al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 23-6-africa-36

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 23-6-

Africa-36

C: There are three “Ds” of America’s security strategy: Diplomacy, Development and Defence. But soon they became Disrupt, Dismantle and Defeat, none of them worked so far. C: do we ever learn: On what Kerry called “the resolution of the Assad problem?” - Tuesday marks the four-year anniversary of the US-backed assassination of Libya’s former leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and the decline into chaos of one of Africa’s greatest nations. Sadly the lessons of the Iraq war did not alert NATO leaders to the disastrous consequences of their punitive mission. - “We got him!” exclaimed the US proconsul in Iraq, Paul Bremer, at the beginning of the press conference announcing Hussein’s capture; On April 9, 2003, the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square in central Baghdad was torn down while the international media filmed. It was the moment the public, both in Baghdad and the rest of the world, knew for sure that the game was up for Saddam’s Ba’athist regime after 24 years in power. Orchestrated by the US military, which invited journalists and camera crews to witness

and record what was essentially a moment of pure war propaganda, the end of Saddam and the beginning of a new era of democracy for the Iraqi people.- According to a

recent study conducted by Brown University, at least 134,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed in the violence since the invasion of the country by the coalition in 2003. The situation created 1.4 million internally displaced persons and over 1.3 million refugees and the rise of the self declared Caliphate: DAESH. VIENNA — Before Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov, met on Friday to explore a possible political solution to the civil war in Syria, they were well aware of the biggest obstacle: Russia wants Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to stay, while the United States wants him to go. They walked out of the meeting with the same disagreement The United States and Russia agree that the war needs to end through a political deal, and that they want Syria to remain a unified country with a secular government, Mr. Kerry said. Like the United States, “Russia wants to see that Daesh and other extremists are eliminated from the scene,” he said, using the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. On what he called “the resolution of the Assad problem,” Mr. Kerry said he thought the two sides could reach an agreement on a process to address that question even if they currently disagree on the Syrian leader’s role - On Oct. 18, Egypt began the first phase of parliamentary elections, but many voters shunned the balloting and turnout is estimated at a measly 15 percent.

The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.–Winston Churchill

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 14 03/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]


Most Egyptians seem to have decided that the election results are a foregone conclusion, with a new parliament that will kowtow to President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s iron-fisted regime in the absence of any meaningful opposition. When Sisi and the Egyptian military ousted the country’s first democratically elected president two years ago, they promised a quick return to democracy and civilian rule. But like much else in Egypt’s modern history, those promises did not materialize. Instead, Sisi has turned into a strongman. And like the strongmen of an earlier generation in the Middle East, Sisi has dangled the promise of reform while finding new ways to consolidate his power. C: do we ever learn?

Libya: From Africa’s Wealthiest Democracy Under Gaddafi to Terrorist Haven After US Intervention by GARIKAI CHENGU

Oct 20, Tuesday marks the four-year anniversary of the US-backed assassination of Libya’s former leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and the decline into chaos of one of Africa’s greatest nations.In 1967 Colonel Gaddafi inherited one of the poorest nations in Africa; by the time he was assassinated, he had transformed Libya into Africa’s richest nation. Prior to the US-led bombing campaign in 2011, Libya had the highest Human Development Index, the lowest infant mortality and the highest life expectancy in all of Africa.Today, Libya is a failed state. Western military intervention has caused all of the worst-scenarios: Western embassies have all left, the South of the country has become a haven for ISIS terrorists, and the Northern coast a center of migrant trafficking. Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia have all closed their borders with Libya. This all occurs amidst a backdrop of widespread rape, assassinations and torture that complete the picture of a state that is failed to the bone. Libya currently has two competing governments, two parliaments, two sets of rivaling claims to control over the central bank and the national oil company, no functioning national police or army, and the United States now believes that ISIS is running training camps across large swathes of the country. On one side, in the West of the nation, Islamist-allied militias took over control of the capital Tripoli and other key cities and set up their own government, chasing away a parliament that was previously elected. On the other side, in the East of the nation, the “legitimate” government dominated by anti-Islamist politicians, exiled 1,200 kilometers away in Tobruk, no longer governs anything. The democracy which Libyans were promised by Western governments after the fall of Colonel Gaddafi has all but vanished. Contrary to popular belief, Libya, which western media routinely described as “Gaddafi’s military dictatorship” was in actual fact one of the world’s most democratic States.Under Gaddafi’s unique system of direct democracy, traditional institutions of government were disbanded and abolished, and power belonged to the people directly through various committees and congresses.Far from control being in the hands of one man, Libya was highly decentralized and divided into several small communities that were essentially “mini-autonomous States” within a State. These autonomous States had control over their districts and could make a range of decisions including how to allocate oil revenue and budgetary funds. Within these mini autonomous States, the three main bodies of Libya’s democracy were Local Committees,





Basic People’s Congresses and Executive Revolutionary Councils.The Basic People’s Congress (BPC), or Mu’tamar shaʿbi asāsi was essentially Libya’s functional equivalent of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom or the House of Representatives in the United States. However, Libya’s People’s Congress was not comprised merely of elected representatives who discussed and proposed legislation on behalf of the people; rather, the Congress allowed all Libyans to directly participate in this process. Eight hundred People’s Congresses were set up across the country and all Libyans were free to attend and shape national policy and make decisions over all major issues including budgets, education, industry, and the economy.In 2009, Mr. Gaddafi invited the New York Times to Libya to spend two weeks observing the nation’s direct democracy. The New York Times, that has traditionally been highly critical of Colonel Gaddafi’s democratic experiment, conceded that in Libya, the intention was that “everyone is involved in every decision…Tens of thousands of people take part in local committee meetings to discuss issues and vote on everything from foreign treaties to building schools.” The fundamental difference between western democratic systems and the Libyan Jamahiriya’s direct democracy is that in Libya all citizens were allowed to voice their views directly – not in one parliament of only a few hundred wealthy politicians – but in hundreds of committees attended by tens of thousands of ordinary citizens. Far from being a military dictatorship, Libya under Mr. Gaddafi was Africa’s most prosperous democracy. On numerous occasions Mr. Gaddafi’s proposals were rejected by popular vote during Congresses and the opposite was approved and enacted as legislation. For instance, on many occasions Mr. Gaddafi proposed the abolition of capital punishment and he pushed for home schooling over traditional schools. However, the People’s Congresses wanted to maintain the death penalty and classic schools, and the will of the People’s Congresses prevailed. Similarly, in 2009, Colonel Gaddafi put forward a proposal to essentially abolish the central government altogether and give all the oil proceeds directly to each family. The People’s Congresses rejected this idea too.For over four decades, Gaddafi promoted economic democracy and used the nationalized oil wealth to sustain progressive social welfare programs for all Libyans. Under Gaddafi’s rule, Libyans enjoyed not only free health-care and free education, but also free electricity and interest-free loans. Now thanks to NATO’s intervention the health-care sector is on the verge of collapse as thousands of Filipino health workers flee the country, institutions of higher education across the East of the country are shut down, and black outs are a common occurrence in once thriving Tripoli.Unlike in the West, Libyans did not vote once every four years for a President and an invariably wealthy local parliamentarian who would then make all decisions for them. Ordinary Libyans made decisions regarding foreign, domestic and economic policy themselves.America’s bombing campaign of 2011 has not only destroyed the infrastructure of Libya’s democracy, America has also actively promoted ISIS terror group leader Abdelhakim Belhadj whose organization is making the establishment of Libyan democracy impossible.The fact that the United States has a long and torrid history of backing terrorist groups in North Africa and the Middle East will surprise only those who watch the news and ignore history.

The CIA first aligned itself with extremist Islam during the Cold War era. Back then, America saw the world in rather simple terms: on one side the Soviet Union and Third World nationalism, which America regarded as a Soviet tool; on the other side Western nations and extremist political Islam, which America considered an ally in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Since then America has used the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt against Soviet expansion, the Sarekat Islam against Sukarno in Indonesia and the





Jamaat-e-Islami terror group against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan. Last but certainly not least there is Al-Qaeda.Lest we forget, the CIA gave birth to Osama Bin Laden and breastfed his organization throughout the 1980’s. Former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook told the House of Commons that Al Qaeda was unquestionably a product of western intelligence agencies. Mr. Cook explained that Al Qaeda, which literally means “the base” in Arabic, was originally the computer database of the thousands of Islamist extremists who were trained by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) used to have a different name: Al Qaeda in Iraq.ISIS is metastasizing at an alarming rate in Libya, under the leadership of one Abdelhakim Belhadj. Fox News recently admitted that Mr. Belhadj “was once courted by the Obama administration and members of Congress” and he was a staunch ally of the United States in the quest to topple Gaddafi. In 2011, the United States and Senator McCain hailed Belhadj as a “heroic freedom fighter” and Washington gave his organization arms and logistical support. Now Senator McCain has called Belhadj’s organization ISIS, “probably the biggest threat to America and everything we stand for.”Under Gaddafi, Islamic terrorism was virtually non existent and in 2009 the US State Department called Libya “an important ally in the war on terrorism”.Today, after US intervention, Libya is home to the world’s largest loose arms cache, and its porous borders are routinely transited by a host of heavily armed non-state actors including Tuareg separatists, jihadists who forced Mali’s national military from Timbuktu and increasingly ISIS militiamen led by former US ally Abdelhakim Belhadj. Clearly, Gaddafi’s system of economic and direct democracy was one of the 21st century’s most profound democratic experiments and NATO’s bombardment of Libya may indeed go down in history as one of the greatest military failures of the 21st century.Garikai Chengu is a scholar at Harvard University.

( C: Muammar Gaddafi, the deposed leader of Libya, died on 20 October 2011 during the Battle of Sirte. Gaddafi was found hiding in a culvert west of Sirte and captured by National Transitional Council forces. He was killed shortly afterwards. The NTC initially claimed he died from injuries sustained in a firefight when loyalist forces attempted to free him, although videos of his last moments show rebel fighters beating him before he was shot several times.( You cannot simply launch an attack on a country without any knowledge of the mindset or character of its inhabitants)

Oct 20, What exactly was toppled in Libya with the overthrow of Muammar Gadaffi? A dictator, or a working power structure? It was utterly predictable that military intervention would be a fiasco. Sadly the lessons of the Iraq war did not alert Nato leaders to the disastrous consequences of their punitive mission. Western military strategists had, of course, identified the nerve centres they would need to target to bring down their enemy. They made detailed appraisals of Gaddafi’s defensive strongholds, his air bases, listening stations, electronic warfare and communications networks, tank regiments, ground troops, planning and command centres, logistics hubs, key infrastructure and administration. Everything. But they failed to take account of the most essential





consideration: the nature of the Arab-Berber world. And it’s this monumental oversight that holds the key to Libya’s current’s chaos, along with the chaos that has been tearing the Iraqi people apart for over a decade.You cannot simply launch an attack on a country without any knowledge of the mindset or character of its inhabitants. You can destroy every tank and combat aircraft in its arsenal, wipe out its entire strategic networks, but if you don’t know what kind of people you’re dealing with, you are merely opening a Pandora’s box, and every idle peace operation embarked on later is doomed only to throw fuel on the fire.To understand the Libyan tragedy we must first study the peculiarities of Arab-Berber culture. For centuries Libya languished on the sidelines, resisting the encroachment of the modern world and the perceived dangers of cosmopolitanism.The Libyan people did not exist as a homogenous nation under one flag and sharing one common ideal. It was a collection of fiercely autonomous, proud and unruly tribes, suspicious of centralised rule (first there had been a substitute Ottoman regency, then a mandated principality, next a short-lived monarchy – the last king of Libya, Idris I, was Algerian), which they saw as a potential threat and to which they would only give allegiance to preserve their own independence.The history of deeply hostile relationships between Libya’s ethnic groups is littered with violent raids, betrayals, unfulfilled vendettas and long-held frustrations carried like shameful injuries that have festered over the years as each generation is brought up to seek revenge for old sins. The terrible reality of the Libyan situation is precisely what Nato’s generals did not deem it necessary to know, dangerously choosing to ignore the unique combination of factors that make up the Libyan mindset. They failed to consider how Libyans would react to having a war thrust upon them. Gaddafi played a defining role in the rebuilding of the modern Libyan nation. By overthrowing the monarchy and declaring the Jamahiriya (a republic of the masses in which political power was to be passed to the people), the revolutionary army officer achieved what no sovereign before him had accomplished.Born of the tribes and the outcasts, a wretched child destined for menial tasks and a lifetime of poverty, Gaddafi – thanks, in large part, to his humble roots – immediately won the adoration of the disadvantaged on the fringes of society and rallied the aggrieved and the rejected to his cause. But his greatest feat, after the coup d’etat, was absolutely remarkable: he succeeded in bringing together the intensely opposed ethnic groups of the north and south, who had always despised one another. To the casual western observer this might seem a basic achievement and of little import, but for an inveterate tribalist it is little short of a miracle. For four decades Gaddafi acted as guarantor of the nation’s stability and a careful moderator between tribal leaders, reconciling warring parties and delicately handling the hangovers of the past that still awoke old demons from time to time. Gaddafi, as vigilant keeper of the flame, kept a weather eye open, heaping privileges on some and

prestige on others in order to consolidate alliances and plaster over any cracks that threatened to appear.A peerless orator, unparalleled expert in tribal psychology and extraordinary manipulator, he ostentatiously showered gifts on his allies while pitilessly crushing his doubters. Giving with one hand, torturing with the other, he kept the nation on steady footing, as if marching in a parade. ((C: The execution of Saddam Hussein took





place on Saturday 30 December 2006. Hussein was sentenced to death by hanging, after being found guilty and convicted of crimes against humanity by the Iraqi Special Tribunal for the murder of 148 Iraqi Shi'ites in the town of Dujail in 1982, in retaliation for an assassination attempt against him)

You cannot simply launch an attack on a country without any knowledge of the mindset or character of its inhabitants )

Yet this authority essentially hinged on the precarious support of the ethnic groups whom Gaddafi made dependent on him. Nothing is as unpredictable and dangerous as a tribe turning on you – such sudden revolts are the stuff of legend and the hallmark of the Maghreb and its colonial history. By toppling Gaddafi, Nato interfered with the order of things. Once the personal guarantor of national unity had been lynched by his compatriots, the Libyan people were left to their own devices in an appalling state of upheaval, with no roadmap to guide them.Through herd mentality, or pure atavism, the leaderless state was drawn back to its one familiar point of reference, the tribal system of its ancestors, and with it the full force of its legacy: a return to the hatred of the past, to intractable rivalries, violent raids and an unquenchable thirst for vengeance.After civil war, pillaging, settling of scores, mass rape and destruction on a massive scale, each ethnic group has withdrawn to its own territory and demands autonomy. The bastion Gaddafi built is crumbling. Libyan unity is now no more than an old story, a fairytale no one believes in. Each militia, each religious community, each ethnic group rebels against the other, every region is a minefield. And into this advanced decomposition other deathly winds are blowing: Islamic State the sirocco of the north; and al-Qaida, the southerly harmattan sweeping up from Niger and Mali.The noose tightens around Libya as competing ideological and territorial claims are staked on it. Today, no region has been spared violence and mass criminality. NGOs and even the Red Crescent are unwelcome: peacekeepers are rebuffed, hospitals doomed to failure.AdvertisementIn the face of western bewilderment and inaction, the situation is on the verge of spreading throughout the whole of north Africa, turning neighbouring countries into powder kegs whose shock waves could destroy the stability of the entire Mediterranean, possibly even dragging the rest of Europe into a calamitous downward spiral. It is becoming a matter of urgency that a unity government is imposed on Libya – and with sufficient backing that popular support for Isis and al-Qaida are cut off. Only then can lasting stability in the region be restored. Failure means it is inevitable that the breakdown of law and order will be exported to the rest of the world. A solution to the Libyan crisis, on the other hand, could bring peace to other Arab countries mired in chaos. Is such a solution possible? I remain convinced it could be, if only the west were to put its mind – and its means – to achieving it.

Jimmy Carter: A Five-Nation Plan to End the Syrian CrisisBy JIMMY CARTEROCT. 23, 2015 I HAVE known Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria, since he was a college student in London, and have spent many hours negotiating with him since he has been in office. This has often been at the request of the United States government during those many times when our ambassadors have been withdrawn from Damascus because of diplomatic disputes.Bashar and his father, Hafez, had a policy of not speaking to anyone at the American Embassy during those periods of estrangement, but they would talk to me. I noticed that





Bashar never referred to a subordinate for advice or information. His most persistent characteristic was stubbornness; it was almost psychologically impossible for him to change his mind — and certainly not when under pressure.Before the revolution began in March 2011, Syria set a good example of harmonious relations among its many different ethnic and religious groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians and Assyrians who were Christians, Jews, Sunnis, Alawites and Shiites. The Assad family had ruled the country since 1970, and was very proud of this relative harmony among these diverse groups.When protesters in Syria demanded long overdue reforms in the political system, President Assad saw this as an illegal revolutionary effort to overthrow his “legitimate” regime and erroneously decided to stamp it out by using unnecessary force. Because of many complex reasons, he was supported by his military forces, most Christians, Jews, Shiite Muslims, Alawites and others who feared a takeover by radical Sunni Muslims. The prospect for his overthrow was remote.The Carter Center had been deeply involved in Syria since the early 1980s, and we shared our insights with top officials in Washington, seeking to preserve an opportunity for a political solution to the rapidly growing conflict. Despite our persistent but confidential protests, the early American position was that the first step in resolving the dispute had to be the removal of Mr. Assad from office. Those who knew him saw this as a fruitless demand, but it has been maintained for more than four years. In effect, our prerequisite for peace efforts has been an impossibility.Kofi Annan, the former United Nations secretary general, and Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister, tried to end the conflict as special representatives of the United Nations, but abandoned the effort as fruitless because of incompatibilities among America, Russia and other nations regarding the status of Mr. Assad during a peace process.In May 2015, a group of global leaders known as the Elders visited Moscow, where we had detailed discussions with the American ambassador, former President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, former Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov, Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov and representatives of international think tanks, including the Moscow branch of the Carnegie Center.They pointed out the longstanding partnership between Russia and the Assad regime and the great threat of the Islamic State to Russia, where an estimated 14 percent of its population are Sunni Muslims. Later, I questioned President Putin about his support for Mr. Assad, and about his two sessions that year with representatives of factions from Syria. He replied that little progress had been made, and he thought that the only real chance of ending the conflict was for the United States and Russia to be joined by Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in preparing a comprehensive peace proposal. He believed that all factions in Syria, except the Islamic State, would accept almost any plan endorsed strongly by these five, with Iran and Russia supporting Mr. Assad and the other three backing the opposition. With his approval, I relayed this suggestion to Washington.AdvertisementFor the past three years, the Carter Center has been working with Syrians across political divides, armed opposition group leaders and diplomats from the United Nations and Europe to find a political path for ending the conflict. This effort has been based on data-driven research about the Syrian catastrophe that the center has conducted, which reveals the location of different factions and clearly shows that neither side in Syria can prevail militarily.The recent decision by Russia to support the Assad regime with airstrikes and other military forces has intensified the fighting, raised the level of armaments and may increase the flow of refugees to neighboring countries and Europe. At the same time, it has helped





to clarify the choice between a political process in which the Assad regime assumes a role and more war in which the Islamic State becomes an even greater threat to world peace. With these clear alternatives, the five nations mentioned above could formulate a unanimous proposal. Unfortunately, differences among them persist.Iran outlined a general four-point sequence several months ago, consisting of a cease-fire, formation of a unity government, constitutional reforms and elections. Working through the United Nations Security Council and utilizing a five-nation proposal, some mechanism could be found to implement these goals.The involvement of Russia and Iran is essential. Mr. Assad’s only concession in four years of war was giving up chemical weapons, and he did so only under pressure from Russia and Iran. Similarly, he will not end the war by accepting concessions imposed by the West, but is likely to do so if urged by his allies.Mr. Assad’s governing authority could then be ended in an orderly process, an acceptable government established in Syria, and a concerted effort could then be made to stamp out the threat of the Islamic State.The needed concessions are not from the combatants in Syria, but from the proud nations that claim to want peace but refuse to cooperate with one another.Jimmy Carter, the 39th president, is the founder of the Carter Center and the recipient of the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize.

Late Sep. From the perspective of a US national security specialist, we live in a dark and gloomy world. Numerous worldwide threats exist across almost every part of the planet including China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. This typically puts Africa at the bottom of the pecking order. But America is taking more notice of the African continent due to the expansion of extremist organisations operating in Africa like al-Qaeda, al-Shabbab, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitun, Boko Haram, Islamic State (IS) and others.

The four main threats Islamic extremist organisations operating inside Libya, Nigeria, northwest Africa and Somalia pose the largest substantial threats to the African people and their international partners like the US. The situation in Libya, also referred to as “Somalia on the Med”, has spiralled out of control since Muammar Gaddafi was ousted in 2011. Fighters from Ansar al-Sharia, IS and others control territory and operate and train with impunity. The US strategy here is to contain the situation by supporting its allies like Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia.

The second main threat comes from Somalia and al-Shabaab. Despite a robust African Union mission supported by a host of African and international countries, the group continues to execute lethal attacks within Somalia’s borders, as well in countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The US strategy is to support partner operations by helping to plan and co-ordinate operations and to support maritime security efforts in the region. For instance, the US donated US$92.4 million to the Kenyan Defence Forces in August for soldier training and new equipment acquisitions.

The third main threat comes from Northwest Africa and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). The strategy is to support France. AQIM is France’s number one overseas problem, and they understand this is not a short term fight. In May, the US gave France US$35 million to support their operations in Chad, Niger and Mali, but also to help combat the threat posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Boko Haram recently pledged its allegiance to IS, meaning its aim is now to establish a caliphate in West Africa rather than just Northern Nigeria. The US strategy is to help Nigeria and neighbouring countries get back into the fight. Under a new joint US Department of State and US Department of Defense initiative, the Global Security Contingency Fund, the US will contribute US$40





million to the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. This money is to train and equip their military and civilian forces and to lay the groundwork for increased cross-border co-operation against Boko Haram.

A last threat, but not at the same level as the other four, is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Led by Joseph Kony, the LRA is believed to still be carrying out small-scale attacks around the border region of the Central African Republic, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda. The US first deployed 100 special forces in 2011 to support the search for LRA commanders. The US strategy is to continue supporting its African partners, particularly Uganda, through a Special Operations Command Africa-led operation.

Barriers to success Africa’s gigantic size makes the operations difficult.In war, the military needs overhead imagery to provide crucial intelligence. If satellites are not available, drones are the other option. But due to the location of the airports the US military uses and the sheer distance between areas, flying a drone from one location to another at 80-90 knots can hypothetically mean only 30 minutes to one hour of actual intelligence out of 16 hours flying time. Troops are too far from each other in Somalia, making communication and movement difficult. In March, the US helped combat the air support problem by donating two Cessna 208B aircraft as a token of appreciation for Uganda’s counterterrorism and security efforts. From an ideological viewpoint, it is hard to fight extremist threats because of their effective narrative. They are fighting under an ideology they claim is powered by God. This is difficult to counter. Negative socioeconomic factors only exacerbate the situation. All of these operations equate to money. Until 2014 when transitions were made in Afghanistan and Iraq to an “advise and assist” role, most of this money was not going to the US military’s African Command but to Central Command responsible for America’s security interests in 20 nations, stretching through the Arabian Gulf region into Central Asia. Even when money is available and





military training of partner nations is going well, what is the US to do if the newly trained and equipped African defence force is used elsewhere, say to squash internal uprisings?

The good news? The good news is that the new US defence budget of US$534 billion is the largest ever. AFRICOM is to get 2% more after a 6.5% cut the year before. The US is expanding African operations. This includes new US military facilities in countries like Niger.It was announced in August that jet fuel is now available at Zinger Airport in Niger enabling American planes to make pit stops. This is in addition to the new US drone base in Niamey and another refurbished airstrip in the fringe of the Sahara Desert, all closely located to Boko Haram’s operating territory.

Expect more US-Nigerian military cooperation with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, a US Army War College alumnus, in command. Washington refused to sell US-made Cobra fighter-helicopters to Nigeria during President Goodluck Jonathan’s presidency due to concerns over the protection of civilians when conducting military operations. Strides are already being made on certain fronts. In 2008, the LRA had approximately 800 troops. Today it has about 190 to 200. US Special Forces are even using Ugandan music and a famous song, Come Home, to encourage defections.The FBI recently sent officers to Uganda to assist with investigations in relation to the International Criminal Court trial of ex-LRA Commander Dominic Ongwen. Of the five indicted LRA commanders only two Ongwen and Joseph Kony are still alive. The latter is still on the run.This new multifront and multidimensional battle is different from the 1990s when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan. America is doing what it can to assist and will be doing





more. There is increased overall multilateral support, but there can always be more. Africa itself can always do more. Without security there is no “Africa Rising”. There are three “Ds” of America’s security strategy: diplomacy, development and defence. We cannot downplay the importance of the military and defence, but diplomacy is terribly underfunded. America’s military has more members in its 158 military bands than diplomats in the State Department in the US and abroad. In the long term, you can’t shoot your way out of this one.

Oct 23, A spiritual leader of Islamist militant group al-Shabaab pledged his allegiance to Islamic State, further fracturing the Somalia-based insurgency, CNN reported, citing sources including an unidentified person in U.S. intelligence.Sheikh Abdulqadir Mumin offered his support to ISIS in a video that is expected to be posted online, the broadcaster said. Al-Shabaab, which has been trying to overthrow Somalia’s government since 2006, pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012.The split has led al-Shabaab’s secret police, known as the Amniyat, to arrest and jail members who are suspected of switching allegiance, CNN said. Mumin is thought to be based in the mountainous parts of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in northern Somalia, while the Amniyat mainly operate in southern Somalia, it said.

Al-Shabaab In the past Al Shabaab, the Somali terrorist group allied with al-Qaeda have attacked

the areas surrounding Lamu hence Total’s jitters and reservations about the positioning of the pipeline.

Oct 23, A recent deal between Uganda and Tanzania to explore the viability of a joint pipeline may threaten the relationship with Kenya, which was first in line for the project.Last week Kampala announced it had signed a deal with Tanzania and oil company Total to explore the possibility of an oil pipeline to the sea, barely two months after Uganda and Kenya announced the agreement pertaining to the route their pipeline would take.Total officials said considerations about security on Kenya’s favoured pipeline through the northern part of the country to Lamu, was the reason for them considering an alternative.Total along with China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and London-listed explorer Tullow are partners in the development of Uganda’s oil reserves.Kenya and Uganda in August agreed in principle to the development of a pipeline that would begin in the oil fields of western Uganda, pass Turkana in northern Kenya and then on to the port of Lamu. This pipeline would be a major asset for Kenya because it would massively reduce the unit cost of transporting its own oil to the coast. The surprise move to explore the southern route is being seen by some as a negotiation ploy by Uganda, who was getting concerned that Kenya maybe loading too many of its own costs on the northern pipeline.Evidence of this is when in August Uganda insisted that before it could sign off on the pipeline, Kenya had to commit to shoulder the cost of the risk guarantee, undertake to pay any cost overruns, establish commercial viability of their oil reserves and offer affordable tariffs for the use of its pipeline. Uganda established that its oil deposits were commercially viable in 2006 and it is estimated that it has recoverable reserves of 3.5 billion barrels, the fourth largest verifiable reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria, Angola and South Sudan.Kenya’s reserves are currently estimated at 600 million barrels which is exactly makes the Ugandan oil pipeline urgent. However commercial viability of Kenya’s reserves have not been established. The current planned route is a small distance from the Somali border. In the past Al Shabaab, the Somali terrorist group allied with al-Qaeda have attacked the





areas surrounding Lamu hence Total’s jitters and reservations about the positioning of the pipeline. The Northern pipeline is one of three mooted previously but which gained prominence with the discovery of oil in northern Kenya and could be latched onto an existing plan to evacuate oil from southern Sudan. The $20b LAPSSET (Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport) corridor is an ambitious project which would develop the port of Lamu, an oil pipeline from South Sudan, a road network across the neglected northern Kenya and coal-powered firepower.The current administration in Kenya has huge political investment in this project being successful, but with the civil strife in Southern Sudan and now this rethink by Kampala, they may be forced to return to the drawing board or put the project on hold indefinitely.If Uganda pull out of the northern pipeline Kenya would have to foot the estimated $4.5b bill alone for the 1500 km pipeline. The high cost of the pipeline is due to the waxy nature of the oil from both countries, which solidifies at temperatures below 40 degrees Celsius, and would therefore require that the pipes are heated. But more than money is at stake in this intricate trans-national investment. Kenya and Uganda have taken the lead in the revitalisation of the East African Community (EAC), a $110b economy that was shoved aside in the 70s over conflicting egos of the region’s leaders.Kenya and Uganda are each other’s biggest trading partners and the northern oil pipeline was going to tie in nicely with a planned $11b Mombasa-Kampala-Kigali standard gauge railway line, with spurs into south Sudan. The two countries with new entrant Rwanda, frustrated by their southern neighbours foot dragging on key infrastructure projects pushed ahead with plans for the project, which for a time soured relations between Tanzania on one hand and its three neighbours on the other. Uganda is already overly dependent on Kenya for its route to the sea, with the possible development of the southern pipeline it may reduce Uganda’s dependence on its eastern neighbour however this could lead to tense relations between the two countries.

Boko Haram, Oct 22, US strategy against Boko Haram could backfire. On Oct. 12 the United States began deploying ground troops to Cameroon to “conduct airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations in the region,” according to White House spokesman Josh Earnest. He said the 300-person force will have no combat role. Instead, it will offer the United States’ “unique capabilities” to a regional force that is fighting to stamp out the Nigeria-based Boko Haram insurgency. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari and the Nigerian military have praised Washington’s decision.Nigeria and its neighbors — Cameroon, Chad and Niger — launched a coordinated offensive against the group in northeastern Nigeria in January. However, the African Union–backed initiative has had mixed results. Boko Haram remains a serious threat. In addition to continued attacks in Nigeria, it has intensified violence in neighboring countries, carrying out regular bombings and massacres. This is the second major deployment of U.S. troops to counter Boko Haram. In 2014 the U.S. sent some 80 military personnel to Nigeria after the group kidnapped 276 schoolgirls in Chibok. But the latest effort is larger and more directly involved in the conflict. It implicitly acknowledges that the regional approach is not entirely working as intended. Within the context of U.S. policy toward Nigeria, the deployment sends a clear signal that Washington prioritizes security over the messy work of understanding and resolving the political aspects of the Boko Haram conflict.The move sidesteps some of the legal issues that might complicate a direct deployment to Nigeria, whose heavy-handed response to Boko Haram has been marred by grave and systematic human rights violations. Yet there is recurring congressional pressure on





President Barack Obama to waive the Leahy Law, which prevents the U.S. from providing security assistance to foreign military forces implicated in human rights abuses. The U.S. appears increasingly ready to make security reform in Nigeria a secondary concern rather than a prerequisite for deepening its involvement in the fight against Boko Haram. The deployment to Cameroon may foreshadow direct involvement in Nigeria.Washington often talks of security reform as a core element of its engagement with African militaries, but the arrival of U.S. troops in Cameroon confirms the Obama administration’s willingness to compromise on politics in the name of advancing security. Cameroon’s President Paul Biya has been in office since 1982, and Chad’s President Idriss Deby, another key U.S. ally in the fight against Boko Haram, took power in a military coup in 1990.The regionalization of the war against Boko Haram enhances both leaders’ stature as supposed guarantors of stability while minimizing Washington’s incentive to question their legitimacy. Deby and Biya are known for playing by their own rules, even in defiance of international partners. But the United States’ overreliance on them mutes U.S. criticism of their domestic policies. Washington’s aversion to talking with those it deems terrorists creates a climate that prioritizes militarizing the conflict over sorting through its political complexities. Ultimately, Washington lacks a strategy that extends much beyond the goal of helping regional governments defeat Boko Haram militarily. Its policy is based on a simplistic assumption that the insurgency is mostly a result of poverty. As a result, the United States’ postconflict reconstruction agenda hinges on investing more in socioeconomic development in Nigeria’s northeast. This approach ignores several questions. What happens to Boko Haram fighters who are not killed? Is there any possibility of dialogue with the group’s various factions? What steps are necessary to ensure that Boko Haram does not spring back after it is defeated? Who must be held accountable nationally and locally? The deployment of U.S. troops to Cameroon does not necessarily prevent Buhari or his peers from thinking through these questions. Buhari has already expressed willingness to talk to Boko Haram. Yet Washington’s aversion to talking with those it deems terrorists — and its long-standing silence on the merits of dialogue and negotiations — creates a climate that prioritizes militarizing the conflict over sorting through its political complexities.It appears unlikely that the mission in Cameroon will end in disaster. But U.S. policymakers might take a hard look at the uninspiring results of Washington’s mission to capture Joseph Kony, the leader of the Uganda-born, cultlike Lord’s Resistance Army, which has troubled central Africa for nearly three decades. Since 2011, U.S. troops have pursued Kony without success and have acquired problematic allies such as the Seleka, a rebel militia in the Central African Republic. The anti-Kony campaign has deepened Washington’s association with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who took office in 1986 and whose latest re-election campaign involves systematic police brutality against opponents of his regime. The mission in Cameroon, as with the effort to catch Kony, could yield little except painful questions about Washington’s counterproductive compromises in Africa and its facile approaches to the continent’s conflicts. U.S. policies aimed at neutralizing armed groups’ military capabilities often breed more violence. In Yemen, for example, the wave of targeted drone strikes has fed rather than decimated Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Arabian Peninsula. In Somalia, U.S. drone strikes and U.S.-backed East African militaries have vastly shrunk the territory controlled by Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab, but the threat lingers, with grim consequences for neighboring countries, particularly Kenya. Washington’s “unique capabilities” are helpful for assassinating insurgents and preventing them from holding territory but are less useful for generating what must ultimately be political solutions to conflicts.Alexander Thurston is a visiting





assistant professor of African studies at Georgetown University.




al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 23-6-africa-36

Documents