a brief history of field artillery rockets, missiles, and
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF FIELD ARTILLERY ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND THE
THREAT
Dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 heralded
the beginning of the atomic age, often called the nuclear age. Initially, the American
defense establishment made strategic atomic weapons and airpower its number one priority
to deter aggression and relegated the ground forces to a distant second. The Soviet
acquisition of the atomic bomb in 1949, the fall of China to the communists in 1949, and
the Korean War of the early 1950s, however, energized the Army to develop tactical atomic
field artillery rockets and guided missiles to augment a conventional atomic cannon and to
complement strategic atomic weapons. After the Korean War and through the 1980s, the
Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat motivated the Army and the Field Artillery to continue
modernizing and expanding their tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. With the collapse of
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in the 1990s, the need for tactical nuclear weapons
disappeared. This emboldened the President of the United States, George H.W. Bush, to
eliminate country’s tactical nuclear weapons and forced Army and the Field Artillery to
rely upon long-range conventional rockets and missiles to counter international threats to
national security.
FIRST GENERATION OF NUCLEAR ROCKETS AND MISSILES
Following World War Two, the American military community concluded that an
air-delivered atomic bomb (a fission bomb in which the atom nucleus was split to generate
energy) represented the ultimate weapon. President Harry Truman and the American
defense community relied upon the threat of the atomic bomb as the nation’s first line of
defense to deter and even halt an invasion of West Europe by the numerically superior
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Soviet army. As the War Department Equipment Board of 1946, headed by General Joseph
W. Stilwell, pointed out, this required developing atomic bombs and long-range bombers
as the nation’s number one priority and warning potential threats that an unprovoked attack
on American interests would cause the United States to counter with atomic weapons. The
Army Air Force would drop atomic bombs on enemy industrial areas, military bases, and
naval ports, to name a few targets, in response to an attack. To make this a reality, the Air
Force, created by the National Defense Act of 1947, acquired the B-36 “Peacemaker”
bomber, a piston-engine aircraft with a range of 9,000 miles and a speed of 435 miles per
hour in 1949, and the B-47 bomber, a jet engine aircraft with a range of 4,600 miles without
bombs and speed of 587 miles per hour in 1951. Both had the ability to deliver the atomic
bomb.1
While dropping atomic bombs dominated the defense community’s thinking and
determined priorities, military strategists still recognized the supporting role of the ground
forces in this new age. They would occupy the hostile territory after the bomb had been
dropped and mop up any enemy military forces that might have survived the blast. In view
of this, the Stilwell Board predicted a prominent role for ground based long-range field
artillery rockets and guided missiles to strike deep into enemy territory and antiaircraft
artillery to protect the ground forces from enemy aircraft. Sometime in the future, these
rockets and missiles would augment the light caliber, multiple rocket launchers with ranges
of 5,000 yards that had been employed during World War Two to saturate a target with
rockets and to complement cannon (tube) artillery. The Stilwell Board even envisioned
using rockets and guided missiles to deliver an atomic warhead.2
3
Upon reviewing Army equipment requirements in light of the progress in rocket
and guided missile technology since 1946, the Army Equipment Board of March 1950
under Lieutenant General John R. Hodge supported obtaining atomic bombs as the top
priority as advocated by the Stilwell Board, promoted modernizing the ground force’s
equipment, and urged the Army to develop surface-to-surface and surface-to-air rockets
and guided missiles. The latter would defend the country and overseas military
installations against air threats, while the former would carry conventional or atomic
warheads to support fast-moving, highly mobile combat units. However, with World War
Two over and no major conflict in sight at the beginning of 1950, the defense budget of
fiscal year 1950 restricted military spending; and the Department of Defense prioritized
its efforts on acquiring aircraft to deliver the atomic bomb.3
Unanticipated events prompted the Army to step up the pace of acquiring rockets
and missiles. Late in 1949, the Soviets detonated their own atomic bomb to end the
American monopoly of the bomb. According to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1950
the American monopoly had discouraged the Soviets from invading West Europe. Armed
with their own atomic bomb, they now would be emboldened to attack. This meant that
the nation’s ground forces had to be modernized. In 1949 China fell to the communists
under Mao Tse Tung. Subsequently, North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950,
reaffirming to American leaders the Soviet Union’s hostility and willingness to support a
client state’s assault on American interests. The invasion also heightened American fears
about Communist aggression and a potential attack on West Europe. Later in 1951, the
Central Intelligence Agency predicted that the Soviets would have 200 atomic bombs by
1954 and would employ them to strike cities and military targets in West Europe. These
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series of events provided the existential national security crisis for the United States. This
prompted President Dwight D. Eisenhower to decide that the United States needed to be
equipped with the most modern weapons to deter Soviet aggression and to sign National
Security Council Memorandum 162/2 in October 1953. This memorandum encouraged
maintaining and even expanding the country’s nuclear arsenal and played importantly in
the formulation of a doctrine of massive retaliation under the rubric of “the New Look,”
declaring that the United States would respond to communist aggression by employing
nuclear weapons. In harmony with this, the country developed a nuclear bomb (a fusion
bomb in which a fission bomb was used to compress and heat fusion fuel to generate much
greater energy) to be dropped by an aircraft and a nuclear warhead to be delivered by an
intercontinental missile to stay ahead of the Soviets and to discourage Soviet and Chinese
aggression. Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy of relying on nuclear weapons and the
subsequent spurt of military technological innovation aimed to compensate for the Soviet
conventional forces’ numerical superiority and has often been called “the first offset” by
some historians and political scientists. Basically, the United States planned to rely on
nuclear weapons to counteract the Soviet numerical superiority in conventional military
forces. At the time the Soviets could assemble around 175 active divisions and had 125
reserve divisions. In comparison, the United States had 29 Army and Marine divisions
with seven in the reserve and could not afford to expand its conventional forces.4
Simultaneously, Soviet acquisition of an atomic bomb forced the Army to
accelerate development of tactical atomic weapons. Fearing that West Europe would now
be vulnerable to a Soviet attack with conventional and atomic weapons, the Army initiated
work in May 1950 to acquire an atomic cannon. Rushed into production, the M-65 280-
5
mm. cannon, called Atomic Annie, fired an atomic warhead for the first time on 25 May
1953 at Frenchman Flats, Nevada. The warhead had a yield of 15-kilotons, which was
equal to the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945. Weighing 88 tons, the
ungainly cannon required two tractor trucks to move it – one on its front and one on its
rear. The cannon lacked the range (maximum range was 30 kilometers or 20 miles) and
flexibility of aircraft-delivered munitions; but it could provide atomic fire support to
ground forces in all weather and at night whereas aircraft had difficulties providing support
in inclement weather and during hours of darkness.5
Concurrently, the Army rushed the Honest John rocket through development by
using as much off-the-shelf equipment and parts as possible because it promised to provide
the requisite conventional and atomic firepower for the Army. The Army hoped to deploy
the rocket to Korea as an interim rocket until it could be replaced by a better one. Fielded
in 1954 after the Korean War armistice had been signed in 1953, the M31 Honest John was
a free-flight, fin-stabilized, solid propellant rocket. It was fired from a rail-type launcher,
received no guidance in flight, and followed a ballistic trajectory similar to a cannon
projectile. It carried a 1,500-pound conventional or atomic warhead, had a range of 5.7 to
15.7 miles (9.2 to 25.26 kilometers), could hit within 300 yards (274 meters) of the target,
could be transported on highways or cross country with ease, and was less expensive than
a guided missile. Even armed with a conventional warhead, it furnished more fire power
than heavy cannon field artillery. The rocket also provided responsive fire support for the
division and could engage targets beyond the enemy’s forward line of troops and out of
range of conventional cannon artillery.6
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Atomic Annie, an 8-inch nuclear projectile introduced in 1955, and Honest John
gave the Army the capability to discourage and even thwart a massive Soviet armor strike
through the Fulda Gap into West Germany that would easily overwhelm the West’s
numerically inferior forces. By the mid-1950s, these nuclear weapons along with strategic
nuclear weapons served as the primary means of defending West Europe and prompted the
Army to develop its pentomic division of five battle groups by 1957 to function on the
atomic battlefield. Just as important, nuclear cannon and rocket artillery gave the Army a
place in the Eisenhower administration’s massive retaliation strategy.7
Major General Earle G. Wheeler, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Military Operations, U.S. Army, explained Honest John’s significance in an
article published in Artillery Trends, a publication of the Artillery and Guided Missile
School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in December 1956.8 “The atomic threat that Honest John
presents to a hostile force is so great that such [Honest John] units are certain to be prime
enemy targets…, he wrote.9 He added, “the ability to go into position, fire, and move out,
is a matter of vital importance, since Honest John will be firing from forward positions
where it is more prone to detection by the enemy as compared with long-range missiles
well to the rear.”10 Fortunately, the rocket’s supersonic speed would protect it from any
known countermeasures once it had been fired. Given this and the capability of carrying
an atomic warhead and the tactical requirement for the rocket, the contractor, Douglas
Aircraft, produced almost 8,000 M31 Honest John rockets for the Army between 1952 and
1960.11
Recognizing the limitations of this hastily developed rocket, the Army upgraded it.
An improvement program in 1958 streamlined the rocket from nose to tail to make it more
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aerodynamic and simplified firing preparations to make it more responsive and less
vulnerable to enemy counterbattery fire. Designated the M50, the improved Honest John
had a range of 10 to 22 miles (16 to 35 kilometers), had a tighter delivery area of 250 yards
(230 meters), and could carry a nuclear warhead that was more powerful than the M31’s
atomic warhead. It also offered greater mobility than the 280-mm. atomic cannon and
provided general support and reinforcing fires to the division, corps, or field army.
Approximately 7,000 M50’s were produced.12
Although some in the Army wanted to employ the M31 and M50 Honest John to
support airborne units, they lacked sufficient mobility for such duty, causing the Army to
develop the smaller and less capable M51 Little John nuclear rocket. The solid-propellant
Little John had a range of 3,000 to 20,400 meters (3,280 to 22,309 yards), was transportable
by helicopter, weighed about 800 pounds, and delivered a 260-pound conventional or
nuclear warhead. The first operational unit was fielded in 1961. The Army limited
production to 67 rockets because they were designed to provide general support and
reinforcing fires for the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division. With
the introduction of the 155-mm. nuclear projectile in 1963, the Army ultimately declared
the Little John obsolete in 1969.13
Meanwhile, the Army explored adopting long-range guided missiles for general
support that led to fielding the Corporal missile. As early as 1936, a small group of rocket
enthusiasts at the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at the California Institute of
Technology (GALCIT, later called the Jet Propulsion Laboratory), Pasadena, California,
received permission to organize the GALCIT Research Project to investigate rocketry.
Beginning in May 1944, the GALCIT Research Project developed a succession of rocket
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test vehicles – the Corporal E, the Private A, the Private F, the WAC Corporal A and B,
the Bumper WAC, and the WAC Corporal – with the goal of obtaining long-range, surface-
to-surface guided missiles. According to the director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
director William H. Pickering (1954-1976), the “WAC” preface was in honor of the
Women’s’ Army Corps, since these rockets were spinoffs from the larger Corporal missile
and called “the little sisters.” The WAC Corporal missile, the country’s first two-stage
guided missile, paved the way for the Corporal missile of the 1950s.14
The M2 Corporal missile, the Army’s first surface-to-surface guided missile, was
the product of a crash program to develop an interim missile to meet the operational needs
of the Korean War until the more sophisticated Hermes (pronounced air’ mez) A3 and
Redstone missiles could be developed. Acquired to provide the Army with an atomic
delivery system, to extend the range of field artillery, to supplement cannon artillery, and
to give the ground forces a readily available means of all-weather, heavy fire support, the
Corporal could deliver a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead or a conventional warhead, had a
maximum range of 90 miles (145 kilometers), was lighter and offered greater mobility than
the 280-mm. cannon, and furnished all-weather heavy fire support to the division, corps,
or theater army. However, the missile’s failure prone and complex guidance and control
system made the Corporal inaccurate when compared to the accuracy of heavy artillery and
made it poorly suited for nonnuclear employment. The ability to deliver a nuclear warhead
provided the missile with its reason for being and caused the Army to organize 12 Corporal
battalions beginning in 1955, with eight of them in Europe, and to field 358 missiles by
1957.15
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Corporal’s deficiencies that led to an improvement program. As a liquid-propelled
missile, Corporal required many items of specialized ground equipment and a large number
of people for the crew. Because the multi-component liquid fuel was volatile, unstable,
and dangerous, the mixing and fueling processes were detailed and lengthy, and had to be
conducted just before firing, making response time after receiving a target assignment too
long. An upgraded Corporal that eliminated these defects and enhanced reliability and
maintainability went into production in 1957, and remained operational through 1964 when
the solid-propellant Sergeant guided missile replaced it.16
Concurrently, the Army fielded the Lacrosse guided missile. In 1947, based on
World War Two Pacific Theater experience, the Marine Corps developed a requirement
for a conventional and atomic close support weapon to destroy concrete pill boxes, timber-
reinforced, sandbagged bunkers, and other pinpoint targets and area targets up to 30,000
meters (32,808 yards) in range. Following a March 1950 Joint Chiefs of Staff policy giving
the Army control of all surface-to-surface guided missiles, on 31 August 1950 the Navy
transferred the Lacrosse program to the Army, which had the same requirement. The
Army started fielding the Lacrosse in 1959, deploying the missile to Europe and to Korea
the next year. The Lacrosse was a solid propellant, guided missile capable of carrying a
conventional or nuclear warhead up to 12 miles (19 kilometers) in support of the corps and
the division. However, the system’s guidance system could be easily jammed by electronic
countermeasures. This, other technical problems, and the introduction of the 155-mm.
nuclear projectile in 1963 prompted the Army to declare the Lacrosse obsolete and remove
it from its arsenal in 1964.17
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Assessing the significance of fielded rockets and guided missiles and those
scheduled to be introduced in the near future, the Army cautioned as early as 1956 that they
did not replace cannon artillery but supplemented it by providing unprecedented ranges
and firepower. Together, conventional and nuclear cannon artillery, rockets, and guided
missiles gave the Army flexibility to apply the right amount of firepower as the situation
warranted and to offset the numerical superiority of the Soviet threat in Europe, stood as a
deterrent to Soviet aggression, and provided long-range fires to engage targets far behind
enemy lines.18
Meanwhile in November 1944, the Army signed a contract with General Electric
for the Hermes project to develop technical information on guided missile design and to
acquire surface-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles that eventually led to fielding
the Redstone missile, another first generation nuclear missile to complement the Lacrosse,
the Corporal, and the Honest John. In 1946 the Army’s Ordnance Department signed a
contract with General Electric for the Hermes project. The project combined German A4
missile technology with American innovations and led to a feasibility study in 1950 for
surface-to-surface guided missiles – the Hermes A1, an antiaircraft missile that never left
the planning stage; the Hermes A2, a surface-to-surface missile; and the Hermes A3, a
tactical missile intended to deliver a 450-kiloton warhead. The Army also planned to
develop the high-performance Hermes C1 with a 3,200-kilometer (1,988-mile) range.
Severe budget cuts forced cancellation of the Hermes A1 and A2; and constantly changing
specifications generated by the rapid development of nuclear weapons and Army nuclear
doctrine prevented development of the Hermes A3. This left just the Hermes C1. As the
Korean War dragged on, Hermes C1 increased in importance with the hopes that it would
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be operational for employment in Korea to help defeat a numerically superior threat. The
Chief of Ordnance found work on the missile to be valuable, ordered further work, but did
not authorize active development of Hermes C1. Instead, the Army asked Werner von
Braun’s team that had just moved to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, in October 1950, to
pursue development of a single-engine, single-stage tactical ballistic missile known as
Hermes C. Although General Electric Hermes project did not field any missiles, it
provided valuable experience in handling and firing large missiles and pioneered missile
development.19
The Army subsequently transferred responsibility for rocket and guided missile
development from General Electric to the Army’s Guided Missile Center at Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama, in 1951. At that time the Army directed developing the Corporal and
Hermes C as top priorities. The Corporal would have a range of 5.7 to 40.2 miles (9.17 to
64.7 kilometers), while the Hermes C would have a range of 172 to 863 miles (277 to 1,389
kilometers) to provide theater support.20
In 1952 the Army renamed the Hermes C the Redstone after the Redstone Arsenal.
To speed up development and to make it mobile, the Army and Chrysler, the contractor,
reduced the Redstone’s range to 58 to 200 miles (93 to 322 kilometers). Following the first
successful flight in August 1953, Chrysler began full production in 1955 with 120 missiles
being manufactured between 1955 and 1960 with the first operational Redstone battalion
being activated in 1956. Two years later in 1958, the Army deployed a Redstone battalion
to West Germany to become the Army’s first large guided missile deployed overseas. In
fact, the Redstone was the Army’s largest and longest range tactical weapon at the time
until Pershing I with a 430 miles range (692 kilometers) and Pershing II with a 1,000 mile
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range (1,609 kilometers) were introduced in the 1960s and even served to launch America’s
first satellite into space in 1958.21
A liquid-propellant missile, the Redstone provided mixed blessings. While it could
deliver a nuclear warhead within 1,000 feet of the aim point to unprecedented ranges in
support of the field army and represented a distinct improvement over the Corporal with
its ability to engage targets deep in enemy territory, it required 20 heavy vehicles to move
a battalion and upon reaching a launch site required eight hours to set up the missile for
firing, to solve the gunnery problem, and to fire. Upon receiving the launch order, fueling
required another 15 minutes before the Redstone could be launched.22
Although they were cumbersome, the Redstone and other nuclear rockets and
missiles not only expanded the Army’s firepower exponentially to meet Cold War
requirements but also forced the Army to write tactical doctrine for nuclear weapons.
Published in 1951, Field Manual 100-31, Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons, reminded
officers that atomic weapons would not end conflicts by themselves but had to be integrated
into tactical operations and basically described atomic weapons as weapons with greater
firepower than conventional cannon, rocket, and guided missile artillery. At this point in
time, the Army and the Field Artillery envisioned an atomic field artillery weapon as just
another powerful weapon at their disposal.23
By the end of the 1950s, doctrine for employing nuclear artillery began to crystalize
as the number of tactical nuclear weapons grew. Department of the Army Pamphlet 39-3,
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (May 1957), furnished information on the primary effects
of a nuclear detonation and covered the fission process, the fusion process, blast effects,
thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation. Department of the Army Pamphlet 39-1, Atomic
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Weapons Employment (June 1956), outlined suitable targets, damage estimation charts,
troop safety, and other information concerning employment. As Lieutenant Colonel David
E. Wright, Jr. of the Department of Tactics and Combined Arms at the U.S. Army Artillery
and Missile School, Fort Sill clarified in 1960, proper employment required a full
appreciation of blast, thermal, and nuclear radiation effects. While conventional weapons
caused a selective effect on a target, nuclear weapons destroyed the desired target and
everything in the vicinity and created deadly radiation. In view of this, commanders had
to have a general plan for the employment of nuclear weapons that considered the desired
results, the undesired effects, and the acceptable risks to friendly troops, and could not use
them casually or indiscriminately as they might a conventional rocket, missile, or cannon.24
As it moved into the 1960s, the Army had the weapons to fight a tactical nuclear
war or conventional war and concluded that nuclear warfare was the most rapidly
employable means to influence action but brought with it the danger of extensive damage,
including radiological contamination. As a result, the Army taught commanders to employ
the smallest available weapon that produced the desired effect. For example, nuclear
cannon projectiles, rockets, and guided missiles would be the preferred means of
conducting counterbattery work where heavy concentrations of fire were required and
where the risk of contaminating friendly forces was low. In fact, the Army considered a
single nuclear round to be more effective against enemy indirect fire systems than fire from
hundreds of conventional field artillery pieces. Although conventional firepower remained
critical for defeating forward enemy positions, nuclear firepower would annihilate the
enemy, permit the maneuver arms to seize and hold ground, and provide the decisive
element of an attack or defense. Commanders had the flexibility to employ conventional
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field artillery against appropriate targets, reserving nuclear field artillery, rockets, and
missiles for targets where greater effects were required. Nuclear weapons were not seen
as the first resort; and thoughtful consideration was required before launching nuclear
weapons.25
Interestingly, nuclear field artillery rockets and guided missiles along with the 280-
mm. atomic cannon and nuclear 8-inch projectile brought the Army and the Field Artillery
back into relevance in the nuclear age. In the aftermath of dropping the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Air Force occupied the focal point in the country’s
national security posture, with the atomic bomb deterring enemy aggression. In the worst
case scenario the Air Force would drop nuclear bombs on the aggressor if the United States
were attacked or threatened. As Brian M. Linn argued in The Echo of Battle: The Army’s
Way of War, this thinking made developing nuclear bombs and delivery systems paramount
for defending the country and left the Army and the Field Artillery in a quandary about
their role in the nuclear age.
When the Soviets exploded their atomic bomb in 1949, the United States lost its
monopoly of atomic weapons and their effectiveness as a deterrence to a Soviet invasion
of West Europe. With a Soviet attack now possible as clearly demonstrated by its client
state of North Korea, the Army, the Field Artillery, and North Atlantic Organization Treaty
concluded that ground forces armed only with conventional weapons would have to retreat
in the face of an assault from a numerically superior opponent, allowing the Soviets to
overrun the West. Fielding the 280-mm. atomic cannon, 8-inch nuclear projectile, and
nuclear rockets and missiles in the 1950s dramatically altered this scenario. These tactical
nuclear weapons gave the Army and the Field Artillery the capability of unleashing
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unprecedented lethality to counter a Soviet invasion and offset Soviet numerical superiority
in conventional forces and to make it relevant in the nuclear age; but employing tactical
nuclear weapons would cause extensive destruction and radiation that would produce
unimaginable collateral damage to civilian infrastructure and friendly troops that tried to
cross the ground where the nuclear warhead had impacted.
SECOND GENERATION NUCLEAR ROCKETS AND MISSILES
With the signing of the armistice to end the Korean War in 1953, the Army turned
its attention once again to the Soviet threat in Europe. As the Soviets improved their
tactical nuclear field artillery rockets and missile systems and made them a vital part of
their offensive operations, the Army faced the imperative of improving its tactical nuclear
rocket and missiles systems. This led to developing the second generation of Army nuclear
rockets and guided missiles – Sergeant, Pershing, and Lance – even as the first generation
– Honest John, Little John, Corporal, Lacrosse and Redstone – was being fielded.26
The genesis of the Sergeant guided missile that replaced the Corporal began in 1948
when the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Thiokol began examining new solid-propellant
rocket designs for the Army under the name of Sergeant. This Sergeant effort lasted
through 1951 but failed to produce an acceptable solid-propellant motor for tactical missile
applications. Subsequently, General Electric initiated a test program for Hermes A2 that
proved the feasibility of solid-propellant motors. However, funding cutbacks caused
Hermes A2 to be cancelled in 1953. Aware of the Soviet advancements in rocketry and
guided missiles and the existence of a numerically superior Soviet military force in East
Europe, the Army Field Forces in October 1954 advised developing the Sergeant missile
immediately as a counterpoise. Shortly after, the Army requested proposals from several
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companies to develop the solid-propellant Sergeant guided missile. After seven years of
development, the Army deployed the first Sergeant missile for general support of the army
or corps or reinforcing nuclear fires to the corps when it activated two Sergeant battalions
in 1962. Over the next two years, the Army deployed seven more Sergeant battalions with
one going to the Strategic Army Corps, five to Europe, and one to Korea.27
Even before the Sergeant became operational, the Ordnance Missile Command at
Redstone Arsenal explained the major advantages that the missile had over the Corporal.
The Corporal required 11 vehicles and 10 trailers of various sizes to transport it, while the
Sergeant used five trailers towed by their prime movers. The solid propellant fuel was less
volatile than liquid propellant. Due to the solid-propellant, the Sergeant could be fired
every 30 minutes from a given launcher, whereas the liquid-propellant Corporal could be
fired at a rate of one every two hours from a given launcher. The Sergeant was also less
complex to maintain and was more resistant to countermeasures. Last, the Sergeant
required 30,000 pounds of support equipment compared to the 300,000 pounds for the
Corporal, giving it more mobility.28
Subsequent to the deployment of Sergeant in 1962, an article in December 1964
Artillery Trends explained succinctly its significance. “It [Sergeant] was the beginning of
the end of the era of liquid-fueled, complex-oriented missile systems,” the article
explained.29 The key improvements gave Sergeant all-weather, all-terrain operation
capabilities, while the solid-propellant motor gave quick reaction and rapid emplacement
and displacement. The Sergeant remained in service through 1977 until it was replaced by
the Lance guided missile.30
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The Pershing and Lance missiles represented the epitome of the second generation
of nuclear missiles. The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the fear of further Soviet
aggression, and Sputnik I that was launched by the Soviets in 1957 cast doubt on the United
States’ capability to defend West Europe as a part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and its claim to technological superiority. In view of this, President Dwight
D. Eisenhower directed that the United States needed to be equipped with the most modern
weapons to deter Soviet aggression and offset Soviet numerical superiority. This caused
the Department of Defense in January 1958 to direct the Army’s Ballistic Missile Agency
at Redstone Arsenal to develop a new solid-propellant nuclear missile to replace the aging,
liquid-propellant Redstone missile. The new missile required a range of 575 to 850 miles
(925 to 1,368 kilometers), had to be transportable by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft,
and had to be capable of being fired at a moment’s notice. This led to the development of
the Pershing missile named after General of the Armies of the United States John J.
Pershing. To keep pace with Soviet rocket and missile developments, the Army traded off
requirements, particularly range, in order to accelerate the development of the Pershing
missile and to get it operational sooner. Within two years after development began, the
Pershing debuted at the Atlantic Missile Range in 1960. The 32-foot Pershing was smaller
and lighter than the 69-foot Redstone and employed a solid-propellant engine to reduce
weight and to improve mobility. The solid propellant also reduced response time because
the missile did not have to be fueled at the firing point and eliminated the need for heavy
and cumbersome propellant generating and transporting equipment associated with liquid-
propellant missiles. The missile was immune to electronic jamming devices of the time,
was capable of carrying a 60-, 200-, or 400-kiloton nuclear warhead, and could to engage
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targets up to 430 miles (692 kilometers) from the launch point. It was sufficiently mobile
to go anywhere the field army deployed and transportable overland and by helicopter or
fixed wing aircraft. This combination gave the commander an unprecedented increase in
firepower. In June 1962 the Army formed the first Pershing battery. Two years later in
1964, the Army assigned the first Pershing units to West Germany where they replaced the
Redstone to provide nuclear fires in support of special employment or in general support
of the field army or independent corps. By 1965 the Army had three Pershing battalions
of eight launchers each in Europe. According to Lieutenant General John P. Daley,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, the combination of
nuclear warheads and guided missiles, especially the Pershing missile, revolutionized
firepower, and contributed to the Army’s nuclear strike capability in Europe.31
In 1965, after a study found the Pershing superior to tactical aircraft in the theater
quick reaction alert mission, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara directed Pershing
to assume the theater quick reaction alert mission. Beginning in 1965, this became the
Pershing’s primary mission while support to the field army became a secondary
responsibility to be undertaken once the quick reaction alert task had been accomplished.
Supporting the field army as a surface-to-surface missile, the Pershing had refire
capabilities, but the new quick reaction alert mission required getting as many missiles as
possible in the air at once, which was not considered when developing the missile. Pending
materiel improvements, the Army changed tactics to meet the quick reaction alert mission.
A portion of each Pershing unit was to maintain the highest level of combat readiness and
be ready to fire at a moment’s notice. The Army placed two of the four Pershing batteries
in each battalion on constant alert at prepared firing sites. The third battery would be on
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alert at its home station, while the fourth battery would be at home station in a maintenance
status. As Lieutenant General Austin W. Betts, Chief of Army Research and Development
explained, the objective of having three batteries ready to fire almost instantaneously
centered on getting as many missiles launched in the shortest possible time. Basically, the
quick reaction alert mission involved providing short notice nuclear fire support on high-
priority targets assigned by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.32
In 1965 the Army started upgrading the Pershing, now Pershing I, to become the
Pershing IA to meet the new mission requirements. The contractor replaced Pershing
tracked vehicles with wheeled vehicles for better movement over paved roads, improved
the transporter-erector launcher, and added a trailer to carry the missile’s warhead. This
allowed for faster deployment and permitted the missile to serve the quick reaction alert
mission more effectively. Pershing IA replaced the Pershing I by 1970.33
During the 1970s, Soviet and American activities in Europe dramatically altered
the balance of power on the continent and influenced moves to limit intermediate-range
nuclear forces – the Pershing missile and the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile. At the
beginning of the decade, United States’ strategic guarantees and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization medium-range bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and tactical
nuclear weapons had sufficient power to deter Soviet aggression. To counter these
weapons the Soviets deployed their SS-20 missile that had a longer range, greater mobility,
a triple warhead, and superior accuracy over its predecessors, the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles,
by the middle of the 1970s. This action nullified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
nuclear superiority and threatened its security. Fearing this shift in nuclear superiority,
West Germany pushed to modernize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s theater
20
nuclear weapons by opening discussions with other West European nations over the
preferable means of offsetting Soviet SS-20 missiles. As a part of this effort to readdress
the imbalance, in 1973 the Army began developing the sophisticated Pershing II missile
with a range of 1,000 miles (1,609 kilometers) to replace the aging Pershing IA missile
with a range of 400 miles (644 kilometers).34
Although Western European countries envisioned the number of Pershing IIs being
reduced from the original number as a result of American efforts to limit intermediate-
range nuclear forces in Europe, the Soviets still considered the missile to be provocative.
Viewing the missile’s lethality, mobility, survivability, and range, the Soviets pointed out
that it could reach western portions of the Soviet Union from West European launch sites
in six minutes and was a first-strike weapon, but they overlooked that their SS-20
threatened virtually all of the West. Hoping to avert deployment, the Soviets staged a
monumental propaganda campaign in West Germany, which generated heated debates in
the West German legislature and caused the West German public to demonstrate against
deployment. Despite this opposition, the United States started activating Pershing II units
in West Germany in December 1983.35
Pershing II gave commanders unmatched capabilities. The missile could rapidly
strike deep into the enemy’s rear operational area with sufficient striking force to
desynchronize the forward movement of rear echelons, while the missile’s accuracy
permitted surgically destroying hardened point targets with its nuclear warhead that could
penetrate deep into the earth before exploding and obliterating the target with minimal
collateral damage. As experts noted, such devastating precision nuclear strikes would
21
cause forward movement to grind to a halt with the Pershing II annihilating units and
disrupting logistics and communications.36
Prodded by the specter of nuclear war in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United
States entered negotiations to reduce their intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.
After lengthy discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, President
Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Force Treaty in December 1987 to eliminate their countries’ intermediate-
range (1,000-5,000 kilometer) and shorter-range (500-1,000 kilometer) missiles to lessen
the risk of nuclear war and to promote international peace, security, and strategic stability.
Article III of the treaty declared the Pershing II to be an intermediate-range missile that
was subject to the treaty and that along with its launchers and all support structures would
be removed from the United States’ arsenal within three years after the effective date of
the treaty. Equally important, the treaty permitted each country to inspect the other one to
ensure compliance with this provision. The treaty covered 234 Pershing IIs, the most
formidable weapon ever fielded by the Army, and 169 Pershing IA missiles. Army
contractors destroyed Pershing IA missiles by July 1989 and Pershing II missiles by May
1991. After almost three decades of service, the Pershing missile’s service to the country
ended.37
With the phasing out of the nuclear-capable Pershing missile, the Army had only
Lance missile to serve as a nuclear deterrent to complement 8-inch and 155-mm. nuclear
projectiles. The Lance missile originated in the mid-1950s when the Army established its
concept of a family of surface-to-surface missiles for 1965-1970 to replace the Honest John
rocket fielded in 1954 and the Sergeant deployed in 1962. In 1973 the Army began
22
converting Sergeant and Honest John battalions in Europe to Lance battalions. This
conversion gave the Army a more flexible and versatile missile than ever before in Europe.
The new missile was mobile in all types of terrain, capable of being fired from its own
carrier, provided nuclear and nonnuclear fires, and was simple to operate and maintain. In
fact, the missile was so simple to operate that an observer would note little difference
between occupation of position by the Lance and occupation of position by a single self-
propelled howitzer. It also could be air dropped by a fixed wing aircraft, moved by
helicopter, and could survive by effectively hiding and delivering ordnance when and
where needed to a range of 90 kilometers (56 miles). The Lance’s primary targets
included enemy missile firing positions, airfields, transportation centers, command and
logistic installations, critical terrain features, such as bridges and supply routes, and large
troop concentrations in support of the corps or reinforcing the division. This latter mission
meant taking away the corps commander’s long-range artillery. According to Lieutenant
Colonel Wilson A. Shoffner, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 79th Field Artillery
Regiment (Lance), in 1976, Lance’s reason for being was to provide the corps with a
capacity to deal with a major enemy attack and achieve a quick, decisive reversal of that
attack. However, the weapon’s high cost and limited numbers forced the corps commander
to employ the missile selectively in concert with cannon artillery and tactical air support.38
Recognizing that the Lance missile represented 1960s technology, the Army took
action in the 1980s to replace it. Initially, the Army hoped to use the Joint Tactical Missile
System, renamed the Army Tactical Missile System, in 1985 as a corps artillery weapon to
deliver a conventional or nuclear warhead. However, congressional legislation limited the
Army Tactical Missile System to carrying conventional munitions. This forced the Army
23
to develop a program to extend the Lance’s life through 1995. The Army found this to be
prohibitive and opted to replace the Lance with a weapon with greater accuracy and range.
The Follow-on-To Lance missile would carry a conventional or nuclear warhead, be
launched from a multiple rocket launcher, and be a corps weapon. In December 1988 the
Secretary of Defense approved fielding the nuclear Follow-on-To Lance for employment
against high priority targets beyond the line of contact that had a direct impact on the corps-
level battle.39
Optimism about the missile quickly changed. As political relations between the
West Germany and East Germany became more amicable and as the threat of a Soviet-
Warsaw Pact invasion faded, the rationale for nuclear weapons precipitously declined.
This caused Europeans and Americans to question the need for nuclear weapons and even
to accept reducing their numbers. With this as a backdrop, President George H.W. Bush
announced in May 1990 that the United States would not modernize its short-range, land-
based nuclear missiles. This terminated the Follow-on-To Lance.40
The Lance and 8-inch and 155-mm. nuclear projectiles all met a similar fate. In
September 1991 President Bush announced that the United States would destroy its
stockpile of surface-to-surface, tactical nuclear weapons. This ended the Army’s and the
Field Artillery’s nuclear delivery mission and caused the active Army and Army reserve
components to turn in their equipment that supported the nuclear mission. One month later
in October 1991, President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev announced a cut in
Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. Although the Soviet Union fell shortly thereafter, the
United States signed a nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine in May 1992. With this the Army inactivated Lance units with the final one being
24
stood down at Fort Sill on 30 June 1992 and relegated the excess missiles to serve as
targets.41
The deactivation of the Lance and the demise of the Follow-on-To Lance brought
an era to a close. For almost 40 years, the Field Artillery had nuclear rockets and missiles
to complement nuclear cannon artillery. These weapons possessed the ability to wreak
unprecedented havoc on the battlefield and provided unparalleled range for a field artillery
weapon. Though never fired in anger, rockets and missiles stood poised to respond to a
Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion of the West that never came, successfully serving their
mission as deterrents to stop Soviet aggression towards the West. Today, rather than
pointed against the Soviet-Warsaw Pact that had dissolved in the 1990s, these rockets and
missiles could be found in the Field Artillery Museum’s Artillery Park, Fort Sill, as a stark
reminder of a dangerous past where a small incident could have triggered a nuclear war in
Europe.
A NEW ERA
Just as the Cold War provided the rationale for developing and acquiring tactical
nuclear rockets and missiles, it also justified adopting the Multiple Launch Rocket System
and the Army Tactical Missile System during the last decades of the 20th Century. While
the United States was fighting in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union
modernized its nuclear and conventional ground forces. Noting the numerically superior
Soviet-Warsaw Pact military force with its modernized weapons and equipment and the
effectiveness of air defenses in the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, the Army launched
an aggressive modernization effort to replace aging weapons with new ones by investing
in extended-range precision munitions; stealth aircraft; and new intelligence, surveillance,
25
and reconnaissance platforms. As a part of this modernization effort, the Army and the
Field Artillery adopted the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the Army Tactical Missile
System that gave the Field Artillery precision capabilities, among other weapons.42
The Army’s experience with multiple rocket launchers dated back to World War
Two. Although they were inaccurate and possessed only 5,000-yard (4,572-meter) ranges,
the rockets provided incomparable firepower and the ability to destroy area targets.
However, the Army’s development of more glamorous tactical nuclear rockets and guided
missiles in the 1950s and 1960s to deter a Soviet invasion of the West caused it to ignore
modernizing its multiple rocket launchers. By the 1970s the Army’s arsenal of multiple
rocket launchers was obsolete.43
Several factors revived the Army’s interest in multiple rocket launchers in the
1970s. First, numerous studies raised the necessity of a multiple rocket launcher to offset
the Soviet-Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in Europe and simultaneously outlined the
requirement for an all-weather conventional area fire support weapon system. Second,
aggressive Arab air defense systems wreaked havoc with the Israeli aircraft in the Israeli-
Arab War of October 1973. To neutralize such effective Arab air defenses, the Israelis
turned to multiple rocket launchers to suppress them so that their aircraft could attack
targets behind Arab lines. Third, the Soviet-Warsaw Pact was introducing new long-range
multiple rocket launchers to enhance its conventional firepower.44
As convincing as these reasons were for modernizing its multiple rocket launcher
inventory, only after a rigorous debate within the Army did the Field Artillery School push
acquiring the General Support Rocket System multiple rocket launcher, later called the
Multiple Launch Rocket System. As outlined by the school in March 1974, the system’s
26
rockets would suppress enemy indirect fire and air defense systems by delivering a
tremendous volume of fire at long ranges. From the perspective of the Commandant of the
Field Artillery School, Major General Donald R. Keith (1976-1977), the Multiple Launch
Rocket System’s chief attraction was its capability of saturating a target with rocket fire.45
Recognizing this, the Army fielded the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System
launcher that fired 12 rockets and formed its first operational battery of nine M270
launchers in March 1983. Shortly thereafter in September 1983, the Army deployed a
battery to West Germany and fielded an average of three batteries a year between 1983 and
1987 to give it 25 batteries. The system provided the Army with a conventional, all-
weather, indirect fire, and an area fire support system to engage indirect fire systems, air
defense systems, lightly armored formations, and soft stationary targets out to 30
kilometers. Its primary mission focused on the suppression, neutralization, and destruction
of threat fire support systems and forward area air defense sites.46
Even though Operation Desert Storm validated the effectiveness of the M270
launcher and rockets, combat operations highlighted critical deficiencies. Combat taxed
the launcher’s aging fire control system, and underscored the need to reduce the time to
aim and load the launcher to decrease the system’s reaction time on battlefields that
promised to become even more mobile and chaotic in the future. Improving the fire control
system and decreasing the system’s reaction time during the 1990s created the M270A1
Multiple Launch Rocket System launcher that fired 12 rockets. Operation Desert Storm
also revealed the proliferation of long-range rocket and cannon artillery. To counter this
and to engage more targets, the Army adopted the Extended Range Multiple Launch
Rocket System rocket with a range of 45 kilometers early in the 1990s and later the Guided
27
Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket with a range of 60 kilometers to provide precision
capabilities. Operation Desert Storm also encouraged the Army to introduce the M142
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System in 2005. The M142 fired six rockets from a
wheeled platform that was lighter than the tracked M270A1 and furnished greater strategic
mobility.47
Another critical deficiency involved the Multiple Launch Rocket System’s Dual-
Purpose Improved Conventional Munition. A carrier shell, the Dual-Purpose Improved
Conventional Munition, commonly known as a cluster munition, dispensed anti-
personnel/anti-material submunitions (bomblets) that carpeted an entire grid square,
causing Iraqi soldiers in Operation Desert Storm of 1991 to call them “Steel Rain.” The
submunitions often failed to detonate upon impact when fired in soft terrain like the sand
of Iraq and left dangerous duds on the battlefield that might explode unexpectedly,
prompting the Army to reduce the dud rate. The Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket
System Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition delivered anti-personnel/anti-
material submunitions. Subsequently, the Army introduced the Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition that also carried anti-
personnel/anti-material submunitions. Both had longer ranges and lower dud rates than
their Operation Desert Storm predecessor and engaged soft and lightly armored combat
vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, towed artillery, air defense units, and command,
control, and communication sites.48
Over the years, cluster munitions, such as the Dual-Purpose Improved
Conventional Munition, generated controversy. Armies first used them in World War Two,
and at least 21 countries have employed them since. While the United States employed
28
them in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets utilized them in Afghanistan in
the 1970s and 1980s; and the British employed them in the Falkland Islands in the 1980s.
Subsequently, the United States used cluster munitions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first
decade of the 21st Century.49
Seizing on media coverage of the Israeli use of cluster munitions with their
collateral damage in urban areas of Lebanon in 2006, a group of nations led by Norway
reached an agreement on 30 May 2008, called the Dublin Accord, to ban them. In
December 2008 94 countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or Oslo
Convention, that clearly defined and prohibited the development, production, acquisition,
transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. The United States, Russia, China, Israel,
Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not participate in the talks that led to the
agreement or sign the convention. By December 2009 103 states had signed the
convention.50
Although it recognized cluster munitions as a legitimate weapon with clear military
utility and did not support banning them, the Department of Defense in the meantime
officially announced in June 2008 a moratorium on the production and use of cluster
munitions that would leave more than one percent submunition duds and subsequently
approved an effort in October 2008 to develop a viable alternative to the Guided Multiple
Launch Rocket System Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition. This led to
fielding the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead in 2016. The
munition dispensed non-explosive submunitions and engaged the same targets as the
cluster munition did without the lingering effect of unexploded ordinance. The Alternative
Warhead complemented the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary that was a
29
single, high-explosive warhead, could be launched from both the M270A1 and M142
launchers, could hit point targets with minimal collateral damage, and complemented the
M982 155-mm. Excalibur precision guided munition and the M1156 Precision Guided Kit
that turned conventional unguided cannon munition into precision and near precision
munitions, respectively.51
Meanwhile, the Army replaced the Lance with the Army Tactical Missile System.
The Army Tactical Missile System missile could be launched from the M270, M270A1,
and the M142 launcher and had a longer range than the Lance to permit hitting second and
third echelon forces. The Army Tactical Missile System was introduced in two blocks.
The Army Tactical Missile System Block I was an unguided missile with a range of 35 to
165 kilometers (21 to 103 miles), and dispensed anti-personnel/anti-material submunitions
to engage lightly armored formations, infantry, command and control centers, and air
defense units; was introduced in 1990; and was fired in Operation Desert Storm. Six years
later, in 1996, the Army fielded the Army Tactical Missile System Block IA. It was a
guided missile which delivered a smaller payload of anti-personnel/anti-material
submunitions 70 to 300 kilometers (48 miles to 186 miles). Both missiles permitted
attacking high-payoff targets and disrupted the tempo and efficiency of the enemy’s
operations.52
In 2001 the Army introduced the M48 Army Tactical Missile System Quick
Reaction Unitary. Based on the Block 1A, it employed the Global Positioning System for
accuracy to attack high-payoff targets precisely at extended ranges as well as troops in
contact with minimal collateral damage, delivering a single 500-pound high-explosive
warhead out to 270 kilometers (168 miles).53
30
By 2014 the Army had four variants of the Army Tactical Missile System – the
M39 Block I Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, the M39A1 Block IA, the
M48 Quick Reaction Unitary, and M57 Unitary – that possessed long-range, all-weather
capabilities and provided the joint task force and corps commander with the ability to
engage targets throughout the depths of the battlefield. The Block I and Block IA were
employed extensively and effectively early in the major combat portion of Operation Iraqi
Freedom of 2003; the Quick Reaction Unitary was used with great effectiveness in
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.54
Army Tactical Missile System Block I and Block IA with anti-personnel/anti-
material submunitions did not comply with the 2008 Department of Defense policy on
cluster munitions, which precluded using them after 1 January 2018, and were scheduled
to be removed from the inventory by 2019 until the Department of Defense cluster
munition policy was revised on 30 November 2017. This revision, based on the renewed
threat of Russian aggression, re-emphasized the need for cluster munitions, retained current
stockpiles, delegated release authority down to combatant commanders, and directed the
services to pursue replacements to the meet the less than one percent unexploded ordnance
requirement of the 2008 policy.55
Over a period of years, the Army explored a service life extension program for the
Army Tactical Missile System. As of early 2014, the Army had service life extension
programs for Army Tactical Missile Systems I, IA, and Unitary. By refurbishing or
replacing propulsion and navigation systems and replacing the non-compliant cluster
munition warheads on the Army Tactical Missile System I and IA with the Unitary, the
service life extension program would provide time to complete the development of a
31
successor to the Army Tactical Missile System to satisfy the Long Range Precision Fires
Strategy.56
As much as tactical nuclear rockets and missiles revolutionized the Field Artillery
by giving it unprecedented destructive capabilities, the Multiple Launch Rocket System
and the Army Tactical Missile System also transformed the branch. These systems
furnished unmatched long-range, conventional firepower to neutralize threat indirect fire
systems, air defense systems, command posts, large bodies of enemy troops, and other
targets. Of the two, Army Tactical Missile System had the capability of engaging targets
at longer ranges than the Multiple Launch Rocket System. Perhaps, the most
transformative aspect involved the introduction of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System Unitary and the Army Tactical Missile System Block IA, the Army Tactical Missile
System Quick Reaction Unitary, and the Army Tactical Missile System Unitary. These
missiles gave the Field Artillery precision capabilities to supplement the area fire
capabilities of field artillery cannon and rocket systems and the precision 155-mm.
Excalibur munition and near-precision cannon munitions fitted with the Precision
Guidance Kit. In so doing, they could be employed to hit a particular target with minimal
collateral damage.
Rockets and guided missiles dramatically changed the Field Artillery. The nuclear
capable systems developed in the 1950s and 1960s provided unprecedented firepower and
range, fortunately were never fired in anger, and kept the Army and the Field Artillery
relevant in the nuclear age. The M270, M270A1, and M142 launchers and their family of
rockets and missiles gave the Field Artillery tremendous firepower to destroy area targets
and the precision to attack pinpoint targets and made the branch relevant in urban warfare
32
and on the modern complex battlefield.
1Janice E. McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775-2003 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2007), p. 209; Mary T. Cagle, “History of the Basic (B31) Honest John Rocket System, 1950-1964,” Historical Monograph Project No. AMC 7M, Part 1, 7 Apr 1964, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, pp. 1, 4, Historical Research and Documents Collection (HRDC), U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Historian’s Office, Fort Sill, Ok; Richard Lingeman, The Noir Forties: The American People from Victory to Cold War (New York: Nation Books, 2012), p. 249. 2Cagle, “History of the Basic (B31) Honest John Rocket System, 1950-1964,” pp. 5-7, 12-14, 17; John W. Bullard, “History of the Redstone Missile System,” pp. 19-20, Army Missile Command, 15 Oct 1965, HRDC; MG Holger N. Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” Army Information Digest, Dec 1956, pp. 10-34. 3McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, pp. 211-12; Cagle, “History of the Basic (B31) Honest John Rocket System, 1950-1964,” pp. 12-14; Bullard, “History of the Redstone Missile System,” p. 4, HRDC; Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-34; MG J.P. Daley, “Missile Research and Development,” Army Information Digest, Dec 1956, pp. 45-51
4J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford, UK: The Military Press, 1989), p. 267; Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2015), pp. 13-14, 38; Donald A. Carter, The U.S. Army before Vietnam, 1953-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2015), p. 8; Zachary Keck, “A Tale of Two Offset Strategies,” The Diplomat, 18 Nov 2014, www.thediplomat.com; Peter Grier, “The First Offset,” Air Force Magazine, Jun 2016, pp. 56-60.
5Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 267; Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962, pp. 13-14, 38; Carter, The Army before Vietnam, p. 24.
61LT Leon Moore, “Honest John,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 49-51; Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., Training Text on Honest John, Sep 1954, p. 9, UL408.43 H5D6, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL), Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., Notes on Development Type Material for the Honest John (Model 1236F) Type II Large Caliber Field Rocket, Jan 1953, p. 2, UL 408.43 H5D61, SM-14681, MSTL; “Employment of the Honest John in a Conventional War,” Artillery Trends, Jan 1967, pp. 50-52; Field Manual 6-61, Field Artillery Battalion, Honest John, Apr 1966, p. 4; Maj Gen Earle G. Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” Army Information Digest, Dec 1956, pp. 36, 42; Information Paper, Redstone Arsenal, subj: Honest John, undated, HRDC; Honest John Training Text, Douglas Aircraft, 1954, p. 1, UL408.43 H5D6, MSTL; Technical Manual 9-1340-202-12, Operator and Maintenance Manual: 762-mm. Rocket, Honest John, p. 1-2, UL408.43 H5U5, MSTL; Notes on Development Type Material for the Honest John, Type II, Large Caliber Field Rocket, Douglas Aircraft, 1953, p. 2, UL 408.43 H5D61, MSTL; “Employment of the Honest John in a Conventional War,” Artillery Trends, Jan 1967, pp. 50-52; Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 13, 38-40, 212, 217, 247, 257-59, 270-74; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 267.
_________________
33
__________________ 7See Footnote 6. 8Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” p. 42.
9Ibid. 10Ibid. 11Ibid., p. 43; Information Paper, Redstone Arsenal, subj: Honest John, undated, HRDC; “Last Name: John, First Name: Honest; Occupation: Artillery Weapon,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 49-51. 12Cpt John Tanzer, “XM50,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1962, pp. 5-6; McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775-2003, pp. 212-13; Information Paper, Redstone Arsenal, subj: Honest John, undated, HRDC. 13Andreas Parsch, “Emerson Electric M47/M51/MGR-3 Little John,” undated, HRDC; Redstone Arsenal Fact Sheet, subj: Little John, undated, HRDC; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 1-3, UF 478.43 U5, MSTL; Ltr with atchs, Cdr, U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, to CG, U.S. Continental Army Command, 3 Sep 1959, UF 157.2 U61, MTSL; Field Manual 6-56, Field Artillery Battalion Little John, Jun 1956, pp. 3, 4, 31; Field Manual 6-61, Field Artillery Missile Battalion, Honest John Rocket, Self-Propelled, Dec 1959, pp. 2-3. After 1955 with the successful detonation of a nuclear bomb, the Army converted from atomic warheads to nuclear warheads on its rockets and missiles. 14McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775-2003, p. 214; Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” p. 38; Field Manual 6-60, Field Artillery Missile Battalion, Corporal, Mar 1959, p. 4; Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-34; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 25, 47, UF 478.43 U5, MSTL; James W. Bragg, “Development of the Corporal: The Embryo of the Army Missile Program,” Reports and Historical Branch Control Office, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, Apr 1961, pp. xiv, xii, xix, PDF copy in HRDC, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Andreas Parsch, “Chrysler SSM-A-14/M8/PGM-11 Redstone, 2002, HRDC. 15McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775-2003, p. 214; Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” p. 38; Field Manual 6-60, Field Artillery Missile Battalion, Corporal, Mar 1959, p. 4; Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-34; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 25, 47, UF 478.43 U5, MSTL; Bragg, “Development of the Corporal: The Embryo of the Army Missile Program,” pp. xiv, xix, Ltr, H.I. Gibson, General Manager, Guided Missile Division, The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, to Commanding General, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Al, 23 Sep 1957, in Corporal Planning Information, 23 Sep 1957, UL407.415 C5F4, MSTL; Corporal Planning Information, 23 Sep 1957, p. 3, UL407.415 C5F4, MSTL; Carter, The U.S. Army before Vietnam, p. 24. 16McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, p. 214. 17Redstone Arsenal Fact Sheet, subj: Lacrosse, undated, HRDC; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 36-38, UF 478.43 U5, MSTL; “Lacrosse: From Bunker Busting to General Support,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1959, pp. 7-17; Maj Michael L. Kirk, “Nuke: End of Mission, Out,” Field Artillery Magazine, Aug 1992, pp. 40-41; Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Lacrosse Final Report, Task I, Jun 1949-1950, pp. 1-4, UL407.415 L15 C72 Be-635 S-3, MSTL; Marine Corps Military Characteristics for a Helicopter Transportable General Support Field Artillery Guided Missile System
34
__________________ (Lacrosse), undated, p. 3, UL407.415 L15SM3, MSTL; Martin, U.S. Army Lacrosse, May 1957, p. 1, UL407.415 L15M21, MSTL. 18“Added Power for the Army’s Arsenal,” Army Information Digest, Dec 1956, p. 5. 19Bullard, “History of the Redstone Guided Missile,” pp. 7-16; Andreas Parsch, “JPL/Sperry SSM-A-27/M15/MGS-29 Sergeant,” 2001-2005, HRDC; Sergeant Design Release Review, 31 Mar-1-2 Apr 1959, p. 7, UL407.415 S3 U64, MSTL; General Electric, Final Report on Project Hermes V-2 Missile Program, Sep 1952, pp. 1-5, UL407.415 H3 G33, MSTL. 20Bullard, “History of the Redstone Guided Missile,” pp. 37-38; Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-34. 21Andreas Parsch, “Chrysler SSM-A-14/M8/PGM-11 Redstone,” 2002, HRDC; Andrews J. LePage, “Old Reliable: The Story of the Redstone,” 2011, HRDC; “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-35; U.S. Army, The Redstone Missile System, 1960, p. 1, UL 407.415 R29 U51, MTSL; Redstone Arsenal Fact Sheet, subj: Redstone, undated, HRDC. 22Parsch, “Chrysler SSM-A-14/M8/PGM-11 Redstone,” 2002, HRDC; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 72-73, UF 478.43 US, MSTL. 23Lt Col David E. Wright, “Nuclear Weapons Employment,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1960, pp. 3-8; 1st Lieutenant Rudolph S. Malooley, “USAFA Missile Training Command,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1958, pp. 43-47; History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Vol III, 1945-1957, pp. 63, 64, 214, 217, 221, 268, 377, 379; History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Vol IV, 1958-1967, p. 3; Kirk, “Nuke, End of Mission, Out,” pp. 40-41; Maj Karl R. Liewer, “The First Field Artillery Missile Brigade,” Artillery Trends, May 1960, pp. 66-69; “US Army Artillery and Missile Center Reorganized,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1959, 56-57; “1st Field Artillery Missile Brigade Activated,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1958, p. 63. Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 55, 101-104, 212. Note: In 1955 the US military introduced a nuclear weapon to replace an atomic weapon.
24Cpt Powell H. Skipper, “Nuclear Weapons,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 19-20; Wright, “Nuclear Weapons Employment,” pp. 3-8; Field Manual, Staff, Nuclear Weapons Employment, Aug 1964, p. 4; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 271-72; “Employment of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1968, pp. 80-82; Field Manual 101-31-1, Nuclear Weapons Employment, Feb 1963, pp. 4, 33. 25Cpt Powell H. Skipper, “Nuclear Weapons,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 19-20; Wright, “Nuclear Weapons Employment,” pp. 3-8; Field Manual, Staff, Nuclear Weapons Employment, Aug 1964, p. 4; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 271-72; “Employment of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1968, pp. 80-82; Field Manual 101-31-1, Nuclear Weapons Employment, Feb 1963, pp. 4, 33. 26Chris Bellamy, Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces (London: Brassy’s Defence Publishers, 1986) p. 157; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 267-68; Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 336-39. 27Design Release Review, Final Edition, Sergeant, 31 March-1-2 April 1959, pp. 7, 11, 93, 189, 194, UL 407.415 S3 U64, MSTL; Parsch, “JPL/Sperry SSM-A-
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__________________ 27/M15/MGM-29 Sergeant,” 2001-2005, HRDC; Redstone Arsenal Fact Sheet, subj: Sergeant, undated, HRDC. 28Design Release Review, Final Edition, Sergeant, 31 March-1-2 April 1959, pp. 72-79, UL 407.415 S3 U64, MSTL; Parsch, “JPL/Sperry SSM-A-27/M15/MGM-29 Sergeant,” 2001-2005, HRDC; “A Picture of Sergeant,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1964, p. 19; Fact Sheet, AMRDEC, subj: Sergeant Missile, undated, HRDC. 29“A Picture of Sergeant,” p. 19. 30Ibid.; Army Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center Fact Sheet, subj: Sergeant Missile, undated, HRDC. 31Army Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center Fact Sheet, subj: Sergeant Missile, undated, HRDC; “The Pershing Missile: The Army’s ‘Blackjack,’” Artillery Trends, May 1960, pp. 30-34; Fact Sheet, Redstone Arsenal Historical Information, subj: Pershing, undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, Lockheed Martin, subj: The Pershing Missile: Peace Through Strength, undated, HRDC; Cpt Alan L. Moore, Jr., “A New Look of Pershing,” The Field Artilleryman, Apr 1969, pp. 49-57; Fact Sheet, subj: MGM-31 Pershing I, undated, HRDC; Maj John E. Bonner, “Pershing Ia,” The Field Artilleryman, Feb 1972, pp. 41-47; Col Myron F. Curtis, Col Thomas M. Brown, and Dr. John C. Hogan, “Pershing: It Gave Peace a Chance,” Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1991, pp. 28-32; Kaylene Hughes, “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch’: The Pershing II and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” Army History, Fall 1989, pp. 7-16; Martin Company, Pershing Weapon System, undated, p. 1, UL 407.415. p. 3. 32Bonner, “Pershing Ia,” pp. 41-47; Curtis, Brown, and Hogan, “Pershing,” pp. 28-32; Hughes, “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch,’” pp. 16; McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery, 1775-2003, pp. 232-34; Cpt Alan L. Moore, “A New Look of Pershing,” The Field Artilleryman, Apr 1969, pp. 49-57. 33Moore, “A New Look of Pershing,” pp. 49-57; Andreas Parsch, “Martin Marietta M14/MGM-31 Pershing,” HRDC. 34Briefing, subj: 1987 INF Treaty and its Impact on Fort Sill and 3/9 FA, HRDC; 1987 USAFACFS Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 28-29; Luanne Aline Turrentine, “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Modernization and Soviet-West German Relations,” unpublished Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1984, pp. 8-12, MSTL. 35Ibid., pp. 4-5; Hughes, “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch,’” pp. 10-12. 36Curtis, Brown, and Hogan, “Pershing,” pp. 28-32. 37Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of the Elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, 1987, pp. 1-4, HRDC; Msg, HQDA to CINCUSAREUR, et al, subj: INF Treaty Implementation Plan Update 88-1, 122000Z Jan 88, HRDC; Fact Sheet, Redstone Arsenal Historical Information, undated, HRDC; Hughes, “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch,’’ pp. 7-16. 38Lt Col Wilson A. Shoffner, “The Time has Come,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1976, pp. 50; “Lance: Greater Fire Support,” Artillery Trends, Feb 1964, pp. 3-7; Fact Sheet, Redstone Arsenal Historical Information, subj: Lance, undated, HRDC; LTC Justin LaPorte, “Lance: Testing in the European Environment,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1976, pp. 44-45; “The School Speaks,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1979, pp. 41-43; Maj Jim Rabon, “Lance,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1974, pp. 8-10.
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__________________ 39USAFAS and DCD, Program and Project Summary Sheets, 6 Jan 1989, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Cpt James Pearson, TRADOC System Manger (TSM) Rockets and Missiles (RAM), Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), 3 Mar 1989, HRDC; Annex A, FOTL Operational and Organizational Plan, Mar 1989, HRDC; DA Follow-on To Lance Systems Concept Paper (S), paras 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, material used is unclassified, HRDC; Information Paper, FOTL, undated, HRDC. 40TSM RAM Input for CG’s Monthly Report, 16 Feb 1990, HRDC; TSM RAM Input for CG’s Monthly Report, 20 Mar 1990, HRDC; TSM RAM Input for CG’s Monthly Report, 16 Jan 1990, HRDC; “Lance Follow-on To Be Axed,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 5 May 1990, p. 836; “Filling the Gap Left by Lance,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 19 May 1990, pp. 954-55; TSM RAM Input to CG’s Monthly Report, 15 May 1990, HRDC; Memorandum for USAFAS Operations, subj: CG’s Monthly Report, 16 May 1990, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Ken Roberts, TSM RAM, DCD, 4 Feb 1991, HRDC.
41Kirk, “Nuke: End of Mission, Out,” pp. 40-41; Sharon W. Lang, “SMDC History: Lance Missile Concludes Second Career,” 6 Aug 15, www.army.mil; “Lance,” https://history.redstone.army.mil. 42Briefing, Merritt, subj: Field Artillery Update, 18 Apr 1979, pp. 11-12, HRDC; Bruce Gudmundsson, “The Multiple Launch Rocket System: On Time and Under Budget,” Case Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1987, pp. 1-5,7, 10, in author’s possession; TRADOC System Manager, Fort Sill, Multiple Launch Rocket System Information Brochure, Mar 1982, p. 5, 33, HRDC; Ltr with encl, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery Board to See Distribution, subj: Draft Test Design Plan for Force Development Testing and Experimentation of the MLRS, 13 Apr 1982, MSTL; Keck, “A Tale of Two Offset Strategies,” The Diplomat, 18 Nov 2014. 43Lt Col Allan R. Stern, “Do We Need A Multiple Rocket Launcher,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1974, pp. 25-28; Comptroller General, Report to the Congress, The Army’s Multiple Launcher Rocket System is Progressing Well and Merits Continued Support, 5 Feb 1982, p. 1, HRDC; Jane’s Artillery and Armour, 1979-1980, pp. 528-29; Kenneth C. McDonald, “GSRS: More than the MRL,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1974, pp. 12-15. 44Mary Corrales, “MLRS: The Soldier’s System,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1980, p. 8; Col Charles J. Buel and Cpt Gary R. Miller, “GSRS Status Report,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1979, pp. 13-15; McDonald, “GSRS: More Than The MRL,” pp. 12-15; MLRS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (S), 17 Apr 80, p. 10, material used is unclassified, HRDC; Bruce A. Brant, “Battlefield Air Interdiction in the 1973 Middle East War and its Significance on NATO Air Operations,” Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Command and General Staff College, 1986, p. 85, Defense Technical Information Center reprint. 45McDonald, “GSRS: More than the MRL?” pp. 12-15; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 309; Buel and Miller, “GSRS Status Report,” pp. 13-15. 46“Bigger Wallop from Army Heavy Hitting Artillery,” Army, Sep 1983, pp. 28-29; Briefing, Japan/US Staff Talks, subj: MLRS, 8 Nov 1989, HRDC; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FATDS Quarterly Report, 5 Oct 1985, HRDC; Ltr, Cdr, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FATDS Quarterly Report, 7 Apr 1986, HRDC; “GSRS Contracts Awarded,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1977, p. 55; Buel and
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__________________ Miller, “GSRS: Status Report,” v pp. 13-15; Program Chart, subj: MLRS, undated, HRDC; Interview, Dr. Larry M. Kaplan, Assist Cmd Historian, with Maj John Nagle, Chief Writer, Rocket and Missile Division, Gunnery Department, 23 Jan 1990, HRDC; Directorate, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 1999 Annual Report, pp. 127-35, HRDC.
47Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOTE), FY 1999 Annual Report, pp. 128-35, HRDC; DOTE, FY 2000 Annual Report, pp. 85-88, HRDC; Memorandum for Director, Center of Lessons Learned, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Jul 1991, HRDC; 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44; Directorate of Test and Evaluation, FY 2000 Report, HRDC. 48DOTE, FY 1999 Annual Report, pp. 128-35, HRDC; DOTE, FY 2000 Annual Report, pp. 85-88, HRDC; Memorandum for Director, Center of Lessons Learned, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Jul 1991, HRDC; 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 49Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 Dec 09, pp. 1-2, HRDC. 50Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 3-4. 51Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, 19 Jun 08, HRDC; DOD News Release, Cluster Munitions Policy Released, 9 Jul 08, HRDC; Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to Reduce Collateral Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 Jul 08, HRDC; DOTE, FY 2014 Annual Report, p. 109, HRDC; Lockheed Fact Sheet, subj: First Lockheed Martin GMLRS Alternative Warhead Rolls off Assembly Line, 12 Sep 2016, HRDC. 52Briefing, subj: ATACMS, 1987, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Gregg Hutton, Chief, TSM RAMS, DCD, 11 Mar 1988, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Deep Fires, 28 Nov 1989, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Army TACMS (Extract)1989, HRDC; USAFAS Program and Project Summary Sheets, 20 Jan 1990, HRDC; TSM Rockets and Missiles, Input for CG’s Monthly Report, 12 Dec 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Army Tactical Missile System, 22 Feb 1989, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Dep Dir, 10 Feb 11, HRDC; Federal Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile System Product Office Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 9 Dec 14, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Rockets and Missiles, Update for AUSA 2013, Fall 2013, HRDC; Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, HRDC.
532010 USAFAS AH, pp. 105-10. 54Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr
12, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, 10 Feb 11, HRDC. Federal
38
__________________ Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile System Product Office Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 9 Dec 14, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Rockets and Missiles, Update for AUSA 2013, Fall 2013, HRDC; Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, HRDC. See 2010 USAFAS AH for history of ATACMS from the early 1990s to 2009, pp. 105-10. 55Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Duitsman, 10 Feb 11, HRDC; Federal Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile System Product Office Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 9 Dec 14, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Rockets and Missiles, Update for AUSA 2013, Fall 2013, HRDC; Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, HRDC; Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Commanders of Combatant Commands, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, subj: DoD Policy on Cluster Munitions, 30 Nov 2017, HRDC. 56Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager – Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44; Charles Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 2014, pp. 22-23; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires,” 16 May 2014, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC; Program Executive Officer Missiles and Space FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 2016, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 2017, HRDC; Program Executive Officer Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, HRDC.
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