1. 1. Jennifer Jackson Al Qeada: Policy Paper Terrorists in Pakistan The strength of some terrorists groups in Pakistan is growing thus threatening a jihadist rise that could encompass that entire county. If these militant Sunni terrorists consume Pakistan, then this will also strengthen Al Qeada. The implications of this threat, if realized, would not only be the biggest threat yet for the U.S. but for the entire world (Riedel 2009). Pakistan is not only functional enough to pose this threat such as this due to modern communications, technology, and transportation, but it is equipped with nuclear capabilities as well. The flow of resources used for terrorist recruitment (radicalization and training) did not end after the tens of thousands of volunteers from all over the world were recruited and trained to fight against the Soviets in Afghan but continues today with the recruitment of Pakistani youth through the radically extremist madrassa schools (or training camps in many cases). This is one of many issues of concern to the U. S. in regards to terrorists (and the proliferation of) in Pakistan.
2. 2. Riedel (2009) gives an excellent synopsis of what could happen and why extremist fundamentalists in Pakistan matter to the U.S., especially if they continue to expand (or, in a worst case scenario, gain enough power to take over the country). Pakistan would become even more unstable and violent than it already is. Many Pakistani westernized and educated individuals and families would try to leave the chaotic country but with no where to go because other countries would most likely be on a high security alert, which would basically close their borders to Pakistanis (or at least exercise extreme regulation/control) throughout much of the world. This would result in a weaker economy (perhaps collapse) for Pakistan and would discourage foreign investment, which could create much greater poverty, hunger/starvation, and chaos within the country. Terrorists would not only have the opportunity for obtaining control of the nuclear weapons but would open up to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qeada in general, while using their embassies abroad for terrorist activities (until banned from those countries) against Christian Crusaders as well as Israeli Zionists, while claiming Ummah (community) Globally. Pakistani madrassas are Islamic, religious schools that do not teach modern, open- minded curricula but that teach radicalized versions of (the Koran) religious Islam instead, which includes radical militant activities. The madrassas are economically financed by Saudi Arabia in order to further promote Saudis Wahhabism (rigid Islam) values but they also foster Islamic fundamentalism (Nasr 2008). The jihadi threat from Pakistan is the biggest emerging threat we are facing an ideological training hotbed for jihadists, and they are being exported here (Warner 2009:7).
3. 3. Nasr (2008) also argues that the most likely root cause of continued terrorist recruitment is particular interpretations of Islam which takes place in almost all Pakistan madrassas that have been funded by Saudi Arabia (and these schools most likely would not have been produced or succeeded without that funding). He also suggests that some of the madrassas that are being (have been) developed along the border of Afghanistan are actually similar to, if not the same as, guerilla camps, in which there is a mixing of Islamic radical fundamentalist teachings with military training, while producing the new mosque leaders and other clerics who will open even more mosques and madrassas with funding from Saudi Arabia. Texts books and other propaganda (other than the Koran) being used for schooling in madrassas are fundamentalist materials, the same type that has been used to train the Taliban leaders as well as fighters for terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e Taiba from Kashmir and others (Berman 2009; Warner 2009). What appears to be the an obvious solution, build alternative schools in Pakistan thus lure the youth away from the madrassas, has been attempted with little success. While the alternative schools are, in theory, an excellent policy approach in that they are filling an absolute need for the Pakistani youth, this approach alone is not optimal. It has been shown that only 1/3 of foreign economic aid, which includes education aid for building schools, hits its target while the remaining is siphoned off and used for other developments (Malik 2009). Also, the leaders of madrassa schools will defensively begin to spread rumors about the Western government schools in regards to conspiracy theories (Ali 2009), while extremist (trained in madrassas!) come from behind and close down the new schools, burn them down, or terrify the students and/or families enough that not many will attend (Warner 2009).
4. 4. Supplying more economic aid with a substantial portion of that allocated to education and other public welfare programs would be positive in that it would relieve some of the agony that comes with extreme poverty but also in that it could be designated to specific programs such as technical and vocational training in education. This economic aid would have to come with built in monitoring mechanisms, however, to reinforce the dispersal of the aid to its intended target (Malik 2009). If the U.S. simply marched into Pakistan and began destroying all of the madrassas, this would effectively eliminate them for a very short time thus it would be difficult for extremist leaders to recruit and train many youth. However, destroying madrassas by way of military coercion would be counterproductive to be sure. The madrassas and other training camps are very easily reconstructed plus neighboring citizens would resent the inevitable casualties of innocent citizens (collateral damage) resulting from such destruction. Thus terrorist sympathy and recruitment would actually grow (Riedel 2009)! Finally, adopting a policy of ignoring the madrassas is not an option either due to the fact that their original motive, to combat communism, has changed to a motive of combat all Westerners/Americans.
5. 5. Ali (2009) contends that there is a need for reform in the heart of Pakistans education infrastructure with a need to focus on conflict resolution skills within Pakistan and around its borders. He offers four issues that cause negative outcomes in Pakistan educated youth: 1. Youth that leave madrassas do not have an employable skill-set due to the curriculum (Koran and ideology teachings), 2. If madrassas are updated with modern technology such as computers then they become even more vulnerable to Internet extremists recruitment, 3. Madrassas continually perpetuate Islamic extremists ideology, 4. Madrassas play a large role in recruiting and training not only from the most remote and isolated areas of Pakistan but from the urban areas as well. One priority reform that should be focused on right away in Pakistan is implementing (strict) government regulations in regards to madrassas. Regulation would include issues such as standardized testing to measure students progress but should also address issues such as restricting military training (tactics and weapons use), while prohibiting weapons of any kind altogether in all schools/madrassas (and perhaps even mosques). Ali (2009) has found that only 39 madrassas out of 363 in one district were even registered with the Pakistan Government. This type of regulation, however, may affect the funding of madrassas from Saudi Arabia thus clear negotiations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are essential during the regulation implementation process.
6. 6. Curriculum issues that need to be reformed would include offering alternative historical narratives in regards to the region and colonialism, adding sections of conflict resolution (Ali 1009), exposing issues involving peaceful (religion) tolerance, and perhaps even Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) options (highly regulated, of course) to help students prepare not only for higher education but for global success. This could be facilitated by inviting madrassa leaders to do fellowships with successful Muslim schools in other parts of the world, such as the U.S. (or as Ali [2009] mentions, Indonesian). Another program that would be worth pursuing is for U.S. and Allies to recruit the new graduates (from these new reformed madrassas) as well as other locals and pay them well (Brezinski 2009). Also, by reassuring Pakistan that U.S. is not going to pull out of Afghanistan for a very long time, Pakistan will be much more willing to forgo offering support to the (Afghan) Taliban because the threat from India would continue to be minimal. This may facilitate an alliance between U.S. and Pakistan in which Pakistan more readily cooperates with reform efforts (Jenkins 2009; Ohanlon 2009). Riedel (2009) goes even further and suggests that the U.S. should help Pakistan in educational aid specifically targeted at Pakistani women in the fight against terrorists. Though there are many issues in regards to terrorists in Pakistan, madrassas seem to be a key issue that can be addressed in the present moment (if done simultaneously across Pakistan) that could have an impact within a few years and immediately in some instances thus should be considered a major focus in global counter-terrorism.
7. 7. REFERENCES Ali, S. (2009). "Pakistan's Madrassas: The Need for Internal Reform and the Role of International Assistance - Brookings Institution." Brookings - Quality. Independence. Impact. Saban Center for Middle East Policy for the Brookings Institution. Web. 18 Sept. 2009. . Berman, I (2009). "Uneducating the Islamic World." American Spectator Vol. 42. Iss. 6: 58-60. Brezinski, Z. (2009). "RAND | Conference Proceedings | U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Basic Questions -- Strategic Choices." RAND Corporation Provides Objective Research Services and Public Policy Analysis.Web. 9 Nov. 2009. . Jenkins, B. (2009). "RAND | Conference Proceedings | U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Basic Questions -- Strategic Choices." RAND Corporation Provides Objective Research Services and Public Policy Analysis. Web. 9 Nov. 2009. . Malik, M. (2009). "Pakistan: Can U.S. Policy Save the Day?." Middle East Policy Vol.16
8. 8. Iss. 2: 138-148. Nasr, V. and R. Holbrooke (2008). "PBS-frontline: Saudi Time Bomb?: Analyses: Madrassas." PBS-Frontline. Web. 10 Nov. 2009. . O'hanlon, M. (2009). "RAND | Conference Proceedings | U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Basic Questions -- Strategic Choices." RAND Corporation Provides Objective Research Services and Public Policy Analysis. 29 Oct. 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2009. . Riedel, B. (2009). "Armageddon in Islamabad." The National Interest Vol. July/Aug., Iss. 102: 9-18. Warner, E. (2009). "Terror's Tipping Point: While the U.S. focuses on Afghanistan, Nuclear-armed Pakistan is the far more Critical Concern." The American Conservative Vol. 8. Iss. 13: 6-9.