disaster, security, and governance

Disaster, Security, and Governance

MAGG Spring 2014Bin Xu

Assistant ProfessorFlorida International University

Japan: disaster management system before 3.11

• The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act• The Disaster Management Council (advisory body)• Minister of State for Disaster Management

(coordinating disaster preparedness)• Ad hoc Disaster Management Headquarters in

times of emergency• The Self-Defense Forces: can dispatch SDF units

without a request from the prefecture governor (after 1995)

Japan: disaster management system before 3.11

• Comparison to the US1. Much higher level of institutional

preparedness2. Centrally managed system with

support from local governments, the military, and public corporations vs. local-government-based system in the US

3. Less bureaucratic slippage and blockage

4. The military’s bigger role vs. militarized response

Japan’s Problems

• The Fukushima accident and the communication issues:

1. The government-TEPCO Integrated Response Officecorporate interests

2. Lack of crisis information from the government

3. Information about damages was not well shared among management

Japan’s Problems

4. The government’s distrust in and blames on foreign media and governments5. The government altered minutes of meeting

Why?

• Reliance on nuclear power and lack of preparedness for a nuclear crisis

• “Collusion” between the government and big corporations (the iron-triangle political structure)negligence of possible disasters

• “Groupism” in organizational culture

Environmental Impacts

• Response and Environmental impacts (Video)

• http://whiv.alexanderstreet.com/View/887845/Clip/20380

“Litvinenko's Murder — They Wanted to Give Up a Suspect for $7,000.”

Gorbachev and his glasnost

• Gorbachev and Pizza Huthttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9lvzzH0STw

Glasnost (Openness)

• The Chernobyl incident was a test of Gorbachev’s “glasnost”

• Perestroika

Political Consequences

• Controversies and disputes1. The Soviet authorities failed to report the accident

for 48 hours. 2. The local authorities underestimated the scale and

tried to contain it at local level. 3. No warnings were issued to the local population4. The Ukrainian officials ordered only 10 km radius

evacuation5. Some villains: the plant official and local officials

fled or provided false info

Political Consequences

• The tricky domestic politics

• Blaming on the stagnation in the Brezhnev years

• International image: the Soviet report to IAEA

Political Consequences

• The trial: the political drama

• Selective glasnost

• Officials as scapegoats

• The Brezhnev years as scapegoats