alberta-- executive summary of the 2012 fda electoral fairness audit report

Executive Summary of the 2012 FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit of Alberta’s

Provincial Electoral System

Electoral Fairness Audit Completed February 28, 2012. Updated April 13, 2012. Updated June 28, 2012.

In terms of its legislated process, the Alberta provincial electoral system received an overall unacceptable electoral fairness score of 52.2 percent (out of a reasonably attainable score of 100 percent). In addition, the Alberta system received two unacceptable passing scores and two unacceptable failing scores in the four audit sections.

The FDA believes that these scores reflect both a strong core electoral process, and yet significant deficiencies in the areas of electoral finance and political content of media. The FDA argues that the Alberta electoral process, in particular, dominance by the premier and cabinet of the Legislative Assembly, non-regulation of major media, high caps on contributions and third party spending, inclusion of corporations and unions in the electoral process, and no campaign expenditure limits, undermines the legitimacy of Alberta's democracy.

The FDA believes that the Alberta electoral system requires reform in order to create a basis for an equal playing field for candidates and parties and a broad and balanced electoral discourse. The FDA believes that the implementation of its reform recommendations will create an informed electorate, competitive elections, and an Alberta Legislature that more significantly reflects the voice of the people from its districts.

Prepared by Mr. Stephen Garvey, Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, University of British Columbia and Master of Philosophy in Environment and Development, University of Cambridge.

Purpose of Alberta Electoral Fairness Audit:

The purpose of the Foundation for Democratic Advancement (FDA)’s electoral fairness audit (the “Audit”) is to determine a comprehensive grade for electoral fairness in Alberta at the legislative level of government. This Audit is an extension of the FDA’s global audit of electoral fairness involving all countries that hold political elections. The purpose of the global audit is to quantify electoral fairness, establish benchmarks for electoral fairness, identify areas of democratic advancement and progression, and encourage democracy reform where needed.

The goal of the FDA's Alberta report is to give the people of Alberta and other stakeholders an informed, objective perspective of the Alberta provincial electoral system and provide recommendations for reform of the system. Albertans may want to use this information as a way to help determine their 2012 electoral choices. The release of the FDA Alberta report just prior to the 2012 Alberta Election coincides with this initiative.

The views in this electoral fairness audit are the views of the FDA only. The FDA’s members are in no way affiliated with Elections Alberta or any of Alberta's registered/non-registered political parties. The Audit is an independent assessment based on objectivity, transparency and non-partisanship. The FDA assumes no responsibility or liability for any errors in the measurement and calculation of its audit results or inaccuracies in its research of relevant Albertan legislation.

About the Foundation for Democratic Advancement:

The Foundation for Democratic Advancement is a non-partisan and independent democracy reform and advocacy organization. The FDA's reforms center on increasing the voice of people in constituencies. Members of the FDA embrace the following principles: progress, innovation, objectivity, and transparency. The FDA's mission is to advance fair and transparent democratic processes wherever elections occur, thereby bringing the people to the forefront democratic discourse. (For more information on the FDA visit: www.democracychange.org)

© 2012, Foundation for Democratic AdvancementAll rights reserved.Foundation for Democratic Advancement728 Northmount Drive NWP.O. Box 94, Calgary, Alberta,Canada, T2K 1P0

An online version of this report can be found at: www.democracychange.orgFor further information and/or comments please contact the FDA at [email protected]

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Table of Contents:

Introduction 5

Chapter 1: Electoral Finance 6

Chapter Summary 6

Introduction 6

Analysis 7

Chapter 2 Political Content of the Media 9

Chapter Summary 9

Introduction 9

Analysis 10

Chapter 3: Candidate and Party Influence 12

Chapter Summary 12

Introduction 12

Analysis 13

Chapter 4: Voter Influence 15

Chapter Summary 15

Introduction 15

Analysis 16

Chapter 5: Overall Audit Results 19

Chapter 6: Analysis 21

Chapter 7: Conclusion 25

Chapter 8: Recommendations 27

References 30

Definition of Key Terms 33

History of the Alberta Political System 36

Research Methodology 40

FDA Audit Team And Associates 44

Introduction:

The FDA audit of Alberta's electoral legislation is based on non-partisanship and objectivity.

The audit process entails three major components:

1. Research of Alberta's electoral legislation.

2. Audit of the legislation based on audit team consensus, and FDA matrices and scoring scales.

3. Analysis of findings.

The value of scores in the FDA matrices are based on fundamental democratic principles of legislative neutrality, political freedom, and political fairness, and the comparative impact of variables on democracy. For example, if there is no electoral finance transparency then this result will impact other sections such as the legislative process, because without financial transparency, it will be difficult to enforce electoral finance laws and prevent and discover electoral finance wrongdoing. Consequently, according to the FDA scoring system, zero financial transparency will result in a zero score for legislative process as well.

The FDA research component is objective, because it is simply a compilation of the legislative and financial data for Alberta.

The FDA audit component is both objective and subjective. It is objective when determining yes and no facts, such as does province A have caps on electoral contributions—yes or no? It is subjective because of the predetermined scores for each audit section, and the scores given for each section. The FDA acknowledges that there is no absolute scoring system.

The FDA minimizes subjectivity through non-partisanship, the predetermination of scores based on consensus of FDA auditors, the application of core democratic concepts such as electoral legislative neutrality, political freedom, and political fairness, and the valuation of the comparative impact of variables on democracy. In addition, the FDA has a minimum quorum of five experienced auditors during audit sessions. For further discussion of the FDA methodology please see the Research Methodology chapter on page 40.

Foundation for Democratic Advancement / 2012 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Alberta 5

Chapter One: Electoral Finance

Chapter one will focus on the FDA research and audit results of Albertan electoral finance laws with respect to the electoral fairness.

Chapter Summary: Alberta received an unacceptable score of 47.7 percent (out of a reasonably attainable 100 percent score) for the fairness of its electoral finance legislation. The FDA measured deficiency in 52.3 percent of the Alberta legislation. The FDA found electoral fairness in the following: public transparency of electoral finances, caps on contributions to candidates, parties, and constituency associations, caps on third party spending, and reasonable legislative process to enforce electoral finance laws. The FDA found electoral unfairness in the following: no candidate and party expenditure limits, caps on contributions to parties that are not reflective of Alberta per capita income and income inequality, and no laws that disallow corporations and unions from making electoral contributions and spending as third parties. The level and areas of electoral unfairness measured by the FDA suggest that electoral finance reform is necessary in order to encourage an equal candidate and party playing field, a broader and more balanced electoral discourse, and ultimately a more informed electorate.

Introduction:

This chapter focuses on the Alberta electoral finance laws and the FDA's audit of them in terms of electoral fairness. Based on the political concepts of egalitarianism and political liberalism, the FDA audit team audits electoral finance laws according to their equity for registered candidates and parties, and equity for voters (see Definition of Key Terms and Research Methodology for more explanation). Also, based on the concepts of 'one person, one vote' and 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people', the FDA auditors assume that a people's representative democracy will disallow corporations and unions from making electoral contributions and spending as third parties, because corporations and unions are not people. The FDA does not associate electoral expenditures directly with free speech, nor does the FDA believe that freedom alone comprises an optimal people's representative democracy. The FDA believes that freedom must be balanced with equity, so that the most powerful (economically and politically) do not dominate and the will of people from districts is reflected in the representative government. The FDA audit team audits from the standpoint of a people's representative democracy.

The FDA electoral finance audit focuses on the following sub-sections:

1. electoral finance transparency;2. contributions to candidates and parties;3. caps on contributions to candidates and parties;4. campaign expenditure limits;5. caps on third party spending; 6. legislative process.


The FDA chose these sub-sections because they represent core areas of electoral finance. Based on the concept of political liberalism (as defined in Research Methodology), electoral finance transparency is weighted the highest due to its importance in preventing corruption and fraud, and informing the public on the sources of candidate and party funds. The FDA audit of electoral finance includes research of Alberta's electoral finance legislation and the application of the research to the FDA matrices. Matrix scoring is based on an overall score of 0 to 10 out of 10.

Analysis:

Alberta received a score of 47.7 percent for the electoral fairness of its electoral finance legislation (see pie below). Based on FDA scoring scales, the score is 2.3 percent below the minimum passing score of 50 percent. This reflects unacceptable scores overall in electoral finance legislation. Auditors found that public transparency of electoral finances could be a catalyst for reform of others areas of Alberta's electoral finance legislation. Barring this potential for reform, the FDA found that Alberta has a large area of electoral finance deficiency (52.3 percent); illustrated by high caps on contributions to parties and third party spending, no campaign expenditure limits, and no laws that disallow corporations/unions from contributing and spending as third parties.

High caps on contributions and third party spending allow Alberta corporations/unions and wealthy Albertans to disproportionately influence electoral discourse. With no equitable campaign expenditure limits, candidates and parties have unequal electoral funds, which again can create an imbalanced electoral discourse, and ultimately impact how Albertans' vote. There are no measures in the electoral system to create equitable electoral finances for candidates and parties. Consequently, there has been gross electoral finance disparities over the last two provincial elections, in which the PC party has had more than double the campaign finances compared to all the other parties combined (Public Interest Alberta; Lisac, 2004). To illustrate, in the 2008 Alberta general election, the PC Party had 36 percent more political contributions than all the other parties (seven) combined ($2,285,789 to $1,463,593) (Foundation for Democratic Advancement, 2012). The FDA finds this inequitable political environment antagonistic to a broad and balanced electoral discourse and informed electorate.

Further, with no campaign expenditure limits, the FDA argues that the Alberta electoral system is rewarding candidates and parties who can raise the most money and have the ability to raise funds. The FDA believes that fund-raising and the ability to raise funds are not necessarily an indication of popular support; rather, they are an indication of voter influence. This is likely linked to high income inequality, and is therefore skewed to the wealthier segments of society. Moreover, larger, more established political parties, due to their experience, network, and resources, have an advantage over small and new parties in fund-raising.

The FDA believes that the following reforms will create a political environment based on issues and backgrounds rather than financial interests and fund-raising capabilities: reasonably attainable caps on contributions to parties, no corporation/union contributions or third party spending, and a reasonably attainable expenditure limit on campaign finances. To argue that


contributions and third party spending should not be restricted because they are an extension of freedom of speech and popular support (see US Supreme Court, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, January 21, 2010), begs the question as to why they are needed, if the popular support is determined by the electorate on Election Day? The FDA argues that equating speech with electoral spending assumes erroneously that fund raising is necessarily linked to popular support. Further, unlimited freedom to contribute and spend electorally may limit the freedom of speech of others who are not able to contribute and spend, thereby their voice may be overshadowed, for example, by the voice of powerful money interests.

The pie illustrates the level of fairness of the Alberta legislation on electoral finance.


Chapter Two: Political Content of Media

Chapter two will focus on the FDA research and audit results of Albertan laws on political content of media and with respect to electoral fairness.

Chapter Summary: Alberta received a score of 45 percent for the electoral fairness of its media laws. The score means that 55 percent of Alberta's media laws are unsatisfactory. The FDA found electoral fairness in the following areas: legislative freedom of media, and disclosure requirements on electoral surveys/polls. The FDA found electoral unfairness in the following areas: no requirement for impartial and balanced political coverage before and during the campaign period, and no media ownership concentration laws or equivalent. The level and areas of electoral unfairness measured by the FDA suggest that media reform is necessary in order to encourage a broad and balanced electoral discourse, an equal playing field for candidates and parties, and ultimately a more informed electorate. The FDA argues that Alberta's media legislation deficiencies result from a disparity between media freedom and political equality.

Introduction:

This chapter focuses on Alberta's media laws and the FDA's audit of them. Based on the concepts of egalitarianism and political liberalism, the FDA audit team examines media laws according to the standard of impartial and balanced political coverage before, during and after a campaign period (see Definition of Key Terms and Research Methodology for further explanation). Based on the concepts of 'one person, one vote' and 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people', the FDA assumes that impartial and balanced political coverage by media supports democracy by promoting a broad and balanced electoral discourse and a more informed electorate. The FDA demands balance between media freedom and equity of media coverage so that the most powerful media and government players do not dominate electoral discourse.

The FDA's media legislation audit focuses on the following sub-sections:

1. impartial and balanced political coverage;2. media ownership concentration laws;3. surveys/polls;4. freedom of media;5. press code of practice/conduct.

The FDA chose these sub-sections because they represent core areas of the political content of media. Based on the concept of political liberalism and the importance of freedom of expression in a democracy, freedom of media is weighted the highest of the five sub-sections. The FDA's audit of media includes research of Alberta's media legislation and then application of the research to the FDA matrices. The matrix scoring is based on an overall score of 0 to 10 out of 10.


Analysis:

Based on the FDA scoring scales, Alberta scored 45 percent for the political content of media, 5 percent below the minimum passing score of 50 percent. The score reflects more electoral unfairness than electoral fairness in the political content on media. The results demonstrate a large area that could compromise Alberta’s election results in the coming election.

Based on legislated freedom of the media and disclosure requirements on survey/polls, the FDA scored 45 percent electoral fairness in media legislation. FDA matrices weigh freedom of expression the highest due to its relevance to democracy. In the media section, freedom of the media represents 40 percent of the total score and Alberta received full percentage points in this area. However, FDA Freedom and Democracy podcasts (2011) revealed that freedom alone cannot guarantee democracy. Without monitors to ensure equality, freedom of the media will allow the most powerful and wealthy individuals and organizations to dominate the political process. The FDA concludes that Alberta does not monitor freedom of the media in order to guarantee equality.

There is no legislative requirement in Alberta for impartial, balanced or pluralistic political media coverage. There are no media concentration laws or equivalent to encourage a pluralistic media and prevent significant concentration of media ownership. There are no public subsidy measures to help encourage balanced campaign coverage, and ultimately, balanced electoral discourse. The Alberta Press Council's Code of Practice does not mandate impartial/balanced political or campaign coverage. These findings suggest that Alberta's media is susceptible to partisan, imbalanced political and campaign coverage, and limited coverage from few sources. A media network with significant ownership rights in television, radio, and the press could dominate the Alberta electoral discourse, just as a media ownership oligopoly with similar viewpoints could do likewise. Alberta legislation allows for this possibility, as demonstrated in the 2004 Alberta Provincial Election. Election coverage mentioned the the Progressive Conservatives 58% of the time, the Liberals 16% of the time, and the NDP only 12% of the time (Wesley and Colborne, 2005).

The FDA argues that an electorate that is informed in the platforms of all relevant political parties will greatly impact the outcome of the election. It is essential for Alberta's democracy to have, at minimum, balanced and pluralistic campaign coverage. There are public policy options available; as illustrated by media ownership concentration laws in Norway, France, and Bolivia, or legal requirements for fair and balanced political coverage and public measures to ensure fair and balanced campaign coverage in Venezuela (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit Reports on Norway, France, Bolivia, and Venezuela, 2011).


The pie illustrates the level of fairness of the Alberta legislation on political content of media.


Chapter Three: Candidate and Party Influence

Chapter three will focus on the FDA research and audit results of Albertan laws on candidate and party influence and with respect to the electoral fairness.

Chapter Summary: Alberta received a score of 51 percent for the electoral fairness of its legislation on candidate and party influence. The score indicates that Alberta's laws on candidate and party influence scored slightly higher than satisfactory in areas overall. The FDA found electoral fairness in the following areas: reasonable length of the campaign period, reasonable and fair process to determine electoral boundaries, reasonable registration requirements of candidates and parties, electoral complaints process for candidates and parties, fair presentation of candidates on ballots, scrutineers at polling stations, disclosure requirements on surveys/polls, legislated freedom of speech and assembly, public transparency of electoral finances, caps on contributions to candidates, parties, and constituency associations, caps on third party electoral spending, reasonable legislative process to enforce the Election Act, and reasonable voting procedures including voter assistance, protection, and registration requirements. The FDA found electoral unfairness in the following areas: no candidate and party expenditure limits, caps on contributions to parties that are not reflective of Alberta per capita income and income inequality data, no laws that disallow corporations/unions from making electoral contributions and spending as third parties, no proportional representation, and a less reasonable government process. The FDA argues that these areas of electoral unfairness may allow some parties an unfair financial advantage over other parties through their access to wealthy segments of Alberta society and/or their ability to raise funds. The FDA believes that in the areas of electoral unfairness, reform is necessary in order to encourage equal levels of candidate and party influence, broad and balanced electoral discourse, and an informed electorate.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on Alberta laws pertaining to candidate and party influence. Based on concepts of egalitarianism and political liberalism, the FDA audit team examines election laws according to their equity for registered candidates and parties (see Definition of Key Terms and Research Methodology for further explanation). Based on the concepts of 'one person, one vote' and 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people', the FDA auditors assume that a representative democracy supports equitable treatment of candidates and parties. The FDA argues that political freedom alone does not guarantee a democratic process, but that democracy also requires political equality.

The FDA's candidate and party influence audit focuses on the following sub-sections not including relevant sub-sections from other audit sections:

1. Campaign period;2. methodology for determining winners of districts;3. electoral boundaries;


4. process of government;5. registration of candidates;6. registration of parties;7. electoral complaints;8. electoral lists and ballots;9. scrutineers;10. candidates and party campaign advertisements.

The FDA chose the sub-sections above and relevant sub-sections from other sections because they represent core areas of candidate and party influence. Based on the concepts of egalitarianism and political liberalism (as defined in Research Methodology), freedom of speech and assembly, electoral finance transparency, and process of government have the highest weight. The FDA audit of candidate and party influence includes research of Alberta's legislation pertaining to candidate and party influence and then application of the research to the FDA matrices. Matrix scoring is based on an overall score from 0 to 10 out of 10.

Analysis:

Alberta received a score of 51 percent for candidate and party influence. Based on the FDA scoring scales, the score is 1 percent above the minimum passing score of 50 percent. Results indicate that Alberta's legislation on candidate and party influence scored slightly above satisfactory in areas overall. The FDA found electoral fairness in the following areas: reasonable candidate, party, and voter registrations requirements, fairness of electoral boundaries, allowance for scrutineers, reasonable voter protection and measures, and freedom of speech and assembly. The FDA found electoral unfairness in the following areas: no candidate and party campaign expenditure limits, no legal requirement on the media for impartial and balanced electoral coverage, weak process of government which allows monopolization by the Alberta cabinet, no proportional representation, no media ownership concentration laws, high cap on contributions to parties, and no laws which disallow corporations/unions from contributing to candidates and parties and spending as third parties. As in the previous sections, the FDA measured a large zone of unfairness that may allow some candidates and parties to have significant campaign advantages over other candidates and parties.

As mentioned in the Definition of Key Terms, impartiality, balance, and equity define electoral fairness. When looking at legislation, FDA auditors need to determine its equity in relation to all registered candidates and parties. This is not a straightforward requirement. For example, although Alberta's high cap on contributions applies to all candidates and parties, a high cap will likely favor those who have connections to wealthy segments of Alberta society, and who have an ability to raise more funds. Alberta has no campaign expenditure limits for candidates and parties, which will likely favor large, more established parties over small and new parties, through the larger parties' greater ability to raise funds. The FDA argues that equitable laws need to replace these areas of favoritism and unfairness in Alberta's electoral process. For example, the FDA recommends campaign expenditure limits that reflect the financial capability of all


registered candidates and parties, and caps on contributions and third party spending that is reflective of Alberta's per capita income and income inequality data.

The pie illustrates the level of fairness of the Alberta legislation on candidate and party influence.


Chapter Four: Voter Influence

Chapter four will focus on the FDA research and audit results of Albertan laws on voter influence and with respect to the electoral fairness.

Chapter Summary: Alberta received a score of 65 percent for the electoral fairness of its legislation pertaining to voter influence. The score means that Alberta's laws on voter influence have more than satisfactory scores in areas overall. The FDA found electoral fairness in the following sections: reasonable length of the campaign period, legislated 'one person, one vote', freedom of expression and assembly, reasonable voter registration requirements, existing electoral complaints process, special ballots for citizens unable to vote on election day, public transparency of electoral finances, caps on contributions to candidates, parties, and constituency associations, caps on third party electoral spending, reasonable legislative process to enforce electoral finance laws, disclosure requirements on electoral surveys/polls, reasonable process to determine electoral boundaries, and reasonable registration requirements of candidates and parties. The FDA found electoral unfairness in the following sections: no campaign blackout period, no provisions for inclusion of minorities in the Legislative Assembly, no candidate and party expenditure limits, high cap on contributions to parties, no laws which disallow corporations/unions from making contributions and spending as third parties, no requirement for impartial and balance political coverage before and during the campaign period, no media ownership concentration laws or equivalent, no proportional representation, and undemocratic process of government. The level and areas of electoral unfairness measured by the FDA suggest that voter influence reform is necessary in order to encourage more equity for voters during the campaign period, broad and balanced electoral discourse, and a more informed electorate. However, since the voter influence received the highest score of the fours audit sections, this suggests that reforms for voter influence is less necessary, especially in consideration of the multi-application of sub-sections. Consequently, media and electoral finance reform will have significant impact on the electoral fairness of both voter influence and candidate and party influence.

Introduction:

This chapter focuses on the Alberta laws pertaining to voter influence. The FDA audit team measures Alberta's laws according to their equity for voters based on concepts of egalitarianism and political liberalism (see Definition of Key Terms and Research Methodology for further explanation). The equity of voters entails not only equal value of votes, but also equitable opportunity for voter influence prior to and during the campaign period, and reasonable means to take advantage of these opportunities. The FDA acknowledges that perfect equal opportunity and means to take advantage of opportunity are very likely not attainable. For example, it is inconceivable how government and society can ensure that all voters have the same education, income, intelligence, leisure time etc. However, the FDA is interested in the overall equity of Alberta legislation pertaining to voter influence. Does the legislation promote equity within reasonable bounds? Are there areas of the legislation that clearly favour certain voters?


The FDA voter influence audit focuses on the following sub-sections not including relevant sub-sections from other sections:

1. blackout period;2. value of a vote;3. freedom of speech and assembly;4. voter registration requirements;5. voter electoral complaints;6. voter protection;7. voter assistance;8. citizens living abroad;9. inclusion of minorities.

The FDA chose these sub-sections above and relevant sub-sections from other sections because they represent core areas of voter influence. Freedom of speech and assembly is weighted the highest based on the concept of political liberalism. The FDA audit of voter influence includes research of Alberta's election law and then application of the FDA matrices. The matrix scoring is based on an overall score of 0 to 10 out of 10.

Analysis:

Alberta received a score of 65 percent for the electoral fairness of its legislation pertaining to voter influence. Based on the FDA scoring scales, the score is unacceptable. (A score of 70 percent is the threshold for acceptability.) The score means that Alberta's legislation on voter influence has more satisfactory areas overall. Of the four audit sections, voter influence received the highest measurement of electoral fairness.

Similar to the candidate and party influence section, the voter influence includes relevant sub-sections from the electoral finance, candidate and party influence, and political content of media sections. These sub-sections accounts for almost the entire 35 percent zone of measured unfairness. The FDA found electoral unfairness in the following: no campaign expenditure limits on candidates and parties, high caps on contributions to parties and third party spending, no laws which disallow corporations/unions from making contributions and spending as third parties, no media ownership concentration laws or equivalent, and no legislative requirements for impartial and balanced campaign coverage. The FDA found electoral fairness in the following: reasonable voter registration, advanced voter assistance measures, detailed voter protection measures, and freedom of speech and assembly. If the audit did not allow for multi-application of sub-sections, the FDA would have measured near 100 percent for voter influence. Consequently, Alberta legislation on voter influence does not require reform except for provision to ensure the inclusion of minorities in Alberta Legislature and voter electoral complaints prior to the Election Day.

As mentioned in the Research Methodology, the voter influence section measures the equity of voter influence in terms of the value of a vote and before and during the campaign period. The


FDA argues that a high level of electoral fairness for voter influence does not necessarily equate to a fair electoral system. Laws on candidate and party influence, media laws, and electoral finance laws may impact the outcome of an election. For example, the relative equity between voters' electoral influence may be offset by inequity between candidates and parties' electoral influence such as grossly unfair registration requirements of candidates and parties. What good is 65 percent equity between voters, if major media favors a particular party? (With no regulation of the political content of media, in the 2004 Alberta General Election 58% of media election stories analyzed by the authors mentioned the Progressive Conservatives, while the Liberals were mentioned 16% of the time, and the NDP 12% of the time according to the findings from (Wesley and Colborne, 2005). What good is 65 percent equity between voters, if electoral finance laws favour the party with greater access to the wealthy sectors of society and which is better able to raise funds? (With high caps on contributions and no campaign expenditure limits, in the 2008 Alberta general election the PC Party had 36 percent more political contributions than all the other parties (seven) combined ($2,285,789 to $1,463,593) (Foundation for Democratic Advancement, 2012).)

To illustrate the electoral unfairness of the Alberta system, the $30,000 cap on contributions to parties will likely favour wealthy voters over less wealthy voters (see for example the findings under Caps on Contributions to Candidates and Parties above). Similarly, the inclusion of corporations/unions in contributions and third party electoral spending will favour their dominance over voters, because corporations/unions are wealthier than most voters, especially in Alberta where the corporate sector represents the high end of the income spectrum. No media ownership concentration laws and no requirements that the media has broad and balanced electoral coverage will likely favour voters who are aligned ideologically with the media organizations over voters who are not. No blackout period will favour voters who are aligned with individuals and organizations with the most influence on electoral discourse. No campaign expenditure limits on candidates and parties will favour voters aligned with candidates and parties who are better able to raise funds.


The pie illustrates the level of fairness of the Alberta legislation on voter influence.


Chapter Five: Overall Audit Results

Chapter five will show the FDA’s overall and sectional audit scores for the Alberta provincial electoral system.

1. FDA research and audit results for the electoral fairness of Albertan laws on electoral finance:

47.7 percent

2. FDA research and audit results for the electoral fairness of Albertan laws on the political content of media:

45 percent

3. FDA research and audit results for the electoral fairness of Albertan laws on candidate and party influence:

51 percent

4. FDA research and audit results for the electoral fairness of Albertan laws on voter influence:

65 percent

Total score: 52.2 percent

The pie illustrates the level of fairness based on the overall audit results.


The pie illustrates the percentage breakdown of fairness based on the overall score of 52.2 percent and the four audit sections.

The pie illustrates the percentage breakdown of unfairness based on the overall score of 47.8 percent and the four audit sections.


Chapter Six: Analysis

Chapter six will provide an overall analysis of the FDA’s findings.

The Alberta provincial electoral system received an unacceptable overall electoral fairness score of 52.2 percent out of a reasonably attainable score of 100 percent. Two audit sections received unacceptable passing scores, and two audit sections received unacceptable failing scores. These measurements suggest that the Alberta electoral system is in an unstable position by bordering the overall failing zone of 49.99 percent or less. New electoral legislation could easily move Alberta into the electoral unfairness zone. The FDA believes that the existing zone of electoral unfairness, 47.8 percent, suggests that the Alberta system is susceptible to compromise through issues such as unequal distribution of campaign contributions among political parties and severely imbalanced and partisan media.

The FDA found electoral fairness in the following: voter issues, electoral finance transparency, enforcement of the Election Act, determination of electoral boundaries, disclosure of surveys/polls, voter, candidate, and party registration requirements, and freedom of speech and assembly. At the same time, the electoral system has significant deficiencies in the following: high caps on contributions to parties and third party spending, no laws which disallow corporations/unions from making contributions and spending as third parties, no requirements of impartial, balanced or even pluralistic political coverage by the media, no expenditure limits on candidate and party electoral spending, no proportional representation, and monopolistic process of government through the dominance of the Alberta Legislative Assembly by the Alberta cabinet.

Similar to the US federal electoral system, the FDA believes that an emphasis on freedom versus equality has weakened the Alberta electoral system. As stated in the Research Methodology, freedom alone can only guarantee that the strongest and most powerful (economically and politically) will dominate. The FDA believes that optimal democracy results from a balance between freedom and equality. Perhaps the political establishment in Alberta wants excessive freedom considering the enormous and disproportionate wealth generated by Alberta's primary industries, oil and gas, as compared to other Albertan industries. On the other hand, perhaps the Alberta political establishment does not understand freedom and democracy in the same way as the FDA or the consequences from having too much and too little freedom.

The FDA measured political content of the media (55 percent unfair) and electoral finance (52.3 percent unfair) as the most unfair aspects of the Alberta electoral system. The FDA found these to be gaping holes of unfairness, which could allow a wealthy minority to dominate campaign finances or a large media conglomerate to dictate electoral discourse. These deficiencies in Alberta media and electoral finances have a significant impact on candidate, party, and voter influence. They impair the possibility for balanced representation of a pluralistic party system in Alberta. It also affects the ability of voters to make an informed choice during an election. The FDA found that the Alberta system does very little to offset electoral unfairness, with the


exception of the public transparency of electoral finances and value of a vote. Finance inequity and the sources of party funds are available through public transparency measures. The FDA believes that this information can lead to positive reform. The Alberta law of 'one person, one vote' means that the people of Alberta decide who governs, however, if the public is not adequately informed of all their electoral choices its political power can and will be reduced. The FDA argues that the potential for unequal electoral finances combined with imbalanced political and electoral content by the media will affect electoral discourse, and ultimately how informed the electorate is. The FDA believes that voters will likely not vote for a candidate or party that is not familiar to them. The political power of 'one person, one vote' is not enough to guarantee election outcomes that truly represent the voice of the people.

The flow charts below capture an overview of the major elements of the Alberta electoral system and their interactions:


Chapter Seven: Conclusion

Chapter seven will provide a conclusion based on the FDA’s findings and analysis.

To be consistent with fundamental democratic principles such as 'one person, one vote', 'will of the people', and 'government for, by, of the people', the FDA believes that the Alberta provincial electoral system requires significant reform. Presently, the electoral system is susceptible to inequitable candidate and party electoral finances, imbalanced and partisan political coverage by the media, and inequitable candidate, party, and voter influence. Certain concentrations of wealth, political power, and media ownership can determine a degree of electoral unfairness in Alberta. The FDA found that unfairness in electoral finance and media content, key elements of freedom, has worked to undermine a democratic electoral process. The FDA concludes that the election system is significantly connected to wealthy elements in Alberta and likely disconnected from the majority. The notion of a fair and equitable Alberta electoral system, despite certain elements of fairness, is an illusion. Small and new parties cling to the hope from one person, one vote, that they can overcome huge barriers of unfairness and inequity. The system expects the public to make informed choices on Election Day after inundating them with partisan and imbalanced political coverage.

The powers to be in Alberta need to look themselves in the mirror and ask if doing the wrong thing is really worth it.

The FDA believes that the people of Alberta need to align themselves with candidates, parties, and organizations who truly represent their interests (rather than money interests), and who are committed to reforming the Alberta provincial electoral system into a system which is only about the people of Alberta.

The table below shows the position of Alberta's overall electoral fairness score in the FDA scoring scale:


FDA Scoring Scales Score Range 2012 Alberta's Score

A +

Exceptional democratic process and reasonably attainable

85% to 100%

100% maximum score

n/a

A

Outstanding democratic process

80% to 84.99% n/a

B+

Very good democratic process

75% to 79.99% n/a

B

Acceptable democratic process

70% to 74.99% n/a

D to C+Unacceptable democratic process (many deficiencies

and/or major deficiencies in the electoral legislation)

50% to 69.99% 52.20%

F

Unacceptable, failed democratic process

0% to 49.99%

0% minimum score

n/a

Foundation for Democratic Advancement (2012)


Chapter Eight: Recommendations

Chapter eight will set out the FDA’s recommendations on how to improve the electoral fairness of the Alberta provincial electoral system.

The FDA believes that the Alberta provincial electoral system requires significant reform from bordering a failed state. The FDA outlines below what it thinks are necessary reforms that need to take place:

Electoral Finance:

1. The caps on contributions to parties need to be reduced from $15,000 in non-election years to about $4,000 and from $30,000 in election years to about $7,000 in election years.

(FDA calculations are from the electoral finance audit section under Caps on Contributions to Candidates and Parties based on Alberta per capita income levels and income inequality data. Canada at the federal level has a $1,000 cap on contributions to candidates, and France has a €4,600 Euro cap (about $6,200 CAD) cap during the campaign period and €7,500 Euro cap (about $10,100 CAD) during non-election periods (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Reports on Canada and France, 2011).)

2. Contributions from corporations/unions and third party electoral spending to candidates, parties, and constituency associations should not be allowed.

(FDA believes that the 'will of the people', the basis for democracy, is exclusively about citizens; corporations/unions are not citizens in terms of the democratic concept of 'one person, one vote'; corporations/unions are not people. Also, by removing corporations/unions from electoral finance, would help prevent wealthy elements in society from having disproportionate impact on electoral discourse. In the following countries, for example, corporations/unions cannot make electoral contributions: Canada and France at the federal levels of government (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Reports on Canada and France, 2011).)

3. Expenditure limits need to be placed on candidate and party campaign expenditures. The number of candidates running, size of electoral divisions, and financial capabilities of candidates, parties, and constituency associations should determine the limits. The expenditure limits need to be reasonably attainable by all registered candidates, parties, and constituency associations.

(The Canadian federal electoral system has expenditure limits. FDA Global Electoral Fairness Report on Canada (2011). However, expenditure limits are a mute point if they still produce significant inequity in electoral expenditures. Canada has no measures such as public subsidies based on the financial need of all registered parties that would ensure fair and equitable


campaign expenditures. In addition, Canadian established federal parties are favored through public subsidies based on the number of seats won. A party with large popular support and no seats won will receive no public subsidies. In France, there are candidate expenditure limits, and if candidates attain at least 5 percent of the popular vote in their constituency, it receives back 50 percent of their campaign expenditures. Also, there are public subsidies available for new political parties (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Report on France, 2011).)

4. Public subsidies need to be available to small and new parties based on reasonable popular support and to larger parties based on reasonable popular support and need.

(France has public subsidies for new political parties based on level of contributions and electoral official support. Also, public subsidies are available to parties that receive at least 1 percent of the popular vote, and campaign expenditures for candidates are refunded by 50 percent if at least 5 percent of the popular vote is attained (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Report on France, 2011).) Political Content of Media:

1. Media needs to be required to publish and broadcast impartial and balanced electoral coverage during the campaign period, in order to help ensure balanced electoral discourse and foster an informed electorate.

(Venezuela has constitutional and legislative requirements that the media's electoral content must be fair and balanced (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Report on Venezuela, 2011).)

2. Media needs to be required to publish and broadcast pluralistic and balanced political coverage outside of the campaign period, in order to encourage balanced political discourse and produce an informed electorate.

(Venezuela has constitutional and legislative requirements that the media's electoral content must be fair and balanced (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Report on Venezuela, 2011).)

3. Effective media ownership concentration laws need to be applied to all sectors of the Alberta media, in order to encourage a pluralistic media.

(France, Norway, and Bolivia for example have media ownership concentration laws. Bolivia requires that media ownership concentration conform to the following ratio: 1/3 private, 1/3 government, 1/3 social and indigenous groups and Bolivia has constitutional laws prohibiting monopolies and oligopolies (FDA Global Electoral Audit Reports on France, Norway, and Bolivia, 2011).)

Candidate and Party Influence:

1. The media needs to be required to charge equal electoral advertisement rates to all


registered candidates and parties.

(The US federal electoral system requires that candidate and parties have equal access to media for electoral advertisement and equal cost of electoral advertisements (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Report on the USA, 2011).)

2. An open list proportional based system should determine winners of electoral districts. This system allows for representation of the popular vote as opposed to the first-past-the-post system. (Strong popular support represents a proportionally represented government, whereby the party in power deserves majority control of an Assembly.)

(Norway and Sweden have an open list, Sainte-Laguë’s modified method proportional based electoral systems (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Reports on Norway and Sweden, 2011).)

3. Government process reform should require the winning party and its cabinet base the passage of legislation on at least 50 percent of popular support (in terms of elected officials’ actual voter support) in the previous election, rather than legislative dominance (FDA reform initiative, 2012).

4. In order for the people of Alberta to remove corrupt political representatives and have a direct say in government policy, policy referendum and recall legislation needs to be established.

(Bolivia provides a model for these referendum processes: popular initiative referendum for issues such autonomous regions, constitutional reform, international treaties etc., and revocation candidate/party mandate referendum (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit Report on Bolivia, 2011).)

Voter Influence:

1. A comprehensive inquiry needs to be implemented which identifies minorities in Alberta and the extent to which their views are represented in the Alberta Legislature. If the Alberta Legislature does not represent some minorities, the system should take measures to ensure their representation including guaranteed seats in the Assembly.

(New Zealand has guaranteed parliamentary seats for the Maori population; Norway has a separate parliament for the Sami population; Syria has guaranteed parliamentary seats based on gender and occupation; and Iraq has guaranteed seats for women and religious minorities (FDA Global Electoral Fairness Reports on New Zealand, Norway, Syria, and Iraq, 2011).)

The FDA believes that these reforms if implemented will help return Alberta to the people of Alberta, and allow Albertans to realize their individual and collective potential through freedom, fairness, and equal opportunity for all.


References

Alberta Views. (2012). “Going it Alone.” Editorial: Evan Osenton. January/February 2012.

Alberta Press Council, Code of Practice, 2006-2007. Retrieved from Alberta Press Council website: http://www.albertapresscouncil.ca/code_of_practice.html

Blackwell, W. Christopher. (2003). “Athenian Democracy: a brief overview.” In Adriaan Lanni, ed., “Athenian Law in its Democratic Context” (Center for Hellenic Studies On-line Discussion Series). Republished in C.W. Blackwell, ed., Dēmos: Classical Athenian Democracy (A. Mahoney and R. Scaife, edd., The Stoa: a consortium for electronic publication in the humanities [www.stoa.org]). February 28, 2003.

Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms, 1982. Retrieved from Canadian Department of Justice website: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/charter/

Election Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta. (2000, c. E-1). Retrieved from the Service Alberta

website: http://www.qp.alberta.ca/574.cfmpage=E01.cfm&leg_type= Acts&isbncln=9780779733903

Elections Alberta. (2009). “2008 Annual Report of the Chief Electoral Officer: The Electoral

Finances and Contributions Disclosure Act for the Calendar Year 2008.” Retrieved from the Elections Alberta website: http://www.elections.ab.ca/%20Website/files/Reports/2008_ANNUAL_REPORT_NET_POSTING_JAN_14_2009.pdf

Elections Alberta. Various information retrieved from Elections Alberta website: http://www.elections.ab.ca/Public%20Website/index.htm

Election Almanac. (2011). Alberta provincial election 2011 election results. RetrievedJanuary 14, 2012, fromhttp://www.electionalmanac.com/canada/alberta/results.php

Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta. (2000, c.E 3 as

amended (the Act)) Election Finances and Contributions Disclosure Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta

(2000, c. E-2). Retrieved from the Service Alberta website: http://www.qp.alberta. ca/574.cfm?page=E02.cfm&leg_type=Acts&isbncln=9780779730315

Jensen Harold, & Young Lisa. (2005). “Electoral Democracy in Alberta: Time for Reform.” Institute for Advanced Policy Research, University of Calgary.


http://www.elections.ab.ca/

Ibrahim, M. Oweiss. Egypt’s Economy: The Pressing Issues. Retrieved from: http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/imo3/epe/epe.htm

Legislative Assembly Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta. (2000 Chapter L-9Current as of November 1, 2010). Retrieved from the Service Alberta website: http://www.qp.alberta.ca/574.cfmpage=L09.cfm&leg_type=Acts&isbncln=9780779753659

Lessig, Lawerence. (2011). Republic, Lost. New York: Hachette Book Group.

Lisac, M. (2004). In Barbour D., Penny M. (Eds.), Alberta politics uncovered taking back our province. Edmonton: NeWest Press.

Macpherson, C. B. (1962). Democracy in alberta: Social credit and the party system

(2nd ed.) University of Toronto Press.

Myles, John. (2011). “Why Have Poorer Neighbourhoods Stagnated Economically, While The Richer Have Flourished?” Working Paper. University of Toronto.

Proposed Electoral Division Areas, Boundaries, and Names for Alberta, Interim Report to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta. (February, 2010), from http://www.altaebc.ab.ca/EBC%20Interim%20Report_web5mb.pdf

Public Interest Alberta. (2009). How Alberta compares on money and politics- political,

election and campaign finance in Alberta: realities, comparison, and possibilities for reform. Retrieved from Public Interest Alberta website:http://pialberta.org/sites/default/files/Documents/howalbertacomparesmp.pdf

Radio Regulations, 1986. Retrieved from the Department of Justice Canada website:

http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR%2D86%2D982/ Stewart, D., & Archer, K. (2000). Party democracy in Alberta. In V. Adams (Ed.), Quasi-

democracy: Parties and leadership selection in Alberta (pp. 3-21). Vancouver: UBC Press.

Television Broadcasting Regulations, 1987. Retrieved from the Department of Justice

Canada website: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-87-49/ The Citizen’s Guide to Alberta Legislature, 2010. (7th Edition). Retrieved from

http://www.assembly.ab.ca/pub/gdbook/citizensguide.pdf


http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-87-49/

http://www.qp.alberta.ca/574.cfm?page=L09.cfm&leg_type=Acts&isbncln

Structures of Government, February 2012. Service Alberta. Retrieved from Service Alberta website: http://www.albertacanada.com/immigration/living/government-structure.aspx

Wesley, J.J., & Colborne, M. (2005). “Framing Democracy: Media Politics and the 2004 Alberta Election.” presented at Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario. Retrieved from http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Wesley,%20Jared.pdf


Definition of Key Terms:

The Foundation for Democratic Advancement characterized the following definitions:

Candidate and party influence refers to the opportunity and ability of candidates and parties to campaign in the public domain for elected positions. This opportunity and ability occur before, during, and after an election period. Candidate and party influence may involve political content of media, electoral finance, and voter influence (as defined below). In the terms of the FDA electoral fairness audit, which focuses on electoral process, candidate and party influence includes:

· Registrations requirements for candidates and parties.· Laws on candidates and parties access to media and reasonable opportunity to take advantage of the access. · Regulations on access to major debates.· Electoral complaints process for candidates and parties.· Laws on contributions to candidates and parties.· Procedures for formation of electoral lists and boundaries. · Procedures for the determination of elected winners in districts. · Regulations on the political content of public and private media. · Laws on the structure of state bodies and their relationship in terms of political power.· Length of the campaign period. · Rules on right of reply in the media for registered candidates and parties. In the FDA electoral fairness audit, candidate and party influence only encompasses laws, regulations, procedures etc. that affect the electoral influence of candidates and parties. For example, candidate and party influence does not encompass laws on electoral complaints by voters nor does it encompass laws on voter assistance at polling booths.

Electoral fairness refers to the impartiality and equitability of election law before, during, and after an election period. In the context of the Audit, electoral fairness involves concepts relating to political content in the media, candidate and party influence, electoral finance, and voter influence. In particular, this includes evaluating impartiality and balance of political content in the media, equitable opportunity and ability for registered candidates and parties to influence voters and government, equitable electoral finance laws, and equitable opportunity and ability for voters to voice political views and/or influence the outcome of an election.

Electoral fairness does not entail bias through for example legislation which gives a concrete electoral advantage to one registered party over another, or legislation that allows equitable access to media without facilitating equal opportunity to take advantage of equal access. In contrast, electoral fairness would include a broad, balanced diffusion of electoral propaganda by registered political parties during the campaign period, equal campaign finances (beyond equal expenditure limits) for all registered parties according to the number of candidates endorsed, and


the registration of parties based on reasonable popular support (rather than financial deposit or unreasonable popular support).

Electoral fairness in any democratic process must include an equal playing field for registered parties and candidates, distinguishable by voters according to a clear political platform, and a broad and balanced political discourse in where information about electoral choices are clear and available to the voting public.

Electoral finance refers to electoral finance laws applied to registered candidates and parties before, during, and after an election period. Electoral finance also encompasses campaign finance which is restricted to the campaign period.

In the context of the FDA electoral fairness audit, electoral finance includes:

· Caps on electoral contributions (or the lack of).· Caps on candidate and party electoral expenditures (or the lack of).· Procedures for financial disclosure and reporting of candidate and party electoral finances.· Procedures for the handling of electoral contributions by registered candidates and parties.· Public electoral subsidies (or the lack of).· Laws on who can make electoral contributions.· Laws for third party electoral expenditure (or the lack of). · Rules for electoral deposits by registered candidates and parties. Electoral finance does not include non-financial laws, regulations, procedures etc. such as laws on candidate and party access to media, political right laws like freedom of speech and assembly, rules on right of reply in the media, laws on the political content of media, and laws on voter assistance.

Political content of media refers to the political content of radio and television broadcasters, the printed press, and online news media such as news sites before, during, and after an election period. This content may entail news stories, editorials, articles, programs, and group analysis and discussion. It does not include electoral advertisements by candidates, parties, and third parties. Electoral advertisements by candidates and parties are included in candidate and party influence, and electoral advertisements by third parties are included in voter influence and electoral finance.

In the context of FDA electoral fairness audit, political content of media includes:

· Registration requirements for television and radio broadcast companies and press companies.· Laws on the ownership concentration of media (or the lack of).· Laws on the political content of media before, during, and after a campaign period. · Laws on freedom of the press and broadcasters.


· Laws on the regulation of broadcasters and the press.

The FDA defines “balance” in the media as equal political content of all registered political parties. This definition supports the premise that voters should have balanced information on all registered candidates and parties, and election outcomes reflect the will of the voting public. The FDA does not support the idea that incumbent or previously successful parties should be favored in media coverage in a current election as this could create bias based merely on past results, and potentially weaken the process of capturing the will of the people in the present. In addition, the FDA does not support unlimited freedom of broadcast and press media. The FDA believes there is a misleading connection between freedom of media and democracy. The purpose of democratic elections is to capture as accurately as possible the will of the people from districts. A broad and balanced electoral discourse supports the will of the people producing an informed electorate. The FDA concedes that if sufficient media ownership concentration laws existed to produce pluralistic media ownership and equitable coverage of all registered political parties, any imbalance in political content in the media could be canceled out.

Voter influence refers to the citizens who are eligible to vote and their opportunity to express through articles, letters to editors, blogs, advertisements, spoken word etc. their political voice in the public domain and to vote. Voter influence applies to before, during, and after an election period.

In the context of the FDA electoral fairness audit, which focuses on electoral process, voter influence includes:

· Laws and regulations on freedom of speech and assembly.· Laws on the registration requirements for voters. · Laws on voter assistance at the polling booth. · Rules on right of reply by voters in the media. · Laws on the inclusion of minorities in the electoral process. · Caps on electoral contributions and candidate and party expenditures (or the lack of).· Caps on third party electoral expenditures (or the lack of). · Laws on electoral complaints to the election authority by voters. · Laws on the ownership concentration in the media (or the lack of). · Laws on the political content of the media. · Registration requirements for candidates and parties.

In the context of the FDA electoral fairness audit, voter influence may involve political content of media, candidate and party influence, and electoral finance. The involvement is contingent on the impact on voter influence. For example, no cap on contributions to candidates and parties will affect voter influence because no cap favors voters with more financial wealth, and thereby create inequity and imbalance in voter influence. (Foundation for Democratic Advancement, 2012).


History of Alberta Provincial Electoral System

In 1905, the Alberta Act established the Canadian province of Alberta. Since this time, there have only been majority governments, with four parties having power: The Liberal Party from 1905 to 1921; the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) from 1921 to 1935; The Social Credit Party from 1935 to 1971; and the Progressive Conservative Party which has ruled from 1971 to the time of writing in 2012 (Election Almanac, 2011). Macpherson (1962) described Alberta's system during the reign of The Social Credit Party as not a multi-party, one-party or non-party system, but as a quasi-party system for numerous reasons. These include the swift manner in which the UFA and Social Credit Party came into power (which could also be said of the Progressive Conservative Party, going from six seats out of 65 in the Legislative Assembly in 1967, to 45 of 75 seats in 1971 (Election Almanac)), the lack of a competitive method in creating policies, and the fact that parties were still used and opposition parties still present. Stewart and Archer (2000) characterize opposition parties as entities which struggle more to survive than to win governments.

A variety of explanations have been given for this quasi-party system. Macpherson (1962) focuses on the origin of Alberta, a province tightly controlled by the federal government with a population similar in class structure. He attributes the relative dissolution of the federal parties' provincial counterparts during the reign of the UFA and Social Credit Parties to distrust of the federal government. Lisac (2004) notes that during the reign of the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party, politicians fostered a similar distrust. In addition to this apparent cultural explanation, Stewart and Archer (2000) discuss the relationship between longevity of party rule and perceptions of the party leader, noting the popularity of long-serving leaders and premiers William Aberhart, Preston Manning, Peter Lougheed and Ralph Klein. Stewart and Archer contrasts the reigns of these individuals with that of former Progressive Conservative leader and Premier Don Getty, whose time in office was marked by an increasing opposition size.

Other explanations for the political state in Alberta center on the disparities between the parties, in particular between the Progressive Conservatives, and Liberals and New Democratic Party (NDP). Lisac (2004) focuses on the greater experience of Progressive Conservative candidates compared to those in the opposition. He concludes that there is little reason for someone to become a candidate for an opposition party, due to impairment of future non-political employment, hostility from the governing party, making less money than other government members (due to such members' presence on boards and agencies) and having less media coverage than the governing party. The last point is supported by findings from Wesley and Colborne (2005) which state that during the 2004 Alberta General Election, 58% of provincial media election stories mentioned the Progressive Conservatives while the Liberals and the NDP garnered 16% and 12% of coverage, respectively. Research also reveals a disparity in campaign finances. Quantitatively, Lisac notes that in 2003 the Progressive Conservatives raised $2.3 million, the Liberals raised $348, 759 and the NDP raised $417, 966 for their respective campaigns. According to Public Interest Alberta (2009) the Progressive Conservatives spent twice as much as all other parties combined in the 2004 and 2008 elections. Public Interest Alberta also notes qualitative differences in financing, with the Progressive Conservatives


receiving most of their contributions from corporations, while the NDP received most of their contributions from individuals. The Alberta electoral system, in particular its first-past-the-post system, has also been blamed for the weak state of opposition parties in the province (McCormick, cited in Stewart and Archer, 2000).

Voter Turnout:

Another aspect of the Alberta provincial electoral system is relative low voter turnout. Over last five provincial elections, voter turnout has been low and on an overall decline:

Year of Provincial Election Percentage of Voter Turnout2008 40.62004 44.72001 52.81997 52.81993 60.2

Elections Alberta (2010).


Another way to look at the voter turnout is from the standpoint of voters and non-voters:

Yes of Provincial Election Percentage of Voter Turnout Percentage of Non-voters2008 40.6 59.42004 44.7 55.32001 52.8 47.21997 52.8 47.21993 60.2 39.8

Elections Alberta (2010).

The table above demonstrates that in the last two Alberta provincial elections, there were significantly more non-voters than voters. The 2008 election had an 18.8% difference and the 2004 election had a 10.6% difference.

Elections Results:

Further, the Progressive Conservative Party has won a majority of the seats in the Alberta Legislature since 1971:

Year Seats Won by PC Party

Percentage of Assembly Seats

Percentage of Popular Vote

1971 49 of 75 65.3 46.41975 69 of 75 92 62.71979 74 of 79 93.7 57.41982 75 of 79 94.9 62.31986 61 of 83 73.5 51.41989 59 of 83 71.1 44.31993 51 of 83 61.4 44.51997 63 of 83 75.9 51.22001 74 of 83 89.2 61.92004 62 of 83 74.5 46.82008 72 of 83 86.7 52.7

Wikipedia, List of Alberta General Elections (2012).


As shown in the table and graph above, in every election year since 1971, the percentage of the PC Party's seats in the Legislative Assembly has been significantly greater than the PC Party's percentage of popular vote. In addition, the most significant difference in seats and popular vote occurs when the PC Party has the greatest number of seats in the Legislative Assembly.

History of Alberta's Electoral Process:

During the 1910s, plurality defined Alberta’s electoral system. In 1926, a dual electoral system replaced plurality in where Edmonton and Calgary had multi-member districts and a single transferable vote (STV). The STV ranks candidates in order of preference and has a quota system based on popular vote and voter preferences. Rural areas had an alternative vote (AV) system. The AV system is similar to the STV, except there are single-member districts, and candidates need to earn a majority of the votes. In 1956, a single member plurality (SMP), commonly referred to as first-past-the-post, replaced the dual system and is still in effect at the time of writing (Jensen & Young, 2005).

From 1971 to 1975, the number electoral districts were 74. In 1979, the number of electoral districts increased to 79, and from 1986 to 2009, the number of electoral districts increased to 83. In 2010, the number of electoral districts again increased to 87 (Elections Alberta, 2012).


Research Methodology

Methodology of the Electoral Fairness Audit:

The FDA research methodology is rooted in non-partisanship and the political concepts of egalitarianism and liberalism. A non-partisan approach allows the FDA to remain as objective as possible.

Egalitarianism is part of the FDA methodology from the standpoint of political equality (or neutrality), in which each person has one vote of equal value. The FDA also extends political equality into non-election and election periods, demanding a relatively equal playing field for registered candidates and parties and broad and balanced political discourse. The FDA believes that political equality is a core component of democracy, whereby electoral legislation is neutral for all candidates and parties, the value of a vote is same for all eligible voters, and candidates and parties have an opportunity to disseminate their of political view points in a reasonably balanced manner. The FDA recognizes that complete political equality is not attainable, but assumes that a reasonable state of political equality is possible.

Liberalism is part of the FDA methodology from the standpoint of political freedom, and progress, innovation, and reform through that freedom. The FDA believes that political freedom is also a core component of democracy, whereby candidates and parties, citizens, and media persons are permitted to express their political views.

The FDA believes that the union of freedom and equality, an essential part of democracy, means compromise for the greater good of society and political freedom within the bounds of political equality.

Based on its research of international electoral systems and study of fundamental democratic concepts, the FDA believes that optimal democracy results from a balance of freedom and equality. Too much freedom can allow the most powerful (or wealthy) to dominate politically, and too much equality can weaken individual freedoms to a point that impedes progress and innovation. The FDA's methodology centers on finding the optimal balance by identifying and analyzing extremes on either end of the freedom/equality continuum and reasonable methods in the electoral process.

The FDA uses egalitarianism and liberalism as the basis for its methodology because in the FDA's opinion, these concepts are consistent with core democratic principles such as political freedom and equality. With reference to John Rawls and The Theory of Justice, Rawls' concept of the “veil of ignorance" supports the theoretical justification for political fairness and equality. In the “veil of ignorance” prior to the formation of society, no reasonable person would gamble on his or her lot in life, and instead would choose a free existence within the constraints of egalitarianism. Beyond this veil, democracy has its Greek roots in demos 'the people' and kratos 'rule' (Christopher W. Blackwell, 2003). The FDA believes that democracy of and by the people


must entail political freedom within the bounds of political equality. Excessive political freedom would likely lead to a plutocracy or rule of the rich, and excessive political equality would likely lead to communism.

The FDA methodology has two main components: research and audit. The research component is qualitative, based on collecting relevant facts and data, and sourcing the information collected using APA guidelines. The audit process too is qualitative but also employs a quantitative aspect. The audit entails team analysis of research using matrices and the interpretation of the audit results using scoring scales.

Matrices:

The FDA matrices are a detailed, spreadsheet scoring system of relevant data and information. The matrices' scores conform to the concept of optimal democracy defined as a balance of freedom and equality. The purpose of the matrices is to objectify the audit process and help create result reliability through an established structure of scoring. Relevance to the electoral process and the four audit sections inform the variables in the matrices. Individual matrix scores are based on their positive or negative impact on the electoral process in terms of optimal democracy. To illustrate, the two sub-sections below were part of the matrices used in the Alberta electoral fairness audit:

Political Content of the Media, Matrix Section, for Alberta:

Categories Measures Example or Alternative

Scale

Rational Score

Freedom of the Media

Is the freedom of the media (including journalists) established through constitutional or legislative law?

If yes<4; if no=0

The score of 4 represents the significance of media freedom within reasonable limits. The score of 0 represents imbalanced, one-sided political discourse in the media through unreasonable restrictions on media freedom.

4

Impartial and Balanced Political Coverage

During the campaign period is the media (private and public) required legally to publish/broadcast impartial/balanced

If yes=2; if no=0; if freedom of media=0, then yes=0

The campaign period is the most heightened period in terms of voter awareness. The media due to its mass influence has the means to impact significantly

0


coverage of registered candidates and parties?

electoral discourse. The requirement of balanced, impartial media coverage would prevent the media from being imbalanced and partisan.

In this example, media freedom garnered significant weight (40 percent of the total score for political content of media) and value in other sub-sections. (As an example, see the intersection of column 'Example or Alternative Scale' and row 'Impartial and Balanced Political Coverage' above.) Impartial and Balanced Political Coverage is weighted on grounds of the democratic importance of a broad and balanced electoral discourse and a corresponding well-informed electorate. As mentioned, a positive or negative impact on the electoral process determines matrix weightings and scores. According to the scores in the matrix example above, the FDA assumes that freedom of media has more impact on the electoral process than impartial and balanced political coverage.

The FDA matrices are comprised of four sections: electoral finance, political content of media, candidate and party influence, and voter influence (see Definition of Key Terms). Within these sections, there are 52 variables (sub-sections), where 127 variables including sub-sections used in more than one section comprise the overall matrix score. Within the electoral finance section, there are 19 sub-sections; within the political content of media section, there are 10 sub-sections; within the candidate and party influence section, there are 48 sub-sections; and within the voter influence section, there are 50 sub-sections.

Weighting and Scoring:

Overall, the soundness of reasons for scores and the relevancy of each area guides FDA grading. Since each audit section has a maximum and minimum score, sub-section scores are determined based on their relation to each other and their impact on optimal democracy as related to the relevant section. The FDA acknowledges that the determination of scores is an unavoidable qualitative step. The FDA minimizes the subjectivity of scores through required group consensus on their values.

Each audit section has a score range between 0 and 10, and each section counts equally. As mentioned, the FDA matrices allow, based on relevancy, sub-sections apply to multiple sections. For example, the sub-section 'electoral finance transparency' is part of the electoral finance, voter influence and candidate and party influence sections. The FDA justifies multi-application on grounds that electoral financial transparency significantly affects voters, candidates and parties. For example, electoral finances only transparent to a government will favour candidates and parties aligned with the ruling party and voters who support that government. In contrast, electoral finances transparent to the public will affect all voters, candidates, and parties equally and help prevent electoral finance fraud and corruption.


As illustrated in the matrix example above, scores are based on the formula if yes=#, if no=#. The scale rests on yes and no answers. In the case of ambiguous answers, the FDA uses the lesser than and greater than values (“<” and “>”). When these values are used, the FDA audit team attempts to reach consensus on the score, and if that it is not possible, the FDA takes the mean of the individual scores, with each score having equal weight. Relevant and sound evidence, facts, and/or reasons, whether team or individual, must support audit scores. To enhance the reliability of audit results, the FDA has a group of experienced auditors. An audit team has a minimum quorum of five auditors and maximum of nine auditors. Any auditors in excess of nine act as silent observers. New auditors are introduced to the process first as observers, then as researchers, and then as auditors within a team of experienced auditors. Audit Focus:

The FDA's electoral fairness audit focuses on four areas of the Alberta electoral process before, during and after elections:

1) Laws on electoral finance;2) Laws on political content of media;3) Laws on candidate and party influence; and4) Laws on voter influence.

The FDA audits these four areas because they cover broad aspects of the electoral process. The FDA acknowledges that electoral laws may not necessarily correspond to the implementation of those laws or the public’s response to them. The implementation and response could be positive or negative, in terms of electoral fairness. Nevertheless, laws provide the foundation for democracy, framework for the electoral system, and an indication of electoral fairness. A province's constitutional and/or electoral laws are part of the reality of its democracy. In the 2012 general election, the FDA will conduct ground assessments of the Alberta provincial electoral system in tandem with its audit and analysis to determine the correlation between process and actualities. Following the 2012 Alberta general election the FDA will publish its report.

FDA Audit Team and Associates:


FDA Researchers:

Mr. Stephen Garvey, Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, University of British Columbia and Master of Philosophy in Environment and Development, University of Cambridge.Mr. Mark Schmidt, Bachelor of Science in Psychology, University of Calgary.

FDA Electoral Fairness Audit Team:

Chief Electoral Auditor:

Mr. Stephen Garvey, Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, University of British Columbia and Master of Philosophy in Environment and Development, University of Cambridge.

Electoral Auditors:

Mr. Shane Donovan, 4th year Political Science, University of Calgary.Mr. Dale Monette, Bachelor of Commerce, University of Saskatchewan.Mr. Mark Schmidt, Bachelor of Science in Psychology, University of Calgary. Ms. Lindsay Tetlock, Master of Arts in Historical Studies, University of Calgary.

Report Writer:

Mr. Stephen Garvey, Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, University of British Columbia and Master of Philosophy in Environment and Development, University of Cambridge.

Report Reviewers:

Mr. Michael Fabris, Bachelor of Accounting, Brock University.Mr. Dale Monette, Bachelor of Commerce, University of Saskatchewan.Mr. Aurangzeb Qureshi, Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, University of Alberta and Bachelor of Arts in Journalism, University of King's College.Mr. Milton Ortega, PhD candidate in Public Administration and Policy, Portland State University.Mr. Mark Schmidt, Bachelor of Science in Psychology, University of Calgary.Ms. Lindsay Tetlock, Master of Arts in Historical Studies, University of Calgary. Mrs. Liza Valentine, Master of Architecture, University of Calgary.

* Special thanks goes to Mr. Milton Ortega for his comprehensive review of draft reports, Mr. Mark Schmidt, Mrs. Liza Valentine, and Ms. Lindsay Tetlock for their thorough edit of drafts, and Mr. Michael Fabris for his help with the report's visual presentation.


alberta-- executive summary of the 2012 fda electoral fairness audit report

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