air power in the mediterranean november 1942 february 1945 part 1 of 4

7/29/2019 Air Power in the Mediterranean November 1942 February 1945 Part 1 of 4

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MEDiTERRA NEANO VEM KR I


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Office of the Commander-in-ChiefHEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCESA.P.O. 650

27 February 1945

SUBJECT: Air Power in the Ifediterranean.TO : Group and Wing Commanders,

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

1. At the suggestion of the Assistant Chief of StaffIntelligence, Headquarters, Army Air Forces this series ofbrief studies covering the history and the principal tasksof "Air Power in the Ifediterranean" has been prepared by theHistorical Section, Headquarters, M.A.A.F.2 . Originally these papers were to be used as aconvenient and quick reference on M.A.A.F. to acquaintinterested persons, such as student officers and instructorsat A.A.F. training establishments, with some of the commitmentsof our units and how these have been discharged. Included alsowas a statement on the enemy.3* When I read the completed studies it occurred to methat they might be of interest to Group and Wing Commanders.This folder has therefore been reproduced for your use.4* M.A.A.F. today is an organization of over a quarter

million officers and men, wearing several uniforms, flying thirtytypes of aircraft, widely scattered geographically and engaged ina variety of tasks. I believe all of us will benefit by keepingan over-all perspective of the past achievements and presentassignments of this great aggregation of air power.5. The inclosed material is unclassified.

iIRA C. EAKER

Lieutenant General, U.S.A.Commanding


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CONDENSED SUMMARY OF AIR FORGES ACTIVITYIN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATREThe successive achievements of the Air Forces in this Theatre which are libelow combine to illustrate the following three outstanding features in theiroperations:a. They have carried on, practically simultaneously, the widest variety ofcombat air activities, - including six major amphibious operations,strategic bombing, ground support, interdiction of enemy communicationsconvoy protection, rear defense and supply dropping to Partisan formatib. Through their thoroughness and enterprise they have innovated and estab"" lished methods particularly in the field of tactical operations which hbeen of value in all our Theatres of War. They have maintained a combined Allied command, the success of the opertions having reflected the harmony of the combined direction and theefficiency which has resulted by reason of an assignment of aircraft byfunction rather than by nationality.A selection of the more significant achievements of these Air Forces would

include:au The establishment of air superiority in North Africa in February, 1943 b. The interdiction of German supply lines to Tunisia. . The close support accorded to our armies during the last phase of theNorth African campaign.d. The reduction of Pantelleria._e. The destruction of enemy air forces in Sicily,f. The reduction of enemy air opposition to our landings at Salerno, Anzioin Southern France, On the first two occasions, in addition, soon aftethe landings, a major crisis was turned in our favor by a mass air attaagainst enemy concentration,. . The offensive against the Ploesti oilfields,h. Participation with the 8th Air Force in destroying the German airplaneindustry.i. Operation "Strangle", - the systematic cutting of enemy lines of communtion, an operation which played a large part in winning the battle of Rand the advance into Umbria and Tuscany.^. A large role in convoy defense and the anti-submarine war in theMediterranean.k. A programme of supply dropping to the Partisan formations in YugoslaviaFrance, Northern Italy and Poland, and cooperation with the Russian forin SE Europe.For a more detailed account of these activities see Appendices as listed othe next page.


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tasks anevolutio


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THE PRESENT TASKS AND THE EVOLUTIONQF

AI.I.TRD AIR POTflER IN THB MEDITERRANEAN

T he M e d i t e r r an e a n A l l i e d A i r F o r c e s ha ve f o u r p r im a r y t a s k s . The f i r s t . wth e S tr a te g i c A ir F or ce , i s t o b r in g maximum p r es su re on German in d u s t ry . Thes e c o n d i s t o s u p p o r t , w i t h t h e T a c t i c a l A i r F o r c e , th e l a n d a r m i e s i n b a t t l e . t h i r d i s t o a s s i s t i n k e e p i n g t h e s e a l a n e s o f c om m u n ic at io n o p e n , p r o t e c t i n g os h i p p i n g , o u r h a r b o r s a n d o u r r e a r e s t a b l i s h m e n t s fr om enem y a i r a c t i o n . Thef o u r t h m a j o r t a s k i s t o s u p p l y t h e maxim um c o o p e r a t i o n t o t h e P a r t i s a n s i n t h eB a l k a n s *T he o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e M e d i t er r a n e an A l l i e d A i r F o r c e s i s d e s i g n e d t o p r oa m a j o r u n i t f o r t h e p e r fo r m a n c e o f e a c h o f t h e s e p r im a r y t a s k s . The S t r a t e g i cF a r c e , c o m po se d o f t h e U . S . F i f t e e n t h A i r F o r c e a n d t h e B r i t i s h 205 Grou p , i so r g a n i z e d p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e a c c om p l is h m e nt o f th e f i r s t t a s k . I t s l o n g - r a n g e b

e r s a i m a t t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f German i n d u s t r y , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r e m p h a s is a t p r e so n o i l p r o d u c t i o n a n d s t o r e s . T he T a c t i c a l A i r F o r c e , c om p os ed o f th e A m e r ic a nT w e l f t h A i r F o r c e a n d t h e B r i t i s h D e s e r t A i r F o r c e , s u p p o r t s t h e E i g h t h a n d F i fAr mie s in t h e i r l an d cam p aign s . The b omb ers o f th e T ac t i ca l A ir Force now h avet h e i r p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f German c o m m u n i ca t io n s i n t h e P o V a l la n d B r e n n e r B a s s . T he C o a s t a l A i r F o r c e i s o r g a n i z e d t o p r o t e c t ou r s h i p p i n g lf r om en em y a i r a t t a c k s a n d t o l o c a t e a n d d e s t r o y en em y s u bm a r in e s a n d s h i p p i n g .i s a l s o c h a r g e d w i t h t h e d e f e n s e o f o u r h a r b o r s a n d r e a r e c h e l o n s , s u p p l y d e p o ta n d e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . And t h e B a lk a n A i r F or ce i s p r i m a r i l y c t e r g e d w i t h t h eo p e r a t i o n s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e P a r t i s a n s .For th e accomp l i sh men t o f t h e se t a s k s , Mf&F now d i s p o se s , an d h as d i sp ose ds i n c e A p r i l 1 9 4 4 w hen i t r e a c h e d f u l l s t r e n g t h , som e 1 3 i 0 0 0 a i r p l a n e s a nd s a ne3 0 0 , 0 0 0 o f f i c e r s a n d m e n , o f w h i ch s l i g h t l y more t h a n h a l f a r e A m e r i ca n a n d t h er e s t B r i t i s h . D u r in g 1 9 4 4 t h i s g r e a t a g g r e g a t i o n o f s t r i k i n g p ow er p l a y e d a mr o l e i n t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e E u ro p ea n w ar a n d b r o u gh t t o f u l l f r u i t i o n t h e d e v e l om e nt o f a i r p o w er w h i c h b e g a n w i t h t h e v i c t o r i e s o f E l A l a m e i n a nd t h e i n v a s i o nN o r t h A f r i c a i n t h e F a l l o f 1 9 4 2 .A i r P o w e r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o o u r p r o g r e s s s i n c e t h e n c an be su m m ar iz ed s t ai c a l l y 5 4 5 0 0 t o n s o f bom bs d r o p p e d , 8 , 7 3 3 en em y a i r c r a f t s h o t do w n. I t c asu m ma riz ed b y t h e l o n g l i s t o f v i c t o r i e s won - T u n i s i a , P a n t e l l e r i a , P l o e s t i , aso on . Bu t over an d ab ove th e bombs d ropp ed an d th e b a t t l e s won i n th e p a s t twy e a r s , t h e A l l i e d A i r F o r c e s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n h av e m ade t wo g r e a t c o n t r i b u tt o t h e A l l i e d c a u s e e v e r y w h e r e . F o r t h e M e d i t e r r a ne a n T h e a t r e h a s b e e n t h e p r ic r u c i b l e f o r t h e d e v el o pm e n t o f t a c t i c a l a i r p ow er a n d t h e e v o l u t i o n o f j o i n tcom mand b e t w e en A l l i e s .


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Ever sin ce E l Alamein the M editerranean has been a laboratory for ta c t ic a l fo rc es , ju st as England has been the primary te st in g ground of s tr at eg ic a ir foEach succeeding ba ttl e in the long march acros s Africa through Tunis to S ic il y ,Italy and Southern France witnessed further improvements in the tactical employmof a ir power. The join t U.S. and B ri ti sh la c t ic a l Air Force in the Mediterranehas the lo ng est exp erience of any of our a ir f or ce s i n the a rt of supportingground advances by a ir ac ti on . I t s recent opera tions , es p ec ia lly in the Ba ttle Rome, have been recog nized a s m asterp ieces of th at a rt and a model for a ir suppprocedure in a l l war th ea ter s.

Similarly the Mediterranean has been our first and most complete laboratoryin developing e ff ic ie n t jo in t management, not only between Br iti sh and Americanbut with the French, Yugo slavs, and other A l l i e s . There i s no be tte r example ofhow the many diverse elements in the Mediterranean have been welded into an intgrated whole than the evo lu tio n of a ir command in Afr ica and I t a ly . In England American and B ri tis h a ir forces have, un ti l rec en tly , operated almost en ti re ly onatio nal l i n e s . In the Mediterranean, however, for nearly two years the B ri ti shand American a ir fo rc es have been merged i n a u nifi ed chain of command of which org an izatio n of Mediterranean A llie d Air Forces at the beginning of 1944 was theultim ate development. The les so ns thus learned i n management and coop era tionbetween A ll ie s have been a major contribu tion to our ef fic ien cy in the jo in t prsecution of the war everywhere.

The history of the air forces in the ifediterranean falls naturally into thrph ase s. The f ir s t phase, which extended un ti l February 1943 began with the DeA ir Force a t E l A la me in and the embryo Twelfth Air Force a t Casablanca and endewith both of them converging on Tun isia . The second phase covers the career of Northwest A frican A ir Force and the Mediterranean Ai r Command from February 1943u n ti l December 1943* These two org aniza tions represen ted the fi r s t assembling the v ar ious A ll ie d a ir forces under one management. Under A ir Chief Jforshal Teand General Spaatz they conducted the Tunisian campaign, the invasion of Sicily the conquest of Southern Ita ly as fa r north as C assino . The th ird and fi n a l phdates from the c re at ion of M editerranean A ll ie d A ir Forces in December 1943 u nthe pr es en t. This period has seen the b at tle lin e advance from Cassino to Bolothe conquest of the Balkans and of IJrance, the tremendous battle of Ploesti andthe cl ea ri ng of the enemy from almost the whole Mediterranean.At the time of the landing in North Africa the Tw elfth A ir Force c on sis ted

only 551 ai rc r a ft . By February, when the Desert Air Force was link ed w ith i t inNorthwest Afr ican Air F orces , the Twelfth had grown to 1,038 pl an es . The f i r s tgr ea t achievement of the Northwest Africa n A ir Forces was the estab lishm ent ofcomplete a ir su pe rio rit y in A fr ica . The second was the in te rd ic tio n o f Germansupply li n e s to Tun isia by bombing p o r ts , sinking sh ip s and shoo ting down the a

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convoys which were the Germans' desperate last resort. The elimination of Germair power and the cutting of German supply lines were two of the major reasons the complete collapse of the German armies in Tunisia. A third contribution ofAllied air power to that great victory was the intense close support of our troin the final break-through. Here the newly formed Tactical Air Force brought ta new peak of proficiency the tactics learned by the Desert Air Force since ElAlamein and the Twelfth Air Force since Casablanca. All told in the North Africampaign the air forces dropped 11,708 tons of bombs, shot down 1,304 Axis aircraft and sank 76 Axis ships. Our own losses, both British and American, were Next came Bantelleria, history's first example of territorial conquest by action. Between 30 Ifey and 11 June our planes flew 5,252 sorties and dropped6,313 tons on this hapless island, whose capitulation provided the advance fighbase needed to invade Sicily.The Allied Air Forces' indispensable contribution to the conquest of Sicilbetween 10 July and 17 August 1943 was the destruction of the Axis air forcesconcentrated there. Between July first and D-day 2,925 sorties were directedagainst enemy airfields, wiping out several hundred Axis planes on the ground.The measure of the success of this counter air offensive is the fact that theSicilian invasion took place with only token opposition from the Luftwaffe. Th

same pattern was repeated in the Southern Italy invasion. The spectacular straing of the 200 JU-38's concentrated at Foggia enabled the Salerno beachhead to established without air opposition. And when the Salerno battle was at its crithe air forces for two days in succession mustered more than 1,000 sorties, effively halting the German counter-attack. Nowadays, 1,000 sorties is an ordinarw a s a n e wday's work. But in September 1943 i* achievement to put that manyaircraft over a distant beachhead.At the end of the Tunisian campaign the Allied air forces totalled 2,630American airplanes, 1,076 British and 94 French, making a total of 6,43. Bythe time southern Italy had been conquered in the Fall of 1943 tlie NorthwestAfrican Air Force had increased to a total of 7.59 aircraft and a new element

had appeared on the scene of the Fifteenth Air Force, which was created Novembe1, 1943 out of XII Bomber Command in order to take advantage of the strategicbombardment possibilities which had become available to us through the captureof the Foggia airfields. With the movement of the war entirely away from NorthAfrica, it was obviously time to reorganize the air structure. Accordingly, inearly December all the air forces in the Mediterranean and including R.A.F. MidEast were merged into the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. This brought Alliedair power in the Mediterranean to its final organizational form and was followewithin a few months by the achievement of its full strength in airplanes. Thegreat build-up was in heavy bombers and came in the Spring of 1944 when fifteenU.S. groups poured into the Fifteenth Air Force in the space of two and a halfmonths! By the first week of April, therefore, when the Strategic Air Force beits great offensive against Ploesti, MAAF's strength had reached the tremendous


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total of 13t974 aircraft and 273 gliders. Much of this comprised non-operationaircraft (four thousand odd in R.A.F. Middle East, for example) but even so thetotal in tactical units was very large - 5#192.The great build-up of the air forces is dramatically reflected in thestatistics of the difficult amphibious assault at Anzio. Whereas the Allied aiforces had put up 25i000 sorties in support of the invasion of Sicily and 29.00in support of the Salerno landings, for Anzio the total came to 54000. As atSicily and Salerno, the air forces kept the beachhead at Anzio free of all buttoken enemy air opposition. And when the German counter-attack a month afterthe landing threatened to push the beachhead back into the sea the air forcesagain mustered every available plane to play a major role in stopping the Germaattack.

STRANGLE

Following the stalemate at Anzio and Cassino the Allied air forces in theMediterranean were employed in the now famous STRANGLE operation whose purpose wto cut the German lines of supply down Italy until the German armies were so weaened logistically that they would be unable to withstand a major Allied assault.Between 15 March and 11 May, when the ground advance began, MAAF devoted 65,003effective sorties and 331O4 tons of bombs to this enormous interdiction prograFrom 24 March onward its bridge-busting tactics resulted in the cutting of all lines south of Pisa. The desperate Germans tried barges down the coast and motconvoys down the roads. Air power shot both to bits. When the ground armies sued forward in eerly May the Germans no longer had the muscle to withstand them.While they fell back in disorganized rout, MAAF kept up its pressure on communiions, concentrating on motor, of which Tactical Air Force destroyed 6,577- Bet12 May and 22 June MAAF flew another 72,946 sorties and dropped 51,500 tons ofbombs. This scale of effort averages out to 1,352 effective sorties and 843 toper day. Cost was 803 planes, or only .0058% of effective sorties. But perhapthe most revealing figure is the number of cuts maintained in rail lines. In Msuch cuts averaged 71 in existence each day.

With the battle for Rome won, MAAF turned its attention to the invasion ofsouthern France. Here again air and ground formed a close partnership. The laings were achieved without air opposition from the enemy and with a minimum ofresistance from German batteries on the shore, all of which had been neutralizeby intensive aerial and naval bombardment. In the space between 10 August, whethe preliminary bombing began, and 11 September, when the Seventh Army made conwith the Third, MAAF flew 23,808 sorties and dropped 14.030 tons of bombs in Fr

PL0ESTIOp eration STRANGLE and the in v a si o n of Sou ther n France were p ri m ar ily the

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responsibility of the Tactical Air Force, though the Strategic joined in on manyan occasion. Strategics main function, of course, was the prosecution of theDonfoing offensive against German war industry. Carefully integrated with theEighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command in England, its attacks have ranged fromsouthern France through Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. Strategic *s destruction of the Bfesserschmitt factories at Wiener Neustadt was a majocontribution to the elimination of the Luftwaffe. Another Strategic milestonewas the execution of the first shuttle mission to Russia. But undoubtedly themost significant achievement of the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force wasthe battle of Ploesti - an epic in the history of air war.Air operations against Ploesti started on 5 April 1944, eight months after low-level attack by aircraft of the U.S. Eighth and Ninth Air Forces then operatfrom Middle Bast bases, and lasted until 19 August 1944. During this almost 5month period. Fifteenth Air Force heavy bombers flew 6,186 sorties, dropped 13,4tons of bombs, were escorted by 3,400 fighters.Twenty daylight missions were flown over what was the third most heavily defended target on the continent (protected by 240 plus heavy guns). The 205 Grou

(RAF), which with the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force comprises the Mediterranean AlliStrategic Air Force, conducted four night attacks against Ploesti oil and contrited substantially to the overall success of the Ploesti campaign.The largest single source of German oil, Rumania contained some >$% of althe crude oil production in German Europe. And 85% of Rumania's petroleum wasprocessed at Ploesti, whose refineries in April 1944 were potentially capable othroughput of 602,000 tons per month. Actual average monthly throughput at thetime was 366,000 tons and the difference was excess capacity, or cushion, which to be destroyed before refinery production could be effectively reduced.With the beginning of the concerted offensive on 5 April production started

decline. From April to 23 August 1944f when the refineries shut down, an averagof but 140,000 tons of crude oil were refined monthly, which was 3856 of the JanuIferch average. The total five months estimated reduction was 1,129,000 tons, a62% loss to Germany. Tbese figures are all taken from official refinery recordscaptured at Ploesti after Rumania's surrender.

The loss of Ploesti oil at a time when all other major enemy oil productioncenters were being systematically liquidated day by day represents a major triumph in the history of strategic air warfare.During the battle of Ploesti approximately 59.834 airmen attacked it. TheGerman fighter and flak defenses were aggressive and skilled. Nevertheless

personnel losses were kept to 4l. aggregating 2,432 men. A fitting climax to

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story of Ploesti was the rescue of l,06l of these boys from Bucharest on 31 Augand 1 and 3 September by Flying Fortresses which only 12 days earlier had takenpart in the last Ploesti mission.CONCLUSION

A fter the capture of Bone Fi eld l& rsha l (then General) S ir Harold Alexandesig na led the a ir fo rce s: "Without you we could not have done i t , " The co ld figes of Air Power's work in the Mediterranean are perhaps equally eloquent:Effort :

l tQ 33 tl 84 e f fec t ive sort i es 545tOOO tons of bombsClaims:

&7?3 enemy a ir cra ft destroyed2205 " probably destroyed3409 damaged

Losses:7888 planes

ffiftmv Transport Claimed:- 1 January 1944 to 1 February 194516,817 Motor ve h ic le s destroyed15.179 - - damaged7,465 Bailroad car s destroyed17,311 - damaged2,11 2 Locomotives destroyed2,502 N damaged

Help for the Partisans:10,000 tons of supplies dropped16,000 personnel evacuated

Strategic Btpmhafflroppti- 1 January 1944 "to 1 February 1945:Aircraft factories - 14,000 tons bombsA irf ield s - 25.000 (4535 planes destroyed)Oil Refin eries - 41,131 Oil Stor es - 7,555 - -M isc. Industry - 13,899

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Campaigns Sorties Tona Claims LossNorth Africa8 Nbv 42 to13 May 1943Bantellaria,30 May to11 June I9Z13S i c i l y ,10 July to17 Aug. 43Southern ItalyApril 1943 to20 Sept. 1943Salerno, 1 to30 SeptemberAnzio, 1 Janto 15 Feb 44Central ItalyPreliminaryPh ase , 15 Marto 11 Ifay.STRfrNGIE"C e ntr a l I ta ly12 Ifay to22 June.S. France10 Aug. t o11 Sept 44

34.974 11,708 1,304 651

5.252 6.313 236 63

25,070 16,243 293 177

277,65429,068

54,060

65,003

72,946

23,808 USftAF f ig u re s on ly j f&F not

15.38525.272

261468

169234

33.104 296 365

51.500 176

14.030a v a i l a b l e .

173

Prepared by*H is to r ia n , Hq M&AF.18 February 1945.


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air power in the mediterranean november 1942 february 1945 part 1 of 4

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