an efficient and secure rfid security method with ownership transfer

AN EFFICIENT AND SECURE RFID SECURITY METHOD WITH OWNERSHIP TRANSFER

Authors: Kyosuke Osaka, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Kenichi Yamazaki, Osamu TakahashiSource: Computational Intelligence and Security, 2006 International Conference on Presenter: Hsin-Ruey Tsai

FIVE REQUIREMENTS 1. Indistinguishability

2. Forward security

3. Resistance against replay attack

4. Resistance against tag killing

5. Ownership transferability

INDISTINGUISHABILITY No adversary can distinguish output from

RFID tags.

FORWARD SECURITY Even if present data on RFID tags are leaked

to an adversary, past data still remain secure.

No tamper resistance

RESISTANCE AGAINST REPLAY ATTACK

No adversary can succeed in a replay attack that spoofs a legitimate RFID tag.

RESISTANCE AGAINST TAG KILLING

RFID tags shall be resistant against a large number of incoming queries.

no additional memoryno upper limit

OWNERSHIP TRANSFERABILITY

Ownership is transferable without violation of previous and present RFID tag owner’s privacy.

ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS SCHEMES

Challenge–Response Type Schemes

Ohkubo Type Schemes

Other Type Schemes

HASH LOCK SCHEME 03

RANDOMIZED HASH LOCK SCHEME

HASH-BASED ID VARIATION SCHEME 04

THE RKKW SCHEME 05

KANG–NYANG’S SCHEME 05

OHKUBO SCHEME

MODIFIED OHKUBO SCHEME

UNIDENTIFIABLE ANONYMOUS ID SCHEME

OWNER CHANGE SCHEME 05

PROPOSED METHOD The protocol of the proposed method consists

of:

• A writing process

• An authentication process

• An ownership transfer process

PROPOSED METHOD

INDISTINGUISHABILITY

FS & RA Because of updated by changing symmetric

key. Even if Eki (ID) is leaked to the adversary, neither the ID nor Ekj (ID) leaks to the adversary, where i > j. Unless the ID is leaked, the encryption function E satisfies the one-wayness. This means that the adversary cannot compute Ek j (ID) from Eki(ID) unless the ID is leaked.

TK & OT 1. Tags require no additional memory for

storing random numbers each reading a tag. 2. Tags have no upper limit of reading tags

1. A protocol to be able to securely change an

owner’s key used for encryption is built into

the RFID system. 2. Owners can change their key at any time..

EFFICIENCY OF PROPOSED METHOD