On February 7, 1984, the petitioner, as plaintiff, filed a complaint2for declaration of ownership with damages against the private respondent, the spouses Leonilo Bercasio and Candida dela Torre. Seventeen days thereafter, or on February 24, 1984, to be exact, the private respondents-defendants filed their answer (with counterclaim)3to the complaint. Still much later, on November 11, 1984, the private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint against them on the sole ground that the petitioner allegedly failed to comply with the provisions of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508 which require conciliation proceedings before the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa as a pre- condition to the filing of a case in court.4The petitioner lost no time in submitting an opposition to the private respondents' motion to dismiss. The respondent judge, to whose sala the case was raffled, on November 23, 1984, issued the questioned resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction

The petitioner (plaintiff), avers that the parties are not only residents of different barangays and municipalities but are also, in fact, residents of different provinces. P.D. No. 1508 only applies to residents of the same municipalities or at most, under par. 1 of Section 3 thereof, residents of adjoining barangays situated in two different municipalities.9It would therefore be absurd if the compulsory conciliation process is made to apply to residents of different and distant provinces, as the parties herein, when the law itself is inapplicable to residents of different municipalities unless they are from adjacent barangays. Undoubtedly, the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent is beyond the jurisdiction of any barangay court and could immediately be filed in the regular courts of justice as the petitioner here did. The private respondents submit that the subject dispute between them and the petitioner is cognizable by the barangay Lupon. They premise their contention on the allegation that at the time the petitioner filed his complaint, he was temporarily residing in Barangay Sto. Domingo, in Pacasao, Camarines Sur.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner a resident of the same barangay as contemplated by P.D No. 1508 and consequently the dispute is one cognizable by the Lupon?

Residence as contemplated in P.D. No. 1508 compels not only actual residence but also membership in the barangay. Here, it has not been shown that the petitioner became a member of Barangay Sto. Domingo during his brief sojourn in Pacasao, Camarines Sur. It follows, lacking in that qualification, that he could not then be considered, for the purpose of applying the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, as an actual resident of Barangay Sto. Domingo. There is therefore no need for the dispute between him and the private respondents to be brought before a barangay Lupon.

ALSO, the failure of the private respondents to raise timely this ground in a motion to dismiss filed before their answer to the complaint, or in their answer, constitutes a waiver thereof.

Vercide vs Judge Hernandez

A complaint was filed against Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez of the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and Tudela, Misamis Occidental, charging her with grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for her dismissal of a case which complainant Valencides Vercide and his wife had filed against Daria Lagas Galleros for recovery of possession of a piece of land. The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same municipality, while complainant and his wife are residents of Dipolog City. Because of this fact, the case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

However, this matter was raised by defendant in her answer as an affirmative defense, and respondent, in her order of July 15, 1997, ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to the prosecution of the counterclaim pleaded by the defendant in her answer.

The complainant move for reconsideration citing the provision in Local government code excepting from the authority of the Lupon disputes involving real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless parties agreed to submit their differences to a lupon. (Sec. 408 of Local Government Code of 1991).However, respondent denied the motion. His contention was that Rule VI, Section 3 paragraph (c) of the same Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which provides that Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the Barangay where the real property or larger portion thereof is situated.

ISSUE: Is the respondent judge barred from taking cognizance of the ejectment case?

HELD: Contrary to respondents interpretation, it is clear even from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. Rule VI of the same states in pertinent part:

SECTION 2.Subject matters for settlement. - All disputes may be the subject of proceedings for amicable settlement under these rulesexcept the following enumerated cases:

(f)Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto to agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

Indeed, these provisions, which are also found in P.D. No. 1508, have already been authoritatively interpreted by this Court, and the duty of respondent judge was to follow the rulings of this Court. Her insistence on her own interpretation of the law can only be due either to an ignorance of this Courts ruling or to an utter disregard thereof.

Universal Robina Sugar vs Heirs of Angel Teves

Andres Abanto owned two parcels of land situated in Campuyo, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental.One lot, consisting of 55,463 square meters, is registered in his name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. H-37 of the Registry of Deeds of said province.The other lot with an area of 193,789 square meters is unregistered.He died on February 16, 1973.[1]

On October 19, 1974, Andres Abanto's heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Andres Abanto and Simultaneous Sale.[2]In this document, Abanto's heirs adjudicated unto themselves the two lots and sold the (a)unregisteredlot of 193,789 square meters to the United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO), and(b) theregisteredlot covered by TCT No. H-37 to Angel M. Teves, for a total sum of P115,000.00. Teves verbally allowed UPSUMCO to use the lot covered by TCT No. H-37 for pier and loading facilities, free of charge,subjectto the condition that UPSUMCO shall shoulder the payment of real property taxes and that its occupation shall be co-terminus with its corporate existence. Years later, UPSUMCOs properties were acquired by the Philippine National Bank (PNB).Later, PNB transferred the same properties to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) which, in turn, sold the same to the Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO). URSUMCO then took possession of UPSUMCOs properties,includingTeves' lot covered by TCT No. H-37. Upon learning of URSUMCO's acquisition of his lot, Teves formally asked the corporation to turn over to him possession thereof or the corresponding rentals. URSUMCO refused to heed Teves' demand, claiming that it acquired the right to occupy the property from UPSUMCO which purchased it from Andres Abanto. Teves filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dumaguete City, Branch 43, a complaint for recovery of possession of real property with damages against URSUMCO. RTC ruled in favor of Heirs of Teves. CA affirmed the decision of RTC:

ISSUE:

1. Do respondents have established a cause of action against petitioner?

2. Does the petitioner have the legal capacity to question the validity of the sale?

3. Is Barangay conciliation needed?

HELD:

(1) Yes, respondents have cause of action since the transfer of H-37 was a contract of sale. In addition, it wasTeves who allowed UPSUMCO to construct the pier and guest house, clearly manifestations of acts of ownershipover the land by Teves.(2) No, petitioner cannot hide behind the veil of an innocent purchaser for value as two important factors areabsent: (1) property bought for consideration and (2) Lack of knowledge of adverse claim prior to sale. In addition,H-37 was not included in the property acquired by URSUMCO from APT which was limited to UPSUMCO properties foreclosed by PNB.

(2) No, petitioner cannot hide behind the veil of an innocent purchaser for value as two important factors areabsent: (1) property bought for consideration and (2) lack of knowledge of adverse claim prior to sale. In addition,H-37 was not included in the property acquired by URSUMCO from APT which was limited to UPSUMCOproperties foreclosed by PNB.

(3) No. Regarding the third issue, suffice it to state that being a corporation, petitioner cannot be impleaded as a party to abarangayconciliation proceeding.Section 1, Rule VI of theKatarungang PambarangayRules implementing theKatarungang PambarangayLaw[28]provides:"Section 1.Parties. - Only individuals shall be parties to these proceedings either as complainants or respondents.No complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical entitiesshall be filed, received or acted upon."

Mauro Blardony Jr vs Judge Jose Coscolluela

FACTS: The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. They were married on April 30, 1975. During their marriage, they begot one child. Due to irreconcilable differences, petitioner and private respondent separated in March, 1981. On 1982, the wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the Court of First Instance. The husband, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned the conjugal home. However, failing to agree upon the equitable partition of their conjugal partnership properties, the husband prayed the court to order "a fair and equitable dissolution of their conjugal partnership in accordance with law. Later, the husband filed a motion to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508, because both are residents of the same Municipality of Makati. Judge Segundo Soza dismissed the petition on October 8, 1982 for failure of the plaintiff to comply with Section 6 of P.D. 1508. After the reorganization of the courts, the case was transferred to Judge Coscolluela who set aside Judge Sozas order of dismissal and required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses, and commissions.

ISSUE: Did the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it assumed jurisdiction over the case without prior referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa as required by P.D. 1508?

HELD: No. There was no abuse of discretion in the case at bar, much more a grave one. The petition is without merit. While the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement,.Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable partition of the conjugal properties. Under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and may be filed directly without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa.

Teresita Montoya vs Terestita Escayo

FACTS: The private respondents were all formerly employed as salesgirls in the petitioner's store, the "Terry's Dry Goods Store," in Bacolod City. On different dates, they separately filed complaints for the collection of sums of money against the petitioner for alleged unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and service leave pay: for violation of the minimum wage law, illegal dismissal, and attorney's fees. The complaints, were subsequently consolidated on account of the similarity in their nature. The petitioner-employer moved for the dismissal of the complaints, claiming that among others, the private respondents failed to refer the dispute to the Lupong Tagapayapa for possible settlement and to secure the certification required from the Lupon Chairman prior to the filing of the cases with the Labor Arbiter. These actions were allegedly violative of the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, which apply to the parties who are all residents of Bacolod City.

ISSUE: Is the prior referral to barangay conciliation proceedings required in labor disputes?

HELD: No. The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the submission of disputes before the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court or other government offices are not applicable to labor cases. From the three "WHEREAS" clauses of P.D. No. 1508 can be gleaned clearly the decree's intended applicability only to courts of justice, and not to labor relations commissions or labor arbitrators' offices. The express reference to "judicial resources", to "courts of justice", "court dockets", or simply to "courts" are significant. On the other hand, there is no mention at all of labor relations or controversies and labor arbiters or commissions in the clauses involved. In addition the presidential issuances made clear that the only official directed to oversee the implementation of the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law (P.D. No. 1508) are the then Minister of Justice, the then Minister of Local Governments and Community Development, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. If the contention of the petitioner were correct, the then Minister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment would have been included in the list, and the two presidential issuancesalsowould have been addressed to the labor relations officers, labor arbiters, and the members of the National Labor Relations Commission.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The Labor Code Of The Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended) itself. Article 226 thereof grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over the conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances, or problems in the regional offices of the Department of Labor and Employ- ment. It is the said Bureau and its divisions, and not the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa, which are vested by law withoriginalandexclusiveauthority to conduct conciliation and mediation proceedings on labor controversies before their endorsement to the appropriate Labor Arbiter for adjudication.

Pascula vs Pascual

FACTS: Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002. Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC at Roxas a complaint entitled Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual and Register of Deeds, Defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657 of Isabela and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages. To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to Dismiss[3]on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code. The respondent contended that The Attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of Vira, Roxas, Isabela, and he substitute(sic)Dante Pascual by virtue of said Special Power of Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact should have brought the dispute before barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where the property is located. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: (1) Is the Attorney-in-fact the real part in interest and may therefore bring the necessary complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa andappear in person as if he is the owner of the land?

(2) Is prior referral to the lupon for conciliation proceedings a requirement in the case at bar?

RULING: (1) No. The Attorney-in-fact is not the real party in interest. Section 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest.

(2) No. The pertinent provisions of the Sec 408 of the Local Government Code read:

SEC. 408.Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the partiesactually residingin the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes.

In the 1982 case ofTavora v. Veloso,[11]this Court held that where the parties are notactual residentsin the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to theluponas provided for in Section 6vis a visSections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang PambarangayLaw). To construe the express statutory requirement ofactualresidencyas applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a real party in interest as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3[14]of the 1997 Rules of Courtvis a visSection 3.

In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner,the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the localluponhas no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.

Teresita Agbayani vs Judge Belen

FACTS: Nullification is sought by petitioners of the Order of respondent Judge1dated September 28, 1983, dismissing the civil action instituted by said petitioners against private respondents and other persons for quieting of title and damages involving three (3) parcels of land in Dayomaca (Tobuan), Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan. The Court sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss "on the ground that ... (it had) not yet acquired jurisdiction to try the case" because of the failure of the petitioners to submit the controversy to conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. No. 1508 before filing their complaint with the court. The respondent contended that even if the parties reside in barargays of different cities or municipalities, the real property subject matter of the case are not however located in different barangays but in one and the same barangay, that is, Barangay Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan.Based on these facts obtaining in this case, it is clear and clean that the present action is within the authority of the Lupon, hence the provision of P.D. 1508 should first be complied with before the complaint could be flied in court.

ISSUE: Does the prior submission of the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation apply to actions affecting real property situated in one city or municipality although the parties actually reside in barangays which are located in different cities or municipalities and do not adjoin each other?

RULING: No. The question has already been passed upon and answered by thisCourt. InTavora vs. Veloso,et al.,12the Courten bancheld that the "precondition" had no application to cases over which the Lupon had no authority. Specifically, the Court ruled that by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other."13In such a situation, where the Lupon is without jurisdiction of the controversy because the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality or of adjoining' barangays, the nature of the controversy is of no moment-whether or not affecting real property or interest therein, located in the same city or municipality. And the principle is not at an altered by the proviso of Section 3 of PD 1508(governing venue) that "disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated." The "quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule onvenueprescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3;"14but obviously, the rule on venue is utterly in-consequential as regards a case over which the Barangay Lupon does not, in the first place, have any jurisdiction. Since the dispute between the parties in this case was never within the authority or jurisdiction of the Barangay Lupon because the parties admittedly reside in different cities and municipalities (and not in adjoining barangays), there was no occasion or reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue governing disputes concerning real property. Petitioners were there-fore under no obligation to comply with the "precondition" of first referring their dispute with private respondents to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement before instituting their suit in court.

Spouses Santos vs Spouses Lumbao

FACTS: An action for reconveyance with damages was filed by Spouses Lumbao against petitioners. Petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Rita Santos who allegedly sold two parcels of land to respondents when she was alive by virtue of a document called bilihan ng lupa.The lower court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of ground of lack of cause of action as the spouses allegedly did not comply with the required barangay conciliation because the parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and the dispute between them involves a real property, hence, the said dispute should have been brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter of the controversy, is located, which happens to be the same city where the contending parties reside. The CA granted and ordered the petititoners to convey the land to the spouses, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Should the complaint for reconveyance filed by the respondents be dismissed for failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings?

RULING: No. This argument cannot be sustained.Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it.Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao.It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the courts jurisdiction.[17]It is also well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[18]Hence, herein petitioners can no longer raise the defense of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the complaint filed by the respondents Spouses Lumbao, because they already waived the said defense when they failed to file a Motion to Dismiss.

Zamora vs Izquierdo

FACTS: Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units in Caloocan City. They agreed on the following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased premises is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it. After the death of Carmen (lessor) , her successors decided to have new contract of lease wherein the rental was increased from P3,000.00 toP3,600.00 per month. However, lessees refused to sign it. Moreover the lessees violated the terms of the contract for having established a photocopying business within the premise. The lessee wanted to apply for a water line installation in the premises but they need to secure a written consent from the owner. However the owners refused due to the violation of the contract and their refusal to pay for a higher rent. The parties presented their dispute before the barangay captain for conciliation but to no avail, thus a certificate to file action was issued. The owner filed for unlawful detainer. The respondent moved for the dismissal of the case, on the ground that there was no conciliation at the brgy level. They argued that upon failing to reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b), Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No. 7160[8] (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991).

ISSUE: Was there a compliance of the requisite referral to barangany conciliation even absent the constitution of pangkat?

RULING: Yes there was substantial compliance. The petitioners contention that theLuponconciliation alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat ngTagapagkasundo,contravenes the law onKatarungang Pambarangay is erroneous. Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation processeitherbefore theLuponChairman (as what happened in the present case),orthePangkat.

Moreover, inDiu vs. Court of Appeals[21]held that notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b) of R.A. No. 7160 that theBarangayChairman shall constitute aPangkatif he fails in his mediation efforts, the same Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. Here, while thePangkatwas not constituted, however, the parties metnine (9) timesat the Office of theBarangayChairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.

April Martinez vs Rodolfo Martinez

FACTS: Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936 against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint forestafa through falsification of a public document in the Office of the City Prosecutor against Manolo, which was elevated to the Department of Justice. On motion of the defendants, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the complaint. On October 4, 1999, Rodolfo filed a Petition with the RTC of Manila for the probate of the last will of the deceased Daniel Martinez, Sr.]

In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the owners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and that pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508, the matter was referred to thebarangayfor conciliation and settlement, but none was reached. They appended the certification to file action executed by thebarangaychairman to the complaint. In his Answer[13]to the complaint filed Rodolfo alleged,inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a condition precedent, namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement of the matter between the parties had been exerted, but that none was reached. He also pointed out that the dispute had not been referred to thebarangaybefore the complaint was filed.

RULING: The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in theKatarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in thebarangaychairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.[25]The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the certification to file action by thebarangaychairman, is sufficient compliance with article 151 of the Family Code. It bears stressing that under Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, no complaint involving any matter within the authority of theLuponshall be instituted or filed directly in court for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties and no settlement was reached.

Bonifacio Law Office vs Judge Bellosillo

FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated August 28, 1997, Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr.of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 34, with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality. Complainant assails the Order dated April 2, 1996 referring the said ejectment case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint, that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached [to] the verified complaint as ANNEX E thereof. The respondent judge denied the charges leveled against him and argued that where there is failure of settlement of mediation proceedings before the Barangay Chairman, it is necessary that the Pangkat be constituted by the parties from the Lupon members in order that they may have a second opportunity to amicably settle their dispute.It is a mandatory duty of the Barangay Chairman to set the meeting of the parties for the constitution of the Pangkat upon failure of parties to amicably settle otherwise there is no compliance with the requirements of P.D. 1508, now Sec. 412, 1991 Local Government Code.In the case of complainant, it appears from the records thereof that there was premature issuance of the Certificate to File Action considering that there is no proof to show that the Pangkat was duly constituted before the said certificate was issued.

ISSUE: Was there a substantial compliance with the the requiremens of Sec 412 of the Local Government Code?

RULING: There was none. The records reveal that such the certification to file action was improperly and prematurely issued.In what appears to be a pre-printed standard form thereof,[4]the x before the second enumerated statement clearly shows that no personal confrontation before a duly constitutedPangkat ng Tagapagkasundotook place.Respondents position that thePangkatwas not constituted, and that no face to face conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is substantiated by the Minutes[5]submitted by complainant.Evidently, complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings. Also the Complaint[6]before the barangay was dated February 16, 1996.Records show that the hearing was scheduled for February 26, 1996 and was reset for February 29, 1996.[7]And yet, the Certification to File Action[8]was issued on March 1, 1996, less than fifteen days after the first scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman. As provided under the law, If the barangay chairman fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of thepangkat. Furthermore, Administrative Circular No. 14-93 provides that If mediation or conciliation efforts before thePunong Barangayproved unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before thePunong Barangay, thePunong Barangayshall not cause the issuance of this stage of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute thePangkatbefore whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held. Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the parties and to settle the case before it.Hence, respondent judge was not incorrect in remanding the case to it for completion of the mandated proceedings.

Pang-et vs Dao-as GR

On23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to theBarangayLupon (Lupon) ofDagdag,Sagadafor arbitration in accordance with the provisions of theKatarungangPambarangayLaw.[5]Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.[6]

Thereafter, theLuponissued a Certification to File Action due to the refusal of theManacnesspouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their insistence that the case should go to court.

An Order was issued by the MCTC on7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for conciliation by theLuponand ordering theLuponto render an Arbitration Award thereon.According to the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the parties concerned; however, theLuponfailed to issue an Arbitration Award as provided under theKatarungangPambarangayLaw, so that, the case must be returned to theLuponuntil an Arbitration Award is rendered.Thus the Lupon ordered an arbitral award in compliance. On1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the Arbitration Award.On the other hand,FlorentinaManacnesfiled a Motion with the MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration Award issued by the Lupon. Thus, on16 October 2001, herein petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration Award which was sought to be dismissed by the heir of theManacnesspouses.[8]The heir of theManacnesspouses argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are void.

ISSUE: Is the petiti

RULING: It is pivotal to stress that, during the initial hearing before theLupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spousesManacnesdeclined to sign the Agreement for Arbitration and were adamant that the proceedings before the MCTC. As reflected in the Minutes[12]of the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995, the legality of the signature of CatherineManacnes, daughter of theManacnesspouses, who signed the Agreement for Arbitration on behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be the spousesManacnesthemselves who should have signed such agreement.To resolve the issue, thePangkatChairman then asked the spousesManacnesthat if they wanted the arbitration proceedings to continue, they must signify their intention in the Agreement for Arbitration form.However, as stated earlier, theManacnesspouses did not want to sign such agreement and instead insisted that the case go to court. The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under theKatarungangPambarangayLawis the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by theLuponor thePangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment of a court.[17]Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under theKatarungangPambarangayLaw, there cannot be a binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration to theLupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the parties to submit the case for arbitrationuntilan arbitration award is rendered by theLupon. It is contrary to the very nature of the proceedings under theKatarungangPambarangayLawwhich espouses the principle of voluntary acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable settlement. Therefore, upon certification by theLupon ng Tagapamayapathat the confrontation before thePangkatfailed because the spousesManacnesrefused to submit the case for arbitration and insisted that the case should go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in the case for recovery of possession which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable resolution of the case through arbitration before theLupon ng Tagapamayapa. Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering theLupon ng Tagapamayapato render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spousesManacnesto submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration award will not bind the spouses.As reflected in Section 413 of the RevisedKatarungangPambarangayLaw, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of theLuponor thePangkat.Like in any other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it.

Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan leased her premise respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo for a period of three years. However, he violated some of the provisions of the agreement and refused to pay increased in rental feel. The petitioner referred the matter to theBarangayChairmans office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement.TheBarangayChairman then issued aCertificate to File Action.[6] The petitioner filed against the respondent an action for Unlawful Detainer with the MTC. The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the RTC directed the parties to go back to theLuponChairman orPunongBarangayfor further proceedings and to comply strictly with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded toMeTCof Manila. The case was then elevated to the CA. Meantime, while this petition was pending before this Court, the parties went through barangayconciliation proceedings as directed by the RTC of Manila which proceeding failed.

ISSUED: Were the parties able to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in the barangay level?

RULING: Yes. With the parties subsequent meeting with theLuponChairman orPunongBarangayfor further conciliation proceedings, the procedural defect was cured.Even prior to the filing of the case, there was already a substantial compliance. The Lupon/PangkatChairman andLupon/PangkatSecretary signed theCertificate to File Actionstating that no settlement was reached by the parties.While admittedly nopangkatwas constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the office of theBarangayChairman for possible settlement.The efforts of theBarangayChairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached.Although nopangkatwas formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance with the law.It is noteworthy that under theaforequotedprovision, the confrontation before theLuponChairman or thepangkatis sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.[17]This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that theBarangayChairman shall constitute apangkatif he fails in his mediation efforts.Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case.On this score, it is significant that theBarangayChairman orPunongBarangayis herself the Chairman of theLuponunder the Local Government Code.[18]

Atty. Magno vs Atty. Jacoba-Velasco

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.Om.plainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before thePunong Barangay,acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact such as that Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the complaint; That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant. In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family

RULING: Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subjectKatarungang Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415.Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangayproceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed herSumbongto the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote herSumbongwith the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed herSumbongto the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs theLupong Tagapamayapa.[10]

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to allkatarungan barangayproceedings. Section 412(a)[11]the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before theluponchairman or theluponorpangkat. As what happened in this case, thepunong barangay, as chairman of theLupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties.

San Miguel Village vs Judge Punoogar

FACTS: Petitioner, a duly arredited private school located in Iligan City, entered into a contract of services with private respondent Christina Trio. Sometime in August 1985, while the contract was in full force and effect, and during a final examination period, private respondent suddenly stopped teaching at the petitioner School, without giving notice of termination and thereby causing not inconsiderable difficulties for the School. Petitioner School immediately sought the assistance of the Barangay Captain of Palao and the commencement of conciliation proceedings, This attempt failed because private respondent could not be contacted, she having left Iligan City and having secured a better paying job at the Philippine Refugee Center based in Manila. The lower court rendered a decision against the defendant. Four (4) months later,private respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the trial court, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to render its decision dated 26 January 1986 for failure of petitioner to go through the mandatory conciliation procedure prescribed by Sections 2 and 6 of P.D. No. 1508. Private respondent argued that the certification of the Barangay Captain of Palao dated 17 September 1985 was inadequate compliance with P.D. No. 1508, private respondent being a resident, not of Barangay Palao, Iligan City, but rather of Barangay Tomas Cabili, Iligan City. The court decided in favor of the private respondent contending that the trial court in did not in the first place acquire jurisdiction for failure to comply with the requirement of conciliation within the barangal level.

ISSUE: Did the the trial court acquire jurisdiction despite the non performance of the requirement of conciliation within the barangay level?

RULING: Yes. It is, firmly settled2that failure of a plaintiff to comply with the requirements of P.D. No. 1508 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court that tried the action. In, e.g.,Millare v. Hernando, the Court stressed that "the conciliation procedure required under P.D. No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that failure to have prior recourse to such procedure would not deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant."3Failure of a plaintiff to go through the conciliation procedure established by P.D. No. 1508 merely affects the sufficiency, or the maturity or ripeness of the plaintiffs cause of action and the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but rather for want of cause of action or for prematurity.4Respondent Judge was thus in palpable error in holding his predecessor without jurisdiction to render the assailed decision. There is no question that the "confrontation" or conciliation proceedings did not materialize here, since private respondent did not appear before theLupon. Where, however, the defendant in an action fails for one reason or another to respond to a notice to appear before theLupon, the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 must be regarded as having been satisfied by the plaintiff. In simplest terms, a defendant cannot be allowed to profit by her own default. In the first place, the Barangay authorities of Barangay Palao must be presumed to have performed their official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing the Certificate to File Action. They must be presumed to have sent a notice to Christina Trio to appear before theLupon; otherwise, they could not reasonably have stated that Christina "could not be contacted." Secondly, petitioner School had already presented evidence during the hearing before the Commissioner appointed by Judge Rasuman that both petitioner and private respondent were residents of Palao, Iligan City. Finally, and in any event, the alleged failure on the part of a plaintiff to comply with the procedural requirement established by P.D. No. 1508 must be raised in a timely manner, that is, at the first available opportunity, if such alleged failure is to provide legal basis for dismissal of the complaint. Such failure must be pleaded, in other words, in a timely motion to dismiss or in the answer. Failure to so set up that defense produces the effect of waiver of such defense.

Ma Theresa Vidal vs Ma Theresa Escueta

FACTS: Survivors of Abelardo Escueta , inclusive of Teresa Escueta decided to sell their inherited property which supposedly was leased to Rainier Llanera. Ma. Teresa Escueta, as a co-owner of the property, filed an ejectment case against Llanera and the sub-lessees before theLuponof Barangay Highway Hills. In the meantime, the heirs of Abelardo Escueta executed a deed of conditional sale[6]over the property including the house thereon, to Mary Liza Santos. With the agreement that the seller will be responsible for the ejectment of all the tenants. Consequently, Escueta and Llanera, and the sub-lessees, executed an Amicable Settlement,[9]where they agreed that (a) the owners of the property would no longer collect the rentals due from the respondents therein (lessee and sub-lessees) starting May 1999, with the concomitant obligation of the respondents to vacate the property on or before December 1999; (b) time was the essence of the agreement, and that consequently, if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the property on or before December 1999, the barangay chairman was authorized without any court order to cause the eviction and removal of all the respondents on the property.[10]The amicable settlement was attested byPangkatChairman Jose Acong.The parties did not repudiate the amicable settlement within ten days from the execution thereof. Neither did any of the parties file any petition to repudiate the settlement. By January 2000, five sub-lessees, namely, Ma. Teresa Vidal, Lulu Marquez, Marcelo Trinidad, Carlos Sobremonte,[12]and Jingkee Angremained in the property, and requested Escueta for extensions to vacate the property.Escueta agreed, but despite the lapse of the extensions granted them, the five sub-lessees refused to vacate the property. OnMay 12, 2000, Escueta filed a verified Motion for Execution against the recalcitrant sub-lessees with the MTC for the enforcement of the amicable settlement and the issuance of a writ of execution. The defendants asserted that the amicable settlement was not elevated to or approved by the MTC as required by Section 419 of the Local Government Code (LGC), nor approved by a competent court; hence, there was no judgment to enforce by a new motion for a writ of execution. As such, the plaintiffs motion was premature and procedurally improper.

ISSUE: Can the settlement agreed upon within the barangay level be enforced?

RULING: Yes. Under Section 416 of the LGC, the amicable settlement executed by the parties before theLuponon the arbitration award has the force and effect ofa final judgment of a courtupon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless the settlement is repudiated within the period therefor, where the consent is vitiated by force, violence or intimidation, or a petition to nullify the award is filed before the proper city or municipal court.[25]The repudiation of the settlement shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a certification to file a complaint. The Secretary of theLuponis mandated to transmit the settlement to the appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish the parties and theLuponChairman with copies thereof.[27]The amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the period therefor may be enforced by execution by theLuponthrough thePunong Barangaywithin a time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so enforced by theLuponafter the lapse of the said period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or municipal court. Section 417 of the LGC grants a party a period of six months to enforce the amicable settlement by theLuponthrough thePunong Barangaybefore such party may resort to filing an action with the MTC to enforce the settlement. The time line of six months is for the benefit not only of the complainant, but also of the respondent.Going by the plain words of Section 417 of the LGC, the time line of six months should be computed from the date of settlement. However, if applied to a particular case because of its peculiar circumstance, the computation of the time line from the date of the settlement may be arbitrary and unjust and contrary to the intent of the law.The six months can then be counted after the obligation becomes due and demandable. In this case, the parties executed their Amicable Settlement onMay 5, 1999.However, the petitioners were obliged to vacate the property only in January 2000, orseven months after the date of the settlement; hence, the respondent may enforce the settlement through thePunong Barangaywithin six months from January 2000 or until June 2000, when the obligation of the petitioners to vacate the property became due. The respondent was precluded from enforcing the settlementviaan action with the MTC before June 2000.However, the respondent filed onMay 12, 2000a motion for execution with the MTC and not with thePunong Barangay.Clearly, the respondent adopted the wrong remedy. Normally, the Court would remand the case to thePunong Barangayfor further proceedings.However, the Court may resolve the issues posed by the petitioners, based on the pleadings of the parties to serve the ends of justice. In this case, there is no question that the petitioners were obliged under the settlement to vacate the premises in January 2000.They refused, despite the extensions granted by the respondent, to allow their stay in the property. For the court to remand the case to theLuponand require the respondent to refile her motion for execution with theLuponwould be an idle ceremony.It would only unduly prolong the petitioners unlawful retention of the premises. Also, the petitioners are estopped from assailing the amicable settlement on the ground of deceit and fraud.First. The petitioners failed to repudiate the settlement within the period therefor.Second. The petitioners werebenefited by the amicable settlement.They were allowed to remain in the propertywithout any rentals therefor until December 1998.They were even granted extensions to continue in possession of the property.It was only when the respondent filed the motion for execution that the petitioners alleged for the first time that the respondents deceived them into executing the amicable settlement.

Chavez vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease[4]whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond situated in Bulacan, Bulacan, for a term of six (6) years commencing from October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. Paragraph 5 of the contract further provided that respondent shall undertake all construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from petitioner. In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, respondent was informed by abarangaycouncilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.

In September 1996, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of theBarangayCaptain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached. Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing Kasunduan, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pretrial brief and to attend the pretrial conference. On October 21, 1997, respondent was allowed to present his evidenceex-partebefore and a judgment was rendered. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of theBarangayCaptain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. Petitioner argued that respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in theRevised Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Assuming arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction, it cannot award more than the amount stipulated in the Kasunduan which isP150,000.00.

RULING: In the case at bar, theRevised Katarungang Pambarangay Lawprovides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by thePunong Barangaywhich is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.[21]However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of theCivil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417[22]itself which provides that the amicable settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word may clearly makes the procedure provided in theRevised Katarungang PambarangayLaw directory[23]or merely optional in nature.

Thus, although theKasunduanexecuted by petitioner and respondent before the Office of theBarangayCaptainhad the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioners non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the RevisedKatarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. Respondent was not limited to claimingP150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in theKasunduan,it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation[24]which the parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing.[25]Under the Kasunduan, respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder.

Harold vs Aliba

FACTS:

Sometime in January 1993, Harold engaged the services of respondent Agapito T. Aliba, a geodetic engineer. It also appears that sometime in January 1994, Aliba prevailed upon Harold and her husband to sign a document which was supposedly needed to facilitate the consolidation-subdivision and the issuance of separate transfer certificates of title over the properties. Harold and her husband signed the document without reading it. Thereafter, on April 18, 1994, a truck loaded with G.I. sheets and construction materials came to the subject lot2owned by Harold. Upon inquiry, Harold and her husband were informed that Aliba had sold the lot to a third person.

On several occasions, Aliba tried to convince Harold to accept the sum ofP400,000 which was later on increased toP500,000, as purchase price of the said lot. It was only after such offers were made that Aliba told Harold that he had indeed sold the lot.