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CSC304 Lecture 8
Mechanism Design with Money:
VCG mechanism
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RECAP: Game Theory
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β’ Simultaneous-move Games
β’ Nash equilibria
β’ Prices of anarchy and stability
β’ Cost-sharing games, congestion games, Braessβ paradox
β’ Zero-sum games and the minimax theorem
β’ Stackelberg games
Mechanism Design with Money
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β’ Design the game structure in order to induce the desired behavior from the agents
β’ Desired behavior?β’ We will mostly focus on incentivizing agents to truthfully
reveal their private information
β’ With moneyβ’ Can pay agents or ask agents for money depending on
what the agents report
Mathematical Setup
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β’ A set of outcomes π΄β’ π΄ might depend on which agents are participating.
β’ Each agent π has a private valuation π£π βΆ π΄ β β
β’ Auctions:β’ π΄ has a nice structure.o Selling one item to π buyers = π outcomes (βgive to πβ)
o Selling π items to π buyers = ππ outcomes
β’ Agents only care about which items they receiveo π΄π = bundle of items allocated to agent π
o Use π£π π΄π instead of π£π(π΄) for notational simplicity
β’ But for now, weβll look at the general setup.
Mathematical Setup
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β’ Agent π might misreport: report π£π instead of π£π
β’ Mechanism: (π, π)β’ Input: reported valuations π£ = ( π£1, β¦ , π£π)
β’ π π£ β π΄ decides what outcome is implemented
β’ π π£ = (π1, β¦ , ππ) decides how much each agent payso Note that each ππ is a function of all reported valuations
β’ Utility to agent π : π’π π£ = π£π π π£ β ππ π£β’ βQuasi-linear utilitiesβ
Mathematical Setup
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β’ Our goal is to design the mechanism (π, π)β’ π is called the social choice function
β’ π is called the payment scheme
β’ We want to several things from our mechanism
β’ Truthfulness/strategyproofnessβ’ For all agents π, all π£π, and all π£,
π’π π£π , π£βπ β₯ π’π( π£π , π£βπ)
β’ An agent is at least as happy reporting the truth as telling any lie, irrespective of what other agents report
Mathematical Setup
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β’ Our goal is to design the mechanism (π, π)β’ π is called the social choice function
β’ π is called the payment scheme
β’ We want to several things from our mechanism
β’ Individual rationalityβ’ For all agents π and for all π£βπ,
π’π π£π , π£βπ β₯ 0
β’ An agent doesnβt regret participating if she tells the truth.
Mathematical Setup
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β’ Our goal is to design the mechanism (π, π)β’ π is called the social choice function
β’ π is called the payment scheme
β’ We want to several things from our mechanism
β’ No payments to agentsβ’ For all agents π and for all π£,
ππ π£ β₯ 0
β’ Agents pay the center. Not the other way around.
Mathematical Setup
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β’ Our goal is to design the mechanism (π, π)β’ π is called the social choice function
β’ π is called the payment scheme
β’ We want to several things from our mechanism
β’ Welfare maximizationβ’ Maximize Οπ π£π π π£
o In many contexts, payments are less important (e.g. ad auctions)
o Or think of the auctioneer as another agent with utility Οπ ππ π£
β’ Then, the total utility of all agents (including the auctioneer) is precisely the objective written above
Single-Item Auction
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Image Courtesy: Freepik
Rule 1: Each would tell me his/her value. Iβll give it to the one with the higher value.
Objective: The one who really needs it more should have it.
?
Single-Item Auction
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Image Courtesy: Freepik
Rule 2: Each would tell me his/her value. Iβll give it to the one with the higher value, but they have to pay me that value.
Objective: The one who really needs it more should have it.
?
Single-Item Auction
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Image Courtesy: Freepik
Implements the desired outcome. But not truthfully.
Objective: The one who really needs it more should have it.
?
Single-Item Auction
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Image Courtesy: Freepik
Rule 3: Each would tell me his/her value. Iβll give it to the one with the highest value, and charge them the second highest value.
Objective: The one who really needs it more should have it.
?
Single-item Vickrey Auction
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β’ Simplifying notation: π£π = value of agent π for the item
β’ π π£ : give the item to agent πβ β argmaxπ π£π
β’ π π£ : ππβ = maxπβ πβ
π£π, other agents pay nothing
Theorem:Single-item Vickrey auction is strategyproof.
Proof sketch:
Highest reported value among other agents
Case 1:π£π < π
True value of agent π
Case 2π£π = π
Case 3π£π > π
Increasingvalue
π
Vickrey Auction: Identical Items
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β’ Two identical xboxes
β’ Each agent π only wants one, has value π£π
β’ Goal: give to the agents with the two highest values
β’ Attempt 1
β’ To agent with highest value, charge 2nd highest value.
β’ To agent with 2nd highest value, charge 3rd highest value.
β’ Attempt 2
β’ To agents with highest and 2nd highest values, charge the 3rd
highest value.
β’ Question: Which attempt(s) would be strategyproof?
β’ Both, 1, 2, None?
VCG Auction
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β’ Recall the general setup:β’ π΄ = set of outcomes, π£π = valuation of agent π, π£π = what
agent π reports, π chooses the outcome, π decides payments
β’ VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction)β’ π π£ = πβ β argmaxπβπ΄ Οπ π£π π
β’ ππ π£ = maxπ
Οπβ π π£π π β Οπβ π π£π πβ
Maximize welfare
πβs payment = welfare that others lost due to presence of π
A Note About Payments
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β’ ππ π£ = maxπ
Οπβ π π£π π β Οπβ π π£π πβ
β’ In the first termβ¦β’ Maximum is taken over alternatives that are feasible
when π does not participate.
β’ Agent π cannot affect this term, so can ignore in calculating incentives.
β’ Could be replaced with any function βπ π£βπ
o This specific function has advantages (weβll see)
Properties of VCG Auction
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β’ Strategyproofness:β’ Suppose agents other than π report π£βπ.
β’ Agent π reports π£π β outcome chosen is π π£ = π
β’ Utility to agent π = π£π π β β β Οπβ π π£π π
β’ Agent π wants π to maximize π£π π + Οπβ π π£π π
β’ π chooses π to maximize π£π π + Οπβ π π£π π
β’ Hence, agent π is best off reporting π£π = π£π
o π chooses π that maximizes the utility to agent π
Term that agent π cannot affect
Properties of VCG Auction
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β’ Individual rationality:β’ πβ β argmaxπβπ΄ π£π π + Οπβ π π£π π
β’ π β argmaxπβπ΄ Οπβ π π£π π
π’π π£π , π£βπ
= π£π πβ β πβ π
π£π π β πβ π
π£π πβ
= π£π πβ + πβ π
π£π πβ β πβ π
π£π π
= Max welfare to all agentsβ max welfare to others when π is absent
β₯ 0
Properties of VCG Auction
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β’ No payments to agents:β’ Suppose the agents report π£
β’ πβ β argmaxπβπ΄ Οπ π£π π
β’ π β argmaxπβπ΄ Οπβ π π£π π
ππ π£
= πβ π
π£π π β πβ π
π£π πβ
= Max welfare to others when π is absentβ welfare to others when π is present
β₯ 0
Properties of VCG Auction
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β’ Welfare maximization:β’ By definition, since π chooses the outcome maximizing
the sum of reported values
β’ Informal result:β’ Under minimal assumptions, VCG is the unique auction
satisfying these properties.
VCG: Simple Example
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β’ Suppose each agent has a value XBox and a value for PS4.
β’ Their value for {ππ΅ππ₯, ππ4} is the max of their two values.
A1 A2 A3 A4
XBox 3 4 8 7
PS4 4 2 6 1
Q: Who gets the xbox and who gets the PS4?
Q: How much do they pay?
VCG: Simple Example
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A1 A2 A3 A4
XBox 3 4 8 7
PS4 4 2 6 1
Allocation:
β’ A4 gets XBox, A3 gets PS4
β’ Achieves maximum welfare of 7 + 6 = 13
VCG: Simple Example
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A1 A2 A3 A4
XBox 3 4 8 7
PS4 4 2 6 1
Payments:
β’ Zero payments charged to A1 and A2β’ βDeletingβ either does not change the outcome/payments for others
β’ Can also be seen by individual rationality
VCG: Simple Example
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A1 A2 A3 A4
XBox 3 4 8 7
PS4 4 2 6 1
Payments:
β’ Payment charged to A3 = 11 β 7 = 4β’ Max welfare to others if A3 absent: 7 + 4 = 11
o Give XBox to A4 and PS4 to A1
β’ Welfare to others if A3 present: 7
VCG: Simple Example
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A1 A2 A3 A4
XBox 3 4 8 7
PS4 4 2 6 1
Payments:
β’ Payment charged to A4 = 12 β 6 = 6β’ Max welfare to others if A4 absent: 8 + 4 = 12
o Give XBox to A3 and PS4 to A1
β’ Welfare to others if A4 present: 6
VCG: Simple Example
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A1 A2 A3 A4
XBox 3 4 8 7
PS4 4 2 6 1
Final Outcome:
β’ Allocation: A3 gets PS4, A4 gets XBox
β’ Payments: A3 pays 4, A4 pays 6
β’ Net utilities: A3 gets 6 β 4 = 2, A4 gets 7 β 6 = 1
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