altmann saadya's conception of the law

8/3/2019 Altmann Saadya's Conception of the Law

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SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW.BY DR. LEXANDER ALTMANN.S ADYA B. JOSEF A L F A W M I (892-942), the in-augurator of medieval Jewish scholasticism, was the first to

divide the body of the Biblical laws into two distinct classes,those demanded by Reason and those which derived theirauthority from Revelation only? This distinction holds animportant place in the history of Jewish philosophy, and, as we

'6hope to show, in the history of European enlightenment " ingeneral. We propose to analyse Saadya's conception with aview to determining more exactly its historical position.

Saadya's theory must be viewed against the background ofIslamic " Aufklarung " in the tenth century. Outwardly con-sidered, it looks like a compromise between the positions of theAsh'ariya and Mu'tazila. The Ash'ariya, clinging to the mysticalconcept of the Kuran and stressing its eternity and Divinity (inanalogy to the Christian Logos), would not allow Reason to judgethe Divine Law. The laws prescribed by the Kuran are theoutflow of God's arbitrary will. They are not to be measuredby rational standards. If God had willed, he could have given anentirely different Law. The Mu'tazilites rebelled against suchtyranny of the idea of Reveldtion. They proclaimed Reason thesole arbiter over the validity of the Law. A law was good, notbecause it was revealed by God, but it was revealedby God becauseit was good, an utterance which echoes the deepeisentiments ofCreek thought.= Moreover, it is in full accord with the Creek

l The rational laws are termedU Hebr. ni*hw), the revelationallaws i;cr, (Hebr. nl*~nw). Cf. Kit& al-Amhit ~~'l-l'ti~ddit,d. S.Landauer, Leiden, 1880(quoted as Amhat),pp. 114ff. (in Judah ibn Tibbon'sHebrew Version, niY7;rl nu'lDx;r1DD , ed. Sluck;, Leipzig, 1864, pp. 59 ff.) ;Version Arabe du Pentateuque (quoted as Pent.), ed. J. Ddrenbourg. Paris, 1893.pp. 3-4; Version Arabe des Prowrbes (quoted as Prou.), ed. J. DCrenbourg-M. Lambert, Pans, 1894, pp. 3-4. For the literature on the subject seeH. Malter. Saadia Gaon, HisLife nd Work. Philadelphia, 1921,p. 208, n. 479.

a Cf. I. Coldziher. Vorlesungen idm d. Islama, 1925, pp. 98-101 ; A. J.Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, 1932, pp. 214-215.

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SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 321notion of Natural Law which, in its Stoic form, exercised aprofound influence on the Mu'tazilite schoo1s.l Saadya, individing the rational and purely revelational laws, and recognisingboth, seems to have steered a middle course in this great Islamiccontr~versy.~But his attitude was necessitated not so much bya tendency to compromise as by the character of the Biblical Lawwhich so clearly showed the two separate aspects of morality andritual. Saadya, who, as a teacher of the Law accepted it in itsentirety, had to draw a distinction between the rational and reve-lational laws. Whereas Philo could do without such a distinction,applying as he was an allegorical meaning to the ritual laws ofthe Torah, Saadya, who would not indulge in an allegoricalinterpretation of the ritual laws, had to resort to this distinction,once he accepted the Mu'tazilite principle that Reason was astandard by which to measure the Law. His task, then, wastwofold : to show the rational character of the so-called " rational

9 9laws , and to interpret, within the context of a rational philo-sophy, the second class of Iaws, those of Revelation. Themethodical problem arising out of his conception of the Law wasthat of the reconciliation of the two principles of Reason andRevelation.

( 1 ) The " rational Law ".-Saadya's exposition of the rationalLaw is not of one piece. There are inconsistencies, and, as Ihave been able to show in a recent study,' Saadya must be pre-,*sumed to have dealt with the matter in two separate " versions ,in a pure Mu'tazilite form, and, in addition, from the backgroundof Plato's Psychology and Ethics. But despite this double linein Saadya's conception there remains the outstanding fact thatto him Reason dictated a system of laws on its own ground and,logically, prior to Revelation.(a ) The Mu'tazilite exposition of " rational Law ".-Saadyaenumerates three distinctly rational laws ; those of gratitude,

Cf. H. H. Schaeder in ZDMG 1 925).Vol. 79, pp. 193-197, in the name ofL.Massignon.Cf. J. Cuttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie d. Saadia, 1882,p. 133." I;lalubt ham-migvotle-Rabbenu SaadyaCaon," in R. SaadyaG m ,ed.J. L.Fishman, Jerusalem, 1943, pp. 658-673.21


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322 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYreverence and social conduct, from which, in turn, he derives alarge number of specified laws. The stereotyped formula used' " 1by him to introduce these laws is Reason demands. . . .Cod has implanted in our Reason the cognition of what is laud-able and blameworthy with regard to our actions. It is mostsignificant that the list of these " rational " laws is headed bythe example of gratitude, which Saadya regards as the root ofall forms of religious devotion. In the controversy betweenMu'tazila and Ash'ariya, " gratitude " is the classical exampleadduced by the Mu'tazila in order to demonstrate the rationalcharacter of moral ~o gnition.~ he fact that Saadya opens hisexposition of the rational laws by citing the example of gratitudeis important, not only because it illustrates the extent to whichSaadya is under the spell of Mu'tazilite thought, but also becauseit sheds light on the meaning of this multi-coloured term," Reason " ('aql). Reason demanding gratitude can only mean anatural moral instinct, not Reason in any sense of logic. This isexactIy the Mu'tazilite conception of Reason as an organ of moral'judgment. It denotes man's natural gift, his mental equip-ment by birth " (jfra),' and is tantamount to the Stoic notion ofman's nature of Reason. It expresses, as Wensinck has ex-plained, the Mu'tazilite doctrine of natural religion. Everychild is, according to this doctrine, a Muslim by birth, grantingthat Islam is a rational religion.4 In stating that Cod has im-planted the cognition of certain moral values in Man's Reason,'Saadya clearly expresses the same idea. There seems to be noclash, in this view, between Nature and Reason. The exampleI e b 5 ) f.A r n h d t , pp. 113-1 14 (pp. 58-59)

a Cf.A l - ~ h a r a s t ~d.aarbriicker). I, pp. 41.44.59.72.74.82, 110.3% 1M. Horten, Die phil. Probleme d. SpeAylat Theologie i. Islam, 1910, p. 257;Cuttmann, 1.c.. p. 133, n. 2.' f.Wensinck, 1.c.. pp. 214-215, 261 ; H. Malter, "Mediaeval HebrewTerms for Nature." in Judaica, Festschrift z. H . Cohen's 70. Ceburtstag. 1912,pp. 253 ff.

"f. Wensinck, 1.c. In another tradition firs denotes the pre-Islamicreligion which has its origin in the revelation to Adam. Cf. Wensinck. 1.c.'Cf. r n h d t . p. 115: 4-1 W+ j ,i 4 jYL 0 . b j. 3 3,bb l U p j j & 2 4 $, (P 59 : nlsnw n5xa ~ I Ykia w ubw2 Y P ~nn i9n~nwnn T ~ Y 31 ,ina'lt) uhwa Y D ~2).


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SMDYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 323of gratitude (which is also frequently quoted in Karaite litera-ture): makes it obvious that Saadya shares the Mu'tazilitenotion of fifra. Reason and Nature are one. Cod has " m-planted '* moral cognition in our reason, a sentence which recallsJohn of Damascus' saying-also profoundly echoing the Stoicview-that in following our nature we follow Cod, who implantedthe cognition of the moral order in it.2 Saadya is here in perfectagreement with the basic outlook of both Stoa and Mu'tazila.He even outbids the Mu'tazila by placing the moral cognition ofReason on one plane with the logical axioms. In his doctrine ofthe " Roots of Knowledge "-perhaps the first attempt of thiskind in Islamic Philosophy 3-he declares the moral judgment(" Truth is good and Untruth is blameworthy ") to be of thesame primacy and immediacy as the axioms of logic.4 Al-BaghdPdi, who also attempted a classification of the Roots ofKnowledge, did not accept this view. T o him logic truth was aprimary cognition, whereas Reason ('aqZ) and the J a w (shar')were only secondary and acquired.' Saadya gives the truth ofReason (both logical and moral) the same immediacy as sensepercep t i on .~ l though e does not share the platonic idea ofanamnesis,' he believes in an intuitive capacity of the soul to graspthe truth of Reason. Learning and research have only thefunction of removing, as it were, the veil which hides the truthsof Reason from our faulty understanding. When all the obstaclesare removed, truth stands fully revealed before Reason?

(b) The " Platonic " exposition of the Rational Law.-Inaddition to this outspoken Mu'tazilite exposition of the rationallaws, Saadya turns, in a second paragraph, to a different kind oftreatment of the same subject. Instead of stating categoricallythat such and such laws are demanded by Reason, he now employsdialectical arguments to prove the rational character of these

Cf. Martin Schreiner. Studien iiber Jexhu'a ben J h d a , 1900, pp. 55-56, 67.'John of Damascus, De Fide 01th. (ed. Migne, Vol. XCLIV, wl . 972 seq.),cited by Wensinck. LC.,p. 216. Cf. Wensinck. LC.,p. 251.' m&&,pp. 13 (7) ;107 (55) ; cf. Aron b. Elia. 'Eg@uyyim (ed. Delitzsch),1841. ~ . 1 0 3 or a treatment of the subject see A. Heschel in JQR. N.S., ol. 33,pp. 227 ff.Cf. Wensinck, LC., pp. 253-254. Cf. Proo., p. 9.Cf. Malter, LC.,p. 225, n. 504 ; my article, ~ a l u ~ a t ,tc., p. 663, n. 21.Cf. Proo., p. 9.


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THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYlaws? The arguments tend to show the desttuctive effects ofevil action. Homicide must be prohibited because it runscounter to the very purpose of creation ; adultery must be for-bidden because it disrupts the social structure of the family;theft and robbery, because they undermine the economic basis ofsociety ; untruthfulness, because it destroys the harmony of thesoul. The dialectical character of Saadya's argumentationbecomes even more outspoken in combating the doctrine ofHedonism. Here we stand solidly on platonic ground. Notonly was Plato's ethics actually evolved in a constant struggleagainst the hedonistic position-to a certain extent never en-tirely discarded in Plato's own views '-but SaadyaSsargumentis literally taken from Plato ; he pleasant (486) cannot be madethe criterion of the good, because the pleasant of to-day turnsinto the unpleasant of to-morrow.8 Saadya sees the function ofReason in the foresight of what follows from evildoing.* Pleasureand pain are mixed in the evil act like poison and honey."ut,whereas Plato establishes the contradiction between X h r ) and 4%in the person of the evil-doer himself, Saadya demonstrates italso by reference to the I-Thou relation. What is pleasant tothe Ego is, in the case of evil, unpleasant to the neighbour onwhom the evil is inflicted. One may say that Saadya showshimself inspired by the social element of Jewish ethics as againstthe basically hedonistic principle of Greek morality.

The stereotyped formula used in this second exposition ofthe rational laws is no longer the Mu'tazilite phrase " Reason

6 6demands .. "but, Wisdom suggests. . .."." This change ofteminology is highly significant. I t can be traced to Saadya'spsychology and ethics (chs. 6 and 10). where the term Wisdomis equivalent to the platonic term X~~rmrxo 'v ,~s the ruling and

Amhit, pp. 115 ff . (59 f f .).a Cf. onstantinRitter. The Essence of Plate's Philosophy (translation by A-Alles), p. 44.a A m h i t . pp. 116 (60) ; 285 (146) ; Proo.. p. 7; Plato. Gorgias. 4 9 5494(= Phaedon. 60 R C Phaedros. 258E ; Politeia, 583B-584C; 505c-D.See D. Rau, " Die Ethik R. Saadjas," in MCW], 1912,pp. 74-79.' f. Proo., pp. 2-7. A&&, p. 116 (60) ;Proo., P. 7.'&I j. (Hebr. n m n n p).'41 ;;i nl3nn n3). Cf. Am67na"t. pp. 195 (98) ; 284 (I 75).


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SAADYAsS CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 325judging faculty in the triad of the soul? Saadya fully adoptsPlato's psychology (in ch. 6), and in an Appendix to the book(ch. 10) Plato's ethics as well. Whereas Maimonides, later,accepted Aristotle's Principle of mesotes, Saadya accepts the moreflexible notion of justice as the chief virtue. Wisdom is thejudging and ruling principle which gives every part of nature itsdue and thus establishes the harmony of the The lawsare, in this light, the guides to wisdom, or rather the products ofwisdom, since, like plat^,^ Saadya sees in the state an image ofthe soul. It is the function of wisdom to create harmony bothin the individual soul and in society.' Its instruments are thelaws.

This is no longer the MuLtazilite dea of Reason and Naturein a state of automatic harmony, but a more realistic one viewingReason in a perpetual struggle against the irrational forces ofthe soul. In his " Commentary on Proverbs ", Saadya reflectsthis platonic view when he speaks of the eternal conflict betweenNature and Reason, a conflict which compels the latter to seekall kinds of devices against the " indolence " and " greed " ofNature." Whereas ii his phiIosophical work he adopts, inaddition to the AOYLUTLK~V lso the Ovpoe~SCsand Z ~ L ~ U ~ ~ T L K O I Vof Plato's Psychology,' he replaces here the Oupoe~SCsby its

'6 .opposite, ~ndolence . But the AOYLMLK~V retains even hereits chief function, that of judge and ruler.8 Although the term

9," Reason 1s re-introduced, is clear that it must not be con-fused with the Mu'tazilite meaning of the term. How doesReason induce the recalcitrant forces of nature to follow the rightpath ? Here the function of " images " and " parables " such asoccur in the Bible comes in. An image is of value, because itexpresses an idea of Reason in terms of nature, i.e. of sense

Cf. my article flalukat. etc., pp. 667-668.a On the relation of Ch. 10 to the rest of the book, d. Landauer in his intro-

duction to the Amiiniit, p. xx ; Rau, I.c., p. 198 ; Cuttman, 1.c.. pp. 258 n. 1 ;Julius Guttman, Philosophie d. Judentums, p. 81.Amhiit, pp. 282 ff. (144 ff.) ; Proo., p. 2. ' oliteia, 441C443B.ArniinSt, pp. 282-283 (144-145) ; 305 (1 55).

Cf. Prou.. pp. 1-7. See also Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, " Saadya Caon : AnAppreciation of his Biblical Exegesis," in Bulletin of the ] o h &lands Library,Vol. 27, No. 1 .Cf. Amiiniit, pp. 195 (98) ; 284 (145). PTOV.,p. 2ff.


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326 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYperception. Reason by itself, Saadya says, could not move and stir

nature. But the language of images does, because it is initself an expression of nature? If a modern analogy may bedrawn, this is exactly Jung's view as to the nature of the symbol.Instead of Nature and Reason, Jung speaks of the conscious andunconscious, but his view is substantially the same : onlysymbols and images as the products of the unconscious are ableto transform libido.'

Despite the inconsistencies between the Mu'tazilite and theplatonic approach, the common denominator is the idea that thefaculty of Reason is self-sufficient to establish certain laws whichlead man and society to a state of harmony in accord with Reason.The Mu'tazilite approach leads Saadya to the notion of naturallaw, the platonic approach to a kind of autonomous ethics.(2) The Reoelational Laws.-Saadya's attitude towards theritual laws of the Torah is determined by his rationalistic attitudein general. His aim is to discover rational aspects of these laws,too, SO far as human intelligence can penetrate the designs ofDivine wisdom. In trying to lay bare such rational motives inthis part of the Divine legislation, Saadya is all the time consciousof the conjectural character of his enterprise, and reminds bothhimself and the reader repeatedly that " Cod's wisdom issuperior to ours ". everth he less, he takes care to find out " heusefulness " of these laws which,-viewed from the standpoint ofReason, seem to have no rational significance at first sight.Saadya9sconclusion is, that, in a relative sense, even these lawsare rational if we call purposiveness for human ends rationals.

-In analysing the meaning of the second group of laws, Saadyaavoids both the allegoristic method of Philo and the method

Prou.. p. 5 ; on pp. 13-15, Saadya describes four types of "parables ''.a Cf. K. Keller, C. C. Jung's Philosophie auf der Cnmdlage seiner Tiefen-psychologie, 1937, p. 3 .a Cf. Amihdt, p. 118: a-I .i 1c-i 1 &!I 1 .b J s j;i I ~ I L , LII c Z w +% ( p . 6 ~ p q n ;nSmi fnl~mnv


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SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 327of " Religionsgeschichte" later adopted by Mairnonides.' Heapproaches his problem from a practical point of view and bringsa wealth of psychological insight to bear on it. He enumeratesand expounds briefly the following laws : holy seasons ; holypersons ; dietary laws ; prohibition of incest ; laws of purity.$The holy seasons of the year, he says, are intended to enableman to abstain from work and to devote himself entirely to thespiritual side of life. They also help to promote human fellow-ship on the ground of common spiritual ideals. The institutionof priesthood aims at training religious leaders able to guide menand to instil a sense of religious values in them. In times of dis-tress these religious leaders will invoke, by prayer, Divine helpon behalf of their people ; they will provide models of characterand piety which their flock will seek to imitate. Saadya describeshere what Max Weber would call a " charismatic personality ".It is remarkable that he sees the chief value of the priest not inhis ritual work, but in his social function. Most interesting isSaadya's interpretation of the dietary laws. A number ofanimals, he says, are designated as unclean in order to eliminatefrom the minds of people the idea of these animals being divine.This is, in a sense, a most striking anticipation of the totemtheory of modem ethnologist^.^ But whereas the modemethnologist explains the prohibition to ea_t the meat of a totemanimal by reference to its sacred character-the animals forbiddenin the Torah are said to have been the totems of ancient Hebrewclans 4-Saadya holds the reverse to be true. He adds that thefact that certain animals were selected for food was again intendedto combat the deification of animals.' No less interesting is his

On Maimonides' theory and its historical importance, see Julius Cuttmann," John Spencers Erkliarung der biblischen Cesetze in ihrer Beziehung zuMaimonides," in Festskrift af Professor Daoid Simonsen, Copenhagen, 1923 ;Leo Strauss. Die Religionskritik Spinozas. Berlin. 1930.ArnZnZt, pp. 117-1 18 (60-61). In Proo., p. I I, he enumerates purity,sacrifice, holy seasons.Cf. Andrew Lang. The Secret of Totem, 1905 ; . C. Frazer, Totemism andExogamy ; . Freud, Totem and Taboo (transl. by A. A. Brill).' . B. Paton. " Early Hebrew Ethics ". in The Eoolution of Ethics. 1927.p. 166.' eified animals were, however, used as food, as the history of primitivereligion shows. Cf. Bertholet-Lehmann. Lehrbuch d . Re1.-Gesch. I , p. 91.


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328 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYexposition of the " usefulness " of the laws prohibiting incest ;sexual relations between blood relatives are forbidden becausethe natural social intimacy between such relatives would inevit-ably lead to sexual licence if no strict prohibition of sexual inter-course between such relatives existed. Here, again, the analogyto the findings of modem psychology cannot be overlooked.Freud's idea of " Inzestschranke " leaps to the mind? Finally,Saadya explains the laws of purity which enforce certain periodsof abstinence by reference to the biological and psychologicallaw of periodicity and rhythm ; a period of abstinence willenhance a man's appreciation of the blessings of life.This list does not exhaust Saadya's view of the irrationallaws. He is emphatic that man's actions have an influence onthe condition of his soul, for good or for evil. He conceives ofthe soul as a substance of light which may become either dimmedor purified by man's action.' Man is unable to tell preciselywhich action has a salutary, and which a damaging effect upon thesoul, for the soul is invisible. But Cod, who is the maker of thesoul, knows best what is good and evil for its happiness and per-fection. From this point of view Saadya calls the sins " heillnesses of the soul ",and the whole body of divine laws becomes,in this sense, a system of mental hygiene.' Its purpose is thewell-being and happiness of man.(3) The Necessity of Revelation.-So far as the second groupof laws is concerned, the necessity of Revelation is no problem.Since they are indifferent to Reason-except to a tentative inquiryas to their " usefulness "-they depend entirely on Revelation.But was there any need to reveal the rational laws which humanReason could have established by its own effort, unaided byRevelation ?

Saadya was faced with this problem not merely as a logicalsequence of his conception of " rational law ", but also for'Cf., in particular, Freud's Totem and T a b , where the complicated socialsystem of primitive society is explained by reference to the need for separationof blood relatives in order to avoid sexual licence.

a Amhiit, pp. 165-167 (84-85). Cf. C U ~ ,eli~ions~lu'loso~hieSaadio.pp. 175-177.Amhiit, 1.c.-Jung callsDogma and Ritual "methods of mental hygiene."Cf. C C.Jung,Psychology and Religion,p. 53.


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SMDYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 3296 6 **reasons of apologetics. I must explain ,he says, "why there

was a necessitv to send Prophets. For I have heard that thereare people who contend that men do not need Prophets, andthat Reason is sufficient to guide them on the path of good andevil." l Saadya refers here to the doctrine of the Brahmins(Barhamiyya) which is frequently reported in both Islamic andKaraite sources to have rejected, on the grounds of " naturalreligion ", all sorts of prophetic (revealed) re l ig i~n .~ aadya, whohimself identified the " rational laws " of the Torah with the laws* *of " natural religion , could not have ignored the blunt rejectionof Revelation by the Brahmins. What was his answer 3 Apartfrom the direct answer which he gave to the followers of theBrahminic doctrine, there are two more attempts on his part toqapple with the problem. All three answers reflect, in a highdegree, Saadya's basic attitude of " enlightenment ".

(a) In his refutation of the Brahmins Saadya points outthat human Reason is only able to establish ethical standards,but not to determine the details of right and wrong, good andevil. In other words, Reason is insufficient to frame a legalcode, to fix concrete laws. Here, Revelation comes in. Itteaches man not only the idea of divine worship, but gives rulesas to the right times and forms of prayer. It not only forbidssexual licence, but lays down definite laws as to what constituteslegal marriage, etc. It not merely prohibits theft, but establisheslaws which regulate the conditions of ownership, inheritance,commercial dealing, etc. Here Saadya must have had in mindAristotle's distinction between natural and legal justice, the onebeing everywhere the same and not dependent on human opinion,the other deriving its authority from the fact of its enactment ;or, in yet another formula, the distinction between the universal

Ama^na^t,p. 118 (61).Al-SharastHni (ed. Haarbr.). 11, pp. 356-357 ; Wensinck. 1.c.. p. 261 ;

Aron b. Elia. 'E; (layyirn (ed. Delitzsch), pp. 160-161 ; Aron b. Josef, Seferham-mibhar. Y etr o.' aadya knows also of another version of the doctrine of the Brahmins, thatwhich accepts the Revelation to Adam. but rejects all later prophecy. Cf.Arn&a^t, p. 139 (71) ;Wensinck, I.c., p. 261 ; P. Kraus, Beitr6ge z. islmn. Ke tze r-geschichte, 1934, pp. 31 ff., 48 ff. ; S. Pines, Beitriige z. islam. Atommlehre,1936, p. 121, n. 1.' m&a^t, pp. I 18-119 (61-62).


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330 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYlaw of nature (6 K U T A + ~ ( + L v6 p o s ; 6 K O L V ~ P~ 6 ~ 0 s )nd theparticular law of each country (6 2'0s V ~ ~ O S ) ?

Saadya accepts this distinction, which both in Aristotle's andin his case, flows from the conception of natural law,' but he doesso with this remarkable difference : he assigns the establishmentof the "legal law" to Revelation.' He feels that to rely onmutual agreement is futile. In echoing Aristotle's phrase oflaws based on agreement, he makes the ironical remark that,people never agree.4 The conception of " conventional lawsthus falls to the ground. It is replaced by the prophetic lawof Revelation.' The Prophet is the authoritative legislatorof the ideal state, which, to Saadya, is the theocracy of theBible.

(b) A second answer which Saadya puts forward more orless incidentally, but which, nevertheless, is deeply rooted in hissystem of thought, runs like this : mankind would have beenable to evolve a code of moral laws based on Reason ; but wehave to admit that such a process would have taken some con-siderable time. For this reason, Cod revealed the rational lawas well, and thus enabled mankind to follow the right path inobedience to the revealed law which, later, it would have beenable to discover by the effort of its own Reason.'

This answer does not seem auite consonant with the notionof natural law, since the idea of natural law places the ~er fec tmoral condition precisely in the original state-of mankind fromwhich the future progress of history is more or less a retrogression.SaadyaSs nswer does, however, agree with the second " version"

Eth. Nic. . V. 1 134b ; Rhetoric, I . 13. 2.a Cf. J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Niwmachean Ethics of Aristotle, 1094b ;

R. Hirzel, ''Agraphos Nomos," in Abh. d. Siichs. Ces . d. W. phi1.-hist.Kl., XX I .AmiiRQAt,P. I19 : $SF &A& &a "1 ; d j &)I ~ L ( p . 6 2 :

P D ~ D f 3 nnn YYW 53 3 n5w31;1 1~31). The detail fixed by Divine Legisla-tion is termed .L fi133.AmiiRdt, pp. 1 19-1 20 (62).' n Pent. , p. 4 , Saadya emphasises that even the Torah does not settle everydetail of right action but leaves a great deal to the oral law. He mentions thetimes of prayer, the prescribed amount of charity and the categories of workwhich are forbidden on the Sabbath. ' miiRdt, p. 113 (58).


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SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 331of his theory of the rational law, namely, that which is moulded bythe platonic outlook, and views the moral task as a conflict be-tween Nature and Reason. It is, then, the force of nature whichimpedes moral progress. Mankind has to free itself from itsdisturbing influence in order to attain both intellectual and moralperfection? The same irrational factors of nature which hinderthe progress of intellectual cognition and are the sources oferrors and doubts, also stand in the way of moral perfection.By overcoming them man is able to arrive at the truth and at theperfection of his soul. Revelation, in its rational aspects, doesnot teach anything different from Reason, but simply anticipatesthe final result of the strides made by Reason in its struggleagainst nature. It is, therefore, not a source of knowledgecontrary to Reason, but the affirmation of Reason and the pathleading to it. In a sense, it has an educative function ; t trainsmankind to grasp the light of Reason which God has kindled intheir souls.

The parallel of Lessing's theory of natural religion is verystriking indeed. Lessing solves the tension between Reason andRevelation by applying Leibnitz's conception of evolution tohistory. The education of the human race to the self-conscious-ness of autonomous Reason can be achieved only through theinstrumentality of positive religion as a stage preparatory to purehumanism. Revelation is necessary for the " Erziehung desMens~hen~eschlechts.'

(c) Saadya's third answer is outlined in his Introduction tothe chapter on the Law.S It has a theological depth which theother answers, in their purely philosophical outlook, do notpossess. What is the purpose of the Law? Saadya asks. Couldnot Cod have given us eternal blessedness even without theLaw 3 Is not the gift of Grace higher than the gift of the Lawwhich is bound up with the notion of reward and punishment 2His answer is that man's happiness is greater when his ownaction has merited the blessings granted to him. T o be arecipient of pure grace cannot make him equally happy. For

Cf. Am&a"t, pp. 2-4 (2-3) ; 26-29 (13-14) ; Proo., pp. 2-5.Cf. The article. " Natiirliche Religion u. Theologie." in RCC. VoI. 4.Arn&a"t, pp. I 12-1 13 (58).


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THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYthis reason God, in His infinite love of man, gave him theLaw. It enables man to feel that his happiness is a blend ofgrace and merit. In this sense the Law is a creation of Cod'slove.

Saadya's theological position, though deeply rooted in Jewishthousht,l is not unrelated to the Islamic controversy about theLaw. That controversy concerned also the relation betweenobligation ( t&l i f ) and reward. Orthodox Kalam contended thatprior to Revelation no moral obligation existed. A person whoselife conformed to the moral standards of Reason had, prior toRevelation, no claim to reward. God could only bestow graceupon him. The Mu'tazila held that both obligation and rewardwere independent of Revelation.' Saadya taught that, on theone hand, moral obligation was independent of Revelati~n,~utthat, on the other hand, reward was only possible after Revelation.'It is God's act of Revelation which holds out the promise ofreward to man. Without Revelation only grace is possible.The Iove of Cod thus endows man, through the Law, with thepromise of reward. For this reason God included in the Lawnot only the ritual laws, but also those of Reason, although theywere valid even prior to Revelation. By giving them a placein the Law God increased man's scope of religious action. Hestamped them, as it were, with the seal of religious laws. Here,according to Saadya, lies the necessity of including the rationallaws in Revelation. It is a necessity of the order of grace. Atthe same time it becomes possible to attribute a rational aspectto the ritual Law as well. Apart from its intrinsic value (its4 1 usefulness '3 it enables man to serve Cod in obedience to Hiswill and thus increases man's claim to happiness. Saadya calls,

' aadya's words seem to praphrase R. Ijananya b. h h y a ' s well-knownsaying, "The Holy One, blessed be he, was pleased to make Israel worthy...wherefore he gave them a copious Torah and many commandments . . .(MishnahMahlyt, end).

a Cf. Wensinck. LC.,pp. 261-263.Amhat, p. 133 (68) ; Saadya makes this pi n t very dear. His determined

stand for the rational principle in Ethics has earned him the warm approval ofHermann Cohen. Cf. H. Cohen's Jiid Sdriften, I, p. 289.

Amrindt. p. 155 : *Ij& JJ-5 J ~ L+ 9, CS\LJ;(p. 79 : 5ia1 15 a9;r H$ m r a *nSam;n n i K tzv att 5).


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SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 333under this aspect, the group of ritual laws, laws of ' Service **?The body of divine legislation therefore comprises (a) rationallaws, (b) laws of Service, but, as pointed out before, the rationallaws themselves assume the character of laws of Service byvirtue of the fact that they are included in the Revelation.'

In attempting an appreciation of Saadya's theory of the Lawthe various components of his conception must be consideredseparately. ( a ) As a protagonist of the doctrine of natural LawSaadya followed a tradition which was not entirely alien to theJewish heritage. Professor Heinemann has shown that in certainutterances of Rabbinic literature there is reflected the influenceof the Creek distinction between the written and unwrittenLaw.S In addition, Philo's conception of Torah as an image ofthe Higher Law of Nature (Logos) bears also witness to someearlier influence of the Creek conception on Jewish thought?SaadyaVs heory which, as we have seen, springs mainly fromIslamic sources, helped to introduce the doctrine of naturalLaw into medieval thought. It is an important milestone on theroad that leads from the Stoic conception of natural Law overJustinian's Institutes to Hugo Crotius' De Jure Belli et Pacis.In its uncompromising rationalism it is a most remarkable ex-pression of the spirit of "Aufkliirung " with its belief in theconstancy of Reason.

Cf. A m h i t , p. 115 (59). The obscure passage, LC.,3.i d l 2-4JjYl $4 j U I J ~ I dJIwn plpa iooim ha2 nn3y n ap n5r w x m must be translated, ". . eunrse of the service performedthereby. Thus the second class [of laws] is joined to the first class ".p&, hich ibn Tibbon translates by aipn'7, means simply " because".-Cf. p. 120, line 3, where ibn Tibbon (p 62) translates it by 1 1 2 ~ 2 .Cuttmann,loc. cit., p. 136, misunderstood nfl3YiI 0 l p ~ 5s "Service of Cod ". For anelucidation of the general meaning of the passage cf. Cuttmann, 1.c. ; Rau,1.c.. p. 186, n. 3.

'Cf. A m h a , p. 311: i;JIJ U l I,.dI . ;JWI jl LC)(p. 157 : nrunwm n r h w n ninnn '733 xln n n2 ~ ? n' 3 ).Cf. I . Heinemann,Die Lehre v. Ungeschriebenen Gesetz im J i . . Schrifttum,HUCA IV, 1927, pp. 149 ff. See also F. Perles, Judaiea, Fatdrift H. Cohen,

pp. 103 ff .' his has been dearly shown by E. R. Coodenough. 1.c.


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THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYMaimonides rejected Saadya's term " rational Laws "? , He

felt that Reason was only concerned with the categories of trueand false, not with those of good and evil. T o him the laws of'ethics were only conditioned by man's needs as a social being.He would not call them " rational " but, in translating Aristotle's

6 4term 76 &80fa, generally believed ".' Aristotle, though hedistinguished between contemplative and practical reason,scientific and moral t r ~ t h , ~nhesitatingly called the faculty ofmoral cognition one of Reason (vok). The phrase K ~ T & dyou,which so often occurs in his Ethics, also most probably means6 b rational ground, course of reasoning *'.4 In the same way,both Al-Firiibi and Avicenna used the term Reason ('aql)both forthe contemplative and practical intellect.' In rejecting the term" rational laws " Maimonides thus outbid his master Aristotle.But whilst he denied the right of calling the moral legislation ofthe Bible a rational one, he agreed with Saadya that there existsa distinction between the two classes of Law, and he did so withthe clear understanding that this distinction has its precedentin those utterances of Talmudic literature which, as we saw,were influenced by the notion of natural Law.6

Cf. The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics (ed. J . I . Corfinkle), 1912,p. 36.~ ~ N ' I I ; I W D ~ X Hebr. nin~l l i~n) .Cf. Maimonides, Millot ha-Higgayon(ed. Ventura), 1935, pp. 67-68 ; Guide (ed. Munk), I, 2 (Munk's note, p. 39) ;Abraham ibn Daud, Emunah ramah (ed. Weil), 2, 5, 2 ; Aron b. Elia, 1.c.. pp.100-105 ; J. Cuttman, Die Religionsphilosophie, d. Abr. i. Daud, 1879, p. 181,n. 1 ; S.B. Scheyer, Das psychol. System, d. Maimonides, 1845, pp. 23-26 ;106-107.Cf. Eth. Nic., VI. 1 139a-1142a. The meaning of the term QGofov in rela-tion to A.'s ethics is discussed by L.H.G. Greenwood, Atistotle Niwm. EthicsBoo t Six, 1909. Reasoning 24 &Gdfwv is dialectic. The most fundamental ofall ethical principles can only be the most probable of &Gofa on the subject.Cf. pp. 133-136.-Cf. the discussion between J. L. Stocks, Journal of Philology. XXXIII,1914, pp. 182-194 ; C ~ U S S I ' U I ~uarterly, VIII, 1914, pp. 9-12 ; J. Cook Wilson,Classical Reuietu. XXVII, 1913, pp. 113-1 17 ; summed up by W. D. Ross.Aristotle Ethica Niwmachen. 1925, note on 1095a. who suggests the renderingquoted above.Cf. I. Madkour, La place d'al Fir&? dans I'hle phil. musulmane. 1934,p. 137 ; A. M. Goichon, k r iq u e d e la langue phil. d'lbn Sina. 1938, p. 226 ;Scheyer, LC., p. 25.

See reference in n. 3, p. 333.


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SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 335Towards the close of the medieval period of Jewish philosophy,

Saadya's and Maimonides' views were harmonised by Josef Albo(died 1444) in his great book on Jewish dogmatics, the SeferhaLbIkkarim. Albo distinguished between three classes of Law :the natura1,conventional and Divine Law.l He may have been in-fluenced by Thomas Aquinas, who distinguished between four kindsof Law : the eternal and natural on the one hand, and the humanand divine on the other.' But the possibility cannot be ruled outthat Thomas Aquinas himself was influenced by the controversybetween Maimonides and Saadya. At any rate, his own concep-tion of the four laws embodies the salient p i n t s made by theseJewish thinkers. The " lex eterna " is the divine reason whichgoverns the world. Its reflection is the " lex naturalis " which-corresponds to Saadya9s notion of the rational Law. Its prin-ciples are unchangeable. The human Law gives these principlesa determinate character. It is enacted by the state and fixes thedetails of right and wrong. It corresponds to Maimonides'conception of conventional Laws, and also echoes Saadya'sdescription of Divine legislation. T he divine Law, according toThomas, has as its supreme purpose the eternal blessedness ofman. Here, again, both Saadya and Maimonides had expressedthe same view.

Whether or not Thomas Aquinas' theory of the Law is in-debted to Jewish predecessors, it seems certain that HugoCrotius was acquainted with the scholastic tradition of Judaism.He knew Albo's work and spoke highly of it.8 Like Albo, hedistinguishes between three laws, the natural, human and divine.His definition of the natural Law follows closely the Saadyanianpattern : "Natural Law is the dictate of right reason, indicatingthat any act from its agreement or disagreement with the rationalnature of man has in it a moral turpitude or a moral necessity ;and consequently that such act is forbidden or commanded by

Cf. S e f n ha-'Ikkarim (ed. Husik), I, pp. 2, 78 ff.a Cf. I. Husik, "The Law of Nature, Hugo Crotius, and th e Bible." inHUCA1, 1925, p. 393.In his Comm. ad . Math., 5.20, he calls Albo " J u d a e om acm im i judicii " ;in his k t t n s , pp. 14 and 111, he advocated a translation of the Sefm ha-'Ikkarimby W. Schlessinger in his edition of the S.h.-I., 1844, p. xv, n. 2).


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336 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYCod, the author of nature." l Furthermore, like Saadya, hedistinguishes between those parts of the Bible which reflect theLaw of nature and those which, though they are never at variancewith the true Law of nature, nevertheless, are no proof of it,but proceed from the wil l of God. He reproves those writerswho allege that the Old Testament in its entirety is proof of theLaw of nature. But whereas Saadya tried to discover a certaindegree of rational purpose even in the second class of laws,Grotius sharply distinguishes between the command and will ofCod, the latter being more or less a rb i t r a r~ .~ lthough Grotiusdoes not mention Saadya9sname, it can be claimed that, throughthe agency of Albo, sa;dya indirectly exerted an influence on Gsthought. In a way, Saadya has thus a share in Hugo Grotius*work, and, through him, in the rise of the Natural Law Schoolwhich played such a vital part in the foundation of modeminternational law.

(b) In utilising the social philosophy of Plato for an inter-pretation of the Biblical laws Saadya initiated a tradition in Jewishphilosophy which found its classical expression in Maimonides'theory of the Prophet as the Law-giver and ruler of the idealstate. The philosopher-king replaced by the Prophet, this isthe essence of Maimonides' political thought.' In nuce, thisdoctrine is already present in Saadya's conception of the Law, ifwe consider the second " version " n which it is developed. Aswe have seen, Saadya conceives the divine legislation in terms ofa state law enacted by divine authority. The Prophet becomesthe law-giver of the ideal state. Like Maimonides, he distin-guishes between two purposes of the Law : the ordering ofhuman society and the perfection of the individual soul. Buteven more strongly than Maimonides, who was influenced byAristotle's ethics of mesotes, he follows Plato's conception of thestate as an image of the soul with justice as the chief v i r t ~ e . ~' ugo Crotius, De lu re Belli et Pacis (ed. W. Whewell), Cambridge,1853,I. 1,p. 10. a L.c., p. Ixxii. Cf. Husik,HUCA, LC.,pp. 394 ff.

Cf. Leo Strauss, Pku'losophiemd Cesetz, 1935, pp. 113 ff . ; E. I. J.Rosenthal," Maimonides Conceptionof StateandSociety." in Moses Maimonides,ed. I. Eptein. London. 1935.'An analysis of th e differences between Plato's and Aristotle's Ethics is givenby H. W. B. Joseph,Essays in Ancient and Modem Philosophy, 1935,pp. 156-177.


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SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 337The rational legislation of the Torah becomes, in this aspect, akind of a state law based on the ruling capacity of " Wisdom "in the platonic sense of A O Y L ~ L K ~ V .

It is not surprising that Saadya should have reflected platonicinfluence to such an extent seeing that the Republic and Laws ofPlato were translated into Arabic by Honein ben Ishilq and hisschool as early as in the ninth century? These writings began toexercise an influence on Islamic thought even prior to Al-F~riibi.~The extent of this influence can be recognised in the politicalthoughts of Al-Fiiriibi and Avicenna, as well as Maimonide~.~But, as we have shown, it is already reflected in Saadya's concep-tion of the Law. As a pioneer of medieval Jewish scholasticism,who absorbed a variety of philosophical traditions, Saadya helpedto create not only the medieval school of natural Law, but alsothe socio-Political interpretation of Judaism. Whether thisparticular conception does justice to the nature of the JewishLaw, is a different question. Spinoza, who adopted it, regardedthe Jewish legislation as a mere state law and concluded that thefall of the Jewish state meant the final abolition of the JewishLaw. Kant, who took his conception of Judaism from Spinoza-a fact recorded and deeply regretted by Herman Cohen 4-describes Judaism likewise not as a religion, but as a state law.'This misunderstanding has, to some extent, its roots inethemedieval interpetation of Judaism of which Saadya was theinitiator.

(c) Saadya9s insistence that human reason is insufficient toprobe the motives of the ritual Law bears the impress of a deeplyreligious mind. But it is a mind which is lacking in the sense ofmystery. Reason is the ultimate metaphysical reality. Itadmits of no serious crisis or dialectic in the structure of theworld. Whereas some Jewish mystics-and in a sense, even

Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea was Iikewise translated into Arabic but nothis Politics. Cf. Steinschneider, HU, 112, 116.Cf. L. Strauss, LC.,and in Le Monde Oriental, XXVIII, 1934, p. 129, n. 1.Cf. Strauss, Phil. u. Gesetz, pp. 108-199 ;Le Monde Oriental, pp. 124-1 31 ;Rosenthal, 1.c.Cf. H. Cohen, Jiid. Schriften, LC .Cf. I . Kant. " D ie Religion innerhalb der C renzen d. blossen Vernunft,"

in I.Kants Werke,ed. Cassirer, VI, pp. 272 ff.22


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338 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARYMaimonidessaw in the Law the divinely appointed remedy to

fall, and assigned to it the function of restoring the lostintegrity of the soul and of the universe,' Saadya knows of nosuch redeeming function of the Law. The Law is, in hisplainly optimistic philosophy of enlightenment, the road tohappiness and perfection. Nor does he accept any notion of apre-existent Logos, a notion so familiar in all branches of Jewishmysticism from Philo down to the Kabbalah. Like the Mu'tazi-

4 6lites who combated the Islamic Logos doctrine (of the eternalKuran ") because of its christological implications, Saadya, in hisdoctrine of the Divine attributes, similarly rejects any notion of aneternal Word (Logos) co-existent with Cod. The famous passageof Proverbs, ch. 8,which describes the part of Wisdom in Creation,and which served as the locusclassicus for all mystical references tothe pre-existent Logos, is given a harmless rendering.= Thus everybasis is removed for a conception of the mystical transcendanc~fthe Law. There is totally absent any trace of mysticism from histheory of the Law. The ritual laws-to the mystics a source ofprofound symbolism-are explained rationally. Saadya may beregarded as a pioneer in the psychology of religion. He exhibitsa great capacity in this respect. But it would seem that a properevaluation of the Jewish Law would have to transcend the sphereof psychological interpretation.(d) A final remark about Saadya's basic attitude of " enlight-enment ". Berdyaev has characterised " Aufklarung " as that

4 6age in the history of every people when the self-confidentFor the Jewish mystical conception of Torah in the above sense, cf. C.G.

Scholem, Major Trends of Jewish Mysticism, Jerusalem, 1941, pp. 228-275. ForMaimonides, cf. the remarkable interpretation of the " fall " of Adam in Guide,I, 2 : Before his sin, Adam was so fully absorbed in the contemplative life ofReason, i.e. in the cognition of truth, that the dialectical problem of good andevil did not occur to him ; as a consequence of his sin, he became entangled inthe problem of good and evil. Hence the Law became necessary. Its functionis to enable man to regain the lost beatitude of the contemplative life. A moregenuinely Jewish conception of the purpose of the Law-that of teaching man toimitate God's ways of love-is only reached in the last part of M.'s work. Foran appreciation of this see I. Epstein in Moses Maimonides (e&ted by I . Epstein),pp. 61 ff .' f. the references in my article " Saadya9s Theory of Revelation," inEm y s on Saadya, ed. E . J. J. Rosenthal, 1943, pp. 13-14.


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SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 339human Reason rears itself above the mysteries of being and oflife ", and Maritain and Leo Strauss have shown that in itsultimate consequence the spirit of " Aufklarung " leads to ananthropocentric and atheistic position.2 We must, of course,distinguish between moderate and radical enlightenment.Saadya as much as Hugo Crotius, and, in the eighteenth century,Moses Mendelsson, represent a moderate enlightenment whichtried to harmonise the claims of Reason and Revelation. But theseparation of ethics from religion, which lies at the core of allthese forms of enlightenment, works itself out to a logical con-clusion unforeseen by these protagonists of moderate enlighten-ment. Lessing, who assigned to Revelation a function similar tothat which Saadya conceived, makes in fact humanism self- .sufficient and autonomous. Kant, whose conception of Reasonis so deeply imbued with the spirit of "Aufklarung ",distin-guishes, in words which seem to echo Saadya9s ormula, betweenthe religion of Reason and the religion of Service (" Gottes-dienstliche Religion ") and attributes value only to the first.3 Man

4 6becomes the centre of the universe. His reason rears itselfabove the mysteries of Iife and being ".The history of European enlightenment seems at a deadlock

to-day. The conviction is gaining ground amongst religiousthinkers, both Jewish and Christian, that religion and ethicscannot be separated ; that they are essentially inter-related, apoint which was clearly recognised by Jewish moralists in bothmedieval and modern times. Their interpretation df the JewishLaw goes a long way in elucidating the interdependence of ethicsand religion. The ethical Iife is an expression not of Ratio andNature, but of Love and Grace. The period of enlightenmentot which Saadya was so distinguished a representative may thusgive way to an age of religious humanism in which the twoelements which have become separated will unite again.

Nicolas Berdyaev. The Meaning of Histo ry, pp. 5-6.a Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, p. 1-26 ;Leo Strauss,Phil. u. C'esetz.

pp. 9-29.Kant, 1.c.. pp. 278 ff.

altmann saadya's conception of the law

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