al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 19-71-caliphate-sunni-shia-13

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-71-Caliphate-Sunni-Shia-13

In The "War of the Cross, we seek a Strategy, our Enemy has one."How far did (do) we allow the Iranian influence sphere to grow?

Increasingly since 1979, the Iranians and Saudis “have turned [Middle East turmoil] into a zero sum game” that the United States can do little about, Riedel added. “Fanning the flames of sectarianism is not good for the kingdom, for the United States” and even worse for the Russians.

'I believe that the future of Syria, or the future of all these peace talks, the Syrian-led negotiation, should not be held up by an issue of the future of one man,' Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

Saudi Arabia demanded that Russia and Iran withdraw all military forces from Syria, where the two countries have intervened on behalf of President Bashar Assad in the country's continuing civil war

The outside world hasn’t paid much attention, but the regional struggle between Shia and Sunni has intensified in the last few weeks. Shia states across the Middle East, notably Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, have never had much doubt that they are in a fight to the finish with the Sunni states, led by Saudi Arabia, and their local allies in Syria and Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s “commitment to an inclusive government where Shia, Sunni, and Kurds” are unified. But the emphasis on the Sunni-Shiite-Kurd divide obscures divisions within the Iraqi Sunni population. In doing so, it oversimplifies the political bargain that has to be struck in order to win the war against ISIS, given that there is no single “Sunni” perspective toward central governance in Iraq

Nov. 2, 2015 Iran will withdraw from talks for peace in Syria if the discussions turn into a forum for political bickering that fails to address the plight of the Syrian people, a senior Iranian official said Monday, adding that Iran’s chief regional rival Saudi Arabia had been playing a negative role. “Neither the Islamic Republic nor many countries where logic governs will welcome futile talks," the official, deputy foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, was quoted as saying by the semiofficial ISNA news outlet. “If we assess these meetings [as being] positive, we will take part," he said. The comments added to a war of words between Iranian and Saudi officials following international discussions on Friday in Vienna about ending Syria’s more than four-year-old civil war. Mr. Rouhani appeared to be responding to comments over the weekend by Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, who said that Iran’s military presence in Syria was stalling the peace process and that Mr. Assad had to cede power to end the conflict. Syria is just one of several battlefields where Iran and Saudi Arabia are squaring off.

The Islamic State and Saudi Arabia “believe in an intolerant version of Islam,” but the critical difference between the two is that the kingdom is a pragmatic state, the author of a recent essay on the Saudi interior minister said Wednesday.Bruce Riedel, speaking at the Brookings Institution, where he is a senior fellow, said Crown Prince Muhammed bin Nayef, who was educated in Oregon and trained by the FBI in counterterrorism techniques, “is instinctively pro-American.” He is part of the generational shift in leadership in Saudi Arabia. His rival for the throne in the future is the current minister of defense, Prince Muhammed bin Salman, the son of King Salman bin

The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.–Winston Churchill

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Abdulaziz Al Saud. Bin Salman is the architect of the Saudi-led Sunni Arab coalition trying to oust the Shiite Houthis from control of Yemen, but in Riedel’s words it is a stalemated conflict that is producing a humanitarian crisis in the country of 25 million. Bin Nayef put down an al Qaeda-led insurgency in the kingdom in 2006 but it has shown renewed strength in Yemen and parts of Saudi Arabia. William McCants, who wrote a companion essay on Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for the Washington think-tank, described him as “uniquely capable leader” who “would be very difficult to replace” if killed. Al Baghdadi has religious stature as scholar of the Koran, his claim of descent from the Prophet Mohammed—which he used to proclaim himself caliph—and his considerable skills at negotiation between jihadis and Ba’athists who had served in Saddam Hussein’s regime in establishing the Islamic State. McCants said al Baghdadi had become radicalized before he was held in 2004 by the Americans after the Iraq invasion. What sets him apart from other Islamic extremists is his wanting “to impose his vision on the Muslims around him . . . by force if necessary.” Both bin Nayef and al Baghdadi “are at the top of a Muslim state,” but al Baghdadi, claiming to be the commander of believers as caliph “seeks to expand [the Islamic State] beyond its borders.” McCants said 8 million people live under its control in large sections of Syria and Iraq.When asked what fuels the growth of the Islamic State, McCants said it is a “belief that the Sunni world is under attack.” Going after al Baghdadi “is not enough, but about all we can do,” he added. The center of gravity in topping the Islamic State is the Sunni Arab tribes who remain on the sidelines in this campaign.In the Syria civil war, Riedel said at the start the Saudis were willing to fight [Bashar al] Assad, whose regime is backed by Russia, Iran and Iranian-supported Hezbollah. Iran and Hezbollah are Shiite, who make up about 10 percent of the Muslim world. Now with Moscow playing a larger role in the fighting, Saudi clerics are saying it is time to teach Russia a lesson they will never forget, one stronger than its defeat in Afghanistan that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of global jihad, he said. Increasingly since 1979, the Iranians and Saudis “have turned [Middle East turmoil] into a zero sum game” that the United States can do little about, Riedel added. “Fanning the flames of sectarianism is not good for the kingdom, for the United States” and even worse for the Russians.

November 2, 2015: The Shia rebels are not getting much help from their main supporter; Iran. While things are going well for Iran in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq the pro-Iran Shia rebels of Yemen are facing defeat. This comes despite help from Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah smugglers and military advisors. The worst aspect of all this is that the foreign intervention was all Arab (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain), using their modern Western weapons. The Arabs are succeeding, which does not bode well for Iran which has long (at least in the last few centuries) relied on its superior military capabilities to intimidate their Arab neighbors. What’s going on in Yemen is diminishing that threat quite a bit. It makes Yemen a particularly costly defeat for Iran. Nevertheless the Arab support in Yemen is not without problems. Most of the pro-government forces in Yemen are tribal militias. The Yemeni military has fallen apart since the unrest began in 2011. ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) and AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) are spending more time attacking the government than each other or the Shia rebels. These Islamic terrorist groups are seeking power in the Sunni south, where they can recruit and have some allies among tribes seeking to create a separate Yemen state in the south. This is all widely known and accepted in the south. Yet





Iranian media pushes the idea that the Saudis are flying ISIL Islamic terrorists in from Syria to help with the fight against Shia rebels in the north. This sort of paranoia plays well throughout the Middle East and is regularly used against enemies local and foreign. For example many Moslems (Sunni and Shia) believe that ISIL is the creation of the United States and Israel. Meanwhile many southerners are fighting the Shia rebels only until the Shia are pushed out of the south. After that these southern tribesmen want to fight the government forces who oppose the partition of Yemen.The Shia rebels again claim to have sunk a third Arab coalition ship off the Yemen coast using Chinese or Iranian anti-ship missiles. The Rebels made their first such claim in early October but it is doubtful they actually did any damage. The rebels have not been able to provide any proof, other than some vague videos. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to hide the fact that a naval or commercial ship took a hit like that. No one has come forward with any pictures or video of a ship that has been hit. There are not enough soldiers or police in Aden to keep out large groups of Islamic terrorists, who are now trying to establish control of some neighborhoods and eventually take control of the city. The Arab coalition is assisting the Yemeni government to build a counter-terrorist force to battle the increasingly assertive Islamic terrorists from AQAP and ISIL. Despite Iranian protests Sudanese troops continued to arrive in Yemen. Sudan is doing this because Sudan is largely Sunni and its president had been indicted as a war criminal for backing a war against black skinned Sudanese (who are Moslem) in the west and Christians in the south. This made Sudan an international pariah but Arab states stuck by the Sudanese president, in part because he was championing Arab culture. Last month, For the third time since June Shia rebels in Yemen launched a SCUD ballistic missile against a major Saudi Arabian base. This one was not intercepted and landed near the air base in southwest Saudi Arabia. There were no reports of damage to the base. The Yemeni SCUDs are believed to be older models with a max range of 300 kilometers. This means these missiles cannot reach the Saudi capital or the major oil fields. The Shia rebels got these missiles because most of the Yemeni armed forces remained loyal to former president Saleh, who took good care of the military and that was one reason Saleh rule lasted for three decades. If pro-Saleh forces didn’t provide crews to launch a SCUD, Iran could have

Iran's President Hassan Rouhani called 2 Nov on Saudi Arabia to end what he called the kingdom's "intrusions" in the Middle East in order to allow closer ties between the two regional rivals. "If Saudi Arabia's vision on the big regional questions confronts reality and it stops its intrusions, we can solve many problems, especially in our relations," Rouhani told a gathering of Iranian ambassadors in Tehran. Iran's deputy foreign minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on Sunday chided Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, warning him "not to test the limits of the Islamic republic's patience". "Instead of blaming others, Saudi Arabia's minister of foreign affairs would do better to end his visible and hidden support for terrorists in Yemen, Iraq and Syria," Abdollahian said.

Nov 4, Iran’s increasing military involvement in Syria to sustain President Bashar Assad’s regime is costing more and more casualties and top commanders of the elite Revolutionary Guards force have been charged with mutiny and treason for refusing orders to fight there, a pan-Arab daily newspaper reported on Wednesday. A source quoted by the London-based Asharq al-Awsat daily said several Revolutionary Guard generals from Ahvaz province which has a significant Arab population, have chosen to retire or go into business rather than fight in Syria. An official investigation has been launched into the large





numbers of generals from that region suddenly retiring from service, the source told the paper, which backs Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia, a rival of Iran’s Shiite regime.

Explosion 'targets Muslim committee' in Lebanon's Arsal. Blast reportedly targeting Muslim scholars committee that has been mediating between army and al-Nusra Front kills five. 05 Nov 2015 The blast, believed to be a car bomb, appeared to have targeted the Qalamoun Muslim Scholars Committee, an Islamic group mediating between Lebanon security forces and the al-Nusra Front over the fate of kidnapped Lebanese security forces members. Salem Zahran, a security researcher and political analyst who monitors the Bekaa valley, where Arsal is located, said that the area is strategically crucial to the Lebanese army. Over the last two years, in areas up and down the border, including Arsal, the army has clashed with ISIL, Nusra Front and other Syrian opposition groups seeking to expand into Lebanon.

Oct 26, Saudi Arabia’s top court has upheld a death sentence for Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a Shiite cleric who led protests against the government in 2011 in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. Saudi Arabia’s Specialized Criminal Court had previously sentenced him to death in October 2014 for “foreign meddling” and “disobeying” the kingdom’s rulers. Now Nimr’s fate lies with Saudi King Salman, who can either reject or endorse the Supreme Court’s rejection of the appeal against Nimr’s execution, while both political and non-government critics have condemned the decision.Iran, which is a Shiite state and Saudi Arabia ’s regional rival, warned that if Saudi Arabia executed Sheikh Nimr, his death “would exact a heavy price on Saudi Arabia,” in the words of Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs. He did not appear to elaborate on what that heavy price would be.

Radical Islam is morphing into a global jihad. Fri Oct 30, 2015. Al Qaeda has at least doubled in size since we killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. ISIS is the most successful terrorist organization of modern times. They own a vast swath of territory in Iraq and Syria. They have seven affiliated counties that have provided money and training,” Keane said. Russia, Iran and China all seek to be the dominate powers in their region, and all are enjoying some success toward those goals. “We’ve got countries with advanced technologies – and eventually terrorist organizations – that have the ability to cripple banking, finance, utility and transportation systems in the United States,” Keane said. Keane said the United States has faced security challenges before. The difference now is that the nation is failing to meet the challenges. Enemies are emboldened and allies are left to question U.S. resolve. The Islamic religion is central to radical Islam, Keane said. “It is a geopolitical movement with significant objectives in regional and global domination – very similar to what communism was.” There is no comprehensive strategy to deal with radical Islam. Communism was challenged and defeated by long-term, global alliances and, when necessary, by force of arms. “Where is that alliance today?” Keane asked. America can’t be expected – by itself – to deal with a radical philosophy most Americans do not understand. “We need Muslims, clerics, religious leaders in that faith to undermine that ideology. But we also have to hold their horrific behavior accountable. And sometimes that means military force,” Keane said. “The only way you stop that barbarism is with force. The only way you stop people from joining it, is you have to defeat that ideology. They have to understand from a faith perspective why this ideology is wrong. No Christians can do that. No Jews can do that. This takes clerical/religious leaders of the Muslim faith to do that.” President Obama said 14 months ago “that we will defeat ISIS.





Where are we?” “If you can’t accept a risk of escalation, I don’t think you should be a leader of the United States of America,” Keane said. -- retired Gen. Jack Keane

Is There a Sunni Solution to ISIS? David Ignatius calls for reconciliation among Iraqi Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. But this oversimplifies the bargain that needs to be struck. David Ignatius is right to recognize the importance of historical legacy to the rise of ISIS. He is also right to criticize the embrace of an “80-percent solution” to the reconstruction of Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, whereby, as he puts it in his recent Atlantic essay on the roots of the Islamic State, “Kurds and Shiites would build the new state regardless of opposition from the 20 percent of the population that was Sunni.” Exclusion probably did encourage some Sunnis to first support the Islamic State of Iraq and then its successor, ISIS.U.S. President Barack Obama has praised Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s “commitment to an inclusive government where Shia, Sunni, and Kurds” are unified. The mechanism that would make something like this work, Iraq’s ambassador to Washington, Lukman Faily, tells Ignatius, is a federal system that could give Sunnis some “skin in the game.” But the emphasis on the Sunni-Shiite-Kurd divide obscures divisions within the Iraqi Sunni population. In doing so, it oversimplifies the political bargain that has to be struck in order to win the war against ISIS, given that there is no single “Sunni” perspective toward central governance in Iraq. Much will depend on how a future system is administered. Iraq isn’t so much innately divided along ethnic and sectarian lines as it is fractured within ethnic and sectarian lines. Understanding these divisions is critical to defining political solutions that will produce meaningful inclusion of tribal and regional interests, whether in a federal system or some other arrangement. Western Iraq, for example—especially Anbar province, where ISIS has a strong presence, having taken the provincial capital of Ramadi this summer—has long posed a governance challenge to the Iraqi government in Baghdad. This can be seen as both good and bad news. ISIS “control” over its territory in Anbar is not necessarily secure. It is clear from documents belonging to Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, captured after the 2003 U.S. invasion, that even Saddam was hard-pressed to force his political will on the people of western Iraq, despite the sectarian identity they shared with his ruling Sunni regime. This tendency will complicate the process of governing the area for a Baghdad-based government, or ISIS, or any other party, as the United States learned after 2003. ISIS relies on extreme brutality to maintain control, but it may face resistance, just as Saddam did, even if it can keep the self-proclaimed caliphate intact. The campaign to retake Ramadi is now the focus of the Iraqi government and its U.S. backers in the fight against ISIS. Abadi’s government is trying to take advantage of local enmities to organize Sunni tribal fighters to combat the Islamic State (just as these tribes came to oppose the Islamic State of Iraq, the parent of ISIS, during the U.S. troop surge beginning in 2007). But the effort is faltering due to distressingly familiar problems: Government-supported troops tend to be under-resourced and minimally trained, leaving them vulnerable to ISIS attacks or possible defection to the group.

Russia has now taken advantage of the US failure to suppress the jihadis. But great power rivalry is only one of the confrontations taking place in Syria, and the fixation on Russian intervention has obscured other important developments. The outside world hasn’t paid much attention, but the regional struggle between Shia and Sunni has intensified in the last few weeks. Shia states across the Middle East, notably Iran, Iraq and Lebanon,





have never had much doubt that they are in a fight to the finish with the Sunni states, led by Saudi Arabia, and their local allies in Syria and Iraq. Shia leaders dismiss the idea, much favoured in Washington, that a sizeable moderate, non-sectarian Sunni opposition exists that would be willing to share power in Damascus and Baghdad: this, they believe, is propaganda pumped out by Saudi and Qatari-backed media. When it comes to keeping Assad in charge in Damascus, the increased involvement of the Shia powers is as important as the Russian air campaign. For the first time units of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard have been deployed in Syria, mostly around Aleppo, and there are reports that a thousand fighters from Iran and Hizbullah are waiting to attack from the north. Several senior Iranian commanders have recently been killed in the fighting. The mobilisation of the Shia axis is significant because, although Sunni outnumber Shia in the Muslim world at large, in the swathe of countries most directly involved in the conflict – Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon – there are more than a hundred million Shia, who believe their own existence is threatened if Assad goes down, compared to thirty million Sunnis, who are in a majority only in Syria. In addition to the Russian-American rivalry and the struggle between Shia and Sunni, a third development of growing importance is shaping the war. This is the struggle of the 2.2 million Kurds, 10 per cent of the Syrian population, to create a Kurdish statelet in north-east Syria, which the Kurds call Rojava.

Oct 31, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister said Saturday that Russia and Iran must agree to a date and means for Syria's President Bashar al-Assad to quit the country, and to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Syria. Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir made his comments in an interview with Sky News Arabia broadcast on Saturday, a day after Saudi Arabia and Iran took part in talks to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Syria. The U.N. secretary-general weighed in on the topic Saturday, saying that disagreements over Assad's future should not hold up a humanitarian ceasefire or a wider deal to end the war in Syria. 'I believe that the future of Syria, or the future of all these peace talks, the Syrian-led negotiation, should not be held up by an issue of the future of one man,' Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told a news conference in Geneva. "Basically I believe that it is up to the Syrian people who have to decide the future of President Assad."

31 Oct, Saudi Arabia Saturday demanded that Russia and Iran withdraw all military forces from Syria, where the two countries have intervened on behalf of President Bashar Assad in the country's continuing civil war, Reuters reported. Saudi Arabia, which supports rebel fighters opposing Assad's regime, Friday participated in talks in Vienna with Russia and Iran to negotiate a way toward a resolution of the war. "Our two points where we differ from them are on a date and means for Assad's departure, and the second point is on a date and means for the withdrawal of foreign forces, especially Iranian ones," Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said in an interview with Sky News Arabia. "These are the two basic points without which there can be no solution." The rebel fighters working against Assad -- which the U.S. and Saudis contend are moderate and do not contain jihadist elements such as Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamic State group or al-Qaeda -- have asked for support against Assad's forces, which are backed by Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian fighters and Russian airstrikes, Reuters reported. During the Vienna meeting, the Saudis and the U.S. agreed to increase support to "moderate Syrian opposition."

Why bridging the Iran-Saudi divide is vital for peace in Syria and the regionSeyed Hossein Mousavian





Archrivals Saudi Arabia and Iran are experiencing their first regional talks in Vienna on the Syrian conflict. Since assuming office in August 2013, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has initiated several overtures to Saudi Arabia, attempting to mend what has steadily devolved into a dangerously adversarial relationship in the years since the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Rouhani, who called for better ties with Saudi Arabia shortly after his inauguration, made his first diplomatic outreach to Saudi Arabia at a critical juncture. He dispatched his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, to visit several of the Arab Persian Gulf states shortly after the November 2013 interim nuclear deal was reached between Iran and the P5+1 group of nations. “I believe that our relations with Saudi Arabia should expand as we consider Saudi Arabia as an extremely important country in the region and the Islamic world,” Zarif said at the time. “We believe that Iran and Saudi Arabia should work together in order to promote peace and stability in the region.” Zarif was in effect signaling that Iran was willing to take proactive steps to ease any concerns its southern neighbors had about a post-nuclear deal regional environment. Rouhani followed this move with numerous other attempts at détente: Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian visited Riyadh in August 2014, Zarif met with his Saudi counterpart during the 2014 United National General Assembly, and Zarif went to Saudi Arabia to attend the funeral of the late Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz in January 2015. After the new Saudi king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, appointed U.S. Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir as foreign minister earlier this year, Zarif also congratulated him and announced that he hoped “relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Saudi monarchy will develop.” Zarif reached out al-Jubeir to meet during this year’s UNGA, but was shunned. Nonetheless, at a recent press conference with Arab reporters in Tehran, Zarif reiterated that Iran and Saudi Arabia “have the same interests” and should “work together.” For its part, Saudi Arabia has rebuffed all of Iran’s attempts at engagement. To be sure, the Saudi government has not shied from making faux offers of cooperation, predicated on senseless preconditions like Iran ending its “interference” in Arab countries. The unfortunate reality is that Saudi Arabia, doubly so since the ascension of King Salman, has overtly opted for a more confrontational approach towards Iran. As the Brookings Institution’s Suzanne Maloney has said: “Saudi leaders have adopted a more aggressive diplomatic, economic and military campaign aimed both at marginalizing Iran and reasserting its own ambitions for regional dominance.” There are multiple reasons why Saudi Arabia is not ready for serious negotiations with Iran at present. For one thing, the hothead son of the King Salman, Mohammed bin Salman, is battling for power and to move up in the succession line. The Saudi war in Yemen is largely his design, and the sensational extent to which supposed Iranian intervention in Yemen has been hyped up has helped bin Salman consolidate power, much to the derision of other members of the royal family. Furthermore, as one member of the House of Saud told me in New York City during this year’s UNGA, the Saudis do not want come to the table with Iran because they believe Iran has the upper hand in the region. They feel that if they did engage Iran, it would be tantamount to accepting Iran’s position the region. However, if this is indeed the case, the Saudis have fundamentally misread Iranian strategic thinking in this regard. Iran’s history since the revolution demonstrates that whenever it feels it is in a position of strength, it becomes more flexible, and whenever it comes under increased pressure, it becomes obstinate and acts in ways to increase the cost of pressuring it. By opting to increase rather than ameliorate tensions with Iran, Saudi Arabia has brought itself and the rest of the region to a dangerous precipice. Dialogue and broad cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is the only way forward and imperative if the various crises in the region, whether





in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen or elsewhere, are to be resolved. Saudi Arabia and Iran can either jumpstart negotiations or continue down the path of escalation, practically ensuring a devastating war becomes an inevitability. There are three paths Saudi Arabia and Iran can take to bridge their differences. The first is formal, official high-level talks between foreign ministers and other senior representatives of the respective governments. Unfortunately, the Saudi government does not appear receptive of this option at this stage. Another alternative is for the two countries to engage in track one-and a-half or track-two diplomacy -- contacts between former officials and prominent non-government figures and experts -- to discuss a package to build trust and move towards official dialogue. There have been some efforts made on that front, but it is crucial that they be significantly expanded. One other way of escaping the pressures of public negotiations is for Saudi Arabia and Iran to confidentially exchange special envoys. These

meetings would be strictly off the record and allow for the two sides to engage in high-level talks and more effectively hash out their differences. During the mid-1990s, I engaged in precisely this type of diplomacy with Saudi Arabia in my capacity as a senior diplomat and advisor to then-president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Back then, Saudi Arabia and Iran both sought to take steps to reconcile with one another after more than a decade of hostilities. I negotiated and agreed on a “peace package” with then-Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, during that time. After four nights of intense negotiations, we reached agreements which paved the road for amicable relations between our countries that would last until the mid-2000s. Rather than trying to constrain Iran and isolate it in its own region, the leaders of Saudi Arabia should acknowledge that Iran is their neighbor and that they can and should live in peace with each other. Negotiations should be done without preconditions and both sides should act to understand and address one another’s





concerns. Cooperation between Saudi Arabia, Iran and the other Persian Gulf states is vital and will fill the vacuum causing much of the conflicts raging in the region today. Détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia can indeed be the first step in creating a formal regional cooperation system that makes this goal a reality and helps stabilize the region.

Syria explainer: the allies and the enemies

©ReutersRussia has stepped forcefully into a Syrian civil war that has confounded regional and international actors since a popular uprising in March 2011 challenged the authoritarian rule of the Assad family. The evolution of the revolt into a mostly-Sunni insurgency battling a regime dominated by the minority Alawite community, an offshoot of Shia Islam, has turned the country into a battlefield for regional score settling, sectarian bloodletting and international rivalry. The Syrian conflict has evolved in three spheres: local, regional and international. Within Syria, the fighting pits a range of mostly Islamist factions against a series of players on the regime side, including the Syrian army, fighters from Lebanon’s Hizbollah Shia armed group, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and a range of pro-regime militia groups.The rebels themselves are divided between various factions. The main Islamist and Kurdish groups co-operate but both are opposed to the regime as well as to Isis, the strongest insurgent force. On the regional front, a proxy war is raging in Syria, with Iran on one side and Sunni Gulf states on the other. In this graphic, the FT maps out the main regional and international actors, their attitude towards the forces on the ground and their relationship with each other. While all players share the same goal of defeating Isis, the main jihadi threat in Syria, their interests diverge depending on their attitude towards the regime of Bashar al-Assad and towards the complex set of non-Isis forces lined up against it.Russia is not a new player — it is a long-time ally of Syria and it has been a main supporter of the Assad regime since the start of the crisis. But its backing reached a dramatic new level last week, with direct military intervention against Isis and other rebel forces. The US leads a coalition of dozens of countries — including many European states — aiming to degrade Isis, and supports the Gulf states’ objective of a change of regime in Damascus. But Washington has been wary of co-operating with some of the forces fighting the regime and Isis and is eager to avoid being dragged into the Syrian quagmire. To counter Iranian influence, Sunni Arab states, mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have funded and armed Syria’s rebels but have grown increasingly alarmed by the rise of Isis and have joined the US-led coalition against the jihadi group. Their attitude towards other hardcore Islamists, including al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, is more ambiguous, and in some cases supportive. Syria historically has been the Islamic Republic’s closest Arab





friend, backing Iran against Iraq (a fellow Arab state) during the 1980-1988 war. Iran was quick to lend its support when the uprising against Bashar al-Assad erupted, with direct involvement through its own operatives as well as through its Lebanese proxy, Hizbollah. Turkey has worked closely with Arab states and shares their aim — the demise of the Assad regime — and their support for Islamist rebel forces. Ankara’s priority, however, has been to prevent Syria’s Kurds from carving out their own state, and it has seen them, rather than Isis, as the main problem among the rebels.

Regards Cees: “It’s not where you look, it’s what you see”. Part of what makes Syria so confusing is that all the various actors have disclosed and undisclosed complex, contradictory agendas. Reductive binary formulas such as state v. society, Sunni v. Shia, Saudi Arabia v. Iran, United States/Turkey v. Assad regime all evade the centrality of this complexity that follows from the multi-dimensionality of the various overlapping tensions and interests. It’s not just state against state as in traditional forms of international conflict. Additional dimensions include the sectarian division between Sunni and Shia, and also a resurgent tribalism, revealing its relevance in Yemen and in Libya, as well as in Iraq (and also Afghanistan). Political leaders have underestimated the degree to which these old forms of political organizations and collective loyalty have reasserted their relevance in conflict situations, both assuming a religious form and political forms as in these countries. A major aspect of this mishandling of the post World War I diplomacy was to treat tribalism and religion as irrelevant to the establishment of stable and legitimate political communities. The region is living with these fundamental oversights of a hundred years ago.




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