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Algebraic Voting Theory Michael Orrison Harvey Mudd College

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Page 1: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Algebraic Voting Theory

Michael Orrison

Harvey Mudd College

Page 2: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Collaborators and Sounding Boards

Don Saari (UC Irvine)

Anna Bargagliotti (University of Memphis)

Steven Brams (NYU)

Brian Lawson (Santa Monica College)

Zajj Daugherty ’05

Alex Eustis ’06

Mike Hansen ’07

Marie Jameson ’07

Gregory Minton ’08

Stephen Lee ’10

Jen Townsend ’10 (Scripps)

Aaron Meyers ’10 (Bucknell)

Sarah Wolff ’10 (Colorado College)

Angela Wu ’10 (Swarthmore)

Page 3: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Voting Paradoxes

Page 4: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Voting–Preferences

Example

Eleven voters have the following preferences:2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA.We will call this voting data the profile.

Change of Perspective

Focus on the procedure, not the preferences, because “...ratherthan reflecting the views of the voters, it is entirely possible for anelection outcome to more accurately reflect the choice of anelection procedure.” (Donald Saari, Chaotic Elections!)

Page 5: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Let’s Vote!

Preferences2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA

Plurality: Vote for Favorite

A: 5 points B: 4 points C: 2 points A > B > C

Anti-Plurality: Vote for Top Two Favorites

A: 5 points B: 8 points C: 9 points C > B > A

Borda Count: 1 Point for First, 12

Point for Second

A: 5 points B: 6 points C: 512 points B > C > A

Page 6: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Algebraic Perspective

Page 7: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Positional Voting with Three Candidates

Weighting Vector: w = [1, s, 0]t ∈ R3

1st: 1 point

2nd: s points, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1

3rd: 0 points

Tally Matrix: Tw : R3! → R3

Tw(p) =

1 1 s 0 s 0s 0 1 1 0 s0 s 0 s 1 1

230402

ABCACBBACBCACABCBA

=

54 + 4s2 + 7s

ABC

= r

Page 8: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Linear Algebra

Tally Matrices

In general, we have a weighting vector w = [w1, . . . ,wn]t ∈ Rn and

Tw : Rn! → Rn.

Profile Space Decomposition

The effective space of Tw is E (w) = (ker(Tw))⊥. Note that

Rn! = E (w)⊕ ker(Tw).

QuestionsWhat is the dimension of E (w)? Given w and x, what isE (w) ∩ E (x)?

Page 9: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Change of Perspective

ProfilesWe can think of our profile

p =

230402

ABCACBBACBCACABCBA

as an element of the group ring RS3:

p = 2e + 3(23) + 0(12) + 4(123) + 0(132) + 2(13).

Page 10: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Change of Perspective

Tally MatricesWe can think of our tally Tw(p) as the result of p acting on w:

Tw(p) =

1 1 s 0 s 0s 0 1 1 0 s0 s 0 s 1 1

230402

= 2

1s0

+ 3

10s

+ 4

01s

+ 2

0s1

= (2e + 3(23) + 4(123) + 2(13)) ·

1s0

= p ·w.

Page 11: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Representation Theory

We have elements of RSn (i.e., profiles) acting as lineartransformations on the vector space Rn:

ρ : RSn → End(Rn) ∼= Rn×n.

This opens the door to using tools and insights from therepresentation theory of the symmetric group.

Page 12: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Theorems

Page 13: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Equivalent Weighting Vectors

DefintionTwo nonzero weighting vectors w, x ∈ Rn are equivalent (w ∼ x) ifand only if there exist α, β ∈ R such that α > 0 and x = αw + β1.

Example

[3, 2, 1]t ∼ [2, 1, 0]t ∼ [1, 1/2, 0]t ∼ [1, 0,−1]t

Sum-zero Weighting Vectors

For convenience, we will usually assume that the entries of ourweighting vectors sum to zero, i.e., our weighting vectors aresum-zero vectors.

Key Insight

If w 6= 0 is sum-zero, then E (w) is an irreducible RSn-module. Infact, E (w) ∼= S (n−1,1).

Page 14: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Results

Theorem (Saari)

Let n ≥ 2, and let w and x be nonzero weighting vectors in Rn.The ordinal rankings of Tw(p) and Tx(p) will be the same for allp ∈ Rn! if and only if w ∼ x.

TheoremIf w and x are nonzero sum-zero weighting vectors in Rn, thenE (w) = E (x) if and only if w ∼ x. Moreover, if E (w) 6= E (x),then E (w) ∩ E (x) = {0}.

TheoremIf w and x are nonzero sum-zero weighting vectors in Rn, thenw ⊥ x if and only if E (w) ⊥ E (x).

Page 15: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Results

TheoremLet n ≥ 2, and suppose {w1, . . . ,wk} ⊂ Rn is a linearlyindependent set of sum-zero weighting vectors. If r1, . . . , rk areany k sum-zero results vectors in Rn, then there exist infinitelymany profiles p ∈ Rn! such that Twi (p) = ri for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k .

In other words...For a fixed profile p, as long as our weighting vectors are differentenough, there need not be any relationship whatsoever among theresults of each election.

Key to the Proof

A theorem by Burnside says that every linear transformation froman irreducible module to itself can be realized as the action ofsome element (i.e., a profile) in RSn.

Page 16: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Why the Borda Count is Special

Page 17: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Pairwise Voting

Ordered PairsAssign points to each ordered pair of candidates, then use thisinformation to determine a winner.

Example of the Pairs Matrix

P2(p) =

1 1 0 0 1 00 0 1 1 0 11 1 1 0 0 00 0 0 1 1 11 0 1 1 0 00 1 0 0 1 1

230402

ABCACBBACBCACABCBA

=

565665

ABBAACCABCCB

Voting Connection

Some voting procedures (e.g., Copeland) depend only on P2(p).

Page 18: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Pairwise and Positional Voting

QuestionHow are pairwise and positional voting methods related?

DefinitionLet T and T ′ be linear transformations defined on the same vectorspace V . We say that T is recoverable from T ′ if there exists alinear transformation R such that T = R ◦ T ′.

Theorem (Saari)

A tally map Tw : Rn! → Rn is recoverable from the pairs mapP2 : Rn! → Rn(n−1) if and only if w is equivalent to the Bordacount [n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 1, 0].

Key to Our Proof

E (Tw ) ∼= S (n−1,1) and E (P2) ∼= S (n) ⊕ S (n−1,1) ⊕ S (n−2,1,1).

Page 19: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Counting QuestionsTo find the number of times each candidate is ranked above a(k − 1)-element subset of other candidates, use the weightingvector

bk =

[(n − 1

k − 1

),

(n − 2

k − 1

), . . . ,

(1

k − 1

),

(0

k − 1

)].

This is a generalization of the Borda count (which is b2).

Example

If n = 4, then b1 = [1, 1, 1, 1], b2 = [3, 2, 1, 0], b3 = [3, 1, 0, 0], andb4 = [1, 0, 0, 0].

Page 20: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Generalized Specialness

k-wise Maps

Generalize the pairwise map P2 to create the k-wise mapPk : Rn! → R(n)k where Pk counts the number of times eachordered k-tuple of candidates is actually ranked in that order by avoter.

TheoremLet n ≥ 2 and let w ∈ Rn be a weighting vector. The map Tw isrecoverable from the k-wise map Pk if and only if w is a linearcombination of b1, . . . , bk .

DefinitionWe say that a weighting vector is k-Borda if it is a linearcombination of b1, . . . ,bk .

Page 21: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Orthogonal BasesApplying Gram-Schmidt to the bi for small values of n yields:

n = 2: c1 = [1, 1], c2 = [1,−1]

n = 3: c1 = [1, 1, 1], c2 = [2, 0,−2], and c3 = [1,−2, 1].

n = 4: c1 = [1, 1, 1, 1], c2 = [3, 1,−1,−3], c3 = [3,−3,−3, 3], andc4 = [1,−3, 3,−1].

TheoremA weighting vector for n candidates is (n − 1)-Borda if and only ifit is orthogonal to the nth row of Pascal’s triangle with alternatingsigns.

Proof.Focus on the inverses of so-called Pascal matrices.

Page 22: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Pascal MatricesIf n = 5, then we are interested in the following Pascal matrix:

1 0 0 0 01 1 0 0 01 2 1 0 01 3 3 1 01 4 6 4 1

.

Its inverse looks just like itself but with alternating signs:1 0 0 0 0−1 1 0 0 01 −2 1 0 0−1 3 −3 1 01 −4 6 −4 1

.

Page 23: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Tests of Uniformity

Page 24: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Profiles

Ask m people to fully rank n alternatives from most preferred toleast preferred, and encode the resulting data as a profile p ∈ Rn!.

Example

If n = 3, and the rankings of the alternatives A,B,C are orderedlexicographically, then the profile

p = [10, 15, 2, 7, 9, 21]t ∈ R6

encodes the situation where 10 judges chose the ranking ABC , 15chose ACB, 2 chose BAC , and so on.

Page 25: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Data from a Distribution

We imagine that the data is being generated using a probabilitydistribution P defined on the permutations of the alternatives.

We want to test the null hypothesis H0 that P is the uniformdistribution. A natural starting point is the estimated probabilitiesvector

P̂ = (1/m)p.

If P̂ is far from the vector (1/n!)[1, . . . , 1]t , then we would rejectH0.

In general, given a subspace S that is orthogonal to [1, . . . , 1]t ,we’ll compute the projection of P̂ onto S , and we’ll use the value

mn!‖P̂S‖2

as a test statistic.

Page 26: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Linear Summary Statistics

The marginals summary statistic computes, for each alternative,the proportion of times an alternative is ranked first, second, third,and so on.

The means summary statistic computes the average rank ofobtained by each alternative.

The pairs summary statistic computes for each ordered pair (Ai ,Aj)of alternatives, the proportion of voters who ranked Ai above Aj .

Key Insight

The linear maps associated with the means, marginals, and pairssummary statistics described above are module homomorphisms.Futhermore, we can use their effective spaces (which aresubmodules of the data space Rn!) to create our subspace S .

Page 27: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Matrices

Linear summary statistics may easily be realized by multiplying P̂by a suitable matrix. For example, when m = 3, let

Mmns =

1 1 2 3 2 32 3 1 1 3 23 2 3 2 1 1

.Then MmnsP̂ encodes the average rank of each alternative.

Key Insight

The highly structured row spaces of these matrices form theeffective spaces of the associated linear maps.

Page 28: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Decomposition

If n ≥ 3, then the effective spaces of the means, marginals, andpairs maps are related by an orthogonal decomposition

Rn! = W1 ⊕W2 ⊕W3 ⊕W4 ⊕W5

into RSn-submodules such that

1 W1 is the space spanned by the all-ones vector,2 W1 ⊕W2 is the effective space for the means,3 W1 ⊕W2 ⊕W3 is the effective space for the marginals, and4 W1 ⊕W2 ⊕W4 is the effective space for the pairs.

Key Insight

The effective spaces for the means, marginals, and pairs summarystatistics have some of the Wi in common. Thus the results of onetest could have implications for the other tests.

Page 29: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Examples of Disagreement

Let m = 3, let α = .05, and consider the data vector

d =

6106

101414

ABCACBBACBCACABCBA

for the three alternatives A, B, and C . When using the meanstest, the p-value is 0.0408, thus we reject the null hypothesis.

On the other hand, the p-values for the marginals test and pairstest are 0.1712 and 0.0937, respectively, thus we fail to reject thenull hypothesis when using the marginals and pairs tests.

Page 30: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Finding Examples is Now Easy

The results above become less surprising once we see thatd = d1 + d2, where di ∈Wi , and d1 = [10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10]t andd2 = [−4, 0,−4, 0, 4, 4]t . Thus, the data vector d is composed ofvectors in just W1 and W2, which together form the effective spaceof the means summary statistic.

The spaces W3 and W4 are not needed to construct d. Becausethey are necessary to form the effective spaces of the marginalsand pairs summary statistics, however, this explains the largerp-values for the associated tests.

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Other Examples

Marginals

The data vector d = [8, 16, 6, 18, 10, 8]t rejects the null hypothesisfor the marginals test, but not for the means or pairs tests. Thep-values for the means, marginals, and pairs tests that are 0.8338,0.0375, and 0.8232, respectively.

PairsThe data vector d = [15, 8, 7, 16, 17, 9]t rejects the null hypothesisfor the pairs test, but not for the means or marginals tests. Thep-values for the means, marginals, and pairs test are 0.8465,0.9876, and 0.0396, respectively.

Page 32: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Connections and New Directions

Page 33: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Connections

Approval Voting

These ideas are applicable to approval voting where there areseveral weighting vectors being used at once:[1, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0]t , [1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]t , [1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0]t , . . . .

Partial Rankings

These ideas may be extended to partially ranked data, in whichcase we have nontrivial analogues of the Borda count.

Extending Condorcet’s Criterion

We can focus k candidates at a time and get different “k-winners”for different values of k.

Page 34: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

New Directions

Dropping Candidates

How can we use this algebraic framework to help us betterunderstand what happens when candidates drop out of an election?

Voting for Committees

When it comes to voting for committees, what do these techniqueshave to offer? What changes?

Page 35: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Resources

Spectral analysis of the Supreme Court (with B. Lawson and D.Uminsky), Mathematics Magazine 79 (2006).

Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election (with S.Brams and M. Hansen), Public Choice 128 (2006).

Borda meets Pascal (with M. Jameson and G. Minton), MathHorizons 16 (2008).

Voting, the symmetric group, and representation theory (with Z.Daugherty, A. Eustis, and G. Minton), The American MathematicalMonthly 116 (2009).

Linear rank tests of uniformity: Understanding inconsistentoutcomes and the construction of new tests (with A. Bargagliotti),Journal of Nonparametric Statistics 24 (2012).

Generalized Condorcet winners (with A. Meyers, J. Townsend, S.Wolff, and A. Wu), Social Choice and Welfare (2013).

Page 36: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this

Take Home Message

Looking at voting theory from an algebraic perspective is gratifyingand illuminating. Doing so gives rise to new techniques, surprisinginsights, and interesting questions.

Page 37: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this
Page 38: Algebraic Voting Theory - University of Chicago · 2014-07-22 · Voting{Preferences Example Eleven voters have the following preferences: 2 ABC 3 ACB 4 BCA 2 CBA. We will call this