critically evaluate the development of irish law on the duty of decision-makers to give reasons for...

Critically evaluate the development of Irish law on the duty of decision-

makers to give reasons for their decisions.

Administrative Law Assignment Student No. 1000366

(a) Fairness and Arbitrariness

In the absence of any specific statutory requirement it was traditionally the case

that administrative bodies and tribunals were under no obligation to give

reasons for their final decisions.1 It was, therefore, at the “absolute discretion”

of the decision-maker whether or not such reasons were offered. It would

appear, however, that the principles of natural and constitutional justice began

to work against the absolute nature of this discretion in order to ensure fairness

in the decision making process. In East Donegal Co-operative Mart v. Attorney

General2 Walsh J held that the powers granted to a Minister which are prefaced

or followed by the words "at his discretion" or "as he shall think proper" or "if

he so thinks fit,"

[A]re powers which cast upon the Minister the duty of acting fairly and

judicially in accordance with the principles of constitutional justice, and

they do not give him an absolute or an unqualified or an arbitrary power to

grant or refuse at his will.3

Implicit in this statement is the distinction between having reasons and

disclosing reasons with the former being that which is necessary to avoid the

arbitrary exercise of conferred statutory power.4 However, and in spite of this

reasoning, the application of the general thesis can still be evidenced in Irish

law, an example of which being Costello J’s ex tempore judgment in Broomfield

v Minister for Agriculture.5 In that case a prison officer’s services were

dispensed with during his period of probation without any notice as to the

reasons for so doing. The power to terminate his service was grounded in

statute and Costello J took the view that the plaintiff prison officer was not

entitled to be given reasons for his dismissal as the employing officer, even in

the absence of “any specific charge of any acts of misconduct,” may keep to

himself the right not to appoint the probationer on a full-time basis.6 Little more

than a year after this decision O’Higgins CJ observed in State (Lynch) v.

1 Morgan, Hogan & Daly, Hogan and Morgan’s Administrative Law. Dublin, Thompson Roundhall (2012) at p.445.2 [1970] IR 317.3 East Donegal Co-operative Mart v. Attorney General [1970] IR 317 at p.343-344.4 See: Fennelly J in Mallak v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59 at [43].5 Unreported, High Court, Costello J, ex tempore, April 10 1981.6 Unreported, High Court, Costello J, ex tempore, April 10 1981 at p.5

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Cooney7 that “[any] opinion formed by the Minister [under the statutory

authority] must be one which is bona fide held and factually sustainable and not

unreasonable”.8

This conflict came to a head in the case of State (Daly) v. Minister for

Agriculture9 which may be considered as the first line of authority proper for

what Hogan and Morgan see as the judiciary “tapping a vein of constitutional

justice”10 to source a right to reasons in Irish law. To put this another way, Daly

can be viewed as the case in which the first reasoned exception to the general

rule was developed. Much like Broomfield this case also concerned the

dismissal of a probationer civil servant pursuant to the exercise of a statutory

power “if the appropriate authority is satisfied that he has failed to fulfill the

conditions of probation”.11 Having reviewed the relevant authorities Barron J

held that Broomfield “no longer represents the law and has been impliedly over-

ruled” by the Supreme Court’s decision in State (Lynch) v. Cooney.12 The High

Court’s reasoning in this case is interesting as it displays a significant legal

development which is theoretically injurious to its own purposes. The

development involves the raising of a presumption, namely, where a Minister

fails to disclose the materials upon which he has acted in reaching a decision it

could be presumed that there was no such material.13 What limits this

development is the fact that presumption is only raised once the decision is

challenged in which case the Minister is “obliged to disclose to the prosecutor

the material upon which he had acted and to give his reasons for so doing”

failure to do so amounted to a failure on the part of the Minister to show that he

acted intra vires.14

The fact that the presumption, and thus the duty, is only raised upon challenge

means that the decision-maker is not obliged to give reasons at the time of the

decision and thus that the decision-maker need not have had such reasons (or

materials) at that time. At this point in the development of the legal duty to give

reasons the logic for the duty revolves primarily around the eradication of

arbitrary decision making but the presumption, as limited, does not appear to 7 The State (Lynch) v. Cooney [1982] I.R. 337.8 Ibid at p.361.9 [1987] IR 165.10 Morgan, Hogan & Daly, op. cit. at p.446.11 Section 7 of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956, as amended by s.3 of the Civil Service Regulation (Amendment) Act 1958.12 State (Daly) v. Minister for Agriculture [1987] IR 165 at p.171.13 Ibid at p.17214 State (Daly) v. Minister for Agriculture [1987] IR 165 at p.172.

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go far enough to secure this goal. On the one hand, scope remains for an

administrative body or tribunal to make a decision arbitrarily and, subsequently

upon challenge, to attach reasons which rationalise that decision. Furthermore,

as there is no requirement that the reasons be formulated by the original

decision-maker, or that the decision-maker keep records, the accuracy of any

post-hoc rationalising and the overall quality of the reasoning itself is thus

rendered dubious.15 Taken together, the law at this point not only falls short of

the sought after goal but allows poor decision making practices by encouraging

the provision of those reasons that could have supported a decision in exchange

for those that did. Irrespective of its shortcomings, the decision in Daly can be

seen as a major step forward and one which sowed the seed for the

development a dual rationale justifying the duty to give reasons.

(b) The Dual Rationale

Following on from Daly, the Supreme Court in State (Creedon) v. Criminal

Injuries Compensation Tribunal16 upheld the existence of a duty to give reasons

in addition to expanding and clarifying the rationale contained therein. The case

concerned a decision of the respondent tribunal to reject a claim for

compensation under the former non-statutory Scheme of Compensation for

Personal Injuries Criminally Inflicted and although the case was ultimately

decided on the basis of irrationality Finlay CJ, in an obiter dictum (with which

Walsh and McCarthy JJ agreed) considered that the duty to give reasons was

grounded both non-instrumentally and instrumentally in procedural fairness.17

In terms of the former, the requirement that justice should appear to be done

necessitated that an unsuccessful applicant be “made aware in general and

broad terms of the grounds on which he or she has failed”.18 Instrumentally,

such reasons are also necessary for the Courts to exercise their supervisory

function over the decisions and activities of tribunals functioning in a quasi-

judicial manner.19

15 See: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 at [39]; Administrative Justice Office, Ministry of Attorney General Province of British Columbia, Statutory Decision-Makers and the Obligation to Give Reasons. Available at: http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/ajo/down/reasons_paper092008.pdf (accessed on 01/04/2013); Higgins, op. cit. at p.4.16 [1988] IR 51.17 Fennelly J in Mallak v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59 at [62] reluctantly agreed with submissions made in relation to the obiter nature of the Chief Justices’ statements. 18 State (Creedon) v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal [1988] IR 51 at p.55.19 Ibid.

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The latter, instrumental, rationale was again expounded by Blayney J in

International Fishing Vessels Ltd v. Minister for the Marine20 where the

Minister had refused to renew the applicants sea-boat license curtly refusing to

give reasons “as a matter of policy”. Contemplating the applicants right to

review the decision of the Minister, the Court extended the requirement to give

reasons to purely administrative bodies where their decisions affect legal rights

and obligations.21 Indeed, Blayney J explained that,

[I]n refusing to give his reasons for his decision the Minister places a

serious obstacle in the way of the exercise of that right. He deprives the

applicant of the material it needs in order to be able to form a view as to

whether grounds exist on which the Minister's decision might be quashed.

As a result, the applicant is at a great disadvantage, firstly, in reaching a

decision as to whether to challenge the Minister's decision or not, and

secondly, if he does decide to challenge it, in actually doing so, since the

absence of reasons would make it very much more difficult to succeed.22

The logic of this approach can be seen permeating subsequent decisions in this

area.23 In Rajah v. Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland24 which concerned the

judicial review of a decision made by the academic appeals board of the

respondent college, Keane J relying on Creedon, found that,

In general, bodies which are not courts but which exercise functions of a

judicial or quasi-judicial nature determining legal rights and obligations

must give reasons for their decisions, because of the requirements of

constitutional and natural justice and in order to ensure that the superior

courts may exercise their jurisdiction to enquire into and, if necessary,

correct such decisions.25

This dual rationale purports to avoid what Craig sees as a “Kafkaesque world”26

in which the State wields a silent power over the rights of its citizens and,

moreover, it is clear that reasons also facilitate the right to review and appeal

20 [1989] IR 149.21 See: Rajah v Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [1994] IR 384 at p.395.22 International Fishing Vessels Ltd v. Minister for the Marine [1989] IR 149 at p.155.23 See also: O'Donoghue v. An Bord Pleanála [1991] ILRM 750  per Murphy J at 757; Manning v. Shackleton [1994] 1 ILRM 346 at 351; Mulholland v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2006] 1 IR 453 at 460 per Kelly J. For the operation of similar logic in the House of Lords see: R v. Sectretary of State for the Home Department ex partes Doody [1993] 3 All ER 92 per Lord Mustill at p.98.24 [1994] IR 384.25 Rajah v Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [1994] IR 384 at p.395.26 Craig op. cit. at p.284.

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decisions by assisting in assessing their potential for success,27 by disclosing

errors of law and procedure, that is, whether a tribunal or administrative body

was acting ultra vires,28 and by also aiding in the determination of costs and

benefits.29 Furthermore, these advantages give rise to corollary benefits such as

a reduction in the number of decisions reviewed, a freeing of the Courts for

meritorious applications,30 added transparency and greater public confidence.31

Nevertheless, in spite of what Delaney aptly labels as its “ inexorable logic”32

the dual rationale has yet to overwhelm the general thesis. As Craig puts it

“[w]hy could it not always plausibly be maintained that effective review

demands the provision of the reasons underlying the contested decision?”33

(c) Objections and Limitations

In answer to this query it must be noted that although there are robust

arguments in favour of the duty to give reasons there are also strong arguments

against imposing such a duty and, in particular, against the universal

application of the duty.34 Indeed Delaney argues that the answer to the question

posed by Craig resides in the weight of such counter arguments35 pointing to

the excessive administrative and financial burden and the resultant fettering of

discretionary power.36 To this Hogan and Morgan would add that such burdens

could result in the giving of canned reasons,37 while Higgins argues, inter alia,

that “some decisions are based on open-ended policy considerations which are

extremely difficult to express in the traditional form of reasons”.38

27 See: Finnegan P in McAlister v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform [2003] 4 IR 35 at p.44.28 Ibid. See also: Sedley J in R v. Higher Education Funding Council ex partes Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 242 at p.256.29 Higgins op. cit. at p.7.30 Ibid. See also: ‘Seminar for the Establishment of a Court of Appeal’ (2nd March 2013) in which the Chief Justice in her speech labelled the current 4 and half year delay in appeals reaching the Supreme Court as “unsustainable”. (http://www.google.ie/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.supremecourt.ie%2FSupremeCourt%2Fsclibrary3.nsf%2F%28WebFiles%29%2FE4E2321F94071F3680257B27003BFC4F%2F%24FILE%2FUnsustainable.doc&ei=CuVZUc3WI4S3hQfn_4DICg&usg=AFQjCNHGAPpzWcBuRK3l6s2Ddf5um6XK0A&bvm=bv.44442042,d.ZG4 (Accessed on 01/04/2013).31 Morgan, Hogan and Daly, op. cit. at [14-111]32 Delaney, ‘The Duty to Give Reasons in Administrative Decision Making’ (1994) 12 I.L.T. 145 at p.3.33 Craig, ‘Reasons and Administrative Justice (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 12 at p.14. See also: Delaney, Judicial Review of Administrative Action. Dublin, Thompson Roundhall (2009) at p.322.34 Higgins, op. cit. canvasses such arguments at p.7-8.35 Delaney, Judicial Review of Administrative Action. Dublin, Thompson Roundhall (2009) at p.322.36 Ibid at p.306. See also: Morgan, Hogan and Daly, op. cit. at [14-113].37 Morgan, Hogan and Daly, op. cit. at p.458.38 Higgins, op. cit. canvasses such arguments at p.7-8.

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This scepticism is evident in the judgement of Costello P in McCormack v.

Garda Siochána Complaints Board39 a case which went a considerable way

towards curbing the advance of exceptions to the general thesis by resiling

somewhat from the dual rational in favour of an examination that focused on

detriment. The case concerned a challenge to the decision of the respondent

Board to take no further action in response to an allegation that a Garda had

solicited self-incriminating evidence from the applicant under duress and had

visited him in prison in order to warn him off pursuing his appeal. Costello P

focused on the statutory function and framework in which the decision-maker

was operating in addition to the the possible detriment the complainant may

suffer arising from the failure to state reasons.40 In arriving at this finding and

refusing the relief sought Costello P distinguished previous case law on the

grounds that, firstly, that the statutory function of the Garda Siochána

Complaints Board is “different in kind” and, secondly, the Board is not carrying

out a quasi-judicial function.41 In the Court’s consideration of the question of

detriment it becomes clear that Costello P felt that reasons were being sought

in this case merely for the purpose of discovering whether the Board had erred

in law and, as such, the findings of the Court seemed to aim at guarding against

the kind of abuse that could arise where a duty to give reasons is employed as a

means of overturning an otherwise valid decision.42

In order to arrive at this conclusion, however, Costello P was forced to offer a

strained interpretation of International Fishing Vessels Ltd which insisted that

the ratio of Blayney J was incapable of being construed as providing a right to

obtain reasons “merely for the purpose of seeing whether or not the decision-

maker had erred”.43 In Dunnes Stores Ireland Ltd v. Moloney44 Laffoy J having

considered Costello P’s interpretation stated that,

The applicants have demonstrated that they bona fide believe the Minister

has misused her power in appointing an authorised officer. Whether that

belief is well founded or not, they are entitled to explore the possibility of

39 [1997] 2 IR 489.40 McCormack v. Garda Siochána Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489 at 500. Applied by Kelly J in Flood v. Garda Siochána Complaints Board [1997] 3 IR 121.41 McCormack v. Garda Siochána Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489 at 500-501.42 Delaney, Judicial Review of Administrative Action. Dublin, Thompson Roundhall (2009) at p.323. See also: Mallak v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59 at [60].43 McCormack v. Garda Siochána Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489 at 502.44 [1999] 3 IR 542.

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obtaining redress by way of judicial review. They have made a bona fide

request for reasons.45

More recently in Christian v. Dublin City Council46 Clarke J noted that,

In some cases if a court does not know why a decision was taken, then the

court may not be able to ascertain whether the decision was lawful for the

lawfulness of the decision in question may depend on whether the reasons

were valid in the light of the appropriate statutory and legal regime

applicable.47

Although the potential for abuse ought to be acknowledged, it is questionable

whether such vigorous measures are called for and whether the rationale which

support such measures it is forceful and broad enough to warrant limiting an

applicant’s right to review a decision affecting his or her civil rights and

obligations.

The Supreme Court has recently offered a principled analysis of the duty to give

reasons in Mallak v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform48 which

concerned an application for naturalisation which is granted “at the absolute

discretion” of the Minister. Offering a strong endorsement of the dual rationale

and reversing the trend of McCormack, Fennelly J held that,

The developing jurisprudence of our own courts provides compelling

evidence that, at this point, it must be unusual for a decision maker to be

permitted to refuse to give reasons. The reason is obvious. In the absence

of any reasons, it is simply not possible for the applicant to make a

judgment as to whether he has a ground for applying for a judicial review

of the substance of the decision and, for the same reason, for the court to

exercise its power. At the very least, the decision maker must be able to

justify the refusal.49

(d) Further Exceptions

45 Dunnes Stores Ireland Ltd v. Moloney [1999] 3 IR 542 at 563.46 [2012] IEHC 163.47 Christian v. Dublin City Council [2012] IEHC 163 at 45. See also Deerland Construction v. Aquatic Licensing Appeals Board [2009] 1 IR 673 per Kelly J at [66] citing with approval South Bucks D.C. v. Porter (No. 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953.48 [2012] IESC 59.49 Mallak v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59 at [74].

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In McCormack Costello P also found that there were “cogent arguments” for

suggesting that the Garda Siochána Complaints Board should be treated much

like the DPP who, as a prosecuting authority, have always declined to give

reasons for a decision not to prosecute because of the possibility of unfairness.50

Indeed, this is another trend in the development of the duty to give reasons that

has recently been reviewed by the Supreme Court. In Eviston v. DPP51 which

concerned the review of a reversal of a decision by the DPP not to prosecute,

Keane CJ stated that the while the nature of the DPP’s role renders him

“immune to the judicial review process to a greater extent than is normally the

case with quasi-judicial tribunals” it remains the case nonetheless that he “will

be restrained by the courts where he acts otherwise than in accordance with

the Constitution and the law”.52 Keane CJ found the decision to be prima facie

reviewable as the reversal of the DPP’s decision was accompanied by no change

in circumstances or evidence, but the “decisive component”53 in his finding that

the decision was wanting in fair procedures was "the degree of … stress and

anxiety to which the applicant was subjected was exacerbated" and that the

applicant "was subjected to a further and entirely unnecessary layer of anxiety

and stress".54

(e) Adequacy of Reasons

The adequacy or cogency of the reasons required to be given can be contrasted

with the objections levelled against the duty itself. The Courts have effectively

developed a two-tier system which operates based on the circumstances of the

case. In Ní Éilí v The Environmental Protection Agency55 Murphy J cited with

approval the decision in MJT Securities Ltd v Secretary of State for the

Environment56 where Evan LJ commented that “the courts can do no more than

say that the reasons must be ‘proper, intelligible and adequate,’ as had been

held. What degree of particularity is required must depend on the

circumstances of each case”. In Faulker v. Minister for Industry and

50 McCormack v. Garda Siochána Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489 at p.502. See also the comments of Hogan J in Flynn v. Medical Council [2012] IEHC 477 at [27].51 [2002] 3 IR 260.52 Eviston v. DPP [2002] 3 IR 260.53 Carlin v. DPP [2010] 3 IR 547 at [41].54 Eviston v. DPP [2002] 3 IR 260 at 299. See also: Denham CJ in Carlin v. DPP [2010] 3 IR 547 at [40]-[41]; McDermott, ‘Evidence and Procedure Update’ (2002) 3 I.C.J.L. 25. 55 Ní Éilí v The Environmental Protection Agency [1999] IESC 64.56 [1998] JPL 138 at 144.

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Commerece57 O’Flaherty stated that “administraive tribunals … should be

required only to give the broad gist of the basis for their decisions”.58

On the other hand, in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law

Reform59 Murray CJ found that where civil rights and obligations were at play,

An administrative decision affecting the rights and obligations of persons

should at least disclose the essential rationale on foot of which the decision

is taken. That rationale should be patent from the terms of the decision or

capable of being inferred from its terms and its context.60

In Flynn v. Medical Council61 where the vindication of a medical practitioners

right to a good name was at stake Hogan J, having considered Meadows, held

that although a discursive judgement is not necessary62 “there should be no

need at all for anyone to have to read between the lines”63 and that what was in

fact required was no more than a “pithily and succinctly expressed” statement

of “two or three sentences”.64

Given that the latter has been considered as the higher standard65 the duty to

provide reasons could hardly be characterised as an onerous one that is capable

of contributing to the excessive administrative or financial burdens which have

been claimed.

(f) The Statutory Duty

The Freedom of Information Act 1997 (as amended)66 in addition to various

pieces of specialised legislation, for example, the Planning and Development Act

2000 and the Immigration Act 1999 (as amended) have placed the duty to give

reasons on a statutory footing. This, however, has not resulted in splitting of

standards and it has been held that “the pre-existing case-law on adequacy of

reasons … continues to apply.”67 Moreover, in terms of situations in which the

duty arises, there is a significant amount of overlap between that statutory duty

57 [1997] ELR 107.58 Ibid. See: Morgan, Hogan and Daly, op. cit. at [14-96].59 [2010] 2 IR 701.60 Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 IR 701 at 732.61 [2012] IEHC 477.62 Flynn v. Medical Council [2012] IEHC 477at [37].63 Ibid at [36].64 Flynn v. Medical Council [2012] IEHC 477at [37].65 Morgan, Hogan and Daly, op. cit. at [14-98]-[14-100].66 From here ‘the FOI Act 1997’.67 Mulholland v. An Bord Pleanála (No.2) [2006] 1 IR 453 at 464.

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and the common law.68 It is worth noting from the outset the the timing issue

which arose in Daly has been given a statutory grounding in s.18(1) of the FOI

Act 1997 which provides that reasons will only be given on application and thus

gives rise to the problems canvassed above. Furthermore, it would appear that

the FOI Act does not actually require a public body to reason its decisions. As

explained by the Information Commissioner:

I consider the purpose of section 18 of the FOI act is to ensure that such

reasons for an act

as may be identified are conveyed to the Applicant. Where reasons cannot

be identified, it is

not the purpose of section 18 to require the creation, after the event, of

such reasons.69

The failure to give reasons under the statutory regime does not of itself render

the decision invalid but, as Higgins points out, it would still be open for an

applicant to claim that such failure is unconstitutional or contrary to EU law.70

Aside from this, the main area of divergence with the common law occurs in the

area of locus standi where the right to make the request for reasons is

“significantly limited”.71 An applicant must be able to demonstrate, firstly, that

they have been affected by the act or decision of the public body and, secondly,

that they have a “material interest” in a matter affected by the decision or act.72

The notion of “material interest” is defined by s.18(5) of the FOI Act as arising

where the consequences or effect of the decision or act may be to confer on or

withhold from the person a benefit without also conferring it on or withholding

it from persons in general or a class of persons which is of significant size

having regard to all the circumstances and of which the person is a member.

The Department of Finance in its F.O.I. Manual for Public Bodies states that

“material interest” indicates that a person is: “directly affected by a decision or

act of a public body, but that the people in general, or a large class of people,

are not similarly affected”.73 This definition clearly eliminates a substantial

68 Morgan, Hogan and Daly, op. cit. at [14-89]69 Case 100198 – Mr X, Ms Y & Health Service Executive (HSE). See: Higgins, op. cit. at p.1 (fn.3).70 Higgins, op.cit. at p.1.71 Ibid at p.2-3.72 See: Ryall, ‘Freedom of Information Act 1997, Section 18: The Duty to Give Reasons for Decisions’ (2000) 1 I.P.E.L.J 8 at p.2-3.73 Ibid.

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number of decisions from the ambit of the statutory duty by excluding decisions

that affect the general public or a large enough portion of it.74

(g) Conclusion

In recent decades there has been a clear and dynamic shift in this area of the

law which is demonstrated by the growing number of exceptions to the general

rule in addition to the commencement of the statutory duty. The most recent

developments have seen a resurgence of this duty with the Supreme Court

giving its strongest statement on the subject in Mallak and the legislature

expanding its statutory application in recent amendments of the Freedom of

Information Act. What is certain, however, is that this is an area of the law that

is still developing and it will be interesting to see, given the persistence of

argument in its favour and its constitutional and statutory footing, whether the

shift advocated by Craig will inevitably elevate the duty to a universal rule.

Bibliography

Books

Delaney, Judicial Review of Administrative Action. Dublin, Thompson Roundhall

(2009).

Morgan, Hogan & Daly, Hogan and Morgan’s Administrative Law. Dublin,

Thompson Roundhall (2012).

Journal Articles

Craig, ‘The Common Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice’ (1994) 53(2)

C.L.J. 283-302..

Delaney, ‘The Duty to Give Reasons in Administrative Decision Making’ (1994)

12 I.L.T. 145.

Higgins, ‘The duty to give reasons in Irish law: Is it time to recognise a general

duty?’ (2011) 2 D.U.L.J. 23.

Ryall, ‘Freedom of Information Act 1997, Section 18: The Duty to Give Reasons

for Decisions’ (2000) 1 I.P.E.L.J 8.

Statute Law

74 In Case 98101 Ms. ABC and the Office of the Local Appointments Commissioners (LAC) the Commissioner deemed the applicant not to have a “material interest” for being part of a group of 64 individuals who were called for interview.

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Section 7 of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956, as amended by s.3 of the

Civil Service Regulation (Amendment) Act 1958.

Freedom of Information Act 1997 (as amended).

Irish Case Law

Broomfield v Minister for Agriculture (Unreported, High Court, Costello J, ex

tempore, April 10 1981).

Carlin v. DPP [2010] 3 IR 547.

Christian v. Dublin City Council [2012] IEHC 163.

Deerland Construction v. Aquatic Licensing Appeals Board [2009] 1 IR 673.

Dunnes Stores Ireland Ltd v. Moloney [1999] 3 IR 542.

East Donegal Co-operative Mart v. Attorney General [1970] IR 317.

Eviston v. DPP [2002] 3 IR 260.

Flood v. Garda Siochána Complaints Board [1997] 3 IR 121.

Flynn v. Medical Council [2012] IEHC 477.

International Fishing Vessels Ltd v. Minister for the Marine [1989] IR 149.

Mallak v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59.

Manning v. Shackleton [1994] 1 ILRM 346.

McAlister v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform [2003] 4 IR 35.

McCormack v. Garda Siochána Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489.

Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 IR 701.

Mulholland v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2006] 1 IR 453.

Ní Éilí v The Environmental Protection Agency [1999] IESC 64.

O'Donoghue v. An Bord Pleanála [1991] ILRM 750.

The State (Lynch) v. Cooney [1982] I.R. 337.

State (Daly) v. Minister for Agriculture [1987] IR 165.

State (Creedon) v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal [1988] IR 51.

Rajah v Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [1994] IR 384.

Canadian Case Law

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817.

UK Case Law

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R v. Higher Education Funding Council ex partes Institute of Dental Surgery

[1994] 1 WLR 242.

R v. Sectretary of State for the Home Department ex partes Doody [1993] 3 All

ER 92.

South Bucks D.C. v. Porter (No. 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953.

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