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AD-A284 188

Desert Storm's Siren Song:Examining Revolution In Warfare

A Monographby

Major Kurtis D. Lohide,United States Air Force DTIC,4 f ELECTEDS 0 9 1994D

G94-2905711Hll11H I' 111114

School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas __ ~ Second Term AY 93-94 /Approved f'or Public Release; Ditsribution Is Unlimited

MIC QUALTY 2:2PCT.D S94 9 06 124

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE F" AO PDo,Oe Pmgke. SI Ii. Aateig .V 0. Mdto the Offce 4 , . Aim .de 9aecm'wt hd wclOrogect 14 W1Kew to,. OC wfl.11. AGENCY US ONLY (L.v* b 2,,)REPORT DATE 1. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED27/05/94 MONOGRAPH4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE S. FUNDING NUMBERSDESERT STORM'S SIREN SONG:EXAMINING-REVOLUTION IN WARFARE (U)6. AUTNOR(S)MAJ KURTIS D. LOHIDE, USAF7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADORES ES ) S. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONSCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES REPORT NUMERATTN: AZTL-SWVFORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900COX (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON 552-34372. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/ MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11 . SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED12i. OISTRUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT '12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maxhnum 200vwonft)This study refutes the claims by many air power advocates thatOperation Desert Storm stands as a revolution in warfare.According to their logic, the success of the Gulf War aircampaign proves air power has become the dominant force inmodern warfare. As this study demonstrates, these argumentspromoting Desert Storm as a revolution in warfare are basedmore upon emotion than logic. After evaluating the Gulf War ona cognitive level, one finds it only appears a revolution whenviewed as a single event. However a true revolution requires asample size larger than one. Unless the Desert Storm victory isvalidated through time and repetition, talk of revolution ispremature. Worsa yet, inaccurately labeling the Gulf War arevolution could lead the U.S. military to develop a forcestructure which is unable to deal with the full gamut of twenty-first century threats.

14 . SuluECT T1ERMS DeetRvlto nWraeIS. NUMBER Of PAGESoperation Desert Storm Revolution in warfare 54Cultural Warfare Air Power in Future Wars 16 . PRICE CODE17. SECURITY CLASSWICATION 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20 . UMITATION OF ABSTROF REPORTy OF T"IS PAGE OF ABSTRACT

N .. .... 4.. I ....'NSN 740n-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-8P0cicr~bed by ANdSItd 139IS

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Maior Kurtis D. LohideTitle of Monograph: Desert Storm's Siren Sona: Examining

Revolution in Warfare

Approved by:

__________________________________Monograph Director',Qes j chneider, Ph.D.

____ ___ _____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___Director, School ofCOL Gregof Fo4itenot, MA, MMAS Advanced M ilitaryStudies

" Director, GraduatePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

Accepted this 6th day of May 1994

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageAPPROVAL PAGE .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. iABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . .................. iiiCHAPTERI. INTRODUCTION. ... . .......... . .II. FATAL SUCCESS .. . . . . . . ....... . 2III. DEFINING REVOLUTION .. . . . . ....... 7IV. STRATEGY OF ANNIHILATION ........... ............. 9V. STRATEGY OF EXHAUSTION . . ............. 13VI. STRATEGY OF PARALYSIS .............. 20VII. CLOSING TH E GAP . . . . . . . . 25VIII. CULTURAL WARFARE. .. . . . . ......... 36IX. CONCLUSION . . . . . . ... . . . . . 38APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . 42ENDNOTES ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . ........ ........... 49

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I. INTRODUCTIONAddressing an audience at Trinity College in 1963,

British historian Noble Frankland remarked, "people havepreferred to feel rather than to know about strategicbombing."' His comment referred to the widely disparateopinions concerning the effectiveness of strategic bombing inWorld War II. For example, authors of the United StatesStrategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) maintained Allied airattacks were decisive in winning th e war in Western Europe.'Using the same survey as evidence, J.F.C. Fuller pronouncedth e Combined Bomber Offensive a largely wasted operation.,That these controversies continued to exist, despite thevoluminous data contained in the USSBS, lends credence toFrankland's observation that the subject had been addressedon the emotional as opposed to cognitive level.

Similar to th e Allied Bomber Offensive, no consensuscurrently exists as to th e significance of the Gulf War aircampaign. Central to the ongoing debate is whether DesertStorm heralds a revolution in warfare. In his book SQO , U.S. Air Force historian, Dr. Richard Hallionstates th e war confirms "a major transformation in the natureof warfare: the dominance of air power." 4 Opposing thisposition, individuals like William S. Lind, author of TheManeuver Warfare Handbook, argue although the air campaigndamaged Iraq's strategic infrastructure, it did notdecisively defeat the Iraqi Army in Kuwait, a fact which

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discredits talk of revolution.'As it was for the Combined Bomber Offensive, Frankland's

comment seems an appropriate observation fo r the ongoingdebate concerning the significance of the Gulf War bombingcampaign. The contradictory opinions discussed above offertestament to much "feeling" but little "knowing." To reversethis situation and examine Desert Storm on a cognitive,instead of emotional, level it is necessary to first definewhat constitutes a revolution in warfare. This studyevaluates Operation Desert Storm after establishing such adefinition to act as a bench mark fo r comparison. Itconcludes the air campaign only represents a revolution ifviewed as a single snapshot in time. However such a view isfundamentally flawed. Revolutions require validation overtime and repetition which makes them verifiable only throughhistorical retrospective. Thus, while Desert Storm certainlycontains valuable lessons applicable to future wars, it isstill a too recent event to substantiate claims ofrevolution.

II. FATAL SUCCESSThe above conclusions might seem an inconsequential

matter of semantics until one considers the hazards ofmisrealing a military victory. The Israelis made such anerror after their lopsided victory over the Arabs in 1967.'To initiate the Six Day War, the Israeli Air Force (IAF)executed a near flawless preemptive attack, destroying the

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bulk of the Egyptian and Syrian Air Forces on the ground.Hard on this surprise air offensive, the Israel Army launcheda rapid armored thrust which left it perched on the Banks ofthe Suez Canal and in possession of the entire SinaiPeninsula.

This quick decisive victory in the Six Day War instilledwithin Israeli Defense Force (IDF) commanders a belief in theinvincibility of their air and armored forces. In theaftermath of the conflict, ID F doctrine, training and weaponsprocurements were all driven by the principles of mobileoffensive warfare which the Israelis felt carried the day in1967. This continued even after Egyptian troops, firingnewly acquired Soviet SA-3 missiles, downed 20 IAF jetsduring a six-month stretch in 1970. So enamored were theIsraelis with their invincibility, they dismissed both thelethality of the Egyptian's new defensive weapons and theincreasing competence of the Arab gunners.

These dismissals cost the ID F dearly in the 1973 YomKippur War. While ostensibly an Israeli victory, the outcomewas far from the unequivocal success of 1967. In the Sinaitheater the Israelis managed to counter-cross the Suez Canaland rush armored columns south to the Red Sea. Although thismaneuver encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the east sideof the waterway, the Egyptian forces were still intact andfar from decisively defeated at the time of the cease fire.

Enroute to this dissatisfying .endstate stiff Egyptian3

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resistance continually surprised and bloodied the IDF.Knowing of the Israeli overconfidence and preoccupation witha mobile offensive doctrine, the Egyptians countered with amore balanced combined arms approach. Along with theirSoviet tanks and fighter jets, the Egyptians also fieldedsubstantial numbers of infantry highly trained in anti-armortactics. To protect these ground forces from air attack, theArabs constructed a dense surface-to-air missile umbrellawhich decimated the IAF before Israeli ground units finallyoverran the sites.

The failure of the Israelis to dominate the Arabsresulted from an overconfidence rooted in the Six Day War.Although this after-the-fact conclusion might initially seempresumptuous, it is significantly buttressed by Israel's ownpost-war observations. In 1974, the Agranat Commission, ahigh-level Israeli council convened to assess IDF failures,released preliminary findings. These verdicts severelycriticized high ranking Israeli intelligence officials fortheir unflinching adherence to the belief that, based ontheir 1967 performance, the hapless Egyptians could nevercarry off a surprise attack.'

Furthermore, as retired MG Avraham "Bren" Adan, an IDFdivision commander on the Sinai Front, states, the Israeliswere fully aware of the enemy's increased anti-tankcapabilities but because of an exaggerated overconfidencefailed until too late to develop counter tactics.* Thus, by

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their own admissions, the 1967 victory infected the Israeliswith a."victory disease" which manifested itself as a severecase of institutional myopia.' 0 Israeli defense officialsonly envisioned a future war where air superiority fightersand tank-heavy ground forces would rapidly and totally defeattheir Arab antagonists.

The United States risks suffering the consequences ofvictory disease if the Persian Gulf conflict is prematurelyjudged a revolution in warfare. Already prodromal effects ofth e disease could account for certain developments in thedefense establishment. Former Secretary of Defense LesAspin's recent Bottom-Up Review is a case in point.Commendably, Mr. Aspin's review is a proactive attempt totailor correctly the nation's armed forces to meet securitydemands in the post Cold W ar era. Unfortunately th e reviewreveals'a rearward-looking fixation on the Gulf War victory.

The study concludes the United States needs the militarycapability to simultaneously fight two major regionalcontingencies (MRC).' 1 It cites a remilitarized Iraq and anaggressive North Korea as probable major regional entitiesagainst which the U.S. would likely fight."2 As Dr Eliot A.Cohen points out in a New Republic article, this concept ofthe future is somewhat circumspect. It imagines a situationwhere "an opponent, conveniently armed with th e weapons ofthe Gulf War and with forces the size of Saddam Hussein's,would attach an innocent but loyal American ally who would

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call fo r help."13Inasmuch as the Gulf War emerges as a model for future

conflict, while U.S. military planners are wrestling withissues like Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, leads to certainconclusions. Foremost, it suggests those championing theGulf War as a new paradigm of warfare are gaining ascendancyin certain military circles. As a result of their patronage,such a mantle of credibility bedecks the Gulf victory thatscenarios imitating it are automatically looked upon withgreat favor. In this environment the statement, "Oh, but Isaw it in the Gulf," is capable of validating what wouldordinarily remain matters of military conjecture.-"

So , like the Israelis, Americans seem committed topreparing fo r the next war by using the lessons of the last.The seductive nature of the Gulf War victory makes thetemptation to do so quite compelling. Due largely to thesuccess of coalition air power, Desert Storm was quick; itwas decisive; and with relatively few U.S. casualties, itappeared almost bloodless. Understandably then, Americanslike to picture the war as a revolution in warfare. As such,it would usher in an era where an air-dominated, hightechnology military force could win all wars in this samerelatively bloodless fashion.

However, as Clausewitz points out, war "is not theaction of a living force upon a lifeless mass but always thjcollision of two living forces."*" Or, to translate

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Clausewitz into twentieth century parlance: the enemy gets avote. The recent deaths of 17 U.S. Army Rangers in Somaliaadds a bloody exclamation point to this remark. Still,despite the debacle in Mogadishu, the Gulf War victory shinesso bright in many Americans' eyes that it tends to blind themto Clausewitz's warning.

Talk of revolution only exasperites this problem bygiving th e comforting impression that, by relying heavily onair power and technology, th e U.S. military is capable ofdefeating all comers. In choosing to believe blindly in thisflawed logic the United States might still win a twenty--first-century war, but leave a battlefield needlesslylittered with its dead. To prevent such an occurrence, it isnecessary to evaluate the Persian Gulf War on a cognitivelevel. Such a review assists in dispelling the notion ofDesert Storm as the beginning of a revolutionary new era inwarfare.

III. DEFINING REVOLUTIONIn order to prove that Desert Storm does not comprise a

revolution in warfare it becomes necessary first to establisha standard for comparison. Unfortunately, revolution is oneof the looser words in modern lexicon. In the introductionto his book, AnatoMy of a Revolution, social scientist CraneBrinton writes that in common usage the term revolution hasbecome a synonym for virtually any change." Brinton goeson to explain th e reason such an indistinct definition

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exists. He describes the difference between a revolution andnormal change as more like th e difference between a mountainand a hill than between the freezing and boiling points of aparticular substance." Therefore, looking for scientificparameters which mark the boundaries between ordinary changeand revolution becomes a thoroughly frustrating exercise.

Still, discussion without definition is difficult. '*Consequently, to facilitate evaluation some credibledefinition is required. In their recent book War and Anti-W r, futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler offer the followingdefinition for military revolution.

A military revolution, in the fullest sense,occurs only when a new civilization arises tochallenge the old, when an entire society transformsitself, forcing its armed services to change at everylevel simultaneously -- from technology and cultureto organization, strategy, tactics, training,doctrine, and logistics.'"The Tofflers, definition is correct in the broad sense thatrevolutionary societal change begets revolution militarychange. However, their "laundry list" of changes which occurwhen a country's armed services undergo revolutionary changeis somewhat convoluted. -f one likens military revolution toa planet-like sphere, the changes the Tofflers list liketechnology, culture, organization and strategy represent onlythe outer strata. Underlying this layer is a denser corecontaining the rudimentary elements of warfare: time, spaceand mass. A true revolution in warfare occurs only when along-term restructuring of these core elements takes place.

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Perhaps the best method of illustrating this thought isthrough th e use of historical example. During the AmericanCivil War an enduring reordering of the basic elements of waroccurred. As such, this conflict serves as a historical"Rosetta Stone" against which to compare and analyzeOperation Desert Storm. However, before the significance ofthe American Civil War can be understood, it is necessary tograsp th e type of warfare which it replaced.

IV. STRATEGY OF ANNIHILATIONOn 20 September 1792, the combined armies of French

Generals Dumoureiz and Kellerman caused a Prussian armycommanded by th e Duke of Brunswick to withdraw from abattlefield near Valmy in North-Eastern France.2 0 FrenchMarshal Ferdinand Foch noted th e significance of th eencounter, remarking it ended the wars of the Kings andlaunched a new era of nationalist people's wars." The manwho emerged as the leading figure of this new era was ofcourse Napoleon Bonaparte. By combining the nationalisticfervor of the French social revolution and his ow n genius,Napoleon created the strategy of annihilation; a paradigm ofwarfare destined to dominate military thinking for th e nextcentury.

Perhaps better than any other historian, David G.Chandler, author of The Campaigns of Napoleon, summed up theFrench Emperor's approach to war by calling him "theproponent of th e single knockout blow."22 Elaborating on

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Chandler's thought, J.F.C. Fuller noted Napoleon generallyachieved this annihilating punch by adhering to a singleover- arching principle. Above all else, the French commanderirsisted on a concentrated superiority of force on thebattlefield, particularly at the decisive point of attack."A look at the French Army's 1805 campaigns reveals thedevastating effectiveness of this strategy. In that year,Napoleon gathered his corps, at the time quartered all overwestern Europe, and brought them together with perfect timingto surround the Austrian army at Ulm. After Austrian GeneralMack capitulated, Napoleon dispersed his forces only to havethem converge again and defeat the Austrian and Russians atAusterl i tz.*4

Clearly these campaigns showcased a variety of militaryinnovations which Napoleon introduced to warfare. Nationalconscription, the corps system and the central positionstrategy were all part of this military metamorphosis.However, returning to the previous analogy which likenedrevolution in warfare to a planet, these changes were part ofthe outer mantle and not the central core. The essence ofNapoleonic warfare, the quality which made it unique andenduring, is found in the relationship he established betweenthe'core elements of time, space and mass.

The two leading nineteenth century chroniclers ofNapbleonic warfare, Jomini and Clausewitz, both grasped thesignificance of this relationship. In book three of on jja,

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Clausewitz devotes two chapters to the subject of time, spaceand mass. In chapter eleven, entitled "Concentration ofForces in Space," Clausewitz states "there is no higher andsimpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forcesconcentrated." 3 5

This comes as a telling statement from a theorist whogenerally maintained metaphysical factors prevented universalaxioms which could govern the conduct of war. In thefollowing chapter, "Unification of Forces in Time," hepresents another of his rare rules. In this passage hestates all forces intended and available for a strategicpurpose should be applied simultaneously to facilitate asingle action at a single point. 2" Since Clausewitz equatedmilitary forces to mass, one sees he considered thisrelationship between time, space and mass as the inviolateessence of Napoleonic warfare.

Unlike Clausewitz, Baron Antoine Henri Jomini seldomhesitated to write prescriptions fo r warfare. However, heagreed with his fellow theorist that the most importantprinciple of warfare dealt with the relationship betweentime, space and mass. The essence of this primal principle,which Jomini expressed in four maximums, was that the mass offorces must be thrown upon the decisive point at the propertime." Jomini then, like Clausewitz, saw the concentrationof time and mass upon a single point in space as the basicfabric of Napoleonic warfare.

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Figure one in appendix A is a graphic depiction ofNapoleon's strategy. By adhering to this strategy of thesingle point, Napoleon forced his enemies either tocapitulate, as Mack did, or to face annihilation, as happenedto the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz. Germanmilitary historian Hans Delbruck has labeled this type ofwarfare, which has as its aim the decisive battle, as thestrategy of annihilation." Whether termed strategy of thesingle point or strategy of annihilation, the convergence oftime, space and mass into a single point, constitutes .classical Napoleonic warfare.

A historical review reveals this strategy ofannihilation had an enduring impact on warfare. AsNapoleonic historian Gunther E. Rothenburg points outs,starting with the French Revolution in 1792 and ending withNapoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815, more than 644 majorbattles took place." Certainly not all these clashesresulted in French victories; however, a common threadrunning through them was an ever-growing adoption of theFrench method of battle. For decades after his death,Napoleon's concept of the decisive battle of annihilationwielded a heavy influence upon military thinking.

During the mid-nineteenth century, for example, Helmuthvon Noltke used the new strategic mobility made possible byrailroads to rapidly mass-mobilize Prussian forces and windecisive Napoleonic victories during the wars of German

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Unification.3 Motivating Moltke was a belief that throughsuch rapid concentrations he could elevate the principle ofquick, decisive battle to a new, higher level." Half acentury later Napoleonic principles exerted a major influenceon Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the German General Staff.At the h:art of the Schiefflen Plan, Germany's all outinitial assault of World War I, was the concept ofVernichtungsgedanke, the idea of annihilation.32

From the above examples one sees it is necessary to havea sample size larger than one to authenticate the occurrenceof a revolution in warfare. As stated earlier, a revolution,besides reorganizing the basic elements of war, also requiresvalidation through time and repetition. As demonstrated, theNapoleonic strategy of annihilation has satisfied bothrequirements, making it a valid revolution. However only inretrospect can one determine if such enduring change hasindeed occurred. Conflict not satisfying this criteria,while still significant to the study of warfare, does notconstitute revolution. Therefore, developing militarydoctrine on a single case example can, as Israel found out in1973, lead to disaster. Therein lies the danger of labelingDesert Storm a revolution before it is properly validated.

V. STRATEGY OF EXHAUSTIONIn his book Stages of Economic Growth, Professor W. W.

Rostow indicates between the years 1843-1860 the UnitedStates underwent an economic take-off which launched the

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country into the industrial revolution.3" This shift froman agrarian to an industrial based society represents thetype of sweeping change in political and social order whichthe Tofflers cite as a prerequisite to revolution in warfare.True to this forecast, the American Civil War ushered in anew paradigm of warfare. The end product of this first greatconflict in the age of steam was the replacement of theclassical Napoleonic battle of annihilation by the modernstrategy of exhaustion.3'

The cause of this transformation lies in the influencesthe industrial revolution had upon the character of warfare.For instance, the industrial revolution permitted massproduction of the rifled musket which led to dramatic changeson the battlefield. The appearance of this weapon in largequantities rendered the Napoleonic practice of densebattalion column attacks obsolete.3

The rifled musket increased the effective rangeof the infantryman's weapon from not much over 50yards to 25 0 yards, and the extreme range from 250yards to about half a mile. Against rifledfirepower, the only safety was in trenches or behindother kinds of protection. To rise up and deliver afrontal attack became almost always futile againstany reasonably steady defenders. Even well-executedflank attacks tended to suffer such heavy casualtiesas experienced rifleman maneuvered to form new frontsagainst them that they lost the decisiveness they hadenjoyed in the Napoleonic Wars. 3"

Thus, as a result of the rifled musket massed offensiveattacks against a decisive point, the trademark of Napoleonicwarfare, quickly became obsolete.

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complexion of warfare, railroads did the same on thestrategic level. The industrial revolution enabled countriesto develop robust economic sectors which could mass produceweapons, clothing, engineering equipment and most othermaterials which fueled modern conflict. During periods ofwar: railroads linked this vast economic rear area with thewarfighting front. The result was a nation which couldmaintain a near continuous state of mobilization."' Hence,unlike Napoleonic times, the army and the nation were nolonger distinct entities. The nation in its entirety becamean armed fortress."

Since railroads incorporated the nation's military,industrial base and population into a single sphere ofwarfighting, a Napoleonic defeat of a single army in a singlebattle, even if decisive, no longer could cause a country'scollapse. Thus a new way of war, one which attacked anenemy's fielded forces and industrial infrastructure, had tobe devised. Unfortunately commanders of the day were illprepared intellectually to grasp this concept. Prior to theCivil War the U.S. Military Academy at West Point hadinstitutionalized the Napoleonic standard of decisive battle.Dennis Hart Mahan, an influential instructor at the academyfrom 1832 to 1871, translated French interpretations ofNapoleonic war into English and made these works part of theacademy's core curriculum.3 ' In 1846, Henry Wager Halleck,a disciple of Mahan and future commander of the America's

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Civil War Army, published Elements of Military Art andSience. In writing heavily influence by Jomini, Halleck

instructed cadets that directing mass on a decisive point wasthe defining element of strategy.4' So both Mahan andHalleck, the two leading American strategists prior to theCivil War, inculcated successive generations of Americanmilitary officers with the idea of the decisive battle.

Not surprisingly, when the American Civil War broke out,these commanders, packing West Point manuals in their saddlebags, attempted to fight classical battles of annihilation.Against modern industrialized armies the outcome of thesebattles was bloody and indecisive. For example, at FirstBull Run the rifled musket caused heavy casualties to bothConfederate and Union forces as they made alternating chargesacross the open ground at Henry House Hill. 41 Later in thebattle, in another moved which signaled the impact oftechnology on modern warfare, the Confederates sealed theirvictory by using railroads in the rapid transfer of 7,000 ofJoe Johnston's men from Piedmont Station to ManassasJunction."'

Beyond the tactical significance of the events at FirstBull Run lay a greater lesson for Civil War commanders. Eventhough the defeated Union Army fled the field, the day'sfighting produced no decisive victory. As such, the battleserved as a signpost that modern warfare had renderedNapoleonic principles obsolete. Unfortunately none of the

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generals understood that a dichotomy existed between theconcept of annihilation and the regenerative powers of anindustrialized nation in arms.

Therefore, as Union commander Ulysses S. Grant observed,after three years of war the opposing forces, especially inthe East, stood in substantially the same positions as theyhad at the start of th e war.4 3 Grant's assessment of th esituation came during a trip to Washington, D.C. where, inearly 1864, he received his third star and assumed command ofa ll Union field armies. Grant's promotion and subsequentreassignment represented a turning point in the strugglebetween the states. In Grant the war found its firstcommander capable of conceptualizing the difference betweenclassical and modern warfare. Grant understood theindustrial revolution had caused the modern battlefield toexpand in length, breadth and depth. Consequently herealized victory no longer resided in one decisive action."Hence, instead of pursuing a strategy of exhausting, Grantconceived a strategy which would destroy the enemy byattriting his army and resources.

Thus the kind of campaign that General Grant hadin mind was one that would be characterized by aseries of battles--some fought sequentially, otherssimultaneously--that would be distributed across theentire theater of war. No one would likely bedecisive, but the culmination of the effects of allwould.49

According to Grant, continuous hammering against the South'smilitary fortress would eventually, by exhaustion through

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attrition, force the confederacy to capitulate.'"In the spring of 1864 Grant planned a campaign composed

of five operations to affect a strategy of exhaustion againstthe Confederacy. George Meade's Army of the Potomac attackedLee's Army in Northern Virginia. Benjamin F. Butler moved bywater up the James River where his forces landed to threatenRichmond and Lee's lines of communications. Franz Sigelattacked into the fertile Shenandoah Valley with orders todestroy food supplies and rail hubs. In the West, Grantinstructed William T. Sherman to penetrate deep into theConfederacy destroying rail lines and supply centers atAtlanta, Augusta, Savannah and Charleston. In an additionalthrust at the South's economic heart, Grant planned forNathaniel P. Banks to seize Mobile and march inland to attackthe economically vital areas of Montgomery and Selma."

Although the ineptitude of several Northern generalscaused some of Grant's plans to go awry, his strategy ofexhaustion ultimately proved successful. This successcarried a significance beyond winning the war fo r the Union.Grant's campaign design also restructured the relationship oftime, space and mass. Figure two in appendix A is a graphicrepresentation of how these three elements were changed byGrant's 1964-65 Civil War campaign. As mentioned previously,the Industrial Revolution essentially formed entire nationsinto armed garrisons. This in turn greatly expanded thetheater of war. As Grant correctly ascertained, attacking

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only an enemy's army, essentially the Napoleonic method,would not cause a nation to surrender. To win a modern war asuccessful attacker had to strike simultaneously andsuccessively throughout a nation's industrial depth. Such acampaign of deep successive operationswould severely attritthe enemy's warmaking capabilities, eventually causing hisdefeat.

World War II reaffirmed Grant's strategy as thearchetype for winning modern industrialized warfare. Just asGrant orchestrated multiple attacks against ConfederateArmies, Allied forces struck Axis forces in Italy, WesternRussia and France. Meanwhile, in a modern version ofSherman's deep raid against the South's economic resourcesand communications, Allied bomber attacks struck devastatingblows against German industrial centers and rail hubs. WorldWar II thus served as the test of time and repetition whichvalidated Grant's strategy of exhaustion as a true revolutionin warfare.

Before moving on, it is important to again emphasizerevolution can only be identified, as in the above example,in broad retrospect. That is, one can verify Grant's orNapoleon's strategies as revolutions in warfare only througha historical review which confirms their enduring effects.To identify a conflict as a revolution immediately after thefact, which is the attempt with Desert Storm, is impossiblesince one event cannot constitute a definable pattern.

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Logically then the lessons one learns from studying arevolution in warfare can never have an immediateapplication. Instead, this information contributes to amilitary planner's overall body of knowledge. Then, just asGrant did in 1864, planners use this entire body of knowledgeto analyze individually each situation before them andconceptualize a proper military solution.

VI. STRATEGY OF PARALYSISToday mankind is experiencing the effects of a technology

based societal revolution.'4 So proclaims Alvin Toffler inhis future orientated book, The Third Wave. The changesassociated with this new era are so profound Toffler saysfinding a name which encompasses them all is problematical.Terms like Space Age, Information Age and Electronic Era comeclose, but overall seem to fail in capturing the ongoingchanges in their entirety." Nevertheless, althoughdifficult to describe, few persons today argue the thirdwave's existence. Nor do many argue that like the agrarianand industrial waves before it, this third wave is shatteringsocial, political and economic paradigms.

If history is an accurate indicator, warfare will alsochange in this new era. If one thinks of the strategy ofannihilation as a product of the agrarian age and thestrategy of exhaustion as belonging to the industrial age,then it seems reasonable to assume the third wave will spawnit own unique strategy. Individuals supporting Desert Storm

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as a revolution in warfare claim this new strategy emergedduring the Gulf War. As their logic goes, third wavetechnological advances allowed coalition air forces to employa new defeat mechanism against Saddam's military. The airattacks against Iraq led to defeat neither by annihilation orexhaustion, instead, by using what has been coined parallelwar, coalition aircraft "paralyzed" the Iraqis.

To understand this new strategy of paralysis one mustfirst examine its theoretical underpinnings which are foundin the writings of Italian air theorist Guilo Douhet. In1921, General Dounet, then head of the Italian CentralAeronautical Bureau, published Command of the Air, the firstcomprehensive theory of air power. In this work Douhetboldly predicted air forces possessed capabilities whichwould soon allow them to dominate land and sea services.He reasoned the aircraft 's ability to overfly surfacedefenses and geographic obstacles made it an offensive weaponpar excellence."' Air power therefore could overcome thesuperiority of the defense and mercifully end the entrenchedstalemates which characterized World W ar I.

To exploit fully air power's inherent offensive nature,Douhet fervently crusaded for the establishment of anindependent air force. Untethered from their ground supportrole, air planes could then fly massed raids deep into theenemy's heartland. To ensure the success of these strategicattacks, Douhet stressed the need to throw all the nation's

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resources into the offensive.Viewed in its true light, aerial warfare admitsof no defense, only offense. We must thereforeresign ourselves to the offensives the enemy inflictsupon us, while striving to put all our resources towork to inflict even heavier ones upon him. This isthe basic principle which must govern the developmentof aerial warfare. 5 2

With these resources Douhet advocated building what hetermed a "battleplane." Such a warplane would maximize thecharacteristics of armament, armor protection, speed andradius of action."3 While local defenses composed of anti-aircraft batteries and pursuit planes might down someairborne attackers, Douhet argued such weapons were largelyineffective. No matter the strength of the enemy's defense,he believed th e majority of the battleplanes would invariablyget through.

As his bottom line then, Douhet maintained that anindependent air force, using battleplanes in a strategicrole, could inflict "the greatest damage in the shortestpossible time.'' 5 4 After a few days of such devastating airattacks Douhet believed an enemy would collapse.5 " As such,Douhet became the first to forecast a future where air powerwould return decisiveness to warfare.

Reality challenged Douhet's theories in World War II.At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Allied leadersmapped out plans for a coordinated aerial campaign againstGermany. Using the RAF for night attacks, and the AmericanEight and Fifteenth Air Forces for day strikes, Allied

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bombers would strike the German war machine "round theclock."" Code named Pointbank, the operation sent massedraids against economically strategic targets such aselectrical power plants, transportation facilities andpetroleum refineries."

Unfortunately the Allied planners chose to make attacksagainst the Luftwaffe a secondary objective. This choiceproved a costly intellectual error, albeit an understandablemistake considering the rudimentary state of air campaignplanning. A closer reading of Douhet would have revealed tothe planners his dictum that at the beginning of thehostilities aerial warfare should be prosecuted to thegreatest extent possible." By aerial warfare Douhet meantthe air force should carry out pre-emptive attacks against anenemy's airfield. This would destroy the rival air force onthe ground and secure the all important command of the air.

The Allies' failure to achieve air superiority madePointblank a very close run thing. For example, during theinfamous "Black Week" in October 1943, the Eighth Force Airlost 15 2 bombers and a quarter of its aircrews." Lossrates this high threatened the very survival of the Americanstrategic bomber force and throughout the remainder of theyear no raids penetrated the Reich.' 0 The devastatinglosses also threatened the upcoming D-Day invasion leadingU.S. Army Air Force Commander, General Henry "Hap" Arnold, toreassess the situation.

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On 27 December 1943, Arnold ordered the commandinggenerals of Eight and Fifteenth Air rorces to change theirobjectives."

It is a conceded fact that Overlord and Anvilwill not be possible unless the German Air Force isdestroyed. Therefore, my personal message to you--this is a must--is to destroy the enemy air forcewherever you find them, in th e air, on th e ground,and in the factories.' 2Arnold's decision secured command of the sky for the allies.Aided by newly fielded long range P-51 Mustangs, and a changein fighter tactics from close escort to "sweeps," the Alliesreversed the disasters of Black Week. Instead came the BigWeek of 22 to 25 February when U.S. air forces flew 3,800daylight sorties over occupied Europe and eliminated theLuftwaffe as an effective fighting force.' 3

With the Luftwaffe disabled, Germany bore the fullimpact of massed allied bomber attacks. According to Douhetsuch attacks should have quickly destroyed the country'sstrategic warmaking capability and collapsed civilian morale.This did not occur. In face of the onslaught Germanproduction actually increased. Post-war data gathered by theUSSBS revealed almost every category of critical war materiallike petroleum, armaments, ball-bearings and so forth, sawincreased outputs well into the summer months of 1944."

Critics of the Combined Bomber Offensive argued outputdecreased only after Russian ground forces begin overrunningGerman production facilities on the eastern front. This ledopponents of air power to dismiss once and for all the

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concept of a decisive air campaign. Airmen heatedlycontested this assertion. They contended th e problem'ssource was the technological gap separating theory andreality. Although touted as daylight precision bombers,World War II planes like the B-17 were grossly inaccurate.For instance to ensure a 90 per cent probability one bombwould h it a 60 by 100 foot target required dropping well over9000 bombs.s Nighttime attacks produced even worse resultswith British bombers routinely missing their targets by morethan five miles."

Due to this lack of precision, allied air planners couldonly cause significant damage by sending a series of raidsagainst the same target. The serial nature of this sort ofair campaign violated another of Douhet's axioms which statedan objective "must be destroyed completely in one attack."'' 7Only total target destruction, on the first pass, could havecreated the moral and physical destruction which Douhetbelieved would cause the enemy to quickly acquiesce. WorldWar II bombers obviously lacked the technology to ever causesuch catastrophic damage.

VII. CLOSING THE CAPAs the preceding discussions disclose, Douhet's

disciples attributed air power's shortcomings in World War IImore to problems of mind and machine than flaws in theory.In the heady days following Desert Storm, air power patronstouted the Gulf War as a watershed event in which these

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disparities finally disappeared and Douhet's prophecies wereat last fulfilled. Based on the stunning effectiveness ofthe air offensive, long time air power devotees went on toportray the victory as symbolic of a fundamental shift in thetraditional methods of waging warfare.'" Still, untilrigorously evaluated against a proven standard, these post-war pronouncements of revolution remain products more ofemotion than logic.

This study earlier established such a standard byexamining Grants's 1865-64 campaign. If the Gulf War trulyrepresents a revolution it must alter warfare in the samemanner as Grant's campaign. Specifically, as a result ofOperation Desert Storm the elements of time, space and massmust exhibit a qualitative and lasting transformation in thepattern of warfare.

Many airmen claim Desert Storm, by finally vindicatingDouhet's theories, qualifies as such lasting change. Tofollow this logic one needs to examine the role of technologyin the conflict. As stated in the Desert Storm after actionreport to the U.S. Congress, sophistication in weaponry had amajor impact on the outcome of the war.

This war demonstrated dramatically the newpossibilities of what has been called the "military-technological revolution in warfare." This technicalrevolution encompasses many areas, including stand-off precision weapons, sophisticated sensors, stealthfor surprise and survivability, night visioncapabilities and tactical ballistic missiledefenses."

Those trying to verify the existence of this military-26

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technical revolution in the Desert Storm victory find acompelling example in the war 's star performer, th e F-117ANighthawk Stealth Fighter. A close examination of thisweapon system shows it epitomizes the profound effects which"third wave" technologies can have on the modern battlefield.

While many coalition aircraft contained individualelements of high technology, the Stealth fighter was a trueamalgamation: its design both absorbed and reflected radaremissions making it invisible to the enemy; in its weaponsbays hung bombs equipped with sophisticated laser guidancepackages; and to deliver these munitions with superbaccuracy, both at day and night, the F-117A utilized a state-of-the-art infrared targeting system. Overall, thesynergistic effects of these systems allowed the aircraft animpressive showing in its first large-scale combatemployment.

Of the 1,296 sorties the Stealth fighter flew in thedesert, the majority were against heavily defended strategictargets in downtown Baghdad. So effective was the F-117Athat although it flew only two percent of the coalition'sattacks, it struck 40 percent of the strategic targetsselected by air planners. Remarkably the Stealth fighter didthis with little, if any, assistance from support aircraft.Unlike non-stealth airframes, which required protection fromescorting electronic combat and air superiority planes,Stealth fighters most often flew alone. Finally, in contrast

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to the massed raids of the Combined Bomber Offensive, Iraqienemy air defenders claimed not a single Stealth kill."o

By compiling this wartime record the Stealth providedconvincing evidence that seemingly technology had at lastbreached the Douhetian gap. Actually, the Stealth surpassedDouhet's expectations. Cloaked in stealth instead of armor,F-1117A survivability rates exceeded anything Douhet imaginedwhen he first described the attributes of a consummatebattleplane. Additionally, its superior bombing accuracyensured target destruction more surely than Douhet everenvisioned.

With this unprecedented accuracy Desert Storm plannersbegan to anticipate that one F-117A sortie would destroy onetarget. When compared against the 300 plus bomber raids ofthe Combined Bomber Offensive, it at first appearedtechnologically advanced aircraft like the Stealth fighterhad led to a "de-massing" of aerial combat." This howeverrepresents a faulty conclusion resulting from erroneouslyequating mass to numbers instead of effects. The aircampaign still relied on mass but the coalition plannersapplied it in a totally new manner. Inasmuch as theiractions effectively closed the "intellectual gap" betweenreality and Douhet's theories, the planner's thoughtprocesses merit closer inspection.

As Christopher Bellamy points out in The Evolution ofModern Land Warfare, no technical panaceas exist in warfare;

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only through intelligence and laborious study of tactics andoperational art can one discover new means of fighting."2Prior to th e outbreak of Desert Storm, a group of planners inthe Air Forces's Checkmate division focused their efforts onjust such intellectual endeavors. Checkmate, a planning celllocated in the Pentagon, was headed by U.S. Air Force ColonelJohn A. Warden III. A few years earlier Warden had authoredThe Air Campaian, th e first theoret ical treatise on aerialcampaigning since Douhet's work. 7 3 Warden's opportunity toapply his theories to a real air campaign came when CENTCOMcommander U.S. Army GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf requested helpfrom the Joint Chiefs of Staff in planning the air campaign.They passed his request on to Checkmate.

When Warden showed up in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a weeklater to brief Schwarzkopf, he presented a plan "designed tocripple Iraq's military without laying waste to thecountry."" At the crux of the plan was Warden's holisticconceptualization of Iraq as five concentric circles, eachrepresenting a center of gravity. In the middle residedIraqi leadership, highly centralized under Saddam Hussein.Working outward in decreasing importance, the next ringrepresented organic essentials, namely strategic warmakingfacilities such as petroleum, electricity and weaponsproduction centers. Next came Iraq's militaryinfrastructure, followed by the Iraqi population and thenSaddam's fielded military forces."'

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Warden visualized these rings as an interdependentsystem.'" A single attack against a critical componentwithin the system would therefore have a rippling effectwhich would degrade the entire structure. Additionally,Warden believed power became more concentrated as oneapproached the center of the circle. Thus, attacks againstthe center, which consisted of the nation's command andcontrol apparatus, would cause devastating reverberationscapable of crippling the entire system. In Air Force argotthis approach became known as bombing the "golden screw."

By conceptually superimposing these rings over Iraq andKuwait, Warden and his planners picked out what they believedwere the Iraqi golden screws. Ranked in order of descendingimportance they selected the Iraqi National CommandAuthority; Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclearcapability; and Republican Guard Forces Command elements."Warden believed precision strikes against these centrallyvital targets would paralyze the Iraqi military yet cause nowidespread physical damage or loss of life. By designing theair campaign in this manner, Warden and his staff suppliedthe intellectual component which maximized the potential ofthird wave weapon systems. Upon execution, their unique planwould give parallel warfare its first trial by fire.

In retrospect, it seems Warden and his staff made alogical and relatively low risk decision in choosing aparallel campaign. A closer look, however, suggests since it

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relied on technologies as yet unproven in combat, parallelwarfare represented a seemingly bold departure from theconventions which governed previous aerial campaigns. Asdiscussed previously, atrocious bombing accuracies and stiffenemy air defenses usually prevented 1940s era airmen fromdestroying targets in a single massed attack. Instead, toensure at least some damage to a target, Allied plannersmassed their bomber forces in a series of attacks against aparticular target set. For example, in July of 1943, theallied planners sent six massed raids against the Germanaircraft industry. In October they launched another fiveraids and then three more in November and December." Atthe time each of these attacks required the bulk of thebombers the allies could launch, thus preventing simultaneousattacks against other targets." This method of successiveattacks against the same target became known as serialwarfare.

In Desert Storm, Warden elected to rely on newtechnology, as embodied in the Stealth Fighter and otheraerial platforms, to plan a campaign which departed from theserial model. As mentioned, his was a parallel campaign, onecharacterized by a series of simultaneous and near continuousstrikes against strategic, operational and tacticaltargets." Warden and the Checkmate staff set aboutplanning these simultaneous strikes against the criticaltargets which emerged from their earlier deliberations. If

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this parallel approach worked, they reckoned the net impactwould paralyze the Iraqis. This idea of paralysis wasnothing new to warfare. As early as 1918, J.F.C. Fullerwrote a memorandum entitled "Strategic Paralysis as theObjective of the Decisive Attack."A Due to technologicallimitations however, neither the rapid tank warfare whichFuller envisioned nor modern air campaigns had, to date,achieved the decisiveness and simultaneity necessary fo r thestrategy of paralysis to work. The Checkmate planners hopedtheir air campaign would reverse this trend.

Figure three in appendix A graphically depicts parallelwarfare and the strategy of paralysis as envisioned by Wardenand his Checkmate staff. As one can see the intent is todistribute mass along a time line which is narrow, but aspace continuum which is broad. Essentially then, the planwas to concentrate mass in time but not space. In thismanner, Warden's plan, if it worked, would recast the basicelements of war and at least partially meet the criteria fora revolution in warfare. Keeping faith with Warden'stheoretical constructs, the planners at CENTCOM headquartersin Riyadh incorporated Checkmate's ideas into a massive airtasking order (ATO) and distributed it to coalition airsquadrons scattered throughout the Arabian Peninsula.Following the guidance in the ATO, packages of fighter,bomber and attack aircraft would launch to strikesimultaneously the length, depth and breadth of Iraq. If all

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went as planned a quick, decisive and relatively bloodlessvictory would ensue.*' On 16 January 1991, thousands ofcoalition aircraft executed the ATO and tested strategy ofparalysis.

During the first twenty four hours of th e war th ecoalition launched more strikes against leadership,organizational elements and fielded forces, the Checkmatederived vital targets, than Eighth Air Force had againstGermany in the whole of 1943.8' Based on the lack of Iraqiresponse, air advocates state these opening blows proved theair campaign successfully achieved paralysis. Throughout theremainder of the conflict Saddam's forces offered noresistance other than some isolated tactical level fightswhich proved entirely ineffective. The lopsidedness of thevictory seemingly legitimized the strategy of paralysis andearmarked the air campaign as a notable event in the history.Pulitzer Prize winning author Rick Atkinson summarized thefeelings of airmen by saying, "in the twentieth century, onlyone sizable war had been decided by a single battle in asingle day: the 1967 conflict between Israeli and Arab. Nowthere were two.""4

Actually the scope of the Gulf War's first day wentdrastically beyond the Israeli Air Force's pre-emptive airstrikes in the Six Day War. In 1967, the IAF destroyed theEgyptian Air Force giving Israel air superiority over theSinai battlefield. With freedom of the skies assured, the

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IAF then subordinated itself to IDF ground forces. Then,while the IAF supplied close air support, highly mobileIsraeli armored forces applied the killing blow, blastingthrough Egyptian defenses and eventually capturing the entireSinai Peninsula. Unlike the Six Day War, in Desert Storm theinitial air strikes accomplished much more than ai-superiority. Air power fo r the first time administered thecoup do main, the blow which brought on the enemy'sdefeat. "

Since air power provided the defeat mechanism in DesertStorm, air power disciples assert the victory unequivocallyvalidates Douhet's prophecies. Furthermore, they maintainthe victory signals the need to challenge assumptions andlong-standing beliefs about the dominance of surfaceforces." Many now call fo r a U.S. military modeled on theair dominated force which won in the Persian Gulf.

Relying on a sample size of one makes the above logicfundamentally flawed. According to the criteria establishedin this study, unless it is validated by repetition over timea so-called revolution in warfare might just as likely be anaberration. In the Gulf War, this criteria obviously remainsunfulfilled which makes it perilous to label prematurely thewar a revolution. However, Desert Storm advocates present apowerful counter argument to this reasoning. They contend itis extremely dangerous in today's world to adopt a wait andsee attitude toward the Gulf War victory.

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To buttress this position they cite the exponential rateat which third wave change occurs. While the agrarianrevolution took thousands of years to play itself out, th eindustrial revolution took only hundreds of years and theongoing third wave may be complete in a few decades orless." In this environment of rapid change, air proponentsreason the U.S. can not afford the time required to validatednew strategies of warfare. They maintain, changes intechnology develop so rapidly that unless military plannersact proactively, new weapons will become obsolete even beforethey are fully fielded.

Further exacerbating these problems are drastic budgetcutbacks. Since only finite amounts of money exist forfuture military development, air enthusiasts say it isimpossible for America to hedge its bet by developing a broadbased defense structure composed of equally robust air, seaand land components. In this climate they make theconvenient and very reassuring argument the Desert Stormexperience stands as a shining beacon to guide the U.S.military as it navigates through an uncertain future.

To summarize, believing in the veracity of Desert Stormas a revolution in warfare lowers the risk associated withplanning future military force structures. A quotation fromDouhet's Command of the Air, helps explain why this is such aseductive thought.

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate thechanges in the character of war, not upon those who35

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wait to adapt themselves after the change occurs. Inthis period of rapid transition from one form toanother, those who daringly take to th e new roadfirst will enjoy the incalculable advantages of thenew means of war over the old. . .. Those who areready first not only will win quickly, but will winwith the fewest sacrifices and the minimumexpenditure of means.'"If Desert Storm represents a new paradigm of warfare,designing a force structure based on its outcome meshesnicely with Douhet's prescription for managing change.However, despite the temptations to be proactive, Americansmust not believe in a military revolution which has not beenvalidated by time. There exists ample evidence todaysuggesting the future harbors threats radically differentfrom Iraq. By examining these alternative threats, onediscovers the guiding beacon of Desert Storm could actuallybecome a siren song, luring the American military onto therocks of disaster.

VIII. CULTURAL WARFAREOne will remember the Bottom-Up Review force structure

requirements were based on fighting near simultaneous warsagainst North Korea and a revitalized Iraq. In a recentarticle entitled "The Coming Anarchy," noted journalistRobert D. Kaplan disputes th e notion that these countries areAmerica's most dangerous future threats. Using West Africaas an example, Kaplan makes the case that a vast wave ofanarchy is likely to cause drastic changes in the politicalcharacter of the twenty-first-century world.8" He

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postulates this surge of lawlessness could spawn a kind ofcultural based warfare "far more significant than any coup,rebel incursion, or episodic experiment in democracy."'*

As Kaplan's argument goes, the anarchical implosion ofviolence will lead to a withering away of central governmentsin much of the future world.*' In this type of world,international borders become largely meaningless as culturalentities such as ethnic clans, drug cartels or religioussects replace traditional nation-state type governments. IfKaplan is correct then the U.S. could pay a bloody price forbelieving in the strategy of paralysis as the blueprint forwinning future wars.

Against non-integrated political units, the strategy ofparalysis is largely irrelevant. One must remember in DesertStorm the U.S. led coalition found itself pitted against ahighly organized political system bearing all the trappingsof a modern nation-state. In Iraq, the militaryinfrastructure, fielded forces and command structures weretangible centers of gravity which air power could effectivelyattack. These well defined target arrays accentuated theU.S. military's advantage in technology which facilitated aquick, decisive victory with minimum casualties. However ahighly de-centralized threat tends to mitigate thecapabilities of precision weapons. In Somalia for instance,every clan warrior concealed in a doorway constitutes apotential center of gravity. In such a situation there are

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no golden screws and the strategy of paralysis isinapplicable.

Since the country possess no coherent strategy to combatcultural conflict many Americans, both civilian and military,counsel a neo-isolationist posture. This attitude accountsfo r the nation's extreme reluctance to become involved in theformer Yugoslavia. Yet many respected individuals, likeKaplan, convincingly depict a twenty. first century wherecultural confrontation will dominate continents and threatentoday's geo-political status quo. Such a climate commandsthe United States either to develop an effective strategy tocombat cultural conflict or abdicate its superpower status.

This threat to U.S. livelihood highlights the dangers ofaccepting Desert Storm as a revolution in warfare. Believingthe Gulf War symbolizes a new warfighting paradigm promotes ahazardous singularity of thought which can easily create akind of collective cognitive dissonance. That is, defenseplanners risk becoming incapable of mentally envisioning anyfuture scenario which contradicts the Desert Storm model.Already struggling with force draw downs and budget cutbacks,the U.S. military must not permit itself to become furtherhandicapped by such mental ossification. Lacking resources,the best leverage against an uncertain future comes fromrobust intellectual debate. Such free flowing dialogueallows the military community to ponder a broad spectrum ofmilitary strategies. Dispelling the myth that an air-

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dominated, high technology military revolution took placeduring the Gulf War will ensure these vital discussionsoccur.

IX . CONCLUSIONBritish military historian Sir Michael Howard once

stated, in times of peace, whatever strategy a militaryadopts will be to some degree wrong.' 2 Still, Howard saysduring an age of peace a military organization must strive toselect a course which is not "too wrong."'3 According tomany air power proponents, since Desert Storm represents arevolution in warfare, it serves as a beacon to safely guidethe American military through the current fog of peace. Theytherefore suggest pressing ahead with a strategy whichmirrors the air dominant Desert Storm model. The presentstudy discredits this logic. It determines calling DesertStorm a revolution in warfare is an emotional reaction whichadvances a tentative hypothesis tc the force of theoremwithout proper verification provided by rigorous testing.

To facilitate such testing this study used the AmericanCivil War to derive criteria against which to evaluate DesertStorm. In 1864, Union General Ulysses S. Grant concluded theindustrial revolution had made the regenerative powers of amodern state so vast a Napoleonic decisive battle was nolonger attainable. In place of Napoleon's strategy ofannihilation, Grant substituted the strategy of exhaustionwhich used distributed operations to attack throughout the

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depth of the Confederate nation.In devising this strategy, Grant reordered the basic

elements of warfare: time, space and mass. Unlike Napoleon,whose strategy of annihilation concentrated time and massupon a single point in space, Grant expanded the battlefieldin time and space, then distributed mass throughout thisenlarged area. This strategy of exhaustion proved successfulin waning modern industrialized warfare and remained thestandard well into the next century. From the analysis ofGrant's campaign, this study isolated the criteria whichconstitute a revolution in warfare. First, a revolutionreconfigures the fundamental elements of warfare. Second, toseparate revolution from aberration or other less significanttypes of change, this reconfiguration must be enduring.

Thus, taken just as a snapshot in time, Desert Stormappears as a revolution. Realizing the potential of advancedtechnologies, coalition planners designed an aerial campaignwhich fo r the first time paralyzed the enemy. This newstrategy of paralysis recast the basic elements of war byapplying mass along a compressed time line which extendthrough space. In this manner, the Gulf War met the firstcriterion for revolution. However, since Desert Stormrepresents a sample size of only one, it obviously fails thesecond criterion, that of enduring change.

Air enthusiasts dismiss this argument saying it isnecessary to act now on the assumption that Desert Storm is a

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1 ,

revolution. They argue change occurs so rapidly in today'ssociety the U.S. must be proactive in incorporating thelessons of Desert Storm into its future defense plans.Actually, this view is dangerously short-sighted. Abundantevidence exists which suggests the twenty first century maybe dominated by culturally based conflict. Against such anamorphous threat the strategy of paralysis is ineffective.Thus, creating a U.S. military force which is over dependentupon a high technology air arm, would be, to use Howard'swords, too wrong.

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APPENDIX A: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TIME, SPACE AND MASSNapoleonic Decisive BattleStrategy of Annihilation

Tim*eIL

Figure 1 SpaceGrant's Distributed OperationsStrategy of Exhaustion

Time

Time

Figure 2 space SpaceDesert Storm Parallel WarStrategy of Paralysis

Time A

$Poo* SpaceFigure 3 42 Mase

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1. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (here after referredto as USSBS), vol 1 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976),vii.2. Ibid, 15.3. J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (New York: El CapoPress, 1992), 287.4. Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraa (Washington: SmithsonianInstitution Press, 1992), 1.5. William S. Lind, "What Great Victory? What Great Revolution?"Net Call, Fall-Winter 1993, 25.6. To gain an understanding of how the Six Day War _ffected theperformance of both the Israelis and Egyptians in the 1973 YomKippur War, one can reference three sources. Anthony H.Cordesman's The Lesson's of Modern War. Volume I, is acomprehensive work which analyzes the weaponry, tactics, leadershipand systems effectiveness of both sides in the conflict. For th eEgyptian point view, there is The Crossing of the Suez, by retiredLTG Saad el Shazly. As Chief of Staff of th e Egyptian Armed Forcesduring the war and the years immediately proceeding it, Shazly'smemoirs provide insights as to how the Egyptian military overcamethe humiliations of 1967 and fielded a credible fighting force in1973. To balance Shazly's interpretations of Lhe war, one can readOn the Banks of the Suez by former Israeli MG Avraham "Bren" Adan,who commanded an armored division which fought in th e Sinai in1973. Adan's book candidly admits that the IDF suffered from overconfidence after the sweeping victory in 1967. He credits th efighting prowess of the individual soldier as the key to eventuallyovercoming this shortcoming in 1973.7. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Warner, The Lessons ofModern War. Vol 1, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), 20 .S. Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez, (Jerusalem: EdanimPublishers, 1979), 69-78.9. Ibid, 84.10. The term "victory disease" comes from H.P. Willmott's book Th1Barrier and the Javelin, a volume about Japanese and Alliedstrategies in the Pacific from February to June 1942. Willmottdescribes the Japanese as developing victory disease after triumphpiled upon triumph in th e early days of their campaigns in WW II.The disease reinforced, with disastrous results, a belief among th eJapanese that the methods of warfare which worked againstunprepared enemies would continue to be effective against enemies

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who were now stronger and better prepared. The parallels betweenthe Japanese and Israeli over confidence seems to make the termappropriate for the Israelis mindset at the outset of the 1973 YomKippur War.11. Les Aspin, The Bottom-Review: Forces For a NeW Era,(Washington: United States Department of Defense, 1993), 5.12. Ibid.13. Eliot A. Cohen, "Dump the Bottom-Up Review," New Republic,7 March 1994, 7.14. Gunther E. Rothenberg reports a similar occurrence during themid-eighteenth century after Prussia's Frederick th e Great compiledan impressive string of victories. As Rothenberg writes in The&rtof Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, "it was a period of considerableferment and agitation in military circles, yet many disputes weresettled by the statement: 'Oh, but I saw it in Prussia"' (p 19).A similar condition now exists an American military basking in th eafterglow of the Desert Storm victory.15. Carl von Clausewitz, OnJWa, trans. and ed. Michael Howard andPeter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.16. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: RandomHouse, 1965), 3.17. Ibid, 2518. James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo, "Clausewitz's ElusiveCenter of Gravity," Raaet , September 1987, 46, reprinted inU.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies Course 1 textbookFoundations of Military Theory (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College, 1990), 2.19. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (Boston: Little,Brown and Company, 1993), 32.2C Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age ofNgg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 11.21. Ibid.22. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York:MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), 172.23. J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (New York: De CapoPress, 1961), 49.24. Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1976) 84.

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25. Clausowitz, 204.26. Ibid, 209.27. Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War, reprinted in RosSategy (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1987), 461.28. Hans Delbruck, "To the First World War," in Makers of ModernS, ed. by Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1986), 341.29. Rothenburg, 246.30. Howard, War in European History, 100.31. Matthew Cooper, The German Army 1933-1945 (Chelsa: ScarboroughHouse, 1990), 133.32. Ibid.33. W.W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1990), 38.34. Craig A. Gordon, "Delbruck: The Military Historian," in Makersof Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1986), 341.35. Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil," 10.36. Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginningsthrough the First World War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed.Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 419.37. James J. Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War andth e Emergence of Operational Art," Fort Leavenworth: U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College, School of Advanced MilitaryStudies, 36.38. Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian W ar (London: Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd, 1961), 3.39. Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginningsthrough the First World War," in Makers of Modern Strateav(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 414.40. Russell F. Weigley, The American War of War (Bloomirgton:Indiana University Press, 1973), 84.41. W. Glenn Robertson, "First Bull Run," in &perica's FirstBattles 1776-1965 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986),100-106.

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42. Ibid, 106.43. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. ed. by E.B.Long (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1982), 364.44. Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil," 31.45. James M. Dubick, "Grant's Final Campaign: A Study ofOperational Art," 10.46. David L. Wilson, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, vol 10(Carbondale: Southern Ill inois University Press, 1982), 200.47. Hattaway, 518-519.48. Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Bantam Books, 1980),9.49. Ibid.50. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, eds. Richard H. Kohn andJoseph P. Harahan (New York: Coward-McMcann, Inc., 1942), 29.51. Ibid, 15.52. Ibid, 55.53. Ibid, 114.54. Ibid, 51.55. Ibid.56. Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley Phillips Newton, To Command th eA (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 94.57. Gwen M. Linde, "From Black Week to Big Week," Military Review,October 1993, 62.58. Douhet, 108.59. Linde, 62.60. Lee Kenneth, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: CharlesScribner's Sons, 1982), 153.61. Linde, 62.62. The Army Air Forces in World W ar II, 7 vols., eds. WesleyFrank Craven and James Lea Cate (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1951), Vol II, 678-89.

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63. Linde, 63.64. See USSBS as referenced earlier.65. Rick Atkinson, Cs (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,1993), 58.66. Kenneth, 128.67. Douhet, 20.68. Dennis M. Drew, "Desert Storm as a Symbol," Airpower Journal,Fall 1992, 5.69. U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,Final Re2ort to Congress, April 1992, xii.70. For a complete summary of the F-117s wartime performance seethe GWAPS appendix T, "Performance of Selected Weapons Systems,"71. Edward Mann, "One Target, One Bomb, Is The Principle of MassDead?" AirDower Journal, Spring 1993, 39.72. Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare (NewYork: Routledge, 1990), 45.73. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaion (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1988), xv.74. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, / tDoesn't Take a Hero (New York: BantamBooks, 1992), 318.75. Atkinson, 58-59.76. Warden, 8.77. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, The Gulf War Air PowerS , Summary Report, Washington, D.C., 1993, 15.78. USSBS, vol 1, 16.79. Ibid.80. Robert R. Soucy, II, "Serial vs. Parallel War: An Airman's Viewof Operational Art," (F t Leavenworth: United States Army Commandand General Staff College, 1993), ii.81. Matthew Cooper, The German Army (Chelsea: Scarborough, 1990),141.

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82. The phrase quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties isderived from th e U.S. Army's capstc.ie doctrinal manual, FM 100-5Qrtin. It is a paraphrase of the ideas found in chapter one,page 1-2 under the heading "The American View of War."83. This information supplied to the author by Col John A. WardenIII.84. Atkinson, 48.85. An alternative argument can be made that the air campaign onlyappeared decisive because of the limited objectives established forOperation Desert Storm. Had th e objectives been unlimited, asGrant's were, a much more robust ground war, one with successiveoperations, would have become necessary. In this case a strategyof exhaustion would have been more evident and reflective of asecond wave war. Instead, it appeared a revolution had taken placewhen in fact the limited nature of the war made the objectives moreeasily attainable.86. Drew, 13.87. Toffler, The Third Wave, 10.88. Douhet, 30.89. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly,February 1994, 50.90. Ibid, 49.91. Ibid, 51.92. Michael Howard, "M ilitary Science in the Age of Peace," Journalof the Royal United Services Institute fo r Defense Studies, March1974. Reprinted in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,C610 Introduction to Military Theory, 209, Fort Leavenworth:USACGSC, July 1992..93. Ibid.

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