ST/DPI ORAL HISTORY (02)/L3

Yale-UN Oral History Project

Ambassador Jacques Leprette James S. Sutterlin, Interviewer

8 April, 1991 Paris, France

NOTICE This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the United Nations. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken,

rather than the written word.

RESTRICTIONS This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes

of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld Library.

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fARIS, FRANCE~- . APRIL 8, 1991INTERVIEWER, JAMES SUTTERLIN NOV

Table of Contents

I. The Selection of Secretaries-General

Attitude of French Government in the electionof Waldheim

Qualifications for Secretary-General

Attitude toward the UN of General de Gaulle

Election of Perez de Cuellar

Comments on election procedure

II. The 1973 Middle East War

outbreak of the war

French attitude toward peace-keeping

III. French Participation in UNIFIL

1

1-3

4-6; 12-13

6

7-10; 14

10-12; 14-18

18

19-20

21-

~1f_/ ........... _

¥UN INTERVIEWAMBASSADOR JACQUES LEPRETTE

PARIS, FRANCEAPRIL 8, 1991

INTERVIEWER, JAMES SUTTERLIN

JSS Ambassador Leprette, I want to first thank you very much

for agreeing to participate in this Yale Oral History

Project on the United Nations and if we might I'd like to

begin by discussing with you the procedure through which

Secretaries-General of the United Nations are chosen. I

believe that when Kurt Waldheim was selected as

Secretary-General, you at that time were in the Foreign

Ministry in Paris, is that correct?

JL Yes.

JSS And what was your position at that time?

JL I was in charge of the United Nations and International

organizations in the French Foreign Office.

JSS And let me just start with a general question on that.

In the French government - and particularly in the Quai -

is the selection of the Secretary-General of the united

JL

Nations considered an important matter?

Yes, right or wrong.

JSS Right or wrong? And does it involve the highest levels

of the French government?

JL Yes

JSS So could you describe the situation as you saw it from

the perspective of Paris at the time a new Secretary-

1

JL

General needed to be elected to take U Thant's place?

Yes, well the initiative came from the Austrian

government. I remember that I was invited at a luncheon

party by the Austrian ambassador in Paris who wanted me

to meet with a candidate of their country by the name of

Kurt Waldheim. We were in all something like twelve

people around the table and not important people - I

mean, people of my level - and discussions started with

gentleman who was introduced to me and who was Kurt

Waldheim. I think that Mr. Waldheim made a number of

trips in Europe and elsewhere in the world. When the

election day came the Austrian ambassador kept calling me

on the phone after each tour de scrutin - how do you say

that in English? - I don't remember how many ballots were

cast but what struck me was that his question which was

always the same - "You told me that France would vote for

Mr. Waldheim - did I understand you correctly?" And my

answer was "yes".

JSS Was France consistent then in supporting Waldheim' s

candidacy from the beginning?

JL Yes.

JSS Because there were a number of other candidates at that

time. So what you are very clearly suggesting is that

there was strong electioneering, you would say, in order

to gain support for Waldheim - it was a real campaign.

JL I have forgotten who were the others - but you might

2

remind me.

JSS Prince Sadruddin Khan was one. I believe he was vetoed,

well, one doesn't know.

JL I see. Well I don't remember exactly the criteria that

were selected by France.

JSS Now in favoring Waldheim, what was this decision based

on? Simply the approaches of the Austrians, or an

analysis of the strength of the potential Secretary-

General?

JL Well, in those days we felt that after somebody from Asia

we would welcome a good professional coming from another

section of the world and since there was a European, we

had a tendency to favor a European. But that didn't mean

at that time that we were against the others.

JSS And the inevitable question - was anything done in Paris

to look into the background of Mr. Waldheim given the

fact that it was known that he had been in the German

army?

JL I don't remember anything on that particular point.

Waldheim had served in Paris, first during the war - we

knew that. He never concealed that, that he had been an

officer in Paris. Second, he had served as a diplomat in

Paris and I think that was considered (having served in

Paris) good credentials •.

JSS As clearance •••

JL Pardon?

3

JSS From the French point of view then - perhaps it has

changed now - what did you see and what did other people

in the French government see as the desirable qualities

of a Secretary-General?

JL It is very difficult to answer. The position is a very

difficult one and I had later on occasions to see that

more closely. In France the united Nations is the world

organization; everybody knows that all the miseries of

the world, one day or another, are put forward to the

United Nations, the Security Council, other organs, other

bodies, and this is why we consider that it is

indispensable to have a good professional. To that

extent it seemed to us that Kurt Waldheim had the

training of a diplomat and since he was a European,

probably we came to the conclusion that he would serve as

a good high civil servant to the organization. But we

never considered that the Secretary-General of the United .

Nations had the stature of a head of a state, for

instance. He is what the Charter says - the most

important official of the organization. I don't remember

exactly the provisions of the Charter ...

JSS The chief administrative officer, I think it says. But

in the background of this question is what I believe to

have been considerable dissatisfaction in France, at

least on the part of General ·De Gaulle, with Dag

Hammarskjold. Was there any sense when this new

4

opportunity to select a new Secretary-General came along,

that France at least would not want another person of

such strong and independent character as Dag

Hammarskjold?

JL When you use the word "strong" my reaction is, "What do

you mean by 'strong'?" Because I'm afraid that Dag

Hammarskjold, who was highly respected, very active, very

able, very intelligent, highly cultivated, whom I

remember I met within the OECD in those days - Dag

Hammarskjold probably missed the occasion to enjoy the

support of the most important members of the

organization. And then he lost his strength. I don't

know whether I make myself clear but what I am trying to

say is that an active Secretary-General is somebody who

dares to make reference to Article 99 of the Charter, for

instance. They have to perform their duties, they have

also to use their privileges when they are in that high

position. But they have also to remember that, after

all, they serve the countries, the member countries.

When, due to an excess of activity, they lose the support

of important quarters of the United Nations, they become

weak - that's all. It's up to them to see where is the

invisible line.

JSS So you're suggesting that really one important

qualification for a Secretary-General is a man or a woman

who can maintain tolerable relations, especially with the

5

Permanent Members of the Security council.

JL It seems to me essential. Dag Hammarskjold, I am afraid,

although he was a man of good faith and he wanted to do

all in his power for the benefit for the community of

nations lost, at a time, the trust of some members. They

were difficult times, I remember it well, because in 1960

I was in the French Foreign Office in charge of African

Affairs - that period when we were trying, not always

successfully, to transfer independence to former

colonies. It was such a delicate operation that we were

not eager to see too many people interfere, and since you

refer to General De Gaulle and his reluctance, first I

must say that what has been reported, that General De

Gaulle treated the United Nations as "Ie machin", has to

be qualified and I am ready to say something about that.

What I want to point out is that in some difficult

political situations, when member states have lots of

problems to solve, or are trying to solve them, the

activity of an international organization may not be as

welcome as some people think, that's all. But once the

Algerian question was solved, once the African states

became members of the organization, you will remember

that General De Gaulle entertained good relations with U

Thant. The United States also felt at times that the

united Nations didn't live up to its reputation.

JSS That raises an interesting question, both from the past

6

and for the future. At the time of the choice of the

next new Secretary-General, that is, Perez de Cuellar, if

I'm not mistaken, you were in New York and you were the

Permanent Representative of France and actually serving

on the security Council.

JL . Before that there was the reelection of Waldheim in '76.

JSS That was relatively uncontroversial - did you find it

necessary to make any decision ?

JL Well, on that particular instance we were faced with a

decision to make which was a difficult one.

JSS Can you elaborate on that?

JL No. (laughter on both sides). I'll tell you the story

later on.

JSS Well, let's go ahead then .•

JL And then we come to '81.

JSS '81. And before going into some of the details there,

I'd like to connect it with your previous comment which

is an interesting one - and that is, the change between

the period when decolonization was still taking place and

when it had been completed. Would this suggest that from

the French point of view then, in '81 or for that matter

now, a candidate from the Third World, from the former

colonial world, would be acceptable?

JL I'm speaking personally. I have no official

responsibility now and my answer is "yes" and I think

that there are a number of well-qualified personalities

7

who could highly, fill the job.

JSS Going now to the election at the end of which Perez de

CUellar was elected, could you describe how you saw that

procedure, how did that work?

JL I don't remember now how many ballots there were - maybe

you can?

JSS I think there were quite a few, over 20.

JL Over 20 - what I remember, is that at one time Kurt

Waldheim passed me a message and told me that he wanted

to have a private conversation on what was going on

because the first ballots hadn't been favorable, although

he had enjoyed the votes of four permanent members out of

the five. And since there were intermissions from time

to time between the ballots, I went to see him and his

question was, "what kind of advice would you give me -

should I stay on, or what?" And of course I said, "I

have no advice to offer because you have more information

than I have. The French government has collected

information on the chances of Mr. so-and-so, your chances

and so forth and so. But we have just a limited point of

view whereas I'm sure that with all your connections, and

since you have been here for 10 years as Secretary-

General, you know much better than I." But he insisted,

he insisted in such a way that I told him that I'm not

speaking for the French government but as an individual.

"My feeling is that one Permanent Member is voting

8

against you," and he interrupted me and said, "It is

China". "This situation will go on," and he looked

surprised and said to me, "but I don't follow you, I

don't understand. What is the reason? I was invited by

the Chinese last summer, I got a red carpet treatment.

They were extremely friendly. They had no grievances, no

reproach to make to me. This is why my conclusion is

that they wanted, for a number of ballots, to vote "no",

to show that they are not following necessarily the other

big powers. They have their own judgment, but maybe not

the next ballot, but the following one, they will just

either abstain or vote in favor." I kept silent for a

while, then answered, "This is not what I think, I'm

sorry to say." And once more he looked surprised and

wanted to know more, and I told him "the Chinese want to

appear as the 'defendeur' and porte parole of the Third

World. It is one occasion where they can send a message.

But if they change their mind, they demonstrate nothing

except their lack of will. What they want, according to

our own analysis is to show to the outside world that

there was one big country against the Europeans in favor

of a representative of the Third World, that country was

China". He said to me, "well, fine, maybe, I think

you're wrong" and this is how our conversation ended.

JSS Looking back at that experience, do you feel that the

President of the Security Council - Ambassador otunnu,

9

became the President during this, at this stage - can

make a significant difference in the outcome of the

selection of the Secretary-General? Was it your

impression then, for example, that otunnu really made the

difference in terms of the election?

JL Mr. Otunnu was presiding over it?

JSS Yes.

JL I don't think so, although through awkwardness, (Which

was not the case because I hold Mr. Otunnu as a very good

diplomat) or lack of expertise, a President may

complicate the proceedings. I remember other occasions

when a president of the Security Council, unfortunately

following the advice of somebody else, made mistakes and

regretted it, of course. A good president, knowing the

procedure and keeping his "sangfroid", can carry the task

without influencing one way or another the ballots.

Because, as far as I know, members of the Security·

Council with few exceptions follow their instructions.

JSS Now there were •••

JL May I ••••

JSS Surely•••

JL On another occasion, I remember that I felt it necessary

to go to Paris to get the oral instructions of my Foreign

Minister. I got them, I went back,

JSS On this question?

JL Yes, a similar question - I went back to New York,

10

because I didn't want to embarrass my staff, amazing as

it is. I trusted them all, they were perfect, very good

assistants, but I knew that there is always a curiosity

about how France is going to vote. I had arrived at the

conclusion that my staff didn't know the position, they

couldn't answer. And I remember that once the whole

thing was over, I dictated a cable to Paris, "1 voted

according to your instructions." Actually I spared mu

assistants some embarrassment. They had to answer all

those who were questioning them, the junior officers very

often, "well, amazing as it is, I don't know".

JSS Well this is an interesting indication of the importance

that France attributes to the election of the Secretary-

General.

JL Indeed.

JSS Now, I think at this point when the Waldheim' s third term

was being considered, there were quite a few informal

consultations on. the part of members of the Security

Council. My question here is, during these

consultations, was there any real discussion of the

qualifications of the various candidates? Sadruddin Khan

was again a candidate, I think, and so was Salim Salim,

as a matter of fact.

JL Good, they had good credentials, good qualifications.

JSS But did the members of the Council in their informal

consultations, sit down and say, "well, it appears that

11

from his curriculum vitae Sadruddin Khan may be a good

administrator, a good manager and this is a plus in his

case" or was it a far more informal political process?

JL All considerations are taken into account, but there are

things we don't know. Whether Mr. So and So is a good

administrator or not for example. Some know but others

don't. What I remember is that we always wanted to know

whether the candidates had good political and diplomatic

experience, whether they had traveled, whether they had

been posted to Europe, for instance, things like that,

which looks trivial, are of minor importance, but we feel

that somebody who has lived in another country, who knows

the languages, who has travelled a lot, who has had big

responsibilities, will appear safer.

JSS And now that you have had the experience of observing the

results and now with a new election approaching, would

you still think that this is the important question to

raise about a potential candidate - this diplomatic

experience, the experience of having traveled, of knowing

languages in your opinion is still a maj or

qualification - perhaps the first qualification?

JL It is very difficult to establish a hierarchy among all

the criteria, and it is not because somebody would speak

fluent French that I would necessarily say "he's the

best", no. But .•..

JSS If I may just interpose here - suppose he didn't speak

12

JL

fluent French - would that be a disqualification?

Not for France only but for a number of countries,

France, which consider that it's easier to express one's

self in one's language and therefore to avoid

misunderstandings. It is not only for, I would say,

chauvinistic reasons that for instance, French

representatives insist on this question of language. It

is because the literature in English when received by a

government which doesn't use English, this literature is

not considered as seriously as it deserves. And that

applies to France. Of course there are now a greater

number of young people who speak the languages - more

particularly, English - but it is a fact that if you sent

a memo to a French administration, since there is a

barrier of language the memo will not be considered. And

then in New York they will wait for an answer and never

get it. So if for all those practical reasons we feel

that someone fluent in several languages - I don't insist

upon French - but several languages, first has an

"ouverture d'esprit", an open mind, and second, will be

in a better position to make himself understood. It's

alright to have a good translator, it's alright to have

a good interpreter, but I have realized that in the

caucus of francophone heads of state the conversation is

much more lively, much easier, much simpler, goes to the

point much more easily than [in a multilingual group].

13

JSS Just to continue with Perez de Cuellar, did you consider

him first of all a candidate? Was he really a candidate?

JL Perez de CUellar was not in New York but I remember very

well the Peruvian delegation and the gentleman who was

the head of this delegation and had been Permanent

Representative of Peru carried on a very active campaign.

I may say that several times a day he managed to have a

talk with me and just made certain whether I knew who Mr.

Perez de CUellar was, and of course I knew him very well,

Perez de Cuellar having been the special representative

of Kurt Waldheim on a number of occasions, and I had had

many opportunities many occasions to talk with him on a

variety of topics. So there was a very active Peruvian

delegation which didn't lose a moment and which was eager

to canvass the whole spectrum of the influential

delegations.

JSS So would you say there has to be some campaigning for a

person to have a chance at success?

JL Yes, at least for one reason. A good candidate must not

appear to be indifferent. In order not to appear

indifferent you've got either to have a spokesman or to

do the job yourself, whether in the lobbies or elsewhere.

JSS There are no written rules of procedure for the election,

or for deciding on a recommendation in the Security

Council for a Secretary-General. In your experience how

were most of the candidacies put forward? Was it

14

possible.for a person to become a candidate without his

government's support?

JL I don't think so. But there are peculiar situations.

There were, I remember, very good candidates who were

considered as nationals of two countries, or who were

considered as not having a specific nationality. It

happens very rarely but it happens.

JSS That would have been the case with Sadruddin Khan.

JL For instance, who was and is a very strong personality •.•

JSS I believe that there was a Filipino who became one of the

candidates without the sponsorship of his government. He

was the head of the Population Fund at that time.

JL Yes, I remember.

JSS But it would be your view that it would be a very

difficult disadvantage for anybody

JL I think so.

JSS I have just one final question in this series and that

is, from your experience and your wisdom, what do you

think is a desirable procedure for selecting a secretary-

General, what could be better than the procedure which

has been followed until now, the very informal

procedure •••

JL You mean, whether it could be improved?

JSS Yes

JL I am hesitant, because there is nothing that really

strikes me, I don't see any kind of measure or

15

initiative which would really improve the selection

process. It's very difficult to say.

JSS Let me pose one specific question in that regard. Brian

Urquhart, whom you know, has written some recommendations

which have been receiving wide attention on the sUbject

and one of these recommendations is that what we would

call a search committee should be established by the

Security Council well in advance. This committee should

actually go out and search for persons who would be well

qualified for the position and their names would then be

put forward by such a committee.

JL It seems to me a good suggestion. I don't know whether

it would prove very efficient but I'm all in favor of

anything which can offer the community of nations the

largest amount of information. It is true that we don't

know everybody and the French government never boasts of

knowing well in advance who would be necessarily a good .

Secretary-General. Maybe we don't know enough. If

through that procedure of Brian Urquhart we could enlarge

the information of the member countries then I think it

would be good.

JSS And the really final question on this particular subj ect.

In your experience, which was quite long in observing

very closely the performances of secretaries-General,

did you reach any conclusions - or for that matter, did

the French government reach any conclusions - on changes

16

JL

in the organization in the Secretariat or in other

aspects of the organization - which could enhance the

effectiveness of the secretary-General? Is there

something lacking as far you have observed?

Well, I'm a great supporter of the UN system and for that

reason I always welcome suggestions for improvement of

the organization. I think that much depends on

personalities and this is where and why the selection is

so important. With a small group of good people you can

perform much better than with a bigger structure with

less qualified assistants of the Secretary-General. On

the other hand we all know that there must be a balance

of representation within the system. This in itself

doesn't mean that we have to welcome less qualified

people but when you consider that there are only, on the

one hand, two working languages and, on the other one,

six official languages - you cannot expect, except for

very brilliant agents, you cannot expect that those who

are requested to work in another language than their own

as well as the others. For that single reason there is

a lack of balance which reflects the lack of balance of

the international community. I think that we've got to

live with that. I think that those who hold high

responsibilities within the Secretariat have to perform,

to make sure that everybody is qualified and working

well. For that reason I think what is very important is

17

to recruit people who believe in the organization. Once

you believe, once you accept that there are a number of

shortcomings, that it is unavoidable, then you get the

strength to perform your duty.

JSS Thank you now, I'd like to change the SUbject entirely.

Very briefly, to just go to the Middle East War which

began in October of 1973. Where were you in the French

service at that particular time?

JL I was in New York. I was a member of the French

delegation to the GA and I remember very well, I was in

the office when the Secretary-General called the

ambassador, the French ambassador in those days, and told

him that war had broken out and that he wanted to consult

with him. This is how it started and there we were, as

all our other colleagues, following the dispatches and

the messages coming, I mean, during the whole week.

JSS I jUdge from what you say that, on the French side, like

on most other sides, you had not really anticipated the

outbreak of war at that time?

JL No, we had not.

JSS Even though President Sadat had clearly indicated that he

was thinking of it?

JL Yes, which shows that one can be wrong, (laughter) along

with many others.

JSS As the war developed very quickly, was there any

inclination on the French side to take any initiative, or

18

JL

was there (as there apparently was on the part of

Waldheim) an inclination to let the Americans take the

lead in dealing with the situation?

Well, in that particular part of the world, we always

feel that whenever the Middle East is concerned, France -

the French people I would say - are interested. I mean,

for one reason or another because probably of Lebanon,

they feel that they cannot be indifferent, that something

is happening, that something has to be done and so forth.

And on the other hand we got the feeling that the

Americans, whenever the Middle East is concerned, feel

that they cannot be indifferent and they have to take the

lead and to take some initiative. I think that the

British are in the same situation for similar reasons and

of course, the Soviets cannot get too far away. So in

this question of leadership, I think that we would need

another interview to develop this idea. But the US has

demonstrated that when they wanted to take the lead, they

can.

JSS I did want to pursue a related question there and that is

the French attitude at that time (and for that matter,

earlier) toward peacekeeping as a technique, followed by

the UN. Just this afternoon Mr. Pineau was commenting to

me that actually he had very early thought of the idea of

a UN force and had suggested it to Dag Hammarskj old. Was

the French support constant (if I may use that word) for

19

the concept of peacekeeping, including in 1973 when the

war was finally brought to a ceasefire through a UN

resolution?

JL You mean a UN force?

JSS Yes.

JL Well I have a distinct recollection (as far as this issue

is concerned) which relates not necessarily to the events

of 1973 but to developments which took place later on.

In 1971 the President of the French Republic mentioned

that if things in Lebanon became more difficult then

France would consider helping militarily in Lebanon. In

1976 a new French president, Giscard d'Estaing was making

a trip in the US and somewhere (I think it was in New

Orleans) he said vaguely, because the situation was not

good in Lebanon, "if something happens in Lebanon France

would consider sending military troops to the area."

When I took over my position as ambassador I called in

the Minister of Defense, our Secretary of Defense, and I

told him, "Two French presidents have said that. Now I

don't want to interfere but although no Permanent Member

of the Security Council has sent troops as part of the

peacekeeping forces of the UN in recent years (with the

exception of the UK in Cyprus), our duty, considering the

commitments of our heads of state, our duty is to

envisage a possible involvement of France within such a

UN action." The defense minister listened to me and said

20

"You've got to talk to our Joint Chiefs of Staff", which

I did. In 1978, March, I was in Paris. We had a

legislative election, and the second vote was due on

March 18, or something like that, on a Sunday. I called

on my foreign minister. The situation had been

deteriorating after the invasion of Lebanon by Israeli

forces and I asked Mr. Louis de Guiringaud who had been

my predecessor in New York and who was extremely open to

everything coming from the UN, I asked him, "Do you think

that we might be involved?" and he said "Yes, I'll give

you an answer tomorrow, Sunday," (after the second ballot

of the elections which shows that the government was

working business as usual even under those

circumstances). Back in New York, I went directly from

the airport to the Security Council chambers. There my

American colleague and my Lebanon colleague took me by

the hand. In a remote place they told me, "Is France

ready to send troops?" I looked astonished and said,

"But this has never happened." They said "true, but the

situation is different. It is different because we are

expecting Mr. Begin on an official visit next Wednesday,

and we want something to happen in between. We want this

military move to stop and we don't know how to do it

except through the UN." "Oh", I said, "well, this is new

to me. II I turned to my assistants, who had attended the

first speeches in the Security Council and I noticed that

21

my German colleague had taken the floor and said: "we

support the idea of sending immediately peacekeeping

forces to Lebanon, southern Lebanon. Of course those

would be troops coming from non-Permanent Members of the

security council. II I turned to my American friends,

"This is the true doctrine, he was right." He said, "no,

we've got to correct that." Then I had a long talk with

Waldheim who said to me, "The situation is now very

serious. What we need is somebody to take initiative

with the support of the Council and at the request of the

Secretary-General. If you do that I trust that two or

three contingents from other member countries of the UN

might become unable??" Then I got in touch with my

foreign minister: in the middle of the afternoon I knew

that our answer would be, "We are ready to send a

battalion provided that first we are not alone and

second, it will be temporary." I remember that you were.

present during those days: I don't want to rewrite the

story but I want to add, to close on that matter, that I

had suggested to my government to limit the presence of

French troops to six months. I kept on that point until

in September we had to, as we say in French, "couper la

poire en deux." Instead of six months it was four

months. Then I wrote to my government that we had

accepted another four months, but that should be the last

time because our mission, the one which was requested,

22

had been to send a contingent immediately, in order to

facilitate the gathering of a stronger force. That now

has been done." The situation is not perfect, but the

situation is better and we should now, after having given

a decent advance notice, withdraw. That would be in

accordance with our commitment and that would save on

embarrassing situation later on." When I gave my

feelings to Waldheim he listened, didn't answer, flew to

Paris, had a private conversation with our President and

came back apparently reassured. The French contingent -

twelve years later - is still there. This is my

confidential conclusion.

JSS That's interesting, but it does show that an initiative

on the part of the Secretary-General can have an effect.

JL Right, and that an ambassador plenipotentiary is not as

powerful as the credentials say.

JSS Those are all the questions that I'm going to ask about

the '73 War unless there's any other point that you

wanted to make, that comes to your mind, in terms of the

French attitude at that point.

JL No, not particularly. I've been now away from New York

and following what is happening, the new developments and

the new life in the organization. I'm gratified at what

is happening. I don't think that it is a new UN; it is

a new environment. Let's hope that this new environment

will stay on for a long time.

23

JSS One thing that has happened just this past week that is

relevant to what you were talking about is a decision of

the five Permanent Members to participate in the observer

mission in the Gulf.

JL Yes, it's very interesting. I'm not against new

initiatives provided that it serves the peace, safeguards

the peace.

JSS Thank you very very much for participating.

24

Begin, Menachem

Giscard, Valery d'Estaning

Guiringaud, Louis de

Hammarskjold, Dag

Khan, Sadruddin Aga

Perez de Cuellar, Javier

Pineau, Christian

Sadat, Anwar

Salim, Salim

Thant, U

Urquhart, Brian

Waldheim, Kurt

Name Index

2, 22

21

22

5-7, 20

4, 12, 13, 16

1, 8, 9, 15

20

19

12

3, 7

17

1-5, 8, 9, 12, 15, 20, 23, 24

25

Leprette 8 April 1991Subject IndexTape 1ATape 2AName Index