1 transnational trade union strategies in european wage policy empirical evidences from the metal...
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Transnational trade union strategies in European wage policy
Empirical evidences from the metal sector
Conferece: ‘Getting Europe back to work.
Alternatives to Austerity’
Brussels, 6 November 2013
Vera Glassner
University of Linz, Austria
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Why wage policy coordination?
(Forthcoming) EMU:
- Common monetary policy in Eurozone
- Non-accommodating monetary regime of ECB: main aim containment of inflation
- ‚Convergence criteria‘ Stability and Growth Pact: balanced public budgets and control of public debt
Pressure on wages as parameter to adjust to imbalances in international (cost) competitiveness
Pressure on wage setting institutions, in particular centralised MEB.
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Trade unions as actors in Europeanisation of wage policy
EU ‚enlargements‘: increasing heterogeneity of IR and welfare regimes
Asymmetry of social and economic integration of EU: capital mobility vs. nationally embedded trade unions
Withdrawal of European Commission in European social policy and social dialogue
TNCs and employers‘ associations: No interest in European social dialogue and wage policy coordination (making use of regime variation)
unilateral initiatives to coordinate wage bargaining across borders by European and national trade unions : based on transnational solidarity (vs. wage competition)!
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Determinants of transnational union cooperation
Transnational trade union action in the context of governance crisis and wage political interventionism (decentralisation of wage setting, pressure on public sector wages & employment, labour market deregulation and restricting trade union and employees‘ rights) in Europe
Standard assumption: conflicting national interests and differences in the national systems of industrial relations - competition prevail over cooperation
Eastern enlargement has further decreased the likelihood of trade union cooperation
Counter evidences
Example I: Creation of structures and instruments for wage coordination in the European metal sector
Example II: Transnational union union cooperation at GM Europe/Opel (before crisis)
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Three arguments: WHY do trade unions cooperate?
1) (Power)positions of actors shaped by their material interests and availability of (legitimate) resources (structural, associational and institutional power).
2) Institutions at (trans)national/supranational level promote or hinder transnational solidarity between trade unions:
Three pillars of institutions (Scott 1995; 2001; 2008):
REGULATIVE e.g. labour law
NORMATIVEe.g. normative pressure on employers to participate in multi-employer bargaining
CULTURAL-COGNITIVEe.g. understanding of solidarity
Basis of cooperation
Utilitaristic considerations, ‚appropriateness‘Avoidance of (legal) sanctions
Moral obligationCompliance to ‚appropriate‘ social expectations
Common understanding, Internalisation of unconcious, ‚taken-for-granted‘ frames of interpretation
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Empirical evidences – the effects of supportive institutions
DACH
DE, AT, CH
Nordiska Metall
SE, FI, NO, IC
Bargaining Network
Western EuropeBE, NL, DE
Bargaining Network
Nordic EuropeSE, FI, DK, NO, IC
Early cross-border coordination initiatives (1960s, 1970s)
Transnational CB networks (since late
1990s)
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Institutional power resources at national level (metal sector)
Regulative/normative institutions:DE:
-decentralisation of CB (opening clauses),
-organisational weakness of unions in (services) sector
results in wage restraint
BE:
-Law on safeguarding of international competitiveness
AT, DE, DK, SE, NO, FI, BE, NL:
-Decentralisation of CB and flexibilisation of wage
setting
-Deregulation of labour markets
-Orgnisational weakening of trade unions
Institutions supporting transnational cooperation
Regulative/normative institutions:
AT, DE, DK, SE, NO, FI, BE, NL:
-Highly coordinated and inclusive MEB (sector level),
-Practice to extend collective agreements (BE, lesser in DE, NL)
-strong role of social partners in public policy making,
Cutural-cognitive institutions:
-Welfare state traditions (social democrat, corporatist)
-Productivity-oriented wage policy perceived as ‘solidaristic’
-Trade union identities
Insitutions hampering transnational cooperation/promoting transnational competition
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Institutional power resources at transnational level (metal sector)
Institutions supporting transnational cooperation
Regulative/normative institutions:
Viking and Laval rulings of ECJ
General:
-Weakening of institutions such as ESD and European labour law
-Economic governance: European Semester (‘excessive deficits’, ‘excessive imbalances’)
Regulative/normative institutions:
1993:EMF ‘Principles of CB policy coordination’
1997: Transnational bargaining networks
1998: EMF CB coordination rule
Cutural-cognitive institutions:
-Common language (DE, AT, CH)
-Cultural closeness and long experience of cross-border exchange and interaction
-Common welfare state traditions (social democrat and corporatist)
-Productivity-oriented wage policy perceived as ‘solidaristic’
Insitutions hampering transnational cooperation/promoting transnational competition
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Trade union strategies at the level of TNCs: The Opel case (DE and PL plants)
Before the crisis (2000-2008) Europeanisation: transnational
cooperation (collective bargaining, mobilisation, industrial action)
During and after the crisis (2009-2012) (Re)nationalisation: political
lobbying, logic of influence (e.g. car scrapping schemes, extension of
short-time work regulation), strengthening influence at company level.
10Titel/Ersteller, Datum
Determinants(Institutional strategies)
Institutional power Associational power
Structural power (Institutional) Strategies employers
(Institutional) Strategies state actors
Political lobbying, (sub)national
Low (tripartism not important in DE and PL)
High: high union densities car industry: 70-90% DE; 30-60% PL;
High: high share of qualified workers, partly scarencess (e.g. eastern DE and south PL)
Threat to relocate (DE)
Labour market flexibilisation (DE, PL)
Collective bargaining (sub)national
transnational (global)
High DE: MEB and industry collective agreements, CB autonomy; Low in PL: SEB, no industry coll. agreements, no employers‘ association etc. Medium: CB coordination within EMF (EEF), Europ./International Framework Agreements
High (see above)
High: see aboveLow: Increase of flexible employment forms, outsourcing (cost pressurce, overcapacities..)
Use of opening clauses in coll. Agreements, ‚Concession Bargaining‘ (DE); coercive cost comparisons, ‚Benchmarks‘ between locations (DE, PL)
Labour market flexibilisation (DE, PL)
Opel plants DE and PL before the crisis: Transnational cooperation of unions
11Titel/Ersteller, Datum
Determinants(Institutional strategies)
Institutional power Associational power
Structural power (Institutional) Strategies employers
(Institutional) Strategies state actors
Employee participation (sub)national transnational (global)
High: WC and co-determination rights (DE)Lower in PL High: EWC GM Europe (EEF)General WC Opel
High: strong presence of unionists in WCs (DE, PL)
High: high share of qualified workers; segmentation of Low: labour force (weakening of bargaining and organisational power)
‚conflict partnership‘ (DE)‚low-trust‘ relations WCs and unions (PL)
Legal regulation workers participation, implementation of EU Directive in PL
Industrial action, mobilisation (sub)national transnational (global)
High: ‚strike funds‘ of unions (DE) Lower in PL: trade union pluralism and rivalry
Medium: European Action Days GM Europe
High: High union densities (but declining in PL)
Low: segmentation of labour force
Relocation threats to break strikes
Decisions of ECJ weaken right to strike (subordinated to market freedoms)
Opel plants DE and PL before the crisis: Transnational cooperation of unions
12Titel/Ersteller, Datum
Determinants(Institutional strategies)
Institutional power Associational power
Structural power
(Institutional) Strategies employers
(Institutional) Strategies state actors
Political lobbying, corporatism (sub)national
High: Political lobbying, industry policy in DE (low in PL)
High: high union density: 70-90% DE; 30-60% PL;
High: high share of highly-skilled workers, in part, lack in key industries (strong export-orientation)
Threats to relocate production (DE and PL)Maintenance of qualified labour
Industry policy (e.g. car scrapping schemes)
Collective bargaining (sub)national transnational (global)
High DE: MEB and industry coll. Agreements, CB autonomy; Low in PL: SEB, no industry coll. agreement, no employer association..
Low: Decline of CB coordination within EMF, within EWC, no new Europ./International Framework Agreements
High (see above)
High (see above)Low: cost pressurce, overcapacities.
Redundancies of agency workers etc., concession bargaining (restructuring agreement Opel); increasing competition between locations
Employment policy, e.g. short-time work in DE (PL)
Opel plants DE and PL during the crisis: (Re-)nationalisation and end of transnational cooperation?
13Titel/Ersteller, Datum
Determinants(Institutional strategies)
Institutional power Associational power
Structural power (Institutional) Strategies employers
(Institutional) Strategies state actors
Employee participation (sub)national transnational (global)
High: WC and co-determination rights (DE)Lower in PL Low: Declining transnational cooperation within EWC
High: strong presence of unionists in WCs (DE, PL)
High: high share of highly-skilled workers; increasing unemployment (PL)
‚conflict partnership‘ (DE)‚low-trust‘ relations WCs and unions (PL)
Legal regulation workers participation, implementation of EU Directive in PL
Industrial action, mobilisation (sub)national transnational (global)
High: ‚strike funds‘ of unions (DE) Lower in PL: trade union pluralism and rivalry
Low: No transnational mobilisation by EEF GM Europe
High: High union densities (but declining in PL)
Low: segmentation of labour force (temporary declining due to redundancies of agency workers)
Relocation threats to break strikes
Decisions of ECJ weaken right to strike (subordinated to market freedoms)
Opel plants DE and PL during the crisis: (Re-)nationalisation and end of transnational cooperation?
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Conclusions
Explanation of transnational union cooperation in wage policy needs to take account of both material interests and institutional embeddedness of trade union behaviour
Institutions (rules, norms, culture) may provide support to transnational trade union action (or might limit it)
Structural and associational power (low unemployment/scarceness of high-skilled labour; union density, union presence plant level etc.)
Supportive institutions can be set up by trade unions themselves (bargaining coordination networks, EEF GM Europe)
However, in order to create transnationally supportive institutions of wage bargaining coordination, (European) state support is an absolute precondition for a solidaristic wage policy that also includes the employers‘ side
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Thank you for your attention!
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