braxton eisel 14 - air force historical foundationvulcan the fire god—the inside story of the avro...

COVER: The SR–71 in flight over Beale AFB, California. (USAF Photo)

History MysteryReview Essay: Roger G. MillerBook Reviews

World History of Warfareby I. Archer, J.R. Ferris, H.H. Herwig, and T.H.E. Travers Reviewed by Stéphane Lefebvre

Warthog and the Close Air Support Debateby Douglas N. Campbell Reviewed by Darrel Whitcomb

From Autogiro to Gyroplane: The Amazing Survival of an Aviation Technologyby Bruce H. Charnov Reviewed by I. B. Holley, Jr.

Anatomy of a Reform: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force by Richard G. Davis Reviewed by Robert A. Morris

To the End of the Solar System: The Story of the Nuclear Rocket by James A. Dewar Reviewed by Rick W. Sturdevant

The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communismin Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

by Arthur J. Dommen Reviewed by John L. Cirafici100 Years of Air Power and Aviation

by Robin Higham Reviewed by Kenneth P. WerrellThe Royal Air Force in Texas: Training British Pilots in Terrell During World War II

by Tom Killebrew Reviewed by Scott D. MurdockMastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space

by Benjamin S. Lambeth Reviewed by Rick W. SturdevantChoosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalationof War in Vietnam

by Frederik Logevall Reviewed by Stéphane LefebvreStand Well Clear

by D. K. Tooker Reviewed by William A. NardoHeroic Flights: The First 100 Years of Aviation

by John Frayn Turner Reviewed by John BraddonVulcan the Fire God—The Inside Story of the Avro Vulcan

by Power Point Communications Reviewed by Larry RichmondImagining Flight: Aviation and the Popular Culture

by Bowdoin Van Riper Reviewed by William A. Nardo

Books ReceivedComing UpLetters, Notices, News, ReunionsFoundation Notes

4344464646474848

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FALL 2004 - Volume 51, Number 3

The Effects of Aerial and Satellite Imagery on the 1973 Yom Kippur WarDino A. Brugioni

Signal Aircraft Warning Battalions in theSouthwest Pacific in World War IIBraxton Eisel

Fighting Machines for the Air Service, AEFTheodore M. Hamady

Flight to Korea, June 25, 1950James A. Scheib 38

2 AIR POWER History / FALL 2004

Contributing Members

The individuals and companies listed are contributingmembers of the Air Force Historical Foundation. TheFoundation Trustees and members are grateful for theirsupport and contributions to preserving, perpetuating,and publishing the history and traditions of Americanaviation.

BenefactorMrs. Ruth A. (Ira C.) Eaker Estate

PatronMaj. Gen. Ramsay PottsQuesada Foundation

SponsorsMaj. Gen. William LyonMaj. Gen. John S. PattonGen. William Y. Smith

DonorsMr. John F. DonahueEmerson ElectricRockwell InternationalGen. Bernard A. Schriever

SupportersThe Aerospace CorporationAllied-Signal Aerospace CorporationArthur Metcalf FoundationLt. Gen. John B. Conaway, USAF (Ret)CSX CorporationGen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF (Ret)Brig. Gen. Brian S. GundersonMaj. Gen. John P. HenebryGen. & Mrs. Robert T. HerresMaj. Gen. Harold E. HumfeldMcDonnell Douglas FoundationMrs. Irene W. McPhersonMaj. Gen. Kenneth P. MilesNorthrop-Grumman CorporationMr. William O’RourkeMr. James PartonMr. George PendeltonPratt & WhitneyUnited TechnologiesCapt. William C. WardMaj. Gen. Richard A. Yudkin

Annual Contributing MembersANSERARX, Inc.ASTECH/MCI Manufacturing, Inc.Beech Aircraft CorporationBoeing Defense & Space GroupGeneral Electric CompanyInstrument Systems Corp.Litton IndustriesLockheed Martin Corp.The Mitre CorporationNorthrop CorporationVinell Corporation

Officers

PresidentLt. Gen. Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret)Vice-PresidentGen. John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Secretary-TreasurerMaj. Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Executive Director Col. George K. Williams, USAF (Ret)

Advisors

Gen. John P. Jumper, USAFLt. Gen. John R. Dallager, USAFLt. Gen. Donald A. Lamontagne, USAFBrig. Gen. Frederick F. Roggero, USAFCMSAF Gerald R. Murray, USAFMr. C. R. “Dick” Anderegg

Board of Trustees

Col. Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret)Mr. F. Clifton Berry, Jr.Lt.Gen. John B. Conaway, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Russell C. Davis, USAF (Ret)Gen. Michael J. Dugan, USAF (Ret)Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF(Ret)Maj.Gen. John P. Henebry, USAF (Ret)Col. George A. Henry, Jr., USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. James A. Jaeger, USAF (Ret)Mr. John Kreis, USAF (Ret)Gen. Walter Kross, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)Hon. Hans MarkCMSgt Norman A. Marous, USAF Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., USAF(Ret)CMSgtAF Sam E. Parish, USAF (Ret)Col. Robert E. Vickers, Jr., USAF (Ret)Col. George Weinbrenner, USAF(Ret)

Trustees Emeriti

Lt. Col. Maynard Y. Binge, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Devol Brett, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. William E. Brown, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Charles G. Cleveland, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bennie L. Davis, USAF (Ret)Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF (Ret)Mr. John E. GreenwoodBrig.Gen. Brian S. Gunderson, USAF (Ret)Gen. Robert T. Herres, USAF (Ret)Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr.Maj.Gen. Jeanne M. Holm, USAF (Ret)Gen. David C. Jones, USAF (Ret)Lt.Col. Donald S. Lopez, USAF (Ret)Col. Kenneth Moll, USAF (Ret)Col. Helen E. O’Day, USAF (Ret)Hon. Verne OrrMaj.Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Ramsay D. Potts, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret)Gen. W. Y. Smith, USAF (Ret)MSgt. Charles J. Warth, USAF (Ret)Col. Sherman W. Wilkins, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Richard A. Yudkin, USAF (Ret)

The Journal of theAir Force Historical Foundation

Fall 2004 Volume 51 Number 3

PublisherBrian S. Gunderson

EditorJacob Neufeld

Technical EditorRobert F. Dorr

Book Review EditorScott A. Willey

Layout and TypesettingRichard I. Wolf

AdvertisingMark D. Mandeles

CirculationRichard I. Wolf

Air Power History (ISSN 1044-016X) is produced in March, June, September,and December by the Air Force HistoricalFoundation.

Prospective contributors should consult theGUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS atthe back of this journal. Unsolicited manu-scripts will be returned only on specificrequest. The Editor cannot accept responsi-bility for any damage to or loss of the man-uscript. The Editor reserves the right toedit manuscripts and letters.

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3AIR POWER History / FALL 2004

Dino Brugioni, one of the Nation’s premier photo interpreter’s, leads off this issue with the previ-ously untold story of America’s aerial reconnaissance in monitoring the aftermath of the 1973 YomKippur War. He demonstrates how this remarkable element of air power contributed to peace andimproved relations between Egypt and Israel.

“Brick” Eisel, who served as a ground controller in ground and airborne radar systems, explores therole of signal aircraft warning battalions in the southwest Pacific during World War II. Eisel’s inter-est in the subject was motivated by the fact that his uncle, Jake Herring—featured in the article—served as a radar technician during the war.

In June 1917, two months after the United States entered World War I, Major Raynal Bolling, amilitary aviator and former corporate lawyer, led a special commission to investigate European devel-opments in aviation. After an intense three-month-long tour of facilities in France, Italy, and England,the Bolling mission recommended that Allied aircraft should be built under license in the U.S. untilAmerican designs became available. However, as author Ted Hamady notes in “Fighting Machines forthe Air Service, AEF,” U.S. industry was unable to build and ship the aircraft soon enough before theywere deemed obsolete.

On June 25, 1950, James Scheib took off from Johnson Air Base, near Tokyo. Aboard his SB–17Gwas Col. William Wright, USA, the chief of staff, Korean Military Advisory Group; they were headedfor Kimpo AB, South Korea. Was this the first combat mission flown by the United States Air Force?

There are fourteen reviews of new air power books—dealing with air and space operations, theory,analysis, and more. Also, be sure to check out the new books received and to read Roger Miller’s reviewessay on the latest biography of the legendary Billy Mitchell.

The departments section is chock full of news, starting with our introduction of Col. GeorgeWilliams as the Foundation’s new executive director (see page 63). The other big news is thatFoundation’s trustees have established an annual $1,000 prize for the year’s best book on air power.To qualify, authors must have an Air Force affiliation, the books must have been published during theprevious year, and been reviewed in Air Power History. The finalists were:

Robert F. Dorr, Air Force OneJohn W. Huston, American Airpower Comes of Age: General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s

World War II DiariesPhillip S. Meilinger, Airmen and Air Theory: A Review of the SourcesDavid N. Spires, Air Power for Patton’s Army: The XIXth Tactical Air Command in the Second

World WarJerry L. Thigpen’s, The Praetorian STARShip: The Untold Story of the Combat Talon.

This award’s committee of judges was chaired by John Kreis, an author and research staff member atthe Institute for Defense Analyses and included Alfred Hurley, former head of the Air Force Academy’shistory department and former chancellor of North Texas State University; Col. Robert Vickers, USAF(Ret.); and Donald Baucom, the former chief historian of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agency. To findout who won, turn to page 61.

From the Editor

Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements,either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or othercommunication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facieevidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air ForceHistorical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works,if published in the authors’ own works. In the case of articles, upon acceptance, the author will be sentan agreement and an assignment of copyright.

��

AIR POWER History / FALL 2004 5

Dino A. Brugioni

� he origins of the Yom Kippur War of October1973 may be traced to the Suez Crisis in 1956,when President Dwight D. Eisenhower autho-

rized U–2 flights over the Middle East. By theonset of the June 1967 Six-Day War, the UnitedStates had acquired a significant amount of aerialand satellite imagery over “targets” in that area.

The CIA’s National Photographic InterpretationCenter (NPIC) had an experienced and dedicatedcomplement of imagery intelligence officers, capa-ble of melding the imagery derived with collateralinformation to produce accurate and timely intelli-gence reporting.

After the Six-Day War, the NPIC published aspecial detailed Middle East edition of a KH–4satellite mission. The mission reflected the exten-sive damage the Israelis had inflicted on theirArab foes. A total of 246 destroyed aircraft wereimaged in three countries—202 in Egypt, 26 inSyria, and 18 in Jordan.1

The few surviving combat aircraft were laterseen at Aswan, Luxor, and smaller airfields insouthern Egypt—beyond the range of the Israeliaircraft. Both the Egyptians and Syrians realizedthey were extremely vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes and turned to the Soviet Union for help.The Soviets replaced the aircraft destroyed on amore than one-to-one basis. New aircraft includedlarge numbers of MiG–21s, SU–7s, and replace-ments for the IL–28 bombers lost during the war.At main Arab airfields, we noted the constructionof hangarettes, which would complicate our effortsto provide good air-order-of-battle counts.

Four high flying MiG–25 Foxbats were identi-fied near one of the hangarettes. From varioussources, it was known that they were piloted bySoviets. Attachés noted camera ports on one of theFoxbats in flight, indicating that the Soviets wereprobably conducting reconnaissance missions forthe Egyptians. Pat Ashburn, one of our inter-preters familiar with Israeli airfields, found some-thing very interesting. At several Israeli airfields,obvious targets for MiG–25 reconnaissance, therewas always an armed Phantom fighter on alert.On several occasions, we learned that when therewas a MiG–25 recon flight, the Phantoms would begone. We later learned the Israelis had desperatelytried to intercept the MiG–25 with zoom climbsand firing air-to-air missiles. None, however, weresuccessful.

The greatest Soviet contribution to the Arabs,however, was a massive effort to install an elabo-rate air defense network consisting of SA–2, SA–3,and SA–6 surface-to-air missiles. The Israelis were

extremely interested in what was happening inEgypt, but when they sent out their reconnais-sance aircraft, they were met with a volley ofSAMs. Along with the latest anti-aircraft weapons,an impressive aerial umbrella had been estab-lished along the Suez Canal.

To make the Israeli reconnaissance efforts moredifficult, the Egyptians, probably with Soviet help,began playing a shell game with the missile sites.One day an SA–2 missile site would be observed,the next day its equipment had been moved out.The following day SA–3 equipment would beinstalled. Our reporting of this activity caused con-fusion in the intelligence community and also withSecretary of State William Rogers, who was advo-cating his Middle East peace plan. John Hicks,NPIC’s Executive Officer, asked me to prepare abriefing for the Secretary. The NPIC auditoriumwas the site of the briefing and through photos andmaps we were able to show how the sites werebeing changed and how difficult it was to have anup-to-the-minute situation report on the sites.Secretary Rogers was extremely pleased with oureffort; Hicks later sent me this note, “Your personaldirection and organization of the effort to serve theneeds of the Secretary of State on Monday 14September ’70 were notably effective. ManyNPICers participated and contributed to the use-ful efforts, but your particular leadership was akey contribution in meeting the secretary’s need.”Secretary Rogers said that the Israelis had lost anumber of their best reconnaissance pilots.

Another effort at the NPIC concerned theamount of new military equipment the Sovietswere providing their clients to replace andupgrade that destroyed during the 1967 war. Theold T–34 tanks were replaced with T–54, T–55 andT–62 tanks. New BRDM armored-personnel-carri-ers, along with some of the newer artillery pieces,were spotted being unloaded at the port ofAlexandria and later deployed along the Canal.The latest Soviet bridging equipment was alsoseen along with hundreds of new cargo trucks.

The intelligence community estimated thatthere were at least 30,000 Soviet technicians inEgypt before they were expelled by Egypt’sPresident Anwar Sadat in July 1972. The Sovietshad been involved in every aspect of Egypt mili-tary activity from command and control to thetraining of Egyptian conscripts. The ouster of theSoviets came as a surprise to the U.S. intelligencecommunity. We had observed, however, there was anotable slowdown of Soviet military shipments.Sadat, in his biography, asserted that no war could

During World War II, Dino A. Brugioni flew on sixty-six bombing and a number of reconnaissance mis-sions over Europe. After the war, he received BA and MA degrees in foreign affairs from GeorgeWashington University. He joined the CIA in 1948 and in 1955 was selected as one of the founders ofthe National Photographic Interpretation Center. As a senior officer at the Center, he was involved inthe exploitation of U–2, SR–71, and satellite imagery in strategic and crisis situations. He has writtenfive books, more than eighty articles, and has helped with and appeared in dozens of television pro-grams dealing with the application of aerial and spatial imagery to history, intelligence, and environ-mental problems.

(Overleaf) The SR–71. (Allphotos courtesy of theauthor.)

THEEGYPTIANS,PROBABLYWITH SOVIETHELP, BEGANPLAYING ASHELL GAMEWITH THEMISSILESITES

be fought while the Soviet experts were in Egypt.Another, and probably better reason, according toSadat, was that the Soviet experts “had begun tofeel that it enjoyed a privileged position in Egypt—so much so that the Soviet ambassador hadassumed a position comparable to that of theBritish High Commissioner in the days of Britishoccupation of Egypt.”2

After the 1967 war, we also watched the Israelisbuild the Bar-Lev Line along the east bank of theSuez Canal. The line was an enormously fortifiedartificial sand barrier that ranged from 30 to 60feet high and about 30 feet wide. Millions of sand-bags and miles of concertina wire were alsoemployed along the Canal. We saw hundreds oflarge galvanize pipe sections being brought fromIsrael to the Line. Covered with sand, they wouldform living quarters, command posts, and tunnelsto other parts of the line. The Line extended some160 kilometers from Port Taufig to El Qantara. Itwas interspersed with 18 major, and a number ofminor fortified positions. The areas between theoutposts were equipped with artillery, tanks, anddirect-fire positions. The Israel military felt thatarmored forces could be deployed quickly towhichever point of the line was threatened.

On the Egyptian side of the Canal, we began tosee large and tall pyramid-shaped mounds, some30-feet higher than the Israelis, and built at regu-lar intervals from Port Said to Suez. The moundsoverlooked installations along the Bar-Lev Lineand also could be Egyptian crossing points of theCanal. Although originally these would serve asobservation posts, they could also serve as Saggeranti-tank-missile launch points. On one occasionwe saw a tank atop one of these mounds. Sadat vis-ited one of these mounds and reported that “fromthe top I can see Sinai very clearly.”

It was during this period that Sadat beganmaking a number of public statements proclaim-ing an imminent outbreak of hostilities. Skir-

mishes along the Canal would go on intermittentlybut were beginning to escalate both in time, place,and intensity. There were conflicting feelings inthe intelligence community as to whether therewould be war or not. Sadat, however, continuedmaking claims to regain Egyptian sovereigntyover the occupied Sinai.

Each year Egyptian forces were mobilized andwith the new Soviet-provided equipment con-ducted massive military maneuvers and opera-tions along the Canal with the apparent intent tocross it. On several occasions, the Israelis hadmobilized their forces at considerable expense,only to find that the Egyptians forces had returnedto their garrisons. The Israelis, it appeared,became conditioned to the Egyptian maneuvers.

In May 1973 satellite photography, we observeda large Egyptian exercise in the desert with amockup, in the sand, of the Suez Canal and Israelidefenses along the Bar-Lev Line. We saw unitsarrayed in formations as if for a review or inspec-tion. There were several armored units with SA–6missiles indicating that the SA–6 missile unitswould be following the armored units into battleand be their protection. A CIA analyst, who spe-cialized in the area, had written a report that anEgyptian attack was imminent. When Egyptianunits customarily went back to their garrisons, theanalyst was transferred. Sadat would later write:

I had no intention to starting a war in May, but aspart of my strategic deception plan I launched amass media campaign, then took various civildefense measures which led the Israelis to believethat war was imminent. In the days when warseemed likely to break out there was full Israelimobilization, while we enjoyed perfect militarycalm. I did the same thing in August—and theIsraeli reaction was the same.3

John Hicks became the Director of the NPIC,upon the retirement of the first director, Arthur C.Lundahl, in June 1973. Hicks delegated to me, asthe Executive Officer of the Imagery ExploitationGroup, the responsibility for approving imagery-derived cables, briefing boards, and notes.

In September 1973, in a newly recovered satel-lite system, strips of experimental bonus color filmhad been attached to the end of the conventionalblack and white film. Unfortunately, the color filmwas expended over Syria and the Golan Heights.The color film was processed with the black andwhite one and was nearly useless. Eastman Kodakattempted to process one of the colors that mightgive us better resolution. While there was no firmconcrete photographic evidence that the YomKippur War would begin on October 6, 1973, therewas photographic evidence to show war prepara-tions were underway. Crack Egyptian armoreddivisions from the Cairo and Dashur areas werebeing deployed along the Canal along with hun-dreds of artillery pieces, bridging equipment, andSAM batteries. There was more than ordinaryactivity at ammunition dumps and at logistical

A map of the Middle East,depicting aircraft routes.

THE BAR-LEVLINE…EXTENDEDSOME 160KILOMETERSFROM PORTTAUFIG TO ELQANTARA

A CIA ANALYST,WHO SPECIALIZEDIN THE AREA,HAD WRITTENA REPORTTHAT ANEGYPTIANATTACK WASIMMINENT.…THE ANALYSTWAS TRANS-FERRED

sites. Syrian tanks and artillery had moved upfrom their rear positions and were deployed closerto the “Purple Line.” We did not locate the FROGbattalion.

On the evening of October 4, I took severalphoto interpreters, along with prints from thesatellite photography, to meet with Mr. Hicks.Hicks was also shown some clandestine reportssuggesting that an Egyptian and Syrian mobiliza-tion was in progress. CIA’s William Colby mentionsthese reports in his book.4 Portions of those reportssubstantiated what we were seeing on the photog-raphy. Hicks asked if we had put anything onpaper. I gave Hicks a copy of what we had pre-pared. Hicks said he would stop by and meet withofficials of the Office of Strategic Research whohad the primary reporting responsibility on thearea. The U.S. Defense attaches in Tel Aviv werebriefed on our information. They, in turn, passedoff our information to the Israelis. We were latertold that the Israelis, at the highest level, believedthat it would be just another exercise. Ray Cline,Under Secretary of State for Intelligence andResearch, would later remark, “Our difficulty waspartly that we were brainwashed by the Israelis,who brainwashed themselves.”

On October 6, Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day ofAtonement, Egyptian and Syrian forces launcheda massive attack on Israeli forces along the Canaland on the Golan Heights. At 2 p.m., more than200 Egyptian airplanes flew over the Suez Canaland attacked Israeli command centers along theBar-Lev Line. The Israeli units along the Linewere caught unaware of the Egyptian air attack.Using experience gained in the construction of theAswan Dam, the Egyptians used powerful waterpumps that created breaches in the sand barrier.

In his book, Crisis5, Henry Kissinger describesthe confusion as to what was happening along theCanal and on the Golon Heights. The WashingtonSpecial Action Group (WASAG) began meeting on

October 6. The WASAG was chaired by NationalSecurity Adviser, Kissinger, and comprised theDeputy Secretaries of State and Defense, theDirector of Central Intelligence, and the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kissinger was in NewYork, and, in his absence, Brent Scowcroft wouldchair it. President Richard M. Nixon was in KeyBiscayne preoccupied with the resignation of VicePresident Spiro Agnew.

William E. Colby had become CIA director onSeptember 4, 1973. There was an increasing needfor more current intelligence on the prospect of war.A photo satellite was in orbit, but there was sometrepidation about bringing it back too soon.Although a neophyte on aerial reconnaissance,Colby knew the value of photographic intelligence.He called on John Hicks for advice. Hicks’ group anddivision chiefs recommended unanimously that theSR–71 be deployed. The recommendation waspassed on to Colby and the Air Force was agreeableto deploying the SR–71. NPIC was familiar with theSR–71 capabilities from numerous previous mis-sions. It was assumed that the SR–71 would bedeployed to England or West Germany but bothcountries refused to grant access to their bases. Thedecision was made to fly the missions from GriffissAir Force Base, near Rome, N.Y. From Griffiss, theAir Force determined that the SR–71 would have tobe refueled three times to the Middle East targetsand three times back. When several high-rankingAir Force officers were informed of this, they werenot pleased. They feared that because of fuel ormechanical problems, the SR–71might have to landat a foreign base. If that happened, one said, “Itwould an international crisis of the first magni-tude.” However, a three-man photo interpretationteam, very knowledgeable on Israel, Egypt, andSyria, was dispatched from NPIC to Weisbaden,West Germany, to interpret the film. When nonation would grant the U.S. a base, the team tookthe next plane back to Washington.

Two U.S. Naval carrier battle groups, theIndependence and the Roosevelt, and an amphibi-ous force were in the Mediterranean. NPIC, mean-while, was ordered to report immediately theNavy’s highest priority targets—the Soviet sup-plied submarines in Alexandria, Egypt, along withthe OSA and KOMAR guided missile boats, basedin Egypt and Syria. The Navy was also concernedwith the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, which con-sisted of some 75 ships, including about a dozensubmarines. Concern was also expressed as towhat was happening at Sevastopol, the headquar-ters of the Black Sea Fleet.

The first SR–71 mission over the Middle East,named Giant Reach, was flown on October 12,1973. The film was processed at Rochester, NewYork, and a plane was on standby to fly the film tothe NPIC for analysis. We worked through thenight and noted the damage which the Egyptianshad inflicted on the Israelis on the Bar-Lev Lineand beyond was substantial. Most of the fortifiedpositions had been destroyed. It was also obviousthat the Egyptians had used flame-throwers for

President Gerald R. Fordfollows along as Secretaryof State Henry Kissingerbriefs congressional lead-ers on peace agreement,September 4, 1975.

ON…OCTOBER 4…HICKS WASALSO SHOWNSOME CLAN-DESTINEREPORTSSUGGESTINGTHAT ANEGYPTIANAND SYRIANMOBILIZA-TION WAS INPROGRESS

THE SR–71WOULD HAVETO BE REFUELEDTHREE TIMESTO THEMIDDLE EASTTARGETS

many of the command and living bunkers hadbeen burned. The Egyptians had crossed the Canalin five places. Egyptian assault boats were seen allalong the Canal. Rope ladders and ropes could beseen on top of the sand barriers. Craters from aer-ial bombardments and artillery fire had literallytorn great holes in the fortified positions. AnIsraeli tank brigade stationed behind the Bar-LevLine had come forward to be met by Egyptian sol-diers firing Russian supplied Sagger wire guidedmissiles along with rocket propelled grenades.NPIC’s analysis indicated most, if not all of thetanks had been destroyed.

The Egyptians had moved their mobile SA–2,SA–3 and SA–6 missile batteries into the Sinai.The SA–6s were wrecking havoc on the Israeli AirForce. By Tuesday October 9, the Israelis hadreported that they had lost 49 aircraft, including14 Phantoms primarily from the SA–6.6 TwoEgyptian armies were now firmly across theCanal. About 800 Egyptian tanks were arrayednear the Gidi and Mitla passes and down into theSinai. A major tank battle had begun and over1,600 Israeli and Egyptian tanks were involvedand the fighting ranged over a large area. We couldeasily identify the battle lines since the Israelitank forces consisted of Super Shermans, Pattons,AMX, and Centurion Tanks. The Egyptians pos-sessed Soviet tanks

We worked through the night and the nextmorning I carried a three-part situation board toCIA headquarters at Langley, Va., that showed theposition of every Israeli and Egyptian tank fromwhich a battle line was drawn. In addition, indi-vidual briefing boards were prepared to comple-ment the situation board. I met with representa-tives of the Office of Strategic Research who hadprepared an intelligence report derived from allother sources. At 8 o’clock we proceeded to Mr.Colby’s office. He was a good listener and wasalways intrigued with not only the demarcation of

the battle lines but also our reporting of the num-ber of damaged tanks. Usually Colby would thenleave for a 10 o’clock meeting of the WASAG.WASAG meetings were frequently held in theWhite House Situation Room, and according toColby, the map was prominently displayed.

The flight path of the first SR–71 mission, espe-cially in the turns, deprived us of useful coverage.William Willner, an NPIC analyst, provided anexplanation on how the following missions couldbe flown for maximum photographic coverage. Mr.Hicks called the Chairman of COMIREX (Com-mittee on Imagery Reconnaissance and Exploi-tation) who in turn, contacted the Strategic AirCommand. Willner was dispatched to Offutt AirForce Base at Omaha. SAC officials didn’t particu-larly care to have an NPIC analyst tell them howto fly their missions. Willner had taken photo-graphic examples with him and did convince theSAC reconnaissance officials how the particularcameras on the SR–71 would benefit our interpre-tation efforts.

Kissinger was clamoring for information on thenumber of Israeli tanks destroyed. It was rela-tively easy to pick out the destroyed tanks byeither fire or if a tank was severely damaged. Butwe could not determine the tanks that had beendamaged by missiles. NPIC photo interpretationexperts Connie Zimnick, Ralph Symmes, BillHorn, Frank Douglas, and I met with Hicks andexplained our problem. He agreed with our ideathat if a tank had not moved in two days to countit as destroyed. Each photo interpreter was given adegree square of the Sinai to interpret and wouldplot not only the movement but also the tanks thatwere destroyed. We counted 264 Egyptian tanksthat had been destroyed in one battle. As we con-tinued to count on subsequent missions, each sidehad lost over 400 tanks. Israeli reports toKissinger indicated they had lost 500 tanks, 400on the Sinai front. It was difficult to get accuratetank counts on the Golan Heights because Iraqand Jordan had sent tank units equipped withCenturion tanks to help the Syrians.

It was known that the Israelis had flown manyaerial photographic missions over the battle areas.The Israelis were using F–4 Phantoms, TA–4HSkyhawk and Teledyne Ryan 147 drones for recon-naissance. The U.S. Air Force had helped theIsraelis construct a photographic laboratory withequipment to process the film obtained by thePhantoms. The Department of Defense sent twoU.S. Army captains, Alfred J. Lipphardt and JerryGorman, to Israel to view the film taken by theIsraelis to augment the U.S. tank count of des-troyed Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli tanks. Lip-phardt, was detailed to the NPIC and was familiarwith how the Center functioned and how theywere interpreting the SR–71 and satellite photog-raphy. He complained to an Israeli lieutenantcolonel that he was sent to perform a function. Hewas very agitated and said that he was going hometo report to U.S. officials his frustration of notbeing allowed to view the Israeli reconnaissance

The SR–71.

THE ISRAELISHADREPORTEDTHAT THEYHAD LOST 49AIRCRAFT,INCLUDING 14PHANTOMSPRIMARILYFROM THESA–6

EACH SIDEHAD LOSTOVER 400TANKS

film. He then said to the colonel, “If you are notgoing to allow me to view the film here, then giveme some copies of the film to take back with me.”The colonel pointed to a number of boxes of filmthat the Israelis undoubtedly had viewed and said,“Take what you want.” Lipphardt took a large boxfilled with cans of film and was on the first flightback to the United States. Lipphardt informed ushe was on his way back with Israeli film. At NPIC,it was given a separate code name and we beganour analysis. We were able to refine our counts ofdestroyed Egyptian, Israeli, and Syrian tanks.Combining the Israeli photography with that ofthe SR–71, we made a new three-part situationbriefing board. After the crisis was over, the Israelifilm was sent to the Department of Defense whereit mysteriously disappeared.

The Soviet Union began a massive airlift of mil-itary equipment to Egypt and Syria. Most of thecritical items for Egypt were unloaded at CairoWest Airfield. NPIC made briefing boards of theAntonov 22 transports seen there. Kissinger askedrepeatedly if we saw any indication of Soviet air-borne troops in Damascus since a number of theAntonov transports had landed there. We didn’t.

On October 14, the U.S. Air Force began Ope-ration Nickel Glass, a major airlift of military sup-plies to Israel. C–5As, C–141, and C–130 trans-ports began bringing military supplies from theAzores and Germany. Most of the unloading wasdone at Lod Airfield but also at captured Al Arishairfield. We made a number of briefing boards onthis activity. Secretary of Defense James Schle-singer called Colby to recover all the briefingboards that had been disseminated. We were not toshow that the U.S. was aiding the Israelis, yetmany countries had spotted and reported the U.S.aerial armada.

It was during this period that a Soviet mer-chant ship transited the Bosphorus and was sus-pected of carrying nuclear weapons. The ship was

followed to Alexandria and became a prime targetfor all reconnaissance systems. When we did seethe ship, its hatches were closed. Kissinger wouldreport to the Earl of Comer, the BritishAmbassador to the United States, “We had infor-mation that a Soviet ship carrying nuclearweapons passed through the Bosphorus and cameback without them.7 Later reports of the ship sur-faced in the Washington Post and when Kissingerwas queried about them he said, “There was noconfirmed evidence about nuclear weapons arriv-ing in Egypt.”8 In our eyes, however, the reportratcheted up the crisis on the possible use ofnuclear weapons. Kissinger had asked to see ourmap again of the October 12 battle lines. Therewere demands at the UN that a cease-fire beestablished along the October 13 lines, but theIsraelis opposed a cease-fire at the time.

On the Golan Heights, the Israeli and Syrianfront lines were separated by a small strip of no-man’s land often referred to as the “Purple Line.”The line had been established between Israel andSyria after the 1967 cease-fire. The Israelis hadconstructed a series of 20 feet deep defensive tren-ches. Defensive positions overlooked the ditches.Further up the heights, a series of earthen rampsallowed the Israelis the advantageous position toconfront any invading forces.

On the Syrian side, the Syrians had constructeddefenses to block any penetrations through the“Purple Line.” Old T–34 tanks were dug into posi-tions where only the turret could be seen. Therewas a heavy concentration of 57 and 85mm anti-tank guns. The Syrians maintained a fully mobi-lized army stretching from the cease fire line toDamascus. In addition to over 600 tanks and 100artillery batteries, the Soviets had supplied theSyrians with FROG battlefield missiles with arange of up to 50 miles that could reach someIsraeli cities. Units were equipped with both therocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and Sagger anti-tank missiles. When the battle started, the Syrianshad penetrated to Mount Harmon but couldn’thold their positions. Along the winding roads lead-ing to the Heights we could see convoys of Israelitank transporters, vehicles, and personnel movingtoward the Heights.

The Israelis first laid one pontoon bridge andthen another over the Canal, north of the GreatBitter Lake. On October 16, the Israelis begancrossing the Canal. By October 18, a sizablearmored force was both north and south of thepontoon bridges. The continued Israeli armormovements to the south were exerting pressure fora cease-fire. As the situation grew more dangerous,Leonid Brezhnev on October 19 invited Nixon tosend Kissinger to Moscow. Nixon agreed.

On October 20, a political firestorm blazed inWashington, D.C. Called the “Saturday NightMassacre,” it involved the firing of special prosecu-tor Archibald Cox, followed by the resignations ofAttorney General Elliot Richardson and hisdeputy (and acting FBI Director) WilliamRuckelshaus.

President Ford points torelief map as HenryKissinger briefs congres-sional leaders on peaceagreement, September 4,1975.

THE SOVIETUNIONBEGAN AMASSIVE AIRLIFT OFMILITARYEQUIPMENTTO EGYPTAND SYRIA

A SOVIETMERCHANTSHIP TRANSITEDTHEBOSPHORUSAND WASSUSPECTEDOF CARRYINGNUCLEARWEAPONS

We were told that Kissinger would be departingfor Moscow on the 20th. Kissinger asked that allthe briefing boards he had requested be sized to fitinto an attaché case. Later, he asked that the brief-ing boards be attached with tape, like an accor-dion. The boards were arranged in chronologicalsequence. In his book Kissinger writes: “Welearned also from our own sources that Moscowhad alerted seven of its eleven airborne divisions.”9

Although the Soviets had only seven operationalairborne divisions, they became targets for satel-lite reconnaissance.

On October 22, the House of Representativesbegan impeachment proceedings against Presi-dent Nixon. A cease-fire had been negotiated andwould begin at 1900 hours and would be along thebattle lines of that day. On his return trip from theSoviet, Union Kissinger had stopped in Israel andwould be leaving for the U.S. that evening. Hewould tell Golda Meir, “If the forces moved at nightwhile I am flying there would be no protests fromWashington. Nothing can happen until tomorrow,”Meir replied: “If they don’t stop, we won’t.”10 Arecovered satellite mission confirmed that Israeliforces were in Suez, a violation of the cease-fire.They had also cut the Cairo-Suez road. The mis-sion confirmed that Israeli forces had the EgyptianThird Army pinned against the West Bank of theCanal. An Israeli armored column was spotted onthe road leading toward Cairo. From the samesatellite, we noted the Israelis were only 18 milesfrom Damascus and the Syrian army had beenrouted.

We also saw considerable Soviet transportactivity at Cairo West airfield. One of the An–22transports was unloading Scud missiles. The Scudmissiles and the report of the Soviet ship carryingnuclear weapons raised the possibility of a nuclearexchange between the Israelis and Egyptians. Wehad seen the Israeli development of the Jerichomissile and the CIA had given the Israelis credit

for having nuclear weapons. We were seeing activ-ity at the Jericho missile base. All of the Sovietequipment being unloaded was carefully notedand counted. On that mission, we imaged twoSoviet airborne divisions in the Soviet Union andnoted activity at both. We prepared both regular-sized and about ten attaché-sized briefing boardsfor Kissinger. I showed them to Hicks before deliv-ering them to Colby, who took them to a WASAGmeeting.

On one occasion, I asked Colby if the Presidenthad seen all of the materials that we had prepared.Colby replied that all information for the Presi-dent went through Gen. Alexander Haig, who hadreplaced Robert Halderman as White House chiefof staff.

The Soviets were getting good information onthe situation from successive launches of theirphoto satellites, but also probably from MiG–25flights. On October 24, Brezhnev wrote a letter toNixon, demanding that the U.S. join with theSoviets to put forces in Egypt to stop the fighting.If not, the Soviets would go in unilaterally. TheCIA had reported that the Soviet airlift hadstopped on October 24, and the Agency was con-cerned that the Soviets might now transport theirairborne units to Egypt. Reacting to Brezhnev’sletter, Nixon placed U.S. armed forces on Defcon 3status (increased readiness without the determi-nation that war is likely). Hicks asked that we pre-pare contingency SR–71 flight tracks of targets inthe Soviet Union that would be involved in air andsea lifts from the Soviet Union to Egypt. Wereceived an urgent call from the XVIII AirborneCorps for the latest photographs of Egypt’s air-fields.

Anwar Sadat did not want the Soviets back inEgypt and backed the U.S. position for an interna-tional force, which excluded forces from the fivepermanent members of the Security Council. TheUN forces would not only monitor the cease-fire,but also permit convoys of food, water, and medicalsupplies to reach the besieged Third Army. TheSoviets had backed down. The U.S. domestic situ-ation, including the Saturday Night Massacre,Agnew’s resignation, the selection of Gerald Fordas vice president, and the beginning of the Nixonimpeachment process, however, left a lot to bedesired.

The Yom Kippur War lasted for eighteen daysand traumatized both the Israelis and Egyptians.It was also a hectic time at NPIC. I lived throughthe trying days of the Cuban Missile Crisis but Imust confess there were times when tensions dur-ing the Yom Kippur War matched or surpassed theCuban crisis.

Subsequent SR–71 missions revealed the Sinaito be a large killing field. Both armies lay in tat-ters. In both the Sinai and Golan Heights werelarge graveyards of tanks, armored personnel car-riers, and hundreds of supporting vehicles. Wewould later see the Israelis arrive with tank trans-porters to reclaim their damaged tanks and thenthose of the Egyptians. Large mounds of war sup-

CIA Director William Colbyshakes the author’s hand,November 7, 1974

BREZHNEVWROTE ALETTER TONIXON,DEMANDINGTHAT THEU.S. JOINWITH THESOVIETS TOPUT FORCESIN EGYPT TOSTOP THEFIGHTING. IFNOT, THESOVIETSWOULD GO INUNILATER-ALLY

NIXONPLACED U.S.ARMEDFORCES ONDEFCON 3

plies were gathered and stored just inside theIsraeli border for future disposition.

I met Marshal Dmitry Yasov, a former SovietDefense Minister, at an October 2002 Cuban cele-bration of the fortieth anniversary of the CubanMissile Crisis in Havana. I asked him about theYom Kippur War. He waved his hand insolentlyabout the fighting abilities of the Egyptian andSyrian armies. He said, “We gave you a large pack-age of our military secrets.” Captured by theIsraelis were complete SA–2, SA–3, and SA–6 sur-face-to-air missiles, T–62 tanks, MiG–21s, BMPs,Soviet radar and communication equipment, andsome of the latest Soviet ground forces equipment.A bonanza of marking information was obtainedfrom the captured military pieces and ammunitionand on the factories that produced them.

Although there was a cease-fire, the Israelisand Egyptian forces were close enough that spo-radic fighting broke out. There was concern as towhat was happening to the Egyptian and Syrianarmies. An SR–71 mission showed where theirforces were scattered.

Hicks had his group and division chiefs preparerecommendations as to how the cease-fire could bemonitored. While Kissinger and other interna-tional leaders demanded a separation between theIsraeli and Arab armies, NPIC originally recom-mended a five-mile separation between the forces.We further recommended that the U–2 be used totrack compliance. The U–2 would enter Egyptianairspace at Port Said and fly down the Canal to theRed Sea and turn back over the Israeli forces. Wefelt confident that we could monitor a cease-fire.When it was proposed to the Israelis, theyaccepted, but the Egyptians refused charging thatthe U.S. could not be trusted because it favored theIsraelis.

When Hicks learned of the Egyptian rejection,he held more executive meetings. I was very vocaland proposed giving both the Israelis and

Egyptians copies of the U–2 films along with areport describing what we were seeing. WhenHicks advanced this proposal at Langley, a rank-ing Agency officer and Air Force officials wereadamantly opposed. They suspected that by givingaway copies of the film, it would undoubtedly fallinto Soviet hands and compromise our reconnais-sance capabilities. A quick check of NPIC expertsindicated that a newer and superior camera wasbeing developed and, therefore, the U–2 film wouldnot give away our newest secrets.

As part of the disengagement agreementsbetween Israel, Egypt, and Syria, U–2 flightsbegan under the codename, Olive Harvest.Advanced notice would be given of the approxi-mate time the U–2 would be overhead. Dependingon the weather, missions would be flown aboutevery ten days. Procedures were developed to warnthe Egyptians and Israelis—through U.S. attachés—of violations of the cease-fire detected on thefilm. Much to our surprise, there was agreementby both Israeli and Egyptian photo interpreter offi-cials of our analysis, and confidence began to growbetween the two countries.

But still much work had to be done to “drawlines in the sand,” as Kissinger would state, toclearly delineate the demarcation lines. SR–71flights continued and provided the basic informa-tion for drawing those lines. When Kissinger wasshown the poor maps of the Sinai on which thelines were to be drawn, he supposedly remarked,“Who in the hell made these maps, Moses?” Hickswondered if we could not do a better job using theaerial photography in our possession to make aterrain model, rather than the maps. The NPICmodel shop made a large model and when it wasshown to Kissinger, he was both surprised andpleased with out effort. In January 1974, Kissingermet with Sadat and the first disengagement offorces agreement was signed. He took the modelwith him to meet with the Israeli and Egyptian

Sherman Kent, DinoBrugioni, and WilliamColby.

U–2 FLIGHTSBEGANUNDER THECODENAME,OLIVEHARVEST

THERE WASAGREEMENTBY BOTHISRAELI ANDEGYPTIANPHOTOINTERPRETEROFFICIALS OF OURANALYSIS

leaders. Demarcation lines were noted on themodel. Pins with tiny ribbons were attached to themodel to establish demarcation lines. After reach-ing an agreement with both sides, Kissingerreturned to the White House with the model andon September 4, 1975, briefed President Ford andcongressional leaders on the Israeli-Egyptian-Syrian agreement.

A United Nations Truce Supervision Organi-zation began negotiations between the Israelis andEgyptians. The Sinai II agreements called for theU–2 overflights to continue “following the sameprocedures already in place.” Film copies of eachmission were sent simultaneously to Egypt, Israel,and the UN peacekeeping commanders. Both theEgyptians and Israelis were pleased with theNPIC’s effort, and ultimately agreed that we did

not have to provide them copies of the film. Bothparties regarded the overflights as a useful, inde-pendent source of data to confirm or deny othersources of information.

There would be much more diplomatic activitybetween the U.S., Egypt, Israel, and Syria. Theconfidence placed in American impartiality in itsanalysis of the film contributed to the negotiationsthat led to the Camp David Accords. The painstak-ing and complex work accomplished by NPIC alsocontributed greatly to the success of the mission.

Much credit must also go to the SR–71 pilots.Because of the national security secrecy at thetime, little has been written about the magnificentflying abilities of these pilots. They were told “thatthey would be on their own” if they were forced toland on a foreign field for some mechanical prob-lem or inability to refuel. They also knew that if anSA–2 radar locked on them on (and they were)they could increase their speed and outrun themissiles. But little was known about how the SA–5batteries in Syria would react. Fortunately, noSA–5 missiles were fired during the war.

Three SR–71 flights were flown roundtrip fromGriffiss AFB, one mission took off from Griffiss andlanded at Seymour Johnson, while five roundtripflights were made from Seymour Johnson.Although the flights to Seymour Johnson added afew hours of getting the film to the processing site,the time constraints were not as pressing. The U–2pilots who flew the monotonous and time-consum-ing missions each week or so over the designatedareas also deserve considerable credit. ■

1. CIA/NPIC, Photographic Interpretation Report,“KH–4 Mission 1042-1, 17-22 June 1967, Middle EastEdition,” June 1967, declassified.2. Anwar El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, (New York:Harper and Row, 1977), p. 230-31.3. Sadat, pp.241-42.4. William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA,(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 3665. Henry Kissinger, Crisis, (New York: Simon andShuster), pp. 13-84.

6. Ibid., p. 145.7. National Security Archives, Memcom betweenKissinger and the Earl of Cromer, British Ambassador31 October 1973, Source SB-70-73, Pol UK-US.8. Ibid.9. Kissinger, p. 304.10. National Security Archives, Memcom betweenMeir and Kissinger Oct. 1973 1:35-2:15 P.M. Source:RG59, SN70-73 Pol 7 U.S./Kissinger.

The SR–71 flights provided the most valuableinformation during this trying period. The flyingin the Yom Kippur War represents some of thefinest performances in the annals of U.S. war-time military aviation. I think it most appropri-ate to list their names in order of their flights:

Jim Shelton and Gary ColemanEldon Joersz and John Fuller

Bob Helt and Larry ElliottJim Wilson and Bruce Douglas

Jim Sullivan and Noel WiddifeldPat Bledsoe and Reg Blackwell

Harold Adams and Bill MachorekTy Judkins and John Morgan

Lee Ransom and Mark Gersten

John Hicks, NPIC Director

THEEGYPTIANSAND ISRAELISWEREPLEASEDWITH THENPIC’SEFFORT

��

Braxton Eisel

� ir Force units are usually composed of thetraditional flights, squadrons, groups andwings. During World War II, the U.S. Army

Air Forces (AAF) also included platoons, companiesand battalions. Some of the largest and mostimportant of these “Army” units were the SignalAircraft Warning (SAW) battalions, which used thenew technology of radar to provide early warningand air defense.

These battalions served in all theaters anddeveloped somewhat differently depending on thetactical considerations of the specific theater. Thisarticle looks at the evolution and use of SAW unitsassociated with the Fifth Force during World WarII.

Uneasy Alliance

It was only in 1937 that the first successfulSignal Corps use of radar to detect aircraft wasdemonstrated at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey.1 TheSignal Corps was responsible for developing,procuring, and fielding all U.S. Army electronics.Radar was just one more developing technologyunder their purview. At the onset of World War II,the Army Air Corps* was just beginning to come togrips with the concepts of radar and early warning.It also was grappling with the Signal Corps for con-trol of the equipment and personnel associatedwith these concepts.

But even in the years preceding this historicevent, the Air Service had struggled to gain controlover aviation-related communication and otherelectronic equipment and personnel.2 The AAFargued that only airmen could know what specificequipment was needed for aviation. Radar was justone more bone of contention between the two orga-nizations.

However, by the outbreak of the war, the SignalCorps and the AAF had established an uneasyworking arrangement. The Signal Corps woulddevelop, procure, and logistically support the tech-nical equipment needed to conduct radar earlywarning. It would also train the personnel to oper-ate the equipment and extract the information thenew technology provided.3 The AAF would simulta-neously form units that could use and act on theprovided tactical information.4

The Signal Corps, still a part of the largerground Army, organized its tactical radar units intoplatoons – usually forty to fifty men, led by a lieu-tenant; companies included two to four platoonsand were led by a captain; while battalions, num-bering two to four companies, were led by a majoror lieutenant colonel.5 These standard Army forma-tions had to be integrated into the AAF organiza-tions that used squadrons, groups, and wings.

Initially, the AAF used fighter controlsquadrons (FCS), complete with pursuit pilots, toprocess the tactical information provided by SAWbattalions to intercept unknown radar tracks. Thepilot controllers would use very high frequency(VHF) radios to scramble friendly fighters andplace them in the most advantageous position toidentify and, if necessary, shoot down the “bogey.”This technique was, and is, called ground controlledintercept (GCI).6

The fighter control squadrons were a directresult of the experience of Gen. Carl A. “Tooey”Spaatz and other American observers of the Battleof Britain, during the summer of 1940. There AAFleaders saw how the Royal Air Force used pilots ascontrollers to successfully direct fighter squadronsto defend the British homeland against a numeri-cally superior enemy. The lessons learned werebrought back and placed into practice, albeit some-what differently than the RAF model. The RAFowned all facets of the airborne radar system,including the research facilities, radars and operat-ing personnel, and the end-users—the interceptors.7 The U.S. violated the basic tenet of war fighting inthat the responsibility of radar for early warningand for intercepting the enemy was split betweentwo commands, the Signal Corps and the AAF.Eventually, this situation would be rectified, butnot until nearly the end of the war.

Unfortunately, the first example of this “mar-riage” was tragically unsuccessful. On December 7,1941, a Signal Corps operator working at a remotesite on Opana Point detected a large formation ofaircraft approaching from the north of Oahu,Hawaii. Only recently trained in the complexities ofthe SCR–270B radar set, Private Joe Lockardpicked up a large plot of blips. Following hisinstructions, he telephoned the information to theradar information center at Ft. Shafter, Honolulu.8

There, a young P–40 pilot, never trained inearly warning procedures or in appropriate tacticalresponse to such warnings, made the now-famouscommand of “Well, don’t worry about it.”9 Thus, thelast chance of challenging the outcome of the attackon Pearl Harbor was lost. The first engagement ofthe American war did use radar, but not effectively.

Braxton “Brick” Eisel is a major in the United States Air Force Reserve on active duty. He has beenassigned as an ICBM launch officer, a weapons controller in mobile GCI radars, AWACS andJSTARS aircraft, a military historian, and as a military assistant to a senior DoD civilian in thePentagon. Major Braxton is currently serving as an air defense advisor to the Federal AviationAdministration in Washington, D.C. He has written numerous aviation and aviation history arti-cles for magazines such as Air & Space, Flight Journal, Aviation History, Aviation Week & SpaceTechnology and FlyPast. This is his second article for Air Power History.

* At the outset of World War II, the flying service wasnamed the U.S. Army Air Corps. The Army Air Forces(AAF) formal name change was not adopted until June1941 but for the purposes of this article, the “AirForces” term is used.

(Overleaf) Dragging thetwo-stroke generator upthe beach. (Photo courtesyof NARA.)

THE SIGNALCORPS ANDTHE AAF HADESTAB-LISHED ANUNEASYWORKINGARRANGE-MENT

AAF LEADERSSAW HOWTHE ROYALAIR FORCEUSED PILOTSAS CON-TROLLERS

On the Job Training

The Signal Corps, stretched like every otherU.S. military function, expanded rapidly to meetthe demands for radars and the men to operatethem. A huge electronics training base was set upat Drew Field, near Tampa, Florida. Here the vastmajority of radar men undertook their training inelectronics, field living operations and even in somecases, basic training.10

The only operational early warning radarsthen in the U.S. inventory were the large, bulkySCR–268/270 long-range radars. These could pro-vide excellent long-range coverage but as stated,were difficult to move in a hurry since they con-sisted of 66 tons of equipment. What was neededwas a lightweight, smaller radar set that could goashore on the first day of any offensive invasion orbe situated quickly as the tactical situation dic-tated for a defensive campaign.

Jake Herring, a radar technician with the rankof T4 (a corporal with specialist technical training),who was assigned to a SAW battalion in theSouthwest Pacific, remembers that after his induc-tion into the Army in September 1942, he wentthrough six weeks of rushed basic training at Drewbefore beginning his radar training.

In a baritone, rich with the coastal accent ofNorth Carolina, Herring recounted, “We did ourbasic training there at Drew Field, then I was sentto Kansas City, Missouri, for a month of radioschool. I was immediately sent back to Drew tobegin radar training. We went through our course,learning to operate the SCR–602 mobile radarset.”11

The –602 was a U.S.-produced version of aBritish lightweight (LW) mobile radar set. It wasdesigned to provide forward radar coverage for asector, reporting its findings to a control center orfilter center located further back from the front.12

The –602 had a range of up to 100 miles in opti-mum conditions, although 60-70 miles was morecommon. More importantly, the set weighed onlytwo tons.13 It was used in conjunction with otherLW sites and the larger and less mobileSCR–268/270 long-range radar to build a graphicrepresentation or “picture” for air battle comman-ders.

At the filter center, operators would track theoverall picture of a developing air battle on a plex-iglass plotting board and controllers would makeadjustments to the number and placements ofAllied fighters to deal with the approaching air-craft. Again, the concepts were based heavily uponearlier British experiences.14

Not coincidentally, the AAF developed DrewField as a night fighter training base. Many radarwarriors, both airborne and ground-based, learnedand practiced their skills in mock maneuvers onthe flat scrubby fields and in the dark, humid skiesof central Florida. 15

Herring continued his reminiscence:

After graduating from my course, we were sent outfor a month-long field exercise. We set up six pla-toons, each with a –602 radar reporting back to thecontrol center. Each platoon, by the way, was a self-contained unit. We had two cooks, two medics, twotruck drivers, and five four-man radar teams. Wecould load all our gear into two 2-½ ton truck s anda jeep and move out in just a few hours.

Each team had four basic duties: one guy wouldwork as a plotter, one as a radio operator, one as aguard–nobody was allowed into the tent if we wereworking—and one man as a radar operator. Wewould switch off duties about once an hour to keep“fresh” and not miss anything on the radar scope.16

In addition to the LW and heavy long-rangeradars, a Signal Aircraft Warning company (laterbattalion), had ground observer platoons. Theseincluded a specially trained signalman, who wouldgo into areas where radars could not be sitedbecause of topographical limitations or more com-monly because the infantry was engaged in com-bat. Using portable VHF radios and field tele-phones, these soldiers would “voice-tell” their obser-vations of aircraft sightings back to the filter cen-ter.Their reports were incorporated into the pictureto fill out any gaps in radar coverage. 17

As experience with using the electronic realmto guide missions increased, the ground observerswere also used later in the war to direct radar-guided ground attack aircraft. A strike squadronwould be vectored to a target area by a controllerusing radar; once over the area, the groundobservers would call in corrections for subsequentbomb drops.18

With all these personnel needed to meet theSignal Corps mission requirements of operatingradar equipment and detecting aircraft, an SAWbattalion could easily number more than a thou-sand officers and men, all designed to get the infor-

Map of the SouthwestPacific. (Courtesy U.S.Army.)

EARLYWARNINGRADARSTHEN IN THEU.S. INVENTORYWERE THELARGE,BULKYSCR–268/270

THE –602WAS A U.S.-PRODUCEDVERSION OFA BRITISHLIGHT-WEIGHTMOBILERADAR

mation to the controller assigned to the fighter con-trol squadron.19

The much smaller fighter control squadron(FCS) consisted initially of fighter pilots andenlisted radio operators. Later in the war, specialistofficer radar controllers replaced some of the pilotsguiding aircraft. In addition, the missions con-trolled via radar increased from strictly vectoringfighters into intercept position to controlling bomb-ing strikes, providing navigational vectors to lostaircraft, controlling air-sea rescue missions, andweather reporting and warning, among others.20

By the time Jake Herring reported for duty atDrew Field, the Signal Corps and AAF had reacheda more reasonable accommodation. In September1942, the two organizations agreed to put theSignal Aircraft Warning units under Air Forcesoperational control. While the Signal Corps contin-ued as the supplier of equipment and troops tooperate it, the SAW units would work under the

operational orders of the Air Forces. This arrange-ment continued throughout the war.21

Fifth Air Force Experiences

On December 9, 1941, the 8th Fighter ControlSquadron (FCS) was activated at Mitchell Field,New York, and immediately assigned for deploy-ment to the Pacific. By June 1942, it was based atMilne Bay, New Guinea, as part of Fifth Air Force’sV Fighter Command. 22

In the shoe-string days of the early SouthwestPacific campaigns, the 8th FCS used a hodge-podgeof Australian and U.S. radar equipment and anequally assorted collection of fighter aircraft todefend the hard-pressed troops of the New Guineafighting. 23

The SAW units supporting the 8th were like-wise challenged to support the air defense re-quirements of the theater. Trained personnel andreplacement parts for existing radar sets were inextremely short supply and used a mix of U.S. andAustralian parts and troops to function.24

By November 1943, however, the Allied forcesin the area were strong enough to press ahead withoperations to drive the Japanese from outside theNew Guinea archipelago. Based at Finchhaven, theSAW battalions and 8th FCS first went on theoffensive in support of the invasion of New Britain.By isolating or destroying the major Japanese portat Rabaul on that island, the Allies could continueto drive north, eventually towards the Philippines.Reaching that ultimate goal would be difficult.

Finchhaven, New Guinea, became “radar cen-tral” for the Southwest Pacific. New personnel des-tined for existing battalions and newly assignedbattalions arrived at the jungle town to be incorpo-rated into the theater.25

When not assigned to a combat operation, theradar men would conduct training. In addition tothe technical practice needed to correctly interpretthe data on a radar scope, the troops had to prac-tice setting up and breaking down their sites. Unitswould spend a planned week out in the field, hav-ing simulated a combat assault. Then they wouldemplace their equipment, calibrating the radar fortrue north, making sure the equipment stayed dry

(Right) Biak Island, noteeast-west runway. U.S.troops and Herring's GCIplatoon were to the southof the runway, theJapanese to the north.(Photo courtesy of NARA.)

(Below) Jake Herring (c) onNew Britain, 1944. (Photocourtesy of Jake Herring.)

SAW UNITSWOULDWORKUNDER THEOPERA-TIONALORDERS OFTHE AIRFORCES

in the unrelenting humidity of the jungle, andalways, always seeking the best and highest placeto site the antenna.26

The reason for the quest for height was due toline of sight consideration. If an SCR–602 was sit-uated on a flat plain, an aircraft approaching at1,000 feet would not be detected until it was within15 miles. Putting the radar on a 400-ft. hill madethe detection range jump to 50 miles. Higher flyingaircraft could be detected at even longer ranges.27

Another consideration for radar placement isthe need to avoid close by obstructions like buildingsor trees. These obstructions would reflect the elec-tromagnetic energy emitted from the transmitterand reflect it back in massive doses causing “clutter”on the radar scope. Clutter was simply an area onthe scope that could not be used for detecting aircraftbecause of the high level of background reflections.28

Not infrequently, these week-long jaunts lastedlonger. The torrential thunderstorms common to

the area could and did change a rough dirt roadinto a raging stream. Often the troops were cut offand had to be resupplied with C-rations and fuelfrom air drops until the remote jungle track driedout enough to support truck movement.29

For the first campaign not conducted on NewGuinea, the SAWs went in with the infantry. OnD+1 for the invasion of New Britain, the first LWradar platoon went ashore. Assisting the 1stMarine Division, and under fire from the Japanese,the radar proved its worth by picking up Japaneseaircraft sortieing from Rabaul. With the approxi-mately minutes of advanced warning thus pro-vided, the Allies were able to gain air superiorityover the battlefield in relatively short time.30

Jake Herring related his experience from thisinvasion:

We set up our radar on a small island just off themain invasion beach called Duke Island. One day a“Betty” bomber came over at tree-top level surpris-ing everybody. He sprayed everything in sight withmachine gun fire and dropped a bomb on a bargeanchored out in the bay. He zoomed off withoutbeing shot at.

That night we had a Major King, one of the betterofficers we had as far as I was concerned, killed bya Japanese infiltrator. We found the major’s bodythe next morning with his head severed by a bayo-net or a machete.” 31

Herring remained on New Britain until April1944.32

By the time of the next planned Allied advanceto the island of Biak, the integration of SignalCorps SAW battalions and Air Force FCS wasnearly seamless. Indeed, retired CMSgt. JoeNewman, a Signal Corps radio maintenance manassigned to the 8th FCS, spent his entire tour in thePacific under the administrative and operationalcontrol of that Air Force squadron. Even though hewore the distinctive Signal Corps emblem on hisgarrison hat and the aiguillette on his seldom-wornClass A uniform, he worked daily in the FCS filtercenter. At the end of the war, Newman found out hehad been transferred to the Army Air Forces, but

(Right) Engineers buildingcauseway to speed unload-ing of transport ships.(Photo courtesy of JakeHerring.)

(Below) The beach on BiakIsland. (Photo courtesy ofNARA.)

PUTTING THERADAR ON A400-FT. HILLMADE THEDETECTIONRANGE JUMPTO 50 MILES

was never informed. (The Chief went on to have a30-year USAF career.)33

In April 1944, after a refitting period back atFinchhaven, Herring’s 596th SAW battalion sailedaboard an LST (landing ship tank) to support theinvasion of Biak. Landing at the neighboring isletof Los Negros, Herring’s unit ran ashore underJapanese fire.34

As the battle progressed, the U.S. troops wereon the south side of an east-west oriented Japaneserunway, just up from the beach and the defending

troops were on the north side of the runway. Soclose were the opposing forces that Herring recallsthat the radar could not operate at night becausethe little two-cylinder gasoline generator, that pow-ered the radar, gave off a blue exhaust flame atnight. Like a magnet for rifle fire, the blue flicker-ing drew danger onto the radar site. So at night theradar men shut down operations and manneddefensive fighting positions.35

One of the advantages of the self-containedaspect of the LW units was the ability to conductair intercept operations on its own. As mentionedpreviously, the LW sites reported back to a masterfilter center. However when the radar units werefirst getting established, each site could work inter-cepts in its own smaller area. A controller would beattached to the LW platoon and run fighters ontotargets within the limited coverage of the LWs. Notnearly as efficient as the fully integrated LW andheavy SCR–271 designed operations, it was never-theless better than nothing.36

As the war progressed, the pace of recapturingislands increased. In July 1944, Noumfour Islandin the Dutch East Indies was slated for seizurefrom the Japanese.

Herring’s battalion went in with the Army’s503d Parachute Regiment. It was during this oper-ation that Herring first saw the fruit of his labors.A plot was picked up on the SCR–602 radar andthe Air Force controller attached to the LW platoonvectored a P–61 nightfighter on the track. Con-tinuing the intercept, the controller guided theBlack Widow until the radar operator on the bigblack-painted fighter picked up the bogey. He, inturn, provided vectors to the pilot until the pilotvisually sighted the target. Confirming it was a“bandit,” actually a Japanese “Betty” twin-enginedmedium bomber; the pilot proceeded to “torch” the

(Right) Aboard LST (land-ing ship tank) en route toinvasion of Biak Island,July 1944. (Photo courtesyof Jake Herring.)

(Below) "Turning and burn-ing," the SCR–602 radartent conducting opera-tions. (Photo courtesy ofNARA.)

THE RADARCOULD NOTOPERATE ATNIGHTBECAUSETHE LITTLETWO-CYLIN-DER GASOLINEGENERATOR,…GAVE OFFA BLUEEXHAUSTFLAME

bomber with the P–61’s four 20mm cannons andfour .50 caliber machine guns. 37

As it happened, the intercept took place overthe radar site allowing Herring and his mates tospill out of the radar tent and watch the streaks oflight racing from the fighter to the victim. Thenthey saw a big flash, and then many streamers offlames float down from the sky. The fighter pilotradioed, “Splash one bandit.”38

Jake Herring’s battalion, the 596th SAW, wasone of only many that served in the Southwest

Pacific Theater. The author found references in theU.S. National Archives at College Park of elevenseparate SAW battalions during V Fighter Com-mand operations. With an average of 1,000 officersand men in each, it is apparent that substantialnumbers of troops were involved in air warningand defense missions.

Despite all the Signal Corps troops involved,there were very few Army Air Forces-owned per-sonnel in ground control of radar and fighter air-craft operations. For most of V Fighter Command’soperations, the 8th Fighter Control Squadron didyeoman’s work for the theater.

The 8th FCS sent detachments of enlisted air-craft plotters and rated pilots to operations andsites throughout the Southwest Pacific. Initially,the pilots learned their jobs under fire.They did thebest they could, while learning how best to employradar in guiding interceptors onto targets. The AirForce believed that only a pilot could properlytranslate the obscure oscilloscope tracings into averbal “picture” that an airborne fighter couldunderstand.39

As time progressed, many combat tour-expiredfighter pilots were recycled into controller positions.Even this pool of resources was insufficient to meetthe expanding mission demands and “pure” con-trollers were eventually trained and sent into com-bat. Freshly minted second lieutenants wouldattend radar and controller school back in theStates and come to New Guinea for some seasoning.These controllers went on to become the backboneof the FCS units. In March 1942, the 8th had 6 fly-ing officers and 83 enlisted troops. 40 By February1944, the 8th FCS had four flying officers assigned,11 non-flying officer controllers and 231 enlisted.41

Like the SAWs, FCS personnel often foughtunder fire. In July 1942, the 8th was still based at

(Right) M2 .50 calibermachine gun training, NewGuinea, 1944. Herring ison the right.

(Below) Unloading LSTonto beach. (Both photoscourtesy of Jake Herring.)

SUBSTAN-TIAL NUMBERS OF TROOPSWEREINVOLVED INAIR WARNINGANDDEFENSEMISSIONS

Milne Bay, New Guinea. In August, Japanesetroops landed from barges, only six miles from theheadquarters. The squadron endured mortar andartillery fire for several days. Due to a shortage ofcombat troops, the men of the 8th Fighter ControlSquadron were pressed into service as infantry, bol-stering an Australian infantry brigade. Severaltense days in fighting positions ensued, but theJapanese threat was eliminated before the airmancum-infantry had to be used.42

In a more serious example, a Sgt. Brown, 8thFCS radio operator, was awarded the Bronze Starfor Valor for combat action during the invasion ofBiak. Coming ashore on D-Day, Sgt. Brown killedseveral Japanese soldiers during an enemyinfantry charge against the U.S forces. Sgt. Brownlater crawled out under intense enemy fire to res-cue a wounded U.S. soldier. 43

The airmen of the 8th faced more than groundthreats. A combat report dated March 4, 1944 fromthe commanding officer of the 8th FCS to the com-manding general, Fifth Air Force, described aJapanese bombing attack on Gusap, New Guineaand results:

Weather: 4/10s cloud cover, vis 8 miles, cloud base3,000

First radar contact: 1230L, last contact 1340L16 a/c scrambled, 42 a/c returning from mission4 ‘Tonys’ sighted, 3 destroyed, 0 friendly aircraft

missing *Several H/E bombs dropped; 2 A-20s damaged, 3

A–20s slightly damagedNo warnings given – enemy a/c came in low and

timing of returning mission covered plotboard with tracks.44

Finally, the 8th’s combat reports also include aBronze Star citation for Capt. Lloyd Brooks, whoserved as a ground control intercept officer aboarda U.S. Navy destroyer supporting the December,1944 invasion of Ormoc Bay, the Philippines. Capt.Brooks was directing a flight of fighters to intercepta group of enemy tracks. Despite the picture-per-fect intercept, one of the attackers broke throughand performed a kamikaze attack on the destroyer.Capt. Brooks continued controlling until the shiplost power and eventually sank.45

These examples are but dramatic interludes inthe work-a-day business of providing early warningand ground controlled intercept of enemy aircraft.The 8th FCS, and later squadrons like the 1st,35th, 49th and 56th, working with the SignalAircraft Warning battalions expanded the rolesthat radar could play. By war’s end, GCI hadexpanded to include both the SAWs and the FCS tobecome Fifth Air Force’s primary means of com-mand and control (C2) for tactical operations.Indeed, V Fighter Command had been designatedprimary agency for all matters concerning airwarning and defense. As such, V Fighter was thesole source for using SAW BNs and FCS.46

The Allied advance into the Philippines wasperhaps the culmination of the progress made incombining the SAWs and the FCS into a smoothlyrunning air warning and effective air defensemachine. Many radar sites spread throughout theislands as the campaign progressed covered virtu-ally every square mile of territory. Radar suppliesand replacements shipped from Signal Corpsdepots from the ZI (Zone of the Interior) arrivedinto Air Force supply dumps and were distributedas Air Force assets. The signalmen of the SAW bat-talions drew rations and pay from the Air Force.Battalion commanding officers took orders directlyfrom V Fighter Command that in turn relied on theSignal Corps officers to lend advice on how best to

* “Tony” was the Allied code name for the ImperialJapanese Army Air Force’s Ki–63 single enginefighter/bomber.

(Top) Drying out the vac-uum tube electronics.

((Above) Northrop P–61“Black Widow” nightfighter. (Both photos cour-tesy of NARA.)

SGT.BROWN…WASAWARDEDTHE BRONZESTAR

place and use the equipment. Ground controllersand signalmen worked side by side in operationstents and at radar scopes, directing Allied aircraftin myriad missions.47

This unity was a far cry from the early dividedconcept between the Signal Corps and the Army AirForces. As a fitting finale, in June 1945, the SignalAircraft Warning Battalions officially transferredfrom the Signal Corps to the Army Air Forces. 48

Legacy

The legacy of these pioneer radar units lives onin today’s USAF ground tactical air control

squadrons (ACS). The ACSs in the active duty andAir National Guard are constituted much like theirWorld War II predecessors and served in those orig-inal roles in Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War, andboth conflicts in Iraq. They are designed to be self-contained, self-sufficient squadrons capable of pro-viding early warning, air defense, and ground con-trolled intercept. The ACS’s personnel include theirown operators, communicators, radar and com-puter technicians, medics, vehicle maintainers, andcooks. A true legacy—the progeny of the SignalAircraft Warning Battalions and Fighter ControlSquadrons are still providing service to today’s AirForce. ■

1. Army Times Editors, A History of the U.S. SignalCorps, New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1961, p.132.2. Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency(To December 1941), United States Army in World War II:The Technical Services (Washington, D.C., Office of theChief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956),p.24, [Hereinafter, Terrett].3. Terrett, p. 149.4. AG Order 320-2, dated 10 Sep 42 and C.G., 3d AirForce, General Order 288, dated 16 Sep 42, subject:“Constitution and activation of certain Signal AircraftWarning companies with the Army Air Forces.” NationalArchive - College Park [Hereinafter, NARA], RG 18,stack 190, row 60, compartment 9, box 3965.5. Ibid, and Maurice E. Byrne, Col, Signal Corps (ret),SPOTLIGHT: History of 563d Signal Aircraft WarningBattalion in Combat in World War II, NARA, D769.363[Hereinafter, Bryne].6. History of 8th Fighter Control Squadron, 9 Dec1941 - 31 Dec 1943, US Air Force Historical ResearchAgency - OL A, Reference Library [Hereinafter,AFHRA],microfiche roll A 7497 731.01, [Hereinafter, 8th FCS].7. Pape, Gerald R. And Ronald C. Harrison, Queen ofthe Midnight Skies, West Chester, Pa., SchifferPublishing Ltd, 1992, p. 55 [Hereinafter, Pape].8. Thompson, George and Dixie Harris, et al, TheSignal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943),United States Army in World War II: The TechnicalServices, (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief ofMilitary History, Department of the Army, 1957), p.5 .9. Ibid.10. Terrett, p. 288.11. Herring, Jake Thomas, Jr., enlisted SCR-602 radaroperator, personal interview, 12 July 2003 [Hereinafter,Herring].12 Brown, Louis, A Radar History of World War II:technical and military imperatives, (Institute of PhysicsPublishing, Bristol, U.K., Philadelphia, 1999), p. 378.13. Brooks, Stewart M., Remembering the British LW &US SCR-602 Radars, The Sawbuck Gazette: For andAbout ETO Signal Aircraft Warning Battalions, Vol 16,No. 2, Feb 2000 [Hereinafter, Brooks].14. Byrne, p. 78.15. Pape, p. 59.16. Herring.17. Byrne, p. 52.18. Ibid.19. Co. B, 596th SAW BN, June 1945 Monthly report,NARA, RG 407, Stack 270, Row 69, Box 23083.20. 8th FCS.21. AG Order 320-2, dated 10 Sep 42 and C.G., 3d AirForce, General Order 288, dated 16 Sep 42, subject:

“Constitution and activation of certain Signal AircraftWarning companies with the Army Air Forces” NARA,RG 18, stack 190, row 60, compartment 9, box 3965.22. 8th FCS.23. Ibid.24. Ibid. and memo, dated 23 Dec 1942, fromCommanding General, V Fighter Command toCommanding General, Fifth Air Force, describing cur-rent radar assets, AFHRA, microfiche roll A 7497731.01.25. Herring.26. Ibid.27. Brooks and Co. B, 596th SAW BN Monthly ReportMay 1945, NARA, RG407, Stack 270, Row 69, Box 23084.28. Brooks, p. 55.29. Co. B, 596th SAW BN Monthly Report July 1944,NARA, RG407, Stack 270, Row 69, Box 23083.30. Herring.31. Ibid.32. Ibid.33. Newman, Joe, Chief Master Sergeant, USAF (ret),personal interview, 21 Aug 2003.34. Herring.35. Ibid.36. Operational Plans, Fifth Air Force Air Plan forOperation INTERLUDE, Annex 15, undated, NARA RG18, Stack 190, Row 60, compartment 9, box 3965.37. Herring and Pape, p. 113.38. Herring.39. Terrett, p. 149.40. Baumgarner, Randy, ed. Fifth Air Force, (Paducah,Ky., Turner Publishing, 1994), p. 56 and 8th FCS.41. 8th FCS.42. Ibid., and Kenney, George C., General KenneyReports, Washington, DC, Reprint by Office of Air ForceHistory, 1987, p. 88.43. 8th FCS.44. Ibid.45. Ibid.46. Operations Order 5, para 1, HQ Advance Echelon,Fifth Air Force, assigning responsibility for aircraftwarning to V Fighter Command, AFHRA, microfiche rollA7499 731.01.47. V Fighter Command History, Chapter 4, July -December 1944, AFHRA, microfiche roll A7498 and Co.D, 596th SAW BN Monthly Report June 1945, NARA RG407, Stack 270, Row 69, Box 23083.48. Thompson, George and Dixie Harris, The SignalCorps: The Outcome (Mid-1943 Through 1945), UnitedStates Army in World War II: The Technical Services,Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History,Department of the Army, 1966, p.445.

IN JUNE 1945,THE SAWSTRANS-FERRED TOTHE AAF.

Fighting Machines for

Theodore M. Hamady

the Air Service, AEF

We didn’t know what a fighting machine was.— Col. Benjamin D. Foulois, U.S. Air Service1

America’s successful record of manpowermobilization during the First World War faroutpaced the mobilization of American

industry. Throughout the war, the AmericanExpeditionary Forces (AEF) in France remainedlargely dependent on its allies for the provision oftanks, artillery, machineguns, fighting planes, andmany other necessities of modern warfare.

Postwar congressional and public scrutinyfocused on the wartime production record of theU.S. aviation industry, for this industry and its pro-ponents had raised the nation’s expectations withvisions of fleets of American-built fighting planesthat would soon take to the air. FrederickRentschler, president of Pratt & Whitney AircraftCompany during the 1920s, explained:

Immediately after our entry into the war, it wasdetermined that one of our great contributions wasto be in the air, and all generally accepted the ideathat our great automotive companies, within a fewmonths’ time, could duplicate anything in quantity,and as Howard Coffin [president of Hudson MotorCar Company and chairman of the Air ProductionBoard] put it, “darken the skies over Europe.”2

These heady expectations would not be real-ized, however. American factories failed to produceand ship a single pursuit plane to fight in France.The much-modified British D.H. 4 bomber, the sin-gle type of fighting plane to be built and shippedfrom U.S. factories, was obsolescent by the time itreached France.3

What follows is a chronicle of the events thatled to the humiliating failure of America’s aviationproduction efforts in World War I. Fortunately, theappropriate lessons were learned, and would beapplied with great success in a future war.

The Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, U.S.Army, possessed 26 qualified pilots and 142 air-planes when war with Germany was declared onApril 6, 1917. These meager assets, dispersedacross the United States, the Philippine Islands,and the Panama Canal Zone, were supported by adomestic aviation industry that managed to deliveronly 83 of the 366 airplanes ordered by the U.S.Army during 1916.

Prior to the declaration of war, American avia-tion factories had not produced a single moderncombat plane capable of fighting and surviving on

the Western Front. American aeronautical engi-neers and air officers had little concept of the func-tion and design of modern combat aircraft.American air observers were not privy to develop-ments in military aviation overseas, as Col. SamuelReber, former chief of the Aviation Section, SignalCorps, observed:

In that fog of war, no blanket was thicker than theone every army hung over its aircraft plans, and onno other single point was it so eager to learn theenemy’s. Either could only examine the constructionof enemy planes in use at the time, from the exam-ples which fell in their lines; and foreign militaryattachés, who were never allowed permanently atthe front, might, on visits, see the planes of the vari-ous armies at the aerodromes. But the new typesthat were in the process of manufacture were for noeyes except those of the experts in one’s own army.4

Implementing President Wilson’s policy ofstrict neutrality, Secretary of War, Newton D.Baker, compounded the difficulties involved inacquiring vital intelligence regarding rapidlychanging developments in military aviation.

Perhaps an even greater shortcoming of theAviation Section, at the beginning of the war, wasits lack of doctrine. Michael Doubler has defineddoctrine as “the fundamental, authoritative princi-ples armies use to guide their mission accomplish-ment,” and from doctrine, “an army derives its tac-

Theodore M. Hamady retired in 2001 as head of an international marketing company that specializedin aviation and marine products and services. At present, he is writing a history of the Nieuport 28 pur-suit plane and is co-curating an exhibit featuring the aviation art of Clayton Knight and William JohnHeaslip He holds degrees in history and business from the University of Michigan. A flying enthusiastfrom boyhood, Mr. Hamady is a pilot and collector of aviation art, literature, and artifacts. He has con-tributed articles to several journals, including Air Power History, Air Force Magazine, Air & Space,Windsock, and Over the Front. For the past fifteen years he has volunteered as a research historian atthe Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum.

(Overleaf) Frenchsquadrons were rapidlybeing equipped with theSPAD XIII pursuit when thefirst American-trained pur-suit squadrons werepreparing for combat oper-ations. The robust SPADXIII could outrun all oppo-nents in level flight or in adive, but pilots found its220 hp inline Hispano-Suiza engine trouble-prone. Americansquadrons began to transi-tion to the SPAD XIII inJuly 1918 when sufficientnumbers became available.(Photo courtesy of CanadaAviation Museum.)

(Right) Newton DiehlBaker, U.S. secretary ofwar from 1916 to 1921, wascriticized by a Republican-controlled Congress afterthe war for failures in U.S.wartime production efforts,particularly in the area ofmilitary aviation. (Photocourtesy of NASM.)

THEAMERICANEXPEDI-TIONARYFORCESREMAINEDLARGELYDEPENDENTON ITSALLIESFOR…TANKS,ARTILLERY,MACHINE-GUNS, [AND]FIGHTINGPLANES

tics, procedures, organization, equipment andtraining.”5 Once war was declared, the AviationSection of the Signal Corps, reorganized in May1918 as the Army Air Service, began to define itsdoctrine and organize the elements derived from it.The Army Aviation Section was clearly a start-uporganization.

Organization and planning began in April1917, with the creation of the Joint Army and NavyTechnical Board. The board was charged with theresponsibility for standardizing the designs andgeneral specifications of aircraft to be procured byeach of the services. Composed of three Army andthree Navy aviation officers, the board reportedjointly to the secretaries of the War Departmentand of the Navy. Among the Army officers was Maj.Benjamin D. Foulois, who would become Chief ofthe Air Service, AEF, eight months later, with thetemporary rank of brigadier general.

The Chief of the Aviation Section of the U.S.Signal Corps, Brig. Gen. George O. Squier, gave anindication of the board’s scope and authority, whenhe declared that he “would not buy a stick of woodwhich this technical board of Army and Navy offi-cers did not recommend.”6

The Joint Technical Board began work withoutbenefit of a policy directive that would have provideda basis for planning for numbers or proportions ofobservation, pursuit (as fighters were then called),and bombing aircraft. With little information abouthow to proceed, the board was receptive to the ideasand proposals being offered by its new allies.

As British, French, and Italian military mis-sions converged on Washington, D.C., a cablearrived from Premier Alexandre Ribot of France.The cable, directed to the Joint Technical Board forreview, read:

Two thousand planes should be constructed eachmonth as well as 4,000 engines by the American fac-

tories. That is to say, in the first six months of 1918,16,500 planes of the latest type, and 30,000 engineswill have to be built.The French Government is anx-ious to know if the American Government acceptsthis proposition, which would allow the allies to winthe supremacy of the air.7

Incredibly, Ribot’s cable became the basis forestablishing target numbers (but not types) ofAmerican combat aircraft and engines, with therequisite number of pilots and mechanics. WithRibot’s cable in hand, Major Foulois prepared thepersonnel and equipment requirements and appro-priations legislation needed to meet the targets.Brigadier General Squier presented the plan to thesecretaries of the War Department and of the Navyand quickly received their approval, followed by theapproval of the General Staff. On July 14, 1917,amid a barrage of favorable press publicity, theHouse of Representatives voted on the enormous$640 million aeronautics appropriations bill. TheHouse passed the bill, authorizing a sum greaterthan the cost of the Panama Canal, without a sin-gle dissenting vote.

American and Allied media trumpeted the pas-sage of the bill, and painted a fanciful picture of theaccomplishments of American industry and avia-tors once the program got under way. A typical edi-torial, appearing in the New York American,boasted: “Fifty thousand American aviators in fiftythousand flying machines, each dropping one hun-dred dynamite bombs on German soil, would do thework.”8

Official Washington also heralded the comingtriumph of America’s new air arm. BrigadierGeneral Squier, who was also a member of the AirProduction Board chaired by Howard E. Coffin,spoke of “winged cavalry sweeping across theGerman lines and smothering their trenches with astorm of lead, which would put the ‘Yankee

(Near right) Among the firstthree U.S. military aviators,Benjamin D. Foulois partic-ipated in the MexicanPunitive Expedition ascommander of the FirstAero Squadron. Promotedin 1917 to the rank ofbrigadier general as Chiefof the Air Service, AEF,Foulois was under greatpressure to equip and fieldthe first Americansquadrons to supportAmerican troops. MajorGeneral Foulois was Chiefof the Air Corps when heretired in 1935 after 37years of service. (Photocourtesy of NARA.)

(Far right) Lt. Col. GeorgeO. Squier (USMA 1887),was Chief of the AviationSection, U.S. Signal Corps,from May 20, 1916, toFebruary 19, 1917.Promoted several monthslater to Chief Signal Officerof the Army, BrigadierGeneral Squier, picturedhere as a major general,remained in an influentialposition regarding air mat-ters, and served as a mem-ber of the Aircraft Board.On May 20, 1918, anExecutive Order relievedthe Chief Signal Officer ofall duties connected withthe Army’s aerial activitiesand created the Division ofMilitary Aeronautics, whichwas absorbed four dayslater into the Army AirService. (Photo courtesy ofNASM.)

THE ARMYAVIATIONSECTIONWASCLEARLY ASTART-UPORGANIZA-TION

punch’… into the war, … sweep the Germans fromthe sky, [and] … blind the Prussian cannon.” Squiercontinued: “The time will be ripe to release theenormous flock of flying fighters to raid and destroymilitary camps, ammunition depots, and militaryestablishments of all kinds.”9

These expectations seemed reasonable at thetime because America, the most technologicallyadvanced nation in the world, had pioneered massproduction. Its vast automotive industry appearedfully capable of producing thousands of fightingplanes . Writing in National Geographic magazine,Maj. Joseph Tulasne, chief of the French Aviation

Mission to the United States, proclaimed in a morerestrained manner: “In America, the Europeantypes of airplanes and motors will be built, at first,to aid the English and French factories, in orderthat the Allies may have the largest possible num-ber of battle planes at the earliest possiblemoment. Then the new airplanes, more powerfuland better armed, will be built to be used duringthe summer of 1918. The unlimited resources ofAmerican industry will make it possible to carryout these two building programs.” Tulasne contin-ued, “The Allies are anxiously awaiting the aid ofthe American air fleet. If this fleet comes in time forthe 1918 battle, it will be the deciding factor.”10

Lt. Gen. Ernst von Hoeppner, commander ofthe German Air Force (Luftstreitkrafte), observedthat “the entry of America in the war was hailed inboth countries [Britain and France] as offering themedium for the achievement of overwhelming airsuperiority through the use of her vast resources.The columns of the hostile press were filled withfantastic statements,” he said. “In a short time,thousands of American planes were expected toswarm over Germany and force us to sue forpeace.”11

Although skeptical of the claims of America’sindustrial prowess, Lt. General von Hoeppnerwould not risk being unprepared for the onslaughtof American air power. His “Amerika Program,”promulgated in June 1917, proposed doubling thenumber of pursuit squadrons, creating new train-ing schools, and increasing aircraft production.This last proposition would prove difficult becauseraw materials were in short supply in Germany. Lt.General von Hoeppner also directed that aviationtechnical superiority be maintained, and it was this

(Near right) “Uncle Sam’sFighting Face.” This editor-ial cartoon appeared in theN.Y. American; it reflectedwidespread expectationsfor U.S. military aviationwhen war was declared onGermany in April 1917.(From the N.Y. American,reproduced in Aerial AgeWeekly.)

(Far right) Lt. Gen. Ernstvon Hoeppner (1860–1922),chief of the ImperialGerman Air Force(Luftstreitkrafte), institutedthe “Amerika Program” inorder to meet the expectedonslaught of American air-power. German pursuitforces were greatlyexpanded as a result, andGermany deployed thevaunted Fokker D.VII pur-suit aircraft by mid-1918.(Photo courtesy of theauthor.)

(Below) Maj. JosephTulasne (third from left infront row), chief of theFrench Mission to theUnited States, poses withmembers of his mission onthe steps of the NationalGeographic Society’s head-quarters in Washington,DC. (Photo from NationalGeographic.)

momentous decision that ultimately led to thefielding of the Fokker D.VII, perhaps the finest pur-suit of the war.

The immediate order of business in Washing-ton was how to spend the funds appropriated tobuild the U.S. Air Service. Despite an influx of for-eign military advisors, aeronautical engineers, bro-kers, and commission agents for foreign manufac-turers, American aviation authorities soon realizedthat this group was not current with the latestdevelopments in military aircraft overseas. As aresult, Brigadier General Squier was urged to senda technical mission to Europe, to determine thebest types of foreign designs to be built in theUnited States.

Maj. Raynal C. Bolling, an Aviation SectionReserve pilot who was also chief counsel for U.S.Steel Corporation, was named to head the commis-

sion, which included automobile and engine engi-neers, metallurgists, a banker, an efficiency expert,and an aluminum castings expert. In addition,ninety-eight men from the automobile industrywere directed to visit foreign factories, to learnmanufacturing procedures in order to effect an effi-cient technology transfer once they returned to theUnited States.

The Bolling Mission sailed from New York onJune 17, 1917, and landed at Liverpool, England, onJune 26, in the thirty-fourth month of the war. TheBolling Mission soon found that aviation develop-ments were proceeding at a frenetic pace, withBolling reporting that the situation “must bewatched daily in the light of developments which aretaking place with rapidity unequalled in any otherbranch of the military service.”12 Nowhere was thissituation more apparent than in the ongoing devel-opment of pursuit planes.The mission of pursuit avi-ation — to establish and maintain air superiority —underscored the critical importance of selecting thefinest pursuit plane to equip the Air Service, AEF.

Following their arrival in Europe, members ofthe Bolling Mission began a whirlwind tour ofEngland, France, and Italy, and then returned toFrance. They conferred with aviation authoritiesand manufacturers in each country about royaltypayments and the training of U.S. pilots andmechanics in Europe, and investigated existingand contemplated airplane designs and the capac-ity of European factories to build them.

On July 30, 1917, Major Bolling cabled the fol-lowing recommendations to Washington: “Believenecessary [to] build both best fixed [engine] fighterand best rotary engine fighter now developed.These are SPAD with 200 [hp] Hispano and SPADwith 200 [Bolling erred, the Gnome was 160 hp]Gnome Monosoupape [single valve]. Both may besuperceded next year, but this is only a guess.Think Hispano 200 will probably be supercededafter December 1918 by new, undevelopedengine.”13 It is clear that Bolling’s focus was on thestatus of engine development.

(Near right) Maj. RaynalBolling, prewar militaryflyer and cgief counsel forthe U.S. Steel Corporation,undertook a grueling three-month mission to Europeto report on the state ofaviation affairs in France,England, and Italy. Hiscommission’s recommen-dations for aircraft types tobe built in the UnitedStates were largely over-taken by the rapid changesin combat aviation technol-ogy in Europe. Promotedto colonel in August 1917,Bolling was killed inFrance in 1918 when heinadvertently crossed thefront lines and was shotwhile attempting to evadecapture. (Photo courtesy ofNARA.

Maj. Raynal Bolling andmembers of his commis-sion on a visit to thePomilio Factory in Italy in1917. Bolling found theItalian aviation authoritiesparticularly keen on provid-ing training and material tothe American Air Service.(Photo from Aerial AgeWeekly.)

SQUIER WASURGED TOSEND ATECHNICALMISSION TOEUROPE

On August 15, 1917, newly promoted ColonelBolling provided Brigadier General Squier with acomprehensive report, relating the activities andachievements of his Aeronautical Commission.Bolling discussed a wide range of issues, includingresolution of the problem of royalty payments andthe need to coordinate aircraft production fromEurope rather than the United States, to minimizecomplications and achieve greater cooperation withthe Allies.

Bolling noted the willingness of Britain,France, and Italy to train U.S. aviators andmechanics, and the need for the United States toprovide its allies with quantities of raw, semi-fin-ished, and finished goods and materials. Hereported that while the aeronautical industry inEngland was fully mobilized to meet the RoyalFlying Corps’ extensive program for 1918, Frenchindustry, however, possessed both the capacity andthe experience to supply American aviationrequirements.

Clarifying and expanding upon his earlier rec-ommendation to build European designs in theUnited States, Bolling now advised building the fol-lowing aircraft: the British Bristol biplace pursuitand two French-built pursuits, the SPAD XIII withthe 200 hp Hispano-Suiza engines and the SPADXV, powered by the 160 hp Gnome rotary engine.The SPAD XV differed from the SPAD XIII, beingof lighter weight and monocoque construction andpowered by a rotary, instead of an inline, engine.Bolling also recommended the British Airco D.H. 4for day bombing and reconnaissance and theItalian Caproni Triplane for night bombing.

Colonel Bolling noted the difficulties, particu-larly from French sources, of providing sample air-planes to the United States and the “surprisinglack of data covering articles of their manufacture.”He added, “In most of the airplanes and enginesfactories, they are entirely without complete draw-ings, specifications and other tabulated informa-tion which we should consider essential in the[mass production] manufacture of airplanes andengines.”14

In conclusion, Bolling recommended a programfor aircraft production in the United States thatwould begin to supply the requisite number of air-planes at the Front after July 1, 1918. It was evi-dent to Bolling that European production wouldhave to take up the slack until American factoriescould gear up. Requirements for service and train-ing aircraft in Europe prior to July 1, 1918, wouldhave to be met with aircraft produced in Franceand Italy.

On August 30, 1917, the American and Frenchgovernments signed a contract, in which Franceagreed to provide the U.S. Air Service, AEF, with1,500 Breguet 14 bombers and reconnaissanceplanes, 2,000 SPAD XIII fighters equipped with200 hp Hispano-Suiza engines, and 1,500 SPAD XVor Nieuport 28 pursuits, both pursuits beingequipped with 160 hp Gnome 9N rotary engines.Several prototypes of the Nieuport 28 were beingtested at the time, but the SPAD XV was soon

dropped from contention after failing to meet per-formance requirements.

Under the terms of the contract, French pur-suit aircraft would commence delivery in January1918, and be completed by June 1918. The contractalso provided for the substitution of later types ofaircraft if new designs were deemed superior todesigns specified in the contract. For its part, theU.S. government agreed to provide a large quantityof machine tools and raw materials, for delivery toa French port no later than November 1, 1917.

Bolling’s projected requirements for the U.S.Air Service were clearly influenced by the Frenchgovernment’s for its own Aviation Militaire. Frenchprojections for pursuits in service by January 1918foresaw a mix of SPAD XIIIs equipped with 200 hpHispano-Suiza engines, Nieuport 28s with 160 hpGnome 9N rotary engines, and existing Nieuport27s, powered by the 120 hp Le Rhone rotary engine.Although the Nieuport 27 was still in service,French authorities had concluded that it was nowinferior to current German pursuit planes, and itwas already in the process of being replaced byFrench pursuit squadrons. That French report alsonoted the importance of re-equipping its bombingand observation squadrons, stating, “it is indis-pensable that the greatest efforts be made toincrease to the extreme limits, the fabrication of theBreguet [14] and the Salmson [2].”15

The critical quest for a winning pursuit planedesign remained unfulfilled, for during the fall of1917 the Morane-Saulnier A–1, another Gnome 160hp rotary-powered aircraft, appeared on the scene.Early tests of this monoplane pursuit promisedexcellent maneuverability, speed, and rate of climb.Further tests of the Morane-Saulnier A–1 and theNieuport 28 would determine which of these Gnome-powered pursuits would prevail and equip Frenchsquadrons along with the 200 hp SPAD XIII.

By mid-August 1917, Colonel Bolling’s missionwas fulfilled, and he was directed by Gen. JohnJoseph Pershing to remain in Paris to take com-mand of aviation matters in the European Zone ofthe Interior, and continue monitoring aviationactivities there. Most of the former members of themission returned to the United States or to otherduties in France or England, but Bolling retainedthe services of several officers, including Maj.Edgar S. Gorrell. Gorrell, who would later directthe Technical Section of the U.S. Air Service, wouldprove to be a highly influential Air Service officer inthe months ahead.

The Morane-Saulnier A-1monoplane pursuit,equipped with the Gnome9N rotary engine, showedgreat promise when firsttested; its maneuverability,speed, and rate of climbwere superior to that of theNieuport 28. After it suf-fered several fatal crashesdue to wing failure, how-ever, its planned use as afirst-line fighter ceased.(Photo courtesy of NASM.)

BOLLING’SPROJECTEDREQUIRE-MENTS FORTHE U.S. AIRSERVICEWERECLEARLYINFLUENCEDBY THEFRENCHGOVERN-MENT’S

Bolling had predicted earlier that it would takea year for the 200 hp Hispano-Suiza engine to bereplaced by a more powerful engine, but Bollingand Gorrell were now concerned that it might besuperceded sooner.They were also aware that a 300hp scaled-up, ungeared version of the Hispano-Suiza engine was on the drawing board. Wash-ington was informed of these facts by cable onAugust 14, 1917.

On September 24, 1917, Washington informedBolling that the U.S. pursuit-building program nowincluded 1,500 SPAD XIIIs, powered by the 200 hpHispano-Suiza engine. Bolling was also informed ofa program to build 1,500 SPAD XIIIs powered bythe newly developed V-8 Liberty engine. This pro-gram, which had been initiated without Bolling’sknowledge, proved unsuccessful, as did anotherattempt to marry the Liberty engine to the suc-cessful British Bristol F.2B biplace pursuit air-frame. Largely politically motivated by a desire tostandardize on the American Liberty engine, thiseffort resulted in several fatal crashes during test-ing: the up-rated, 400 hp, V-12 Liberty engine wasmuch too heavy for the redesigned Bristol air-frame.16

It was clear, both in the United States and inEurope, that engine development and performancewere driving airframe design. The program to ini-tially equip the Air Service, AEF, with foreign fight-ing planes seemed reasonably well in hand by thelate summer of 1917. The Air Service, however,would be heavily reliant on French productioncapabilities, as well as on the ability of Americanindustry to meet its own obligations after toolingup. For a number of reasons, the aviation equip-ment program for the Air Service, AEF, wouldunravel during the months that followed.

In October 15, 1917, Major Gorrell, in hiscapacity as technical advisor to Colonel Bolling,recommended that “the United States be requestedto build no more pursuit aeroplanes of the typesproposed at that date to be shipped to Europe foruse on the Western Front.”17 Gorrell’s recommen-dation, a stunning reversal of policy, was promptedby several considerations, including the delay inprovision of drawings for the 200 hp Hispano-Suizaengine, and the resulting delay in getting theengine under production in the United States.Considering the timeframe required to get com-pleted pursuit aircraft from factories in the UnitedStates to the Front, Gorrell concluded, “the UnitedStates could not build this [200 hp Hispano-Suiza-equipped] SPAD pursuit airplane in time for it toarrive in Europe before its effectiveness had practi-cally ceased.”18

The principal factor motivating Gorrell’sOctober 1917 recommendation was his judgmentthat the 200 hp Hispano-Suiza engine would soonbecome obsolete. Testifying in 1919 before a Housesubcommittee investigating war expenditures,Gorrell explained:

The German pursuit machine developed, and theirtwo-place [reconnaissance] fighting machines werealways above the French and made the 200-horse-power SPAD a worthless machine because of itslack of performance. Consequently the Allies had toget a better machine and they got that by increasingthe horsepower of the 200 engine to 220 horsepower.The 220-horsepower engine … was a failure for along time, but afterwards they got it so it would runfor an appreciable length of time.19

Gorrell’s recommendation was approved andeffectively became policy for the remainder of thewar, although this was not what Gorrell intendedat the time. He believed that with sufficient fore-knowledge, U.S. industry could build suitable pur-suit designs and get them to the Front in time.Major Gorrell had the new 300 hp Hispano-Suizaengine specifically in mind for future use.

Attempts to produce other pursuit designs inthe United States for use overseas had failed andthe Air Service, AEF, was now principally depen-dent on its French allies for pursuit planes,bombers, and observation types. The timing hadcritical consequences for the U.S. Air Service, AEF.During October 1917, the French accelerated theiraircraft production in anticipation of the growingthreat posed by the German “Amerika Program.”French projections for aircraft at the Front by April1918, initially pegged at 2,665 aircraft, wereincreased to 2,870 aircraft, and increased yet again,to 4,022 aircraft, with bombers and pursuits givenpriority.

French pursuit force projections for April 1918now included SPAD XIIIs equipped with 220 hpHispano-Suiza engines and Nieuport 28s orMorane-Saulnier A–1s, “if the trials of the latterprove satisfactory.”20 Efforts were well under wayto increase production of Breguet 14 and Salmson

Major, later Colonel, EdgarStaley Gorrell graduated in1912 from West Point. Heserved as a military aviatorwith the First AeroSquadron during theMexican PunitiveExpedition in 1916, and thefollowing year went toEurope as a member of theBolling Commission.Gorrell was instrumental inthe policy determination toequip American squadronswith pursuits built inEurope, rather than in theUnited States. After serv-ing as technical director ofthe U.S. Air Service, Col.Gorrell compiled the his-tory of the Air Service inthe months immediatelyfollowing the Armistice.(Photo courtesy of NASM.)

IT WASCLEAR …THAT ENGINEDEVELOP-MENT ANDPERFOR-MANCE WEREDRIVING AIRFRAMEDESIGN

GORRELL…BELIEVED…U.S. INDUS-TRY COULDBUILD SUIT-ABLE PURSUITDESIGNS ANDGET THEM TOTHE FRONTIN TIME

2 bombing and observation planes, as well as thebiplace SPAD XI that was also intended for theobservation role.

In order to reach their production goals, theFrench sought to standardize the best aircraft andengine designs. Problems persisted with the manu-facture of the 220 hp Hispano-Suiza engine, and itwould take time for subcontractors to build uptheir production runs on the SPAD XIII. Theseproblems were finally resolved, but the productionbenefits would only be realized later in 1918.Ultimately, the SPAD XIII would be produced ingreater numbers than any other wartime pursuit.

Pressure was now building on BrigadierGeneral Foulois to organize and equip the firstAmerican aviation units without delay. Foulois hadprepared the original personnel and equipmentprojections for the U.S. Air Service, when he was amember of the Joint Army and Navy TechnicalBoard. Newly promoted to brigadier general andinstalled as Chief of the Air Service, AEF, inNovember 1917, Foulois promptly took charge of“all matters relating to the training, organizationor equipment of the Air Service in France, England[and] Italy.”21 Foulois’ approval was now requiredfor plans and recommendations coming before theJoint Technical Board.

As part of the Foulois reorganization, ColonelBolling was relieved as assistant chief of the U.S.Air Service and placed under Foulois’ command, toact as the principal liaison officer of the Air Service,AEF, to the Allied Air Board.

Brigadier General Foulois had myriad prob-lems, but the most pressing was the necessity toequip and quickly deploy American squadrons tosupport American infantry divisions that wouldsoon enter combat. In response to a query from hisnew boss about the imminent supply of airplanesand engines from France, Colonel Bolling respon-ded with some concern:

The French have recognized what I feared mighthappen, namely, that our air program will developmore slowly than expected because of difficultiesand delays in the establishment of airdromes,parks, depots, etc., and delays in our training pro-gram. Just now these are clearly the limiting factorsrather than the provision of airplanes and engines… Monsieur Lucher, Minister of Armament, whonow controls airplane and engine production, toldme that quite frankly the French would not be ableto deliver to us the numbers of airplanes andengines promised by the dates agreed to. While hementioned delays in deliveries of machine tools andraw materials [from the United States under theterms of the August 30, 1917, contract], he did notconceal the fact that the cause of their decision is alarge increase in their own air program.22

France’s inability to supply modern air equip-ment to the U.S. Air Service was caused by therapid expansion of its own air service in response tothe Amerika Program instituted by the GermanLuftstreitkrafte. Ironically, the Amerika Program

was induced by the media prospect of American-built aircraft “flooding the skies over Germany.”Brigadier General Foulois commented on the dam-age done by this unfortunate braggadocio in a let-ter to Dr. Charles D. Walcott, secretary of theSmithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C.:

The greatly exaggerated publicity, from the States,of our Air Service program, and what remarkablethings we would do to the Germans this Spring, hasbeen the worst thing that I have had to combat sincemy arrival as the English, French, and Italianpublics fully expected us to do something wonderful,and the reaction has hurt us over here very much.23

On November 30, 1917, General Hageneau,chief of the French mission attached to the Ame-rican Army Headquarters, informed Foulois of thetype of equipment that would be supplied initiallyby the French government to the U.S. Air Servicefor advanced training prior to entering front-lineservice. The communication read: “During thisperiod of instruction, it suffices and is even advan-tageous to employ only airplanes of the most recenttype. The squadrons can, therefore, be equipped atfirst with French airplanes of the present currenttype whilst waiting delivery of those ordered fromthe US.”24

Hageneau’s statement appeared reasonableand reassuring, but each of the types proposed —Dorand A.R.s and/or Sopwith 1-1/2 Strutters forobservation and day bombing, Voisin 8s and 10s fornight bombing, and Nieuport 27s for pursuit train-ing — were obsolescent or obsolete, and all, withthe exception of the Voisin 10, were then in theprocess of being removed from French squadrons.

General Petain had decreed in October 1917that the Nieuport 27 pursuit was “inferior to allcontemporary enemy fighters.”25 As Major Gorrellhad observed that “we always give a flier trainingin the same type [of aircraft] he is going to use him-self when he gets to the front,” it now appeared thatthe first American-trained fighter squadrons wouldenter combat with the Nieuport 27 pursuit.26

On January 5, 1918, General Pershing directedBrigadier General Foulois to expedite the develop-ment of the Air Service, AEF. Foulois promptlyqueried Bolling about the availability of the SPADXIII with the 220 hp engine.

Bolling answered, “In reply to your inquiryregarding the SPAD, we are entitled under the[August 30, 1917] agreement to demand the newer[220 hp] type of Hispano-Suiza engine, and I havedictated a letter to the Under-Secretary of State

The Nieuport 27, equippedwith the 120 hp Le Rhonerotary engine, was the lastof Nieuport’s sesquiplane,or Vee-strut, pursuits. Itwas clearly obsolete andbeing withdrawn fromFrench pursuit squadronsat the end of 1917. Itmight have equipped thefirst American pursuitsquadrons to enter com-bat, had not the untested(in combat) Nieuport 28been substituted at the lastmoment. (Photo courtesyof NASM.)

BOLLINGWASRELIEVED ASASSISTANTCHIEF OFTHE U.S. AIRSERVICE ANDPLACEDUNDERFOULOIS’COMMAND

[for Air] telling him that is what we want. Thequestion of deliveries of these machines dependsentirely upon the arrival [from the United States]of raw materials.”27

The raw materials and machine tools from theUnited States, however, and the supply of airplanesand engines from France were not forthcomingwithin the specified time. As a result, on January29, 1918, General Pershing canceled the August 30,1917 agreement. The pressure on Foulois and theAir Service, AEF, to acquire airplanes to equip theirrapidly forming squadrons was now intense.

On February 16, 1918, Foulois sent a formalrequest to the French government for a comple-ment of airplanes for the Zone of Advance, as thefront-line operational area was then called. Basedon the French government’s earlier offer, communi-cated on November 30, 1917, by Gen. Hageneau,Foulois requested eighteen SPAD XIII pursuitswith Hispano-Suiza 220 hp engines to equip onesquadron, thirty-six Nieuport 27 pursuits with LeRhone 120 hp engines to equip two squadrons, sev-enty-two Sopwith 1-1/2 Strutters (thirty-six wereequipped with the 120 hp Le Rhone rotary enginesand the balance with 130 hp Clerget rotaryengines), and thirty-six Dorand A.R. 1 planes. TheA.R. 1 and the Sopwith aircraft were intended forthe observation role.28

This request, formalized as Contract F–12 anddated January 23, 1918, specified that thirty-sixfully equipped Nieuport 27s be delivered toVilleneuve by February 1, 1918. The SPAD XIIIswere intended for the American 103rd AeroSquadron, formerly called the Lafayette Escadrilleand still under the direction of the French Army.The Nieuport 27s were intended for the newlyformed, American-trained pursuit squadrons thatwould shortly become operational.

Foulois was clearly unhappy at the prospect ofequipping American squadrons with obsolete air-craft, and particularly so with the Nieuport 27 pur-suit. He directed his chief of supply to request suf-ficient SPAD XIIIs with 220 hp engines to be deliv-ered March 15, 1918, to equip two fighter squa-

drons for service use at the Front. Foulois’ rationalefor this request was communicated to the Frenchgovernment:

To enable these squadrons to function to the bestadvantage, they will need first-class equipment. Afurther reason for furnishing the latest equipment isthat these few squadrons will be the first ones in theAmerican service to fly over the enemy’s lines. Theirperformance will be watched by not only all thepilots in training, both in this country and in theUnited States, but by the entire American people. Itis greatly to be desired that they should [not] behandicapped in any way as regards lack of up-to-date equipment.29

Foulois’ plaintive appeal for the immediatesupply of the same SPAD XIIIs then being suppliedto French pursuit squadrons appeared to fall ondeaf ears. He communicated his lament to GeneralPershing in a memorandum dated February 14,1918:

These types of aeroplanes [the Dorand A.R. 1,Sopwith 1-1/2 Strutter, and Nieuport 27 pursuit]are rated as 2nd class … although a great numberare being used by the French, at the present time, forfrontline service. Although I fully disapprove ofequipping any American Air Service squadronswith inferior types of aeroplanes, yet in view of thefailure on the part of the United States to supplyraw material as previously agreed upon, and fur-ther, in view of the fact that the French Air Serviceis, through necessity, [still] using a large number ofthese inferior types for front line service, I can offerno logical objection against equipping such numberof our squadrons with these types of aeroplanes asthe military necessity may demand.30

On February 21, 1918, M. Dumesnil, le Sous-Secretaire d’Etat de l’Aeronautique Militaire etMaritime, informed Foulois that “the two Nieuport[27] squadrons mentioned in your order of January23 [Order F–12] and formed for purpose of trainingat the front, will be made up of planes, Type XXVIII[28], fitted with 150 [this should be 160] hp Gnomemonosoupape engines.”31

The French government had not been entirelyunresponsive to Foulois’ plea, and it now made alast-minute substitution of thirty-six of the un-tested (in combat) Nieuport 28 pursuits for theobsolete Nieuport 27s called for in Order F–12.There was no change in the number or compositionof the other aircraft specified in the order. The first

(Near right) Gen. JohnJoseph Pershing(1860–1948), shown herewith Brig. Gen. B. D.Foulois, commanded the2.5 million men of theAmerican ExpeditionaryForce in France in 1918.General Pershing directedthat the fledgling AirService, AEF, be ready tosupport the growing num-bers of U.S. ground troopsas they entered combat.(Photo courtesy of NARA.)

(Far right) The Nieuport 28equipped the four fightersquadrons of the FirstPursuit Group, the firstAmerican-trained unit toenter combat. This light-weight pursuit, powered bya 160 hp Gnome 9N rotaryengine, was fast, highlymaneuverable, and per-formed successfully duringfour months of combatoperations. Many pilotswere loath to give it up forthe heavier SPAD XIII pur-suit. The U.S. Air Servicewas the only air service touse the Nieuport 28 in com-bat. (Photo courtesy of theauthor.)

THE FRENCHGOVERN-MENT…MADE ALAST-MINUTESUBSTITU-TION OFTHIRTY-SIXOF THE UNTESTED(IN COMBAT)NIEUPORT 28PURSUITSFOR THEOBSOLETENIEUPORT27S

deliveries of aircraft began to reach American pur-suit and observation squadrons in February andMarch 1918.

The 94th Aero Squadron became officially com-bat operational on April 14, 1918, and scored a glo-rious double victory on its first day of battle. TheNieuport 28 equipped the four squadrons of theFirst Pursuit Group and served creditably, beforebeing phased out of combat in August 1918 aftersuffering a series of wing failures and engine fires.The SPAD XIII replaced the Nieuport 28, andwould ultimately equip fifteen American pursuitsquadrons in operation at the end of the war.

The 1st Aero Squadron was initially equippedwith a mix of Dorand A.R. 1s, nicknamed the“Antique Rattletrap” by American pilots, and SPADXIs, whose poor weight distribution made them dif-ficult to fly.32 Sopwith 1-1/2 Strutters and DorandA.R. 1s equipped four other observation squadrons.By August 1918, all five squadrons were re-equipped with the outstanding Salmson 2. Withinthree months, the Air Service had forty-fivesquadrons assigned to American armies at thefront; all twenty of the pursuit squadrons wereequipped with foreign-built aircraft.33

On November 11, 1918, American authoritiesscrambled to cancel all aviation contracts placedwith European manufacturers. During the war, theFrench aviation industry supplied 73.5 percent ofthe 6,624 airplanes [this total includes trainingplanes, as well as aircraft sourced in England andItaly] received by the Air Service, AEF. Americanfactories delivered 1,213 license-built D.H. 4s toFrance before the Armistice; of this number, only417 were actually utilized at the Front.34

Congressional inquiries into America’s failureto produce fighting planes for the American Expe-ditionary Force began months before the war en-ded. Intending to fend off a potentially embarrass-ing Senate inquiry, President Woodrow Wilson pre-vailed on Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, hisRepublican opponent in the 1916 election cam-paign, to undertake an investigation of the “air-plane mess.” This ploy failed, however, for a sub-committee of the Senate Military Affairs Com-mittee soon undertook its own investigation intothe matter.

The Senate subcommittee published its reporton August 22, 1918, quickly followed by the reportissued by Chief Justice Hughes on October 25,1918. The Senate report focused on organizationalshortcomings described as “unsystematic and inef-fective,” especially, the “ineffective systems of liai-son to report the requirements of the forces in com-bat to the drawing boards of industry.” Intelligencewas lacking in all respects at the beginning of thewar; manufacturing techniques and drawings,required for every mass-production manufacturingprocess, were not provided on a timely basis by theAllies, if at all. The Senate subcommittee, havingnoted the confusion resulting from too many con-flicting voices attempting direction of aviation mat-ters, recommended “the need for a single, unifiedsource of command to give authoritative decisions

in the selection and development of aerialweapons.35

The Senate subcommittee and Chief JusticeHughes both took issue with the decision to stan-dardize on the American-designed and -builtLiberty engine. Standardization was necessary inorder to begin mass production, but there weresome serious repercussions.

Adapting the D.H. 4 airframe to the Libertyengine caused inordinate delays in getting the air-craft to the Front. By the time it reached the Frontin appreciable numbers, the redesigned D.H. 4 wasnot only considered obsolescent, but also possesseda dangerous design flaw. The unprotected fuel tankwas positioned directly behind the pilot, who wasdoubly vulnerable — to being crushed in the eventof a crash or being burned to death when the tankwas penetrated. The American-modified D.H. 4gained the unfortunate sobriquet “Flaming Coffin”as a result. Hurried attempts to correct this flawand others resulted in the improved D.H. 4B, butthis model failed to reach the Front before the warended.

The unsuccessful attempts to “marry” theLiberty engine to the American-built SPAD XIIIand Bristol F2.B two-place pursuit were furtherevidence of the unfortunate decision (some said itwas politically motivated) to standardize engineson many types of aircraft. Historian I. B. Holley Jr.pointed out the pitfalls of this policy:

As all designers knew, airframes are plannedaround engines. The power plant is the heart of theaircraft.To standardize with one engine was to forceall designers to conform to the limitations and char-acteristics of that one engine regardless of the func-tions to be performed by the airplane. When a stan-dardized engine was imposed upon designers of air-craft, long range night-bombers were limited to thesame power plant used by low-flying observationaircraft. To standardize was to stultify creativedesign and the development of the aircraft as awhole.36 [my underline]

Dr. Holley noted that the struggle betweenrapidly shifting performance requirements andquantity to be obtained by mass production wasnever resolved during the war. At the outset of com-bat, tactical commanders demanded numbers, andwhen aircraft in quantity began to reach the Front,their demands “shifted sharply to performance.”37

The report of the House of RepresentativesSubcommittee No. 1 on Aviation was released onFebruary 20, 1920. Members of the majority ofthis extremely partisan subcommittee primarilyblamed Secretary Baker and the Chief SignalOfficer, Maj. Gen. George Squier. With the cre-ation of the Army Air Service in May 1918, theSignal Corps and General Squier, who was pillo-ried in the press, ceased to have anything to dowith the production or use of aircraft. With theremoval of General Squier from the aviationscene, Coffin also lost his position as chairman ofthe Aircraft Production Board. One historian con-

DURING THEWAR, THEFRENCH AVIATIONINDUSTRYSUPPLIED73.5 PER-CENT OF THE6,624 AIRPLANES…RECEIVED BYTHE AIRSERVICE

sidered Coffin the “chief villain” behind the pro-duction scandal, characterizing him as a “classichigh-pressure automobile salesman [who] touredthe country describing how thousands of planeswould smash the German army into submission,making it unnecessary for American infantry tocharge machine guns.”38

The following brief exchange, quoted on page 3of the House report on expenditures in the WarDepartment, summarizes, and also captures thetone of, the majority report: “Our utter failure toproduce fighting planes after 19 months of war isdisclosed by one question:”

Mr. [Congressman Walter] Magee. “As far as themanufacture of pursuit planes or bombing planesin the United States is concerned, we are practicallyin the same position [in August 1919] we were inwhen we entered the World War?”Col. [Mason] Patrick. “Quite true.”That in brief, is the story of America’s aircraft pro-duction failure, occasioned by a record of stupidityand stubbornness that involved inexcusable wasteof men and money and invited military disaster.39

Minority members of the House subcommittee,branding the majority report as “intemperate,biased, and vituperative,” were far more circum-spect and prescient in presenting their views: “Thebig mistake in the aircraft production program hasbeen not so much that those in charge did not ful-fill it, but rather that they made the mistake of cre-ating a public expectation that they could do so.”40

In view of the short lifespan of the military air-plane, they recommended that constant experi-mentation and development of serviceable aircraftand engines be undertaken. The minority membersrecognized that “aircraft have become a vitalmeans of offensive and defensive warfare,” and that“future wars are possible and it is the duty ofCongress to keep the country in a reasonable state

of preparation to meet an emergency, which, whenit does arise, [will be] of monumental conse-quence.”41

In his final report as Chief of the Air Service,AEF, Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, [Patrick hadrelieved Brigadier General Foulois in May 1918]identified the underlying cause of problemsencountered by the fledgling Air Service: “As weconsider these errors with a view to avoidance inthe future, one fact stands out most prominently,one common source of all our difficulties becomesapparent; these failures were the unavoidableresult of our unpreparedness and of the necessityfor actually preparing for war while hostilities werein progress.”42 Major General Patrick’s commen-tary may also offer the best explanation for theabject failure of American industry to build fightingplanes for the Air Service, AEF, during the FirstWorld War.

It is, therefore, instructive and deeply satisfy-ing to know that the lessons of the failure ofAmerica’s production efforts in World War I werelearned, and applied with spectacular success by afuture generation of America’s war leaders.Preparedness and full national economic mobiliza-tion were keys to ultimate victory in World War II.An essay entitled Mobilization, published in 1990by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, identi-fies the milestone events and decisions that boughtthis sea change about:

The National Defense Act of 4 June 1920, chargedthe assistant secretary of war with planning forindustrial mobilization and responsibility for theWar Department’s procurement. The act representeda first step toward recognizing that modern war-fare, with its demands for huge mechanized forcesarmed with sophisticated weapons and the abilityto move over large fronts, demanded that the entirenational economy be harnessed.43

The creation of the Army and Navy MunitionsBoard in 1922 brought about joint service planningfor wartime resources. The following year, theGeneral Staff produced the first peacetime plan formobilization of an army of 400,000 on the first dayof mobilization, with rapid increases in mobilizedmanpower planned after that.

In 1929, the newly created Army IndustrialCollege began offering a one-year course of studyon industrial mobilization. In the 1930s, coursegraduates helped prepare a series of planning doc-uments that provided for wartime civilian controland direction of the nation’s resources. “Implicit [inthese planning documents] was the expectationthat management of the economy and particularly,control of industry in wartime, were presidentialfunctions that would be exercised through tempo-rary agencies run and largely staffed by civilians.This assumption reflected a realistic understand-ing of the American political system and the tran-scendent character of industrial mobilization.”44 Italso meant that industrial mobilization in wartimewould be vested with the highest authority.

Brig. Gen. Mason M.Patrick, at the request ofhis USMA classmateGeneral Pershing, relievedBrigadier General Fouloisof command of the AirService, AEF, in May 1918.He ably served until demo-bilization after the war, andthen returned to his branchof service, the U.S. Corpsof Engineers. Patrick wasrecalled in 1921 to assumecommand of the Army AirService. Shown here as amajor general, he helpedrestore the postwar AirService to vitality, andmoved it towards totalindependence with the cre-ation of the Army Air Corpsin 1926. Major GeneralPatrick got his wings atage 59; he served as thefirst Chief of the Air Corpsbefore retiring in 1927.(Photo courtesy of theauthor.)

THE ARMYAND NAVYMUNITIONSBOARD…BROUGHTABOUT JOINTSERVICEPLANNINGFORWARTIMERESOURCES

In spite of the new realizations and resultingreforms in military and industrial planning, theperiod between the world wars would prove to bevery difficult years for the U.S. Army and all U.S.military services, as historian Edward M. Coffmanexplained:

During the Roaring 1920s and the Depression-rid-den 1930s, public desire to cut government expendi-tures and traditional antimilitary attitudes com-bined with the dominant isolationist mood toreduce the Army to the point that it was negligibleas a world power. Tight budgets year in and yearout meant understrength units, slow promotion,and restrictions on virtually any activity beyondmaintenance of the status quo.45

However, Coffman continues, “these years weremarked by increasing professionalism in the formof emphasis on advanced schools and the opportu-nities they provided officers to prepare for futurepossibilities.”46 Future possibilities, no doubt,meant the coming war.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to pre-pare the nation as the European war loomed in1939. The industrial mobilization plan promul-gated in 1939 assumed that economic mobilizationcould commence prior to the actual outbreak of hos-tilities against the United States. PresidentRoosevelt knew, however, that he could not imposeall of the measures required for full mobilization,because the nation was still neutral and isolation-ist in thought and would not accept it. He sought,instead, to move ahead with bold, but incremental,steps.

The protective mobilization plan for 1939began to balance wartime production scheduleswith projections of material requirements. A lim-ited rearmament effort, with emphasis on enhanc-ing the striking power of the U.S. Army Air Corps,was undertaken at the same time.

With the outbreak of war in September 1939,the size of the regular Army and National Guardwas immediately increased. With the fall of theLow Countries in May of the following year,President Roosevelt called for 50,000 new militaryairplanes, along with a supplemental industrialmobilization plan to make that happen. The pas-sage of the Selective Service Act in 1940 vastlyincreased the number of trained men, and Armyappropriations jumped to $8 billion, only to jumpagain to $26 billion the following year.

The U.S. government encouraged private ex-pansion of war production facilities with financialincentives such as accelerated depreciation sched-ules and government financing. One beneficiary ofthis program was the massive Willow Run Factorybuilt by the Ford Motor Company. Construction ofthe factory began in April 1941 and the first B-24bomber rolled off its mile-long production line inOctober 1942. At its peak, the plant employed42,000 men and women, with 650 B-24s coming offthe line every month. During the course of manu-facturing over 8,600 bombers, Ford introduced hun-

dreds of engineering changes right on the produc-tion line. This process, adopted by major Americanfactories across the country, ensured that the B-24remained a viable and potent weapon throughoutthe war.

“Lend-Lease,” introduced by President Roose-velt in September 1941, supplied America’s soon-to-be-allies with desperately needed weapons and rawmaterials, sometimes at the expense of her ownforces. However, the program did ensure thatdemand for standard American weapons andequipment would keep up with the growing pro-ductive capacity until fully mobilized Americanforces could use the bulk of the country’s output.

On July 9, 1941, the President directed the sec-retaries of the War Department and of the Navy toprepare a plan that would guide the United Statesin the event of war with the Axis powers. PresidentRoosevelt requested a detailed plan that would“predict with confidence the kinds and amounts of‘munitions and mechanical equipment’ we wouldneed to win a war.”47 In order to achieve creditablenumbers, the planners would have to start with acareful assessment of potential enemies’ strengthsand then determine allocation, training, andemployment of American manpower by each of theservices.

The air annex to the war plan, entitled AWPD-1 (Air War Plans Division-1) was completed in onlynine days in August 1941, by four outstandingArmy Air Forces officers: Lt. Col. Harold LeeGeorge, Lt. Col. Kenneth N. Walker, Maj. HaywoodHansell, and Maj. Laurence S. Kuter. AWPD-1, anda slightly revised AWPD-2 completed a year later,proved to be remarkably accurate projections offuture requirements, setting the “course for theproduction and employment of U.S. airpower inWorld War II.”48

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941, unified the country and removed all peace-time constraints, allowing President Roosevelt toundertake full national economic mobilization.Thus, 1942 saw a dramatic growth in productivecapacity. Manpower and material mobilizationmanagement were brought together in 1943 withthe creation of the Office of War Mobilization. Thedirector of the OWM, James Francis Byrnes, a for-mer congressman, U.S. senator, and associate jus-tice of the U.S. Supreme Court (and a future U.S.secretary of state and governor of South Carolina),had the credentials and the authority to do the job.

Organization for full economic mobilization inwartime was now complete, and the task remain-ing for American industry was to sustain high pro-duction for the balance of the war. By 1945, the U.S.Army Air Forces, now numbering over 2,400,000airmen, had taken delivery of over 225,000 Ame-rican-built military aircraft.49 The support given byU.S. industry to the USAAF was indicative of theoverwhelming material support given to all ofAmerica’s military services.

It mattered greatly that people such asPresident Roosevelt, George C. Marshall, andHenry H. Arnold had experienced directly the prob-

ROOSEVELTCALLED FOR50,000 NEWMILITARYAIRPLANES

THE ATTACKON PEARLHARBOR…UNIFIEDTHE COUNTRYANDREMOVEDALL PEACETIMECON-STRAINTS

lems encountered when a woefully unpreparednation entered World War I in 1917.Their collectiveexperience and leadership, along with that of manyothers, helped mobilize the nation’s vast productive

energies and resources and bring about the care-fully planned and executed production and militaryvictories during World War II. The bitter lessons ofthe earlier war had indeed been learned. ■■

1. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committeeon Expenditures in the War Department. Hearingsbefore Subcommittee No. 1. (Aviation), 66th Congress,1st Session, 1919, Serial 2, Part 6, 387.2. Frederick B. Rentschler, An Account of Pratt &Whitney Aircraft Company 1925–1950 (privatelyprinted, 1950, author’s collection), p. 6.3. I. B. Holley Jr., Ideas and Weapons (New Haven,Ct.: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 126.4. Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker: America atWar, vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1931),p. 282.5. Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: HowGIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945 (Lawrence:University Press of Kansas, 1994), p. 8.6. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1. (Aviation),Serial 2, Part 31, IX.7. Ibid., VIII.8. “Leading Newspapers Ask For $1,000,000,000 forHuge Air Fleet of 100,000 Aeroplanes,” Aerial AgeWeekly, June 18, 1917, p. 449.9. Palmer, Newton D. Baker: America at War, p. 293.10. Maj. Joseph Tulasne, “America’s Part in the Allies’Mastery of the Air,” National Geographic 33, no. 1(January 1918): 5.11. Gen. Ernst von Hoeppner, Germany’s War in theAir (Nashville, Tenn.: Battery Press, 1994), p. 132.12. Report of Aeronautical Commission, Major R. C.Bolling to Chief Signal Officer of the Army,Washington, DC, August 15, 1917, vol. 24, p. 11(National Archives Publication MM 990, roll 32), U.S.Air Service Records, Record Group 120, NationalArchives at College Park, Md.13. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1. (Aviation),Serial 2, Part 31, XLII.14. Report of Aeronautical Commission, vol. 24, p. 4.15. Le General Commandant en Chef [Petain] to leSous-Secretaire d’Etat de l’Aeronautique Militaire,Paris, October 22, 1917. Document from S.H.A.A.Archives, sent to author by Bernard Klaeyle and trans-lated by O. Abi Mershed.16. Holley, Ideas and Weapons, p. 122.17. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1. (Aviation),LXII.18. Ibid., LX.19. Ibid., XLIX.20. General Petain to le Sous-Secretaire d’Etat del’Aeronautique Militaire, Paris, October 22, 1917.21. Brig. Gen. B. D. Foulois, “Office MemorandumRegarding Organizational Changes,” December 12,1917, B.D. Foulois Papers, personal correspondence,Box 5, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.22. Col. R. C. Bolling to Capt. J. A. Drexel, London,England, December 29, 1917, file 452.1, Programs, U.S.Air Service Records, RG 120, National Archives atCollege Park, Md.23. Brig. Gen. B. D. Foulois to Dr. Charles D. Walcott,April 20, 1918, Foulois Papers, Manuscripts Division,Library of Congress.24. General Hagueneau to Chief of Air Service, AEF[Foulois], November 30, 1917, file 452.1, U.S. AirService Records, RG 120, National Archives at CollegePark, Md.25. General Petain to le Sous-Secretaire d’Etat de

l’Aeronautique Militaire, Paris, October 22, 1917.26. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1. (Aviation),LXIV.27. Col. R. C. Bolling to Brig. Gen. B. D. Foulois,January 11, 1918, Foulois Papers, ManuscriptsDivision, Library of Congress.28. Brig. Gen. B. D. Foulois to M. le Sous-Secretaired’Etat de l’Aeronautique Militaire et Maritime, Paris,January 23, 1918, file 452.1, U.S. Air Service Records,RG 120, National Archives at College Park, Md.29. Chief of Air Service, AEF, [Foulois] to Chief,Supply Department, Air Service [Dunwoody], January19, 1918, file 452.1, U.S. Air Service Records, RG 120,National Archives at College Park, Md.30. Brig. Gen. B. D. Foulois, Chief of Air Service, AEF,to General Pershing, Commander in Chief, A.E.F.,February 14, 1918, file 452.1, U.S. Air Service Records,RG 120, National Archives at College Park, Md .31. Le Sous-Secretaire d’Etat de l’AeronautiqueMilitaire et Maritime to Brig. Gen. B. D. Foulois,February 21, 1918, file 452.1, U.S. Air Service Records,RG 120, National Archives at College Park, Md .32. Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi, WorldAircraft: Origins-World War I (Chicago: Rand McNally& Company, 1979), p. 150.33. Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, The Measure of America’sWorld War Aeronautical Effort (Northfield, Vt: NorwichUniversity Publication No. 6, The Lane Press, 1940), p.31.34. Ibid., p. 46.35. Holley, Ideas and Weapons, p. 119.36. Ibid., p. 121.37. Ibid., p. 129.38. Thomas Fleming, The Illusion of Victory (NewYork: Basic Books, 2003), p. 240.39. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1. (Aviation),3.40. Ibid., 6.41. Ibid., 69.42. Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, chief of the AirService, AEF, United States Army in the World War1917–1919: Reports of Commander-in-Chief, AEF, StaffSections and Services (Washington, DC: HistoricalDivision, Department of the Army, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1948), p. 290.43. Frank N. Schubert, Mobilization (Carlyle, Pa.: U.S.Army Center of Military History, ca. 1989), p. 4.44. Ibid., pp. 8–9.45. Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The AmericanArmy, 1898–1941 (Cambridge, Mass.: The BelknapPress of Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 233.46. Ibid.47. James C. Gaston, Planning the American Air War:Four Men and Nine Days in 1941 (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 3.48. Ibid., 105–108. Both AWPD-1 and the revisedAWPD-2, however, failed to recognize the need forlong-range fighters. The decision to equip the P-51 air-frame with the outstanding British-designed RollsRoyce Merlin engine provided that fighter with theperformance needed to dominate and destroy theLuftwaffe.49. Edward Jablonski, America in the Air War(Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1982), p. 3.

��

James A. Scheib

��

� he air rescue crews who provided a continu-ous presence in occupied Japan were predom-inately veterans of World War II. Their

twenty-four tours ranged from the tolerance ofboredom to the excitement of unusual and unpre-dictable challenges. The crews’ reward was theknowledge that during peace or war the alertphone would send them on a real-life mission tosatisfy a vital need. They lived the Air RescueService’s motto: “Those things we do, that othersmay live.”

My most memorable experience began onSunday morning, June 25, 1950, as our nine-mancrew, of Flight A, 3d Air Rescue Squadron, MilitaryAir Transport Service. routinely relieved the pre-vious alert crew on the flight line of Johnson AirBase, near Tokyo. Our plane, an SB–17G (forSearch Bomber, serial number 44-83885), wore dis-tinctive yellow paint markings in wide bandsaround the fuselage, wings, and tail. It was the lastB–17 produced at Long Beach, California. AHiggins, droppable A–1 lifeboat, painted yellowand called the “Flying Dutchman,” was bound bycables to her belly, which were secured to the bombrack shackles in the bomb bay.

The flight engineer, MSgt. William J. Brewster,had inspected the plane, checked the engineeringforms, performed the pre-flight, and run up theengines. Other crew members had assured me thatthe communication, navigation, and rescue andsurvival equipments were in good order. Brewster,1st Lt. Ronald G. Carver, the co-pilot, and Ireviewed the records and declared that -885 was“fit for duty.” The odds were, however, that wewould have no reason to fly her during our Sundaytour. The summer monsoon had started, but theweather was fair over most of Japan. A cold front,moving southward over Korea, was predicted tobring rain and low clouds to Japan by Tuesday,June 27th.1

Also parked on the ramp were Douglas B–26s ofthe 3d Bomb Group’s, 13th Light Bomb Squadron,displaying their World War II nose art. The 8thLight Bomb Squadron had left on the previous dayto participate in an air defense readiness test atAshiya Air Base, in southern Japan. With themwent the RF-80As of the 8th Photo Reconnais-sance Squadron, their pitot cover streamers sway-ing like reins on speeding horses.2

The morning’s quiet stopped suddenly at 1102hours, Korean time, when 1st Lt. Thomas L. Wight,our navigator, answered the alert phone. It was AirDefense Control Center (ADCC) in Tokyo, relayingorders from Far Fast Air Forces (FEAF) headquar-ters. They directed the 3d Air Rescue to prepare afully-armed SB–17, pick up a passenger at Tokyo’sHaneda Airport, and transport him to Kimpo air-field, at Seoul, Republic of South Korea. ADCC had

already filed a flight plan for our mission.3Our crew could not have imagined the portent

of that message. The concise wording gave us nei-ther explanatory nor implementing instructions,and we reacted reflexively. The stand-by alert crewwas instructed to report for duty and notify Capt.Edmund F. O’Connor, the Flight A commander. Asour support personnel arrived, they received ashort briefing. Aware of participating on yetanother “real-life mission,” they moved enthusias-tically to their shops, the hangar, and the ramp,eager to get -885 combat-ready and airborne.

The early arrival of engineering officer 1st Lt.Henry L. Laird and armament officer 1st Lt.Kenneth F. Bailey, hastened the removal of thelifeboat. Machineguns and ammunition wereinstalled, the plane’s fuel tanks topped off, and alltasks completed to ensure we were fully combatready for the mission. Operations officer Capt.Bror C. Seaburg and 1st Lt. Vincent H. McGoverntried to anticipate and resolve potential problemsthat might impede our efforts. Crew chief TSgt.Thomas B. England and his maintenance crewinspired us with their confidence in the airplane’shealth.

During preparations, we learned that the NorthKorean People’s Army, in force, had penetrated theborder of the Republic of South Korea at 0400

Maj. James A. Scheib, USAF (Ret.), flew thirty-one missions as a B–24 pilot with the 485th BombGroup, 831st Bomb Squadron in World War II. From 1948 to 1951, he flew SB–17s and SA–16s onair rescue missions. Subsequently, he worked as a civil service employee in aircraft acquisition, atthe, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

(Overleaf) An SB–17G sitson the apron at JohnsonAB, Japan. (All photoscourtesy of the author.)

(Right) The author.

OUR PLANE,AN SB–17G…WORE DIS-TINCTIVEYELLOWPAINT MARK-INGS IN WIDEBANDSAROUND THEFUSELAGE,WINGS, ANDTAIL

A HIGGINS,DROPPABLEA–1LIFEBOAT,PAINTED YELLOW ANDCALLED THE“FLYINGDUTCHMAN,”WAS BOUNDBY CABLESTO HERBELLY

hours. At 1227, one hour and 25 minutes afterreceiving the phone call from ADCC, and eighthours and 27 minutes after the invasion began, weflew -885 the short distance to Haneda Airport. Inthe, terminal, I met and briefed our passenger, Col.William H. S. Wright, USA, chief of staff, KoreanMilitary Advisory Group (KMAG).4 At 1310 wewere airborne again, climbing westward over theJapanese Alps toward our destination.

The tension eased as we settled into our rou-tine. We were in weather for most of the flight. Ourcrew assumed that we would deliver our passen-ger, refuel, and return to Johnson AB that evening.I remember leaving the flight deck to Lt. Carverand making my way through the bomb bay to thewaist compartment, where gunner/scanners Cpls.George E. Seymour, Hugh H. Fowler, Daniel W.Guyton, and Robert P. Gauss were stationed.Colonel Wright stood at the right waist windowand had unwittingly positioned himself in a posereminiscent of the familiar photograph of GeneralDouglas MacArthur in his personal B–17. I toldColonel Wright that I would contact Kimpo AB toarrange for his debarkation. We discussed theevent of the day and I returned to the flight deck.

The only Airways and Air CommunicationsService (AACS) navigation aid available at KimpoAirfield was a low-power radio beacon that couldbe used for homing and instrument landings.5 Ifamiliarized myself with the headings, altitudes,and frequencies that we would be using for anAutomatic Direction Finding (ADF) letdown andlow approach. “No problem there,” I thought.Suddenly, the routine changed when radio opera-

tor SSgt. Richard G. Grimm handed me a messagefrom FEAF. It instructed us not to land at Kimpo,but to proceed instead to ltazuke AB, Kyushu,Japan. There was no explanation.

En route, we received yet another FEAF mes-sage, directing us to land at an airstrip near Pusanon the southeastern tip of the Korean peninsula.Its existence was about the extent of our knowl-edge of our new destination. Tom Wright searchedhis brown leather navigation case and found a sec-tional chart of the area. We radioed ltazukeControl in Japan and asked them to provide anyavailable information concerning the airstrip atPusan. They told us to stand-by. Some minuteslater, Itazuke came back stating that Pusan wasan abandoned 4,000-foot emergency landing stripwith no radio or navigation facilities. They hadlocated a pilot in the officers’ club who had landeda C-47 at Pusan two years before and who opined,“It wasn’t too bad.” I asked Control for the mostvalid barometric pressure in the Pusan area forsetting our altimeter. With Tom Wright on theAPQ-13 radar, we began our descent to the JapanSea, breaking through a 200-foot ceiling.6

As we approached the Korean coast, Tom stoodbetween the pilots’ seats with his chart and gaveus headings. We adjusted the engine controls toclimb and the superchargers control set for “WarEmergency Power.” All three of us tried to find avisual route inland. We soon flew between twocoastal hills with only ground fog in front of us.Now lightly loaded, -885 responded smoothly andpulled us out of there. We climbed to altitude,made another attempt at coastal penetration, and

(Above) Operations buildi-ing at Johnson AB, Japan.

EN ROUTE,WE RECEIVEDYETANOTHERFEAF MESSAGE,DIRECTINGUS TO LANDAT ANAIRSTRIPNEAR PUSAN

again broke off. Even had we found the Pusanairstrip, I doubted that the low ceiling would havepermitted us to maneuver for a landing. We soinformed ltazuke Control and were subsequentlyinstructed to return to Japan.

Base Operations at Itazuke AB that Sundayevening was crowded. Colonel Wright left quicklyto communicate with Ambassador John J. Muccioand his KMAG staff in Seoul. My next contact withWright occurred years later. I learned that he hadbeen flown to Kimpo early the next morning, June26th, by U. S. Navy pilot Curtis Allen in a NavyJRB–6 (generic C–45). Wright told me that afterarriving at Seoul, he had received a stirring mes-sage and later, an inspiring visit from GeneralMacArthur. A graduate of West Point’s class of1930, Wright retired in the grade lieutenant gen-eral.7

I also learned why, as we prepared for let-downat Kimpo on June 25th, we were abruptly redi-rected to divert to Pusan. Apparently, two NorthKorean Yak-7Bs (Russian fighters similar to theBritish Spitfire) had buzzed Kimpo at 1315. And at1700, as we prepared to land, the Yaks strafed thecontrol tower, a gas dump, and an Air Force C–54.8

The significance of our mission, launched on thefirst day of the Korean War, may well be the firstcombat mission launched by the United States AirForce since it was established in September 1947.■

1. WD AAF Form 1, “Aircraft Flight Report —Operations,” SB–17G, 44-83885, Jun 25, 1950.2. Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Forcein Korea, 1950-1953. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,1961, p. 7.3. 3d Air Rescue Squadron Operations Log, Jun 25,1950, p. 104; E.B. Crevonis and H. Meeks, “Study of theThird Rescue Squadron in Relation to the Korean War,1 May-31 Dec 1950,”4. WD AAF Form 1, “Aircraft Flight Report —Operations,” SB–17G, 44-83885, Jun 25, 1950. H. V.

Brooks, “3d Air Rescue Squadron History, 25 Jun-31 Aug1950,” p. 5.5. Futrell, p. 600.6. Brooks, p. 5.7. Lt. Gen. W. H. S. Wright, USA (Ret.) to J. A. Scheib,Jun 29, 1980; R. E. Appleton, South to the Naktong,North to the Yalu (June-November 1950), Washington,D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History,1961, p. 40;Air Force Magazine, Oct 1995, p.69.8. Futrell, p. 9.

(Right) The author atJohnson AB, Japan.

(Below) The author’s son infront of an SB–17G.

TWO NORTHKOREAN YAK–7BS…HAD BUZZEDKIMPO

OUR MISSION,…MAY WELLBE THE FIRSTCOMBAT MISSIONLAUNCHEDBY THEUNITEDSTATES AIRFORCE

The “What is it?” aircraft in our last issue wasthe Temco T–35 Buckaroo primary trainer.

It was a product of Texas Engineering & Man-ufacturing Company, Inc. (Temco), the firm thatacquired rights to Globe Aircraft products, includ-ing the Swift lightplane. Temco used the GlobeSwift Model GC–1B to create its two-seat primarytrainer, known in company jargon as the TE–1. Itoffered the “tail dragger”TE–1B version with a 165-hp Franklin engine to the Air Force and built threeservice-test YT–35 prototypes.

In 1949, the Air Force looked at the YT–35 alongwith the Beech Model 45—forerunner of the T–34—and the Fairchild T–31. The Fairchild plane wasjudged the best of the three, but budget cuts killedthe program. In 1950, when the Air Force was look-ing for a new trainer, one solution seemed to be theT–35.

The Air Force accepted the three YT–35s in anAugust 2, 1950 ceremony.The date of the first flightof a YT–35 does not appear to be on record; perhapsan Air Power History reader can help.

The YT–35 Buckaroo handled well, had the for-giving qualities needed in a trainer, and cruised at177 mph. The Franklin engine had reliability prob-lems, however, and was going out of production.The Air Force eventually chose the T–34, with itstricycle gear, as its next trainer.

In July 1951, the Air Force evaluated several“armed trainers” for light, close-support duties. To-gether with the T–34 and Fletcher FD–25 Defen-der, a YT–35 Buckaroo was modified to mount two7.65-mm machinegun pods, up to ten rocket projec-tiles, or two 150-lb bombs. This was a colossal loadfor such a small ship. No aircraft in this categorywas ever purchased, although airmen flew mucholder propeller-driven planes in combat in South-east Asia a decade later.

Nineteen readers, including one each in Swi-tzerland and Germany, entered our “name theplane” contest. Unusually, two got it wrong. OurHistory Mystery winner is Thomas O. Gamble ofSanta Rosa, California, who will receive an aviationbook as soon as we get organized around here.

Once more, we present the challenge for ourever-astute readers. See if you can identify thismonth’s mystery aircraft, shown in an artist’s ren-dition. But remember, please: postcards only. Therules, once again:

1. Submit your entry on a postcard. Mail thepostcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive,Oakton VA 22124.

2. Correctly name the aircraft shown in ourartist’s conception. Also include your address andtelephone number, including area code. If youhave access to e-mail, include your electronicscreen name. Remember that a telephone numberis required.

3. A winner will be chosen at random from thepostcards with the correct answer. The winner willreceive an aviation book by this journal’s techni-

cal editor.This feature needs your help. In that attic or

basement, you have a photo of a rare or little-known aircraft. Does anyone have color slides?Send your pictures or slides for possible use as“History Mystery” puzzlers. We will return them.

ThisIssue’sMysteryPlane

History Mysteryby Robert F. Dorr

A Question of Loyalty: Gen. Billy Mitchell andthe Court-Martial that Gripped the Nation.By Douglas Waller. New York: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2004. Illustrations. Photographs.Bibliography. Index. Pp. 448. $26.95. ISBN: 0-06-050547-8.

While one of the most satisfying elements ofbeing a historian with the Office of Air ForceHistory is the opportunity to assist authors andother historians with their work, that opportunityoccasionally requires a confession. Accordingly, Ihad a hand in this book, although my contributionwas far smaller than the “acknowledgments” sec-tion suggests. I also must admit to sharing most ofthe author’s conclusions, but that is because theyare cogently reasoned and thoroughly grounded inprimary research, as A Question of Loyalty reveals.

William “Billy” Mitchell remains the mostimportant and controversial individual in the his-tory of American military air power. Born in 1879,Mitchell chose to make his mark in the U.S. Armyand ultimately in military aviation. Dynamic, artic-ulate, intelligent, charming, forceful, and politicallywell connected, he advanced rapidly. Mitchell cameto aviation later in life than did many of his con-temporaries, but he quickly became a passionateadvocate and fervent enthusiast. During WorldWar I, Mitchell proved to be an outstanding tacti-cian, noted for massing over 1,500 Allied aircraft tosupport the American assault on the St. Mihielsalient in September 1918. He returned fromFrance determined to establish an independent airforce and make air power the dominant weapon ofmodern war. His methods, however, were question-able. Mitchell consistently appealed to Congressand the public—outside the chain of command—and questioned the motives, intelligence, and com-petence of those who disagreed with him, includinghis superiors. His major victory came in 1921, whenarmy airmen sank the former German battleshipOstfriesland. Despite this success, Mitchell’s largergoals remained unfulfilled, and he became increas-ingly arrogant and confrontational, alienating

friends as well as infuriating enemies in theprocess. Denied reappointment as assistant com-mander of the Air Service in 1925, Mitchell seizedupon the crash of the U.S. Navy dirigibleShenandoah to charge “incompetency, criminalnegligence and almost treasonable administrationof the national defense by the Navy and WarDepartments.” (p. 20) The ensuing court-martialwas one of the great public trials of the TwentiethCentury. Convicted, Mitchell subsequentlyresigned from the U.S. Army. The court-martial andhis resignation made him into both a martyr to thecause and a legend in the history of air power.

In A Question of Loyalty, Douglas Waller hasfashioned a dramatic, detailed, day-to-day accountof the court-martial proceedings, while examiningMitchell’s life through a series of flashbacks thatshed new light on the general’s professional andprivate life. In less competent hands, this techniquemight cause confusion, but Waller, a senior corre-spondent for Time Magazine and author of fivebooks, has handled his material well, producing anilluminating story about a compelling, fascinating,and terribly flawed individual.

Waller stresses the political nature of the trialand suggests that Mitchell’s choice of civiliandefense counsel, Congressman Frank Reid ofIllinois, was a better choice than previous writershave acknowledged, despite Reid’s ignorance ofmilitary culture and tendency to show disrespectfor the army in the courtroom: “Anyone in uniformhad now become ‘you people’ to Reid.” (p. 189)Through most of the trial, Reid was able to avoid aruling on whether defense testimony was to beoffered only for mitigation of the sentence, or couldbe considered as absolute defense of the chargeagainst Mitchell. If the court had ruled that testi-mony could only be offered to mitigate the sen-tence, it would have been pointless for Reid to callwitnesses. Thus by avoiding the ruling, Reid wasable to put government management of air poweron trial instead of Billy Mitchell, and to turn thecourt-martial into an expensive, lengthy nationalcarnival that enthralled the newspapers and pub-lic.

The trial began with fireworks when Reid chal-lenged several general officers off the court, includ-ing its president, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall,a distinguished senior commander with a personalgrudge against Mitchell. In another dramaticdevelopment, Reid put Margaret Lansdowne, wifeof the dead commander of the Shenandoah, on thestand to testify that the navy had tried to pressureher to commit perjury during the Shenandoahinvestigation. Such steps generated headlines forweeks. The court-martial turned into the media cir-cus that best suited Mitchell’s purposes, as whenhis friend, the immensely popular humorist WillRogers, slipped in to watch, but ended up beingescorted to the front of the room and having hisphoto taken with the generals sitting in judgment.

The trial was not all show, however, and Wallerdetails numerous substantive issues uncovered bythe defense. Mitchell, for example, had demanded

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WILLIAM“BILLY”MITCHELLREMAINS THEMOST IMPORTANTAND CONTRO-VERSIAL INDIVIDUAL INTHE HISTORYOF AMERICANMILITARY AIRPOWER

unity of command in the Hawaii Islands. The testi-mony of Maj. Jarvis Bain, of the general staff, madeit clear that “unity of command was a conceptlargely foreign” to army and navy officers. (p. 263)Instead, the services had evolved a system basedupon “paramount interest.” Reid’s cross-examina-tion exposed this as an ill-defined term, in whichthe service with less interest was supposed to coop-erate with the service with a larger interest. Inpractice, however, cooperation was strictly volun-tary and could neither be required nor compelled.The problem would prove critical sixteen yearslater, when confusion generated by the lack of unityof command would play a role in the Pearl Harbordebacle on December 7, 1941.

Also, it seems likely that army leadership cameto favor a highly public trial that would humiliateMitchell and diminish his ideas. Waller satisfacto-rily documents the lengths to which the army wentto ensure a highly visible conviction.The chief pros-ecutor, Col. Sherman Moreland, severely underesti-mated the defense and was poorly prepared tocross-examine the stream of witnesses that Reidproduced. The army then assigned to the case Maj.Allen W. Gullion, one of the “most skilled andaggressive prosecutors the service had.” (p. 222) Itwas Gullion who made Mitchell look weak, illinformed and erratic during a devastating cross-examination.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, Mitchell’s bit-terest foe, Brig. Gen. Hugh Drum—who “had will-ingly been the point man for the army’s oppositionto a separate air force”—engineered “the generalstaff’s operation to destroy Billy Mitchell.” (pp. 310)Drum had the trial transcripts scoured thoroughlyand War Department records sifted carefully formaterial that could be used against Mitchell. WhenMoreland proved out of his depth, Drum assignedhis top aide, Maj. Francis B. Wilby, “to sit atMoreland’s side and begin managing the prosecu-tion.” (p. 204)

And the army was not the only serviceinvolved. Waller describes a telling vignette inwhich Reid questioned the identity of two individu-als in civilian clothes sitting at the prosecutiontable.They turned out to be Captains A.W. Johnsonand M. G. Cook of the U.S. Navy, furnished byMitchell’s savvy rival Adm. William A. Moffett toassist Moreland with questions. Ultimately, thenavy allotted four naval officers to the prosecutionthroughout the trial.

Human touches transform Waller’s narrativefrom the mundane. In one example, at precisely10:57 A.M, on November 11, Maj. Gen. RobertHowze, the president, suspended the proceedingsin recognition of the seventh anniversary of thesigning of the Armistice. The court stood and facedeast in silence until 11:00 A.M., a poignantreminder of what was really at stake in the court-room. And in still another touch, the entire court—probably stupefied, one suspects, by the complexand lengthy testimony—became transfixed watch-ing a woman next door hanging her washing in astiff breeze!

Interspersed with the drama of the court-mar-tial,Waller explores the impact of Mitchell’s privatelife, based upon the author’s discovery of newcaches of letters and official documents. Mitchell’sfirst marriage to Caroline Stoddard, in 1903, wasan idyllic love match, but it rapidly fell apart fol-lowing his return from Europe at the end of WorldWar I. Waller documents that Mitchell’s heavydrinking, episodes of domestic violence, and cheat-ing, including quite probably with the wife of one ofhis officers, took its toll. The divorce, in 1922, was abitter one. Especially painful for a historian toread, as a final chapter features the elderlyCaroline burning boxes of papers that documentedher life with Billy Mitchell.

The trial’s end brought final retribution.According to Waller, during rebuttal “the prosecu-tion planned to bring the full weight of the WarDepartment down on Mitchell. . . . Long lists weredrawn up of every claim the defense had made.Rebuttal witnesses were assigned to each point,and counter arguments were prepared.” (p. 257)The navy offered over forty witnesses of its own;the Judge Advocate General’s Office assigned anofficer to locate and bring potential army wit-nesses to Washington; and a stellar group of offi-cers, including Drum and Summerall, lined up to“settle scores with Billy Mitchell.” (p. 259)

The verdict was guilty, and Mitchell subse-quently resigned. His service, however, ended inthe kind of pettiness that had often characterizedit. Army finance officers docked him $393.67 for aleather coat, trousers, camera, goggles, flightsuits, and general’s flags still in his possession.But Mitchell had the last laugh by visitingBolling Field, where he made thirty-seven land-ings in one day, thus qualifying for $1,028.08 inflight pay.

Waller tells a great story, although it is not thecomplete story. Most important, his technique pre-vented a systematic examination of the evolution ofMitchell’s thinking on air power and air power doc-trine, and prevented him from placing Mitchell’schanging concepts within the larger evolution of airpower thought. A Question of Loyalty thus comple-ments, rather than competes with, Dr. Alfred F.Hurley’s classic 1964 study, Billy Mitchell:Crusader for Air Power. Hurley’s work, however,sorely requires revision in light of the new evidenceand interpretations developed by Robert White,James Cooke, Burke Davis, Michael Grumelli,Mark Clodfelter, Tami Davis Biddle, DouglasWaller, and others.

The “bottom line” is that Douglas Waller hasproduced a significant biography of a fascinatingand important military thinker and leader. AQuestion of Loyalty belongs on the shelf of everyoneinterested in the history of air power, the history ofthe U.S. Air Force, and the military history of theTwentieth Century.

Roger G. Miller, Ph.D., Office of Air Force History,Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.

World History of Warfare. By I. Archer,John R. Ferris, Holger H. Herwig, andTimothy H. E. Travers. Lincoln: Universityof Nebraska Press, 2002. Index. Pp. xii, 626.$29.95 ISBN: 0-8032-4423-1

Archer and his colleagues have writtenan outstanding reading text on the history ofwarfare from its origins to the twenty-firstcentury. More than a description of past keyevents and turning points, it is a rewriting ofthis history articulating the concept ofchange and organized around five centralthemes: the idea of war, the experience oftotal war in each era, the impact of technol-ogy on warfare, the nature of armies (struc-ture and organization), and the experience ofthe soldier.

The authors divided their book into fif-teen chapters and used as many non-Western sources as possible, so as to avoidconfining their history mainly to Europeanmilitary history. Following an introductionon the origins of warfare, they devote thenext thirteen chapters to its succeeding eras,encompassing along the way “Warfare of theAncient Empires,” “War and Society in theClassical West,” “Migrations and Invasions,”“European Chivalry and the Rise of Islam,”“Eastern Styles of Warfare,” “The Age ofGunpowder and Sail,” “New Signs of TotalWar,” “Absolutism and War,” “The Revo-lutionary Era,” “The Beginning of IndustrialWarfare,” “The West Conquers the World,”“Twentieth-Century Militarisms andTechnological Warfare,” and “Third WorldWars.” The final chapter is an epilogue on“The Future of War and Peace.”

Each of the chapters covering a particu-lar era of warfare contains a case study anda list of suggested reading materials.Probably because of book’s length, theauthors dispense with footnotes or endnotes.Although this is unfortunate in the eyes ofthe expert reader, undergraduate and grad-uate readers will not find the book lessauthoritative for it. The authors, all rep-utable Canadian military historians withestablished academic records, take particu-lar care not to leave any rock unturned.Their approach, while broad, is meticulousand respectful of opposing explanations andcharacterizations. The authors’ strengthsare their abilities to go straight to what mat-tered most in a particular era. They focus onthe key themes relevant to all eras, ratherthan discussing trivial issues which had nolong-lasting impact. This approach allowsreaders to develop a comparative under-standing between eras, and provides themwith a lens to appreciate the evolution ofwarfare over extended periods of time. Alsoof particular value are the authors’ discus-sions of warfare in non-Western societies,which usually tends to be set aside in moretraditional textbooks.

Because selections had to be made,readers will not find lengthy discussions onevery combat arm, combat support, or com-

bat service support function in each andevery chapter. While the infantry, artillery,naval, and air operations are relatively wellcovered throughout the book, more couldhave been said about logistics and intelli-gence. With respect to the latter and itsimpact on warfare, it seems that the litera-ture may have been underexploited. (For anoverview of this rich literature, see RoseMary Sheldon, Espionage in the AncientWorld: An Annotated Bibliography, McFar-land & Company, 2003.) Likewise, the epi-logue on the future of warfare is only two-pages long and could have benefited from alook at recent trends in warfare and projec-tions into the future. That aside, the book issuperbly edited, and I highly recommend itto undergraduates, graduates, and profes-sionals alike.

Mr. Stéphane Lefebvre, former civilian strate-gic analyst and army intelligence officer,Department of National Defence, Canada

Warthog and the Close Air SupportDebate. By Douglas N. Campbell.Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003.Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp.xii, 202. $ ISBN 1-55750-232-3

This book is about A–10s and close airsupport, or CAS as it is more commonlyknown. The Air Force officially named theA–10 the Thunderbolt II, giving it a directlinkage to the P–47 of World War II fame.But the first pilots who flew it looked at allof its bumps and bulbous features andrenamed it the Warthog, which then mor-phed into simply the Hog.

Truth in advertising: I flew the Hogfrom 1982 to 1990 in two different units.Later, I worked on the Air Staff and saw afew of these issues from the inside. Readingthis book was like reliving some of thoseexperiences.

The author has done an excellent job ofcapturing the story of the genesis of thisversatile aircraft and the role it played inthe endless CAS debate between the ser-vices and politicians. Unfortunatelythough, this is a doctoral thesis. As such,the author has to devote a goodly portion ofthe book plowing through a lot of the CAShistory. Some of this is tedious, but theauthor adroitly documents how—eventhough all of the services have traditional-ly been involved in some way with CAS—each service had its own definition of whatit is. And each used its own definition tocreate a specific weapon designed to best fitits own specific needs.

To the Army, CAS was a command andcontrol problem. Still smarting from the lossof its air forces after World War II, it wantedarmed aircraft that could be task organizedwith ground maneuver units. Too many

Army commanders had been left “high anddry” by the Air Force and they wanted theirCAS in hand. Interservice agreements hadrestricted the Army mostly to rotary-wingoperations, and it pushed for armed heli-copters.

The Marines wanted a CAS that wasresponsive to the needs of its combined armsteams and could move with its task forces.They pushed for the VSTOL AV–8 and heli-copters.

The Air Force traditionally pushed formultirole aircraft. Focused on air superiori-ty, interdiction, and then CAS, its comman-ders wanted forces that could be used in allmission areas. When ultimately forced byCongress to have aircraft dedicated to CAS,they were more than happy to satisfy thepoliticos by so designating several wings ofaircraft. They knew that in combat, the air-craft could be used in some manner to sup-port all three missions. Hence, for the AirForce generals, CAS became a force struc-ture issue. As the author notes, “Money isthe engine of air power. . . .Congress controlsthe budget for all these things.”

With the groundwork laid, the authorthen takes us through the myriad historicalstudies, proposals, debates, tests, starts,false starts, fly-off competitions, and politicalmaneuvering which marked the process ofconceptualizing, planning, selling, funding,and then fielding the A–10. It is a long andinteresting read which well captures theprocess of bringing a weapons system tofruition, especially in the face of governmen-tal bureaucratic detractors, opposition fromother services, and resistance even fromwithin the Air Force. The author also details,through side discussions, the development ofthe 30-mm cannon and Maverick air-to-sur-face missile that were developed primarilyfor the A-10. They were vital to giving theWarthog the lethality it needed to be aneffective CAS aircraft.

Coming off of the production line in thelate 1970s, A–10s were organized into twostateside wings. Then a super wing of sixsquadrons was formed in England. Fromthere, A–10s would regularly rotate intoforward bases on the continent. Soon, everyArmy base in Europe got used to the soundof Warthogs overhead. Reinforced by moreA–10 squadrons from the States (manywere Guard and Reserve units), the Hogsbecame a mainstay of the NATO plan todefeat any Warsaw Pact invasion. TheA–10s endurance, lethality, maneuverabili-ty, and survivability gave our ground forcesthe CAS they needed. This was the high-point of CAS.

Unfortunately, the A–10 still had deter-mined detractors. “Purist” fighter pilots con-tinued to believe that the aircraft was justtoo narrowly focused and ungainly for evolv-ing enemy threats. New efforts werelaunched to mothball the aircraft andreplace them with the new F–16. This led tomore studies, competitions, fly offs, and con-

Book Reviews

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gressional fights. At one point in the late1980s, plans did exist to deactivate the air-craft.

Then Saddam Hussein sent his armyinto Kuwait and everything changed. Sevensquadrons of Hogs eventually went to thewar, where the aircraft were used for manytypes of missions. The author writes, “Thecoalition needed many air tasks accom-plished and the A–10 with its excellent loiterand weapons carriage capacity answered thecall.” A–10s were used for reconnaissance,interdiction, attacks on enemy air defensesites, forward air control, sector control, com-bat search and rescue, traditional CAS, anddirect support of special operations teamsoperating deep in enemy territory. TwoA–10s even shot down Iraqi helicopters. Theair commander, Lt. Gen. Chuck Horner saidof the Hogs, “I love them. They are savingour asses!” In fact, the Hog pilots startedreferring to their aircraft as the RFOA–10.As the author well documents, Desert Stormvalidated the value of the A–10.

But as good as this book is, the authormisses in one very important area. The A–10was built to do what it did. But any aircraftis only as good as the pilot or crew whichoperates it. “The man is the weapon,” saidGeneral Patton. Many of the men who ini-tially influenced the creation of the A–10had combat experience in Southeast Asia.They understood what an attack aircraftshould be able to do. But more importantly,they understood how an attack pilot shouldbe trained. As the A–10s began to fill the

squadrons, the initial cadre of experiencedpilots were also veterans of that war. Theyhad mostly flown A–1s, O–2s, and OV–10s.These men intuitively knew the air-to-ground battle. They had attacked enemytrucks, put in air strikes in front of friendlyground units, and run rescue operations fordowned airmen. They knew the basics of airbattle and brought to the A–10 community asolid grounding in the application of airpower at the tactical level. It was they whothen trained the younger warriors who flewalong the East German border and went toDesert Storm. It was they who developed the“bag of tricks” taught to every A–10 pilot. Itwas they who created the success of theA–10 in the Kuwait Theater of Operations.The author alludes to this but does not bringit out clearly. It would have added to thevalue of this book.

But other than that, this is an excellentbook, which does a great job of showing howa weapon system is created. A–10s were ofcourse used later in Bosnia, Afghanistan,and the second Gulf War. Apparently, theA–10s will now be around well into this cen-tury. I think that we can assume that theCAS debate will continue. Some things arejust endless.

Col. Darrel Whitcomb, USAF (Ret.) Fairfax,Virginia

From Autogiro to Gyroplane: TheAmazing Survival of an AviationTechnology. By Bruce H. Charnov. West-port Ct.: Praeger, 2003. Photographs. Index.Notes. Bibliography. Pp. xxiv, 389. $49.95ISBN: 1-56720-503-8

Bruce Charnov, Business Departmentchairman at New York’s Hofstra University,is clearly a man with an obsession about thehistory of rotary-wing aircraft. He hasamassed what surely must be an exhaustivecollection of virtually every effort to perfectsome sort of rotary-wing vehicle. He beginswith an account of Spaniard Juan de laCierva’s brilliant concept of the rotary-wingprinciple and his collaboration with HaroldF. Pitcairn. Pitcairn poured a great deal ofhis Pittsburgh Plate Glass fortune intodeveloping an autogiro in the United Statesand perfected the technique of direct controlby tilting the rotor blades. Competition fromthe Kellett Autogiro Company in the alreadyscanty market stimulated research butreduced the profits essential for continuedresearch. Just when the approach of warmade a large increase in military sales seemprobable, Igor Sikorsky of the Vought-Sikorsky Division of United Technologiescame out with a practical helicopter designwhich could actually hover and land andtake off vertically— something the autogirocould not do. Although the U.S. Army contin-ued to fund experimental autogiros, it wasevident that the helicopter would captureU.S. military production orders. Despite

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Frank Cass PublishersNorth American Orders: ISBS, 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Portland,

OR 97213 3644, USA Tel: 800 944 6190 Fax: 503 280 8832

UK/RoW Orders: Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London N14 5BP Tel +44 (0)20 8920 2100 Fax: +44 (0)20 8447 8548

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Pitcairn’s generous offer to cut royaltiesfrom the usual 5 percent on his patents usedon helicopter rotors to less than 1 percent,both Pitcairn and Kellett were forced to stopbuilding autogiros by the end of the war.

In Europe, however, the autogiroremained alive. Cierva’s patents licensed toAvro in England and Liore-et-Olivier inFrance. LeO delivered fifty-five autogiros tothe French air force as substitutes for obser-vation balloons. In Germany, despite thesuccess of helicopters, an autogiro with a tip-jet rotor blade proved so excessive in fuelconsumption that it could be used only forvertical flight, reverting to unpowered rota-tion on reaching altitude. This autogiro wasdesigned for use by German submarines.Both the Soviets and the Japanese devel-oped autogiros during World War II.

During the war both the Germans andthe British experimented with rotary-wingkites, very light vehicles for dropping agentsinto enemy territory. Igor Bensen, a Russianimmigrant engineer working with GeneralElectric on rotary-wing projects, was fasci-nated by one of these contraptions, a rotchute weighing barely 100 pounds. In 1953,Benson founded his own firm, the BensenAircraft Company, where he soon movedbeyond the Gyro-Glider he developed to themore ambitious powered Gyrocopter. Thiswas a lightweight vehicle, in which the pilotsat out in the open using a conventionalstick to control the pitch of the rotor. Bensenwas a shrewd entrepreneur. He not onlybuilt Gyrocopters to sell but offered sets ofplans or kits of parts for the hobbyist tobuild for himself. No license was requiredfor these vehicles which soon attracted aswarm of amateurs. Bensen organized thePopular Rotocraft Association and encour-aged annual “fly-ins,” where enthusiastscould demonstrate the many variants of hisoriginal design.

The author has endeavored to trackdown every one of these rotary-wing appli-cations, whether successful or not. Whilethis makes for tiresome reading, one mustadmit the book provides an excellent refer-ence work on the afterlife of Cierva’s rotary-wing principle, especially its 26-page bibliog-raphy of books, articles, and films.

Dr. I. B.Holley Jr., Duke University

Anatomy of a Reform: The Expedi-tionary Aerospace Force. By Richard G.Davis. Washington, D.C.: Air Force Historyand Museums Program, 2003. Illustrations.Notes. Glossary. Pp. vii, 103.

Ask any airman who spent time on aremote airstrip deployed for Bullet Shot,Giant Warrior, Coronet Lightning, or a hostof other exercises and remote assignments,and he will tell you that since its inception,the USAF has been an expeditionary force.

So what then is the Expeditionary Air Force(EAF), and what is the establishment of AirExpeditionary Forces and this “reform” busi-ness all about?

Richard Davis looks into the back-ground of previous “expeditions” conductedby the Air Force, and what the Chief of Staffintends to be the reformed attitude or mind-set of our airmen. The EAF is intended to bea visceral change spanning the entireforce—not just the “pointy end.” WhileUSAF has deployed all over the world, it didso at great cost, at an extreme OpTempo,and with increasing unrest from its mem-bers. Anatomy of a Reform provides a goodexplanation of the problems with “SplitOperations,” equipment and manning short-falls, and the readiness issues associatedwith fulfilling the USAF’s national defenseobligations. He correctly indicates that of allthe issues associated with conducting theseoperations, the morale and attitude of ourairmen was both the thing that made itwork and the element that would eventuallycause operations to fail if not corrected andsupported quickly.

The book well captures the OpTempoand constraints placed on the USAF andtheir spiraling effect in the 1990s. By show-ing Air Staff basing laydown graphics, hebrings a very powerful argument to the fore-front of his treatise that helps set the stagefor the reader throughout the book. This keyissue, and its effects on our airman, was cen-tral to the changes necessary to preventanother instantiation of a “Hollow Force”before it occurred.

Davis lays down the AEF cycle andgraphically demonstrates the process ofplanning and execution for each AEF. Hedoes well in providing context for how theAEF will operate, and the resultant “depend-able schedule” that each airman can usewhen planning even the most mundaneactivities—like leave or a wedding! Byimplementing the AEF cycle, USAF gave 60percent of its force the opportunity to knowwhen they would be deployed and for howlong. This was something the Air Force hadbeen unable to do for more than ten years!

Anatomy of a Reform provides a conciseview of a very dynamic and highly-pacedtime in Air Force history. Headquarters,USAF performed superbly during the rela-tively short twenty-four months that kickedoff the EAF reform. But that tells only partof the story, and that is the single shortfall ofthe book. While Davis tells a great story ofone Air Staff office, that is all he tells. I wasfrankly very surprised to see scant mentionof the analytic efforts of the major com-mands or any mention of the industry sup-port provided through the Air Force Studiesand Analyses Agency. No fewer than tennon-government agencies and fourteen gov-ernment analytic agencies provided directsupport and studies for this effort, and theyreceive scant mention. The many briefingsand slides Davis cites and reproduced in hisbook were a direct result their work in

exploring concepts and developing optionsfor the Air Staff. This story will not be com-plete until the objective data and analysesthey conducted are also documented beyondtheir halls.

For a good overview of the transforma-tion of the Air Force to the EAF, please readthis book. But for the whole story, we’ll waitfor volume II?

Lt. Col. Robert A. Morris, USAF, BarksdaleAFB Louisiana, served as chief analyst forAF/XOP during the EAF transformation.

To the End of the Solar System: TheStory of the Nuclear Rocket. By James A.Dewar. Lexington: The University Press ofKentucky, 2004. Maps. Diagrams. Illus-trations. Photographs. Appendices. Notes.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxi, 438. $65.00ISBN: 0-8131-2267-8

Termination of the Rover/NERVA(Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Appli-cation) program in January 1973 closed a sig-nificant chapter in the development ofnuclear thermal rocket propulsion.That storyhad begun seventeen years earlier when theU.S. Air Force and Atomic Energy Com-mission (AEC) laboratories commenced workon a reactor suitable for propelling a super-Atlas ICBM. The National Aeronautics andSpace Administration (NASA), created in1958, inherited from the Air Force responsi-bility for the program and, in August 1960,negotiated an agreement with the AEC toform a joint Space Nuclear Propulsion Office(SNPO). By the time the program ended, itsparticipants had progressed significantlytoward creation of a fully functional rocketengine employing a nuclear reactor with asolid graphite core.

James Dewar’s To the End of the SolarSystem, an extraordinarily detailed, skillful-ly crafted account of the nuclear rocket’s evo-lution, examines Rover/NERVA from severalinextricably linked perspectives: scientific,technical, economic, bureaucratic, and politi-cal. Dewar argues convincingly that bureau-cratic infighting and budget concerns threat-ened the program’s existence at nearly everyturn. However, the unswerving advocacy ofNew Mexico’s powerful Senator Clinton P.Anderson, combined with timely test-standresults, ensured its survival for more than adozen years. The waning of both a nationalpolicy of preeminence and an expansionistspace vision coincided with Anderson’sdeclining health and departure from publicoffice. A new cast of characters used post-Apollo policy and a focus on more immediateearthly problems to render unnecessary anuclear-powered Saturn third stage.

Although not a historian by training,Dewar scoured practically every relevant,unclassified source in dozens of repositories,as evidenced by his “Essay on Sources” and

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ninety pages of endnotes. Between thebeginning of his research in 1969 and com-pletion of a draft manuscript in 1994, theauthor pored through many different con-gressional and executive record groups inthe Library of Congress, National Archives,presidential libraries, files of the Air Forceand NASA History Offices, and several uni-versity archives containing the personalpapers of key individuals. Dewar also accu-mulated a substantial amount of materialfrom program participants who providedpapers, memoranda, and reports in theirpersonal files at home. Sources requiringmore judicious use—e.g., oral histories,media accounts, secondary literature, andInternet sites—enabled him to comprehendmore thoroughly the Rover/NERVA story.

Dewar, who worked exclusively in theDepartment of Energy and its predecessorsas an expert on nuclear affairs, employs sev-eral clever devices that make his book moreintelligible to both scholars and lay people.Carefully interlaced political and technicaldevelopment stories become the warp andwoof of his complex, tightly woven narrative.Even more detailed information about tech-nical progress appears occasionally in boxedinserts, and explanatory endnotes containinformation that might otherwise disruptthe storyline. Eight appendices addressmore generic matters such as fuel elementdevelopment, alternative and advanced con-cepts, safety and environmental aspects oftesting, turbo pumps and nozzles, programbudget, and the Russian nuclear rocket pro-gram. One especially insightful appendixoutlines for government program managersand the public lessons derived from theRover/NERVA project.

Given NASA’s renewed emphasis onProject Prometheus, publication Dewar’s Tothe End of the Solar System seems especial-ly well timed. It offers instructive analysisfor current decision makers. In a more acad-emic vein, together with George Dyson’sProject Orion: The True Story of the AtomicSpaceship (2002) and several scholarly arti-cles, it signals a growing body of historicalliterature written about nuclear rocketpropulsion.

Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, Deputy CommandHistorian, HQ Air Force Space Command,Peterson AFB, Colorado

The Indochinese Experience of theFrench and the Americans: Nationa-lism and Communism in Cambodia,Laos, and Vietnam. By Arthur J. Dommen.Bloomington and Indianapolis: IndianaUniversity Press, 2001. Notes. Glossary.Index. Pp. xiii, 1172. $49.95 ISBN: 0-253-33854-9

Books about the Vietnam War oftenmake exciting and easy reading for a very

good reason: they are frequently first personaccounts and/or accounts about special unitsin combat and are filled with the emotion ofbattle. This book, in contrast, is neither ofthese. The combat aspect of the wars foughtin Southeast Asia barely warrant mention inthis book, and then only as minimal sidenotes. There are other books, such as H. R.McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty, that angrilyrecapitulate the chain of failures in seniorleadership during the Vietnam War. ArthurDommen’s book does speak to the inadequa-cies of key political and diplomatic leaders,but it is much more. This work is a classicpiece of historiography. It was written by ascholar who was also a journalist with first-hand knowledge garnered during much ofthe American phase of the war, and he haspersonally spoken with many of the princi-pals. It is long; at first I thought too long andburdened with detail. Its 1,172 pages areneither softened with illustrations nor clari-fied with maps; there are none. Aside fromthree very simple graphs, the words flowunimpeded.

What does this book, then, bring to thetable? A great deal. I have done scholarshipon the war, have written a college-levelcourse on it, and fought in it. Yet, like manypeople, I believe that intellectually there hasexisted a considerable vacuum that shouldalready have been filled. A book was neededthat addressed core issues without reflectingpersonal agendas in a manner thatMcNamara’s apologia or Kissinger’s accountof his diplomatic efforts have. Why did “we”choose to make a stand there with unclearnational strategic objectives? Was theimmensity of this nation’s effort there dis-proportionately greater than the region’scriticality to U.S. national security? Werecounter-arguments within the governmentagainst U.S. involvement given short shriftby the decision-makers? What lessons couldhave been learned from the French experi-ence? For the most part this book speaks tothese themes which are woven throughoutthe book; themes that capture the motiva-tions behind this nation’s involvement andthe personalities central to decision making,especially at critical junctures.

As one reads this book, one realizes thatthere are identifiably critical events anddiplomacy that, perhaps more than the bat-tlefield, determined the direction and even-tual outcome of the war. Dommen sees adirect correlation between PresidentKennedy’s shaken reaction to his 1961 sum-mit with Khrushchev and significantlyincreased U.S. involvement in SouthVietnam. The author highlights the failuresof the 1962 Geneva Agreement (supposedlyending the Laotian Crisis), the U.S.-drivencoup against Diem, the “secret talks” thatparalleled the Paris Talks, French duplicityat Geneva (1954) and throughout the U.S.phase of the war, and the collective failure ofthe community of nations to condemn NorthVietnam’s unending violations of interna-tional agreements and its use of violence to

reshape the geopolitical landscape. Theauthor is critical of senior U.S. and Frenchdiplomats like Henry Cabot Lodge, EtienneManac’h, and Averell Harriman, who were soenamored with their respective roles thatthey had failed to realize that they werebeing outmaneuvered or manipulated by thecommunists. The author is especially criticalof Henry Kissinger.There is an undercurrentof bitterness in Dommen’s discussions ofKissinger’s diplomacy, especially his willing-ness to “sell out” the South Vietnamese to thecommunists as the price for extrication fromthe war and return of POWs. Kissinger mayhave been duplicitous, but at a higher levelhe was involved in a comprehensive andglobal approach to improved relations withcommunist nations. Kissinger was, after all,the chief architect and driving force behinddétente. Coincident with Kissinger’s peacenegotiations and subsequent developmentsin Indochina (but with rare exception eitherignored by the book or given short shrift)were his secret overtures to the People’sRepublic of China, the tensions in the MiddleEast culminating in the Yom Kippur Warand the oil embargo, the aftermath of PragueSpring and the subsequent Warsaw Pactinvasion, détente with the Soviet Union, andthe Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty talks.It was Kissinger who orchestrated Nixon’svisits to Moscow and Peking in 1972. TheNixon Administration wanted to disengagefrom a war unpopular at home which was ofmarginal importance to the United Statesand distracting from issues crucial to nation-al strategy. The author, however, maintainsthat the greatly enlarged war in South EastAsia had been largely of U.S. making and,therefore, this nation had a responsibility tosee it through. He also points out that it wasthe United States that was involved in theoverthrow of legitimate governments in Laos(1960) and South Vietnam (1963); the UnitedStates was the driving force in toppling theDiem government and taking over the warjust when South Vietnam was pursuing dis-cussions with North Vietnam that could leadto a bilateral solution to the conflict. Like-wise in Laos the U.S. significantly expandedthe war. The U.S. had turned Southeast Asiainto a major battlefield and in the end wasunwilling to stand by its allies during themost intense and difficult phase.

I am not in complete agreement withthe author’s conclusions, but I am impressedwith the depth of his scholarship and intel-lect. The book does make clear that thenature and direction of the war and in manyways its outcome, from the U.S. perspective,was not necessarily shaped by millions ofAmerican military members who fought inVietnam but was the product of a smallnumber of political and diplomatic elitistswho ultimately drove the decision makingprocess.

Col. John L. Cirafici, USAF

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100 Years of Air Power and Aviation. ByRobin Higham. College Station:Texas A & MUniversity Press, 2003. Maps. Photographs.Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp.xi, 435. $50.00 ISBN: 1-584-544-241-0

Robin Higham is well known to readersof this journal as its former editor, a prolificauthor, and one of America’s foremost avia-tion historians. His scholarly reputation isbased on a large number of excellent bookshe has written and edited, but most espe-cially for his trail blazing Air Power: AConcise History (St Martin’s, 1972). At longlast he has updated and expanded this sig-nificant book.

Higham surveys the broad history ofthe field with a firm hand that delivers com-pact and effective coverage. Especially note-worthy is his broad definition of the subjectthat covers not only development of aircraftand their employment—areas that havereceived the bulk of attention by most avia-tion historians and writers; but also suchaspects as aviation industry, its infrastruc-ture, and civil aviation—which have not.This encyclopedic coverage is truly impres-sive and, considering its expansive scope,well balanced.Along the way Higham makes

frequent acute observations on all aspects ofthe topic. He certainly is not afraid to take astand or voice an opinion, often times con-trary to conventional wisdom. 100 Years ofAir Power and Aviation is handsomely pre-sented in a large (8.5 x 11 inch) formatincluding about 400 illustrations and infor-mative captions that add much to the book.Extremely useful is an excellent bibliogra-phy that lists about 800 items. For the mostpart, this book is summary and analysis,with much less narrative—a large improve-ment over the original.

Such an effort, however, is not withoutits difficulties. The most serious is the prose.Not only is it dense, as might be expected insuch an ambitious survey, but also often-times it is unclear. The topical organization,coupled with little attention to dates, doesnot help. In places the text is redundant,uneven, and choppy, if not disjointed: this isnot an easy read. Errors present another,albeit lesser, problem. I counted over adozen—most unfortunate and unnecessary.While they are generally details that shouldbe correctly regarded as minor that do notundercut the overall value of the book orundermine its conclusions, these annoyingdistractions are regrettable. It would appear

the author either was not well served by hiscopy editors and reviewers, or he did notheed their warnings. Other criticisms areperhaps as much of this genre (a broad over-arching survey) as of this particular effort.The absence of citations streamlines thebook but also limits it. Certainly several ofHigham’s bold assertions require more sup-port than given; for lacking such, these areat best arguable and sometimes question-able. A few of the photos are too small to bereally effective and all deserved to beindexed. However all these failings pale nextto the overall value of this effort.

In sum, this is an impressive andimportant book. It should be known to allstudents of military history and militaryaffairs, and certainly read by all students ofaviation history. All will profit from thisexperience. Higham has enhanced hisalready illustrious reputation, raised thestandard for this type of book, and advancedthe study of aviation history. Well done!

Kenneth P. Werrell, Christiansburg, Virginia

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Air Power History (along with its predecessor Aerospace Historian) is one ofnearly 350 publications indexed and abstracted in the bibliographic databaseLancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature. This informationis produced by Military Policy Research Ltd., of Oxford, England, and can befound at www.mpr.co.uk. It contained over 90,000 citations and abstracts as ofthe end of May 2002, and is increasing at the rate of around 10,000 per year.

The Lancaster Index database is primarily designed for information profes-sionals in the defense and security sector, and can appear somewhat dauntingto the casual visitor. A look at the User Guide, downloadable from the site, isrecommended. Free access, using the global index, scans the whole database,but returns literature citations that exclude the volume, issue, and page refer-ences. Researchers who need these references for serious research purposeswill need to take out a paid subscription. Individual rates range from $9.95 fora 24-hour pass to $99.95 for a 365-day pass.

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Smithsonian Institution Press Ad-- Full Page

Draw from last issue, Page 51

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The Royal Air Force in Texas: TrainingBritish Pilots in Terrell During WorldWar II. By Tom Killebrew. Denton: Uni-versity of North Texas Press, 2003. Photo-graphs. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp.xii, 182. $26.95 ISBN: 1-57441-169-1

Tom Killebrew served in the U.S.Marine Corps Reserve and U.S. NavyReserve. A Dallas native and licensed pri-vate pilot, he earned a master’s degree inhistory from the University of Texas atArlington, and teaches American history atNavarro College. His book explains theinception of Royal Air Force (RAF) flyingtraining in the United States, with the focuson British Flying Training School (BFTS)No. 1, at Kaufman County Airport, Terrell,Texas.

We learn of early courses taking placeat Love Field in Dallas, while the school atTerrell was under construction. The authoroutlines arrangements between the U.S.Army, the RAF, and the contractor (TerrellAviation School, Ltd.) and then details oper-ations at the school. The reader immediatelysees the changes that took place after theUnited States entered the war. Killebrew

tells us how the school started as a Lend-Lease operation and later became DefensePlant Corporation property under U.S. Armycontrol. He goes on to describe the expansionof the school and the maturation of its train-ing process. Killebrew then takes the readerthrough the end of training and shutdown ofthe school at war’s end. The epilogue offers alook at what happened to the BFTS gradu-ates during and after the war and describesthe current condition of the school premises.

When I first glanced at this book, I hadtwo concerns: First, the copious endnotesgave an appearance that this might be a dry,academic report. Second, the title suggestedthis might be a narrow look at one airfield,without a larger context. Those concernsmelted away as I read this excellent book.

While Killebrew did, indeed, use hismaster’s thesis as the basis for this book, itreads more like a novel. The author has agood sense of what makes for interestingreading. He also balances detailed depic-tions of life at the Terrell school with expla-nations of the overall British training sys-tem, the broader scope of Army Air Forcesflying training, and the international politicsof World War II in general.

I only have two minor criticisms: First,where are the maps? I think any book abouta location needs a map of the place! A layoutdiagram of the flying school and field wouldbe useful, and a vicinity map showing thevarious auxiliary fields in relation to themain field and the town would also be nice.Second, the author occasionally jumps fromone idea to another a bit abruptly. For exam-ple, on just one page we learn about schoolutility expenses, aircraft gun cameras, cadetphysical training, and school personnelassignments! Smoother transitions wouldhelp the flow, even though all of the infor-mation is interesting.

This book should please anyone inter-ested in military flight training, Lend-Leaseand the RAF, or even just WWII aviation ingeneral. Former wartime pilots—from eitherside of the pond—should especially appreci-ate this look back in time.

Scott D. Murdock, independent historicalresearcher

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Mastering the Ultimate High Ground:Next Steps in the Military Uses ofSpace. By Benjamin S. Lambeth. SantaMonica, Calif.: RAND, 2003. Notes.Appendix. Bibliography. Pp. xviii, 193.$24.00 Paperback ISBN: 0-8330-3330-1

Under the auspices of Project Air Force,RAND Corporation’s Benjamin Lambethhas produced a thought-provoking analysisof America’s military space challenges at thebeginning of the twenty-first century.Plumbing nearly six decades of Air Forceinvolvement in space, from the late 1940sthrough release of the Space Commissionreport in January 2001, he has pinpointedseveral longstanding conceptual and organi-zational impediments to more rapid growthof U.S. military space capabilities. In theprocess of helping readers better understandthe issues, he suggests some potentiallyworthwhile shifts in U.S. military space pol-icy, but avoids prescriptive solutions.

Lambeth’s fundamental premise isthat the Space Commission’s recommenda-tions reflect a clear historical understand-ing of factors that have hindered Air Forcespace activities and that implementation ofthose recommendations affords the servicean unprecedented opportunity to excel inspace-related endeavors. After explainingbriefly the context in which Congress char-tered the Space Commission, Mastering theUltimate High Ground chronicles how acombination of national policy, whichemphasized the peaceful use of space, andinterservice rivalries frustrated Air Forceambitions for decades. Next, it describeshow Air Force senior leaders’ recurrent fix-ation since 1958 on the “aerospace” con-struct has inhibited the full development ofa theory of space power as distinct from airpower. In his estimation, the flawed conceptof “air and space integration” led to an over-ly restrictive paradigm that prevented theevolutionary changes in doctrine andresource allocation needed to integratemore thoroughly the space capabilities ofthe Air Force with all the services’ air, land,and sea force employment and operationalsupport functions.

The 2001 Space Commission report,Lambeth observes, focused more on howthe defense establishment should be orga-nized for space than on where the nationshould be headed in terms of militaryexploitation of space and what should bedone to get there. While acceptance of thecommissioners’ recommendations correctedmany troublesome bureaucratic deficien-cies, the controversial question of whetherspace should be treated as just anotheroperating medium or considered differentand, therefore, remain weaponless wentunanswered. The author’s cogent examina-tion of the relationship between the con-cepts of space control and space force appli-cation leads him to conclude that“weaponization” of space is not inevitable.Considering America’s traditional commit-

ment to the peaceful use of space, it seemsappropriate in the near term to ensurethat an emphasis on space control remaindecoupled from the thorny issues sur-rounding space force application.

Contending that the Air Force’s con-ceptual focus in the past has been on sim-ply integrating space and air functions,Lambeth suggests it is time for a morecomprehensive perspective. An appropri-ate focus today should emphasize opera-tional integration and organizational dif-ferentiation. Such a bifurcated approachwould harness space for all components inthe joint arena and, simultaneously, ensureproper treatment of space program andinfrastructure management, funding,cadre building, and career development.

The notes and bibliography for Mas-tering the Ultimate High Ground revealgood use of sources—books, articles, mono-graphs, reports, documents, congressionaltestimony, oral histories, and unpublishedpresentations. While Lambeth’s interpre-tations of those materials are generallysound, readers should be advised that note23 on page 21 contains a mistaken causalconnection. Apparently misunderstandingDavid Spires’ narrative in Beyond Hori-zons: A Half-Century of Air Force SpaceLeadership (1997), Lambeth incorrectlyexplains Aerospace Corporation’s estab-lishment as resulting from the Air Force’sloss of the Corona and Samos satellite pro-grams. This annotative error should be for-given, however, by anyone seriously inter-ested in becoming better informed aboutthe historical circumstances behind the AirForce’s current space responsibilities.

Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, Deputy CommandHistorian, HQ Air Force Space Command,Peterson AFB, Colorado

Choosing War: The Lost Chance forPeace and the Escalation of War inVietnam. By Fredrik Logevall, Berkeley:University of California Press, 1999. Notes.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxviii+529. $19.95(paper) ISBN: 0-520-22919-3. $50.00 (cloth)ISBN: 0-520-21511-7

This award-winning book, which beganas a doctoral dissertation at Yale University,is a magisterial effort to explain the U.S.decision to escalate the Vietnam War duringthe period August 1963 to February 1965.Logevall argues that, to be properlyexplained, the decision must be compre-hended within a context larger than onefocused exclusively on U.S. decisionmaking.Hence, he dutifully combed the archives ofkey allies of the United States and that ofits opponents, and carefully took into con-sideration congressional politics, the 1964presidential elections, public opinion, and

the role of the media in his evaluation of theoptions faced by U.S. decisionmakers.

Thorough, rich in details, and wellresearched and articulated, Logevall’sanalysis of all the facts in this wider frame-work leads him to conclude that—contraryto the Administration’s arguments—American credibility, prestige, or reputationwere not really at stake in Vietnam; thatefforts to prevent escalation of the Ame-ricanization of the conflict through diplo-matic efforts were willfully thwarted by theAdministration; and that the notion of cred-ibility had as much to do with domestic pol-itics as anything else (i.e., “the DemocraticParty’s credibility, and the personal credibil-ity of leading officials, rather than the cred-ibility of the United States”).

Logevall clearly demonstrates thatthere were in fact several options, in addi-tion to escalation, available for considera-tion by U.S. decisionmakers during the peri-od under review. Rigidity, however “charac-terized American decision making on thewar, especially with respect to diplomacy.”Opponents of escalation, he adds, were notcommitted enough to stop the UnitedStates. Escalation, therefore, was not in-evitable, but the result of decisions made byindividuals who knew (from personal obser-vations or pessimistic intelligence report-ing) the odds were against victory. “Neitherdomestic nor international considerationscompelled them to escalate the war.”President Johnson was a key actor through-out. Logevall convincingly shows he wasdeceitful and more concerned with his per-sonal historical reputation and domesticpolitical objectives. Johnson and his keyadvisers, in other words, chose escalation inVietnam primarily “because of the threat ofembarrassment—to the United States andthe Democratic Party and, most of all, tothemselves personally. They were willing tosacrifice virtually everything to avoid thestigma of failure.”

While Logevall places more explanato-ry power on the short-term and personalfactors, he remains cognizant that “long-term, subterranean currents in Americanideology and culture” also played but a less-er role. It is probably on such an explanato-ry focus that other historians and expertson the Vietnam conflict will find flaws inLogevall’s analysis and his conclusions. Forone, I believe his work is rigorous, convinc-ing, and will stand scrutiny until newarchival material is unearthed to refutesome of the key archival facts he relied on indrawing his judgments. Wherever onestands on the issue of escalation and its rea-son, this book is a must read.

Mr. Stéphane Lefebvre, former civilianstrategic analyst and army intelligence offi-cer, Department of National Defence,Canada

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Stand Well Clear. By D. K. Tooker.Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003.Photographs. Pp. 208. $26.95 ISBN: 1-59114-871-5

What does “a week with no Tuesday,” a1939 Poterfield, and people who look likepheasants have in common? Well, readColonel Tooker’s book and you will find out.In Stand Well Clear, Tooker tells nineteenstories of events that happened to him andhis friends during his aviation career. D.K.,as his friends call him, learned to fly in 1943,with the Naval Aviation Program and wenton to fly Vought F4U Corsairs in the MarineCorps. During his twenty-five years of activeduty, he flew 133 combat missions spanningthree wars. During peacetime, he loggedover 7,000 hours, while flying 36 differenttypes of fixed-wing aircraft and 19 models ofhelicopters. He earned two DistinguishedFlying Crosses, ten Air Medals, two NavyCommendation medals, and the PresidentialUnit Citation. Tooker is the author of oneother book and has written many articlesabout his flying experiences for various mag-azines, including Reader’s Digest.

The aviation stories presented in StandWell Clear represent a spectrum; some areserious and others are humorous. On theserious side, Tooker shares what it was liketo fly propeller-driven F4U-5s during theKorean War. He describes being attacked bya Soviet-built Yak-9 fighter aircraft in 1951,and tells a gripping story of his participationin the largest air raid of the Korean Warover Sinuiju. He also speaks of scarymoments some years later involving in-flight emergencies he and another pilot hadwhile flying the Chance Vought F-8Crusader. On the fun side, Tooker shares hisexperiences with “The Blue Blooper,” a car—with no brakes—that was a rolling party onwheels; and his assignment with VMF-323,the squadron without a motto, and the trialsand tribulations he and his squadron mateswent through to find one. The final chaptertells the story of his experiences commutingin a Cessna 150 every day to work andback—a practice that he sometimes foundmore dangerous than flying combat mis-sions.

Stand Well Clear provides its readerswith a glimpse into the world of militaryflying from the perspective of a combat-hardened Marine flyer who never lost hissense of humor. This often light-heartedbook uses easy-to-understand language;there is very little technical jargon, andmost of the aviation terms are well defined.Even readers with no aviation backgroundwill relate to and enjoy the antics of ColonelTooker. His book is an easy read and a funexperience.

William A. Nardo, NASM Docent

Heroic Flights: The First 100 Years ofAviation. By John Frayn Turner. SouthYorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Books, 2003.Illustrations. Photographs. Index. Pp. vii,279. £19.95 ISBN 0-85052-970-0

This book’s title would lead a reader tobelieve that the contents are devoted toheroic flights by aviation pioneers, both pastand present. For the most part, this is notquite what the author provides. Some sam-ples of what various chapters cover are:

Development of the Hawker Hurricaneand the Supermarine Spitfire. While thesewere important aircraft, the story of theirdevelopment is not one of heroic flights, andit takes up two chapters.

Birth of the Concorde—again, not anheroic flight at all.

A number of air races, Atlantic cross-ings, and a few early jet speed records andflights—all covered in a chapter called “TheJet Age.”

Turner’s flight during the VC-10 flighttest program (takes up eight pages). Mostaviators would not describe a flight well intothe development test program of an airlineras heroic.

Coverage of Turner’s flights in the backseat of an RAF Lightning and a Red Arrowsacrobatic team Gnat trainer. This chapter isparticularly galling since it isn’t even inter-esting and is nothing more that personalpuffery.

A narrative of Ens. George Bush beingshot down in a U.S. Navy TBM Avenger inthe Pacific. No one disputes that being shotdown is a terrifying experience, but manyaviators have been shot down. Selecting themission of a future President of the UnitedStates strikes me as pandering.

Exploits of World War I heroes in theair. The difficulty is that all of these heroesare British. One would not guess thatGerman, American, or French aviators hadflown any heroic flights. Further, these arenot flight descriptions, but rather the select-ed pilots’ total war experiences.

On the plus side, Turner is a giftedwriter; the narrative is well done, easy toread, and interesting. Occasionally, he does asuperb job of describing truly heroic flights.His account of Alcock and Brown on the firstnonstop Atlantic crossing is gripping. Hecaptures the heroism, danger, and enormousdifficulties the two had to overcome in orderto succeed as they did, even if the outcomewas a crash landing in an Irish peat bog thatthe crew barely survived. Similarly, he doesa wonderful job of describing how unbeliev-ably dangerous Bleriot’s crossing of theEnglish Channel was. Few people probablyrealize that Bleriot knew that his enginewould probably not hold up for the wholeflight and that a water landing would be adisaster. But he attempted it anyway andbarely made it only through unbelievableskill. It’s interesting to note that Bleriot’s

grandson attempted to duplicate his grand-father’s feat in a modern replica of Bleriot’saircraft and didn’t even clear the Frenchshoreline.

These early aviators were incrediblyskillful and courageous. When Turnerdevotes himself to their exploits, he does agreat job.

Col. John Braddon, USMC (Ret.), Docent,NASM Udvar-Hazy Facility, Dulles Airport,Virginia

Vulcan the Fire God—The Inside Storyof the Avro Vulcan. Power Point Com-munications, Ltd., 2002. [CD-Rom] Availablefrom www.govulcan.com. £25.49 (approx.$45).

The Avro Vulcan bomber, with its enor-mous delta wing and small canopy withround windows, is instantly recognizableand somehow unmistakably “British.”Whether decked out in tiger stripe camou-flage or resplendent in “anti-nuclear flashwhite,” this was an awesome aircraft. If themere sight of a Vulcan quickens your pulse,you will definitely enjoy this interactive CD.It is packed with a vast amount of writtenmaterial, including the development of theaircraft, original plans and diagrams, servicehistories (including the Falklands conflict),and full technical details of the plane’s sys-tems and a detailed history of nuclearweapons development.

The CD’s images are what really makeit attractive, however. The CD has morethan thirty minutes of video, including anextended depiction of a Vulcan makingrepeated low-level passes in which the planedemonstrates seemingly impossible fighter-style tight turns and climbs. Equally inter-esting are the virtual reality panoramasinside the aircraft. There are also plenty ofstill pictures, including one side-by-side witha B-52 that graphically demonstrates justhow enormous the Vulcan was.

I had a little trouble running the CD ona computer equipped with Windows ME; itran flawlessly with Windows XP but is notcompatible with any Macintosh.

Larry Richmond is an attorney for the feder-al government and a NASM docent

Imagining Flight: Aviation and thePopular Culture. By Bowdoin Van Riper.College Station: Texas A&M UniversityPress, 2004. Illustrations. Photographs.Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 206.$33.00 ISBN: 1-58544-300-5

Bowdoin Van Riper is a professor of his-tory at the Southern Polytechnic State◆◆◆◆◆◆

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University in Marietta, Georgia, whose spe-cialty is the history of science and technolo-gy. He has written two other books in addi-tion to many articles on geology, archaeology,and aerospace technology. Van Riper wasfive years old when he took his first airplaneride and “has been looking up ever since.”

This book addresses the relationshipbetween the American public and the tech-nological marvel called the airplane. In thissocial history, Van Riper lists three reasonswhy airplanes (or aviation technology) fasci-nate the public: (1) Technology makes ushuman (since no other animal on earth hasit). (2) Aircraft technology confers a sense ofextraordinary power to the people who fly.Man has wanted to fly since the dawn oftime and now he can. (3) The idea of flight(“slipping the surly bonds of earth”) has hadtremendous appeal for people for thousandsof years. If this were not true, why do somany pilots continue to fly after bad experi-ences or non-fatal crashes?

Van Riper examines pre-WWI predic-tions on the airplane’s impact on the future.He surveys the literature discussing why, forexample, aviators spoke about aviation’simpact in rather modest terms, whereasnon-aviators predicted profound worldchange. He next discusses why pilotsbecame national heroes, looking atLindbergh’s and Earhart’s rise to fame inthe aviation world and why they were inter-national heroes. He also addresses groups ofheroes such as the pilots of the Battle ofBritain and the Tuskegee Airmen. But hereVan Riper also hypothesizes why somepilots, although well known and accom-plished, were never raised to hero status,even in the eyes of their own countrymen.

In his chapter entitled “Death fromAbove,” Van Riper discusses the concept ofthe aerial bomber as the ultimate weapon of

destruction and its effect on the general pop-ulation. Here he compares the predictions ofthe bomber during WWI and the reality ofthe bomber of WWII and into modern times.The book then takes a more pleasant turn asVan Riper discusses how the airplane andrelated technology ushered in the air trans-portation industry, giving America’s middleclass access to modern airliners at affordableprices after WWII.

Van Riper also investigates the effectsof aviation crashes and other unfortunateevents on air travel and the public at largeand concludes by looking at the aerospaceindustry and what to expect in the future.

This social history of aviation and thepopular culture is concise and to-the-point.It is a well written book geared for the gen-

eral reader and absents itself from long dis-courses of esoteric, intellectual issues thatwould interest only a philosopher. It con-tains very little technical jargon, as its mainfocus is how people react to the phenomenoncalled the airplane. Lastly, it is very welldocumented; I was impressed with VanRiper’s notes and his bibliographic essay.Well worth the read.

William A. Nardo, NASM Docent

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New from

Available atWWW.GPO.GOV

Henry, Don. Thunderchief: The Right Stuff andhow pilots get it [A novel]. Gretna, La.: PelicanPublishing Co., 2004. Pp. 295. $22.00 ISBN: 1-58980-237-3

Home Field Advantage: A Century of Partnershipbetween Wright-Patterson Air Force Base andDayton, Ohio, in Pursuit of AeronauticalExcellence. Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Aero-nautical Systems Center History Office, 2004.Illustrations. Photographs. Pp. xvii, 400. $67.00.www.ascho.wpafb.af.mil. ISBN: 0-16-068065-4

Kerns, Leo Howard, compiler. King’s Cliffe. [AHistory of the 20th Fighter Group in World War II.Revised, Memorial Edition, 2004.] Maps. Tables.Diagrams. Illustrations. Photographs. Pp. 290.

Kranish, Michael, Brian C. Mooney and Nina J.Easton. John F. Kerry: The Complete Biographyby the Boston Globe Reporters Who Know HimBest. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. Appendices.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxvii, 448. $14.95Paperback ISBN: 1-58648-273-4

Leahy, J. F. Ask the Chief: Backbone of the Navy.Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004.Photographs. Notes. Glossary. Index. Pp. xiv,230. $27.95 ISBN: 1-59114-460-4

Mallik, Donald L. with Peter W. Merlin. TheSmell of Kerosene: A Test Pilot’s Odyssey.Washington, D.C.: NASA History Office, 2004.[NASA SP 4108] Pp. xi, 252. Photographs.Glossary. Appendices. Index.

Marion, Forrest L. Search and Rescue in Korea.Washington, D.C.: Air Force History andMuseums Program, 2004. Pp. 55. [Pamphlet]

Miller, Roger G. Billy Mitchell: The Stormy Petrelof the Air. Washington, D.C.: Air Force Historyand Museums Program, 2004. Pp. 58. [Pamphlet]

Boyne, Walter J. The Influence of Air Power uponHistory. Gretna, La.: Pelican Publishing Co.,2003. Notes. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Pp.447. $29.95 ISBN: 1-58980-034-6

Brown, Nickole and Judith Taylor, eds. Air Fare:Stories, Poems & Essays on flight. Louisville, Ky.:Sarabande Books, 2004. Pp. xv, 237. $16.95Paperback ISBN: 1-889330-99-X

Cunningham, Meghan, Ed. Logbook of SignalCorps No. 1: The U.S. Army’s First Airplane.Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Muse-ums Program, 2004. pp. 52 [Pamphlet]

Dawson, Virginia P. and Mark D. Bowles. TamingLiquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper StageRocket, 1958-2002. Washington, D.C.: NASAHistory Office, 2004. [NASA SP-2004 4230]Tables. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp. xiii, 289.

Freeman, Roger A. The Ploesti Raid: Through theLens. London: Battle of Britain International,2004. Maps. Illustrations. Photographs. Index.Pp. 160. ISBN: 1-870067-55-X

Gross, Chuck. Rattler One-Seven: A VietnamHelicopter Pilot’s War Story. Denton: Universityof North Texas Press, 2004. Maps. Illustrations.Photographs. Notes. Glossary. Bibliography.Index. Pp. xiii, 229. $27.95 ISBN: 1-57441-178-0

Gunston, Bill, editor. The Cambridge AerospaceDictionary. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2004. Appendices. Pp. vii, 741. $75.00ISBN: 0-521-84140-2

Hays, Jr. Otis. Alaska’s Hidden Wars: SecretCampaigns of the Northern Pacific Rim.Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2004.Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. Appendices.Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvii, 182.$19.95 Paperback ISBN: 1-889963-64-X

PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listedabove is invited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.)3704 Brices Ford Ct.Fairfax, VA 22033Tel. (703) 620-4139e-mail: scottwille@aol.com

* Already under review.

Books Received

Putney, Diane T. Airpower Advantage: Planningthe Gulf War Air Campaign, 1989-1991.Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and MuseumsProgram, 2004. Maps. Tables. Diagrams. Illus-trations. Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Glossary.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 481. Paperback

Shawcross, William. Allies: The U.S., Britain,Europe, and the War in Iraq. New York: PublicAffairs, 2004. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 261. $20.00ISBN: 1-58648-216-5

Skurla, George M. and William H. Gregory. Insidethe Iron Works: How Grumman’s Glory DaysFaded. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,2004. Photographs. Index. Pp. xiv, 225. $32.95ISBN: 1-55750-329-X

Strasser, Steven. The 9/11 Investigations. NewYork: Public Affairs, 2004. Appendix. Glossary.Index. Pp. xxxvi, 580. $14.95 Paperback ISBN: 1-58648-279-3

* Waller, Douglas. A Question of Loyalty: Gen.Billy Mitchell and the Court-Martial thatGripped the Nation. New York: Harper Collins,2004. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 428. $26.95ISBN: 0-06-0500547-8

* See page 44

Available at

WWW.GPO.GOV

New from

September 9-12The Tailhook Association will hold its 47th AnnualSymposium at the Nugget Hotel and Casino in Reno,Nevada. Contact:

The Tailhook Association9696 Businesspark Ave.San Diego, CA 92131(858) 689-9223 / (800) 322-4665e-mail: thookassn@aol.comwebsite: http://www.tailhook.org

September 11-15The Air Force Association will hold its annualNational Convention and Aerospace TechnologyExposition in Washington, DC. Contact:

AFA1501 Lee HighwayArlington, VA 22209-1198(703) 247-5800website: http://www.afa.org

September 15-18The Society of Experimental Test Pilots will host its48th Annual Symposium and Banquet at the WestinBonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, California. Contact:

SETPP. O. Box 986Lancaster, CA 93584-0986(661) 942-9574, Fax 940-0398e-mail: setp@setp.orgwebsite: http://www.setp.org

September 24-25The Belgian Luxembourg American Studies Asso-ciation and the Centre for Historical Research andDocumentation on War and ContemporarySociety will co-host a Conference on the 60th Anniver-sary of the Battle of the Bulge in Luxembourg City,Luxembourg. Contact:

William L. Chew III, Ph.D.Professor of HistoryVesalius College, Vrije Universiteit BrusselPleinlaan 2B – 1050 Brussels, Belgiume-mail: wchew@vub.ac.be

September 28-30The American Institute of Aeronautics andAstronautics will host its Space 2004 Conference &Exhibition in San Diego, Calif. Contact:

AIAA1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Ste. 500Reston, VA 20191-4344(703) 264-7551website: http://www.aiaa.org

October 4-8The American Institute of Aeronautics andAstronautics will host the 55th Congress of the

International Astronautical Federation, the Inter-national Academy of Astronautics, and the InternationalInstitute of Space Law in Vancouver, British Columbia.Contact:

AIAA1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Ste. 500Reston, VA 20191-4344(703) 264-7551website: http://www.aiaa.org

October 7-10The Dutch Foundation for the History of Technology willhost the annual meeting of the Society for the Historyof Technology at the Renaissance Amsterdam Hotel inAmsterdam, the Netherlands. Contact:

SHOTDepartment of History603 Ross HallIowa State UniversityAmes, IA 50011 (515) 294-8469, Fax x6390 – include “SHOT” on covere-mail: shot@iastate.edu website: http://shot.press.jhu.edu/

October 8-9The McCormack Tribune Foundation and VMI’sMarshall Library will co-sponsor their third Confe-rence on the Cold War, focusing upon the years 1963-1975. Contact:

Malcolm Muir, Jr.Dept. of HistoryVirginia Military InstituteLexington VA 24450(540) 464-7447/7338e-mail: murim@vmi.edu

October 17-20The Association of Old Crows will host its 41st annualinternational symposium and convention in San Diego,California. Contact:

AOC Headquarters1000 North Payne Street, Suite 300Alexandria, VA. 22314-1652(703) 549-1600, Fax x2589e-mail: wood@crows.orgwebsite: http://www.aoc.org

October 18-20The 3rd Global Conference on War and Virtual Warwill be held in Salzburg, Austria. This inter-disciplinaryand multi-disciplinary conference seeks to provide achallenging forum for the examination and evaluation ofthe nature, purpose and experience of war, and itsimpacts on all aspects of communities across the world.Contact:

Dr Rob Fisher Inter-Disciplinary.Net Priory House FreelandOxfordshire, England OX29 8HR01993 882087, Fax 0870 4601132e-mail: rf@inter-disciplinary.netwebsite: http://www.interdisciplinary.net/ptb/wvw/

wvw3/wvw04cfp.htm

October 25-27The Association of the U.S. Army will hold its annualconvention and symposium at the New WashingtonConvention Center in Washington, D.C. Contact:

Association of the United States Army2425 Wilson Blvd.Arlington, VA 22201(800) 336-4570e-mail: ausa-info@ausa.orgwebsite: http://www.ausa.org/

Compiled by George Cully

October 26-27The U.S. Naval Institute will host its 9th AnnualNaval Warfare Symposium and Exhibition in VirginiaBeach, Virginia. Contact:

U.S. Naval InstituteBeach Hall291 Woods RoadAnnapolis, MD 21402(410) 295-1067, Fax x1048e-mail: frainbow@usni.orgwebsite: http://www.usni.org/

October 27-30The 2004 meeting of the Northern Great PlainsHistory Conference will be held in Bismarck, NorthDakota. Contact:

Joe FitzharrisDept. of History – Mail #4018University of St. Thomas2115 Summit Ave.St. Paul MN 55105e-mail: jcfitzharris@stthomas.edu

October 29-30The 28th annual Great Lakes History Conference,sponsored by Grand Valley State University, will be heldin Grand Rapids, Michigan. This year’s theme is“Challenging Historical Borders: Exploring Intersectionsbetween Nations, Regions, and Disciplines.” Contact:

Dr. Paul Murphy or Dr. David StarkDepartment of History Grand Valley State University Allendale, MI 49401(616) 331-3298, Fax x3285e-mail: murphyp@gvsu.edu or starkd@gvsu.eduwebsite: http://www.gvsu.edu/history/glhc.html

October 29-30The Rensselaer County Historical Society’s Fall 2004symposium is entitled “Upstate New York Goes toWar: War and the Home Front, 1775-2004.” The sym-posium will be held in Troy, New York. Contact:

Stacy Pomeroy DraperCurator, Rensselaer County Historical Society 57 Second Street Troy NY 12180(518) 272-7232 x14e-mail: spdraper@rchsonline.orgwebsite: http://www.rchsonline.org

November 11-14The Film & History League, with the Literature/FilmAssociation, will be holding its conference on “War inFilm, Television, and History” near Dallas, Texas.Topics include ABC-TV shows of the 1960s, including“Twelve O’Clock High,” “Rat Patrol,” and “Combat;” thewar movies of Stanley Kubrick; and “Hollywood on theHomefront.” Contact:

Dr. Sara Jane Richter Dean, School of Liberal Arts Oklahoma Panhandle State University Box 430 Goodwell, OK 73939 e-mail: saraj@opsu.eduwebsite: http://www.filmandhistory.org

November 16-17The American Astronautical Society will hold itsNational Conference and 51st annual meeting at thePasadena Hilton in Pasadena, California. Contact:

American Astronautical Society6352 Rolling Mill Place, Suite #102Springfield, VA 22152-2354(703) 866-0020, Fax -3526

e-mail: info@astronautical.orgwebsite: http://www.astronautical.org

2005February 24-27

The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, willhost the 72d annual meeting of the Society forMilitary History. The conference will take place inhistoric Charleston, South Carolina, and the theme willbe “the Rise of the Military Profession.” Contact:

Professor Kyle S. Sinisi Department of History The Citadel 171 Moultrie Street Charleston, SC 29409 Tel.: (843) 953-5073, fax x7020e-mail: sinisik@citadel.eduwebsite: http://www.smh-hq.org/

April 14-15To commemorate the 30th anniversary of the end of theVietnam War, the University of Newcastle’s ResearchGroup for War, Society, and Culture will host a confer-ence entitled The Vietnam War, Thirty Years On:Memories, Legacies, and Echoes.. The conferencewill be held at the University of Newcastle inCallaghan, NWS, Australia. Contact:

Dr. Chris Dixon History Discipline School of Liberal Arts The University of Newcastle Callaghan NSW 2308 Australia e-mail: chris.dixon@newcastle.edu.au

May 19-21The Business History Conference will host itsannual meeting in Minneapolis (USA), home to the flag-ship campus of the University of Minnesota. The themefor the conference is “Reinvention and Renewal.”Contact:

Roger HorowitzSecretary-Treasurer BHC PO Box 3630 Wilmington DE 19807(302) 658-2400, Fax 655-3188e-mail: rh@udel.eduwebsite: http://www.h-net.org/~business/bhcweb/

September 8-9The Centre for Second World War Studies will hosta conference entitled “Defeat and Memory.” The aim ofthis conference is to examine the manner in whichdefeat in its military form has been understood andremembered by individuals and societies in the era ofmodern warfare. The Conference will be held at theUniversity of Edinburgh, in Edinburgh, Scotland.Contact:

Dr. Jenny Macleod Centre for Second World War Studies University of Edinburgh 24 Buccleuch Place Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9LN e-mail: jenny.macleod@ed.ac.uk

If you wish to have your event listed, contact:

George W. Cully10505 Mercado WayMontgomery Village, MD 20886-3910e-mail: warty@comcast.net

DSCS is no GPS

I couldn’t let the misidentificationof the satellite on page 44 [Summer2004, Vol. 51, No. 2, “Open Skies Policyand the Origin of the U.S. SpaceProgram”] go by without comment. It’sa fine artist’s rendition of a DSCS IIIsatellite, not of a GPS or any navigationsatellite! I used to brief GPS and DSCSas part of Lt. Gen. Dick Henry’sCommand Mission Briefing, and I cantell a DSCS III with one arm tiedbehind my back. The accompanyingarticle is generally pretty good, withonly a couple of minor errors. Forinstance, the SAMOS camera was usedin Lunar Orbiter. I’m not sure whatwas used in Ranger, but Lunar Orbiterwas definitely the SAMOS optical sys-tem. The Jupiter-C did not use strap-onrockets; it had a set of rockets in theupper stage, but nothing that amountedto thrust augmentation in the firststage. The author was confused withthe TAT (Thrust Augmented Thor),used in the CORONA program. Still,the author provided some genuinelygood new bits of insight.

Dr. L. Parker Temple III

Newer Scholarship Overlooked

Lester F. Rentmeester’s article inthe Summer 2004 issue of Air PowerHistory, “Open Skies Policy and theOrigin of the U.S. Space Program,” con-tains several errors and presents a mis-leading account of early American spacehistory, and the resulting policy thatdeveloped from the reconnaissance pro-gram.

For example, on page 42 the authorwrote, “Because of the constraints, weselected a television camera that wouldtransmit its signal to three ground sta-tions in the United States. This systemled to the first project name Feedback.Because of the low resolution of theimages, the system was later discardedfor this program although it was used adecade later in NASA’s Ranger pro-gram. The Feedback name for the pro-

ject was changed often; Sentry, Samos,and Pied Piper; Keyhole was the namefor various photographic subsystems,KH-1, KH-2, etc.”

Although RAND had considered atelevision camera in various studiesthrough the 1954 Feed Back report, itwas ultimately rejected by the Air Forcein 1956 and did not fly on any reconnais-sance satellite. The Weapons System117L program office evaluated three con-tractor proposals under the “Pied Piper”competition in early 1956. Both RCA andMartin proposed television-based sys-tems. Lockheed proposed a satellite thatwould take pictures on film, scan thefilm, and then transmit the images tothe ground. Lockheed won the contractfor several reasons, but one of them wasthat the Air Force officers evaluating theproposals felt that the film system wasthe likeliest to succeed. Starting in late1960, three satellites using this film-scanning technique were launched butonly one reached orbit. But by the timethat the satellites were launched, the AirForce had already been ordered to aban-don the technology. The film-scanningtechnology was later revived for NASA’sLunar Orbiter program, not Ranger.

Feed Back was not the first projectname. It was the name of a report pro-duced by the RAND Corporation in1954 that started the satellite pro-gram. Pied Piper was the name of thecompetition to select a contractor. Theprogram was officially called WeaponsSystem 117L, the Advanced Reconnais-sance System, or ARS, and it was un-derfunded until after Sputnik. Startingin early 1958, WS-117L was dividedinto three components, one of whichwas Sentry. The name Sentry was dis-continued by late 1958 in favor ofSamos, which ultimately included overa half dozen different camera and elec-tronic intelligence payloads. TheKeyhole designation was not adopteduntil the early 1960s and did not applyto the Samos satellites. Instead,Keyhole referred to the product fromsatellite reconnaissance. Designationssuch as KH-1, KH-2, KH-3, KH-4, KH-4A and KH-4B were applied to the var-ious CORONA models. CORONA was adistinctly different system thatreturned its film in capsules to theearth, and was not related to the film-scanning system originally chosen in1956.

On page 44, the author wrote of thedifficulty in selecting a booster forputting the first U.S. satellite in orbitand that this delayed the developmentof the reconnaissance satellite for fouryears. Actually, the civilian scientificsatellite was entirely separate from thereconnaissance satellite and utilizedthe Vanguard rocket. The reconnais-sance satellite was always intended touse a modified Atlas ICBM. WhenCORONA was started, the Air Forceutilized the Thor ballistic missile.Delays in the satellite program wereprimarily due to skepticism by AirForce Undersecretary Donald Quarlesthat the technology was sufficientlymature to make the system work.

While the author cited CargillHall’s article in Prologue, he missedother relevant sources on this subject,including Air Force Capt. James Cool-baugh’s personal memoir on the FeedBack report, which appeared in theJournal of the British InterplanetarySociety. He also missed the book I edit-ed on the CORONA reconnaissancesatellite program, Eye in the Sky, andseveral chapters in the book Recon-sidering Sputnik on the establishmentof freedom of space. The “freedom ofspace” policy actually stemmed from arecommendation made by CIA officialRichard Bissell in fall 1954 that foundits way into an early 1955 report toPresident Eisenhower.

Dr. Dwayne A. Day, Vienna, Virginia

World War II Fighter Pilots toShare Experiences on Veterans’Day, November 13, 2004

Travel back in time on November13, 2004 and relive the life and deathdrama of World War II aerial combat inEurope. The Dixie Wing, Commemo-rative Air Force will host “A Flight withEagles: 365th Fighter Group HellHawks Symposium” at their hangar,the Historical Airpower Facility, atFalcon Field in Peachtree City, Georgia.The Hell Hawks flew the famous

Letters

Notices

Major General John W. Huston,USAF (Ret.) Wins Air ForceHistorical Foundation’s BestMilitary History Award for 2004.

The AFHF Book Award Committee,composed of Alfred F. Hurley, Donald R.Baucom, Robert E. Vickers, and John F.Kreis, chairman, unanimously selectedGeneral Huston’s American AirpowerComes of Age: General Henry H. “Hap”Arnold’s World War II Diaries, pub-lished by Air University Press.

David Schoem

David Schoem, formerly with theOffice of Air Force History, died on March27, 2004. He was eighty-five. Born inPassaic, New Jersey, Mr. Schoem came toWashington in 1941. During World WarII, he served in France as a U.S. Armycourt reporter.After the war, he returnedto Washington, where he worked as chiefof reference and office manager in theOffice of Air Force History. After retiringin 1979, Schoem volunteered for manycharities and causes including theJewish War Veterans, B¹nai B¹rith,United Jewish Appeal, and the HebrewHome. He read weekly at elementaryschools in Silver Spring, Maryland,where he was known as “GrandpaDavid” to hundreds of children. Mr.Schoem received many awards for hisoutstanding, public service. Survivorsinclude his wife of sixty-one years,Lillian; his sons, Alan, Ira, and Marc; sixgrandchildren; and three sisters.

Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and wereassigned to the Ninth Air Force of theUnited States Army Air Forces fromDecember 1943 until the end of WorldWar II. The Hell Hawks provided closeair support to United States and alliedforces in France, Belgium, and Ger-many and were awarded DistinguishedUnit Citations in October 1944 andApril 1945.

“A Flight with Eagles” will be heldthe week of Veterans Day and will fea-ture a panel discussion of Hell Hawksveterans, moderated by John “Skipper”Hyle, former captain, USAF and F-16Viper pilot. A rare P-47 Thunderboltand other operational World War II air-craft, including a North American P-51Mustang and Douglas SBD Dauntlessdive bomber, military vehicles, andmemorabilia will be on display.

Proceeds from the event will bene-fit “Education through Living History,”a World War II program presented byDixie Wing volunteers at their facility.The education program is available toarea schools and youth groups free ofcharge. More information can be foundon www.dixiewing.org. For tickets call(678)-364-1110.

The Commemorative Air Force is a501(c)3 that has 10,000 members in 27states and four countries. The missionof the CAF is to 1) to restore, maintain,and fly World War II aircraft; 2) tomaintain museum facilities for aircraftas a tribute to the thousands of menand women who built, serviced, andflew the planes; and 3) to perpetuate inthe memory and hearts of allAmericans, the spirit in which thesegreat planes were flown in the defenseof this nation. www.commemorativeair-force.org

Herman S. Wolk Wins 2004 GillRobb Wilson Award

The Air Force Association (AFA)named Herman S. Wolk, senior histori-an with the Office of Air Force History,as its 2004 recipient of the Gill RobbWilson Award. The award–named for

the former editor of Flying Magazine,and former president and chairman ofthe board of the AFA—is the associa-tion’s highest award presented annual-ly in the field of Arts and Letters. Mr.Wolk was honored for his latest book,Fulcrum of Power: Essays on the UnitedStates Air Force and National Security.John J. Politi, AFA’s current chairmanwrote, “This is a unique and first-handinsight into important events and peri-ods in the nation’s military history andthe evolution of the Air Force and itsimpact on military affairs.” Mr. Wolkwill receive the award on September 13,2004, at the AFA’s Air & SpaceConference and Technology Exposition,at the Marriott-Wardman Park Hotel inWashington, D.C.

Mr. Wolk is a frequent contributorand reviewer for Air Power History. Hislatest article, an interview with RobertS. McNamara on the former defensesecretary’s World War II service,appeared in the Winter 2003 issue. [Vol.50, No. 4, “Whiz Kid,” pp. 4-15]

Bartsch’s Book Wins Best HistoryAward

Tom Wisker executive producer ofNew York’s WBAI-FM announced thatWilliam H. Bartsch’s book, MacArthur’sPearl Harbor (Texas A&M Press. 2003)was selected unanimously as the bestmilitary history of the year. Bill Bartschhas written an article and reviewedmanuscripts for Air Power History.

The Sampson AFB Veterans Asso-ciation seeks to contact all 3650thBasic Military Training Wing members,especially permanent party, Women’sAir Force, Basic Trainees, and SpecialTraining school personnel, from 1950 to1956. Contact:

Chip PhillipsP,O. Box 31Williamsville, NY 14231-0331e-mail: chip34@aol.com

The 567th Strategic Missile Squa-dron (Atlas) will hold its reunion atBranson, Missouri, September 22-26,2004. Contact:

Jim Henderson6628 Dare Cir.Columbia, SC(803) 782-2977e-mail: chieftarheel@webtv.net

The 610th Air Control and WarningSquadron (618th, 527th, and allSouthern Japan Radar GCI sites).Proposed reunion at Branson, Missouri,in September 2004. Contact:

Marvin Jordahl(904) 739-9337e-mail: jordahlmarvin@attbi.com

The 309th Strategic Missile Wing(Titan II) will hold its reunion atTucson, Arizona, September 29-October3, 2004. Contact:

The Lasherse-mail: jelainelasher@aol.com

The 27th Air Transport Group(310th, 311th, 312th, 325th FerryingSqdns; 86th, 87th, 320th, 321st Trans-port Sqdns.; 519th, 520th ServiceSqdns.).will hold its reunion September30-October 3, 2004, at Bossier City,Louisiana. Contact:

Fred Garcia6533 West Altadena Ave.Glendale, AZ 85304(623) 878-7007

Misawa Recall: 416th TFS, 531stTFS, (1959-1964) will meet October 4-6,2004 in Austin, Texas. Polkadotters and4th fighter pilots also invited. Contact:

Les Frazier702 River Down RoadGeorgetown, TX 78628e-mail: FLoftus@mac.com or les@Iesfrazier.com.

The 1st, 11th, and 69th PilotlessBomber Squadrons will hold theirreunion October 6-10, 2004, atSecaucus, New Jersey. Contact:

Micky Hart156 East 2d.South Preston, ID (208) 852-1863e-mail: qhart@plmw.com

The 49th Fighter Group Associationwill hold its reunion on October 20-24,2004, in Las Vegas, Nevada, Contact:

Lt, Col. Doug Melzer, USAF, ( Ret.)1915 Country Club Dr.Redlands, CA 92373-7305(909) 793-4957

The 20th Fighter Wing Associationwill hold its reunion on October 26-30, 2005, in Tucson, Arizona:

The TAC Missileers will hold theirreunion in 2005 in Nashville,Tennessee.Contact

Joe Perkins(904) 282-9064e-mail: perkster@fcol.com

U.S. Navy readers are advised tolog on to www.navalinstitute.organd then click on reunions.

We seek quality articles—based on sound scholarship, perceptive analysis, and/or firsthand experience—which arewell-written and attractively illustrated. The primary criterion is that the manuscript contributes to knowledge. Articlessubmitted to Air Power History must be original contributions and not be under consideration by any other publicationat the same time. If a manuscript is under consideration by another publication, the author should clearly indicate thisat the time of submission. Each submission must include an abstract—a statement of the article’s theme, its historicalcontext, major subsidiary issues, and research sources. Abstracts should not be longer than one page.

Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate, double-spaced throughout, and prepared according to the Chicago Manualof Style (University of Chicago Press). Use civilian dates and endnotes. Because submissions are evaluated anonymously,the author’s name should appear only on the title page. Authors should provide on a separate page brief biographicaldetails, to include institutional or professional affiliation and recent publications, for inclusion in the printed article. Pages,including those containing illustrations, diagrams or tables, should be numbered consecutively. Any figures and tables mustbe clearly produced ready for photographic reproduction. The source should be given below the table. Endnotes should benumbered consecutively through the article with a raised numeral corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end.

If an article is typed on a computer, the disk should be in IBM-PC compatible format and should accompany the man-uscript. Preferred disk size is a 3 1/2-inch floppy, but any disk size can be utilized. Disks should be labelled with thename of the author, title of the article, and the software used. WordPerfect, in any version number, is preferred. Otherword processors that can be accommodated are WordStar, Microsoft Word, Word for Windows, and AmiPro. As a lastresort, an ASCII text file can be used.

There is no standard length for articles, but 4,500-5,500 words is a general guide.Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to Jacob Neufeld, Editor, c/o Air Power History, P.O. Box

10328, Rockville, MD 20849-0328, e-mail: jneufeld@comcast.net.

Guidelines for Contributors

Reunions

Meet the New Executive Director

On June 21, 2004, Col. George K. Williams,USAF (Ret.) was named to be the new ExecutiveDirector, Air Force Historical Foundation. He suc-ceeds Col. Joseph Marston, USAF (Ret.).

A native of southeastern Colorado, ColonelWilliams is a graduate of West Point, Class of1968. He served ten years as an Army combatarms officer, attended Ranger School, served withthe 82d Airborne Division and commanded at theplatoon and company levels in the 1/1 Cavalry inVietnam, where he was awarded two Silver Stars,a Purple Heart, and other decorations. He attend-ed Cornell University for his master’s degree inAmerican Studies and subsequently taught in theEnglish Department at West Point. After anexchange tour on the faculty of the Air ForceAcademy, he initiated an interservice transfer tothe Air Force. He has had a long association withthe E–3 AWACS at various operational and stafflevels in the U.S., NATO, and Saudi Arabia. In

1981, Williams entered Oxford University where he earned his Ph.D. degree in ModemHistory, under Sir Michael Howard. Colonel Williams’s doctoral dissertation examined theoperations and consequences of long-range bombing by the Royal Air Force during World WarI. After several assignments in the AWACS community, he was selected to be the Deputy AirForce Historian, where he served from 1992 to 1996. He completed his military career as aresearch associate at the National Defense University, retiring in 1998. He has been pub-lished in various formats and has authored a book, Biplanes and Bombsights: BritishBombing in World War I, published by the Air University Press. Colonel Williams began full-time work with the Foundation on June 21, 2004.

Foundation Notes

The Fall 2004 meeting of the Air Force Historical Foundation’s Board ofTrustees is scheduled for Tuesday, October 19th, at the Andrews Air ForceBase, Maryland, Officers’ Club, commencing at ten o’clock in the morning.All members of the Foundation are welcome and encouraged to attend.

Lieutenant General Keith Karl Compton1915–2004

Lt. Gen. Keith Karl Compton died on June 15, 2004, inSan Antonio, Texas. He was eighty-eight.

General Compton was born in 1915 in St. Joseph,Missouri, and graduated from Central High School therein 1933. He received his BA degree from WestminsterCollege at Fulton, Missouri, in 1937. He then entered mil-itary service as an aviation cadet at Randolph Field,Texas, and received his pilot’s wings in 1939.

He spent the next two and a half years at LangleyField, Virginia, with the 2d Bomb Wing, the first unitequipped with the B–17 Flying Fortress. In April 1942, hecommanded the 409th Bomb Squadron and later wasoperations officer for the 93d Bomb Group, at Fort Myers,Florida.

In February 1943, Compton became commander of the376th Bomb Group in Africa and, on August 1st of thatyear, led the famous “Tidal Wave” air attack on theGerman oil refineries in Ploesti, Romania.

He was reassigned as assistant to the air chief of stafffor operations, Fifteenth Air Force, in North Africa inMarch 1944 and returned to the United States in Julythat year as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations

and training, Second Air Force, Colorado Springs, Colorado.In June 1948, following several command assignments and graduation from the Air University,

General Compton was assigned to the Air Proving Ground Command, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, asdeputy for operations, a position he held until February 1953. It was during this tour of duty that Compton,flying an F–86 Sabrejet, won the National Air Races Bendix Trophy for 1951, setting a new national speedrecord for the route.

In February 1953, General Compton transferred to SAC. Several successful command assignmentsin SAC resulted in his designation in September 1961 as SAC director of operations. In June of 1963 hebecame SAC’s chief of staff.

In August 1964 he was assigned to be the inspector general, U.S. Air Force. Six months later he wasdesignated the deputy chief of staff for plans and operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. With theseduties he also became the Air Force’s operations deputy sitting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the chiefof staff, U.S. Air Force. He became vice commander in chief, Strategic Air Command in February 1967.Compton held the position until he retired on August 1, 1969.

An accomplished golfer, he belonged to the Society of Seniors, made up of the nation’s best seniorgolfers. In 1978, he won the U.S. Golf Association’s Senior Amateur championship.

Among the military decorations awarded to General Compton are the Distinguished Service Medal,Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster, Air Medal with nineoak leaf clusters, and the Air Force and the Army Commendation medals.

He is survived by his son, Keith Compton, Jr.; daughters Mary Mace, Tegwin Anne Smith, andMichele Walker; eight grandchildren; and two great, grandchildren.

In Memoriam

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