf, also Nap 3,
3, Nattingly, CAHXII, 315; Zon, XII29; S/IA Prob, XIIl . 8 & XIV; Orosius YII'24,
—30 1-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici
has been taken by units of equites and barbarian troops. When the various
units of equites came into use is almost impossible to tell 1 , but we have
plenty of indications that barbarian auxilia, though not termed as such until
the reign of Constantine, were probably introduced throughout the later third
century. Altheim believed that Gallienus attempted to recruit contingents of
Heruli around 267, when their king, Naulobates, was possibly made consul2.
Claudius is argued by Alföldi and Ensslln to have admitted Germans into the
regular Auxilia, which while it takes things too far does not discount his
recruitment of barbarian irregulars 3. We saw in an earlier chapter that
Aurelian and Probus made extensive use of barbarian troops4. Much of what
the sources have to say are couched in terms more readily associated with
the later Roman empire, yet there is a great deal of independent
corroboration between them, and it is clear from the Notitia that barbarian
units were in existence by the late fourth century. With this in mind, I
think it is fair to say that talk of barbarian recruitment by the successors
of Gallienus was not entirely a figment of historical interpolation.
The reign of Gallienus was a turning point. Shabbily depicted as a
debauched tyrant by a vengeful senatorial tradition5 , he worked tirelessly to
create the conditions by which the empire could be restored and its defence
secured. Outmoded institutions were discarded, and a series of radical
reforms took their place. Though probably intended to do no more than meet
1, cf, ch,VIl: Equites,2, Altheim, So/datenkaiier, 188; Syncellus p,717 (B); Jordanes Ada Gothica XXIII
3, CQH XII, 219 & 379, There ii no evidence fo an influx of barbarian auxiliaries at this time,but the use of barbarian nuieri would fit into the emerging pattern; cf, chY: Auxii.ia,
4, Cf, ch,IX: Foederati,
5, cf, ch,XI: Protectores, p.264 n2,
-302-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtue Illyrici
the needs of the moment, they were comprehensive enough to sow the seeds of
the future. The incorporation of cavalry into the military pantheon gave the
army enough flexibiltiy to deal with the diverse challenges of Palmyrene,
Goth and Gaul1 . Defence-in-depth allowed the empire to ride the hammer-
blows of continuous invasion, and the use of irregulars provided it with the
manpower with which to strike back 2. Yet it was in restructuring the
officer corps, freeing the equestrians to rise swiftly to positions of great
reponsibility3, that Gallienus did the empire his greatest service. For in so
doing, he inculcated those who were to succeed him with the methods needed
for the empire's defence.
Virtue Iflyrici was virtue Gelileni. The Illyrian soldier-emperors did
not succeed simply because of their military prowess. Their actions counted,
as the actions of earlier emperors had not, because when each individual
died, another able commander imbued with the same vision of how to restore
the empire rose to replace him. That vision had its roots in the entourage
of Gallienus. Three emperors rose to prominence through his efforts,
refining their ebilitieB in his company4. One rebelled against him. The
others killed him. It was a sad end for a remarkable man.
Yet his epitaph can be found In the single-minded purpose of his
successors. Imperial life expectancy had not improved; the purple was still
a death shroud; yet those few remarkable individuals able to stamp their
personality onto their reigns were now doing so in the same mariner, and with
1, ci, chh, III & VII: 'onira Coal Ia tut & (QuiteS,2, ci, chh,VI, V & IX: 'exi!iationes, 4uxllia & Foederati,3, ci, chh,X & XI: 'iri Ni/hares & protectores,4, Posiumus (Gallic Emperor 259-268); Claudius Gothicus (268-270); Aurelian (270-275),
-303-
M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtue Illyrici
the same aims. Eventually, their concerted efforts were to create a stable
platform upon which one of their number could stand to guide the empire
away from the abyss. A humble Illyrian, a vir militaris and even a
protector, the young Diodes was as much a product of the reforms of
Gallienus as any of his predecessors'. We must leave the proper evaluation
of his work to other commentators, though it would seem that he built
extensively upon foundations firmly embedded within the third century2 . By
the time of Constantine (an undeniably brilliant son of Illyricum), the empire
had been steered past its crisis, largely thanks to the Illyrian clique of
which he was a scion.
Once the door to power had been opened to them, the Illyrian generals
worked hard to keep it in their hands, for they truly believed in virtus
I11yrici arid felt themselves best suited to govern the empire. Such
jealous guardianship of privilege had as much to do with the
di proportionate number of Illyrians in high office as did the experience and
skill of the Illyrien soldier stock. The Illyrici worked together to restore
the empire, though they may have done so in the spirit of healthy
competition. A combination of factors - unity of purpose, the loyalty of
the soldiery, a streamlined career structure -- all came together with
genetic brilliance to create the phenomenon of Illyrian genius. Whether the
Illyrians would have succeeded without them, and just how much these factors
1, For Diocletian's origins and early career cf, PLRE Diocletian Se5ton Lliociátien et iiTtrarchj g (1946), 38ff; Jones LRE cap,2; Williams, Diocletian and the Rotan R&overy (1985) 26ff &237 n,20,
2, On Docletian's militiry reforms cf, Van Berches, L Arise ile Dictclêtjen ,, (1952) pt 1Jones, LRE cap 17; Luttwak, Stand Strategy, cap,3 Williams Dxletian and the Roaaii REcer$cap, 7,
—304-
M,C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici
were brought about by the Illyrici themselves, is a matter for conjecture.
Here, it is enough to say that if Diocletian and Constantine can be seen as
the crowning examples of virtus Illyrici, Gallienus can be called its adoptive
father.
-305-
M. C. Ibeji. C3 Army
Appridi
APPENDIX 1
TI-a AritLqti Liz cf Vtiti
Up until now, I have studiously avoided any mention of the antlqua legio
of Vegetius, but since Parker's ingenious article of 1932 1 , it would be
inexcusable to write a discussion of the army in the third century without
some reference to it. Modern scholars have always been highly sceptical of
the Epitoma Rel Mil1taris but until recently they have still felt obliged to
give it some credence2. However, the most current orthodoxy is inclined to
reject Vegetius' epitome as en unreliable source for the military composition
of the empire
Vegetius was probably writing some time in the late fourth century, or
early fifth century. Two independent termini are the proclamation of
Arcadius a Augustus in AD 383, mentioned in the text, and a copy of
Vegetius produced some time in the fifth century4 . The epitome is extremely
harsh on Gratian, indicating that he was a sore subject at the time.
Vegetius was a comes arid a vir inlustris, prompting Jones and Martlndale to
believe that he was possibly a finance minister of Theodosius s. Having
1, Veg, II'6; Parker, 'The Antiqua Legioof Vegetius', CQ26 (1932), 137ff.2, watson, Roian $oidie, 26f; Birley, 'Severus & the Roman Army', 68f; Cooper, Origin chill,
36ff who put forward the ingenious argument that it was written as a set of proposals for reform,
3, I am indebted to Dr Nicholas Mimer for sharing with me his knowledge on the Epitoia RelIfilitaris, prior to the publication of his new english translation of Vegetius, with commentary, Muchof what I have to say below is based upon our discussions, though any errors in interpretation are
mine alone,
4, Goffart, 'The Date and Purpose of Vegetius' De Re Hhlitari', Traditbo 33(1977), 65ff; Barnes,'The Date of Vegetius', Phoenix 33 (1979), 254ff,
5, PLRE, Rena tus,
-306-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Appendix 1
written the first book of the epitome independently, he was invited by the
emperor to produce a series of books, which were written as a polemic
against the military. His sketchiness shows that he was not an antiquary,
interested in the details of the antique .Zeglo, but was rather a commentator,
drawing on ancient sources to learn lessons for the present. In particular,
his constant harpthg on the value of citizen troops was most likely an
indirect attack upon the large numbers of barbarian troops of his day, about
whom it was not yet circumspect openly to speak Ill.
Vegetius names some of his sources in two places 1 , and Mimer has
established a highly probable pattern of progression from these. Possibly
starting with the De Re Miiitar.i of Cato the Elder in the second century BC,
his sources may have progressed through Celsus, Frontirius, and some middle
imperial epitome not named, to Paternus. His own epitome is so sketchy and
full of innacuracies tht he probably did not have the originials of these
before him, and it seems likely that he was in fact using a source derived
from Paternus.
That his material dates as far back as the second century BC is
indicated by the confusion he exhibits between the antique leglo and the
ancient republican legions. Throughout, he implicitly carries over
organisetions and assumptions used by Polybius and Livy. At one point, he
talks of soldiers wearing just the breastplate of a cuirass because they
cannot afford chainmail. At another, he talks in terms of manipular
formations, and even mentions hastati and principes though even here he
1, Veg, 1'8: Cato the Elder, Celius, Frontinus, Paternus and the constitwtiones of Augustus1
Trajan and Hadrian; Il • 3: Cato, Frontinus and a/il coipIres,
—307-
M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Appendix 1
confuses the order1.
On the whole, the entiqua leglo of Vegetius does not seem to be
something that existed in reality. When one considers that the size of the
antiqua leglo would have required something in the order of an extra 1,500
men for each legion, at a time when emperors such as Septimius Severus,
Gallienus and Probus were going to extraordinary lengths in search of
resources for the defence of the empire, it seems inconceivable that the
institution could have been introduced. While Parker may be partially
correct in assuming that Vegetius intended to illustrate the legion of the
later third century2, no credence should be given to its description.
1, Veg, 1 . 20; Polyb, VI • 2314-16; Livy VII1'8 . 9-13, ilner also refers to Veg, IIl6 & 11I14,
and coepares Veg,III'20, p.106,6-i with Cato, Re ifulit,, frag,10,
2, Parker, 'Qntiqua Legio', liGf,
-308-
APPENDIX 2
Tri riti Mi.jc j riti
Below is a recension of the career inscription of Traianus Mucianus,
followed by en annotated cursus taken line-by-line. Much of what is said
here is a summary of the discussion to be found in Chapter XI: Protectores
p.27 1ff.
IGRR I1496 = IL.S 9479 = A1908,259 = IGBR 1112 1570. (cf. also von
Domaszewsld, Rangordnung (1967), LVIII-L.D(, 185ff): Tralana Augusta(Stare Zagora), Thrace.
Tpctavov Mouxtavov 5oux (ivaptov)atpctEuOaLEvov v ptr E&] Kov-xop8(t1vatv) xa'. v Xy(uvt) I1cp8(tx), tmrrca xpt(1c)
(i]pattp (taç), oxxt (ov), (xarovtc*pXov) npotiptop5 X€y(uvoc) ly IEJL(tvflç), (xawvtapXov) apot(rxtopa) tyouX(av),
(xa'tov'wpXov) icp[o-]
trxt(opa op avuuavov), xat (xatovtapXov) npot (1xopa) xp"icrcp[at]t (aptac),
[x]ai. nptvxtita npot(xtopa) (xat) lrpEto7t(tXov) Exat] x uvEnavtc*] 6tEpXo,.L Evv ItEpocixto-][p@v, h]cxp ov) XEy (tvoç) 5 Xa (taç), a(tpatryo']
10 [X€y. KX]au5(taç) xai. 5 Xc(taç), (tpt. BvyouX.?](cptP. otp..] tpt(ouvov) At[]oup[vv, atpatyov](rev iraXtv] arpatECu]o[pevv itE]tv][xat liLn€av Mx]u(pov xat] 0aportvv, x(at](atatr'yov v Bpvr]t(ovv) xc*'. pat(opv)
15 (pt. XP'• ... Epatt.] 5ouxrvcp(tov), citaEp-][ov Xytvoç ... flcp8. 7 it]pcxavrcc v MEao(no-](iaita, btap ov X€y. ty] Fci (tvc), atpa'rlyo[v][ .... xcxt] t(v) nc*Xi.v atpatEu[o-](vv nv xa*. trnt]Ec(v) Mcrupcv xat 'O[a-]
20 (povv, apxov Xeiy(tci'voç) B Tpatav(c), citp(a-](iyyov Xcy. KXau5. xczt] S Xa(tcç) xai. Blpvrc.]
[xat 7LXpacop4v np]aavta v 8p[axr'][ I xat &pav[ rcx CPcv tac 7]
( I autou ita[Xtv ......]25 xcxl. iaXtv Xaovta .....
IEtc '(flV uti1ptav (r autou ITrwrptç
CURSUS1,2 ailes coh, (II Concordzenhid: Oomaszewski's argument that this unit was raised from Concordia
In Italy seems sensible, however It is unlikely that it was stationed there under Philip as he
maintains cf, ch,YI: VexiIJationes p,145f,-309-
1,31,41,4
1,51,5
1,61,61,7
1,71,9
1.10
1.101.11
1,111,12
1,14
1,15
M.C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army
Appendix 2
ellis leg, If Par t/,icae,eques coh, VII Praetoriae,evocatus,' The dedications in 168R 1112 1568 & 1569 to Heraclian & his brother by a ucianu5 inTraisna Augusta suggest that Mucianus was a beneficiary of Heraclian's patronage, It so, theservice In the evocati acted as a springboard to the centurionate, so the intervention of thePraetorian Prefect is best placed here as opposed to the centurionate of XIII Gem, as Christolbelieves; Christol, 'Traianus Mucianus', Chironl ( 1977), 397ff;cinturio protector leg, XIII 6esinae, On the leaning of centurioprotectorcf, ch,XI, p,270ff,centurio protector co/i, Vigliwe; Pflaum and Christol believe this and the next post weresinecures, due to the lack of unit numbers, It may be that they were fictional posts, added tothe cursus at this point because the lack of them was unusual, The other alternative is sloppyworkmanship; Pflaua, 168R111 2 , 42; Chrl5tol, op. cit.. 401,centuric protector co/i, (/rbanicianl,centurio protector co/i, V Praetorlae,(centurio) princeps protector it prisu, piliis: Following Christol, who shows that the post ofpririceps preceded the Primipilate on occasion, Contra Christol, the post of prisus p1/us cannotbe avoided at this point; Dobson, AAWVII'l, 399ff; Dobson & Breeze, (p. Stud, 8(1969), 106f;Christol, 404, XI'5215 1LS2650; AE,1954, 135),iv protectoribus, Literal translation 'and coming out of all the protectore?,praei'ectus (castroru.) leg, IVPiaviae: This is the standard promotion for pri.Ipilerescf,Dobson, ANRW, 413ff, Coming here, separated by the Rome tribunates from his other legionaryappointments, it seems certain to be the expected praefectus castrorue appointment, as opposed toan early appointment to practectus legionis a, v.1,,praepositus (vexx ) iegg, VII Claudice it IPflaviae,' Note the unusual use of the Greekc(1ps%qov] In place of mpattoctwv),tritinus vigilu. ?, See below, next post,trthunus g,irbapjcjanj 1: These two urban tribunates fit the CWPSII5 here, but are uncertain,especially sinc, little room is left for unit numbers once again, Perhaps Hucianus only held oneof them replacing the other with the extraordinary pruepositus commands which follow, If 50,
th. command could be expanded to read: ra8, 'a,r, t,, I 8iyovAev or Oopkvszia'vov, Therestoration as it stands is Domaszewski's,trthunus Lthurnarua A unit drawn from the galleys, according to Domaszewski, Rangordnung, 189,praepositus senioria peo'itu. it equitut Haurorue it Oshroenoru.; The Greek crpsri'ov retainscontuinuity throughout the inscription, especially since it is used on line 17 with reference tothe same co mand, The itiniores flauri are known from YIII'20996 ILS 1356, It seems they, toowe e commanded by an ex-tribune of the Urban cohorts before he progressed to the Praetorians,praeposifus 6'rittonu. it exploratoru.' This may be the nuierus Britt onus Lunensiuei which wascommanded by a praepositus Brit(tonu.) it expl(oratorue), However, this man was a centurion ofVIII ,ugusta (XIII'6526), which seems a significantly lower rank than flucianus, Anotheralternative is the joint command of the nuierus Brittonu. and the exploratores GerianIclaniDi vitiensiva always named together on the same inscription, These occupied the fort atNiederbeber in Ge ania Superior until AD 260 (XIII'7749 & 7753; cf, also XII1'6814), Since itis known Mucianus commanded this unit in Thrace (below, 1,21), they may have moved there, It is,of course, possible that the unit is not known from any but this inscription,tritiiws co/i, (,,)Praetor,ae, A preferable reading to Domaszewski's trib, praef, protect,,since it follows the pattern of the other praetorian references in the inscription and retainsthe unit number,
1,15 ducenarius,1, 16 praefectus legionis age,is in Mesopotacia,' Almost certainly one of the Parthian legions since
these were commanded by praefecti Jegionis a, v, I, from their inception,1,17 prasuectus legionis XIII 6esinae a, v, 1,' XIII Gemina came under the command of an equestrian
prafectus during the reign of Gallienus: 111 . 1560 = ILS 3845, M, Aur Veteranus,1, 18 pruefec tus seinorus pedi tue et equi tue Ifauroru. it Os/iroenoru.: This is the first of three
repeat commands in the inscription, Close examination of their wording will show that the-310-
M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army
Appendix 2
commands were exactly similar 1 th. only exception being that Nucianus seems to have held the
second two repetitions as one Joint exploratory command, when one considers the effort required
to carve these repetitions 1 they cannot simply be discounted as an error, Therefore it would
seem that Muclanus Interspersed his legionary appointments with returns to his earlier
extraordinary commands,
120 praef,ctus leg, II Traianae, The Egyptian legion had traditionally been an equestrianappointment; Keyes. Rise of the (qwtes, 18,
1,21 priepositus (vexx,) legq, VII Claudiuc it Flaviae et Brittornis et expioratoru. agens inThracia,' The term thix might be preferable here to preepositus. but it remains essentially avexitlary command,
1,23 praises provinciae Ruetiac?.' A Mucianus is attested In charge of Raetia by 111.5785,1.26 origone Traianae Augustue,' 6reek: . a-ho. ,,, rarpiq, Since the in5cription comes from Traiana
Augusta, and a Mucianus native to that town is known from I68R 1112 1568 & 1569 the restorationseems almost certain,
—311-
ADDENDUM
A recent article by L. Okamure, 'The Flying Columns of the Emperor
Gallienus: 'leglonary' coins and their hoards', Roman Frontier Studies 1989,
Limes Congress XV, ed. V.A. Maxfield & M.J. Dobson, Exeter (1991), pp.387ff
appeared too late to be incorporated into the main body of this thesis, Yet
some of the points he makes are of sufficient interest with reference to my
chapter on Vexiflationes for some general comments to be made.
He suggests that the reverses of RIC V2, 96-97, bearing the legends
lxxx were a die-engraver's mannerism for 'II et XX', referring to the British
legi ns stationed at Sirmium during Gallienus' reign (III3228). This
provides a modicum of corroboration for the obvious deduction that these
legions must have been in Sirinium by AD 259, in order not to have been
abs rbed into the Gallic Empire (cf. ch.VI, p.145).
Of greater importance are his comments on the V P(ia) V F(idelis)
othage di ussed by Maria Alfoldi. The rarity of these coins has prompted
some commentators to suggest that they were struck in error, or that the
whole V P. V F. to VII P. VII F. series was struck simultaneously as one
large donative. Either of these theories further invalidates Alföldi's
already shaky theory that they were struck at specific times to pay specific
vexillations (cf. ch.VI, p.147).
On the other hand, Okamura makes the point that these coins were
discovered in hoards limited to the western empire (Galllenu& sphere of
influence in the division by his father), and, with one exception, they were
not found in the permanent bases of the legions they specify. This may well
be indicative of the permanent vexillation of the legions, which is not
seriously in doubt, but it no more proves the existence of comitatus-style
-3 12-
M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army
'flying columns' than did Alföldi's original observations. Indeed, since the
coins were discovered in hoards scattered throughout the western empire,
their distribution will be more indicative of easily penetrated weak points
along the frontier, prompting civilian abandonment, than of the proximity of
a permanent 'field army'. Logically, the 'field army' will not have arrived
until alter the penetration had occurred; ie., if its inherent logic is to be
maintained, the cause of the burial and abandonment of the coin hoard must
needs precede the arrival of the 'field army'. Therefore, it should not be
urprising that such hoards are rarely found in the vicinity of legionary
fortresses, with their heavy concentrations of troops, since such
str ngpothts were the least likely points of barbarian penetration.
Since the coinage of 259 lists every single legion from the Rhine and
Danube, including II Parthica and the Praetorians, it is more likely to have
been a general issue, minted to pay all the legions named, than a specific
issue de igned to pay only parts of these legions. The accident of their
di covery is almost certainly more a function of civilian despair than It is
f military vexillation.
-3 13-
M,C.Ibeji. C3 Army
Bi bi irp1-iy
CQ
Ep. Stud.
Ephea. Epig.
FGH
FHG
Ge . Schrift.
HAC
IG
IGBR
IGRR
Abbr'.rit ic,ri
AE
AIPhil.
ANRW
BAR
BGU
CAH
CIG
CIL
ISem.
C d. Ju t.
L'Année Epigraphique: Revue des publications epigraphiquesrelatives a l'antiquite romaine ed. R. Cagnat et al., Paris(1888-
American Journal of Philology
Aufeteig und Niede.rgang der rdmischen Welt II • 1-3, ed. I.Vogt, Berlin/New york (1974 & 1975)
British Archaelogical Reports
Aegyptische Urkunde.n aus den staatllchen Museen zu Berlin:Griechische Urkunde,n Berlin (1892)
Cambridge Ancient History, vols XI & XII, Cambridge (1936 &1939)
Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. A. Boecithius, Berlin(1843)
Corpus Inscription urn Latinarum + supplements, ed, T.Mommsen et al., Berlin (1863-1986)
Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum
Codex Just ininanus, Corpus luris Civilis vol. II, ed. P.Krueger, Berlin (1929)
Corpus luris Civilis vols 6 & 7, trans. S. P. Scott, NewYork (1973)
Classical Quarterly
Epigraphische St udien
Ephemeris Epigraphica
F. .Tacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Ristoriker, Berlin(1923-
C. MUller, Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, vols 111-V1Paris (1851-1870)
T. Morninsen, Gesammelte Schriften
Bonner Historia-Augusta-Colloqulum
Inscriptiones Graecae ed. Preuss, Berlin (1873)
Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae, ed. G. Mihailov(texts to all references can be found in Christol, Chiron7, (1977))
Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes, ed. R.Cagnat et al., Bretschneider edn. Rome (1964)
ILS Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae ed. H. Dessau, Berlin (1892)
IRT The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania, edd. J.M. Reynolds &J.B. Ward-Perkins, Rome & London (1952)
JRS Journal of Roman Studies
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