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Alice GreiderGEOG 422W

Final Term Paper4/15/18

Strangers in the Homeland: Ukrainian Internally Displaced Persons

Migration is an integral part of Ukraine’s history and present. As a country of origin,

transit, and destination for permanent, temporary, and circular labor migrants, a source of

refugees under multiple invasions in the Second World War, and home to disaster migrants of

the Chernobyl accident, Ukraine is a rich example of many types of transnational migration.

Prior to the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea and subsequent hybrid separatist war however,

Ukraine had not experienced conflict-induced internal displacement in modern history. This

sudden responsibility for millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing from the eastern

Donbas region meant that Ukraine had to develop policies quickly and for the first time to

provide adequate protection. Ill-suited policies from a government that does not wish to

acknowledge them have failed to support or integrate these IDPs into local communities. Driven

by lack of economic opportunities in Ukraine and a strong migration culture, IDPs are then

compelled to migrate further afield, mainly to destinations within the European Union (EU).

Those unable or unwilling to migrate are left in limbo, and are likely to remain so as neither Kiev

nor Moscow seem willing to resolve the conflict. This stepwise migration challenges the

voluntary/involuntary dichotomy of migration and reveals deeper factors at play within the

spectrum of forced migration.

Ukraine has been called “Europe’s Mexico” for its migration patterns (Düvell 2014).

Although numbers are hard to estimate due to the prevalence of irregular and temporary

migration, the IOM estimates that nearly 700,000 Ukrainians were working abroad in 2015,

mainly in Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Italy (Malynovska 2016). Other sources

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estimate that 20% of the working-age population are engaged in migration, with their $6.5

million in remittances accounting for 5% of Ukraine’s GDP (Düvell 2014 and Ivaschenko-

Stadnik 2017). The European Union has risen in popularity since 2014 as a destination due to

new visa liberalization agreements, the EU-Ukraine Economic Association Agreement, and

negative views of Russia. According to Eurostat, Ukrainians held 1.2 million EU residence

permits in 2015, up from 883,000 in 2014 (Eurostat 2018). In Poland, temporary work permits

are easy to come by under simplified access procedures and many western Ukrainians engage in

seasonal and temporary cross-border migration there to benefit from low travel costs and

language similarity (Jaroszewicz 2015). Poland is also a first stop for many Ukrainians headed to

other EU-destinations on Polish-issued visas (Düvell and Lapshyna 2015). Yet Ukraine has had

little contemporary experience with conflict-induced migration, much less internal migration.

Yet it was precisely the EU Economic Association Agreement (EAA) that sparked the

conflict in the Donbass region that today is creating Ukraine’s first modern internally displaced

persons. Caught in between Russian and European spheres of influence, when former President

Yanukovych unexpectedly refused to sign the EAA in 2013 and signed an economic agreement

with Russia instead, mass protests broke out in what became the EuroMaidan revolution.

Yanukovych was forced to step down in January 2014, and in subsequent elections Petro

Poroschenko became president under a pro-European reform agenda, promising greater

independence from Russia. This sparked opposition from Pro-Russian groups in the east, and in

March 2014 Russia annexed Crimea and fighting erupted between separatist and pro-Ukraine

forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts in the Donbass region (Düvell and Lapchyna 2015).

The Russian-backed separatist forces continue to fight in a murky hybrid war still today, which

has led to internal displacement as civilians flee contested areas that receive daily bombardment

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and shelling. Ethnic minorities in Russian-annexed Crimea such as the Muslim Tartars have fled

to western Ukraine for fear of repression. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

estimates that 1.66 million people are displaced in Ukraine as of December 30th, 2017, the most

recent data available (IDMC 2018). This amounts to 3.5% of the Ukrainian population, or 26%

of the population of Donetsk and Luhansk (Düvell and Lapshyna 2015). Although tracking

forward movement after initial displacement is difficult, many have fled to nearby eastern oblasts

(provinces) or Kiev, but men and the elderly more frequently have stayed in Donetsk oblast itself

closer to the contact line of control (the line separating government controlled areas from the

separatist regions either to look after family property or because they are unable to move. Many

have been displaced since the beginning of the conflict in 2014. Figure 1 shows the geographic

distribution of the displaced in each oblast (IDMC 2017).

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Figure 1

These numbers are highly contested, politicized, and subject to data inaccuracies

however. The Ukrainian government downplays the severity of displacement, declaring lower

numbers of IDPs than the UN finds. Specific government policies also complicate the picture

and create obstacles for the displaced rather than remove them (Rushing and Bilak 2017). In

October 2014, the government passed Resolution 509, which “provided for legal recognition of

IDPs, allowing them access to state support and entitlement to government assistance, pensions,

and free housing for a period of up to six months, with the possibility of extension” (Ferris et al

2015). In practice however, the registration process was disorganized and reception centers

under-resourced, partially because of a lack of capacity stemming from the fact that Ukraine has

not managed a crisis such as this before (Brayman 2015). Furthermore, people who fled

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preemptively or from territories not officially recognized as nongovernment controlled areas

(NGCAs) did not count as an IDP. In contrast, some displaced deliberately avoided registering

with the government to avoid the newly-instituted conscription policy (Ferris et al. 2015).

A second government resolution only a month later was meant to target Russian-

supported separatists (whom the government identifies as terrorists) but ended up impacting

IDPs as well. The resolution closed all government offices in NGCAs, including the Central

Bank, withdrawing support for schools and hospitals and halting the distribution of pensions,

social benefits, and other services (Ferris et al. 2015). Another resolution decreed that pensions

would only be paid to registered IDPs living in government controlled areas (GCAs). This led

pensioners and other citizens reliant on social benefits to move out of their communities and

register as IDPs even if they did not originally intend on doing so. Although the situation has

since improved, at first government “anti-terrorist” policies limited the delivery of humanitarian

assistance, compelling people to relocate for food and medical supplies (Brayman 2015). Some

even become ‘hybrid IDPs’ in which they register as displaced to claim benefits but then travel

back to their home in NGCAs, with as many as 36,000 crossing back and forth across the border

every day (Ivaschenko-Stadnik 2017 and Rushing and Bilak 2017). This further blurs the line of

who is really an IDP uprooted by the conflict, crucial to designing accurate response capacities.

Despite the unintended IDPs created by these government policies, those who were

actually fleeing violence have not been met with adequate support. The relative speed at which

events unfolded meant that reception centers were quickly overwhelmed, and urgent requests for

supplies, including winter clothes and hygiene kits were largely met by international and

domestic NGOs such as Save the Children, the Akhmetov Foundation, and the UNHCR, rather

than the government, which failed to allocate any extra budgetary resources to cover the health

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needs of IDPs (Ferris et al. 2015). Many found their own housing as centers filled up, but those

unable to rent apartments, such as single mothers, large families, and pensioners, were left

vulnerable. The over 8-month delay in even getting a basic protection law passed further

contributed to gaps in support.

This vulnerability is only augmented by the social challenges posed by these IDPs. Given

the fact that they come from a separatist area largely believed to be reliant on Russian support,

IDPs face widespread stigma and suspicion that people from Donbass welcomed the Russian

invasion. The government did not issue a message to counter this narrative. The undeclared and

subversive nature of the conflict means that the wider population perceives it as Russian-funded

aggression aided by the local population and hence are hostile to IDPs from the contested regions

(Ivaschenko-Stadnik 2017). Additionally, they are prima facie criminalized and “othered” simply

because Donbass is associated with an “industrial, underprivileged, and criminogenic

neighborhood” (Bulakh 2017, pp. 54). The proliferation of anti-Russian news and negative

media coverage likely amplifies these assumptions and points to the importance of identity

politics in Ukraine.

Yet as only internally displaced persons, they fall outside of international legal protection

according to the 1951 Geneva Convention and other legal frameworks and are thus the

responsibility of the Ukrainian government to protect. But this assumes that Ukraine has the

capacity or will to protect them. Amidst more pressing problems, including fighting the war,

stabilizing and promoting growth in the economy, and enacting reforms to deal with the

considerable corruption in the country, IDPs can seem like the bottom of the priority list

(Brayman 2015). Indeed, the assumed pro-Russian viewpoint of IDPs may be the cause behind a

July 2015 law that restricts voting rights to those registered in an area, thus disenfranchising

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IDPs (Brayman 2015). If a displaced person were to register in a new location (to get voting

rights for instance), then they would lose their status as an IDP in the first place. Not only is this

problematic for a democratizing nation, but it ignores the possible long-term effects of

displacement and allows the government to exclude potential political opponents (Van Metre et

al. 2017).

In the face of a less-than-supportive government, some of the displaced have tried

applying for asylum in neighboring countries. Here again, the localized nature of the conflict

creating only internally displaced persons means that they are likely to be unsuccessful in their

asylum claim. Rather than find Ukrainians unable to avail themselves of protection in their own

state, asylum authorities point to the fact that the large majority of the country is entirely safe as

grounds to reject an asylum claim. The UNHCR estimates that as of 2016, 236,000 had been

recognized as refugees (IDMC 2018). Table 1 shows Eurostat data for the number of asylum

applications lodged by Ukrainians in the top EU countries from 2014 to 2017 (Eurostat 2018a).

Table 2 then shows Eurostat data on the number of asylum applications approved and granted

refugee status. The percentage of applications “accepted” out of all decisions made in that year

are listed in parentheses. The acceptance rate ranges widely across states and years, providing no

assurance of acceptance for a potential asylum seeker. Existing diaspora communities and labor

Table 1: Number of Asylum Applications by Ukrainians

2014 2015 2016 2017

EU Total 14,060 22,040 12,490 10,175

Germany 2,705 4,660 2,490 1,325

Spain 895 3,345 2,570 2,270

France 1,425 1,645 660 685

Italy 2,080 4,665 2,570 2,745

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Poland 2,275 2,295 1,300 670

Sweden 1,320 1,415 615 495

Table 2: Number of Accepted Applications from Ukrainian Asylum Seekers

2014 2015 2016 2017

EU Total 535 (18.5%) 2,810 (29.5%) 2,835 (24.4%) 2,605 (19.2%)

Germany 20 (33.3%) 55 (52.4%) 60 (2.5%) 300 (6.5%)

Spain 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 65 (15.5%) 275 (8.3%)

France 30 (11.8%) 420 (24.3%) 345 (23.2%) 255 (28.5%)

Italy 165 (67.3%) 1,635 (65.9%) 1,850 (57%) 1,265 (73.3%)

Poland 15 (2.3%) 10 (0.5%) 70 (9.2%) 260 (44.4%)

Sweden 20 (11.1%) 15 (2.5%) 35 (2.5%) 25 (5%)

migration patterns clearly shape destination choices, with Poland, Germany, and Italy being

popular destinations for both labor and asylum migrants. Although these countries had high

numbers of applications, in Estonia and the Czech Republic, Ukrainians constitute the largest

origin group of applicants. Considering that the average EU acceptance rate for applicants from

all nationalities is 45.56%, 51.85%, and 60.8% for 2014, 2015, and 2016 respectively (higher for

more at-risk nationalities like Syrians or Iraqis of course), these are low odds of being accepted

as a Ukrainian asylum seeker, particularly in the context of a larger migration crisis in Europe.

Countries overwhelming reject or delay processing these applications, particularly when they can

point to all the “safe” areas of Ukraine asylum seekers could shelter in (Lyman 2015). It should

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also be noted that the UNHCR estimates that around 260,000 people sought asylum in Russia

and predominantly granted refugee status (UNHCR).

What is not evident in that narrative is the basic lack of economic opportunities in

Ukraine for anyone, much less IDPs. Already struggling under a faltering economy crippled by

corruption and instability, IDPs face stigma and a non-competitive labor market based on local

social networks and connections that places newcomers at a disadvantage. Even among the non-

displaced, economic conditions drive migration aspirations under a majority of workers. Survey

respondents report high dissatisfaction with job availability, quality of life, and government

policies to alleviate poverty, particularly in contract to perceptions of European economic

stability (Düvell and Lapshyna 2015). Although the Ukrainian GDP in 2016 was finally at

positive (2.3%) growth after drops of 7% and 14% in 2014 and 2015 respectively, inflation in

January 2018 still stood at 14.1%, after highs of 50% in 2014 (Jaroszewicz 2015). That same

year, the value of the currency declined by 70% (Jaroszewicz 2015). As mentioned above, even

before the conflict, labor migration or aspirations to migrate were prevalent and supported by the

state for the value of remittances and as a means of alleviating the poverty rate (Borschschevska

2012 and Von Mol et al 2017).

Yet corruption also stands out as a main “push” factor driving migration aspirations.

Lapshyna’s 2014 study demonstrated that not only does corruption pervade every level of the

political and socio-economic system, but that those who view Ukraine as “very corrupt” are

twice as likely to have migration aspirations than those who don’t. In particular, skilled people

tend to migrate because corruption makes it difficult to get returns on investment in education

and training (Lapshyna 2014). Many perceive Ukraine as devoid of career development and

trajectory, IDPs included, particularly given that they also require integration into host

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communities, which the government does little to support. The negative perceptions, stigma

surrounding IDPs as Russian sympathizers who may leave and return home, and host community

belief that IDPs are benefitting from positive discrimination makes economic (and social)

integration all the more difficult. Improvements in the economy notwithstanding, the contacts

needed in the labor market to get a job can make migration an attractive option for IDPs as well

as ordinary citizens. Although originally forcibly displaced by conflict, Ukraine’s IDPs are

equally compelled by economic factors to seek international protection and economic benefits.

Even for those who cannot get asylum, the trajectories as labor migrants are well-known

to Ukrainians. As IDPs from the east (generally less migratory than the rest of the country) join

international migrant flows, gain migration experience, and create their own migration networks,

a cumulative causation effect is created, making migration more accepted by society and possible

for others from the region to move abroad as well. Although the elderly are unlikely to take risky

migration decisions so long as their pensions are distributed, for the others this displaced-to-

economic-migrant pathway might increase Ukraine’s position as a migrant-sending country

(Jaroszewicz 2015).

For it’s likely that the displaced will remain displaced for the foreseeable future. At the

time, people grabbed what they could and fled, certain that the conflict would be resolved

through outside pressure quickly (Lyman 2015). Four years later, and IDPs are accepting the

permanence of their situation. Not only do a third of IDPs report intention to stay in their new

communities, but politically there looks to be no end to the conflict in Donbass (Van Metre et al.

2017). Neither Kiev nor Moscow is willing or has the capacity to work out a solution.

Furthermore, Ukraine benefits from the international visibility of the crisis, and there’s a risk of

the government using IDPs to create a protracted need for humanitarian assistance. This potential

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frozen conflict is only frozen in the political sense: frequent shelling and violence in areas of

Donetsk and Luhansk could potentially create even more IDPs (Rushing and Bilak 2017).

Without an improvement to the economy, resolution to the conflict, and serious anti-corruption

reforms, Ukraine risks a continued outflow of human capital, resulting in brain drain as more

temporary migrants from both east and west of the country become permanent emigrants (Gulina

and Pozniak 2018). Although migration has for many years been prevalent in Ukraine, it remains

to be seen how much of the current labor migration persists as a trend or if it is a reaction to the

instability in the country. Economic factors continue to make migration a preferred option for

many regardless of the unrest in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but those same factors make

external migration the last and only good option for IDPs supposedly supported by their

government.

The compounding effects of the problems that face Ukraine point to the crisis-prone

nature of the weak system of institutions mechanisms meant to protect rights and freedoms

(Malykha 2015). The status of IDPs demonstrates this well, and questions the assumption in

international refugee law that a government wants to protect and provide for its own displaced

populations. For migration scholars, the non-linear stepwise pathway for Ukrainian IDPs who

later are compelled by economic conditions to migrate abroad blurs the line between forced and

voluntary migrant, as well as what factors compel displacement. Rather than separate entities, a

person can be both a forced and a voluntary migrant, but the underlying economic factors driving

secondary migration also question the “voluntary” nature of labor migration. The case of Ukraine

also reveals the methodological nationalism inherent in the classification of IDPs versus asylum

seekers, and how for Ukrainians that distinction means the difference between support and

opportunity or nothing at all.

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Actions of the Ukrainian government demonstrate that states ascribe to the scholarly

distinction between forced and “voluntary” migrants in their policies and attitudes toward the

separate groups, to the detriment of migrants themselves. The future democratization and

patterns of migration in Ukraine will depend on government responses. How the government

manages the current political and economic situation, the concerted efforts it makes towards

reducing corruption, and the steps it takes to help displaced persons integrate will matter greatly

for the country’s future. Particularly if IDPs are successfully integrated into local communities,

they have the opportunity to contribute to peace and the amelioration of national divisions, which

undermines Russian President’s Putin’s narrative of regional destabilization and adds legitimacy

to local governance (Van Metre et al. 2017). Although the new national migration strategy

developed with the IOM holds some promise, more nuanced government support and counter

narratives to combat stigma and provide local integration and employment opportunities for IDPs

will go a long way in re-charting the trajectory of the country.

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3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;CITIZEN,L,Z,0;SEX,L,Z,1;AGE,L,Z,2;AS YL_APP,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS- 057066CITIZEN,UA;DS-057066UNIT,PER;DS-057066ASYL_APP,ASY_APP;DS- 057066INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-057066SEX,T;DS- 057066AGE,TOTAL;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=AGE_1_2_- 1_2&rankName3=CITIZEN_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDICATORS_1_2_- 1_2&rankName5=ASYL-APP_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=SEX_1_2_- 1_2&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_- 1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empt %23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23

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