conflict and fundamental rights: can afghanistan learn from

BriefingPaper

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Introduc:on

ThisbriefingpaperisbasedonafullresearchreportthatexploresthewaysinwhichSouthAfricancivilsocietyandgovernmentactorsengageona<emptstoprotectandupholdfundamentalhumanrights,withtheaimofelici>ngcompara>velessonswithpoten>alprac>calrelevance

forthecontextofAfghanistanandotheremergingdemocracies.(1)Thisbriefexploresstate-civilsocietyinterfaceacrossthefourkeyareasofeduca>on,health,corrup>on,andtherightsofmigrants,refugees,andasylumseekers.Theseareaswereselectedfortheirpoten>alcapacitytoillustrateadiversityofstate-civilsocietyformsof

Conflict and Fundamental Rights: Can Afghanistan Learn From South Africa?

1.TheresearchwasundertakenaspartoftheAfghanistanRightsMonitor(ARM)project,fundedbytheDutchMinistryofForeignAffairsandimplementedbyAfghanistanPublicPolicyResearchOrganiza>on(APPRO).Forthefullreport,seePugh,S.(2016),“State-CivilSocietyRela>ons:FundamentalRightsinSouthAfrica”(Kabul:APPRO),availablefrom:h<p://appro.org.af/?publica>on=fundamental-rights-south-africa

engagementincontemporarySouthAfrica.Allfouroftheseareashavebeenvola>leandprominentinsocialandpoli>caldiscourseinSouthAfrica,providingfer>legroundforcontemporaryresearchandlearningforothercontexts.TheseareaswerealsoselectedfortheirrelevancetothecontextofAfghanistan,toenabletheextrac>onofinforma>ve,compara>ve,andapplicablelessonsforAfghanistan.Thisresearchdrewonrelevantacademicandgreyliteratureandtheanalysisofqualita>vedatafrominterviewswithkeyinformantsdrawnfromSouthAfricancivilsocietyandstateactorsinvolvedinthesethemes.

Background

State-civilsocietyrela>onsinSouthAfricaareinaperpetualstateofflux,constantlyadap>ngtothequicklyshi[ingsocialandpoli>calpost-apartheidlandscape.Theendofapartheidin1994broughtwithitnewmeansandmechanismsforengagementandinterac>onbetweenstateandcivilsocietyfortheadvancementofhumanrights,par>cularlyintermsofthenewprotec>onsaffordedbytheCons>tu>onof1996andtheassociatedBillofRights.Italsobroughtnewchallengesinstate-civilsocietyrela>ons:anac>veandpowerfulcivilsociety,

previouslycloselyalignedwiththeinterestsoftheAfricanNa>onalCongress(ANC)asalibera>onmovement,wasforcedtoadjusttothenewrealityoftheANC’scomingtopoli>calpowerastherulingpartyofanewcons>tu>onaldemocracy.Onceinpower,ANC’sownconceptualiza>onsoftheroleofcivilsocietycameunderscru>nyandadjustmentwhilecivilsocietyinterestsbegantodiverge,resul>ngintheemergenceofacri>cal,andat>mesadversarial,civilsociety.

TheendofapartheidalsoenteredSouthAfricaintoanintenseperiodofpost-conflicttransi>on.Theroleofcivilsocietyinthistransi>oncon>nuestobeofconsiderablesignificanceintermsofitseffortstoshapethenewdemocra>cdispensa>on,andinitsworktoadvanceandprotectthelong-neglectedhumanrightsofthemajorityofthecountry’sci>zens.Newcons>tu>onalandlegisla>veprotec>ons,combinedwithnewna>onalcommitmentstoarangeofhumanrightsinstrumentsattheinterna>onallevelhavepavedthewayfornewformsofhumanrights-baseddiscourseandadvocacythroughoutthecountry.

Atthesame>me,thesenewcommitments,legisla>onandpolicieshavenotalwaystranslatedconsistentlyinto

changedprac>cesorpolicyoutcomes,resul>nginapluralityofengagementsbetweenvariouselementsofcivilsocietyandthepost-apartheidstate.Inworkingtowarditsvariousgoals,post-apartheidcivilsocietyinSouthAfricaemploysamixtureofapproachesinitsinterac>onswiththestate,includingcollabora>on,coopera>onand,increasingly,conten>ousengagements.Theseeffortshavemetwithmixedresultsacrossawiderangeofsocial,poli>cal,economicandculturalissues.

State-CivilSocietyInterface:MethodsandMeans

Acrossthefourissueareasexploredinthisresearch,civilsocietyandstateactorsdescribedathreemainapproachesinengagement,eachwithitsownpar>cularstrengthsandchallenges.Theseare:a)coopera>ve,collabora>veandins>tu>onalapproaches;b)protestsasatooltoeffectidea>onalandmaterialchange;andc)strategicli>ga>onbycivilsocietyinadvancingrights.Mostcivilsocietyactorsemployarangeofcomplementarystrategiesacrossthesethreebroadapproachestoengagementinpursuitoftheirspecificgoals(Table1).

Coopera>ve,collabora>veandins>tu>onalapproachesinstate-civilsociety

interac>onstowardtheadvancementorprotec>onofhumanrightshavemetwithmuchsuccessinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica,par>cularlygiventhehumanrights-basedapproachoftheCons>tu>onof1996andsubsequentlegisla>onandtheprotec>onaffordedtocivilsociety.Civilsocietycanengagecollabora>velywiththestateinmul>pleforumsincludingpar>cipa>oninpolicymakingprocessesthrough,forexample,stakeholderworkshops,policysubmissions,andlobbying.Chapter9Ins>tu>onssuchasthe“OfficeofthePublicProtector”andthe“SouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission”provideaddi>onalavenuesforcivilsocietytoadvanceitsgoals,whileregionalandinterna>onalbodiessuchasthe“AfricanPeerReviewMechanism”andtheUnitedNa>ons’rights-monitoringprogramssuchasthe“UniversalPeriodicReview”providefurtherforumsforinputfromcivilsociety.Somenon-governmentorganiza>onsaredirectlyinvolvedinserviceprovision

throughstatefunding.TheseincludeCommunityCareWorkerprogramsinthehealthsectorestablishedtoprovidehealthservicestomillionsofSouthAfricansintheircommuni>es.

Protestsplayasignificantroleinraisingtheprofileofrights-relatedissues,providingaforumfortheven>ngofpublicfrustra>onsandbuildingmomentumincampaigns.Whilethemajorityofprotestac>onincontemporarySouthAfricaispeaceful,violentordestruc>veprotestsarenotuncommon,rangingfrom“servicedelivery”protestsincommuni>esthatsome>mesresultin>reburningandblockadingroads,tostudentproteststhathaveresultedinarsonandvandalism,cos>ngthecountrymillionsofdollarsindamages.

Theroleofli>ga>oninprotec>ngoradvancingfundamentalhumanrightsiscomplexandcontroversial,garneringsignificantdiscernibleresentmentfromsomequartersofthestate.Li>ga>onhasbeenusedtogreateffectintheareasofhealth,educa>on,migra>onandcorrup>on,amongstothers.However,li>ga>onbycivilsocietyactorsinpursuitofrightsiso[enatooloflastresortinstrategiesforengagingwiththestateduetotheexpense,delays,uncertainty,andthedamagedrela>onshipsthatli>ga>oncanevokebetweencivilsocietyandstateauthori>es.Civilsocietyactorsuseli>ga>onwhenallotheravenuesforcoopera>vecommunica>onandinterac>onwithstateauthori>eshavebeenexhaustedorfailed.

Table1:MethodsofState-CivilSocietyEngagementinSouthAfrica1. FormalPolicySubmissions2. ParliamentaryPorholioCommi<eePresenta>ons3. Government/StakeholderWorkshops4. Par>cipa>oninFormalRightsMonitoringMechanisms5. MediaEngagement(i.e.localradio,newspapers)6. NGOsasservicedeliveryproviders7. Chapter9Ins>tu>ons:formalcomplaintsandinves>ga>ons(2)8. EngagementinIntersectoralIns>tu>ons9. Socialauditstomonitorandensuregovernmentaccountabilityinservicedelivery10. HighLevelDiplomacy11. MassMobiliza>on(e.g.educa>on)12. CommunitySitesofEngagement(e.g.CommunityPolicingForums,WardMee>ngs)13. PeacefulProtestandMarches14. PublicInterest&StrategicLi>ga>on15. ViolentProtests(physicalviolenceanddamagetoproperty

2.“Chapter9Ins>tu>ons”arethesixindependentstateins>tu>onscreatedbytheCons>tu>onoftheRepublicofSouthAfricain1996as“protec>onmechanisms”designedtoensurethatthegovernmentdoesitsworkproperlyandconductsitselfinaccordancewiththeCons>tu>on.Theseins>tu>onsaccountfortheirac>vi>esandperformanceatleastonceayeartotheNa>onalAssembly.Formoreinforma>on,see:h<p://www.wcpp.gov.za/sites/default/files/WCPP%20Poster-Chapter%20Nine%20ENG_0.pdf

KeyFeaturesinState-CivilSocietyInterface

Fourkeyfeaturesofstate-civilsocietyinterfaceneedtobeunderlinedforthecaseofSouthAfrica.

1.RoleofIns:tu:ons

Thecapacityofstateandcivilsocietyactorstoworkindependentlyorintandemtowardtheprotec>onandadvancementofrightsiscloselyinterconnectedwiththeexistenceandstrengthofrelevantins>tu>onsinSouthAfrica.Theseins>tu>onsprovidealegalframeworkforrightsprotec>onandmonitoring,forumsforcoopera>veeffortstowardadvancingorprotec>ngrights,andchecksandbalancesonstatepoweranditspoten>alabuses.Notallins>tu>onsfunc>onwiththesamedegreeofefficacyandefficiency,however,andmanyhistoricallyrootedandcontemporarystructuralchallengesremainasimpedimentstotheireffec>veness.

SouthAfrica’spost-apartheidCons>tu>onof1996featuresstronglyasbothasetofguidingprinciplesandasaprac>caltoolforadvancingsocio-economicrightsinthecountry.Theprotec>onsaffordedbytheCons>tu>oninimposingaspecificobliga>ononthestateto

ensurecivicinvolvementinitsdecisionshavetosomedegreeencouragedandprotectedcivilsocietyinitsinterfacewiththestateevenwherestate-civilsocietyrela>onshavebeenstrainedordifficult.

Thepresenceinthecountryofanindependent,generallyuncorruptedandwell-func>oning,judiciaryhasbeenaninstrumentalstructureforcivilsociety’sa<emptstoadvanceorprotectsocio-economicrightsthroughstrategicorpublicinterestli>ga>on.Whileusingli>ga>ontoadvancesocio-economicrightsandadvocacygoalscansome>mesraisedifficultsepara>onofpowerissuesbetweentheins>tu>onsofthejudiciaryandtheexecu>ve,therecoursetothecourtsisconsideredacri>caltoolinawiderrepertoireofadvocacyinstrumentsinpursuitoffundamentalrights.

Stateauthori>esandcivilsocietyactorsplacecomparableemphasisonChapter9Ins>tu>ons,eventhoughtheseins>tu>onsarealsonotwithouttheirownchallenges.TheOfficeofthePublicProtector,inpar>cular,isseenasoneofthemosteffec>vecontemporaryins>tu>onsinSouthAfricaforcomba>ngissuesofcorrup>onand

abusesofpowerbyandwithinstateins>tu>ons.

Therearemixedreflec>onsregardingtheroleofinter-sectoralbodiessuchastheNa>onalAn>-Corrup>onForuminbringingstate,businessandcivilsocietyactorstogethertojointlyworktowardsolu>onsoradvancementsinspecificcorrup>on-relatedareas.WhiletheForumisseenbysomeasprovidinganimportantavenueforengagementbetweendifferentsectors,otherspointoutthattheeffec>venessoftheForumdependslargelyonstrongandsustainedleadership,awell-designedgovernancestructure,adequateandsustainedresourcing,aclearmandate,andin-builtaccountability,representa>on,andenforcementmechanisms.

Finally,therearevariouswaysinwhichcontemporaryins>tu>onalchallengesinSouthAfricaareshapedbythehistoricalcontext.Thedecadesofconflictcon>nuetoimpacttheins>tu>onalculturesofgovernmentdepartmentsandotherstructures,aswellasthecapacityofgovernmentdepartmentstoexerciseeffec>ve,i.e.,accountableandtransparent,governance.Thishistoricalins>tu>onalistperspec>veunderlineso[en-citedgap

betweenwhatare,inmanyways,theprogressivepoliciesoftheSouthAfricanstateandwaysinwhichthesepoliciestranslateintoprac>ce,giventhehistoricalrole,legaciesandfunc>onsofvariousins>tu>ons.Itisalsoimportanttonotethatthecapacityandeffec>venessofstateins>tu>onsvariessignificantlyacrossdepartments,acrossdifferentlevelsofthestate,andhowthesedifferentins>tu>onsclashorresonatewithotherins>tu>onswithlongerhistory.

2.UseofLi:ga:on

Publicinterestandstrategicli>ga>onhavecometoplayimportantrolesinstate-civilsocietyrela>onsinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica.Theemergenceofthecourtsasanimportantsiteofcontesta>onbetweencivilsocietyandthestatehasresultedinsomelandmarkadvancementsinupholdingorexpansionofhumanrightsinSouthAfrica,asexemplifiedinthecampaignsforaccesstoan>retroviraltherapyforHIVtreatment.

Thereisadominantpercep>onthatwhileli>ga>onisanimportantandnecessarystrategyforprotec>ngandadvancingrights,itisnonethelessastrategyoflastresort.

Li>ga>onbycivilsocietyactorsisalmostalwaysfollowedbyabreakdownincommunica>onsbetweenstateandcivilsociety.Li>ga>oninvolvesexpenses,is>me-consuming,andcancreatetensionsbetweenthestateandcivilsocietyactorsandbetweenthestateandthejudiciary.Thus,li>ga>onbycivilsocietyisini>ateda[ermuchdelibera>on.Civilsocietyactorswhodoengageinli>ga>onfortheprotec>onoradvancementofhumanrightsleveragena>onallawsandinterna>onalhumanrightslawandprovisions.

Despitesomeveryimportantsuccessesintheuseofli>ga>on,thereisthepropensityofthestatetoengageinappeala[erappeala[erlosingacourtcase.Evenmoreimportantly,civilsocietyactorsreportanincreasingtrendofstatenon-compliancewithcourtorders.Thisraisesimportantques>onsregardingstatecapacityandwillingnesstobebeholdentoordersofthecourtandtheu>lityofli>ga>onasatoolforcivilsocietytoholdstateauthori>esaccountable.Eitherscenariohasworrisomeimplica>onsfortheongoinghealthandconsolida>onofthecountry’scons>tu>onaldemocracy.

3.LegaciesofConflict

SouthAfrica’stumultuoushistoryhasvariousimplica>onsforcontemporarystate-civilsocietyengagementsincludingthosearoundtheprotec>onoradvancementofhumanrights.Whilethepost-apartheidstatehasmadeimportantstridesinundoingsomeofapartheid’slegacies,ongoingunmetsocio-economicneedssuchashousing,adequatesanita>on,accesstowater,inequalityineduca>on,andaccesstoemploymentareattherootsofwidespreadsocialdiscontentacrossthecountry.Themajorityoftheprotestsontheseissuesacrossthecountryarepeaceful.Yet,alltooo[enprotestscanspilloverintoviolence,propertydestruc>on,orboth,echoingsomeoftheproteststylescommonduringan>-apartheidstrugglesinvariouscommuni>es.

Apartheid’slegaciesofinequalityandinjus>ceares>llentrenchedinmanywaysinthestructuresandins>tu>onsofcontemporarySouthAfricaandcon>nuetoframeandshapetheagendaofcivilsocietyac>vism.Thecountry’svibranthistoryofsocialac>vism,innosmallpartborneoutofthestruggleagainstapartheid,isevidentincontemporary

formsofcivilsocietyac>vism,bolsteredbytheaddi>onofnew,post-1994opportuni>esforengagementandinfluence.

Un>lthefallofapartheidtheAfricanNa>onalCongressrepresentedanintenselypopularlibera>onmovement,comingtopoli>calpowerwithwidespreadsupportfromacrosscivilsociety.Thetransi>onoftheANCintoarulingpartyinthenewcons>tu>onaldemocracywasaccompaniedbyasignificantshi[intherela>onshipbetweenANCandcivilsociety.Theinterpreta>onsofthe“proper”roleofcivilsocietyinpost-apartheidSouthAfricaremaincontestedandsensi>ve,par>cularlywhenitcomestoa<emptsbycivilsocietytoeffectchecksandbalancesregardingstatepowersandaccountability.Withinthestatetherearemixedsen>mentsaboutthetrustworthinessofsomesectorsofcivilsociety,par>cularlythosewithconten>ousorli>giousstrategiesandthosewithinterna>onalfunding.

4.StrategiesforEngagement

Fromgrassroots,community-basedNGOstolegalNGOs,accesstoinforma>onrepresentsakeycomponentoftheir

strategiesforengagementwithstateauthori>es.Theprotec>onandenhancementofstatemechanismsforaccesstoinforma>onisviewedbymanycivilsocietyac>vistsasamainmeansforupholdingandimprovingthetransparencyandaccountabilityofthestate.

Partnershipwithregionalbodiesorregionalcivilsocietyorganiza>onshasbeenu>lizedbysomeSouthAfricancivilsocietyactorsforadvancingfundamentalrightsinSouthAfrica.Formalregionalins>tu>onssuchastheAfricanPeerReviewMechanism,thoughnotwithoutsignificantchallenges,maybeimportantforumsforadvancinghumanrightsinawaythatavoidssomeofthedifficultando[enemo>vepoli>csof“developmentalism,”viewedbymanyasexternallydrivenrights-basedordevelopmentagendasbeingimposedlargelybydevelopedcountriesasnewformsofcolonialismorcontrol.

Linkedtothis,civilsocietyac>vismhasbeengenerallymostsuccessfulwhenithashadrootsincommuni>es,withbroad-basedpublicsupportbuiltaroundanissuewithdirectrelevanceorimpactonthedailylives

ofci>zens.CampaignsthatentailNGOsorcivilsocietyactorsparachu>ngbrieflyintocommuni>es,andwhicharebuiltaroundabstractconceptualiza>onsofrightsorotherthemesofdevelopment,areseenasmuchlesslikelytohaveanysignificantimpactinthelongerterm.Conduc>ngsocialauditsisoneexampleofapoten>allyeffec>veapproachforadvancingsocio-economicrightsatthelocallevelbytrainingci>zensinmethodsofholdinggovernmentsaccountableforthedirectdeliveryofservicesinimpoverishedandunder-resourcedcommuni>es.

Protectedspacesneedtobeprotectedandexpandedforcivilsocietytoengagefreelywithstateauthori>esusingawidecross-sec>onofcomplementarystrategies.Somecivilsocietyactorsareshutoutbyunresponsivegovernmentofficialsordepartmentsorviewtheopportuni>esforengagementwithstateauthori>esasli<lemorethanwindow-dressing.

State-civilsocietyrela>onscanvarysubstan>allyacrosssectorsandacrossdifferentlevelsofthegovernment.Theserela>onsarealsofunc>onsofspecificpersonali>esofvariousofficialsandcivilsocietyrepresenta>ves,methodsof

engagementused,andins>tu>onalcultures.

Conclusion

SouthAfricancivilsocietyisdiverse,dedicatedandengagedinawiderangeoflocal,na>onal,regionalandinterna>onalissues.Whileaspecifichumanrightsapproachdoesnotnecessarilyinformtheworkofallorganiza>ons,mostareworkinginonewayoranotheronissueswithadirectbearingonhumancondi>onssuchasaccesstoeduca>on,housingandservices,andemployment,environmentalprotec>onandpovertyreduc>on.Othersworkmoredirectlytoholdthestateaccountableandpromotegoodgovernancethroughprotec>onandenhancementofaccesstoinforma>onmechanismsorworkingtocombatcorrup>onandabusesofstatepower.Inmanyways,theeffec>venessofcivilsocietyisinextricablylinkedtotheformallegislatedprotec>onsandins>tu>ons

thatwerecreatedbythepost-apartheidstate.

WhileSouthAfrica’shumanrightscommitmentsremainentrenchedintheCons>tu>on,BillofRights,andtheinterna>onalhumanrightsconven>onstowhichitissignatory,thecapacityofthestatetomeettheseobliga>onsinameaningfuland>melywayremainsuncertain,atbest.Therehavebeenmanylaudableadvancesintheinterveningyearsinareassuchashealth,educa>on,refugeeprotec>on,housing,andtheprovisionofsocialgrants.Yet,SouthAfricaiss>llacountrycharacterizedbyvastinequality,poverty,unemployment,andcommunaltensions.MillionsofSouthAfricanscon>nuetoexperiencearangeofinterlacedstructuralandhistoricalvulnerabili>es.Millionscon>nuetoliveininformalandsemi-formalhousingwithlimitedopportuni>esforeduca>on,meaningfulemployment,goodhealth,safetyandsecurity.

Despitethedepthandscopeofthesechallenges,thereisalsoimpressiveenergy,dedica>on,andcrea>vityofcountlessindividualswithincivilsocietyandvariousins>tu>onsofthestateinSouthAfricawhoareworkingonadailybasisandinmul>plewaystoimproveci>zens’livesinsocial,economicandpoli>calspheres.Regardlessofthedifferencesandtensionsthatmayexistinstate-civilsocietyinterac>onstowardtheadvancementofhumanrightsinSouthAfrica,therearenonethelessmanysharedgoalsandvalues,andmanycon>nuingopportuni>esforchangeandgrowth.Thesuccessesandchallengesofstate-civilsocietyengagementstowardtheprotec>onandadvancementoffundamentalrightsinSouthAfricaalsopresentarangeofimportantpoten>allessonsforAfghanistanandotheremergingdemocracies.