1

AITZAZ AHSAN

ROBBING AN ELECTION

A

WHITE PAPER

ON THE ELECTION

HELD IN

NA-124, LAHORE-VII

ON

MAY 11, 2013

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Dedicated to

the voters of

NA 124 LAHORE VII

whose mandate was stolen

and to

CHAUDHRY MANZUR AHMED

former Member National Assembly

who exposed those

who had stolen it

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INDEX

Preface.

Chapter One Introduction p.05

Chapter Two The Loaded Dice p.07

Chapter Three The Law Relevant to Inspection p.09

Chapter Four Resistance to Inspection p.11

Chapter Five The Process under the RP Act p.14

Chapter Six Those Who Participated in the Inspection p.19

Chapter Seven WHODUNNIT? p.20

Chapter Eight The Enormity of the Fraud p.22

Chapter Nine The Apprehension: NA 139 Kasur p.26

Chapter Ten Inspection At Last p.28

Chapter Eleven Conclusions p.38

Chapter Twelve After the Inspection p.40

Chapter Thirteen The Only Recommendation p.43

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PREFACE

Pakistan was created in 1947 as a direct result of the elections held in the preceding year. Parliamentary elections have been held in Pakistan since 1951. Barring the elections held in 1970, the process has always been doubted to some extent and sometimes rejected outright by the losing side. Allegations of rigging have always been circumstantial though emotional. They have seldom been supported by hard, cogent evidence.

The general elections to the National Assembly held in May 2013 were contested in 270 constituencies across Pakistan. Several defeated candidates are pursuing legal remedies for redressing electoral grievances and to seek substitution of the victor. All manner of illegal activities have been alleged. Only two constituencies have, however, come in for a comprehensive and duly documented, examination of electoral fraud. Both belong to Punjab’s capital, Lahore.

In NA 118 Mr. Hamid Zaman, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) candidate, is contesting the result before an Election Tribunal. The Tribunal has directed the bio-metric checking of each one of the thumb impressions marked by voters who cast their votes. A comprehensive report has been submitted before the Tribunal. It is testimony to the most grievous electoral fraud.

This White Paper is about the other such Lahore constituency, NA 124. After this election the Pakistan Peoples’ Party candidate Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan sought the inspection of the electoral record from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). For this purpose Section 45 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976 (RPA) was invoked and not the more trampled path of an Election Petition. The ECP allowed her to inspect the record. For almost a year the implementation of the order was resisted. This is a report of that inspection and of the astounding revelations that it led to.

On Thursday 30th October 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed a petition seeking a declaration that the entire elections held on May 11, 2013 was flawed and required to be annulled. It was an ill-advised petition seeking to invoke a jurisdiction that the Court did not have. Surprisingly it had been filed by a former judge of the Supreme Court. That settles the issue at least for the time being. The Court could not have set aside the entire general elections at the instance of a single individual. But that judgment cannot also be read as meaning that there was no electoral fraud in those elections. That finding can still be given on a case by case basis.

The assertions in this White Paper are supported by more than two hundred certificates attesting to the various acts of criminality and fraud. In this the Paper is unique. And because these certificates were issued on observations actually made by the incumbent Returning Officer and the Election Commissioner, Punjab in the presence of the duly authorized representatives of the Returned Candidate himself, they provide the most authentic account of how an electorate was robbed of its verdict.

The paper has also primarily been prepared to enable the Election Commission of Pakistan to institute appropriate proceedings against the officials and persons who destroyed electoral material or acted otherwise to procure a fictitious result. The fact that an Election Tribunal has dismissed a challenge to the election in the constituency under review, NA 124 Lahore, cannot impede such action. The Tribunal refused to advert to these most pertinent certificates. It excluded them wholesale from his analysis of the election process. What then can be the value of its verdict?

This paper is about NA 124 Lahore but it documents evidence of ruthless rigging as never before.

The Paper elaborates the relevant law, the process of casting votes, the nature of the various documents required to be maintained and the persons responsible for the rigging. But if the reader is in haste to get to the more astounding proofs of electoral fraud in NA 124, Lahore, she/he may proceed at once to Chapters 8, 10 and 11.

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WHITE PAPER ON THE ELECTION HELD IN

`NA-124, LAHORE-VII

ON MAY 11, 2013

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. General Elections were held in Pakistan on May 11, 2013. Lahore’s NA-124-VII was one of 270 constituencies that were called upon to elect members to the National Assembly of Pakistan.

2. 19 Candidates contested from NA-124, Lahore-VII including:-

i. Mr. Sheikh Rohail Asghar of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N)

ii. Mr. Waleed Iqbal of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), and

iii. Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

3. Mr. Sheikh Rohail Asghar (hereinafter RC, SRA or Asghar) was declared elected as the “Returned Candidate” with a tally of an exceptionally high vote count of 119,312 votes. He took oath as an MNA consequent to the election.

4. SRA’s vote tally in the past could not justify the result he had shown in this election. Contesting from a much larger constituency (NA-83) in 1985 he had polled 46,646 votes. In 1988 the constituency after a fresh delimitation, took the number NA-93. SRA polled 41,181 votes. He could not contest elections in 2002 (from the same constituency now known as NA-124) as he was not a graduate which was the requisite qualification for that election. He fielded his son Khuram Rohail Asghar on his own name and reputation. Khuram polled 23,110 votes. The election of 2008, a walk-over for PML-N in Lahore, and with no significant candidate opposing him, was an all time high for Sheikh Rohail Asghar. He polled 71,342 votes. He had, thus, never come even close to the 100,000 mark even in the best and most favourable environment for him.

5. In between he had also contested elections to the Provincial Assembly and had polled as many as only 9,432 votes in 1993 and 17,419 votes in the year 1997. Now, surprisingly, he tallied 119,312 votes.

6. Incidentally SRA had also not been consistent in party loyalty weaking his personal electoral potential. In the elections of 1997 he ran as a candidate of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP). He had earlier (1990) run as an IJI (Islami Jumhoori Ittehad) candidate, and then (2002) fielded his son as a candidate of the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League (Quid-e-Azam) against the PPP. This time he was contesting as a PML-N candidate.

7. Now in 2013, despite the onerous burden of incumbency and a past of shifting loyalties he had been attributed an astounding tally of 119,312 votes. On the face of it this was a suspect count. The count appeared odd for several other reasons too. The Returned Candidate had run a lackluster and demoralized campaign. He could hold almost no public meeting, and none of any consequence. By comparison, Bushra and I had between us been addressing 15-16 corner meetings and 3-4 sizeable public meetings every day in the run up to the polling day. Every analyst placed her at No.1 in the constituency. Now she had a mere 6,990 votes to his 119,312. This impelled her to seek to inspect the electoral record.

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8. By some expert estimates of the number of voters casting ballots and the number of minutes available in the polling hours, such a high poll would be physically impossible. But that has not been analysed here.

9. There have also been wide scale allegations of pre-poll rigging and post-poll rigging in the general elections. This Paper documents evidence of rigging only during the ballot count as well as rigging by tampering with the polling bags after the poll. It also concerns only one constituency: NA-124, Lahore-VII. However being the only constituency which was truly scanned and duly documented under Section 45 (see below), it provides a fair indicator of what must have happened with equal impunity in other electoral districts of the Punjab. It would indeed be relevant to any wide scale inquiry into allegations of rigging country-wide.

10. The results of the inspection of NA-124 Lahore-VII have been astounding and stand testimony to the sheer abandon and facility with which crucial electoral material and evidence of the poll had been destroyed, solemn official seals ruthlessly broken, electoral bags mutilated and fixed, and to how the result was entirely manufactured.

11. What makes this White Paper unique is the corpus of official certificates and attestations that are appended herewith testifying to countless acts of fabrication and determined destruction of electoral record. Hard and palpable evidence of each act of tampering, destruction, mutilation and fabrication was examined, taken note of and duly certified under the authority of senior officials of the electoral administration supervising the inspection and in the presence of the authorized representatives of the Returned Candidate. In this respect the White Paper is the very first of its kind.

12. Based on these certified and duly documented observations the White Paper therefore provides first-hand and authentic source material to all researchers and those seeking to reform election laws. It will also help the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to probe further and to identify the criminals and their criminality and to expose those who took recourse to it in violation of the law.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE LOADED DICE

13. Although, as submitted, this White Paper deals only with poll and post poll rigging in one constituency, NA 124 Lahore VII, a mention, in the passing, of the manner in which the deck was stacked in favour of PML-N as against the PPP in the Punjab in particular will be in order:

i. Many analysts discussing the conduct of the elections ignore the most manifest unfairness which inhered in the process from start to finish. No PTI leader catalogues this circumstance in its litany of electoral disabilities and unfair practices because the PTI itself (along with the PML-N) were its beneficiaries.

ii. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had declared an intention to sabotage and bomb the PPP campaign. In this it had been encouraged by the PML-N leadership who had, famously, pleaded with the TTP to spare its Government of the Punjab and the PML-N, both it (the TTP) and the Punjab Government/PML-N having the same agenda1.

iii. The PTI also benefitted from this circumstance. It was openly campaigning for the Taliban cause and was largely believed to be exempt from their reprisals. In fact, when talks were subsequently initiated between the TTP and the State, the PTI Chairman was formally and officially nominated by the TTP as a negotiator on its behalf. In contrast PPP rallies had been bombed on July 17, October 18, and December 27 of 2007 taking the huge toll of its then Chairperson, Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto Shaheed and 215 other martyrs. In effect, therefore, the TTP threats really constricted the election campaign of the PPP along with the Awami National Party (ANP).

iv. In the lead-up to the elections the Chief Minister of the Punjab Mian Shahbaz Sharif, himself, and personally, employing the full authority of his provincial office, led violent demonstrations (as Chief Minister) against Pakistan’s own democratically elected Federal Government of the PPP and its allies. He was protesting power outages. In this macabre adventure he employed the muscle of the Punjab police and the administration, both of whom should have been preventing such demonstrations. The Chief Minister of the Punjab thus himself encouraged, organized, fueled and led these violent demonstrations against Pakistan’s own federal government2. The Punjab Government and the PML-N waged war against the Federal Government. An equally immature and impulsive counter response from the federal government would have led to a federation-breaking conflict between the centre and the Punjab. Mercifully the PPP’s federal government responded with restraint and was not provoked, even at the risk of being perceived as weak and indecisive.

v. The Chief Minister himself, as well the future Power Minister, Khawaja Mohammad Asif, made all manner of false but daring promises of ending power shortages within weeks of their government taking over. Sharif, in fact, offered that his ‘name be changed’ if he was

1. http://www.dawn.com/news/857697/cm-shahbaz-wants-taliban-to-spare-punjab

2. http://tribune.com.pk/story/415656/shahbaz-sharif-addresses-loadshedding-protesters/ or

http://www.nation.com.pk/national/02-Jun-2012/punjab-cm-sets-up-camp-office-at-minar-e-pakistan (AA Sb.

to chose)

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not able to end load shedding within 12 weeks of forming government. Demands that he himself suggest a new name for him continue to resound now that more than one year has elapsed since the elections and loadshedding has not abated. If anything it has got worse.

vi. Similar high-fluting but knowingly impossible promises were made about employment, inflation, health, education and civic facilities. On none has the government performed.

vii. The entire key polling staff was selected from amongst government officials who were famously warned by the younger Sharif that he was handing over to the caretaker set-up only temporarily and would be back soon to settle all scores. This electoral staff was crucial to the ‘rigging strategy’ that is described more precisely below.

viii. This warning also addressed all government servants in general. All of them were retained by the caretaker administration by only shuffling them around to other equivalent posts in the service of the province. Hence the entire bureaucracy and police remained overly biased in favour of the Sharifs.

ix. Widespread allegations, albeit ex post facto, are being leveled on account of the seeming reward held out by the PML-N Government towards those who participated in the Caretaker administration which oversaw the elections. Those leveling these allege that the Sharifs had contracted to reward the caretakers if they played their game.

x. Widespread allegations also pursue the then Chief Justice of Pakistan for having addressed and allegedly persuaded the Returning Officers, all judicial officers but at that time seconded to the subordination of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), to ensure PML-N victory. On account of the perceived bias of the Hon’ble Chief Justice, who did indeed loathe the PPP for having resisted his reinstatement, the ROs were persuaded to do the PML-N’s bidding. They knew that their secondment and subservience to the ECP was only a temporary arrangement and they would immediately thereafter revert to the subordination of the superior judiciary presided over by the Chief Justice of Pakistan himself. As will be meticulously shown herein, the ROs played a critical and decisive role in rigging the election.

xi. The ROs’ role was so manifest that with respect to some Polling Stations, as will be shown, pre-ordained results of each candidate were entered in the final tally sheet (Form XVI) even where their polling bags were found stuffed with ‘waste’ and garbage. This fact was so patent and undeniable that it has, in some cases, been conceded in writing even by the advocate and attorney of the Returned (winning) Candidate.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE LAW RELEVANT TO INSPECTION:

14. As submitted above, recourse was made to Sections 44 and 45 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976 (RPA). These sections have seldom been employed by candidates or the general public even thought the cast a bounden duty (“shall”) upon the ECP to allow inspection of certain specified documents in the Polling Bags of each Polling Station.

15. The ECP is bound to allow the opening of the bags and inspection of all material (except ballot papers) under sections 44 & 45 of the RPA. These sections provide:

Section 44: Document to be sent to, and retained by, the Commission.

The Returning Officer shall forward to the Commission:-

a. the packets containing the ballot papers each of which shall be sealed with the seal of the Presiding Officer, or, if opened by the Returning Officer, with the seal of the Returning Officer;

b. the packets containing the counterfoils of issued ballot papers;

c. the packets containing the marked copies of the electoral rolls;

d. the packets containing the ballot paper account;

e. the packets containing the tendered ballot papers, the challenged ballot papers, the tendered votes list and the challenged votes list; and

f. such other papers as the Commission may direct.

(2) The Returning Officer shall endorse in each packet forwarded under sub-section (1) the description of –its contents, the date of the election to which the contents relate and the name and number of the constituency for which the election was held.

(3) The Commission shall retain the documents contained in the packets received under sub-section (1) for a period of one year from the date of their receipt and thereafter shall, unless otherwise directed by a Tribunal, cause them to be destroyed.

Section 45: Public inspection of documents.-

The documents retained by the Commission under section 44, except the ballot papers, shall be open to public inspection at such time and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, and the Commission shall, upon an application made in this behalf and on payment of such fee and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, furnish copies of, or extracts from, those documents.

16. It is thus also apparent that generally the Election Tribunal, and not the ECP, can direct the opening of packets/envelopes containing the used/cast ballots or order their recount.

17. It will also be seen from the above that by order of the ECP:-

i. All material/documents, except ballot papers are (“shall be”) open to public inspection;

ii. Copies of all such documents or their extracts shall be furnished on application;

iii. Where the Election Commission has ordered the supply of copies the concerned officer will, of necessity, have to certify if any such document is not found in the bag.

iv. Advantage can thus be taken of these provisions to obtain certificates attesting to any document that is found missing from a bag.

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IMPORTANT:

v. Since ballot papers cannot be inspected u/sec 45, there could be no certification of their condition or of the apparent numbers even when the visible thickness of the respective envelopes/packets of different candidates patently suggested to the naked eye that the Returned Candidate’s tally was far less than that of other candidates and, ipso facto, less than the number of votes attributed to him by the RO in the final count. Hence there is no certificate about this otherwise visible discrepancy.

vi. Despite the absence of certified observations of only 36 bags (out of 264), this has been the first time in Pakistan’s history that an election in ANY constituency has been certifiably probed under section 45 of RPA (or its preceding equivalents). Candidates and the public at large have only been interested in ‘recounts of ballots’ which are the exclusive preserve of Election Tribunals (once the period under Sec 103-AA expires). No one (barring former MNA Chaudhry Manzur Ahmed, candidate in NA 139 Kasur) has thought it fit to enter upon the probe under section 45 to inspect documents other than ballot papers so as to discern whether there has been a fraud or not.

vii. Former PPP MNA Chaudhry Manzur Ahmed first filed an application under section 45 for the inspection of electoral bags of his Kasur constituency, NA 139. Horrendous illegalities and irregularities were discovered. These are detailed herein. These were, however, not certified or attested to by the RO only because the ECP had not passed an order for the supply of copies of the electoral documents and materials. When there was no duty to supply copies, there was no obligation to certify that any required copies could not be supplied because these were not found in the bags.

viii. In this respect, as a well documented report on the inspection into the allegation of rigging, this White Paper is the first of its kind.

18. Even so, to obtain and exercise the right to inspection was a long and tedious journey. It was vigorously resisted to allow time to reinvent the electoral material.

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CHAPTER FOUR

RESISTANCE TO INSPECTION: FROM PILLAR TO POST

19. There was, as shown below, intense resistance to inspection of the election material even after the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) had allowed it and even though it was a fundamental constitutional and statutory right.

20. On 12.07.2013 PPP candidate Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan (hereinafter the Applicant) applied to the ECP for being allowed to inspect the bags of every polling station of NA-124. This meant all 264 sealed bags containing the entire material relating to the election (The application is at Appendix-

A).

21. As early as on 25.07.2013 the ECP allowed the application and directed the RO to arrange for the inspection (Appendix-B).

22. The ECP order was communicated to the District and Sessions Judge (DRO) vide ECP letter dated 06.08.2013 with copies forwarded to the Secretary ECP and the Applicant. (Appendix-C).

23. Equipped with a copy of the above order the Applicant petitioned the learned RO for inspection. In an effort to divert and deny the inspection the RO, vide order dated 24.08.2013 directed his Ahlmad (court assistant) to “make necessary arrangements for the availability of the requisite record of the above named Candidate who is permitted to inspect the same in the light of order of Election Commission of Pakistan dated 25.07.2013 strictly in accordance with law on 27.08.2013…”(Appendix-D).

24. It was evident from the above order (words in italics) that the learned RO chose to labor under a misconception that the only record that was to be inspected was the few pages in the file maintained by him in his court and pertaining to the Applicant alone. He did not feel bound to summon the 264 Polling bags and allow inspection of these bags and their contents.

25. The Applicant was thus constrained to move another application on 24.08.2013 before the RO seeking full inspection. (Appendix-E).

26. Unfortunately the RO was bent upon denying or at least delaying the inspection and despite the above application he did not arrange for the inspection of the bags and insisted, on 27.08.2013, that the Applicant inspect only the file maintained by him comprising of just a few pages. (Appendix F).

27. In this view of this matter the applicant was again constrained, on 03.09.2013, to move the ECP for implementation of its order dated 25.07.2013. (Appendix-G).

28. On 19.09.2013 the ECP was again pleased to direct that its order dated 25.07.2013 be implemented. This direction was addressed to the RO with copies to the Provincial Election Commissioner and the Applicant (Appendix-H).

29. Yet again there was resistance to inspection of the Polling Bags and the Applicant was informed that technical objections were being taken by the RO so as to deny and at-least to delay the inspection ordered by the ECP. After waiting a few weeks, and upon being informed through anonymous phone calls (from some official numbers of which the caller ID was blocked) that the bags were being tampered with, she applied to the RO himself, on 22.10.2013, expressing that apprehension, for implementation of the ECP order. (Appendix-I-eye).

30. When the RO took no action on the application (Appendix-I) for over a month, the Applicant, on 23.11.2013, moved yet another application to the ECP for inspection expressing clearly the apprehension, in her specific words, that the election material was been re-fabricated:

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“I fear this delay has deliberately been caused to re-fabricate the record/material to avoid the consequences of the much publicized cases of the fabricated record of constituencies NA-139, NA-258 & NA-259.

The record being in the effective custody of the Punjab Government (which is constituted of a party to which the returned candidate belongs), it is vulnerable to tampering. Such tampering, it is learnt, has been undertaken once again, this time by delaying the implementation of ECP’s order by about 4 months. Again and again this is also being brought to ECP’s notice. I have been moving from pillar to post. I am at a loss as to why the Hon’ble ECP has not been able to get its order of 25.07.2013 implemented? The delay is facilitated (sic) the “re-fabrication” of the record.”

(Copy of the Application is at Appendix-J).

31. After waiting for another two weeks the Applicant moved yet another application before the ECP on 05.12.2013 seeking directions for the implementation of its own order and again expressing the apprehension that:

“I fear this delay has deliberately been caused to re-fabricate the record/material to avoid the consequences of the much publicized cases of the fabricated record of constituencies NA-139, NA-258 & NA-259.

The record being in the effective custody of the Punjab Government (which is constituted of a party to which the returned candidate belongs), it is vulnerable to tampering. Such tampering, it is learnt, has been undertaken once again, this time by delaying the implementation of ECP’s order by more than 4 months. Again and again this is also being brought to ECP’s notice. I have been moving from pillar to post. I am at a loss as to why the Hon’ble ECP has not been able to get its order of 25.07.2013 implemented? The delay is facilitated (sic) the “re-fabrication” of the record.”

(A copy of this application is Appendix-K).

32. Failing any response from the ECP, the Applicant was constrained to move a fifth application on

18.12.2013 before it again expressing the concern that:

“My above apprehension is based on the alarming revelations made during the inspection, (also allowed by the ECP u/s 45 of the RP Act, 1976), of the electoral bags of NA-139 Kasur. This inspection inter-alia revealed that out of 272 bags 177 did not contain the results tabulated in Form XIV by the Presiding Officer, 103 bags did not contain the thumb-marked electoral lists, 12 bags were found filled with waste paper. The results of these polling stations, despite, such glaring omissions and commissions, were nevertheless tabulated in consolidated form.

The foregoing reveals a case of massive rigging. Alarmed and put to caution the Provincial Government in Punjab has endeavoured to re-fabricate the material in NA-124 and some other constituencies. The period of almost five months has been utilized for this purpose.

I have repeatedly cautioned the ECP about this “re-fabrication” of previously fabricated record in my earlier applications. Kindly advert to my last application 05.12.2013.”

(A copy of the application is Appendix-L).

33. It appears that the RO had been delaying inspection on a technical ground in some correspondence with the ECP. Therefore to facilitate the inspection the ECP issued a notification dated 26.12.2013 clarifying that the successors-in-office of the original RO’s shall perform all post-election activities under the law. (Appendix-M).

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34. The path for inspection was thus cleared finally by this order and on 01.01.2014 the ECP further directed the Election Commissioner, Punjab to request the RO to retrieve the polling bags of constituency No. NA 124 Lahore VII from the Punjab Treasury and arrange inspection of documents pursuant to its orders dated 25.07.2013 and 19.09.2013. (Appendix-N).

35. After a further delay of more than a month the RO finally convened a meeting on 03.02.2014 and adjourned it to 17.02.2014 and thence to 15.03.2014. (Appendix-O).

36. In the meantime, on 29.01.2014, the Applicant moved another application u/s 45 RPA before the ECP seeking copies of the documents that would be in the bags. (Appendix-P).

37. The above application was allowed by the ECP on 07.02.2014. As will be submitted later this order was crucial to the collection of formal and cogent evidence of massive electoral fraud and the fabrication and re-fabrication of the record. (Appendix-Q).

38. Since the provincial government was interfering to delay the inspection and was also reported to be tampering with the record which was in its custody/Treasury, and the RO was giving abnormally long adjournments, the Applicant once again moved the ECP on 04.03.2014 for an early implementation of its order of 25.07.2013 expressing, once again the fear, that:

“14. As submitted in applications dated 23.11.2013, 05.02.2013 and 18.12.2013 the delay is being caused at the instance of the returned candidate and the party in Government, in the Punjab and in the Federation. The design is to refabricate the record and to ensure that the one year period prescribed in Sec. 44(3) is consumed so that the commission is compelled to destroy the record. If such distant dates are fixed that time will soon be over and I will be denied my right under Sec. 45 RPA as well as the Fundamental Right under Art. 19-A of the Constitution.

15. Already more than seven months have passed and the order dated 25.07.2013 has not been acted upon. This is a flagrant and mala fide violation of the ECP’s authority. As submitted earlier the bags will reveal evidence of grave and serious crime.” (Appendix-R).

39. Finally the ECP, vide its order dated 14.03.2014, was pleased to itself appoint 25.03.2014 as the date of inspection to be continued on a day to day basis. This was later changed to 02.04.2014.

(Appendicii S and T).

40. The blatant resistance to inspection by the Punjab government and the concerned judiciary (the RO) is also further, albeit circumstantial but pointed, evidence of the fraud conducted at the time of the preparation of the result and in the months after the initial order of the ECP on 25.7.2013 directing that Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan be allowed to inspect the bags and their contents (other than ballot papers).

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE PROCESS UNDER THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1976

41. To truly understand the grave implications of the fraudulent activity, and to comprehend the crucial need to preserve (or, as in this case, destroy) cogent evidence and record, it is necessary to first elaborate the polling process and the criticality of that evidence and the documents that were destroyed to record an entirely fictitious result. The following paragraphs are essential to that understanding.

42. The elections were (purportedly and ostensibly) held under the Representation of the People

Act 1976 (RPA). This provides an elaborate process and a strict procedure to ensure the transparency and integrity of the election.

43. Under the RPA voters in 270 single-member constituencies elect their representatives on a “first-past-the-post” principle. In other words the candidate who polls the highest number of votes, whether that figure is more than the majority of voters in a constituency or not, wins.

44. The RPA enables the setting up of several hundred Polling Stations (PSs) in each constituency to facilitate the voter in casting his/her ballot in secrecy in his/her own neighborhood. The urban voter does not have to travel too far to cast his/her vote. The voter in rural areas, on the other hand, may indeed have to travel a long distance.

45. Each Polling Station (PS) has a designated Presiding Officer (PO) who is assisted by sundry staff to man each of the multiple Polling Booths (PB) set up at each PS and at least one Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) to supervise the poll in each PB.

IMPORTANT:

46. To understand the manner in which the election was stolen, and who, including the Returning Officers (ROs), played a critical and key role in this undertaking, it is necessary to elaborate, at some length, the entire chain of events that takes place, or ought to take place, as per the law on the polling day. On paper it is, quite deceptively, a smooth exercise of secret balloting, transparent procedures and an entirely impartial, neutral electoral administration. The law itself is plain and simple. But it is those mandated to administer the law who subvert it.

47. How does the law provide for a secret, transparent and fair poll?

48. Secrecy of the ballot is of paramount importance to the integrity of the result. Secrecy guarantees the freedom to vote for a candidate of one’s own choice. It protects the voter. Secrecy is enjoined by sec. 30 (6) of the RPA and Rule 19 of the Representation of the People [Conduct of Election] Rules, 1977 (The Rules).

49. To ensure the secrecy of the ballot, the law requires that the ballot paper itself must not carry the signature or thumb-impression of the voter nor any other mark that may distinguish it to indicate the identity of the voter. So the ballot paper handed over to a voter carries:

[To maintain secrecy], on its face, nothing except the names and symbols of candidates as well as space for the voter to affix the prescribed stamp against the name and symbol of his preferred candidate. If any other mark is found on the ballot to distinguish it, it is presumed that the mark was affixed after an arrangement between a candidate and the voter to identify the voter and reassure the candidate that the voter concerned had indeed performed his part of a deal. Such a ballot is deemed in breach of the principle of secrecy. It is declared invalid and is not counted. This is a rejected vote.

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[To ensure the integrity of the ballot] and to ensure that only ballots that were actually issued by the Presiding Officer (or the APO) are being counted, every valid ballot must, however, bear on its back side, the signature and stamp of that officer.

50. Secrecy and integrity of the ballot paper are thus paramount. But if the ballot is ‘neutral’ and does not betray the identity of him/her who cast it, then what is the guarantee that more ballots than have officially been issued to the voters at any given Polling Station (PS) are not stuffed and recovered from the Polling Box? Since none can be held responsible for plain, undistinguishable ballots, these in excess of the ‘issued ballots’ can surely be stuffed with impunity unless there is some other safe-guard, determinant or touchstone.

51. One safeguard, as pointed out above, is the requirement that each validly cast ballot that comes out of the ballot-box must bear, on its back, the stamp and signature of the PO/APO. But what if the PO/APO is himself/herself hand in glove a candidate or his party? What if he/she connives in ballot stuffing and gives signed and stamped extra ballots to a candidate to stuff in the bags during, of after the poll?

52. Therefore, to ensure further the integrity of the poll a neat and exact count of the ballots actually issued to the voters has to be maintained. This neat and exact count would also ensure that no stray ballots are stuffed in the boxes. To enable such a neat and exact count all ballot papers come in two parts:

i. The ballot itself: which is neatly torn out of a larger page along a perforated line. This is that piece of paper that is polled and counted. This bears no mark on its face except an indication of the voter’s preference.

ii. The portion above the perforated line: which stays attached to the original ‘book’ like the stub of a bank cheque book. This is called the “counterfoil” (CF).

iii. The CFs/stubs remain with the Presiding Officer and each is distinguished by its own distinct printed number in a distinct and continuous series of numbers like those on the stubs of a cheque book.

iv. As the voter is handed over a ballot after separating from the counterfoil (CF), his signature and thumb impression are obtained on the counterfoil/stub (not, as pointed out earlier, on the ballot).

v. The Counterfoils thus maintain a record of every single ballot that has been issued to the voters. The Presiding Officer also places his own signature and stamp on the CF/stub to ensure that there can be no substitution of the CFs/stubs. (Sec. 33 (1) (e) RPA).

vi. The Stubs/Counter Foils that remain after ballots have been separated from them, indicate who all obtained the ballot as also the exact total number of ballots issued.

vii. The polled and counted ballots must be the exact number of the total number of stubs/Counter Foils from which ballots have been separated. In no case can the cast ballots exceed the issued ballots indicated by the CFs/stubs.

viii. This is a most pertinent process and has been explained in detail because inspection of the bags under Section 45 (see below) does not permit the examination of the ballot papers. Yet if, in any bag no CFs at all are found or the ballots exceed the CFs, or vice versa, then it can be concluded that the count is not proper.

IMPORTANT:

53. The two parts of the ballot thus ensure the secrecy of the ballot as well as facilitate the monitoring and strict account and audit of the poll. The destruction of the CFs is one sure

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testimony of a rigged election. As has been duly and formally certified in writing by the election officials, this destruction occurred in almost 50% of the sealed bags opened for inspection. There was thus no record of how many ballots were actually issued in such polling stations of NA124.

54. Secrecy, transparency, integrity and security of the poll is further ensured by the following measures:

a) Before the voter obtains the plain ballot paper from the Presiding Officer he thumb-marks/an “Electoral List” (EL).

b) The Electoral List is another corroborative element that shows the identity of each voter as also the total number who cast their votes at any given PS.

c) These thumb marks are also meant to be used for biometric verification (which, unfortunately, has not been undertaken after the recent elections despite much fan fare before the elections). All this can be done only if the ELs are preserved.

IMPORTANT:

The inspection of the bags of NA 124 Lahore VII revealed that the thumb-marked electoral lists had been wantonly destroyed in MORE 50% of the sealed bags

opened for inspection. This too is sure evidence of rigging. (Refer para 118 below).

Since the RO himself sealed and transmitted to the ECP, the bags without the thumb-marked ELs, his criminality is evident.

d) After the voter has thumb-marked the Electoral List he is required, as submitted above, to sign and thumb mark the Counter Foil/stub and to obtain the ballot paper which is now separated from the Counter Foil/stub.

e) The voter then proceeds to an area of the polling booth which has been screened off to enable him to mark his preference on the ballot in secrecy. (Sec. 33 (5) (a) & (b) RPA).

f) After marking the ballot the voter folds it out of the view of everyone else, comes out of the screened area and slips the ballot into a transparent and sealed ballot box through a compatible slit in that box.

g) When the voting is over for the day the Presiding Officer unseals the ballot box, empties it of all ballots and begins the count.

h) On completion of the count the Presiding Officer (besides some other documents) certifies the count of each candidate (Statement of Count) on a prescribed Form XIV (as per Sec. 38(9) and Rule 24).

i) A copy of Form XIV duly filled in and signed/stamped must be provided by the Presiding Officer to every Polling Agent of every candidate. It was indeed part of the fraudulent design that the POs were instructed to deny this at as many PSs as possible. This is discussed below.

j) On another Form (Form XV: Rule 25) the PO fills in the details of all the ballots received by him from the Election Commission (entering Counter Foil numbers/series) as well as the number of all the ballots that have been actually used. This is the ‘Ballot Paper

Account’. Discrepancies in the figures and numbers noted in it and the count and contents of the remaining documents betray rigging.

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k) Forms XIV & XV are crucial and are the most important evidence of the result and of ballot paper deployment. The numbers must match and if they do not it is clearly the primary evidence of electoral fraud or rigging.

l) Even if not provided to the Polling Agents, Form XIV (along with Form XV) MUST be provided by each PO to the RO and, in due course, be kept in the Polling Station Bag prepared and sealed by the RO personally. After all, this is the primary document on the basis of which the RO tabulates the final result.

m) The entire polling material is sealed by the PO in separate envelopes/packets provided by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). These include the total Marked Ballots (separately and candidate-wise), the Unused Ballots, the Rejected Ballots, the Electoral List, and the Counterfoils besides Forms XIV & XV. (Sec. 38 (12).

n) The sealed packets, along with Forms XIV and XV are then delivered by the Presiding Officer of each Polling Station to the Returning Officer (RO). This is important because some Presiding Officers are persuaded not to seal the packets and, often, to make a detour to an appointed place en route the office of the RO, where the material is fabricated before delivery to the RO.

o) However, even if the PO fails/forgets to seal the several packets the RO must:

Make a note of the dereliction;

Seal the packets himself;

Place all of them in a separate electoral bag for each PS and himself seal each bag before forwarding the sealed bags to the ECP for safe custody.

This last seal is crucial and cannot be broken or tampered with.

The bags then remain in the safe and joint custody of the Provincial Treasury and the ECP.

IMPORTANT:

If any packet has not been properly sealed, or bears no sign of any seal, or if a packet is missing altogether, that again is a sure indication of rigging. It is imperative for the RO to formally prosecute the PO in any such event. During the inspection of the election material of NA 124 Lahore VII a large proportion of the seals were found broken and mutilated, or bags were found open and without any seal, while very many elements of the election material, even in the sealed bags, were found missing altogether obviously having been destroyed. This circumstance, as submitted below, was observed and formally certified during the inspection.

55. All POs, as submitted, are required to deliver the sealed polling material of each polling station in a bag to the Returning Officer (RO) of the constituency.

56. Since in an overwhelming number of constituencies the difference of votes is substantial, or at least significant, no need is felt to recount the tens of thousands of ballots that are now available (in sealed packets for each candidate). The Returning Officer therefore:

a) Takes out the Form XIV and enters the result of each candidate from each given polling station in a spread sheet/table that he maintains in accordance with Form XVI (under Sec. 39 and Rule 26).

This is obviously not possible where Form XIV is itself missing. (Refer para 112 below).

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b) This consolidation of the provisional result takes place in the presence of the candidates or their agents. These latter were actually prevented from participating.

NOTE: It is a pertinent fact that when Mr. Arshad Tarrar, Advocate went to take part in the proceedings on May 11 as the authorized representative of Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan, he found that the entire court premises had been sealed. Upon his insistence to proceed to the RO’s court-room he was arrested and detained in Police Station Old Anarkali without entry in the daily diary for four hours to enable the RO to complete the destruction of records and the fabrication undisturbed.

c) As a matter of law (sec.39 RPA) the RO is bound to give notice to all candidates of the time and date for the formal and final ‘Consolidation of Results’ received from all Polling Stations. This process, even if candidates choose not to participate in, (which is rare) is a media highlight of the election. Channels and pressmen throng on it. No such event took place.

d) Having Consolidated the Result by entering the figures in the spread sheet/table (Form XVI), the RO then seals Form XIV in an envelope and places it, along with all other sealed packets, in a separate bag provided by the ECP for each Polling Station of the constituency. (Rule 27 (2)).This bag itself is now sealed, and must remain in that condition until ordered to be opened by an Election Tribunal or the ECP.

e) This seal is vital to the integrity of the Election and ensures that the following sealed packets remain and are preserved untouched in safe custody, namely the packets (as per Sec. 44), containing:-

i. The ballot papers;

ii. Counterfoils;

iii. Marked copies of the Electoral Lists;

iv. Ballot Paper Account;

v. Tendered Ballot Papers, the challenged Ballot Papers and the two lists pertaining to these;

vi. Such other papers as the ECP may direct.

f) All sealed bags are then deposited in the Provincial Treasury allowing NO ONE any access to them except under orders from the ECP or the Election Tribunal. Seals must, therefore, remain intact.

IMPORTANT:

g) To repeat for the sake of emphasis:

None of the packets, or their contents, should be missing from the bags when inspected. If they are then the RO, in complicity with the Provincial Government and officials of the ECP must be deemed guilty of destruction of electoral material to enable a fabrication of the result.

As and when, and if, an inspection of all or any of the bags is allowed by a Tribunal or the Commission, the bag or bags, received from the “safe custody of the provincial Treasury, must be seen to be properly and securely sealed. Bags unsealed, with seals broken, or with no sign of any seal whatsoever, are also sure pointers to rigging and fabrication. Many bags of NA124, as will be precisely demonstrated herein, were found in such despicable condition.

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CHAPTER SIX

THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INSPECTION

57. Pursuant to the aforesaid order of the ECP, the Election Commissioner Punjab, (ECPb) the Returning Officer (RO) and the candidates and/or their authorized representatives met on April 2, 2014 in the library of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Lahore to discuss the modalities and logistics of the inspection and supply of copies. It was mutually agreed that the inspection would start on 07.04.2014 the date on which all the bags would be brought to the library under full security. The inspection would thereafter be undertaken on a day to day basis.

58. The RO who had presided over the election had been transferred. His successor therefore presided over the inspection.

59. This is an account of the inspection of the 264 polling bags of NA-124, Lahore-VII held on 7 to 11 and 19th April 2014.

60. The following people attended the inspection and were marked present on a day to day basis:-

o Representatives of the Returned (or winning) Candidate Sheikh Rohail Asghar i. Mr. Khalid Ishaaq, Advocate

ii. Syed Shabbir Husain o Representatives of the Applicant Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan

i. Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, Advocate ii. Mr. Shaukat Ali Javed, Advocate

iii. Mr. Ch. Manzoor Ahmed iv. Mr. Sardar Muhammad Ahmed

o Representatives of Mr. Waleed Iqbal, Candidate: i. Mr. Tariq Hameed

ii. Mr. Mustafa Rasheed iii. Mr. Ali Abbas

o Representative of Mian Mohammad Asghar, Candidate: i. Mr. Tayeeb Jan, Advocate

ii. Mr. Arshad Tarar, Advocate o Representative of Mr. Nawaz Malik, Candidate:

Mr. Naseem Sabir o Candidates in person:

i. Mr. Waleed Iqbal. ii. Mr. Mian Mohammad Asghar

iii. Mr. Nawaz Malik.

61. The inspection was held in the presence and under the authority of learned incumbent and successor Returning Officer Mr. Mohammad Saleem Iqbal, RO, and was supervised by Mr. Mehboob Anwar, Election Commissioner Punjab. Assistant Returning Officer Mr. Muhammad Shafique also remained in attendance along with other officials of the ECP.

62. Signatures of all participating candidates and/or their representatives were obtained by the learned Returning Officer and the ECPb in authentication and certification of their presence and their participation in the inspection on a day to day basis.

63. All certificates appended herewith were obtained in the presence of all participants.

64. Hence this was one authentic inspection the results of which none, including the Returned Candidate himself, can dispute. The evidence is there for everyone to see.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

WHODUNNIT?

65. Before we embark on detailing the observations made during the Inspection it may be apt to spell out the principles on which liability, nay criminality, may be fixed on any or all of four different protagonists: the Presiding Officer (PO), the Returning Officer (RO), the Election Commissioner (ECPb) or his staff, or finally, the Provincial Government (caretaker or elected). In this a fifth, the learned Election Tribunal also can be suspected of lurking in the midst of the illegal efforts.

66. Given that massive electoral record had been destroyed to fabricate what appears to be a pre-ordained result, it should not be too difficult to fix responsibility in reasonably precise terms.

67. This Chapter will thus help us to automatically apportion blame among these officials as we later examine the formally certified facts. The test, by and large, is simple.

68. Hence the question: In the event of the polling bags, or their mandated contents, not being found in the condition expressly required by law, or even in a less than perfect but condonable condition: WHO is responsible for the evident fabrication that the particular state of a bag, or of its statutory contents, bears testimony to?

69. That is the primary question an answer to which is sought by analysts, critics of the process and by the public at large. Who was actually the instrument? WHODUNNIT?

70. How can we identify the delinquent from the condition of a Polling Bag (PB), or of its contents when it is brought out of the Treasury one year after the election? Can the culprit be identified or is that not possible on account of some overlapping of functions and sharing of responsibility? The answer is vital but simple.

i. IF the material delivered to the RO was deficient and did not contain any of the documents required by the RP Act to be delivered to the RO (such as Forms XIV, XV, Counter Foils or thumb-marked electoral list) AND the RO had formally taken action on record, against the PO at the time of delivery then the PO, and not the RO would be criminally liable for rigging.

ii. In the above case, to vindicate and exculpate himself, the RO must prove that he initiated the prosecution of the delinquent PO.

iii. IF the RO did not initiate the prosecution of the PO for the destruction of any prescribed and mandated document, then it is obvious that the PO had submitted to the RO the full record and the RO himself destroyed that material and is himself criminally liable for the destruction of crucial electoral record and for entering a false and fabricated count of the relevant Polling Station (PS).

iv. IF seals are found broken when the bag is produced from the provincial Treasury for inspection then it can be assumed that the RO did indeed seal the bag (even after destroying some or all the electoral material) but the seal was later broken to reinsert in the bag some documents. The crucial question would again be: who broke the seals?

v. IF the provincial government had proceeded formally to prosecute the RO and/or the PO concerned it would be absolved of the charge of breaking the seals and the RO would be held responsible

vi. IF, the bag is in the aforesaid condition when retrieved from the Provincial Treasury and there is no evidence of any complaint or action against the RO, then it can be

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concluded that the Provincial Government had managed the re-tampering and destruction in an attempt to “re-fabricate” the electoral record.

vii. IF, finally, the record is in the joint custody of the ECP and the Provincial Government then complicity of the ECP staff and officials may be presumed.

viii. WHY did the Provincial Government need to “refabricate” the record which had already been fabricated by the PO and the RO?

ix. The answer to the last question must lie in the fear created by the order of the ECP dated July 25, 2013 allowing inspection of the contents of the election bags of NA 124 Lahore VII. It would appear, as is duly attested through appended certificates, that:

First the ROs had, under instructions and in the knowledge of the benefitting party, destroyed, on the night after the poll (11-12 May, 2013), much of the electoral material to facilitate the fabrication of the fictitious final count.

That is why none had been prosecuted despite indisputable evidence of large scale destruction of Forms XIV, XV, Electoral Rolls and Counterfoils.

The material had been destroyed in the confident belief that electoral material (other than ballots) had indeed never been opened for inspection under Sec. 45 of the RPA before.

But on July 25, 2013 the ECP passed just such an order with regard to NA 124 Lahore VII. All 264 sealed bags were to be inspected.

This caused panic. Unless something was done 264 cats would come out of 264 bags. (In the event, they were as many as 227 certificates most showing multiple discrepancies). Something had to be done.

First, efforts were made to deny or at least delay the inspection. Given the clear language of the statute, and of Article 19 (introduced by the Eighteenth Amendment) inspection could not be resisted. Time had to be bought to avail and opportunity to “refabricate” the record. Inspection was resisted by devious means and was delayed by as much as nine long months until the ECP finally itself designated the officials and dates for the inspection.3

As pointed out to the ECP in a series of applications (appended hereto) the provincial governments used this time to take out a few bags every week, break the seals and to re-insert “re-fabricated” material in the bags.

HENCE:

o All bags with broken seals or without seals (as verified by the incumbent RO and the ECPb and attested formally by the ARO) had been polluted and were not worthy of inspection. These presented patent and ex facie evidence of “re-fabrication” with the connivance of the Provincial Government and ECP officials.

o The remaining bags with seals intact yielded evidence of the original fabrication of the record by the RO on May 11, 2013. This evidence was verified, documented and is presented herein.

3 See CHAPTER FOUR above.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ENORMITY OF THE FRAUD

71. The next question, apart from who is guilty, is:

to what extent was the electoral process polluted in NA 124 Lahore VII, and what is the sanctity of the evidence of electoral fraud that this White Paper documents?

72. Broadly speaking, the inspection of the PS bags of NA 124-Lahore-VII in respect to which precise yet elaborate observations, supported by hard and unambiguous documentary evidence, are given below in Chapter 10 of this White Paper, revealed that:

Out of a total of 264 bags as many as 227 had certifiable (and duly certified) multiple criminal defects and deficiencies.

As many as 145 bags (by ECPb ‘s count 152) were found with broken or without any of the prescribed seals. These were not inspected as having been manifestly tampered with.

A large proportion of the remaining 119 had been stuffed with waste or other material after the destruction of all evidence of the electoral results such as Form XIV and other documents.

Obviously fictitious vote counts from these polling stations were thus entered in the table (Form XVI) registering the final consolidated count.

These appear to have been devised somewhere else and provided to the ROs to fill in. To facilitate this exercise, candidates were not allowed to participate in the process.

The contents of the remaining 37 polling bags were also defective in material particulars but no certificates or attestations regarding these defects or deficiencies could be provided as neither the Election Commissioner Punjab (ECPb) nor the RO were authorized to certify the mutilated and roughed up condition of the envelopes/packets of documents that were, in fact, found inside these 37 bags being repositories of ballot papers.

Since the officials supervising the inspection were only mandated to, and did, certify:

o the absence of any required/statutory documents and material; and

o the condition of the seals (broken or not found) on the bags.

They could not certify other circumstances or proofs of fraud and destruction.

They were also not authorized to certify the condition of all those documents/material that were actually recovered from inside the bags even when their packets were found unsealed, mutilated or re-fabricated.

Hence there are no certificates or attestations for the otherwise patent, obvious and visible deficiencies and irregularities in (only) 37 out of as many as 264 bags.

In any case there are cogent and unambiguous certificates (appended herewith) attesting to criminal fraud, forgery, destruction, mutilation and fabrication with

respect to 227 out of 264 Polling Stations. More details are provided in Chapter 10.

This duly certified evidence, as per Appendicii herewith, was provided about a process conducted under the keen supervision of high officials and in the presence of,

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and without objection by the advocates and authorized agents of the Returned Candidate.

Since copies had to be supplied, and since bags with broken seals had to be formally acknowledged, a procedure of obtaining certificates and attestations to that effect was agreed in the first meeting by consent of all.

Whenever a document was not found in the bag a candidate, or his representative, would put in a request for a copy on which it would be certified/attested by the ARO (in the presence of the ECPb and the RO) that a copy could not be supplied as the document was not found in the bag.

A similar certificate/attestation would be made when a seal was broken or not found on a bag provided that on account of this circumstance the candidate gave up the intention to inspect its contents.

Vide orders dated 07.02.2014 and 14.03.2014 the ECP had directed the ECPb and the RO to supervise and preside over the inspection. Requests were addressed to them and attested on their instructions by the ARO in the presence of the all participants.

The two agreed formats of the certificates/attestations were thus in the following standard format:

To 1. The Honourable Election Commissioner, Punjab.

2. The Learned Returning Officer, NA-124 Lahore VII.

Dear Sirs: Vide order dated 07.02.2014 of the Honourable Election Commission of Pakistan I was to be provided with a copy of ___Form XIV________________. Kindly certify that the original is not available in the electoral bag of PS 1134 Yours truly Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan, Certified as above Through,__________ Attested (Authorised Representative). Date: 09 April, 2014. Assistant Returning Officer For Returning Officer NA 124 Lahore VII

And:

To 1. The Honourable Election Commissioner, Punjab.

3. The Learned Returning Officer, NA-124 Lahore VII.

4 Blanks to be filled in appropriately.

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Dear Sirs: The bags of polling stations Nos. 228 5of NA124 Lahore VII were produced for inspection in your presence today pursuant to Order dated 25.07.2013 passed by the Honourable Election Commission of Pakistan but these were found without seals or seals were broken. I therefore opt not to inspect their contents. Yours truly Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan, Through, ______________ Attested (Authorised Representative). Date: 08th April, 2014. Assistant Returning Officer For Returning Officer NA 124 Lahore VII

This unimpeachable evidence to the destruction of seals or record pertains to a

whopping 86 % of the Polling Stations.

And out of the 227 certificates testifying this destruction only 12 certificates were objected to by the learned counsel of the Returned Candidate Sheikh Rohail Asghar.

73. Put another way, the inspection revealed the astounding facts that out of 264 bags:

i. 145 bags had broken or had no seals at all. (The ECPb’s estimate in his report is of 152 such bags).

ii. Out of the remaining 119 (sealed bags) there were 82 bags that presented certifiable, and duly certified (as per appended certificates) evidence of complete or partial, but critical, destruction of electoral material.

iii. Only 37 bags remained. But these also betrayed crucial evidence of fabrication. The only difference is that these deficiencies could not formally be certified as per orders of the ECP.

iv. More interesting is the condition of such bags in which ‘waste material’ and garbage was discovered (and certified) but of which fictitious results were nevertheless tabulated.

v. Similar was the matter in relation to Polling Stations of which fictitious results were entered after destruction from their Bags of ALL electoral material i.e. Form XIV the PO’s result sheet, Form XV the PO’s account of ballots, Counter Foils of ballots and the Thumb-marked Voters’ List)

74. It must be pointed out that the above figures mentioned in clauses i. ii. and iii. above differ, but only very slightly, from those given in the Report filed by the learned Election Commissioner Punjab (ECPb) before the ECP. These herein are based on the certificates obtained and appended herewith. Those from the record maintained by the ECP officials. The ECPb’s figures in fact attest (as will be seen) to more instances of tampering. So the Author has been cautious.

75. In any case the differences are so minute that the conclusions drawn in this White Paper would not in the slightest manner be affected. In fact the enormity of the crime is only corroborated by

5 Relevant No.s of Polling Stations to be filled in.

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the Report. The Author has no issue with those other figures being employed to judge the election under review.

76. The following conclusions with respect to NA-124 can thus be easily drawn from the noted circumstances, namely:

i. With respect to the above mentioned 82 bags of which the seals of the RO were found intact but certain documents, (such as Form XIV & XV, the electoral roll, or the counterfoils), were not found in the polling bag and the RO had not proceeded against the PO:

it can be easily concluded that the actual destruction of the record was done on the night of 11.05.2014 immediately after the polls.

it was evident that the RO had himself destroyed that material and entered a fictitious result in the final tabulation.

ii. With respect to the 145 bags of which seals were found broken, or were otherwise without any seal, when the bags were presented for inspection in April 2014:

it was evident that these bags had been mutilated once more after 25.07.2013 (the date on which the ECP first ordered the inspection) and while these were in the Punjab Treasury.

This was done after the date of the ECP’s order of inspection, in a fervent effort to “re-fabricate the record” and to bring all documents in consonance with the fictitious spread-sheet and the declared result to avoid revelations such as of the criminal misconduct that had been established in regard to NA-139, Kasur and which is spelt out in Chapter Nine below.

According to unspecified but seemingly cogent information this latter process to ‘re-fabricate the record’ was carried out piecemeal as and when individual POs could be contacted and persuaded to “correct” the record under their signatures. That is why the seals of 107 (out of the 145) bags were found ruthlessly broken (as certified by the ARO) and new forms XIV and XV were stuffed in them.

This latter activity took place from time to time between 25.07.2013 (date of ECP’s order) and the actual inspection in April 2013. Since the process could not be completed with respect to all bags, as many as 119 bags could not be ferretted before the inspection. Had there been more time, these would also have been re-fabricated.

As seen above, an apprehension was repeatedly expressed (in successive applications at APPENDICII M, N, and O) that the electoral record of NA 124 was being re-fabricated under orders of the Punjab Government ruled by the PML-N to which party the Returned Candidate belonged.

77. The conclusion that can safely be drawn about the election in NA 124 Lahore VII is that the rigging and electoral fraud was the hand-maiden of the pre-and-post poll Provincial Governments and the Returning Officer(s). In the post 25.07.2013 exercise the participation of some ECP officials cannot be ruled out.

78. In the case of NA 124 this conclusion is based on all the formal and duly executed certificates that are appended to this White Paper.

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CHAPTER NINE

THE APPREHENSION: NA 139 Kasur

79. It is pertinent to mention here that the Applicant had been persuaded to seek the inspection of the record by the revelations made during the inspection of the Kasur Constituency No. NA-139. Inspection of the record u/s 45 of that constituency had taken place on the application of Ch.

Manzoor Ahmed, PPP Candidate. The following revealed facts had indicated that the Returning Officer, Kasur NA-139, had destroyed much of the evidence and election material at the time when he had received it from the Presiding Officers. The RO had then proceeded to enter a fictitious result in the spread-sheet/table before transmitting the sealed and unsealed but deficient bags to the Punjab Treasury (as in the case of NA124 Lahore VII).

80. Inter alia the following criminal discrepancies had been found in the inspection of NA 139:

i. 177 Polling Stations where Form XIV was not found in the bags having been destroyed to enable fictitious entries by the RO in the final tabulation: (Total cast votes of these Polling Stations being 119,542)

ii. 178 Polling Stations where Form XV was not found in the bags having been destroyed to enable fictitious entries by the RO in the final tabulation: (Total cast votes of these Polling Stations being 120,988)

iii. 5 Polling Stations where all counterfoils had been destroyed showing that the total count was stuffed and fictitious: (Total cast votes 3,989)

iv. 12 Polling Stations where bags were found stuffed with waste paper and no election record was found showing the destruction and disposal of the entire record and totally fictitious results: (Total votes attributed to these Polling Stations were 7,643).

v. 10 Polling Stations of which the entire bags had been destroyed and were not found showing that the entire result attributed to the candidates was fictitious. (Total votes fictionally attributed 6,721)

vi. 103 Polling Stations where Electoral List had been destroyed to avoid NADRA verification: (Total cast votes: 71,091)

vii. 32 Polling Stations where Electoral List was found blank, the original having been destroyed to avoid NADRA verification: (Total cast votes: 24,086)

viii. 27 Polling Stations where Counterfoils were less than the total Votes Cast showing that ballots not cast at Polling Stations were stuffed and counted: (Total votes cast 18,939, Counterfoils 14,920 & Difference 4,018)

ix. 3 Polling Stations where Counterfoils were more than Total Votes Cast and counted showing that votes were destroyed and disposed off: (Total votes 3,540, Total votes cast 1857, Counterfoils 2452 & Difference 595)

x. 4 Polling Stations where Counterfoils were mismatched with given CF in Form-15 showing that non-issued ballots were stuffed: (Total votes 4,269, Total cast votes 2,485 & Difference 1,784)

xi. 4 Polling Stations where unused Counterfoils were not found showing that the result was manipulated.

81. The bags and their contents spoke volumes of the manner in which the PML-N had procured its victory through blatant and criminal rigging. There was such pre-meditated recklessness that it seemed the winning electoral camp had been assured that electoral bags would never be opened for inspection. And this is true in a sense. Never before had section 45 simpliciter been invoked to open the bags to peer into them. This was indeed a first.

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82. Unfortunately, as pointed out earlier, the electoral material of NA-139 had been examined in an ‘inspection simpliciter’. No order for the supply of copies had been obtained. The RO was not therefore obliged to certify that a document, of which a copy was sought, was not available in any bag. There was thus no officially certified proof of documents that had been destroyed to fabricate the result. The reality was not officially formally certified. Hence, barring the oral evidence of those who had inspected the record (and this testimony would be denied by the adversary and his representatives) there was no hard evidence to prove the rigging.

83. This would not be the case in the inspection of NA-124 as:

i. The ECPb and the RO were obligated by the ECP’s order dated 07.02.2014 to provide the Applicant (Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan) copies of the documents in the bags other than the ballot papers;

ii. If any such document was missing the ECPb/RO would, ipso facto, have to certify that the copy of the original could not be provided as it was not available in the polling bag;

iii. Because the documents had to emerge out of sealed bags, the ECPb/RO would have also to certify that any bag did not have the designated seal of the RO or that the seal had been broken.

84. The apprehension became reality when evidence of massive electoral fraud emerged during the inspection of the record pertaining to NA 124, Lahore VII.

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CHAPTER TEN

THE INSPECTION AT LAST

85. The inspection of the Polling Material and bags of the May 2013 election finally took place in April 2014. It led to some shocking observations. These are precisely detailed with reference to each document in this Chapter. Certificates were obtained with respect to each criminal act of destruction of electoral material. These certificates are at APPENDIX: U pages 1 to 133.

A. BAGS WITH BROKEN OR NO SEALS:

86. Out of a total of 264 Polling Stations bags of as many as 107 had their seals broken. These were Polling Stations No’s: [125, 206, 114, 86, 91, 175, 212, 126, 78, 219, 55, 50, 198, 179, 224, 02] [177, 232, 153, 214, 157, 48, 49, 231, 52, 70, 204, 99, 246, 96, 117, 189, 205, 23, 07, 210, 135, 41, 218, 81, 202, 225, 161, 92, 45] [88, 199, 194, 59, 142, 74, 162, 47, 65, 160, 31, 128, 62, 17, 33, 239, 263, 18, 259, 100, 247, 174, 14, 34, 115, 19, 230, 188, 40, 207, 190, 64, 168, 235, 85, 191, 145, 238] [154, 61, 195, 220, 04, 215, 200, 54, 106, 254, 118] [166, 110, 240, 208, 155, 32, 152, 237, 256, 68, 186, 05 & 262].6

When the bags were presented for inspection in the presence of the candidate or representatives of candidates, certificates in writing to the effect that seals were broken were obtained from the ARO in the presence and on the instruction of the Election Commissioner Punjab and the Returning Officer and in the presence of the learned counsel for the Returned Candidate.

For ready reference the certificates have also been individually numbered. The specific certificates pertaining to the above Polling Stations (each certificate testifying to multiple PSs) are at Serial No’s 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 110, 111, 112, 114, 118 & 119 of Appendix U/1 to U/133.

None of these certificates was objected to by any one when issued in the presence of the participants including the representatives of the Returned Candidate.

A total number of 133,789 voters are registered in these Polling Stations out of which 70,184 voters (as per the fictitious final count recorded by the RO) allegedly cast their votes with the Returned Candidate being attributed as many as 48,206 votes.

87. Out of the remaining Polling bags, 38 more were entirely without any evidence of any seal

whatsoever. These were bags for Polling Stations No’s: [217, 228, 169, 252, 136, 146, 138, 182, 165] [245, 244, 111, 148, 20, 141, 77, 24, 08, 137, 184, 122, 255, 223, 253] [243, 132, 213, 83, 150, 234, 170, 82, 127, 193] [71] [147, 79 & 178].7

No sign of ANY seal was found on these bags. This fact was duly certified. There was thus no sanctity about the contents of these bags.

6 The clusters are separated by parenthesis because these bags, being a mixed heap, were not

presented for inspection in regular order. They were randomly picked up on several dates. The parenthesis indicate bags picked up from the heap on the several dates that the inspection continued. Respective certificates attest to the broken seals. 7 Same as footnote 6.

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When the bags were presented for inspection in the presence of the candidates/representatives of candidates, certificates to this effect were obtained from the ARO in the presence of and on instruction from the Election Commissioner Punjab and the Returning Officer and in the presence of the learned counsel for the Returned Candidate.

For ready reference the certificates have also been individually numbered. The specific certificates pertaining to the above Polling Stations (each certificate testifying to multiple PSs) are at Serial No’s 10, 11, 12, 13, 29, 58, 59, 95, 99, 100, 101, 113 & 133 of Appendix U/1 to U/133.

A total number of 44,897 voters are registered in these Polling Stations out of which 24,383 voters (as per the fictitious final count recorded by the RO) allegedly cast their votes with the Returned Candidate being attributed as many as 16,678 votes.

None of these certificates was objected to at that time by any one even when issued in the presence of the participants including the representatives of the Returned Candidate.

88. Since the above 145 bags (107 + 38) had clearly been tampered with, there was no point in inspecting them. The applicant, through her representatives, therefore opted to forgo her right to inspect most of these bags as no further proof of fabrication of the record was necessary with respect to these infected or ‘punctured’ bags. It was evident that the election material in these bags with broken seals or without any seal altogether would have been tampered with. Why else would these be such a condition?

89. Bags recovered from top-security custody of the official Punjab Government Treasury with broken seals clearly indicated an effort on the part of the Punjab Government to tamper with the material inside them and to “refabricate” the documents to make them conform to the fabricated and fictitious result declared on May 11, 2013. These bags thus were proof of the fear expressed repeatedly by the Applicant in her applications to the ECP.

90. The abovementioned 145 bags (107 + 38) are excluded from further analysis except where relevant. 8

B. BAGS WITH SEALS INTACT:

91. Now 119 bags (264 – 145) remained. These had their seals intact. All these bags should have been in perfect order containing all the duly sealed packets required by the law. At least to this extent the integrity of the poll ought to have been established.

92. Moreover, if these 119 bags had been in order that would have absolved the RO of all responsibility. He would have been proven not guilty. The culpability for broken seals would then lie solely with some minions of the provincial administration for mutilation of 107 bags while these were in the safe-keeping of the provincial Treasury. The RO would then only have to explain why he had not sealed the 38 unsealed bags.

93. But no explanation was forthcoming with respect to either category of bags. Indeed the RO had not lagged behind the Provincial Government in mutilating the record. This was evident from the state of the 119 bags that he had himself sealed and of which the seals were intact to date.

8 It may be mentioned that the ECPb, in his report to t he ECP, gives a higher figure of 152 infected bags

with broken seals or none at all. The Author has given the conservative and lower figure based on the certificates duly obtained by him. If the figure 152 is taken then only 112 bags with seals (though infected in other ways) would remain and not 119 as taken by the Author.

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94. Out of these 119 bags that were desealed during the inspection under the watchful eyes of the ECPb, the RO and the representatives of the Returned Candidate, it was found that 82 bags provided certifiable (and duly certified) evidence of fabrication of the final result.

95. But 82 infected and polluted bags out of 119 is a very high percentage (69%). If projected to 264 bags this may mean 182 bags could have been tampered with and fabricated out of the total of

264. This however is based on a conjecture albeit on a tangible probability.

96. Bag-wise particulars of the crucial electoral material that had been destroyed in these bags are given below.

POLLING BAGS ACTUALLY STUFFED WITH WASTE OR GARBAGE:

97. An astounding fact that emerged was that many bags were stuffed with waste/garbage and/or irrelevant material and yet results for these polling stations had been compiled! This is a duly certified fact.

98. Certificates pertaining to Polling Stations No’s 84 and 221 show that:

While objecting to the inspection of these bags the learned counsel for the Returned Candidate himself certified, in his own hand that the bags contained “waste material”.

Thus these bags contained NO ELECTORAL MATERIAL AT ALL: no ballots, no counter foils, no Forms XIV of XV, no voters’ list. Poll in these PSs should have been cancelled.

Hence an entirely fictitious result of these Polling Stations was attributed to the candidates as per the following respective counts:

Polling Station No. 84: i. PML-N: Al Haj Sheikh Rohail Asghar: 498 votes

ii. PTI: Mr. Waleed Iqbal: 134 votes iii. PPP-P: Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan: 49 votes.

Polling Station No. 221: i. PML-N: Al Haj Sheikh Rohail Asghar: 687 votes

ii. PTI: Mr. Waleed Iqbal: 275 votes iii. PPP-P:Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan: 18 votes

On what basis was the above result devised? Some fiction. Yet the Returning Officer walks free.

Little wonder Forms XIV were not placed on the ECP website. There were none to be uploaded!

POLLING BAGS STUFFED WITH IRRELEVANT MATERIAL:

99. Certificates pertaining to Polling Stations No’s 164, 58, 144, 90, 76, 06, 03, 22, 139, 11 (ten) show that:

While objecting to the inspection of these bags the learned counsel for the Returned Candidate himself certified, in his own hand that the bags contained “irrelevant material”.

Moreover these bags contained none of the documents that had to be prepared and preserved by the Presiding Officers and the Returning Officer viz: no ballots, no counter

foils, no Forms XIV or XV, no voters’ list. This, as will be seen, is implicit in the observation on behalf of the Returned Candidate that these bags were stuffed with irrelevant material. So on what basis could the candidates be attributed any vote tally in these PSs?

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Yet a fictitious result of these Polling Stations was attributed to the candidates. Only two PSs

are being taken as a sample: Polling Station No. 11:

i. PML-N: Al Haj Sheikh Rohail Asghar: 440 votes ii. PTI: Mr. Waleed Iqbal: 116 votes iii. PPP-P: Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan: 26 votes.

Polling Station No. 139: i. PML-N: Al Haj Sheikh Rohail Asghar: 698 votes ii. PTI: Mr. Waleed Iqbal: 338 votes iii. PPP-P: Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan: 90 votes

On what basis was the above result devised? Some fiction. Yet the Returning Officer walks free.

Little wonder again why Forms XIV were not placed on the ECP website. There were none to be uploaded!

100. The above is just a sample of the ten Polling Stations. Details of all twelve PSs (ten plus two PSs preceding) are given separately in the chart at APPPENDIX-V.

101. These Polling bags testified that electoral documents that had been prepared or preserved by the Presiding Officers (Forms XIV, XV, Counterfoils of ballots, thumb-marked electoral lists) were destroyed by the RO and fabricated results entered in the result in Form XVI (the spread sheet showing the candidate-and-polling-station-wise final result). No other conclusion is possible.

102. The votes attributed to the candidates in the last three columns of the charts pertaining to the above 12 PSs are, by definition, fabricated as the entire electoral record had been destroyed and waste or irrelevant material (as certified on behalf of the Returned Candidate himself) had been stuffed in the bags before sealing them. Since this was the work of the RO, he appears t o be culpable.

DESTRUCTION OF THREE OF THE FOUR MANDATORY DOCUMENTS:

103. Chart at APPENDIX-W testifies to the destruction, in the mentioned 21 Polling Stations, of at least three of the above four documents prepared or preserved by the Presiding Officers. The votes attributed to the candidates in the last three columns are also, therefore, fictitious.

104. There is a pattern to be noticed here. The demonstrably fictitious results attributed to the PML-N a victory by a huge margin. The PTI is placed as a bad second. The PPP is washed out to single or double digits (which even if all PPP jialas died, would by an unlikely tally). But this appears to be a deliberate, calculated and pre-ordained outcome. Since superior Courts have held that where the margin of victory is very large there is no justification for a recount, therefore the contrived margins were ‘recorded’ as massive. This would immunize the bags from being opened to verify the results or inspect the documents.

105. The 12 PSs mentioned in paras 98 and 99, and the 21 PSs in para 103 above, are 33 Polling Bags out of a total of 119 that had had their seals intact. This is 28% of 119. If projected to all of 264 bags it can be surmised that there could be 74 such bags with waste and irrelevant material in them.

106. The 33 Polling Stations mentioned respectively in paras 98, 99 and 103 above had a total number

of 43319 voters who have thus been disenfranchised.

For ready reference the specific certificates pertaining to the above Polling Stations have been assigned serial numbers in the Appendix. Accordingly they are at Serial No’s 06/43, 48, 50, 64, 66, 66, 70/121, 82, 84, 91, 106/120, 116, 117 and 04/128, 07, 19, 31/124, 32, 34/127, 35,

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37, 38, 41/129, 46, 47/132, 49/124, 61, 63, 65/122, 68, 72, 83, 89 & 115 of Appendix U/1 to U/133.

107. The fact that cries out is now simple: after the calculated destruction of Forms XIV and XV as well as the Counter Foils and the thumb-marked Electoral Lists, the Returning Officers were free to devise whatever fictitious results they were ordained to do. Hence the entire result was fabricated and bogus as attested by the appended certificates.

108. This discovery of massive fabrication also solved one other mystery. Though shocked and demoralised by the fictitious result, we had been wondering why, this time around, most of our polling agents had been denied the results of the counts i.e. copies of Form XIV? The premature and over-expeditious announcement of fabricated results demoralized them as well. Before the counting was complete at their own respective polling stations, devastating counts began to be announced from all over the constituency. Our polling agents gave up the will to resist. Little did they know that the very fabrication of the over-all outcome was premised on the other candidates not getting result sheets. That is how it would be convenient to destroy the contents of the polling bags and fabricate the counts.

109. But in any case, what explanation can be given by the RO, the ECP or the Returned Candidate or his Party, the PML-N for the condition of the polling bags retrieved from the latter’s custody demonstrating large-scale destruction of the electoral material? Does absence of Forms XIV with other candidates prove anything except that it corroborates the comprehensive design of rigging?

110. Having taken stock of a few instances of the most blatant mischief, we can now take, in detail, the entire and ruthless destruction of the record and the fabrication of the results in many more of the remaining Polling Stations. This entire exercise appears to have been done at the post-poll stage, such as:

DESTRUCTION OF FORM XIV (Result of Count):

111. Form XIV (i.e. 14) as explained earlier, is the form on which the Presiding Officer enters the score of each candidate and thus tabulates the result at his Polling Station. It is from this form that the RO derives the result of that PS and enters it in Form XVI to consolidate the result from all PSs. Without Form XIV there is no basis (unless the ballots are all recounted in the presence of all the candidates) for the RO to deduce the count at any PS.

112. Form XIV of 53 (out of the above 82 sealed) Polling bags had been destroyed. These related to Polling Stations No’s: [261, 211, 192, 159, 12, 185, 187, 10] [140, 113, 75, 258, 67, 58, 144, 233, 51, 90, 133, 89, 176, 37, 181, 76, 109] [30, 13, 156, 84, 06, 216, 250, 197, 35, 03, 101, 97, 241, 98, 105, 251, 257, 226, 119, 22] [149, 66, 39, 73] [29, 221, 139 & 171]9

For ready reference the specific certificates pertaining to the above Polling Stations have been assigned serial numbers in the Appendix. Accordingly they are at Serial No’s 03, 04, 05, 07, 08, 09, 19, 20, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 76, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 102, 105, 107, 108, 115, 116, 117 & 120 of Appendix U/1 to U/133.

9 The numbers of Polling Station are given in clusters in the chronological order of the dates, from April 7 to April

11 and 19, on which the bags were inspected.

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Except for the underlined (PS 35), Form XV of these PSs had also been destroyed as explained later. Hence in at least 52 (out of 82) bags all evidence of the real count as well as figures reconciling that count, had been eliminated altogether.

Yet, after destroying the primary evidence in Form XIV, the RO credited the Returned Candidate Sheikh Rohail Asghar with as many as 25,861 fictitious votes in these PSs alone.

When the bags were presented for inspection in the presence of the candidates/representatives of candidates, certificates to this effect were obtained from the ARO in the presence of, and on instruction from, the ECPb and the RO, and in the presence of the learned counsel for the Returned Candidate.

None of these certificates was objected to by any one even when issued in the presence of the participants including the representatives of the Returned Candidate.

These 53 missing Forms XIV out of 119 (duly sealed bags) means 45%. When this percentage is applied to 264 bags (including those not sealed and not inspected) it can be surmised that as many as 119 Forms XIV (out of 264) would have been deliberately destroyed. This last, however, is admittedly a conjecture though based on tangible probability.

A total number of 68,520 voters are registered in these Polling Stations out of which 37,710 voters (as per the fictitious final count recorded by the RO) allegedly cast their votes with the Returned Candidate being attributed as many as 25,861 votes.

IMPORTANT:

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF FORM XIV?

i. If there is no Form XIV for any given PS, no candidate can be attributed any votes from that Polling Station in the final consolidated count.

ii. If there was no certificate of vote count prepared by the PO (Form XIV) and yet the spread sheet (Form XVI: the Consolidated Result) nevertheless showed a vote tally for those PSs, the following conclusions are inavoidable:

The RO had NO BASIS on which to enter the count of each candidate at those polling stations in the tabulated spread sheet.

The Returning Officer was induced by some higher power, to himself destroy Forms XIV in large numbers before sealing the bag and entering a fictitious result of the count in Form XVI.

One reason why Form XIV was destroyed was to enable the RO to arbitrarily attribute 25,861 votes to PML-N, 9,400 to Tehreek-e-Insaf Pakistan and only 1,477 to the Pakistan People’s Party in these polling stations.

This fictitious result deliberately placing PML-N at first position, the TIP at a bad second position and the PPP as the beaten third was devised for all of Punjab to make it look credible. But the “over-kill” has brought the cat out of the bag.

This was the crux of the electoral fraud. Destroy Forms XIV and enter fictitious, pre ordained counts.

DESTRUCTION OF FORM XV (Account of Ballots).

113. Form XV of 57 Polling Stations (out of the above-mentioned 82 sealed bags) had been destroyed. These were Polling Stations No’s: [261, 211, 192, 159, 12, 185, 187, 10] [140, 75, 258, 67, 164, 58, 46, 144, 107, 233, 51, 90, 133, 53, 89, 176, 37, 181, 76, 109] [30, 13, 156, 84, 06, 216, 250, 197, 03, 101, 97, 241, 98, 105, 251, 257, 226, 119, 22] [149, 44, 143, 66, 39, 73] [29, 221, 139 & 171]10

10

The numbers of Polling Station are given in clusters in the chronological order of the dates, from April 7 to April

11 and 19, on which the bags were inspected.

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For ready reference the specific certificates pertaining to the above Polling Stations have also been assigned numbers. Accordingly these are at Serial No’s: 03, 04, 05, 07, 08, 09, 19, 20, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 76, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 115, 116, 117 & 120 of Appendix U/1 to U/133.

In the absence of Forms XIV and XV, on what basis these figures were devised is impossible to discern. The allegation that the RO was (as with other ROs) supplied with PS-wise poll results by a secret, but influential, cell appears to be the only viable explanation that fits into the frame of established and proven facts.

It may be noted that there is an obvious over-lap between the Polling Bags of whose election results (Form XIV) and account of ballots (Form XV) were destroyed. It is therefore not being suggested that the above two figures of votes attributed to the Returned Candidate, Sheikh Rohail Asghar, be added and then counted. The two are independent figures and are mentioned only to demonstrate the scale of the fabrication.

A total number of 74,254 voters are registered in these Polling Stations out of which 41,189 voters (as per the fictitious final count recorded by the RO) allegedly cast their votes with the Returned Candidate being attributed as many as 28,159 votes.

IMPORTANT:

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF FORM XV?

i. To reiterate, Form XV is the Form most critical to the precise accounting of issued ballot papers and those actually used. It is also the most cogent device against ballot

stuffing i.e. the insertion of ballots that were not issued for use at a Polling Station. ii. The two figures entered on Form XV (i.e. of the number of ballot papers issued and

the number actually used) must not only match with the actual count of ballots, but also with the Counterfoils in the bag which, in turn, must also be equal to the used ballots AND be of the exact series that is recorded on Form XV. This Form is the lynchpin of the electoral accountancy.

iii. The final vote count can thus be verified and reconciled by a comparison of Forms XIV and XV. The reconciliation is made possible by ensuring, among other facts, that:

The Counter Foils (stubs) in the polling bag are of the same series as those issued to the PO and entered on Form XV. The CFs/stubs being of some other series is one sure indication of vote stuffing.

The used ballots do not exceed the CFs/stubs, nor do they fall short of the CFs/stubs. More ballots than CFs would indicate ballot stuffing, and fewer ballots than CFs would mean that ballots of some of the candidates have been destroyed to reduce their count.

iv. To record fabricated results Form XV (and Counter Foils) need to be destroyed thereby avoiding reconciliation of issued ballots with votes-cast-and-allegedly-counted.

v. These 57 bags out of the aforementioned 119 mean 48%. When this percentage is applied to 264 bags (including those not inspected) it can be surmised that as many as 127 Forms XIV would have been deliberately destroyed. This last, however, is admittedly a conjecture though based on tangible probability.

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114. This was not all. Out of the same aforesaid 82 sealed bags, some other startling facts also emerged.

DESTRUCTION OF COUNTERFOILS (CFs):

115. Preservation of the CFs is essential to ensure that these match the total number of ballots polled.

116. In 34 bags (out of 119 sealed bags) no counterfoils (CFs) at all were found. All had been destroyed. These were Polling Stations Nos.: [90, 159, 187] [58, 144, 107, 209, 26, 37, 76] [84, 216, 01, 264, 104, 241, 105, 72, 242, 22] [171] [29, 221, 139] [03, 06, 11, 181, 75, 121, 151, 164, 211 & 233]11

For ready reference the specific certificates pertaining to the above Polling Stations have also been assigned numbers. Accordingly these are at Serial No’s: 06, 07, 19, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 48, 50, 64, 66, 71, 73, 79, 82, 84, 85, 88, 91, 106, 115, 116, 117, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128 & 129 of Appendix U/1 to U/133.

The entire vote count for these Polling Stations was therefore fictitious and fabricated in these Polling Stations.

These 34 bags out of the aforementioned 119 mean 29%. When this percentage is applied to 264 bags (including those not inspected) it can be surmised that as many as 77 bags from which CFs would have been deliberately destroyed. This last, however, is admittedly a conjecture though based on tangible probability.

A total number of 41,840 voters are registered in these Polling Stations out of which 23,217 voters (as per the fictitious final count recorded by the RO) allegedly cast their votes with the Returned Candidate being attributed as many as 16,208 votes.

DESTRUCTION OF THUMB-MARKED ELECTORAL LISTS:-

117. Thumb-marked electoral rolls/voters’ lists were necessary for biometric verification of the identity of the voter.

118. To avoid verification in polling stations that had been the focus of electoral fraud, and in which votes were stuffed with abandon, it was necessary to destroy completely all evidence capable of biometric verification. How else could fictitious results be entered in the statement of final count? Hence out of the aforementioned 82 Polling bags found with seals as many as 44 Polling bags provided evidence of the complete destruction of all the voluminous thumb-marked electoral lists. These were: [163, 180, 80, 183, 69, 57, 258, 164, 107, 26, 90, 89, 37, 76] [30, 156, 84, 216, 197, 35, 03, 101, 264, 27, 102, 103, 129, 104, 21, 173, 241, 98, 105, 72, 242, 226, 22] [171, 60] [221, 139] & [11, 46 & 176]12

For ready reference the specific certificates pertaining to the above Polling Stations are at Serial No’s 01, 02, 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 34, 38, 40, 43, 46, 48, 50, 61, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 89, 91, 106, 109, 116, 117, 130, 131 & 132 of Appendix U/1 to Appendix U/133.

11

The numbers of Polling Station are given in clusters in the chronological order of the dates, from April 7 to April

11 and 19, on which the bags were inspected.

12 Same as Footnote 11 above..

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A total number of 54,598 voters are registered in these Polling Stations out of which 28,899 voters (as per the fictitious final count recorded by the RO) allegedly cast their votes with the Returned Candidate being attributed as many as 20,426 votes.

119. It may be mentioned that just a few bags with broken seals or with no seals at all were also probed out of curiosity. Shoddy attempts to re-fabricate the materials were found therein although all the evidence could not be certified being outside the scope of the inspection under Section 45 of RPA.

FINALY THE REMAINING 37 BAGS:

120. We have seen that there were 264 Polling Stations in NA-124, and an equal number of Polling bags. Of these the seals of 107 had been broken and 38 were not sealed at all. Contents of these were thus not at all credible.

121. We have also seen that though the remaining 119 were found duly sealed but critical contents of 82 of these 119 sealed bags had been destroyed before sealing by the RO.

122. But there still remain 37 bags to be analysed.

123. These 37 bags seemed, at first, to have been in perfect order. Seals on them had not been violated. They had all the requisite contents. Although these contents were not found in separate sealed packets as required by law this discrepancy and violation could not be certified being beyond the scope of the ECP directives.

124. Even so only 37 bags out of 264 (a mere 14 %) seemed to be in some order. But even that was not so. Each had considerable, significant and visible defects. The only difference was that the learned RO was not obliged to certify any of such defects. Hence no formal certificate attesting the discrepancies could be obtained.

125. But some of the other significant defects and evidence of blatant rigging and electoral fraud that were evident to the naked eye even in these 37 bags may be stated:

The relative thickness of the separate sealed envelopes of ballots of each candidate in some bags did not appear, on sight, to be consonant with the result shown in Form XIV indicating a false count to the winner. Since the contents of the envelopes (the ballots) could not be inspected (as per S.45 RPA above) this fact, though physically observed, could not be formally attested to through a verifying certificate.

In many cases envelopes containing ballot papers bore no seals or had marks showing that the packets and/or seals had been torn, but this fact was again not formally certified as it pertained to ballots.

Even Forms XIV, XV, Counter Foils and Electoral Rolls that were found in these bags in their separate envelopes appeared to have been de-sealed or torn indicating substitution. Since, however, the document was in fact found in the bag no certificate as to its condition could be provided.

In short even these bags bore evidence of mutilation and destruction of electoral material. There therefore appeared not a single bag amongst the 264 that did not yield some measure of fabrication of the result.

MOST IMPORTANT:

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126. Certificates with respect to documents not found in the bags and about broken seals and bags not sealed were obtained with respect to (107+38+82) 227 bags. These certificates provide indisputable evidence of comprehensive rigging.

127. Out of all the aforesaid 227 certificates the learned counsel or authorized representatives of the Returned Candidate Sheikh Rohail Asghar objected only to twelve (12) certificates pertaining to PSs Nos. 03, 06, 11, 22, 58, 76, 84, 90, 144, 139, 164, 221. These objections are noted on the face of the attesting certificates appended herewith.

128. No objection as to the remaining 215 certificates (227–12) were taken at that time. These certificates and attestations are thus uncontested and unimpeachable.

129. This was not a lapse or oversight on the part of the Returned Candidate Sheikh Rohail Asghar. Not at all. These certificates were issued on six separate dates. No objection could indeed be taken to them as the facts that these attested to were patent on the face of the record and obvious to every eye taking part in the proceedings. Evidence of tampering, mutilation and destruction of the record and documents, and thereby, of the fabrication of the result floated on the surface and could not be denied even by the Returned Candidate.

130. It is felt that had the RO been proceeded against even on the studiedly exculpatory report of the ECPb he may himself exposed the grand plan, if there was one. But it takes a crazy RO to destroy, at his own initiative so much of the official and sacred election record.

131. Res ipsa loquitor: the thing speaks for itself.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE CONCLUSIONS

132. From the above it can safely be concluded that ‘Poll Rigging’ on and after May 11, 2013 (as distinct from Pre-Poll Rigging), had been done in three stages:

i. In the First Stage: the Presiding Officers were directed to conduct a smooth poll but not to provide, or to resist the demand to provide certified results to the Polling Agents.

ii. This was facilitated by the premature and rapid announcement of results that demoralized the Polling Agents of rival parties. With this ensured the massive destruction of the record, and even the stuffing of Polling Bags with garbage and waste material, for which there can be no lawful explanation whatsoever, could easily and with impunity be undertaken.

iii. In the Second Stage: (as demonstrated by the missing electoral record in bags sealed by the RO): The RO removed and destroyed en masse vital polling material from these bags before sealing them under his seal. He thus made the result unverifiable at any time in the future. This was done by the RO himself.

iv. The scale of the destruction is so large that it cannot be attributed to mere negligence or innocent oversight.

v. The primary evidence thus destroyed, the fabricated polling-station-wise result of each candidate was entered in Form XVI (the PS-wise spread-sheet) as received from the secret “cell” or command centre.

vi. That pre-fabricated results in a central “cell” can alone explain why the results were prematurely announced or how these could be even bettered during the process of count across Punjab.

vii. Being a surreptitious, rushed and criminal exercise, and as the PML-N was anxious to announce the results in a hurry, the desealing, destruction and resealing was done in such a frenzy that the RO of NA 124 failed to seal 38 bags that were found without any seals.

viii. There was thus no compatibility between the final declared counts/results and the material in (or absent from) the polling bags.

ix. At the Third Stage: (as demonstrated by the 107 bags with broken seals): an attempt was further made, after the ECP’s order of inspection (25.07.2013) created panic in the Punjab Government, to “re-fabricate” the record of NA124 by breaking the seals of the bags and stuffing them with re-manufactured material to make it compatible with the fictitious result declared on May 11, 2013.

x. This could only be done by the Punjab Government that had, together with the RO, control over these bags lying in the Punjab Treasury, the repository of the bags.

xi. Since this last exercise was done piece-meal and in batches of 7-10 bags only at a time per week, and not all at once to avoid sensation and alarm, all bags could not be re-tampered before the physical inspection. That is why only 107 bags were found “re-infected”. These were the bags with broken seals. Had more time been available, all bags would have been loaded with re-fabricated material.

xii. But the matter did not end here. How keen were the high officials of the Election Commission of Pakistan itself, and the members of the electoral judicial hierarchy appointed by the ECP to foul the patent and undeniable evidence revealed by the inspection, throws further light on their complicity and concert in covering up for criminal activity. How blatantly this has been attempted will appear from the events that took place AFTER THE INSPECTION.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

AFTER THE INSPECTION

The Role of Election Commissioner Punjab:

133. An astounding and absurd effort was made by none other than the learned Election Commissioner Punjab to trivialize the destruction of so many official and formal election documents and broken seals. The particular gentlemen who should have been outraged at the sight of unsealed bags (or bags with broken seals) and who should have forcefully proposed swift criminal action against those who destroyed official record under his own watch, smugly endeavored to brush the dirt under the carpet. (Although his counts differ slightly from those relied upon in this Paper, they attest to a greater, not lesser, destruction).

134. Noting, in his report to the ECP, as per his observations, that:-

i. As many as 127 bags were found with broken seals and 31 bags were without any seal at all (making it 152 bags out of 264);

ii. As many as 49 bags (Out of 112 that were inspected) yielded evidence that Form XIV (the result sheet) had been destroyed;

iii. As many as 55 bags (Out of 112 inspected) yielded evidence that Form XV (the account of ballots) had been destroyed;

iv. As many as 47 bags (Out of 112) yielded evidence that the electoral rolls carrying thumb marks had been destroyed;

v. As many as 27 bags (Out of 112) yielded evidence that counterfoils had been destroyed;

he seemed least concerned and tried to trivialize this enormous crime13.

135. This is outrageous. Even if one such document had been missing, or even if the seal of one bag had been found to have been broken the learned Election Commissioner ought to have found it unacceptable. Indeed he should have been outraged. Yet on the basis of pure speculation and conjecture the ECPb, Mr. Mehboob Anwar, tried to cover up for the election fraudsters. How the ECP could have been complacent about such a report is beyond imagination.

136. Yet the learned ECPb has these lame and preposterous explanations for:-

i. Broken Seals:- His astoundingly smug reasoning (in his own words) is:

“It is pertinent to mentioned here that most of the bags were found with broken seal owing to the reason that the seals are affixed with the sealing wax and during transportation the polling bags are miss handled by the transporting staff and the sealed was is broken, torn-out and sometimes disappeared. The parties in the very first day of inspection decided not to inspect the polling bags whose seals were broken/wear out. Since it was parties decision, the undersigned or the Returning Officer had no reason to oppose or controvert their decision”.

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These figures may differ very slightly from those given in this White Paper. Those given herein are based on the

certificates appended. In any case the miniscule difference does not deter from the point that electoral material

and evidence was destroyed on a massive scale. The ECPb, for instance, counts 152 bags with broken seals and

with no seals at all. This is more than the count (147) herein. In any case the author is prepared even to go by the

figures given in the Report of the ECPb. The point will remain the same, perhaps become more authentic.

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Comment: How preposterous! Sealing wax is not the same as candle wax. Wax-seals last for centuries. And no party, not even the learned advocate of the Returned Candidate came up with such an ingenuous explanation for the simple reason that the inspection had revealed brutality with these seals. The ECPb has introduced this new terminology in bad faith.

ii. Unsealed Bags:- The ECPb lends another preposterous explanation:

“Similarly, out of 264 bags 31 polling bags were found unsealed, due to the reason that such bags were jointly sealed with the polling bags of provincial assembly constituency No. PP-145 and PP-146 when the same were retrieved from the Treasury the staff separated them from the polling bags of provincial assembly constituencies and seals were broken in such a way that they were looking as if never sealed”. Comment: Equally ridiculous is the explanation that the bags found unsealed had been jointly sealed with provincial polling bags and hence carried no marks of any seal whatsoever. None of these bags were jointly sealed, and even if they had beenso “sealed”, some slightest mark at least, of the seal should have remained. The bags with no seals were different from single digit number of bags tied together (and not “jointly sealed”) with Provincial bags. The learned advocate of the Returned Candidate aptly registered this observation in his very few objections (only 12) recorded on specific certificates. These were NOT those bags. This is a deliberate misrepresentation betraying the ROs and ECPb’s own culpability and involvement.

iii. Destruction of Documents:-

“As regards the polling bags which were open but requisite documents were not found available therein it is submitted that there is probability that the same documents might have mistakenly been inserted by the Presiding Officers concerned in the polling bags of the corresponding constituencies of the Provincial Assembly Punjab i.e. PP-145 and PP-146. Since those bags could not be retrieved without orders of the Commission or the Tribunal, this could not be confirmed”. Comment: What a cruel joke on the electoral system that the certified destruction of no less than 178 crucial and mandatory electoral documents prescribed by statute (out of only 112 inspected bags) should be met with such complacency on the part of the most authoritative official who presided over the general election in the largest province of Pakistan! His complacency and indifference obviously points to cover up and complicity. How could an election have been fair with such a tainted official presiding over it? And how can the Election Commissioner himself shrug away the destruction of as many as 178 electoral documents from a mere 119 polling bags (those inspected) by speculating that these must have gone into provincial bags? Are National and Provincial bags even opened at the same time? NEVER. It would be naïve for anyone to believe such fairytales.

137. On receiving such a preposterous report the ECP should immediately have put the ECPb to task for such dereliction from duty. But it did not. If nothing else, the figures that he himself has provided in his report should have caused a shock in the exalted ranks of the ECP. But it did not.

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Here was hard evidence of massive destruction of statutory electoral record. It should have outraged the members of the ECP. But it did not.

138. Such has been the involvement of the majority of the election officials on behalf of the PML-N that even after the polls, and even long after the electoral process came to a close, several Election Tribunals continued to distort facts to favour PML-N candidates. One such glaring example is that of Mr. Kazim Ali Malik, constituting the learned Election Tribunal, Lahore. He distorted the very substance of the certificates to favour the PML-N’s Returned Candidate.

THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL:

139. Having deferred to the authenticity of all the certificates and attestations during an inspection spanning several days, the PML-N’s Returned Candidate, Sheikh Rohail Asghar, realized the adverse significance of the evidence that these certificates contained. Belatedly, and as an afterthought, he moved an application to the learned Election Tribunal seeking that the certificates be declared as mere receipts of applications for copies of the documents and not what they indeed were: vis attestations of observed facts.

140. In the meantime the PTI candidate, Mr. Waleed Iqbal who had filed an Election Petition, sought to place the original certificates he had obtained on the file of that Petition.

141. As can be seen from the certificates themselves (appended herewith) they were attestations and endorsements of facts observed on applications submitted to the RO/ECPb seeking attestation of the precise observed facts of broken seals and missing documents. When endorsed, these became certificates.

142. Even though the request made by the Returned Candidate was ex facie contrary to the very contents of the certificates which had been issued with the returned candidate’s consent, Mr. Kazim Ali Malik instantly obliged. Vide his order dated 24.04.2014 he declared the certificates of facts as mere receipts through logic that is facetious and spurious.

(A copy of the order is at APPENDIX Z).

143. Mrs. Bushra Aitzaz Ahsan has moved an application before the ECP against the aforementioned order which is also annexed as APPENDIX AA.

144. In fact there was more to come. On the last date of his current and expected tenure, Mr. Kazim Ali Malik dismissed the election petition filed by PTI candidate Waleed Iqbal reserving the detailed and reasoned judgment to be written later. It is another matter that it is not permissible for judges, other than those of superior courts, to pass judgments piecemeal. But how could the learned judge ignore the vast corpus of evidence contained in appendices to this White Paper which Iqbal had sought to bring on the record through a formal application? It defies logic, but can only be attributed to partisan loyalty that induced a defiance of law and reason.

145. In this environment of intense party loyalty, is it difficult then to understand why all but the PML-N Polling Agents were rendered ineffective. And by the time they might have reacted they were demoralized by the airing of a barrage of untimely and premature results from the centralized fabricated spread-sheets attributing a stunning victory to the iron-fisted Sharifs. As a consequence Polling Agents did not resist refusal by Presiding Officers to provide them with certified results. If any were provided, these were scratches on ordinary paper or unsigned Forms XIV, not worth preserving. IN ANY CASE THE ORIGINALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE BAGS. THEY WERE NOT. What is the explanation for their absence from the so many bags. This was no mistake or negligence. It was a design to rob an electorate of an election.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE ONLY RECOMMENDATION

146. The simple purpose of this White Paper was to document the criminal acts committed by the some elements in the electoral administration during the election in May 2013 in just one constituency: NA 124 Lahore VII. It is not the purpose here to make a comprehensive list of recommendations to prevent such acts in the future. I hope this will generate an informed debate among practitioners and academics alike that will lead to the best possible course of action. A high-level Parliamentary Committee has been established and is at work while taking all stake-holders on board.

147. But such a document as this would be incoherent without at least a suggestion from the author.

148. I personally think that the law itself is fairly adequate. It is an honest implementation of that law that is wanting. The need therefore is for processes to frustrate the designs of those who plan to subvert the proper and fair application of the law.

149. The one crucial point is to eliminate the scope of human interference in the poll and the count. That is the one most fundamental reform. That alone needs to be radically addressed.

150. For this purpose recourse must be had to technology and to providing for proper oversight. The use of biometrics was meant to ensure that only the real voter in person should be able to cast his own vote and that each vote thus cast be counted.

151. But verification of thumb impressions has been denied by combined efforts of the ROs, the government and the NADRA chief. The ROs destroyed or mutilated electoral lists carrying thumb impressions. The government went back on its promise to facilitate verification. And its chosen NADRA chief is alleged to have himself tampered with the lists of the only constituency, NA 118, that came in for comprehensive biometric verification during his watch. Therefore water-tight measures must be instituted in the process.

152. The Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) has been found most appropriate for this purpose. It has been used by 400 million voters in neighboring India. It allows for instant biometric verification. It obviates the possibility of the wrong person casting a vote.

153. The fear will, however, remain of a diabolical hacking or distorting of the process by in-built and automatic “commands” inserted in the computing brain. This could take the result quite off the mark. What then to do?

154. Here, importantly, I recommend a Dual Voting System (DVS) that remains instant and accurate. It will be the most critical reform in the electoral process.

155. The dual voting system that I recommend needs to be devised and put in use. It is quite simple.

156. As the voter approaches the EVM it reads his thumb impression and allows him both:

First to push a button against the name and picture of her/his favored candidate thus casting her/his vote electronically in her/his favour.

Second, and simultaneously, the machine rolls out a paper ballot which the voter will himself cast as he presently does under the RPA.

157. Such a process will allow a dual audit of the poll in any case of dispute. There will be the electronic vote and also the physical ballot. In most cases the EVM count w ill be believed. Only

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in case of disputes in individual constituencies these can be tallied and the process of subverting the mandate avoided. The physical paper ballot will remain a resource to counter check the result if necessary. Its availability will also dissuade and discourage any potential hacker.