airpower in the post cold war 1. gulf war background the enemy the plan of attack objectives ...
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Airpower in the Post Cold War
1
Gulf War Background The Enemy The Plan of Attack
Objectives Concept of Operations Five Strategic Rings Targets Phases of the Campaign
Operations PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH The Conflict and Lessons Learned
Overview I
2
Operation SOUTHERN WATCHThe Conflict and Lessons Learned
Operations PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPEThe Conflict and Lessons Learned
History of the BalkansBackground Ethnic Groups
Overview II
3
Operation DENY FLIGHTThe Conflict and Lessons Learned
Operation ALLIED FORCEBackgroundNATO ActionsOperation ALLIED FORCE BeginsLessons learned by US MilitaryPolitical Lessons LearnedImpact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget
CFD Review
Overview III
4
Conflict began 2 August 1990 Iraq and Kuwait could not settle grievances over oil Saddam Hussein sent armies to invade Kuwait
Gulf War Background
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Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait
Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf Protection of American citizens abroad
US Objectives
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CENTCOM CINC—Army Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf CENTAF Lt Gen Charles A. Horner
Became JFACC during the war
In first five days: Five fighter squadrons, contingent of AWACS, and part of 82d Airborne
Division Equaled Iraqi force in first 35 days
Air Reserves/Air National Guard called to active duty
Operation DESERT SHIELD
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16 Jan—An 11th-hour appeal for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait drew silence
17 Jan—Operation DESERT STORM began as allied forces answered Iraq’s silence
Within 10 days, air sorties reached the 10,000 mark
DESERT STORM Begins
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4th largest armed force in world Well over 1 million troops 750 combat and 200 support aircraft Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities SCUD Missiles
Iraqi Threat
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Iraq’s air defense system thought to be the best outside of the Soviet Union
United States was probably the only nation in the world with the airpower to “disintegrate” an integrated system of this type
Air Defense Threat
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Isolate and incapacitate Iraqi command structure Win air superiority Destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical
capabilities Eliminate Iraqi offensive military capability Eject Iraqi Army from Kuwait
Objectives
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Boyd 2 Video
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Powerful and focused air attacks on strategic centers of gravity over a short period of time Target Hussein Regime, not Iraqi
people Minimize civilian casualties and
collateral damage Minimize Coalition losses Pit US and Coalition strengths
against Iraqi weaknesses
Concept Of Operations
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Developed by Colonel John Warden and his Checkmate staff in WashingtonNamed in direct response to Vietnam’s unsuccessful
Rolling Thunder campaign
Based on a unique five-ring model of the modern nation-state
Instant Thunder
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The Five Strategic Rings
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Target Systems
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Leadership System Essentials
Infra-structure
Population Fielded Forces
Hussein Regime
Electricity
Oil Railroads
Bridges Strategic Psyops
- Iraqis
Destroy Strategic Air Defense
Incapacitate Tele- communications - Civil - Military
- Only internal distribution and storage, not production export capability
- Foreign workers
Destroy Strategic Offense - Bombers - Missiles
Damage Internal Control Org.
Nuclear Biological Chemical Research Facility
Tactical Psyops - Soldiers in Kuwait
Republican Guard
Horner 2 Video
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Four Part Campaign: Phase I: Strategic Air Campaign Phase II: Suppression of enemy Air Defenses over Kuwait vicinity Phase III: Air Attacks on ground forces in Kuwait and vicinity Phase IV: Ground Operations as directed
Campaign Overview
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On 27 Feb 1991, the Iraqi military was scattered and defeated Iraq lost 90 aircraft to coalition forces 122 Iraqi aircraft fled to Iran
Stealth provided the needed edge The Persian Gulf War officially
ended on 11 Apr 1991
And in the end…
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Post-Desert Storm Video
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UN Security Council established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish people from attacks by Saddam Hussein
Operation Provide Comfort began on 5 Apr 1991 as a humanitarian relief effort to deliver food, clothing, and supplies to Iraq’s Kurdish refugees
C-130s began airdropping supplies on 7 Apr 1991 Lasted approximately 8 years and was then replaced by
Operation NORTHERN WATCH
The Crisis in Iraq—ONW
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The need to avoid fratricide The limitations of airdrops Host-country tensions The need for alternate bases Lack of an exit strategy
The Crisis in Iraq:Lessons Learned—ONW
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OSW was a Combined Task Force enforcing the “no-fly zone” below the 32nd parallel (extended to 33rd in 1996) in southern Iraq
Not an aggression against Iraq—executed as a self-defense measure Coalition partners included the US, UK, France, Saudi Arabia, and
Kuwait Fire from more than 850 Iraqi SAMs and AAAs directed at coalition
aircraft Iraq violated the no-fly zone more than 160 times More than 150,000 USAF sorties by 1998
The Crisis in Iraq—OSW
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General Ronald R. Fogleman Jul 1995
“What we’ve effectively done since 1992 is conduct an air occupation of a country…”
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Became a test for USAF AEF concept in Oct 1995 Quality-of-life changes needed due to high Ops-Tempo Reorganized Security Forces
The Crisis in Iraq:Lessons Learned—OSW
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In mid-1992, drought and civil war devastated Somalia Food supplies became a weapon of war Operation PROVIDE RELIEF began by the United States on
22 Aug 1992 to deliver food to Somali refugees Military and civilian aircraft used Over 2,000 sorties, carrying 48,162 metric tons of food
The Crisis in Somalia
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Although a humanitarian effort: 44 American soldiers lost their lives 175 were injured or wounded
Danger of failure due to warlord interference Operation Restore Hope
Coalition peacekeeping operation from 9 Dec 1992 to 4 May 1993 First test of Rapid Global Mobility
from the CONUS
The Crisis in Somalia
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First large scale test of newly formed AMC and the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC)
Difficulties evolved in the planning, coordinating, and managing the operation
Austere infrastructure of Somalia added to lack of adequate bases for strategic airlift aircraft
The Crisis in Somalia:Lessons Learned
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After World War II, monarchy abolished; Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the country the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with himself as prime Minister
Eliminating opposition, the Tito gov’t executed Mihajlovic in 1946
Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent
The Balkans: A Brief History
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After World War II, monarchy abolished; Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the country the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with himself as prime Minister
Eliminating opposition, the Tito gov’t executed Mihajlovic in 1946
Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent
The Balkans: A Brief History
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Serbs—Dominant in Yugoslavia's politics and army, orthodox Christianity makes them natural allies of Russia
Croats—Roman Catholics, closer to the West than Serbs and exposed to Western Influences
Muslims—Living mainly in ethnically mixed towns and cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Three Ethnic Groups In Conflict
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Oct 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 781 established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina
Operation DENY FLIGHT Enforced the no-fly zone Provided close air support to UN troops Conducted approved air strikes under a dual-key command arrangement
with the UN 28 Feb 1994, NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes violating the no-
fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina This was the first military engagement ever undertaken by the Alliance
Operation DENY FLIGHT
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NATO objectives Bosnian Serb compliance to cease attacks on Sarajevo and other
safe areas Withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total
exclusion zone around Sarajevo Complete freedom of movement for UN Forces and personnel, and
nongovernment officials Unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport
Operation DENY FLIGHT
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NATO missions of Operation DENY FLIGHTTo conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance
with UN Security Council Resolution 816To provide close air support for UN troops on the
ground at the request of, and controlled by, UN forcesTo conduct approved air strikes
against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas
Operation DENY FLIGHT
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Operation DENY FLIGHT lasted from 12 Apr 93 – 20 Dec 95 Almost 100,000 sorties flown
A formal closure ceremony was held in Vicenza, Italy on 21 Dec 95 Forces associated with Operation DENY FLIGHT were then
transferred to Operation DECISIVE ENDEAVOR as part of the overall NATO operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
Operation DENY FLIGHT
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Lack of doctrine Tactical air and space power problems Bases weren’t large enough to accept the
contingency surges Coalition/Joint problems Technological problems
The Crisis in Bosnia:Lessons Learned
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KOSOVO
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Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population, the majority of which are ethnic Albanians (Muslims)
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital
The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move
Kosovo Crisis
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Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region
Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions
President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO
United States & NATOInterests at Stake
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Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region
Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions
President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO
United States & NATOInterests at Stake
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After the failure of repeated international diplomatic efforts since the spring of 1998 to peacefully resolve the conflict in Kosovo
North Atlantic Council decided on 23 March 1999 to authorize NATO air strikes
Aimed at strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to end the repression of Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav government
NATO Action
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A stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression
The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police, and paramilitary forces
The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
NATO’s Objectives
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The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons
Establish political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law
NATO’s Objectives (cont’d)
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The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons
Establish political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law
NATO’s Objectives (cont’d)
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Demonstrate the seriousness of their opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans
Deter Milosevic’s attacks on helpless civilians, and reverse ethnic cleansing
Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo
NATO’s Strategic Objectives
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“Degrade and damage the military and security structure President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.”
William Cohen, SECDEF
15 April 1999
Military Objective
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Kosovo War Aims• Stop the Serbian
slaughter and expulsion of ethnic Albanians
• Remove Milosevic from power
• Accomplish the above with minimal collateral damage and NATO casualties
Lessons Learned onKosovo War Objectives
US Grand Strategy Maintain a peaceful,
prosperous US-led Europe
Convince NATO to transition from old Cold War common defense against external threats to new Continental security coalition
Persuade NATO to acquire means and will to conduct out of area military ops
European Strategy
Maintain a peaceful, prosperous, and independent Europe
Prevent spillover into Albania and Macedonia, then to Greece and Turkey
Maintain NATO relationship with Russia and give it a role in helping end the crisis
Demonstrate European unity
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Common Effort Concealed Widely Differing ObjectivesCommon Effort Concealed Widely Differing Objectives
United States air refuelers were stretched thin during operation Force structure numbers and resources were inadequate for current
level of commitments (all services); support and training as important to victory as strike
Older platforms with smart weapons may be seen as good enough; smart weapons may be better than smart platforms
Need the right force structure for the future C4ISR is currently the weakest link in joint and coalition ops On the brink of another “hollow force”
Lessons Learnedby US Military
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Militarily, Europe remains dependent on Americans Best technology, weapons, and platforms “Made in USA.” Politicians unwilling to pay the cost of matching unique US
capabilities
United States cannot always be counted on to serve the Alliance’s interests US focus shifted with opinion polls Fear US commitment could falter if US forces take heavy casualties
Political Lessons Learnedby Europeans
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European Union can provide diplomatic muscle (Martti Ahtisaari saves the day); many foreign policy interests are similar among EU Nations Threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism Humanitarian (ethnic cleansing) Need to build external identity
Europe can overcome internal diversity to maintain cohesion German Luftwaffe conducted first combat missions since 1945 Greece provided logistical support despite popular opposition Italy and France (which have Communist ministers) offered air bases
Political Lessons Learnedby Europeans
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No DOD/Allied spending surge like post-Desert Storm International defense market continues to shrink Readiness and retention will increasingly consume $$$$ for
modernization Inevitable tax cut legislation will further erode DOD budgets Services must eventually deal with the bow wave Old platforms with smart weapons were good enough Congress may balk at big bills for new platforms (JSF, F-22, CVX, DD-21) Support forces will need big $$$$ too
Impact of Kosovo Lessons Learnedon Future DOD Budget Trends
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“We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.”
Jacques Gansler Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
“We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.”
Jacques Gansler Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Distinctive Capabilities—Air and space expertise, capabilities, and technological know-how
Functions—Broad, fundamental, and continuing activities of air and space power
Doctrine—Fundamental principles that guide the actions of military forces in support of national objectives
Review of CFD Model
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CFD Model
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Time Period DistinctiveCapabilities
Functions(missions)
Doctrinal Emphasis
DESERT STORM
Air Superiority Precision
Engagement Global Attack Information
Superiority Agile Combat
Support Rapid Global
Mobility
Strategic Attack Air Refueling Command and Control (C2) Counterair Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
Strategic air attack (precision weapons/stealth)
Suppress enemy air defenses
PROVIDE COMFORT/ NORTHERN WATCH
Rapid Global Mobility
Air Superiority
Airlift Counter Air Strategic Attack Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
Protect northern Iraqi no-fly zone
Humanitarian airdrops for refugees
SOUTHERN WATCH
Precision Engagement
Air Superiority
Counter Air Strategic Attack Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
Theater attack of military targets
Time Period DistinctiveCapabilities
Functions(missions)
Doctrinal Emphasis
PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE
Rapid Global Mobility
Global Attack Air Superiority Agile Combat
Support
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Counter Air/Land Strategic Attack Airlift/Special Operations
AEF concept Humanitarian airdrops
for refugees Strategic Attack
DENY FLIGHT
Air Superiority Information
Superiority Agile Combat
Support
Counterair Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Counterland
No defined doctrine
ALLIED FORCE
Air Superiority Precision
Engagement
Strategic Attack Counterland Intelligence
Strategic attacks on ethnic cleansing Serbs and military capabilities
CFD Model
55
Gulf War Background The Enemy The Plan of Attack
Objectives Concept of Operations Five Strategic Rings Targets Phases of the Campaign
Operations PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH The Conflict and Lessons Learned
Summary I
56
Operation SOUTHERN WATCH The Conflict and Lessons Learned
Operations PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE The Conflict and Lessons Learned
History of the Balkans Background Ethnic Groups
Summary II
57
Operation DENY FLIGHT The Conflict and Lessons Learned
Operation ALLIED FORCE Background NATO Actions Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins Lessons learned by US Military Political Lessons Learned Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget
CFD Review
Summary III
58