All for Some, Some for All:

EU member state reactions to the annexation of Crimea

Hannah M. Kitslaar

Supervised by Professor Nils Ringe

University of Wisconsin-Madison

21 December 2016

Kitslaar 1

INTRODUCTION

At its conception, the architects of the communities that would become the European

Union created an integration scheme with the goal of making war unthinkable. While it was

both a political and economic project, the catalyst for integration was nested in the need for

greater security on the continent after two world wars destroyed the infrastructure and

economies of northern and central Europe. With a major expansion in 2004 into the post-

Soviet sphere, adding such states as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to their roster, EU leaders

also significantly expanded the shared border between the EU and Russia. This expansion was

met with aggression from Russia, with specific reference to the 2014 annexation of Crimea

from Ukraine.

This paper seeks to understand how EU expansion into the post-Soviet sphere has

affected member states’ military expenditures, and the EU defense agenda as a whole. The

compiled data offers the changes in military expenditures of each member state between 2014

and 2015 in the context of new security concerns after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea

from Ukraine. This event was a direct Russian reaction against closer ties between Ukraine

and the EU, and was the first overt display of Russian force in Eastern Europe that has

perpetuated the war in eastern Ukraine. Thus, it is important to understand how each member

state responded to the potential of similar Russian action in the future, especially in the

context of Vladimir Putin’s habit to stifle the advancement of western democratic principles in

Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

In the arguments that follow, I argue that those EU member states situated

geographically closest to the Russian border have the most to immediately lose in the event of

a Russian attack, and because of this those member states have actively sought the highest

Kitslaar 2

increases in terms of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP in response to the

annexation of Crimea. These states also actively pursue non-EU affiliated regional defense

initiatives as an alternative to a void in efficient common EU security and defense policy,

especially with regard to the Baltic states. I will outline the attempts the EU has made to

establish a common security and defense policy, and discuss why progression towards a single

European army has been stifled.

The following data is relevant for the main argument of the paper. All monetary

quantities are listed in euros. The military expenditure data has been taken from a report by

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. As some member states’ military

expenditures were listed in their local currencies, the exchange to the euro value was

calculated with reference to the EUR: LCU ratios for the relevant years as they are published

by the European Central Bank. Member state GDPs not shown, but used for calculation of

military expenditure as a percentage of GDP are taken from the World Bank data bank.

Kitslaar 3

The conception of a common European army has remained a long and controversial

source of debate within the EU. Expansion of the European project begets a vast geographical

spectrum, along with which is acquired conflicting sets of national priorities and increased

opportunity for security threats. Integration among the EU member states has grown from

economic arenas into political ones. Naturally, common security strategies and infrastructure in

theory would contribute to the solidification of the European bloc as one of the most powerful

collective negotiating bodies in the world.

Though the EU institutions enjoyed many years of positive agendas of proactive

economic and political integration, the 2004 expansion caused an unwelcome intrusion into the

post-Soviet sphere that has been met with an increased military presence around the Baltic

States by Russia. The Russian threat to EU security has become the centerpiece context for the

always present, yet historically stifled argument regarding the creation of a single EU army.

Although indirectly in some instances, the supranational institutions of the European

Union affect every aspect of individual member states’ affairs. While the Russian threat

immediately exists geographically for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the entire

security of the European Union is at risk if these member states are subject to a Russian

attack.

The EU member states have consistently recognized and publicly acknowledged a need

to acquire “the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces,” as was

declared in a joint statement between France and the United Kingdom at the 1998 Saint-Malo

bilateral summit (ISS-EU 2000). While the institutions of the European Union have actively

pursued agendas to initiate common security and defense strategies among all member states,

the steadfast desire of national governments to maintain sovereignty regarding decisions of

Kitslaar 4

military capabilities and defense remains an obstacle to the realization of a completely

common defense policy.

Understanding the need for a strong European coalition to combat the growing

communist threat from the Soviet Union, the United States invoked the Marshall Plan through

the Foreign Assistance Act of in 1948 to pledge the contemporary equivalent of approximately

$120 billion in order to rebuild Europe in a western democratic image. The language of the

Foreign Assistance Act immediately cites “the intimate economic and other relationships

between the United States and the nations of Europe” as justification for this assistance

package, in that “the restoration of maintenance of European countries of principles of

individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence” would benefit the perpetuation

of democratic values on a continent much more geographically prone to a western expansion

of the communist ideology (Foreign Assistance Act of 1948). Thus, the European Union was

formed, evolved, and has expanded with western democratic principles modeled by the United

States, and criticized, formerly, by the Soviet Union and, currently, by the Russian Federation.

THE EU’S EXPANSION EASTWARD AND THE REVIVED RUSSIAN THREAT

The immediate geographical Russian threat to the member states of the European

Union is nested in the revived ideological conflict between the western and eastern

hemispheres that some scholars believe has grown tenser than it was during the Cold War

(Baunov 2016). After the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, the international community

recognized fifteen independent states to replace the formerly communist bloc. Those post-

Kitslaar 5

Soviet states that are relevant to the analysis of the contemporary Russian threat to the

European Union are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

In the 1989 “Autumn of Nations”, a series of eastern European revolutions erupted in

which the people of the Baltic Soviet republics and the Caucasus demanded increased

autonomy from Moscow and Soviet influence (Zhurzhenko 2014). The Soviet Union fell in

1991, and the European Union worked rapidly to initiate its most eastern expansion with the

1995 accession of Finland, following a Finnish referendum that yielded a 56.9% victory to

join the European project (Jacobsen 2014). It is argued that Russia may have welcomed the

expansion of the European Union at that time, due to the Russian perception that the European

Union was a “benign organization…without substantial strategic weight of its own” that

posed no real legitimate threat to the Soviet sphere of influence (Greene 2012). In March

1997, United States President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin met in

Helsinki to discuss US-Russia relations, and issued a joint declaration on European Security,

announcing that “they reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable,

secure, integrated, and undivided democratic Europe” (Administration of William J. Clinton

1997). This bilateral willingness to engage in negotiations was promising for the future of US-

Russia relations and, in turn, cooperation between Russia and the European Union.

The May 2000 election of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation

ultimately reversed the mutual desire between western democracies and eastern semi-

autocracies to pursue agendas of peace and unification. James Greene writes that in the

beginning of its first presidential term “the Putin regime became increasingly aware of the

potential for the EU to affect its vital economic interests [in its projection of] Western norms,

values, and business/administrative culture into the post- Soviet region in ways that would

Kitslaar 6

impede Russia’s geopolitical aspirations and its authoritarian model of internal development”

(Greene 2012). The increasing presence of European Union competition in business and gas

production threatened the Russian monopoly on both energy and influence in Eastern Europe.

The European Union initiated the largest expansion since its inception in May 2004,

which included the accession of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary

(European Commission 2016). All of these states are of vital importance to Russian interests

in Eastern Europe, by virtue of their status as states that were republics of the former Soviet

Union, or by their shared borders with post-Soviet states. Russian and the European Union

shared a border of approximately 1304 kilometers, isolated to the Russo-Finnish border area

before the 2004 expansion. This expansion increased the shared border area between Russia

and the European Union to a total 2307 kilometers, including the EU-Russian borders of the

Russian- controlled Kaliningrad Oblast between Poland and Lithuania. The advancement of

the western democratic ideologies and economic practices for which the Russian government

has never been a credible advocate were now the principles under which the post-Soviet

states in the Baltics were forming their young democracies on Russia’s border.

The European Union unveiled its plans to further expand its influence in the post-

Soviet sphere through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) through the EU External

Action Service, which seeks to work “with its southern and eastern neighbours to achieve the

closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration”

(EEAS 2016). The joint initiatives of the ENP provide members with benefits of EU financial

support, economic integration, easier travel to member states within the EU, and technical and

policy support. There are currently twelve participating members of the EU, including the

post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Due to the

Kitslaar 7

European Union’s current and ongoing efforts to strengthen the ENP initiatives through

Association Agendas for each participating state, and the great extent to which Putin perceives

European Union expansion to perpetually pose a threat to Russian interests, it is likely that

Putin will continue to act preemptively so long as ties between post-Soviet states in Putin’s

sphere of influence negotiate with the EU with the intention of accession.

The most significant example of Russian aggression in response to the European

Union’s eastward expansion is the civil war in Ukraine. Still an ongoing conflict, the country

is divided between the majority of Ukrainians in the western regions of the country who

identify with western European goals, and those Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east who

feel a stronger allegiance to the historical Soviet ties between Ukraine and the Russian

Federation. Putin has promoted violence and war in eastern Ukraine in an effort to fuel the

anti-western sentiment that he materialized with the annexation of Crimea in March 2014.

The annexation was a response to the pro-western Euromaidan protests in Kyiv, where

hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens occupied Maidan Square to protest the close

relationship between former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukoviych and Vladimir Putin,

which prohibited Ukraine from advancing as a nation with support from the western-

democratically ideological European Union (Diuk 2014). As was reported by The New York

Times in March 2016, the United Nations reported an approximate 9,160 casualties since the

start of the conflict in April 2014 (Cumming-Bruce 2016).

Despite various international intelligence agencies’ assertions of Russian military

troops and weapons in eastern Ukraine since 2014, Putin has continued to deny direct

Russian influence and involvement, proving that his interest in diplomatic conversations

with the European Union and its allies is virtually non-existent. Despite the casualties, the

Kitslaar 8

European Union has made it clear through the provisional application of the 2016 Deep

and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine, and the extension of visa-free

travel for Ukrainian citizens to the European Union, that the desire to pursue the

advancement of democratic principles in Eastern Europe takes precedence to a continued

Russian sphere of influence (Baczynska 2016, European Commission 2016). After

Ukraine, it is logical to assume that Putin would appeal to the tensions between

sympathetic ethnically Russian minorities in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania to promote further unrest in Eastern Europe and directly threaten the stability of

the European Union.

It is essential that the European Union assume a perpetual Russian threat in response to

EU expansion as efforts move forward in creating the most efficient common defense policy.

Unfortunately, current outlines for that policy remain subject to factors beyond the European

Union institutions’ control. According to Stanley Hoffman’s argument, some areas over which

a state traditionally maintains sovereignty are easier to integrate in the European Union setting

(low politics), while others, such as exclusive capability to decide on a defense budget and

commit military capabilities to international conflict resolution (high politics), are not

(Hoffman 1966). While some member states deem a complete common European army as the

best strategy in which to defend the European Union from a potential Russian invasion, others

accredit the proposal as a naïve hope instead of a tangible policy goal. High Representative of

the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini expressed that the EU

foreign ministers “all agree that the European army is not something that is going to happen

any time soon” after their meeting at the September Bratislava ministerial (Denkova, et al.

2016). In this time of global security uncertainties, the EU would benefit in promoting the

Kitslaar 9

formation and strengthening of smaller, regional security alliances between member states in

Eastern Europe, with the strategic and financial support of the European Union behind them,

instead of pursuing an agenda to consolidate a European army.

DISPROPORTIONATE REACTIONS

Over a two-year period from 2014-2016, the RAND Corporation analyzed a series of war

games from which their authors concluded NATO was unfit to protect the Baltic States should a

Russian military invasion occur. Their findings indicate, “the longest it has taken Russian forces

to reach the outskirts of Tallinn [Estonia] and Riga [Latvia] is sixty hours.” They also argue that

Russian forces in the Baltic States would significantly increase Moscow’s strategic posture in

posing a threat to Warsaw and the rest of Eastern Europe (Shlapyk, Johnson 2016). These

potential realities, in addition to the fact that Russia has increased its military presence in the

Kaliningrad territory, which is located on the opposite side of the Baltic States, reaffirm the fact

that the Baltic States plus Poland face the most immediate geographical threat from a Russian

invasion or attack.

In comparing the response to the annexation of Crimea by review of the change in

military expenditure from 2014 to 2015, it is useful to compare the combined average change

between two groups. The first group includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which are

the states with the most to lose from a Russian invasion or attack in Eastern Europe. The second

group includes France, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These

states have among the highest GDPs and military budgets in the EU, and all are located in

Western Europe, far from the direct immediate threat of a Russian invasion.

Kitslaar 10

There is a clear correlation between increase in military expenditure after the annexation

of Crimea and the location of the member states. In examining the percent change in military

expenditure based on the monetary quantities, the members of the first group collectively

average an 18.43% increase in military expenditure. In contrast, the member states of the second

group in Western Europe average only a 0.74% increase.

It is important to consider other economic factors, so a second comparison details the

difference between the average changes in military expenditure amongst the two groups as a

percentage of the member states’ overall GDP. The member states in the first group average an

0.643% increase while those member states in the second group average an increase of 0.172%.

Although the percentage values are small, the difference is significant. Poland, Estonia, Latvia,

and Lithuania collectively increased their military expenditures over three times than the

collective increase of the wealthy western European member states.

In a traditional military alliance, these results may not render much significance.

However, for those European Union officials who advocate on behalf of wealthy states in

Western Europe, and especially those that were among the founding members of the European

communities, the lack of a significant commitment to contribute to the collective security of all

member states weakens their arguments for a European army and common defense policy.

THE ATTEMPT TO INTEGRATE

The EU has made a concerted effort to collectivize defense strategies in response to

foreign threats. The member states negotiated the institution of the Common Foreign and

Kitslaar 11

Security Policy (CFSP) through the Treaty of Maastricht “to strengthen the EU’s external

ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities.” Within this overall

foreign policy entity of the European Union, the Common Security and Defence Policy

(CSDP) “enables the Union to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict

prevention and in in the strengthening of the international security…drawing on civilian and

military access” (EU External Action 2016). The Treaty of Amsterdam created the position of

the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), which is

currently held by Federica Mogherini of Italy to oversee the foreign affairs of the EU. By

virtue of the position, she is the chief coordinator and representative of the CFSP to other

European Union institutions, and serves as the Vice-President of the European Commission.

While this initial attempt at the member state’s integration of their security capabilities

is symbolic and progressive, it does not grant the European Union any exclusive competency

in regards to mobilizing the military capabilities of each sovereign member state. While

individual member states can choose to pledge resources to the advancement of projects

within the CFSP, the European Union does not possess the capacity to demand member state

resources for a fully collective European Union military.

Franklin Dhousse details what he perceives to be the shortcomings of the CFSP as they

existed in 1998. His main concern is that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991

“paradoxically, fundamentally improved European security, while rendering the continent

more unstable,” due to the fact that while the major Soviet Union bloc had disintegrated, the

member states which were left over were subject to uprisings and instability in smaller, local

conflicts around Eastern Europe. He further argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union

caused the United States to lose interest in European security, which would require a new level

Kitslaar 12

of necessary active membership in the pursuit of their defense agendas. Dhousse highlights

that the organization’s “failure is much more obvious than its success,” specifically citing the

European Union’s lack of efficiency in finding an appropriate solution to the wars in

Yugoslavia (Dhousse 1998).

The initial appeal of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and subsequently the

Common Security and Defence Policy, was the creation of an arena in which European Union

officials could work at the supranational level to analyze, consolidate, and communicate the

common short-term and long-term foreign and security interests of all of the EU member

states. While there are benefits to the existence of these organizations, they are in large part

toothless in the context of responding to major physical threats from foreign adversaries.

A major practical defense strategy within the Common Security and Defense Policy is

the creation of European Union Battlegroups. Originally proposed by the European Council at

their 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU Battlegroups were a part of the Helsinki Headline Goal

which set collective, voluntary military capability targets to be reached by 2003. The

Battlegroups’ main objective is to carry out “Petersberg tasks,” which were introduced in

Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union as military tasks of a humanitarian, disarming,

peacekeeping, and peacemaking nature empowered through the European Union and under

direct control of the European Council (EU External Action 2016).

The goals set in the Helsinki Headline Goal agreement were met in 2004, when, in May,

Operation Artemis became the first military operation under which the European Union

deployed the first EU Battlegroup in response to the external Ituri conflict in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. The EU has marketed this operation as a success, due to decreased

Kitslaar 13

levels of intensity after EU intervention, and in the sense that this operation was completed

without NATO assistance (Homan 2007).

The relative success of Operation Artemis should not be undermined, but it is important

to acknowledge that the success of the group in a war-torn region of Africa against ad-hoc

guerilla groups lead by warlords cannot be identically applied to the response to a

sophisticated Russian invasion in Eastern Europe. In a 2007 Chaillot Paper sponsored by the

EU Institute for Security Studies, Gustav Lindstrom emphasizes that the assumption of an EU

Battlegroup as “a large formation likely to engage in major theatre war conditions” is a

dangerous misconception. Instead, the Battlegroups should be thought of as task forces by

nature of their size of just 1500 personnel with “limited power projection capacity.” Thus,

their “full potential should be best realized in tasks that are of limited duration and intensity”

(Lindstrom 2007). A Russian invasion of the EU member states in Eastern Europe would be

anything but a task of limited duration and intensity, which clearly yields the conclusion that

the only medium for the European Union’s internal common military capabilities under

supranational coordination, as it exists today, under is incapable of a successful response to

Russian aggression.

NATO’S SHORTCOMINGS

In conjunction with an updated 2010 Headline Goal in anticipation of the 2004

eastward expansion of the European Union, the EU introduced the 2003 European Security

Strategy, entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” In it, the European Union

acknowledges its role as a global player with the capacity to respond to conflict. The

Kitslaar 14

expansion of the Common Security and Defense Policy and the creation of EU Battlegroups

are undoubtedly attempts to maintain some supranational capabilities in response to future

threats to the European Union as a whole. But the authors of the European Security Strategy

understand and highlight the fact that the expansion of the EU has increased the opportunity

for non-state actors to play a role in international affairs. These include military alliances

between EU member states and non-member states in response to the “violent [and] frozen

conflicts which persist on [European] borders,” promoted and fueled by the Putin

administration to prohibit influence from the United States and western Europe in the post-

Soviet sphere.

Despite the lack of an exclusive marriage between the two organizations, membership

in the European Union has become almost synonymous with membership in the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, but falls short on a few counts. Twenty-two of twenty-eight

European Union member states are also members of NATO, leaving Austria, Cyprus, Ireland,

Malta, Sweden, and Finland without entitlement to NATO’s coveted Article 5.

Russian aggression in Ukraine, which breeds fear of further Russian aggression in the

Baltic States, is arguably justifiable in consideration of a perceived western threat to a Russian

sphere of influence in the post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe. NATO was founded as an

alliance to counter the Warsaw Pact of the eastern hemisphere during the Cold War. In July

1991, Czech President Vaclav Havel disbanded the Warsaw Pact, but the action was not

reciprocated by NATO. Instead, the Western alliance has since increased membership by

sixteen member states, which, in addition to the original twelve, represent 35.38% of the world

GDP as of 2015. It is not only important to take into account the member states’ GDPs, but the

total combined percent of GDP which they spend on their military capabilities. The member

Kitslaar 15

states of NATO contributed a total 39.6% of their GDPs to their military capabilities, in

comparison to the 5.0% that Russia spent. If the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement leads to

the accession of Ukraine to the European Union, the subsequent addition of Ukraine to NATO

would be likely, due to the fact that more than 78% of European Union member states are also

members of NATO. This expansion of the European Union and NATO would significantly

weaken Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe.

The European Union has made previous attempts to pursue smaller regional defense

organizations in response to Soviet/Russian aggression, [N17] but they have been undermined

by the United States’ power within NATO to determine the outcome of European security

strategy. In May 1948 Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, by means of Swedish proposal,

engaged in discussions of the creation of a neutral Scandinavian Defense Union. They planned

that the deal would last for ten years, on the main condition that no one of the three members

joined NATO. This way, they were not directly affiliated with the political association to the

United States that coincided with NATO membership, and they could maintain their own

negotiating powers with the Soviet Union. The states were confident in their ability to

maintain their small alliance due to the fact that Sweden had remained neutral during World

War II, avoiding the devastating loss to military capabilities and financial security that many

of the other western and central European countries had experienced. The three also agreed

that they would remain neutral in any conflict that may have arisen between the members of

NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the United States greatly valued the territory over

which the Scandinavian countries maintained sovereignty and strategically issued a soft

ultimatum that any country which had not fully committed to NATO would not be subject to

the privilege of military support from the United States. Thus, Denmark, Iceland and Norway

Kitslaar 16

signed the treaty to join NATO and succumbed to the collapse of the plan for the Scandinavian

Defense Union (CVCE 2016).

Finland’s insecurity following the addition of the Scandinavian countries to NATO

resulted in their 1948 10-year Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance

treaty with the Soviet Union in an attempt to increase their political independence (Lukacs

1992). While Finland has existed as a member state of the European Union since its accession

alongside Sweden in 1995, the Finnish government has not taken serious steps to pursue

membership in NATO likely due to the fear of Russian retaliation. In a July 2016 joint press

conference with Finnish President Sauli Niinisto, Vladimir Putin highlighted the close

economic and political ties between the two countries before promising that a significant

increase in Russian military presence at the Russo-Finnish border would follow continued

Finnish-NATO cooperation in the Baltic region (Kremlin.ru 2016)

NATO has historically maintained its reputation as the military protector of North

America and western Europe; however, uncertainty regarding the future and commitment of

the alliance’s major contributors has sharply increased since the election of Donald J. Trump

as the president of the United States, and his continued isolationist promises to not react

defensively on behalf of those states which do not meet his demands of NATO membership.

As is the case in any intergovernmental organization, anarchy at the international level

leaves a void where states can enforce laws and norms within their domestic territories. While

all members of NATO agree to a commitment of a military expenditure that equates to two

percent of GDP in exchange for the promise of the alliance’s security, the only tangible way to

enforce it is a lack of response in the event that a member state is attacked and Article 5 is not

fulfilled by the other member states. In the data table listed above, it is shown that among all

Kitslaar 17

EU member states that also participate in NATO, only Greece and Lithuania fulfilled the two

percent GDP requirement in 2015. Lithuania is arguably the EU member state with the most

immediate threat should the Russian military invade the European Union. In 2014 Lithuania

devoted 3.11% of GDP to military expenditures which is well above the two percent NATO

requirement. The additional 32% increase in military expenditures after the annexation of

Crimea despite a reported decrease in overall GDP demonstrates the urgency and priority with

which the Lithuanian government views the Russian threat.

Donald Trump’s comments have been consistently targeted at the Baltic States that

spend less than the required two percent of GDP on military capabilities, and come just two

years after President Barack Obama’s speech in Tallinn, wherein he explicitly pledged to

protect the Baltic States, promising, “We’ll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia.

We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your independence once before. With NATO, you will

never lose it again” (The White House 2014). Trump’s seemingly laissez-faire attitude

towards international security and the United States’ interests in the security of the Baltics has

prompted repeated attempts by the alliance’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to reassure

all member states that “solidarity among allies is a key value for NATO” (Morello, Taylor

2016). But the reality of the alliance is that the United States contributes approximately

twenty-two percent of the NATO Common Funded budgets, which correlates to $685 million

of NATO’s $2.8 billion annual allowance (The White House 2016). The United States pulling

out of NATO or choosing to not support those allies that the US President deems undeserving

would inflict major geopolitical consequences.

Due to the much broader levels of uncertainty in every aspect of the United States’ role

on the international stage, the European Union is actively pursuing defense strategies and

Kitslaar 18

policies that decrease their overall support on the United States. In November 2016 the

European Parliament voted in favor of increasing European Union spending and coordination

on sharing military assets between member states. This historic vote to increase the 2017

funding of the European Defence Agency by 1.6% came after a break in the six-year British

tradition of blocking an increase of the agency’s budget. Despite the fact that the increase was

significantly lower than the 6.5 percent increase for which the European Defence Agency had

lobbied, this clearly demonstrates the demand for complete cooperation among all member

states in the face of increasing security threats to the entire European Union.

Robin Emmott of Reuters writes that, “While the parliament’s backing is not binding on

European governments, it represents a sign of cross-party political support for the European

Union to pursue its most ambitious defense plan in decades after years of spending cuts”

(Emmott 2016).

REGIONAL REACTIONS IN THE BALTICS

Together, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania makeup just 67,655 of the

European Union’s total 1.67 million square miles. While these states represent a combined

four percent of the EU’s geographical area and 0.8 percent of its total population, an

unchallenged Russian invasion of the Baltics would put Putin at an unprecedented advantage

to threaten the rest of Europe and significantly stronger influence in the relationship between

the European Union and other Eastern European states, like Ukraine. The vast geographical

spectrum prohibits far western European countries from fully appreciating the immediacy

and everyday nuances of a Russian threat in the Baltics. The shared immediate threat these

Kitslaar 19

states face presents them with a unique advantage to work closely together with partners who

experience precisely the same threats and have similar motivations to find security solutions.

In a number of bilateral agreements signed through the 1990s, the Scandinavian and

Nordic countries around the Baltics signed a series of agreements to form the Nordic Defense

Cooperation (NORDEFCO). The members continually refuted the organization’s stance as a

military alliance, instead citing their goals of “enhanced cooperation in capability

development.” Yet, as tensions continued to rise in Eastern Europe and stronger unease grew

in fear of Russian aggression in the Baltics, the members of the Nordic Defense Cooperation

met in Helsinki in 2013 to “ramp up cooperation in defense spending and training with a set of

political guidelines” (Ylander 2016). Out of their discussions was published the tangible

Nordic Defence Cooperation 2020 with the following set of goals which the organization

hopes to realize by 2020:

“By 2020 we envision an enhanced political and military dialogue on security and

defence issues and actively seek for new possibilities for cooperation. We create efficient

and cost-effective solutions based on a shared understanding of our mutual potential and

challenges. We are committed to enhanced cooperation and coordination in capability

development and armaments cooperation. We coordinate activities in international

operations and capacity building, human resources, education, training and exercises. We

seek to increase pooling of capabilities and to deepen cooperation in the area of life-cycle

support of our defence inventories.”

(Nordic Defence Cooperation 2013)

As is clear from their aspirations, the Nordic Defence Cooperation acknowledges its

ability to independently pursue cooperation and coordination with each other to determine the

best immediate security strategies in response to the threat to the Baltic States. They cite their

common history, culture, and geography as the unique advantages they possess to address this

security problem in the ways that best suit their needs. The organization also acknowledges

Kitslaar 20

their obligations to, and benefits of participation in other international communities like the

European Union and NATO, and shares the ambition for complete European security

interests.

The document further details specifically what plans they have to pursue regional

success in response to increased security threats, and what assistance they need as members of

the European Union, specifically, to advance this agenda. The Nordic countries seek to

establish “a roster of specialists and military advisors to conduct capacity building and

security sector reform tasks” and coordinate “training and exercise programmes to contribute

to maintaining and developing capabilities,” as well as “enhanced cooperation in air and sea

surveillance of the Nordic region…and exchange of surveillance data with the aim of

improving situational awareness.” In an effort to engage the entirety of the Nordic and Baltic

region in these efforts, “cross-border training and exercises will be conducted on a regular

basis among the Nordic countries covering the whole Nordic area.” The member states

demonstrate their commitment to their goals of working closely with the European Union by

explicitly stating the “Nordic countries will also cooperate to develop rapid deployment

capabilities to be used for the NATO Response Force and/or the EU Battle Groups” (Nordic

Defence Cooperation 2013).

In an effort to demonstrate their continued commitment to the seven-year plan and

outline their accomplishments to date, the Nordic Defence Cooperation hosted the Nordic

Defence Seminar in May 2016, inviting all EU and NATO member states officials and

providing presentations that outline specific technological military advancements in the past

three years.

Kitslaar 21

NORDEFCO officials also made a significant effort at the conference to update and

reiterate their goals in the second half of their seven-year plan to meet their original goals for

2020. They continue to stress national level preparedness and cross-border collaboration to

military capabilities sharing to ensure the security of the region. This group is organized,

experienced, and knowledgeable about the specific threats that Russia poses to its region.

The European Union should seek further avenues of cooperation with the Nordic Defence

Cooperation to increase exclusively European-sponsored security around the Baltic States.

The infrastructure of the EU Battlegroups already exists with the capability of the European

Union deploying battlegroups under the direction of one member state. The member states of

NORDEFCO already have the goals and strategies in place to accept the personnel of the EU

Battlegroups, so that the European Union maintains some control over the structure and

logistics of the EU Battlegroups, while the Nordic Defence Cooperation focuses on both

long-term and short-term goals specifically for the Nordic and Baltic Regions. A major

principle of NORDEFCO’s doctrine is that the “best way to face the contemporary challenges

to peace and security is through collaboration” (Nordic Defence Cooperation 2016). By

forming closer ties to the Nordic Defence Cooperation, the European Union as a whole stands

to gain increased expertise in response to Russian aggression around the Baltic borders.

CONCLUSION

The rhetoric of European Union security leaders like High Representative Mogherini

who dismiss plans for a European Union-wide military are made with the luxury of having

depended on NATO for inclusive European security since the alliance’s inception. Despite

various attempts to integrate security policy at different levels, the European Union lacks a

Kitslaar 22

tangible cohesive medium through which to address Russian aggression in Eastern Europe,

and Putin will continue to search for ways in which to exploit this lack of cohesion.

Many see NATO as the only source of continued military protection throughout

Europe, and especially in the Baltic States. Growing unpredictability and lack of faith in

NATO’s ability to protect causes increased uncertainty in the future of security in the EU.

Although modern sentiments echo those of the Cold War, the new Russian aggression under

Putin as a method to prohibit the further spread of western ideologies in the post-Soviet

sphere demands new strategies and reactions from a united European Union which focus

more specifically on the regions which are immediately under threat.

The reality of a disproportional response across member states to an increased Russian

threat in the Baltic States is perhaps unsurprising, but still difficult to swallow. The EU has

been a great world power in some respects, but is far from the third pole military power that

Jean Monnet envisioned would rise to the level of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The EU has, in fact, risen, but without a uniform sense of urgency to protect its eastern

borders. It is clear through the changes in military expenditure after the annexation of Crimea

that those EU member states closest to Russia feel a potential Russian threat much more

urgently than their fellow member states in the western regions of the continent. Growing

Euroscepticism and a favorable trend for populist political parties with more national agendas

across Europe do not provide a space for great leaps forward in the realm of a European army

or a substantive common EU defense policy. The EU member states face an ever-growing

need for a common security policy, but lack a common vision regarding the implementation

of one in the context of an ever-closer union.

Kitslaar 23

Works Cited

Adéla Denková, Aline Robert, Georgi Gotev, Jakub Šimkovic, Krzysztof Kokoszczynski,

“EU army? Much ado about nothing,” EurActiv.com, 5 September, 2016,

www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-army-much-ado-about-nothing/

(accessed November 20, 2016).

Administration of William J. Clinton. 1997. Russia-United States Joint Statement on

European Security, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1997-03-24/pdf/WCPD-

1997-03-24Pg392.pdf (accessed November 20, 2016).

Alexander Baunov, “Hitting Rock Bottom: U.S.-Russian Relations Plunge Again,” Carnegie

Moscow Center, 11 October, 2016, carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=64816 (accessed

November 20, 2016).

Carol Morello and Adam Taylor, “Trump says U.S. won’t rush to defend NATO countries if

they don’t spend more on military,” The Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/

world/national-security/trump-says-us-wont-rush-to-defend-nato-countries-if-they-

dont-spend-more-on-military/2016/07/21/76c48430-4f51-11e6-a7d8-

13d06b37f256_story.html (accessed November 20, 2016).

Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe. 2016. The plan for a Scandinavian Defence

Union,www.cvce.eu/obj/the_plan_for_a_scandinavian_defence_union-ena34f4e3a-

f802-481d-9c37-83f092f87be8.html (accessed November 20, 2016).

David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern

Flank,” The RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/

pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf (accessed December

15).

Diuk, Nadia. 2014. “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution.” World Affairs.

www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/euromaidan-ukraine%E2%80%99s-self-

organizing-revolution (accessed November 20, 2016).

European Commission. 2015. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement

Negotiations, ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-28-members/index_en.htm

(accessed November 20, 2016).

European Union. 2016. EU member countries, europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/

member-countries_en (accessed November 20, 2016).

Kitslaar 24

European Union. European Council. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European

Security Strategy, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed

November 20, 2016).

European Union. EU Institute for Security Studies. 2000. Joint Declaration Issued at the

British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France.

European Union External Action. 2016. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),

eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-foreign-security-policy-cfsp_en (accessed November 20,

2016).

European Union External Action. 2016. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),

eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defense-policy-cdsp_en (accessed

November 20, 2016).

European Union External Action. 2016. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),

eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/330/european-

neighbourhood-Policy-enp_en (accessed November 20, 2016).

European Union External Action. 2016. Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy,

eeas.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-safety/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-

defence-policy-_en (accessed November 20, 2016).

Gabriela Baczynska, “EU parliament backs visa-free travel for Ukraine, hurdles remain,”

Reuters, 26 September, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-ukraine-

visas-idUSKCN11W20H (accessed November 20, 2016).

Henriette Jacobsen, “With EU membership, Finland finally punches above its weight,”

EurActiv.com, 24 February, 2014, www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/

news/with-eu-membership-finland-finally-punches-above-its-weight/ (accessed

November 20, 2016).

Hoffman, Stanley. 1966. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of

Western Europe.” Daedalus, 95(3), 862-915, www.jstor.org/stable/20027004 (accessed

November 20, 2016).

Homan, Kees. 2007. “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” European

Commission: Faster and more united? The debate about Europe’s crisis response

capacity, 151-155, www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20070531_cscp_chapter_

homan.pdf (accessed November 20, 2016).

Kitslaar 25

James Greene, “Russian Responses to NATO and EU Enlargement and Outreach,” Chatham

House, Russia and Eurasia Programme, June, 2012,www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/

chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0612bp_greene.pdf

(accessed November 20, 2016).

Lukacs, John. 1992. “Finland Vindicated.” Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/

russia-fsu/1992-09-01/finland-vindicated (accessed November 20, 2016).

Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Death Toll in Ukraine Conflict hits 9,160, U.N.Says,” The New York

Times, 3 March, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/word/europe/ukraine-death-toll-

civilians.html?_r=1 (accessed November 20, 2016).

Niklas Ylander, “The State of Defense Cooperation in the Nordic Region,” The Swedish

Institute for International Affairs, March 1, 2016, http://www.ui.se/eng/blog/blog/2016/

3/1/the-state-of-defense-cooperation-in-the-nordic-region.aspx (accessed November 20,

2016).

Nordic Defence Cooperation. 2013. Nordic Defence Cooperation 2020,

www.nordefco.org/Nordic-Defence-Cooperation-2020 (accessed November 20,

2016).

President of Russia. 2016. Russian-Finnish talks, en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52310

(accessed November 20, 2016).

Richard Maher, “EU defence in an age of uncertainty and crisis,” EurActiv.com, 18

November, 2016, www.euractiv.com/section/security/opinion/eu-defence-in-an-

age-of-uncertainty-and-crisis/ (accessed November 20, 2016).

Robin Emmott, “EU lawmakers endorse joint European defense plans after Trump victory,”

Reuters, 22 November, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-defence-

idUSKBN13H1T2 (accessed November 22, 2016).

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2016. Extended military expenditure dad

covering 1949-2015, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-local-currency.pdf

(accessed December 15, 2016).

Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “The autumn of nations 1989 and the Ukrainian winter 2013-14,”

Eurozine, 13 June, 2014, www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-06-13-zhurzhenko-en.html

(accessed November 20, 2016).

U.S. Congress. Senate. 1948. Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.80th Cong., 2d sess., Chapter

169.

Kitslaar 26

The White House. 2014. Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia,

www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-people-

estonia, (accessed November 20, 2016).

The White House. 2016. Fact Sheet: U.S. Contributions to NATO Capabilities,

www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/08/fact-sheet-us-contributions-nato-

capabilities (accessed November 20, 2016).

World DataBank. 2016. World Development Indicators, GDP, http://databank.worldbank.org

/data/reports.aspx?Code=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&id=af3ce82b&report_name=Popular_

indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y (accessed December 15, 2016).