america's forgotten lessons in visual reconnaissance.pdf

7/31/2019 America's Forgotten Lessons in Visual Reconnaissance.pdf

1/37

Appendix A

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Back to the Future Americas Forgotten Lessons

in Visual Reconnaissance

by

Joseph W. Locke, Maj, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. James W. Forsyth

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2007

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited


2/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the

official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air

Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

i


3/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Abstract

Americas experience in Vietnam provides many insights into tactical innovations that are

directly applicable to current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future battlegrounds in the Global War

on Terror (GWOT). The Vietnam experience, however, is littered with examples of high technology

reconnaissance platforms that emerged, floundered, and died. Unlike the ill-suited technological

solutions of the day, the Forward Air Controller (FAC) was a low-tech enigma that flourished in the

Vietnam conflict. Lauded by the infantry and ridiculed by fighter jocks, FACs effectively bridged the

gap between the ground and air war over South Vietnam like nothing seen since. Re-introducing a

simple Forward Air Control aircraft into the Theater Air Control System will significantly enhance the

Air Force contribution to military success in the Global War on Terrorism.

The FACs ability to both live with the supported ground unit and utilize the aerial perspective to

provide focused intelligence will be a force multiplier for the U.S. military in future low-intensity

conflicts. Harnessing long loiter times and a broad field of view, FACs span of influence will increase

to coincide with the ground units entire area of operations. FAC proximity to the local populace

combined with one-year deployments would allow them to build the cultural awareness required to

execute effective visual reconnaissance required to root out insurgents. The habitual knowledge of their

area will be the crucial ingredient enabling FAC to simultaneously observe and evaluate subtle events to

determine if they are normal or potential indicators of insurgent activity. Simple, reliable aircraft

provide the best balance between cost and effectiveness by enabling FACs to forward base with minimal

support while harnessing existing firepower to attack targets when needed. While this capability is

directly applicable to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, this will not be the end of their utility.

Developing a standing forward air control capability to provide persistent visual reconnaissance is

essential to future flexibility and success in the Global War on Terror.

ii


4/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Table of Contents

Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................................... i Abstract...................................................................................................................................................... ii Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Figures........................................................................................................................................ iv Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 1 Scope........................................................................................................................................................... 4 Evolution of the FAC Concept................................................................................................................. 5 FAC Organization..................................................................................................................................... 8

Visual Reconnaissance............................................................................................................................ 13 FAC Effectiveness and Results .............................................................................................................. 15 Capabilities, Limitations, and the Evolution of FAC Aircraft ........................................................... 20 Vietnam FAC Lessons Learned............................................................................................................. 23 Recommendations for the Future.......................................................................................................... 27 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 31

iii


5/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Table of Figures

Figure 1 .................................................................................................................................................... 10 Figure 2 .................................................................................................................................................... 11

Figure 3 .................................................................................................................................................... 19

iv


6/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Introduction

Nearly six years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the Department of Defense is starting to

realize counterinsurgency (COIN) requires a fundamentally different mindset than conventional military

tasks. Insurgencies are by their very nature a personal struggle for the hearts and minds of the

indigenous population. This is not to say that the military struggle is unimportant, rather it is the

sideshow forcing residents to support one side or the other. Since the publics trust is the center of

gravity, our entire effort must focus on community safety and government legitimacy. With personal,

family, and community security at such a premium, harnessing the lessons of previous

counterinsurgency efforts is essential to finding a road to success in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Having borne the lions share of the effort in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the U.S. Army

and Marines are leading the push to rediscover Americas hard fought lessons of counterinsurgency.

Correctly, the new Army Field Manual 3-24 envisions a ground centric focus for combating an

insurgency and places airpower in a distinctively supporting role. It suggests airpower will have the

greatest effect when used for strike, reconnaissance, and airlift.1 The Air Force, however, has remained

largely aloof to the fundamentally different effects required for counterinsurgency operations. As a

result, Air Force methodologies have remained strikingly similar to conventional operations in Kosovo

or even Desert Storm. Fighters and bombers remain on station to kill targets, ISR assets orbit the

battlefield focusing on high value targets or assessing battle damage, and airlift hauls men and material

from one place to another. Effort, however, is not the key to success. Harnessing airpowers strengths

for maximum effect against an irregular enemy will make the difference between victory and defeat.

Thankfully, the tactical airlift mission fits naturally into counterinsurgency operations. As a

result, C-130s and C-17s are working overtime to support the requirements of the Global War on Terror.

In an effort to avoid the hazards posed by roadside bombs and incessant insurgent ambushes,

1


7/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

commanders maximize the movement of supplies to forward operating bases using tactical airlift instead

of the traditional surface convoys. This solution eliminates a lucrative target for insurgent attacks and

forces them to alter their focus away from the vulnerable supply fleet. Other technological innovations,

such as the joint precision airdrop system, have allowed the re-supply of small outposts without airfields

by GPS guided parachutes. The monumental airlift successes supporting ground forces are only one part

of a larger Air Force contribution.

While not an Air Force doctrinal term, strike is the essence of what the combat arm of the Air

Forces has focused upon since the inception of American airpower in World War I. Decades of

visionary thought, however, did not predict the capabilities of our modern Air Force. With todays

advances in technology, aircraft inflict discrete destruction against pinpoint targets at the time and place

of our choosing. Weapons are even becoming so precise that smaller weapons are being used in an

effort to decrease collateral damage. Some munitions even contain no explosive charges, relying instead

on kinetic energy to kill their target. Despite the seemingly omnipotent ability of U.S. aircraft to hit

virtually any target with little prior planning, the enemys ability to use propaganda and apparent civilian

casualties can transform a rapid tactical victory into a strategic defeat. As a result, airpowers other

inherent strengths must be harnessed to tip the war in our favor.

While complete situational awareness will never be a reality on the battlefield, detailed

intelligence can focus military operations on the most significant targets. The dispersed nature of an

insurgency drives the focus of intelligence collection towards human sources combined and verified

with other means. Cold war technologies, like JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar

System), worked extremely well against Saadams Republican Guard, but are struggling to find a niche

in the current insurgency fight. Conversely, the Predator unmanned aerial system (UAS) is so vital for

real-time video for immediate support of current operations that it can no longer spend time for its

designed reconnaissance mission. Finally, with so little doctrinal emphasis on reconnaissance virtually

2


8/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 all Air Force intelligence assets are low density, high demand. As a result, reconnaissance assets are

sparingly parceled out to commanders to meet only the most critical needs.

In an effort to augment the limited intelligence resources, fighters fill their time in an alternate

role, known as non-traditional ISR. Using the latest targeting pod (TGP) technology, fighter crews

attempt to locate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or enemy activity by comparing their sensor

footage with maps and satellite imagery. While the intention is great, there are huge problems that

thwart even the most proficient pilots and weapons system operators. First, much like the Predator, the

field of view of the targeting pod is narrow. Similar to a set of binoculars, the magnification provided

aids in determining details about a specific point. This is a critical capability in the fleeting seconds

before weapons release to ensure the surgical strike is in fact on the correct target. The same capability,

however, poses a significant challenge when covering a large area to find the proverbial needle in a

haystack. Adding to the difficulty, aircrews are tasked to areas across the AOR based on limited assets

and a gigantic area to cover. Predictably, they usually find nothing. In the few occasions when

anomalies are found, they are passed through intelligence channels and reach ground commanders too

late to make a difference. In short, the Air Force reconnaissance efforts are focusing on working harder

instead of smarter.

Despite the obvious lack of tactical reconnaissance, finding a solution has remained on the back

burner. The rapid proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) across the service components is

evidence enough that the Air Force is not supplying enough aerial reconnaissance to support surface

forces. The limited steps forward are focused entirely on technological solutions to gather more

information for the Joint Force Commander and his staff. In order for the Air Force to become more

effective in the counterinsurgency fight, successful methods of tactical reconnaissance must be

established. They must directly provide ground forces with persistent, detailed, and tailored aerial

3


9/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 reconnaissance dedicated to the individual ground commanders objectives and intent. This capability,

however, is not new to COIN doctrine, nor is it revolutionary to the American military.

Americas experience in Vietnam provides many insights into successful tactical innovations that

are directly applicable to current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future battlegrounds in the Global

War on Terror. The Vietnam experience, however, is littered with examples of high technology

reconnaissance platforms that emerged, floundered, and died. Unlike the ill-suited technological

solutions of the day, the Forward Air Controller (FAC) was a low-tech enigma that flourished in the

Vietnam conflict. Lauded by the infantry and ridiculed by fighter jocks, FACs effectively bridged the

gap between the ground and air war over South Vietnam like nothing seen since. Re-introducing a

simple Forward Air Control aircraft into the Theater Air Control System will significantly enhance the

Air Force contribution to military success in the Global War on Terrorism.

Scope

This paper will focus on the counterinsurgency effort of U.S Air Force and Vietnamese Air

Force (VNAF) FACs in South Vietnam between 1964 and 1969. Limiting its scope will serve several

purposes. First by focusing on the conflict in South Vietnam, the scope of the conflict will be consistent

with an insurgency instead of the larger conventional air war that raged in North Vietnam. This is not to

suggest that North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops never fought in South Vietnam, but rather their

tactics and support mirrored insurgent methods until late in the war. Additionally, the anti-aircraft

weapons used against American aircraft in the south were similar to those currently available to

insurgents in the GWOT. Second, the missions, tactics, and manning of USAF and VNAF FACs were

similar enough to use as a single entity for this analysis. The largest difference stemmed their area of

responsibility. USAF, or Free World FACs, were attached directly to coalition ground units while

VNAF FACs, also referred to as Sector FACs, were assigned specific geographic areas and supported

4


10/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

local government officials.2 While their focus was slightly different, the specific elements of their

tactical missions and reporting structure were virtually identical.

The period of 1964-1969 was chosen to focus military structures, manning, and mindset as

closely as possible to current GWOT realities and an American-centric coalition doctrine. Prior to 1964,

U.S. military involvement was limited to advisors and covert units supporting South Vietnam. The lack

of large American fielded forces during that time mitigates the current realities of Iraq and Afghanistan.

While those early methods offer many lessons that could and should be harnessed in future conflicts,

they are disconnected from todays situation and are therefore beyond the scope of this paper. Finally,

after 1969 Vietnamization was in full swing, which resulted in structures evolving away from

American primacy and toward South Vietnamese independent operations. Despite the obvious parallels

with todays political debate over Iraq, the evolution of American tactics in South Vietnam atrophied

significantly with the implementation of Vietnamization. The change in objective from winning the

war to returning with honor resulted in tactical changes beyond the scope of this analysis.

Evolution of the FAC Concept

The concept of Forward Air Control was not new to the American military in Vietnam. In fact,

its roots can be traced back to the earliest days of aviation and the aerial spotters of World War I. In

those days, spotter aircraft circumvented gravitys barriers and allowed militaries to observe the

movements of enemy troops and adjust artillery fire. By World War II, their role on the battlefield had

fundamentally changed. With increasing weapons payloads, airpower eclipsed artillery as the

preeminent source of firepower in war. Airpowers increasing range also allowed it to affect the enemy

at the time and location of our choosing across the theater of operations. Additionally, the inherent

speed and flexibility of fighter-bombers allowed them to keep pace with the rapid advances of armored

units. The advantages of Close Air Support (CAS) however, did not come without a price.

5


11/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Rapid ground advances and the fog of war combined with the relative inaccuracy of World War

II bombs created several early incidents of fratricide that decreased or negated the advantages airpower

brought to the table. Realizing the advantages and inherent risks of CAS, visionaries such as Brigadier

General Elwood Pete Quesada developed the basic framework to control and employ airpower in

close proximity to ground troops. Major innovations like Air Liaison Officers stationed with ground

commanders, ensured aircraft sorties focused on decisive points.3

Combining this synchronization with

direct radio contact between pilots and ground-based forward air controllers produced a system that

generated broad effects and yet could focus on a specific enemy tank when needed. This revolutionary

capability had decisive consequences at the company and platoon level.4

Although there were no

designated airborne FACs during World War II, dedicated tactical reconnaissance units worked in front

of advancing troops. These assets conducted systematic visual reconnaissance (VR) locating targets for

artillery strikes. If significant targets were located outside of artillery range, tactical reconnaissance

aircraft coordinated attacks of opportunity and led strike aircraft to the objective.5 The tactical

efficiency of harnessing airpowers potential in the close ground battle, however, did not survive the

budget crunch of post-war demobilization.

When the Korean War kicked off on 25 June 1950, the coordination and synchronization

structures that allowed the Army and Air Force to effectively employ CAS during World War II no

longer existed. As a result, many early tactical opportunities in Korea were missed while the Army and

Air Force relearned how to work together. After discovering that radio jeeps developed in World War II

were unable to reach useful locations in Koreas rugged terrain and persistent enemy fire, the ground

based FACs of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) attempted to take their mission into the air. 9 July 1950

saw the first planned use of American airborne FACs using borrowed U.S. Army L-5G liaison aircraft

with modified radios to allow both air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. When accolades began

pouring in from the 24th Infantry Division and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, the Air Force began

6


12/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

pressing T-6 Mosquito aircraft in the FAC mission. The T-6s short takeoff and landing capability

coupled with its low stall speed ensured FACs could operate directly at the front and get a good view of

the battlefield. Their speed and agility also made them survivable despite the heavy anti-aircraft artillery

and North Korean fighters near the front.

6

While the Mosquitoes primary mission was controlling high performance aircraft for CAS, their

special missions included visual reconnaissance, convoy escort, and distributing leaflets. Their

effectiveness in the reconnaissance role was so decisive that within five months after their first missions,

ground commanders insisted upon continuous FAC coverage from sunrise to sunset in front of their

lines.7 The airborne perspective also enhanced the effectiveness of forward air controllers by allowing

them to locate and attack enemy units beyond the visual range of ground troops. The Mosquito FACs

were so effective at finding and engaging North Korean units that they controlled 93 percent of all CAS

strikes in the first 18 months of the Korean conflict.8 Undoubtedly, the focused application of airpower

before direct contact with ground forces reduced the ferocity of the North Korean and Chinese

opposition. In spite of their stellar performance, FAC personnel and equipment again fell victim to the

post war drawdown.

Despite the lack of funds, the USAF established the Air Ground Operations School (AGOS) to

formalize the methodology and instruction for its Forward Air Controllers. FAC airframes, however,

were eliminated between 1954 and 1962 until U.S. participation in Vietnam again forced the Air Force

to refocus on close air support. Starting afresh with AGOS institutional knowledge, a new cadre of

FACs attempted to make a difference in South Vietnam. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, covert

efforts inside Vietnam focused on helping the VNAF to become more effective. Relying on simple

aircraft, such as T-28s, C-47, and B-26s, a covert unit referred to as Jungle Jim quietly applied low

tech, rugged aircraft to help stem the tide of the Viet Cong insurgency.9

The first VNAF liaison

squadron began to operate the O-1A as early as 1957 with initial duties that included artillery spotting,

7


13/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

courier service, and border patrol. By 1962, with a full compliment of USAF advisors that role had

significantly evolved to include airborne control of fighter strikes, visual and photographic

reconnaissance, and aerial liaison service with the South Vietnamese Army.10 Hamstrung by tenuous

rules of engagement and a limited number of aircraft, Jungle Jim was an insufficient force to produce

significant results, but it proved successful at refining tactics for COIN. The role of the O-1 and the

FAC, however, was set for the remainder of the war.

With the deployment of U.S. Air Force F-100s, F-102s, and B-57s in August 1964, the role of

the forward air controller took on a completely new meaning.11

Initially, American FACs attempted to

operate from the ground in accordance with their training and the inter-service agreements of the time.

Almost immediately, they realized that, much like Korea, their jeeps would be inadequate for the task.

FACs were faced with a problem that required out of the box thinking. Their limited numbers did not

allow FACs to operate with every unit where their ability to control CAS was needed. Additionally, the

terrain was so problematic that even being close to the battle could not provide sufficient situational

awareness to confidently employ ordnance in close proximity to friendly troops.12 The dense jungle,

with visibility as low as 5 feet, required most patrols to proceed on foot.13

In a joint effort to enhance

combat effectiveness, FACs coordinated to use U.S. Army L-19 liaison aircraft to increase their

visibility and ability to help the dispersed small units. Their success eventually led to the Air Force

purchasing the L-19 and designating it as the O-1 Birddog FAC aircraft in 1963.14

FAC Organization

The mobility of the airborne FAC was only one small part of a larger system that made the

tactical application of airpower lethal in Vietnam. The intimate knowledge of the ground scheme of

maneuver and a dedicated process to bring weapons to the target was equally significant. Two parallel

organizations existed to control tactical air operations against the Viet Cong and NVA within South

8


14/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Vietnam: Free World FACs worked in direct support of coalition fielded ground forces and Sector

FACs performed Strike Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR) missions away from friendly troops.15

The

504th Tactical Air Support Group (TASG) was the single organization that controlled U.S. Tactical Air

Control Parties (TACP) across South Vietnam, working both the CAS and SCAR missions. It was an

immense organization, authorized 3,422 personnel, supporting operations at 6 Field/Corps Headquarters,

20 Divisions, 34 Brigades, 43 Provinces, 119 Battalions, and 63 Special Forces Camps (See Figure 1).16

The task of supplying and controlling such a diverse and geographically dispersed organization

presented a significant challenge. However, providing a coherent method of requesting and

coordinating the air effort would require most of the time and energy.

The 7th Air Force Commanders Tactical Air Coordination Center, forerunner of todays Air

Operations Center, orchestrated the daily allocation and tasking of tactical combat sorties across South

Vietnam. The 504th TASG provided a Direct Air Support Center (DASC), the predecessor of todays

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), for each Corps or Field Army to choreograph the continuous

flow of aircraft for CAS, tactical air reconnaissance, and tactical airlift in support of the ground

commanders needs. The DASC possessed a robust communications structure that allowed continuous

communications between TACPs, aircraft in flight, and other Theater Air Control System (TACS)

elements.17 Below the DASC, a variable hierarchy was required to incorporate conventional, special

operations and provincial requests for air support within the corps area of operations (See Figure 2).

Tactical Air Control Parties were tailored specifically to meet the needs of each successive echelon to

ensure both the liaison and control missions were met.

9


15/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

Figure 118

10


16/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

Figure 219

11


17/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 The Air Liaison Officer (ALO) was primarily responsible for advising the Army commander on

the capabilities, limitations, and employment of airpower. Additionally, the ALO commanded the

TACP and managed local flying operations.20 Finally, the ALO maintained FAC currency, both on the

ground and in the air, and could therefore control strikes as conditions required to support the ground

commander. The remaining personnel of the TACP adjusted to fit the necessities of the supported unit.

Often it included an appropriate number of FACs, enlisted ROMADs (Radio Maintainer, Operator, and

Drivers), and occasionally a limited number of crew chiefs to perform basic maintenance on assigned

aircraft. Typically, the brigade was the lowest echelon assigned a TACP, but FACs occasionally

deployed for patrols at the battalion level or below.

This level of fidelity was essential in order to gain a better perspective on the ground picture and

the methods and constraints of maneuver. The deeper understanding carried over to FAC effectiveness

in the air as indicated by Capt James A. Anderson, FAC with the 3 rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division,

After my six days, Capt Donald Washburn relieved me on station. Shortly thereafter, I was in the air in

an O-1 as a FAC. My six-day experience on the ground with the Control Element of the Brigade and

Battalions was valuable to me as I did the actual strike controlling. I knew the problems of the

battalions intimately and I hope I communicated the urgency of the situation to the strike pilots.21

Capt

Andersons experience did more than simply allow him to bond with his Army counterparts and

understand the mission. His newfound perspective also ensured that his efforts in the air were truly

focused on lending relevant help to the troops on the ground.

Once back in the air, FACs repeatedly delivered precise support by escorting fighters directly to

the critical point on the battlefield. One battalion commander reported, TACAIR is often looked upon

as the panacea after the tactical situation has already become hopeless. With a little imagination and

ingenuity, it can be the infantrymans Ace-in-the-Hole. It is the Tactical Arm that tips the scales of

battle heavily in favor of the US combat soldier and should so be employed.22 The resulting trust

12


18/37


19/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

knowledge of their respective AO became the crucial ingredient in the success of the visual

reconnaissance program. Most accounts suggest that a new pilot required a minimum of one to two

months flying missions in a specific AO to become truly productive. Col Whitehouse, after returning

from his ALO tour in Vietnam, went even further by suggesting that even moving an experienced pilot

to a new AO reduced his effectiveness for several weeks until he could acquire a feel for the specific

environment25

Using their familiarity, FACs operated according to the priorities combining MACV Directive

95-11 (general priorities for O-1 and O-2 aircraft) and 381-1(visual reconnaissance):

1. Quick response missions necessary to tactical success at the sector level

2. Air strike control

3. Artillery and naval gunfire adjustment

4. Convoy/ship escort

5. Visual reconnaissance and surveillance

a. FAC missions directly supporting ground or air operations.b. Daily surveillance of all areas of known Viet Cong activity and critical terrain such as

national borders.

c. Twice daily sampling of other areas6. Radio Relay

7. Others

With these priorities in mind, scheduling of assigned sectors for FAC visual reconnaissance missions

was handled by the division ALO or below. Often VR missions were executed either before or after

scheduled strike missions to maximize the efficiency of every sortie. Their effects were so highly

regarded by ground units that 85% of O-1 and O-2 sorties were employed for FAC or VR missions at

the expense of artillery adjustment and convoy escort. The programs decentralized nature provided

great flexibility to meet ground commander needs at the tactical level. 26

This same flexibility led to some inefficiency as some sectors received repeated coverage, while

others were potentially left neglected. While this apparent neglect may seem a significant shortcoming

14


20/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

of the decentralized system, further analysis reveals the flexibility was necessary for the local

counterinsurgency effort. The close association of the TACP with the ground units allowed sorties to be

focused at critical points in the tactical environment. Had a larger institution centrally coordinated the

requirements, the system would have suffered from the unnecessary dilution of effort simply to cover

sectors on a map. Instead, decentralized control and execution allowed tactical commanders to make

timely decisions about the location and tasking for their resources to match the local intelligence picture.

Even more vital to mission success was the FACs detailed understanding of his environment

and the subtleties that could indicate the presence of enemy forces. The 21st

Tactical Air Support

Squadrons forward air control manual reveals the subtleties FACs dealt with to locate enemy forces in

Vietnams dense foliage. Not only does the manual recommend an in-depth study of the terrain and

most current intelligence before launching on a mission, but it also emphasizes the importance of

recognizing habit patterns of the local populace in order to detect subtle changes that could be indicators

of activity. Social routines, harvesting and agricultural practices, and daily changes in dust from dry

roads were all potential indications to focus the reconnaissance effort toward enemy concentrations.27

With nothing more than topographic maps of the area, FACs recorded their findings for debrief after the

mission. Once back in the Army command post, intelligence personnel then collected and introduced

the data into the traditional army and air force intelligence networks for further analysis. These

consolidated observations developed patterns of potential enemy activity for further investigation.

FAC Effectiveness and Results

With the intelligence analysis complete, ground commanders then developed a plan of attack.

Realizing his FAC had an unequaled feel for his AO; Battalion Commanders like LTC William Miller

regularly used their knowledge and insight during mission analysis. I would say the FAC had the

AO memorized better than anybody else. He knew that this stream crossing was a certain coordinate, he

15


21/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 knew that this trail junction was a certain coordinate28 This level of detail was essential for accurate

planning of large ground operations. Additionally, the trust between FAC and the ground commander

ensured the synergistic coordination of ground and air capabilities during execution.

While some instances required large conventional forces and the requisite close air support,

many situations were best handled by airpower alone. In these instances, FACs were sent to specific

locations of postulated enemy activity. Target coordinates often had significant errors that made the

FACs job of finding a valid target all the more difficult. A comprehensive Air Force study of tactical

airpower in Vietnam concluded that over 70 percent of the target coordinates for FAC investigation had

at least 100 meters of target location error.29 Additionally, some target positions were completely wrong

due to inaccurate navigation or misinterpreting terrain features. Although a known problem, little could

be done to increase the accuracy of manual map and compass target location in Vietnams dense jungles.

Unfortunately, these errors ensured FACs expended significant effort with little or no chance of finding

their intended target.

The triple canopy jungle and deep elephant grass added an additional level of difficulty,

especially once the Viet Cong and NVA made a concerted effort to conceal and camouflage their assets.

Enemy troops wisely became weary of any approaching aircraft and used a variety of methods to hide

their position. In these instances, subtle indications of abnormality proved to be the deciding factor that

allowed FACs to locate enemy forces. In one area, a fleeting wisp of smoke would indicate a recently

doused cooking fire. In another area, obvious agricultural activity would appear normal without FAC

knowledge that the adjacent village had been abandoned for the last 3 months.30

The observation of

subtleties combined with current intelligence often proved to be the difference that allowed FACs to

positively identify 40% of their tasked targets, which often included imprecise descriptions as Known

Enemy Location.31

Obviously, 40% is a remarkable statistic given the difficult terrain and a mobile,

elusive enemy.

16


22/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 In addition to the FACs capability to confirm enemy troop locations derived from the synthesis

of intelligence data, their ability to locate enemy forces during the mission was remarkable. In a sixty-

day period between 29 May and 30 July 1968, the 20th TASS coordinated 1,128 O-1 and O-2 visual

reconnaissance missions that produced 306 significant sightings. These sightings in support of I Corps

were so significant they generated 1,186 tactical air sorties for immediate attacks.32

The tasking of an

average of 18.8 sorties per day in the I Corps sector for visual reconnaissance netted 5.1 additional

enemy targets. Regardless of the types of targets, it is difficult to argue against any reconnaissance

platform capable enough to generate an additional 150 targets per month for a Corps Commander. Even

against small targets, repeated harassment and an occasional significant strike took its toll on enemy

resolve.

With the target positively identified, the FAC started the coordination process for an air strike.

The first step in the process included contacting the ground commander to ensure friendly deconfliction

and the current commanders intent. Rules of engagement also required Vietnamese Province Chief

approval to strike targets that were not actively engaging coalition forces.33 Once both the military and

local political leadership approved the strike, the FAC coordinated with his DASC for air assets. The

ASOC either scrambled ground alert fighters at a nearby base or diverted airborne assets from pre-

planned targets of lesser importance. This procedure proved extremely successful at providing timely

and sufficient air support across the spectrum of insurgent targets.

Responsiveness, however, is always a point of contention based on the perspective of the

individual. Airborne alert aircraft generally have the fastest response times, but expend huge amounts of

resources for limited usage. Ground alert aircraft ensure aircraft fuel and maintenance are generated to

support only validated requests, but this system adds critical minutes to immediate requests for airpower

when troops are in close contact with enemy forces. In an effort to minimize the response times and

17


23/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

maximize efficiency, the USAF developed a system of distributed fighter bases throughout South

Vietnam with a constant ground alert posture.

In a detailed analysis of ground alert CAS missions, 1795 scrambles were analyzed for timing,

delays, and efficiency over the summer of 1969. Major findings indicated that ground alert scrambles

resulted in median response times of 40 minutes or less from the request to bombs on target with times

ranging between 20 and 80 minutes.34

The details of the report, however, highlight both the efficiency

and limitations of the system. The study identified DASC coordination (median 3 minutes) and FAC

coordination (median 5.5 minutes) as reasonably constant.35

A variety of delays, including FAC arrival,

weather, lack of clearance, communication difficulties, and Army coordination problems all played

some part in the immediate execution of the mission, but only added an average of 3.6 minutes to the

FAC coordination time. The three previous factors culminate in a total of 11.1 minutes and should be

relatively constant regardless of the alert posture of the aircraft.

The remaining 28.9 minutes is accounted for by a combination of scramble and flight time to the

target. Scramble median times ranged from 9.4 to 13.8 minutes. The timing variance was attributed

primarily to base infrastructure characteristics such as proximity of alert facilities, aircraft alert pads and

the runway as well as base loading and air traffic density.36 The base alert posture or the type of aircraft

(F-100, F-4, or AT-37) could also have affected the timing, but was not cited in the report. By far the

most significant amount of time identified in the study was the flight time to the rendezvous point with

the FAC (See Figure 3). The study indicated a median time of 15 minutes but identified 5% of flights

with flight times greater than 25 minutes. Flight times over 15 minutes usually resulted from either an

indirect routing due to adverse weather, or the dispatch of fighters from bases outside of their 15-minute

flight radius. These dispatch related issues were occasionally necessary to ensure proper ordnance for a

specific target or because no aircraft were available at the nearest base.37

18


24/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

Figure 338

19


25/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 The timeliness of the system is of the utmost relevance to the ground forces needing additional

firepower and every minute is significant. On the other hand, flying untasked missions significantly

affects the logistics picture and potentially decreases the available sorties for other important missions.

Striking a balance is essential to ensure the effective use of limited resources without adversely affecting

the trust between the ground and air components. Realizing the need to shorten the response time, the

Air Force had two potential options: either launch airborne alert aircraft for each sector or develop an

armed FAC aircraft capable of employing ordnance until fighters arrived. Unable to significantly

shorten ground alert response timing and unwilling to dedicate additional fighters for sorties without

targets, the Air Force committed itself to the armed FAC concept.

Capabilities, Limitations, and the Evolution of FAC Aircraft

Three aircraft provided the forward air controller duties in South Vietnam: O-1, O-2, and the

OV-10.39 Each aircraft had specific strengths and weaknesses that affected its use on the battlefield. All

three types provided long on station times and stable platforms that allowed pilots and observers to

identify potential targets on the ground. Each successive aircraft improved upon some of the

shortcomings of its predecessor, but like most challenges in aviation, improvement did not come without

a price. The performance tradeoffs combined with fiscal realities meant that despite the introduction of

the OV-10 in 1968, the O-1 continued to serve through the end of the conflict. Highlighting the pros

and cons of each aircraft will be useful to suggest an appropriate balance of capability for a future Air

Force COIN aircraft.

The O-1 was a civilian design by Cessna modified to enhance its capability in military operations.

The O-1s small size, extreme simplicity, excellent ground visibility due to its high wing and narrow

cockpit, combined with proven technology were its strongest suits. It had a cruise speed of about 100

knots and a range of 530 nautical miles. Most significantly, the O-1, with takeoff and landing rolls of

20


26/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 600 feet, could operate easily from a simple grass strip.40 This capability meant that the O-1 could be

forward based with little effort or preparation. Additionally, the O-1 was so reliable it averaged less

than 1 hour of maintenance per hour of flight and could often operate for weeks without anything except

fuel and oil. This rugged independence allowed the FAC to fuel and go without the need for a crew

chief at austere locations. Despite its strengths, the O-1 had two severe weaknesses. First, it was

equipped with a spartan navigation and communications system. This limited its ability to fly in adverse

weather conditions, and the O-1 often had difficulty communicating efficiently with all of the units

required to synchronize the mission. Second, it was plagued by its inability to protect itself.41 Its poor

rate of climb and slow speed often provided the enemy anti-aircraft artillery an easy target. Realizing

the shortcomings of the O-1, the USAF decided to develop the O-2, as an interim FAC aircraft, to fill the

gap until the eventual development and arrival of the OV-10.

The O-2 arrived on the scene as early as 1967 to address some of the O-1s weaknesses. It had

increased speed (150 knots), double the rate of climb, a robust communications and navigation system,

target marking capability, and twin-engine reliability. The additional systems were a definite step in the

right direction, but they came at a price. The O-2s side-by-side seating resulted in less visibility than its

predecessor, which decreased its effectiveness on solo visual reconnaissance missions. Additionally the

O-2s robust avionics and radios, weak landing gear, and rear propeller prevented it from operating on

short and unimproved airfields.42

These restrictions markedly decreased the FACs ability to liaise with

ground units and the effectiveness of the visual reconnaissance mission. Finally, despite the O-2s

higher performance and assumed twin-engine reliability, the O-2 was not rugged enough to handle battle

damage. As a result, the O-2 loss rate was nearly twice the O-1 in 1967 and 1968.43

Luckily, the

introduction of the OV-10 was less than 2 years away.

21


27/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

The introduction of the OV-10 to the theater in July of 1968 represented the pinnacle of

technology in forward air control aircraft in Vietnam. The advantages of the OV-10 were a quantum

leap above either the O-1 or the O-2. OV-10 capabilities included:

1. Excellent short take off and landing performance (takeoff 870 feet/land 500 feet)

2. 328 pounds of armor plating and ejection seats to protect the pilot and observer

3. Increased airspeed (dive @ 400 kts, cruise @ 150-180 kts)

4. Cargo bay with 3000lb load capacity (capable of delivering paratroopers)

5. Significant armament (4 M-60 machine guns and 5 stations for rockets, napalm, or CBU)

6. Self sealing fuel tanks

7. Smoke generating capability to assist in rendezvous with fighters44

These significant advantages ensured the OV-10s endearment by its pilots and the troops on the ground.

With its combined ability to professionally execute the visual reconnaissance mission as well as employ

ordnance, the OV-10 was able to significantly decrease response times for critical troops in contact

situations. On several occasions, it was able to respond from a VR mission and employ ordnance to

support ambushed ground forces in less than 5 minutes.45 From a forward air controller perspective the

OV-10 had few weaknesses for complaint. Logistically, however, the OV-10 represented a significant

increase in the level of required support. Its systems no longer were simple enough for a pilot to care for

himself. Additionally, the ordnance used by the OV-10 needed to be stored, prepared, and loaded.

Finally, the consumption of fuel reached an entirely new level. For example, the O-1 total fuel load was

42 gallons of aviation gasoline. This amount of fuel could easily be delivered and stored with the

normal logistics train required to sustain the army post. The OV-10s turboprop engines, on the other

hand, could consume nearly 400 gallons of JP-4 in the same sortie duration.46

In essence, the

performance of the OV-10 required a more traditional Air Force footprint to operate, despite its ability

to takeoff and land at austere locations. These additional considerations, while not prohibitive,

decreased the flexibility of the OV-10 to work from nearly any location without significant planning like

its predecessor the O-1.

22


28/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Vietnam FAC Lessons Learned

At the core of the lessons learned to improve FAC efficiency in South Vietnam three main points

consistently float to the top. First, FACs needed to be intimately familiar with the current position of

troops on the ground and have a detailed understanding of the ground commanders needs and intent.

This familiarity requires a significant investment of time and cannot be achieved without collating with

the ground unit. Second, close air support must respond rapidly to ground commander requests.

Timeliness can be the difference between life and death during an ambush, but dedicating enough air

assets to respond immediately over a large geographic area can become untenable. Unfortunately,

timeliness will be the measure that can strengthen or destroy the ground commanders trust in the air

arm. Finally, persistent visual reconnaissance is an essential part of the counterinsurgency fight,

requiring months of constant observation to become successful. FACs integrating current intelligence

with a detailed familiarity of the local environment was one of the few tactically successful ways to root

out enemy activity during Vietnam despite the difficult terrain and vegetation.

On the first point, the Air Force preaches this party line by requiring FACs to have a habitual

working relationship with Army units, but only enacts it in a limited sense. Ground FACs are still

assigned to Army posts and maintain a daily interaction during war and peace, but their manning has

been insufficient to meet wartime requirements. This trend has reversed in the last couple of years, but

the time required to fully train ground FACs has prevented any immediate relief. Air FACs, however,

are rarely located in any proximity to Army posts let alone aligned with specific units for training.

Administratively, the air request system used in Vietnam survived the interwar period virtually

unscathed. As noted earlier in this paper, many of the names have changed, but the mission of liaison

and close air support is alive and well in todays Theater Air Control System. Except for a few minor

squabbles early in the GWOT, ground based forward air controllers met or exceeded inter-service

requirements for controlling close air support.

23


29/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 The air arm also successfully provides an adequate number of sorties to respond to ground

requests. This capability is a product of two elements unavailable during Vietnam. First, with no other

air campaign underway, tankers are available to support CAS operations. This allows a continuous

airborne alert posture capable of immediate response to ground requests. Second, precision munitions

like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) have allowed bombers to take a more active role in

providing close air support. Their increased payload and loiter time provide a continuous supply of

munitions. As long as a qualified controller is available, JDAMs can provide the firepower needed to

turn the tide of battle, even in bad weather. As long as both of these capabilities are available in theater,

armed FAC aircraft like the OV-10 will not be required. If future political or military needs reduce the

conventional U.S. Air Force presence, the armed FAC concept will once again become essential and

require a significant investment.

Vietnams final major lesson requiring dedicated visual reconnaissance in counterinsurgency

operations is the largest single element missing in current operations. Despite the fantastic capabilities

of our modern fighters and UASs, neither is able to operate from locations or in the numbers required to

execute the VR mission effectively. A simple platform capable of bridging the gap to provide U.S.

ground forces persistent aerial observation must be found. Using Vietnam as a starting point, aircraft

requirements are easily estimated. In 1966, Tactical Air Command (TAC) published a comprehensive

Required Operational Capability study that determined the appropriate number of aircraft to support

army operations. Each division would have two FACs continuously airborne in its AO either

orchestrating CAS missions or performing visual reconnaissance. It resulted in a requirement for 15

aircraft per division to provide the 24-hour coverage across the division AO. Individual aircraft were

required to fly an average of 3.24 hours per day or 96 hours per month, which accounted for neither

maintenance loss nor combat attrition. Using 15 aircraft as the baseline, TAC determined each division

required 24 FACs of various ranks to execute the required flights and the other ALO functions. Using

24


30/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 TACs calculations to estimate todays requirements, with approximately five divisions active in Iraq

and an extra division in Afghanistan the effort would require approximately 90 aircraft for combat

operations. TAC also expected an additional 25% would be required for training; resulting in a total

purchase of 112 aircraft.

47

There are many aircraft options to fill the void, but three examples will highlight a few of the

possibilities. Many American companies offer acceptable examples of aircraft capable of meeting the

intent, but their capability to handle the austere environment with high reliability will need to be

thoroughly tested. Each of the examples would require some modifications like military specification

radios and night vision goggle compatible cockpits. They are used merely to illustrate different

approaches to filling the niche while highlighting their relative cost and capability. Using an off the

shelf design ensures simplicity and minimal research and development costs.

On one extreme is the O-1 model. With minimal frills, the Pacific Aerosystem Sky Arrow is the

ultimate in simplicity with excellent visibility. It is a composite airframe capable of takeoff and landing

distances of less than 800 feet. Additionally its four hour of loiter time is accomplished with only 18

gallons of fuel. Much like the O-1, the Sky Arrow is extremely slow, 104 knots, and offers little in the

way of amenities. Another limitation is its 13,500 feet service ceiling. While that would easily be

satisfactory in most places in the world, the mountains of Afghanistan would severely limit its

effectiveness. The Sky Arrows price tag of approximately $125,000, however, makes it extremely

affordable.48 The Sky Arrow is only one example of extremely simple off the shelf technology

potentially capable of serving as a light observation aircraft.

Similarly, the Cessna Stationair could easily fit the profile. It is designed for use as a bush plane

and it regularly serves in Alaska and other austere environments around the world. It is larger than the

Sky Arrow, but with a maximum speed of 178 knots and virtually identical takeoff and landing

25


31/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

performance, the Stationair is more conservative. Its service ceiling of over 20,000 feet would also

allow flight over all but the highest peaks in the world. Unfortunately, the added performance comes

with a cost. The Stationair will use nearly four and a half times (80 gallons) as much fuel as the Sky

Arrow on the same sortie duration. Additionally, the side-by-side seating arrangement would limit

visibility from both sides of the aircraft without an additional observer. With an online, unofficial price

tag of approximately $500,000, the Stationair represents mid-level performance with proven reliability.49

A final approach uses the Korean War example of the T-6 Mosquito FACs to fill the FAC

dilemma. Using todays USAF primary training aircraft, Raytheons T-6A, as a FAC platform would

have several advantages. First, its added speed and agility would make it more survivable against

known enemy threats. Additionally, its open architecture would allow for added growth towards the

AT-6 if tankers or bomb dropping aircraft were unavailable in theater. Unfortunately, the T-6A requires

a minimum of 1775 feet for takeoff and Raytheon suggests a 4,000-foot runway for operation with no

mention of any rough field capability.50

Additionally, with an initial price of $5 million the added

performance is completely outweighed by its cost. 51

With severe shortages in funding and the immediate need to recapitalize our existing airframes,

every effort must be made to ensure the viability of the concept outside of history and academia. Using

a synopsis of Vietnam era FAC techniques, tactics, and procedures, a comprehensive field test is the

only way to prove FAC viability in the current insurgencies. Money and manning will be the primary

obstacles to get this program initiated. Funding for the program will obviously be tight and require

some sacrifices to balance what the Air Force wants and what is actually required to get the job done.

The first two examples both show promise because of their simple designs and capability to operate in

austere conditions. Evaluating these and other similar designs can identify a clear winner. Additionally,

the acquisition price tag of $14-56 million is minimal and clearly worth the opportunity to enhance the

Air Force contribution to the GWOT.

26


32/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Augmenting Air Support Operations Squadron manning to allow for simple FAC aircraft

operations is the next hurdle. The TAC assumptions suggest 144 pilots for FAC duty and an additional

30 for instruction.52 Some of the pilots are easily found in the Air Support Operations Squadrons

already attached with Army units. ALOs would continue to execute their current mission of advising

the ground commander, but also return to their original mission of controlling close air support aircraft

and providing visual reconnaissance. This, however, would only be a start. Additional support will be

required to fill cockpits and will require creative sourcing to find the bodies. While sourcing the bodies

is beyond the scope of this paper, applying the lessons of Vietnam is essential. Using excess pilots

tasked to support the current AEF is appealing, but adhering to the 120-day cycle would negate the

familiarity required for successful visual reconnaissance. Having FACs on station for extended periods

in the same AO is the only way they will be able to identify the subtle differences indicating enemy

activity. Deployment for 1-year remote tours to specific locations is the best solution to perpetuate

lessons learned for the longest reasonable period.

Recommendations for the Future

The Global War on Terror will not end with Iraq or Afghanistan. The USAF must be ready to

employ airpower across the spectrum of conflict without notice. The continuing cycle of ignoring close

air support between wars, especially the tactical air control party, must be stopped. This core

competency is essential from the first day American ground forces are employed against the enemy.

Continually reinventing proven tactics at the expense of lives is unacceptable and should be avoided at

all costs. Unfortunately, funds are limited and budget choices must be made. Therefore, maintenance of

a functional FAC force needs to align itself with an eye to surviving the interwar budget crunch.

With modern conventional air-land battle requiring a large fighter force capable of delivering

precision munitions, it is difficult to justify the significant investment in research, development, and

27


33/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

fielding another OV-10 like platform for FAC duty. When faced with modern fielded forces with

mobile surface-to-air defenses, FACs should operate from the ground to provide close air support. In

other conflicts where the enemy chooses an irregular methodology, like the current situation in Iraq,

FACs can utilize their aircraft to increase pressure on dispersed forces by locating, tracking, and

attacking insurgents with aircraft, artillery, or ground ambush.

The ability to both live with the supported ground unit and utilize the aerial perspective to

provide focused intelligence will be a force multiplier for the U.S. military in future low-intensity

conflicts. Not only would the FACs span of influence increase to coincide with the entire ground units

AO, but the exponential rise in ground FAC requirements would decrease with airborne FAC ability to

flow where needed. Additionally, FAC proximity to the local populace and longer deployments would

allow them to build the requisite awareness of the local culture and conditions to execute effective visual

reconnaissance in a manner similar to their Vietnam era predecessors. Simple, inexpensive aircraft

provide the best balance between cost and effectiveness. More important to future flexibility in the

GWOT is a standing capability to integrate forward air control duties with persistent visual

reconnaissance as soon as the need arises.

Endnotes

1 FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency. 15 Dec 2006, E-1.2

United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 2.

3 Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical AirPower in World War II. (New York: Free Press, 1995), 133.

4United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and

James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 1.5 Lester, Gary Robert.Mosquitoes to Wolves : The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller.

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997, 12.6 Ibid., 34-36.7 Ibid., 49.8

Ibid, 50.9 Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson.Airpower in Small Wars : Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists,

(Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 245.

28


34/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 10

Krull, Larry D., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. VNAF 0-1 Operations :1962-1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969, 10.

11 Tilford, Earl H. Setup : What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.:Air University Press ; Washington D.C., 1991), 81-82.

12Cooling, B. Franklin, and United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. Case Studies in the

Development of Close Air Support. (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History U.S. AirForce, 1990), 431.13

LTC William H Miller (USA), interview by Maj Samuel Riddlebarger (USAF), 21 January 1969,transcript, 4, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL.

14Lester, Gary Robert.Mosquitoes to Wolves : The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller.

(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 110.15 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.,

and James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 2.16 Ibid., 8-9.17 Air Force Manual 2-7, Tactical Air Force Operations Tactical Air Control System (TACS).

Washington D.C. 5 June 1967. pg 12-13.18

United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 2.19 Ibid., 4.20

United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller TacticsManual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 1-1.

21 Capt James A. Anderson, interview by unknown historian, 13 December 1968, transcript, AlbertSimpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL.

22 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 28.

23United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance.

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968. 111.24 United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Interdiction.

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968. 52.25

Whitehouse, Wendell H., and Air University (U.S.). Air War College.Air Force Forward Air Controland Visual Reconnaissance. (Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969), 51.

26 United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance.Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968.121-125.

27 United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller TacticsManual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 2-4.

28LTC William H Miller (USA), interview by Maj Samuel Riddlebarger (USAF), 21 January 1969,

transcript, 13, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL.29 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.

Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 20.30 United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller Tactics

Manual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 2-5.31 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.

Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 20.32 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.

Visual Reconnaissance in I Corps, 30 September 1968. S.l.: s.n., 1968, 25.

29


35/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 33

United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance.Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968, 125.

34 Sandborn, Richard T., and Lee E. Dolan.An Examination of Factors Affecting Tactical Air ResponseTime in South Vietnam. (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF Operations Analysis, 1970), 7.

35Ibid., 7,31.

36

Ibid., 10.37 Ibid., 17.38

Ibid., 14.39 Some fighters such as the F-100 and F-4 were also labeled as FAC aircraft, but their utilization was

focused on SCAR missions in North Vietnam to effectively defend themselves against NVAsurface to air missiles and MIG fighters. Their added performance aided in survivability, but atthe expense of slow speed visibility and loiter time. Additionally, their delicate systems and longrunway requirements prohibited any actual close coordination with army units. As a result,despite their identification as FAC aircraft, their roles was fundamentally different than themission previously discussed in this paper.

40Krull, Larry D., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. VNAF 0-1 Operations :

1962-1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1969. pg 19.41 Reed, Lawrence L., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. The OV-10a: It CanPerform the Airborne FAC Mission. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1968. pg 32-33.

42United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.

Supporting Documents FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. Vol II.: s.n. 898417,1968. Doc 32 pg 2.

43United States Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Southeast Asia Air Operations, 1968, 12.

44 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and Joseph V. Potter. OV-10 Operations in SEAsia : Special Report. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 16-17.

45Ibid., 14.

46Reed, Lawrence L., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. The OV-10A: It Can

Perform the Airborne FAC Mission. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1968. pg 62.47 United States Air Force. Tactical Air Command. Directorate of Tactical Air Control Systems.

Quantitative Forward Air Controller Aircraft Required Operational Capability. 1966, 7-8.48 Pacific Aerosystems Inc. Skyarrow Downloadable Specs. http://www.skyarrowusa.com (accessed

16 April 2007).49

Cessna Aircraft Company. Turbo Stationair Specification and Description.http://turbostationair.cessna.com (accessed 16 April 2007).

50 Global Security.org. T-6A JPATS. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htm(accessed 16 April 2007.

51 Federation of American Scientists. T-6A JPATS. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htm(accessed 16 Apr 2007).

52United States Air Force. Tactical Air Command. Directorate of Tactical Air Control Systems.

Quantitative Forward Air Controller Aircraft Required Operational Capability. 1966, 7-8.

30
http://www.skyarrowusa.com/http://turbostationair.cessna.com/http:///reader/full/Security.orghttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htmhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htmhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htmhttp:///reader/full/Security.orghttp://turbostationair.cessna.com/http://www.skyarrowusa.com/


36/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Bibliography

Air Force Manual 2-7, Tactical Air Force Operations Tactical Air Control System (TACS). 5 June1967.

Anderson, Capt James A. (USAF), interview by unknown historian, 13 December 1968, transcript,Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL.

Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 15 Dec 2006.Cessna Aircraft Company. Turbo Stationair Specification and Description.

http://turbostationair.cessna.com (accessed 16 April 2007).Cooling, B. Franklin, and United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. Case Studies in the

Development of Close Air Support. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History U.S. Air Force,1990.

Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson.Airpower in Small Wars : Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists,Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

Federation of American Scientists. T-6A JPATS. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htm(accessed 16 Apr 2007).

Global Security.org. T-6A JPATS. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htm

(accessed 16 April 2007).Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord : General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power

in World War II. New York: Free Press, 1995.Krull, Larry D., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. VNAF 0-1 Operations :

1962-1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1969.Lester, Gary Robert.Mosquitoes to Wolves : The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller.

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997.Miller, LTC William H. (USA), interview by Maj Samuel Riddlebarger (USAF), 21 January 1969,

transcript, 4, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL.Minter, Rondel E., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College.A Review of the

Requirement for Airborne Forward Air Controllers in Close Air Support Operations. Maxwell

AFB, Ala.,, 1966.Pacific Aerosystems Inc. Skyarrow Downloadable Specs. http://www.skyarrowusa.com (accessed 16

April 2007).Reed, Lawrence L., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. The OV-10A: It Can

Perform the Airborne FAC Mission. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1968.Sandborn, Richard T., and Lee E. Dolan.An Examination of Factors Affecting Tactical Air Response

Time in South Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF Operations Analysis, 1970.Tilford, Earl H. Setup : What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air

University Press ; Washington D.C. : For sale by the Supt. of Doc US GPO, 1991.United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College.Interdiction. Maxwell

AFB, Ala., 1968.

. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College.Reconnaissance. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,1968.

. Combat Crew Training Squadron 4410th. The Airborne Forward Air Controller. Holley Field,Fla., 1967.

. Tactical Air Command. Directorate of Tactical Air Control Systems. Quantitative Forward AirController Aircraft Required Operational Capability. 1966.

. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller Tactics Manual 55-3. SanFrancisco: Headquarters 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron (PACAF), 1972.

31
http://turbostationair.cessna.com/http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htmhttp:///reader/full/Security.orghttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htmhttp://www.skyarrowusa.com/http://www.skyarrowusa.com/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htmhttp:///reader/full/Security.orghttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htmhttp://turbostationair.cessna.com/


37/37

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 . Pacific Air Forces., and Lawrence J. Hickey.Night Close Air Support in RVN for 1961-1966.

S.l.: s.n., 1967.. Pacific Air Forces. Southeast Asia Air Operations, 1968.. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division. Tactical Air in

Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970.. Visual Reconnaissance in I Corps, 30 September 1968. S.l.: s.n., 1968.

. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and James B. Overton. FAC Operationsin Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969.. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and Joseph V. Potter.

OV-10 Operations in SEAsia : Special Report. S.l.: s.n., 1969.Whitehouse, Wendell H., and Air University (U.S.). Air War College.Air Force Forward Air Control

and Visual Reconnaissance. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969.