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PAGE THEGENERA

valon HiCG PhiUosophy Part 9The Jan.-Feb. issue laid a rather large

egg. It was not only our worst response (3.38)since we began rating issues, but it formed asharp contrast to the 2.64 of the precedingissue which represented our best effort.Although it was still applauded by some whofelt it was our best ever, Vol. 11, No. 5 wi ll haveto go down as a very mediocre effort. Thescattergun, twelve article format just didn'tmake it wit h the ma jority of the readership sowe'll be returning t o more in-depth features.On an individual article basis, the lead featurefailed to top the 120 0 point ratings for the'firsttime ever.

Decade With Das Afrika Korps 291The Unfought Waterloo-1704 21 8Series Replay Stalingrad 66Force or Finesse.. 15 0Richthofen s War Analys~s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .aratoga 78-Day Airborne Operations.. 53Avalon Hill Philosophy.. ............................ 3 6xperimental Panzerblitz 32es~ gn nalysis 31France 40 That Might Have Bee n. . 17Blitzkrieg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Infiltrator s Report 1

Inquiries as to the nature of n ew titles to beoffered this fall have been coming in withincreased regularity. We hesitate to announcenew titles prematurely to avoid disappointingpeople i n the fall i f something happens in theinterim. Recently, we gave up on one title afterconsiderable research and playtestingbecause i t just didn 't play right. A n ew gamesystem was required . . . ime for which wasnot available. This brings up the matter ofwhere we stand on the playability/realismscale. The Avalon H ill philosophy has alwaysbeen one of approaching wargames as gamesfirst and simulations second. Othercompaniestend to take the other course, emphasizing thehistorical replay or puzzle over the gameaspects. While we attempt to make our gamesas realistic as possible we attempt to do sowithout sacrificing the fun of a game en-vironment. This is not a knock against thosewho take the other tack, but a statemen t of ourown design philosophy.

Even the rejection mentioned above left uswith 9 different games in varying stages ofdevelopment. While it is highly unlikely thatmore than 5of thesewill see print in he fall wedo hope to add at least 1 retail and 3 mail ordergames to the l ine at that time. We are relativelysure of a few of the new titles however.Randall Reed's annual contribution will be aSci Fi tactical game tentatively titledSTARSHIP TROOPER based on the popularworks of Robert Heinlein. This will represent afirst in ying a novel into a simulation (itself, aliterary form of sorts). We are in negotiationswit h M r. Heinlein for the rights for such a tie-in, but should these not pan out the game wi llhave to be altered o a fictional world with nobase in popular fiction. In either case, youshould pick up a copy of his works if you're atall interested in this sort of thing.

Getting back to earth, the perennial WWllrelease wi ll be anextremely tactical tankgamebased on Rommel's campaigns i n Africa.Harold Hock is hedesigner and hissystem haseach counter representing a single AFV orcrew served weapon. Infantry countersrepresent 10 man squads which are reduced i n

a roster system. The game amounts to a highdetailed and complex miniatures treatmen t a boardgame. We hope to have this one reafor a lim ited pre-publica tion release in time fORIGINS I. By next issue, we may hanarrowed the selection process a bit furthand be able to describe one or more additiontitles you can look for i n the fall.Giving away the remaining obsolete parfrom 1st edition games of JUTLANCHANCELLORSVILLE and ANZlO with thpurchase of a 2nd edition copy of the game hproven to be rather popular. We regret thmany of you who bought the games whe n thfirst became available missed out on thopportunity but we cannot afford to mail theto you for free. However, we wi ll send you tremaining 1st edition parts to any one of thegames free upon request when ccomp niby ny g me order wit h which w e can ship thparts. Note tha tth iso ffe r standsonly as longthe supply of these parts lasts and we cmake no guarantees of which parts youactually get other t han that you'll receive oof everything tha t we still have in stock at thtime.The or,der dept. has also asked us to inforyou that brders of GENERAL back issues mube accompanied by sufficient funds to covpostage1 and handling. Postage is free subscription but a handling charge must paid for back issues. They also urge those you w it h P.O. Box or Rural Route addressesgive alternate mailing addresses if possibUPS is by far the safer and quicker parcdelivery service and is unavailable to thetypes of addresses. You might be well advisto have packages sent c/o a neighbor relative so your order can be handled by UPWe also regret to announce that we mudiscontinue the postage coupons fCanadians and overseas customers. Texpense of fo reign shipments forced us to tathis step, much to our displeasure.

We are continually forced to reject FSale or Wanted to Buy ads because trequired token 25C fee is not presentor gamother than collector's items are involved. eliminate any possibility of a mistake on opart we recommend you tape the quarter to ttop of the form so it isn't lost inth e mail sortiprocess.

A.R.E.A.Response to the Avalon Reliability, E

perience and Ability Rating service has bemixed and the jury iss till out on thequestionwhether it will be implementedor not.Ineithcase, don't expect any action on it before JunBy then we'll either have it in operation issue refunds to those involved.

ORI INS IThe lion's share of the Philosophy this timaround shall be devoted to the time table f

ORIGINS I. Perhaps the first order of busineis to explain that this convention is a vespecial project. At thi s time, we have no plato repeat it again next year as it s ust too muof a drain on our limited staff time; time wneed to design and playtest games. We'v

ontinued o n Page 7

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THE GENER L P GE

Richthofen s War. Fun GameAn Analysis and C ritique in One PackageBy Scott Duncan

Because it can be played with so very fewplaying pieces and brought to a definite conclu-sion in perhaps as sho rt a span o f t ime as 5-10minutes, RICHTHOFEN'S W A R must indeedrank a s the m ost elemental struggle currently inthe Avalon Hill line. Despite attract ive graphics,several scenarios with basic an d advan ced o ptions,tournament and optional rules plus a campaigngame-all indicative of a more com plex game-the basic wargaming objective of positioningoneself such that you can inflict more damageupon your opponent than he can upon you isnowhere m ore vividly portrayed th an in this game.The initial appearance of complexity and involve-ment on levels of play deep er tha n one ultimatelylearns exist is not due to a ny commercial paddingof thecompo nents to make it more marketable butto the associations which we bring to the prod uctbased on elements we see in it that suggest othergames with simulation properties. RICHTHOF-EN'S W A R d o e s n ot s t a n d u p t o m u c h i n d e p t hanalysis; it will not adeq uate ly reward the kind ofstudy we are used t o applying to other wargames.If the game is approached expecting too muchmore than a few planes trying to shoot down ordrive off a few oth er p lanes, it will inevitably findits way to collecting dust on a shelf or at thebottom of some closet. I t is a good game to beplayed and not an engrossing contest to bestudied; i t will offer some genuine enjoym ent butwill fail to provide long-term strategic/tacticalsatisfaction; it exhibits nume rous qualities which adesirable wargame m ust possess but o n a scale farsmaller than is normally en ough for mostwargame buffs over extended periods of play.Yet i t seems to me to be thisvery simplicity andstraight-forwardness which holds the real attrac-tion since wargames seem t o increase in complex i-ty and sophistication without always correspond-ingly increasing in enjoymen t. T he game s basicproblem is tha t it is strictly an air conflictsimulation with land un its merely as targets-nota particularly popular setting for wargames up tothis time. Air wargam es have severa l strikesagainst them: no real terrain over which to

struggle so it is often ha rd t o tell who is winningexcept by damage done to planes or targets asexpressed in a po int system (also not alwayspopular because of the drawn decisions itengenders); the limits of strategic and tacticalmachination can not be extended too far withoutstriking increasingly cumbersome records-keeping requirements due to the factors whichmake up such warfare; the historical flavor sonecessary for a successfulgame can only occasion-ally be claimed by air simula tions as the incidenceof uniquely ai r struggles is low as they are mor ecommo nly adjuncts to more well-know9 land/s eaoperations. The situations of LUFTWAFFE a n dBATTLE OF BRITAIN seem to me to be theunique exceptions and both a re grand campaignsrequiring several hours of playing time for evenbasic level play. WW I possibly the only periodwhere a truly tactical air battle could be simulatedwith the necessary histor ical identification to real-life situations plus the playing simplicity of manyof the older games in the Avalon Hill line: adesirable combination which has helped to liftgames such as WA TERLOO, AFRIKA KORPSand S T A L I N G R A D to long-standing popularitydespite consistent criticisms of the inaccuraciesand lapses in sophistication present in each ofthem.

I can in no way agree, however, that RICH-THOFEN'S WA R s in any way destined toa tta inthe cult statu s of which some seem to feel it canhonestly ho pe to achieve an d deserves. This placesfa r too g rea t a burden and va lue upon a gamewhich cannot hope to car ry the load . There a re toomany fine points in RICHTHOFEN'S W A Rwhich work against it becoming a massivelypopula r game such as DIPLOMACY or evenS T A L I N G R A D have attained. And while it istrue that the object and procedures of play arebasically very elementary in all three games,RICHTHOFEN'S WA R uffers from the fact th atthere is no readily identifiable game situa tionsince the numerous scenarios ace almost experi-ments rath er than true games-they are moremomen ts of involvement. T he game truly begs for

manipulation of scenarios and aircraft throutesting of various combinations of both (notmention the auxiliary listing of aircraft for furthexperimentation). DIPLOMACY'S success reupon the utter simplicity of the simultaneous pland the polit ical maneuvering going on behithe scenes, making actual moves and combabstract, even symbolic, in nature. STALINRA D offers a singleness of objective and claritysituation without hordes of optional rules ascenarios to complicate matters-it is a classtruggle of position and maneuver formulataround a consistent playing situation offeringrange of strategic tactical decisions to both sidplus an historical identification which gives othe sense of realism if only in the abstrac t.I might have been a bit facetio usan d called tarticle RICHTHOFEN'S W AR: A Game YCan Counr On since it would hav e appropriateconveyed the significance which can be attribu tto the many num erical factors during the courseplay; however, more than in some other gamRICHTHOFEN'S W A R yields up a good dealplaying enjoyment without that too familgnawing sense of necessity to prem ediate oneach and every movement. Naturally there important considerations which study will revand which judicious application will reward wgreater success in playing the game, but mechanical use of statistical information aanalysis tends to retard the motion an d reduce simulation quality of the game to mere countand co mputing. Yet it can be viewed as curioucontradictory to say this when one realizes tthis game above many others would probabreward a very detailed hex-by-hex analysis duethe very few pieces and relatively few optiduring play. I t might almost seem feasible attempt to uncover the mathematical formuwhich would result in the best move in a givsituation in the same way tha t a Tic-Tac-Toe gacan be shown to be a draw every time if playproperly. I d o not do ubt that there is some chato discover such a formula; however, I certainly highly uninte rested in such analysis a

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THEGENER would assuredly reduce RICHTHOFENS WARto such a mechanically elementary level as toweaken it and mar its enjoyment factor quitedistinctly. Statis tical analysis, if it does not revealany true flaws in the designand play ofagame, canonly assist materially by indicating trends of playand chances for certain die rolls.1 say all this because moving and firing areabout all you have to work with in RICHTHOF-EN'S WAR-should either become too routine,too predictable, the game will drag unbelievably.To exemplify my position, 1 ind it most importan tthat a time limit be placed upon the making ofindividual moves as rapidly as possible once thesystem of play is familiar enough such thatconstant referral to the rules is no longernecessary. Without imposing some sort of timelimit, play can degenerate into plotting andplanning and numerical figuring in a fashionwholly uncharacteristic of and unsuited to a WWIair combat simulation. The kinds of decision-making found during this period of combatcannot be simulated when there is too much timefor tinkering with counting of hexes, etc.-therenever was such a generous allotment of time madeto the pilots of the er aand it seems very reasonableto attempt to hang on to this bit of the feel of theperiod. Of course, i t also drives home very clearlythe message that warfare and wargaming are notthe same, that the former is not conducted in aseries of sequential 'turns.' And while some of thefeel of air combat might be achieved even moresuccessfullyusing simultaneous play of some kind,It would probably only d o so a t the cost of slowingdown the rate of play, detracting from anotherelement of the simulation-six of one and half-a-dozen of another.Given my opinion of the game and how I viewit in light of other games on the market, it is m)intention in this article to reduce analysis ofRICHTHOFEN'S WAR to as elementa la levelasthe game itself deserves while keeping it intelligentand, hopefully, well-informed. Aerial combat ofthe W W I era seems to me to break down into threemajor areas of importance: the individual pilot'sskills, the characteristics of the specific aircraft inquestion and the combat factors of weaponry andsusceptibility to damage. These three onceunderstood can be applied to the specific combatsituation under question and suggest appropriateaction to be taken to either complete or preventcompletion of the mission. Analysis of the gamedivides quite nicely into these three areas althoughthe first demands very littlecommentary since it isa function of the players themselves.

Pilo t Skills Player Knowledge-What makes a good pilot? He must obviouslvknow how to fly and if we are talking about acombat mission, how to coordinate this flyingwith accuracy in hitting the target. How do thesetranslate into game-playing factors? Basically theyrefer to the player's knowledge of the movementand combat rules of the game and how well he usesthem--experience in recognizing certain playingsituations will show particularly if the time limit isapplied. Developing these abilities is the objectiveof the scenarios which will lead up to playing thecampaign game. However, the scenarios are nottotally suffkknt in themsebres nd swherebit of analysis of the Target Damage Table, criticalhit situation, Maneuver Schedules, etc. willbecome useful. It will probably show which side inthe conflict has a basic material edge-] havecome to believe that it is the German player butthat does not mean I think the Allied player isworking on a losing cause from the outset; it's justan uphill fight sometimes. In any event, the

question of pilot skills is not something we canreally learn from the game itself: it is somethingdeveloped by each player through his study of therules and understanding of aircraft capabilities.Perhaps if there were more pieces or the game wasnot as tactically oriented, the question of pilotskills would not come up; however, as the pilotwas an important factor in WWI air combat, somemention should be made ofjust what this entails inthe play of the game. Perhaps the awardingof Acestatus is the only real game element that involvesevaluating the pilot and this can be earnedaccording to the rules; however, it requires playextending past the range of a single game unless itis a given factor in a particular scenario.The Ace status seems to deserve a bit morecomment since it carries a weight during play thatcannot be underestimated as it not only affects theattack value of a plane but its defensive value inthat it lessens attacks against it as much as itenhances its own attacks against otheraircraft. Asan element of play it ranks with the Critical HitTable-which will be covered later-both are notcommon occurrences but their presence can be animportant element in any game played since onewill take its toll slowly but surely and the other willdeliver sudden blows and perhaps alter the entirecourse of play. Ace status can equalize the firingdeficit between an A and a C aircraft since itcarries with it the bonus for the attack and thebonus for the defense of the plane, making the Caircraft a match for the A opponent.The Target Damage Table -The issue of weaponry and combat inevitablylead us to an investigation of the combat tables asthey are the components over which the mostintensive statistical concern is expended, virtuallybegging mathematical analysis. Dice and theprobability laws which accompany the use of dicemake it logical and beneficial to analyze thechances far each type af combat unit under thebasic combat situations present. RICHTHOF-EN'S WAR is no exception and has already beenthe subject for just such an analysis. While thefigures have been accurately presented (See Vol.I, No. 5) and 1 do not wish to criticize the effortexpended in the study, 1 hink such a presentationis too literal a statistical effort and that a moreuseful display of the same information needs to bemade given the real-life situation of rolling diceand using the TDT. The problem with usingexactstatistical figures is basically that a fraction o fa hitis just not present on the TDT: the figures are rooprecise for the actual playing situation especiallywhen one considers the few rolls of the dice whichactually occur during the course of a RICH-THOFEN'S WAR scenario. Probability has avery hard time even approaching the kind ofexactness of numerical results that a purestatistical survey presents, but when the range oftries in rolling the dice amounts to perhaps as fewas 20-30 in a game, 1do not think that basing one'sdecisions upon purely mathematical results will behelpful. Statistics, in this way, can be misleadingsince the end product is all you receive and not apicture of how the results were achieved-the'Law of Averages' seems pushed very far if weexpect to understand the play of a game likeRICHTHOFEN'S WAR by referring to tables offigures.For example, take the situat ion used where wehave a Nieuport 17 at a three hex range with no dieroll adjustment: exact statistical figures will reveala 1.25 hit average using the 36 possible die rollswith a 45 hit total taking the sum of all possibleresults occurring once and then dividing this sumof 5 by the 36 rolls. Of course, there is no suchresult on the Target Damage Table for the

statist ical result really means an approximate gaiof 5 hits every rolls rather than a value for single roll of the dice. However, breaking dowthe possible values on the table and trying tderive the percentages for their occurrence rathethan trying to boil down a roll to the ver gvalue, slightly different results occur which camake a big difference in how one looks at thsituation. Using the Nieuport 17 example, thresults are a s follows: No Hits will occuapproximately 27.8% of the time; 1 Hit, 30.6% othe time; 2 Hits, 33.3%; 3 Hits, 5.6%; and 4 Hit2.8%. Thus you can see that the extreme results o3 or hits will, together, occur less than 10% of thtime while you may expect t o missentirely perhap113 of the time. The major results are a miss, 1 hor 2 hits which can be interpreted in one of twways: either that you will really average only I hper roll or that i you get hit you can hope taverage 1.5 hits per roll. Thus depending upohow you care to view wargaming combat and thodds of die rolls, you might say there are at leasthree different 'averages' at work: 1.25, 1.5 an1.00. Choosing the proper one really does have tbe a matter of what you want out of the analysiyou plan to do. I find it more valuable to think othe situation, using the Nieuport 17 example, athe mixture of the three major results such thatover the course of 10 rolls, you can re son blexpect to have scored from 9 to 11 hits; however,temper that with the knowledge that some ill lucwith the dice can result in substantially less thanthat. And this isan important feature of the TargeDamage Table: its randomness which simulatethe often questionable reliability of WWI armaments as reflected both in specific columns fovarious kinds of aircraft and the general randomresults for all aircraft in actually scoring hits avarious ranges as caused by the rolling of the diceThis is the intention of the designer if I read thegame properly and understand what the results oanaiyzing the TDT truly mean: deliberate planning as opposed to random design.

However, graphic presentations are oftemore striking than purely numerical ones, and fothis reason, the numerical analysis of the foucolumns (A, B, C D) at various ranges using thunadjusted die rolls appears here to suggepatterns of combat for each type of aircraft avarious distances from its target. The figures werderived in the same way as those for the Nieupor17 example above: 1 determined what results weron the chart for each column at each range anthen decided what the percentages of occurrencfor each amount of hits (including missinentirely). The resultant graphs reveal sominteresting and perhaps unexpected situationFor example, taking Graph A (corresponding tthe same column on the TDT), we see three verdistinct patterns: even distribution at 1-2 hexes, sharp dropping off of higher results at 3-4 hexewith much higher chances for a roll of 2 Hits, anfinally very distinct d r o ~ ~ i n gff of results othethan just I Hit at ranges of 5 or more hexes. Hencthe graphs will reveal trends and will provide veruseful comparisons between aircraft-both owhich will be more easily remembered during plathan statistical summaries of just numbers.The patterns formed are largely what onwould expect in that they do not reveal any grosflaws which allow a weaRer rateifai rcraftto enioundue superiority over a supposedly strong&aircraft under particular circumstances which armerely a result of the TDTs design and not osome positional advantages, etc. That is thgraphs do not provide any gimmick for winninand attest to the even randomness of the TDTas general condition. But there are several thing

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THEGENER L P GEwhich show up visually tha t might not have been dierollsgo weflsince the A aircraft , while it hasn t opponent since the Bchancesd ropsha rp lya roa s obvious were we to dea l only in numerical the chance to score a s many 5 hit results, has a very the peaking. As the range increases, both pifactors. A compar ison between the individual even distribution for all results a t 1-2 hexes when will score fewer hits though the A pilot does enplanes is much harder with only numbers a n d compared to a n y of the other graphs. S O a n A the slight advantage; however, a t the extrepercentages than with a graphic display of these column roll is a b o u t a s likely t o score a 4-6 hit ranges, the same thing occurs a s in the A tomathematical elements. One such example is result a s a 1-3 result: he must not be too careless match-up: time is the factor since both playerspossible by overlaying the graphs of the particular facing the B aircraft since a full 113 of the time he sure to miss a great deal of the time a n d canaircraft and compar ing their relative s t reng thsand can expect t o get hit more than he will hit his B hope to score more t h a n a couple hits when tweaknesses. Taking the case of a n A versus a c opponent . In turn, the B pilot must realize tha t it is d o find the mark (at least the chances for eachaircraft-the c o m m o n situation a s we shall see a true he may inflict a 5 hit result occasionally while score 3 hits a r e the same o r very, very nearlybit later when we compare Allied a n d German his opponent scores fewer hits, bu t he will a lso be same a t 5-7 hexes).rosters-the A has the expected advan tage a t a l l the victim of more hits steadily t h a n will his Basically except fo r the D column whichranges bu t its advan tage drops off considerably a s very weak indeed past 2 hexes, there is a pattthe range increases since the number of hits which tha t suggests tha t a t 3 4 n d then higher, the Awill be scored is less a n d less even if, in the long C aircraft a re no t so drastically different that thrun, a n A will score more hits. This fact is lC^ is a sure thing for a n y of them and tha t timimportant a s the time element results in many often the issue a s range increases. Luck wiflhavictories since scenarios are not merely based o n good dea l to d o with certain victories a n d certaishooting down aircraft bu t in reaching certain this is a n element of the era of combat the gamissions for recon, spo t t ing a n d strafing of 8 simulates-one cannot find fault with the matrenches and the defending aircraft a re there to of luck in this situation a n d still purpor t t o beprevent too much damage t o their trenches a n d realistic himself if he d o e s ~ s o ccuse the ltoo much informat ion from being taken back t o factor to be unrealistic. This is simply partenemy lines. The graphs indicate tha t the 3-4 hex the game a n d a par t with which I can haverange is the best one for the C aircraft to bo th personal quarrel since it gives the game soachieve a mission while inflicting some damage 6 of the excitement which the uncertaintyupon the A aircraft as well-longer ranges will W W I aerial combat surely engendered inprevent much damage from being caused under men who participated in it.average rolling of the dice. One further trendnoted in this compar ison which holds u p through- Firepower: Allied vs Germanout the analysis is that a s the ranges increase, the 4C T h e object now becomes torelate some ofrelative advantages between planes d r o p s very graphical in format ion t o specific instancessharply a n d the issue becomes one of time: will this is most usefully done by compar ingthere be enough to roll up the number of hits for a aircraft specifications for each side a s to comwin given the chance tha t only a hit o r two will be elements: the T D T column t o be used,possible and not even o n each roll. (One may 2 accumulated damage a n d the a m m o supply. Dwonder why there is the emphasis o n the time Bottger has noted the advan tage o n the T D T welement a n d the longer ranges since anyone can see he correctly gives the German player a n edge.that the better aircraft will close a n d try to maul of 12 planes, 8 use the A column a n d they arethe weaker planes; however, mat te rs of sighting fighters while, in compar ison , the Allied situatand altitude differences bear heavily upon the o reveals only 5 o u t of 22 planes in the A columnability to d o this a n d will make consideration of fighters b u t that s still ou t of 16) with most Althese longer distances more important.) strength in the C column. Thus the Allied plaHits 4 Hits has to count o n other elements of play to brAnother interesting compar ison is between the down the edge the German has here. And theeA and B aircraft since even though there is b u t one Hit 5 Hits is n o t limited merely to the T D T a s the Germplane in the B column, ad jus tments may bring the has the generally higher number of bursts toequivalent situation between a n A a n d a C 2 Hits Hits fired and can take a bit more damage t h a naircraft. Note the peaking a t 5 hits fo r the B Allied opponents .aircraft a t 1 hex a n d the peaking a t 2 hits a t 2hexes: this suggests a n advan tage but only if the 3 Hits 7 Hits ontinued on Pa

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P GEThere truly seems to be nothing the Alliedplayer can do about such a situation within therealm of the com bat situation itself: the columnsto be used, the am mo supply and the dam age a reall things regulated by the capability of the planeand cannot be altered by pilot action. In fact, Ithink you will ultimately find that there is nothingmuch that can be done by the Allied player toalleviate this situation save through judiciousmaneuvering (somethin g we will com e to see later)

and even tha t can a t t imes d o no th ing more thangain time and prepare for a calculated attac k at aclose range which the G erm an canno t returnimmediately and which might result in damagesevere enough to prevent serious retaliation.Again I seem to give the edge to the German playerand 1 think it is very true th at he does not have towork as hard to succeed; however, there is a greatchallenge in this situation which is the elementwhich makes R I C H T H O F E N ' S W A R a tr u lyinteresting game to play. The quick, sudden turn sof play coupled with the challenge to theindividual to make goo d decisions every turn arenot always evident in more sweeping campaignswhere a few misplaced units will not necessarilyspell defeat ( though they of course can). Previousto th is , AFR IKA KO RP S was the game whichheld this same situation up to scrutiny. I thinkRICHTH OFEN'S WAR goes it one be t te r in th isparticular category and offers a s hort game with agoo d deal of fun-hence my title for the article.In the Allied player's favo r is the design ofmost of the scenarios which matches planes fairlyequally o r gives the 'underdog' the missionrequirement. The mission doe s not always dependon shots scored o n enemy planes and it is oftenaided immensely by the time factor since everyturn a mission goes on can mean points for theAllied player tow ard victo ry. If a mission can berun successfully and the aircraft can escape withdamage but not shot down, then there is a goodchance the Allied player will be a winner.Undoubtedly, the outcome of the game willdepend heavily upon the decisions made to eithergo after the particular aircraft carrying out themission or i ts supporting fighter(s)-the Germandecision generally. And it is generally the case thatgoing after the aircraft carrying ou t the mission isthe best decision because it is this aircraft whichmust count o n having time on its side and can notafford to be distracted to fight enemy fighters.Accordingly, any defending fighters will have todraw closer to the mission area to take on theattacking aircraft-there can be no drawing awayof the attack er if he has decided upo n the missionaircraft as his target. In this way, sho uld it be theGerman who is attempting to stop the missionfrom being successfully completed, he will have achance to s top the mission o r shoo t dow n anAllied fighter and divert attention to the bo mberor recon plane. Again it is emphasized that theAllied player has the edge in the scen ariop erse ifhe is the mission player since he must be sto ppedfrom accumulating too many points for success-fully bombed or reconned o r strafed target hexes.Critical Hits-The od ds of getting a crit ical hit are, to be sure,not very high but I don't thin k that it is soimportant to con dition ou r concern for the crit icalhits based on consideration of how often theyoccur. Their importance is that ifthey do occurthey can reverse the course of th e contest o r drive itrapidly to a conclusion. Getting a critical hit canmean so much more thanjus t scoringa few regularhits as it can lead to a dvantages t o score hits thatwould not otherwise have been available. The'thril l ' of getting a crit ical hit adds to the

psychological f lavor of the ga me and it can be ademoralizing factor upon your opponent shouldyou score one. The utterly fortuitous occurrenceof a critical hit when you really might not have agood ch ance otherwise is an attractive feature ofplay which is entirely in keeping with the combatsituation a nd, a s such, is also 'realistic' in its ownway.Checking the Critical Hit Table to see whatwill happen if one occurs we find tha t 83% of thetime the effect will be to ham per speed/m aneuverin some way while only 22% of the time will itaffect (directly) combat strength and of this 22%,14% has to d o with rear-firing guns. So the effectsare very heavily in favor of damage to one'smovem ent (m ore tha n 100% is indicative of resultswith damage to firing and movement). Thiscan betranslated then into damage to one's combateffectiveness (if not his combat strength) since theabili ty to move is the abili ty to bring combatweapons to bear upon the opponent: if you have10 bursts t o 6 but can't move well enou gh to usethose bursts, what go od ar e they? In this regard ithas been said th at the results hurt the Allied playermor e than the German a s i t has been said that theAllied player has the maneuvering advantage. Iam not sure that this is true as one might thinksimply because of th e fact that maneuver ultimate-ly affects firepower and that's the elemen t of playthe Germ an has going for him for sure. As to theissue of the Allied maneuver superiority, I don'tthink it quite matches the German combatadvan tage in the T D T however , tha t i ssue can betaken up later as i t is not really under considera-tion here.Genera l Comba t Conditions-I have been assuming the use of Tournamentrules thus far a s the use of Basic rules leaves muchto be desired a nd does seem to me t o give a verylarge advantage t o the Germ an player as he 'pure'state of no divisions between aircraft save on theTD T makes combat a su re th ing to tu rn aga instthe Allied player soon er or later. You may as wellbe playing a game on the order of U -BOAT forallthe challenge there is without the Tournamentrules. Now I'm sure someone will rush to thedefense of the Basic game, bu t 1 have not fou nd itvery satisfying as RI CH TH OF EN 'S W AR itselfdepends on these li t t le differences and turns ofplay to make it a worthwhile game-the strategyand tactical satisfaction, as previously noted,doesn't carry as far in this game as in others.The rules covering combat which seem tomake particular difference in play are therequirement to expend your last two movementpoints within the field-of-fire and the targetalti tude differences. These both have roots inmaneuvering since they involve position andmovement points, but they ar e directly a functionof combat values and illustrate how maneuvertranslates into com bat situa tions very smoothly.The former is a function of the you-move-then-l-move system of sequential play where you h ave astationary target which allows such a thing. DaveBottger quite rightly notes the fact that thisregulation emphasizes speed and not maneuverwhen in the real combat situation it seems to havebeen the oth er way aroun d. But perhaps withoutsimultaneous play, this is the most accuraterepresentation of the situation that could bemanaged. The point is that i t attempts t o simulatethe need to have a goo d fix on the enemy aircraftbefore you c an hope to get off a good shot. In thisrespect one might argue tha t this should have beenrepresented by deductions from the die roll ratherthan the inabili ty to fire at all . Maybe so, but whatdoes this rule really dema nd? Not very much asyou must expend your last movement point in the

field-of-fire or you won't have the fielduf-firsince the movement stops with that point beinexpended All you are being asked to do isexpenON E extr a movement point to get the field-of-firand sighting properly coordinated and that donot seem to me to be an unreasonabrequirement-in fact it strikes me as a very logicone since swinging into range an d sighting for thfiring of the guns should be done before yodepress the trigger else you'll end up with velocity in a perpendicular direction sidewayfrom the one you wa nt to sh oot in. Try it withrubber band o n your finger by turning and firinwithout coming t o a full stop and you'll probabldiscover that th e rubb er band te nds to fly off a bin the direction of the turn as well as straigforward, curving a bit away from the intendetarget. R ememb er the ma chine guns were generaly fixed in their mountin gs an d did NO T swivfrom side to side (they had the propellers tsyncronize with, remem ber) an d had t o fire in thdirection of the nose (for forward firing weaponsAs to the altitude differences, the rulinsuggests the rationale and importance of thigeometry . The use of this facto r is actually more matter of maneuver but i t does suggest thcombat discrepancies between planes can breduced during combat by utilizing the relativpositions of the aircraft, i.e., flying the planeffectively will obviously help the combat sitution. Wh at this ruling allows is the use of time oncagain as it will permit a player to remain close itechnical hex distance but separated from hiopponen t by alti tude, givinga lengthier result as trange on the TDT. In this way it is possible tmaneuver close to an opponent without sufferingreat damage in preparation to ascend o r descento meet the opponent on more direct terms for more heated battle on your own terms. As thexample in the rules indicates, you can be withinhexes but actually at a combat range of hexes bhaving a 250 meter difference in altitu de. Perhapthe adva ntage of this is best left to discussions ochanges in alt i tude, but as i t affects combat belongs here if only to be mentioned-l find it aimportant consideration.Aircraft Maneuver-Speed, M aneuver Schedules, climbldive rateand maximums of alt i tude are the aircrafcapabilities which have been felt to be the onewherein the Allied player has the advantageBefore we discuss the relative effects of these upothe individual player, let's evaluate the relativdifferences between the German and Allieaircraft. First we compare th e maximum speeds othe aircraft and discover that the Allied planeseven though more numerous, get theedge in speewith three planes rated at l hexes, 5 rated at 1hexes (German have 2) and then a fairly evebreak of 5 to 4 , 6 to 5 and 3 to 1 a t 9 8 7 hexerespectively. Wh en we limit this to fig hter aircrawe discover that, a s expected, there is little changfor the German a s most of his aircraft can functioas fighters; however, we see that the Allied edgincreases somewhat since the fightersare the faste(all deductions being from the 8 hex rate, excepone from 7 hexes). Minimum speed does noprovide any truly unu sual results-more Allieplanes have a minimum of 3 but then there armor e Allied planes-no real patte rn is evidenTurning to maximu m alti tude we find the Germacraft breaking into three distinct levels: bomberstay at u nder 4200'; abou t half of the fighters arbetween the levels of 5100'/5500'; an d remaininfighters are from 6100'/6300'. Allied aircrafgenerally rate a t higher altitudes overall but this iagain, because there are more of them; howevermost Allied bom bers ar e below all Germa

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P GE 1fighters. Thus in the second category, there is not atruly significant edge revealed for either side-again taking it on a very gross scale of evaluatingall aircraft in a group.But perhaps it is a maximumdive/cl imb whereone would expect to find the figures that would beimportant as it is the rate of change of altitude thatcan be considered to make the real difference incombat and not necessarily the maximum altitudeto which one may operate. When we check theclimb rates for both sides we discover that trulyhere do the Allied aircraft have an advantage as agroup with most aircraft and most fightersoutclimbing the German aircraft by at least 50meters per turn. In fact the Germans have butthree aircraft over 150 meters per turn while theAllied player has a total of 10 (all fighters for bothsides). A level of 200 meters seems to be thebreaking point for the Allied advantage as belowthis level the comparisons are even-here theAllied numericalsuperiority shows by giving moreaircraft to choose from at these levels of climbing.The dive rates indicate a spread similar to that inmaximum altitude: the German player has threedistinct groups (bombers a t 200-250, most fightersat 350 and a set of 3 planes at the 500 level) whilethe Allied player is spread along a fairly evenpattern (everything, 12 planes, above o r at 350being fighters with a few fighters and the bombersat 200-250 meters per turn). It can be said tha t theAllied player hasa slight advantage here-more sothan in maximum altitude-and so it would seemthat there is a definite trend for Allied aircraft tobe able to change altitude at a much faster ratethan the German player can hope for.But wait, let's check out maximum dive speedas tha t bears upon the usefulness of being able todive quickly. Here we find that the Allied playerdoes, indeed, enjoy the edge, being able to dive at amaximum speed higher than his German oppo-nent. And a quick look at the maximumoverdiving abilities of the aircraft reveals that therelationship of German to Allied planes remainsthe same as the overdive maximum is no morethan an addi tion of I to the normal maximum divespeed. Hence the Allied player can both divefurther and faster (and climb faster) than hisGerman counterpart-given many other factorsbeing equal such as the speeds being about thesame at the moment of comparative movementsince one cannot climb as far as one's opponent ifthe current speed is considerably lower given therequirement for deducting from speed to climb.This brings us to an analysis of the ManeuverSchedules. And here we find that in adding up thenumber of aircraft falling into various schedules,we find an approximately equal ration since theAllied superiority in numbers of aircraft is not avery crucial fact at this point. As the Allied playerhas more planes listed, he also has moreat variousschedules making it look like he has somesuperiority. If selection of aircraft can be asuperiority in all cases, then the Allied player hasthis superior chance to select a plane combinationwith better turning ability. More than mostcomparisons, this one would really benefit fromapplication to a particular scenario (which will bedone for the sake of example later when thescenarios are evaluated).

Given this preliminary look a t the comparativefigures for the two sides which serves to putperspective into a mass of numerical values, theapplication of each of these values is the nextobject of consideration. And as we have justmentioned the Maneuver Schedules, why not startwith them? The D schedule would seem to be themost desirable because it offers a freehexside turnfor either direction; however, I would not too

strenuously argue that the Sopwith Camel andFokker Dr-1 have the best of it with the Eschedule-the ONLY ones with it, by the way.Given the willingness to maneuver to advantage ina right-turning direction, there is no question thatthis is the best schedule as to turn left is not a 'bad'situation by any means. The only problem is thatthe schedule is limited to two aircraft types anddoes not concern us in gener l review of theschedules though it will be more important forspecific analysis of individual scenarios. After thisthere is also good reason to find the C schedule agood one as compared to the D since any turnmore than one hexside is the same in eitherschedule. This is important since there are manysituations where it is desirable to turn completelyand end up in the same hex going exactly in theopposite direction rather than head in the oppositedirection but shifted a couple hexes left or right.This is the result of a turn with schedule D if onlyone hexside at a time is desired. But then the E isthe best in this si tuation as a complete 180 turn isbut 3 movement points in E while it is 5 in C or D.Again we are talking about the schedule forfighters as bombers on both sides use A or Bschedules while the fighters use Band C-Alliednumbers, as mentioned, put more fighters in Can dthen in D (3 to the German's 1). Generally it is thefighters which one would expect to have bettermaneuvering characteristics and it is the fighterswhich carry out most combat as the missionaircraft are not expected to be concerned withhaving to wage dogfights plus do the recon,strafing or bombing. Bombers are generallydefensive firing aircraft and as such there is not theneed to have them engage in many turningmaneuvers-if they do then the mission isprobably in jeopardy and the question is whetherto merely press on with it and take your chances orget out of there and not push your luck. This isimportant: living to fight again another day. It isabasic maxim of the campaign game (scenariosdon't always drive this home as the scenarios endand there isn't a 'next time' to contend with).The achieving of altitude and the rate ofchange of altitude are truly key issues because theyhelp make it possible to equalize situations anddevelop a 'ground' upon which to base yourstrategy. Fighting the opponent on your ownterms (on your own 'ground') amounts to fightinghim such that you can control the situation andthis generally resolves itself into whether you canmaneuver away from or into battle more easilythan he does. Thus a plane with superior diveability wants to fight at a higher altitude so he canget away by diving or use this diving ability to goafter an opponent trying to escape. The reverse istrue for superior climbing ability: the fight is mostdesirable at lower altitudes where one can use theclimb rate t o either get away or pursue an escapingopponent. Maximum altitude is an importantissue in achieving the edge by being above youropponent if you can outdive him or in being ableto climb out of reach (even if your rate of climb isnot superior). In conjunction with these is themaximum dive speed as it is very beneficial to beable to maintain a speed superior to youropponent even i fh e c n dive further since it maymean he cannot always use his superior dive rateas effectively as he might wish.Examples may seem to be wantingat this pointbut that is because I wish to use the actualscenarios rather than invent ones and, when 1 dobegin the scenario commentary, I'd like to use allof the factors so that the commentary is trulyfocused on the play of the scenario and not just itsuse as a narrow example of some numericalvalue-this, I feel, would make the scenarios toogreatly a series of practice exercises and not fully

deserving of being played often. They are usefuexamples of the kinds of situations found in thCampaign Game but they have merits of play atheir own that should not be dismissed jusbecause we want to get on with it in the morinvolved thinking and planning of optional ruleetc.It would seem, as a final comment a t this pointhat the Allied player does have the generaadvantage in maneuver. This helps equalize thcombat situation as it allows the firepower of thAllied planes to be brought to bear somewhaeasier as well as make it slightly harder for thGerman aircraft to bring their own superiostrength to full effectiveness.A Word About Optional RulesBefore going any further, there are a fewOptional Rules which seem to deserve somindividual mention because of the effect that theimplementation can have upon the play of thgame (no matter what scenario or version youse). I have in mind three in particular: ReactioRule; Ace Status; Angle of Attack: DeflectionThe first of these has already been briefly toucheupon and 1 do not wish to extend the mention of too much further; however, 1would like to suggethat if the 10-second limit seems a bit too much thandle, i.e., it seems too short, or your experiencwith the game does not suffice, do not hesitate tinstitute a limit of your own (certainly 30 secondshould be plenty of time if you are at acomfortable with the rules and the pace of playDelaying the use of this rule until you are morexperienced will probably delay the rate at whicyou gain experience-nothing gives you experence like mistakes (or those of an opponent whicyou notice as he moves within the time limit).The second Optional Rule has an effect thamerely going to the TDT may not reveimmediately. Of course, the point is that the rulmakes thisan 'earned'benefit which means succewill tend to bring about more success. But theffect which it has is very much a matter of thTDT and the most importan t element of it is NOthe bonus when attacking but the bonus whebeing attacked 1 say this because it allows you tbe just a bit more daring in carrying out your owattacks because your defensive Value'is increasedAn example would probably be helpful here anas we have discovered that the Allied fighter imost often a C aircraft on the TDT while thGerman is most often an A, let's take this matchup at a distance of say 4 hexes. If the Allied playeis doing the attacking, we find that hischancesarabout 42% for missing entirely, 42% for 1 hit an14% for 2 hits (there is the slimchanceofabout 3%for a possible 3 hits). Were he an Ace, this woulchange to be about 28% for missing, 44%for 1 hi19% for 2 hits, 6 for 3 hits and a fairly remote 3%for 4 hits. We can immediately see that there is 11less chance of missing-a notable change; bumore than this there is an increase in the highenumbers as opposed to a large increase in thchance for a lone hit. Now if we assume that thAllied aircraft is being attacked we find thawithout Ace status, the German player will likelfind these percentages operating: 28% for a miss3 for a lone hit, 39% for 2 hits and a scant 3%for 3 hits. If the Allied player is an Ace, theschange to 42% for a miss, 31% for 1 hit and 28%for 2 hits. Note that in either case, the odds of lone hit are the same (and they were nearly thsame when the Allied player attacked) and thchanges are largely between the chance of a misand the larger hits with 113 more chance of a misby the German player an d a bit less than 1 3 leschance for 2 hits. Should similar tests be carrie

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P GEout upon the TDT, other equally interesting littlefigures would be discovered; however, to avoidany further forays into mathematical fields whichjust might not interest anyone at this point, 1suggest you try this with a few other TDTcolumnsat other ranges. You might also try the effects of adouble-Ace (in the above example where theAllied player defends, the German player wouldbe reduced to only a 1-i n4 chance for a single hitand 17% for 2 hits with the odds a t 58% for a misswhile the Allied player would be working withodds of 16% (miss), 42% (1 hit), 25% (2 hits) and8% (3 and 4 hits each).The final Optional Rule is the Angle ofDeflection and there is not a great deal to sayabout it as it isvery straight-forward; however, it isof importance because of the effect it has inaltering the die roll. My understanding of therule's logic suggests that it was easier to maintain agood shot on a moving target from directly aheador behind since there is no lateral displacement todeal with as is the case in firing from the side wherethe target is moving cross your field-of-fire. It isthis rule which will probably provide the mostinteresting results when introduced since it willmake the questiop of maneuvering more signifi-cant. 1 do nor feel that the Allied player can hopeto achieve any serious advantage when suchdeflection play is adopted-perhaps some smallboost since there isa maneuver advantage of smallproport ions which we did note-however, themaneuvering of greatest advantage is verticalrather than horizontal and the deflection rule is afunction of horizontal maneuvering (the Maneu-ver Schedules) which we've seen is notvast ly in theAllied player's advantage. 1 do recommendadoption of this rule since it makes maneuveringimportant by itself irrespective of which playermay benefit slightly.Other optional rulings will alter the play ofthegame but d o not seem to me to be as important inplay as these three. One may question leaving anyof the others out ("Isn't wind direct ion import-ant?" you might ask) but these all seem to be lesssweeping changes to play which can be added orsubtracted without really changing things toogreatly. For example, the variable defense forballoons would not seem to make sense in any butthe scenarios involving balloons and this makesthe adoption of the ruling simply a matter ofvarying one of the scenarios rather than varyingthe play of the game itself. The same can be saidfor the special characteristics listed for variousaircraft: important when using them but not anelement of importance in all scenarios. The issueof wind direction is one which 1 even considerunimportant sometimes-often it is just a thing todo at the end of the turn rather than an importantpart of play since the randomness of the event isfairly predictable: it'll be westerly most of the timeas noted. One may argue that the Critical Hitchances are less important because they are morerare-true if that's your standard for judging theimportance but I prefer to consider the effect ithas, even if potentially, on play and the CriticalHit Table can shake up play a lot more seriouslythan the prevailing winds.Scenarios-Inevitably, one must discuss the situationsgiven. They can hardly be ignored or by-passed infavor of rushing into the Campaign Game sinceone of the game's att ractions is the faster, shorterplay that it offers in the scenarios. 1 find thescenarios more than just practice sessions for theCampaign Game and more than just contrivedsituations to ustify the game's existence (and pricetag). In fact, 1 find some of the scenarios muchmore interesting than the Campaign Game

because they offer the chance for a quick,indisputable conclusion where there are fewdistractions and time-wasting excuses to drag thegame out.Scenario #I-Obviously, this scenario is anideal one to use as a practice situation when you'relearning to play because there are just the two tosix planes to account for, but it seems to me to lastbeyond mere 'training' sessions and offers thepurest level of play where the combatants haveidentical situations as to relative abilities ofaircraft-there are very few differences between aSopwith Camel and a Fokker Drl though it doesseem to me that the climb/dive statistics wouldfavor the Camel over the long haul betweenotherwise equal opponents. In any event, thereappear to be a couple strategies one can employ:try it on a one-for-one basis as the planes areequal; or attempt to isolate one enemy planeagainst two of yours while fending off the othertwo enemy planes with your remaining aircraftand occasional support from either of the othertwo. The latter strategy is one which makes forinteresting results but it can hardly beconsidered aparticularly 'safe' one. What makes it hard to say agreat dea labout this scenario in and and of itself isthat it is so very even that the results will verymuch depend on the individual play. Position isvery important in this situation and thus thescenario is very interesting even after you havelearned more about the play of the game-goingback to the scenario should reveal more interestrather than less as basic skills will be verysignificantly emphasized.Scenario #2-This is nothing more than anon-historical version of the first scenario with a variedplane line-up and, a s such, there is not much to sayabout it. One could go into every plane match-upand make comments, but a comparison of thecharacteristics of the planes involved should befairly simple. For example, taking the very firstmatch-up of the Nieuport 17 and Halberstadt D3,we find that the German plane is largely superioras it has a better fire-power and accumulateddamage rating as well as a higher maximumaltitude. The Nieuport can only hope to outclimbthe Halberstadt for a while as it can climb fasterbut not as high-then the Halberstadt can divefurther each turn though the Nieuport can dive ata slightly faster speed. The Nieuport's slightlysuperior Maneuver Schedule can be of some helpbut it looks to be a very mobile battle with perhapsthe attempt by the German player to 'corner' theAllied player vertically if the Allied plane tries torun. The Allied player might be hard-pressed tohang on in this situation-perhaps trying to wasteenemy fire, hoping he misses, isa possible strategyif things look bad, getting in your own shots whenpossible, but the burst12 damage factor edge ofthe German is not pleasant.Scenario #3-The basic and advanced level arepretty nearly even as to be the problem facing theplayer who must carry out the mission: how to stayalive and get the job done since the photo-reconplane is generally, as pointed out in the rules andnotes, inferior. For example, the first situationgives the Allied player an even poorer shot atwinning than in the dogfight scenarios (#2) sincethe Nieuport 2 is even more inferior to theHalberstadt than the Nieuport 17 was The loweraccumulated damage factor does not help any butthe very low climb rate and inferior dive rates andspeed to the Halberstadt cannot be said to bebalanced by a higher maximum altitude UNLESSthe Allied player gets up there f st (which is hardwith the climb rate being what it is). The Germanplayer should try to get on top and stay therebecause, jfthe Allied player does get above him, hecan photograph all day long and not be touched.

Admittedly, starting at 3500 meters with tGerman player above him from the beginnidoesn't make the si tuation look good for tAllied player, especially when the planes startthe same minimum speed and the Allied playdoes not get a big maximum speed as comparedthe German player-the one hex difference cannbe expected to be felt for a while. In any event, ycan see the difficulty of the situation and I find thadding a defending fighter with the opponegetting a second plane is perhaps a worse situatiothan the one-on-one case.

Scenar io M-This situat ion seems to put divand climb ra tesat a real premium since the strafinmust be done at 350 meters or less yet the planestart at some of the highest levels in any scenariThus getting down fast, strafing a bit and gettinout are the primary requirements for the Allieplayer. The first s ituation pits an Allied plane wiequal dive speed but a slightly better climb ratCouple this with the very superior firepower of thGerman Albatross and the Allied player is verhard-pressed once again. The Allied playerchance is that he gets in a few hexes for pointsanthen gets off OR manages to collect more pointhan the German will get for shooting down onplane then sacrificing one if need be-not particularly pleasant alternative but one whicwould serve to fulfill the victory conditions.Scenario #%The tactical bombing missioneven worse than the previous missions as far as thAllied player isconcerned since the requirement make the pass over the target once and theimmediately return to actually bomb the targsets up the bombing aircraft for attack; however,is in the points for victory that the Allied playhas a chance though he may have to opt fosacrificing a plane a s in the last scenario. Gettinghex successfullybombed willgive you 9 points anthe enemy can only salvage 6 points for thdestruction of the bombing aircraft. Thus if thAllied player can get the target and sacrifice thplane for the mission, he stands a very goochance of winning. At this point you maybegintwonder about the logic of sacrificing planes, bumy own slim knowledge of the period does seem support the 'suicide-mission' atmosphere of manof these situations.Scenario #6-This scenario looks better fothe spotting player as he gets two aircrafhowever, the point situation reveals the fact thshooting down an aircraft is worth quite a bit compared to merely being in the air. If you arenthe spotting player, the best idea seems to be meet the enemy as soon as possible to keep hifrom getting any edge in being beyond the limlisted for spotting. Getting in somedamage to himbefore he even gets to the designated area will hesince the point per turn can build up sloiHly busurely as he tries t o avoid being shot down once his behind the lines. The advanced situation seemto throw it back in the lap of the defending playonce more as he gets another plane and an Ace, that.Scenario #'I-The balloon-busting situatiostruck me as pretty interesting for a whileasit wavery different from the others with the Basicgamversion of a static target (more or less since it caonly lower itself by 50 meters per turn) and statdefenses. 1find that the plane usually ends up withe best of it as the MG and AA chances for a hare quite slim when compared to the planecombat chances and the number of hits it cainflict. The version in the advanced situation theturns to make it very hard for the attacking planto hang on for a victory unless it really does g

Continued on Page 3

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PAGE 2 THEGENERA

Three MoreTHE CAMPAIGNS O F JASTA 11

Of all the units that took part in the first war inthe air, no other British or American Squadron,French Escadrille, or German Jasta had quite themystique or charisma of the German Air Service'sJasta I 1. The pilots of Jasta 11, and the air battlesthey fought were, without a doubt, legendary.There were few Allied airmen who did not bothrespect and fear the wildly painted airplanes ofvon Richthofen's "Big Red Circus."

Most of the high scoring German aces flewwith Jasta I at one time or another during theircareers. Many of these men have become legendsin the same right as von Richthofen himself:

Karl AllmenrbiiPr (30 victories), Richthof-en's deputy Jastafuhrer during the first halfof 1917 and the man who led Jasta 11 intheir first encounters with the SopwithTriplanes of RFC No. 8 (Naval) Squadron.Ernst Udet, Germany's second highestscoring ace with 62 victories. Richthofenwas so impressed by Udet's abilit ies that hehad him transferred from Jasta 37, wherehe was commander, to take command ofJasta 11 in March of 1918 (The Rittmeisterat that time was leader of JagdgeschwaderNr. I).Erich Lowenhardt (56 victories) whowould later become commander of J. G. 1.Werner Voss (perhaps the most famous ofRichthofen's protkg&) who, at the ripe oldage of twenty was transferred from Jasta11, on Richthofen's recommendation, tobecome leader of Jasta 10 and rolled up ascore of 48 victories before he was finallybrought down by six pilots of the RFC'sNo. 56 Squadron in an airbattle that isconsidered an epic in aviation history. Vosswas considered to be a pilot whoseaerobatic flying abilities were superior toRichthofen. He may have only beenGermany's fourth highest scoring Ace, buthe was without a doubt her best dogfighter.So much so, that the first two Fokker Dr.1's delivered to the front were sent toRichthofen and Werner Voss.Between March, 1917 and April, 1918, Jasta 1

was involved in two major offensive campaignsand numerous other airbattles. Of those, "BloodyApril," the campaign against the RFC No. 10(Naval) Squadron, and the second Arras offensiveproved to be the most influential. The first sawJasta 11 arise as a force to be reckoned with, thesecond almost proved their demise, and the thirdsaw the death of their beloved Richthofen.

BLOODY APRILTake the cylinder out of my kidneys,The connecting rod out of my brain, mybrain,From the small of mv back take the camshaftAnd assemble the engine again.

RFC Mess SongDuring April, 19 17, Jasta saw actionagainst many of the British squadrons operating in

the Arras area of the Western front. One of thesesquadrons, No. 48, was equipped with the new

CampaignBristol BR/f2a. The squadron leader was a mannamed Leefe-Robinson who had thegood fortuneto shoot down a zeppelin and the bad luck to beawarded the Victoria Cross for it. The BritishHigh Command, therefore, thought that he wouldmake the perfect man to lead the new "Brisfit"squadron. But Leefe-Robinson knew nothing ofthe air war and he and his men were totallyunfamiliar with the new aircraft. On April 5.19 17,while on their first offensive patrol, six Brisfits ofNo. 48 were jumped by von Richthofen and Jasta11. Leefe-Robinson was the first to go along withthree of the others. Two fell to the guns ofRichthofen himself. In less than 10 minutes, No.48 lost eight men and four aircraft, a quarter oftheir squadron

But it was later realized that the Brisfit was noordinary two-seater, and in the hands of anexperienced pilot was, to say the least, a highlylethal airplane. For when attacked, the Brisfit'sbest defense was to break formation and be used asa fighter with the observer's gun to cover the tail.Captain A. E McKeever of No. I1 Squadronscored most of his 30 victories flying the Brisfit as afighter. Jasta 11's later encounters with the Bristolfighters would not be quite as easy as the first.

THE BATTLE WITH THE BLACK FLIGHTOne must first overcom e the innerschweinehund

Manfred von RichthofenLater that year, Jasta I I would encounter a

squadron of the Royal Naval Air Service thatwould almost cost them their reputation, and didcost them the life of their deputy commander. InJune , 1917, No. 10 (Naval) Squadron was sentfrom the relatively quiet Flanders sector to theYpres sector to aid the disconcerted RFC units inthat area. There the Sopwith Triplanes of No. 10wreaked havoc across the Ypres salient. Its corewas Lt. Raymond Collishaw and the four otherCanadian pilots who comprised the "Black Flight"of Naval Ten. Their reputation developed sorapidly that a price was put on their heads by theGerman high command and Jasta I was sent tothe Ypres sector to deal with ravaging Tripe-hounds of Naval Ten. This little gun battle went onfor two months with the end result of three pilots,including Allmenibder, lost and von Richthofenhimself being shot down and wounded by theobserver in an obsolete two-seater that was beingescorted by the Black Flight.Late July saw three of the Black Flight killedand Collishaw sent back to England. Thus came toan end the brief, but fiery career of Naval Ten andthe gallant company of Black Flight weredisbanded. The end of the service life of theSopwith Triplane came about soon afterwardswith the introduction of the Camel. The SopwithTriplane, although fragile, difficult to maintain,and underarmed was to be one of the best Alliedfighter planes of the First World War. AnthonyFokker copied the Triplane design for his Dr. I,and, again a very good aircraft design gave birth toyet,another very good aircraft design.

THE SECOND ARRAS OFFENSIVEDespire the vicrory, and even if it is a hard-wrested victory, there is always that sadregret, that human sympa thy for thevictim, who w as, after all, another pilot likeonese l f . Hermann Becker

bame y Al BisaskyIn March, 1918, German Chief-of-Staff Er

Von Ludendorff launched his offensive against tBritish forces in the Arras sector. The purpose the offensive was to drive the British back acrothe Somme River. His plan was to defeat the Allon the battlefield before the American entry inthe war could have any effect. Unfortunately, tplan didn't work. After two separate offensivthrough two different parts of the Front (Michaand Georgette), the end of April saw an end to tfighting and the German Army was pushed bato where it started.

Despite the fact that the British wereequippwith a much improved genera tion of aircraft, thlosses, as usual, were heavy. This was due to tfact that the RFC's high command ordered squadrons to bomb and shoot up anything aeverything tha t wasn't on their side of No-ManLand-no matter what thecost. But quantity onagain saved the British and quality kept it frobeing the German turkey-shoot it was the yebefore.

During this period, the German Jastas webeginning to suffer from a shortage of qualireplacement aircraft and pilots. Even the craRichthofen circuses had become a potpourri different aircraft types and models. The highmaneuverable Fokker Dr. was in short suppand went only to the more experienced pilots (wwere also in shor t supply). The Albatross D-V aD-Va had reached their obsolescence and the nePfalz 111, while able to sustain a lot of punishmeand dive like a brick, was, at best, only a mediocfighter.The great strain was beginning to show oJasta in March of 1918. But the greatest blowas yet to come; on April 2lst, von Richthofwas shot down and kil led, and the effects were fthroughout the Jastas. For the German air serviafter the second Arras offensive, the handwritiwas on the wall

THE C MP IGN G INSTTHE BL CK FLIGHT

TIME: June 25th and 27th, 1917.PLACE: The Ypres sector of the Western FronUNITS INVOLVED: RFC No. 10 (Naval) Sqdand Jasta I.THE SITUATION: Jasta I I, under the temporarleadership of Karl Allmenroder has been ordereto the Ypres sector to seek out and destroy thTriplanes of No. 10 Squadron.HISTORICAL NOTES: This campaign againNaval Ten actually lasted over a period of twmonths. This time span, however, is too great tcondense into campaign-scenario form, so onthe first two days in which the units engaged arcovered. During these two days Jasta I I engageonly the planes from Naval Ten's Black FlighSPECIAL GAME NOTES: This CampaigGame is recommended only for multi-playegames due to the number of aircraft allowable othe board simultaneously. The limit of 3 planes peside on board at one time is suspended. Playermay put two boards into play.GAME RULES: Tournament level CampaigGame rules No. 10.1 I and 12and Forced-Landinrules.

ORDE RS OF B TTLENo. 10 (Naval) Sqd.: 5 SOP/Tri, 5 pilo(designate one ace), one replacement aircraft anpilot available for the second day.

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, .P GE

. Jasta 1 1: 6 ALB/d3 , 6 pilots (designate 2 aces),two replacement aircraft a n d pilots available forthe second day.MISSION SCHEDULE

April 25th: 5 S O P / T r i a t 2500 meters vs 6 A l b / d 3a t 3000 meters. British player moves first.April 27th: all available Allied aircraft a t 3000meters vs all available German aircraft; half ofwhich enter a t 2500 meters, the other half a t 3500meters. British player moves first. German playerenters low squadron o n turn 1, high squadron o nturn 3. Victory Points system a s per Dogfightscenario card. ***

THE FIRSTR R S C MP IGN

TIME: April, 1917-Prelude to the ArrasOffensive.PLACE: The Douai-Oisy sector of the Ar rasa rea .U N I TS INVOLVED: R F C No. 6 (Naval) Sqd.,R F C No. 48 Sqd., and Jasta I I.T H E SI TU A TI O N : While most of the Britishsquadrons involved in the Arras Offensive wereassigned to line and close offensive patrols, the 6thand 48th were assigned to conduct distantoffensive patrols a s far east a s Douai and sou th toOisy.H I STO RI CA L NOTES: The greatest disad-vantage the British had was the fact that the. . Douai-Oisy sector lay well behind the Germanlines. They had, however, the advantage of the useof the new Bristol BR/ f2a instead of the slow a n dfragile FE/2's and BE/ 2's. They also had the greatmisfortune of working the sector patrolled by vonRichthofen's Jasta I IS P E C I A L RULES:

' I Because this area was so far behind theGerman lines ignore all trenchlines and apply theForced-Landing Table only to German aircraft.2. The German player may enter and exitanywhere o n the east mapboard edge only.3. The British player may enter and exit o n thewest though hexes AA39 to A52 only.. 4. Because of the critical shortage of pilots andobservers during this period, the British wouldoften send replacements to the front with only theminimum of training and little o r no experiencewith the aircraft type they would fly in combat . T oportray this deficiency, subtract 1 from the die rollfor all attacks made by British replacement pilotsand observers during their first day in comba t .. 5. Photo-recon targets (I I road hexes each):E31 to E21; W20 to 0 2 5 ; W20 t o G G 1 4 ; KK16 toNNIO;Q29toX2 ;S38toP3 ;F34toP3 ;Q29toX24; HH17 to FFIO.6. Bombing targets: W20; X19; 218; KK16;HH17; 1113; 5512; L L I I ; FFIO; F32; 4 2 9 ; V19.

7. Use BR/ f2b counters for No. 48 Sqd . Thecapabilities of the BR/ f2a can be found o n theAuxiliary Aircraft Capabilities Char t in the BattleManual.8. Use the Victory Point system on theCampaign G a m e scenario card.

D A TEMISSION SCHEDULE

PHOTO-RECON BOMBINGII

O R D E R S O F B TTLEG ERM A N A LLI EDJASTA No. 6 (Naval) No. 4 8r

REPLACEMENT O BSERV ERS 0 0 4* (418117)*Earliest da te of arrival for replacements

G A M E RULES: Utilize all Tournament leveland tactical bombing, and Ace rules. Game lasts oCampaign Game rules including photo-recon, week.A

THE SEC O N DR R S OFFENSIVE

TIME: March and April, 1918-The Ludendorff Mission scheduling must be done priorOffensives on Arras determining weather conditions. Missions tPLACE: The Lys Battlefield must be scrubbed in the A M portion of a dUNITS INVOLVED: R F C S Q D . Nos. 54 84 may be flown in the place of those scheduled inand Jasta I I PM portion of those A M missions, if successT H E SITUATION: During this period air-to-air would give the British player more victory poincombat took a back seat to air-to-ground tactics a s 4. Ground fire was responsible for many losboth sides concentrated o n the close support of o n both sides. T o depict this allow both sidesinfantry troops. The British were ordered to b o m b use of six machine gun units to be placed witand strafe advancing German infantry no matter two hexes of each side's trenchlines. Once placwhat the cost. The Jagdstaffeln assigned to the these units may not be moved. However, they msector were ordered to achieve local a ir be redeployed prior to each day's flying.superiority. 5. Target hexes for British bombing missiH I STO RI CA L N O TES: During the offensive, may be selected from those appearing oneach side came to regard the poor weather Tactical Bombing scenario card.condi t ions as much a n enemy a s the other's G A M E S RULES: Tournament , Campaiaircraft. Fog became the German ground force's Game, Anti-aircraft fire, Tactical Bombimost effective air cover . Fo r al though it meant Trench strafing, Ace and Double-Ace rules.their own air force could not support them, it keptthe British on the ground a s well.S P E C I A L G A M E NOTES:1.British ma y assign joint squadron flights ( tothe three-plane-per-side maximum). Eithersquadron may b o m b o r strafe.2. British player must a t t empt to fly fourmissions per day-two missions per each 'AM'and 'PM' portion of the day.3. T o depict the poor weather conditions theBritish player must roll the die and consult theWeather Effects Table prior toeachday's A M andPM missions to determine if flying is possible.

VICTORY POINT SCHEDULEBRITISH:a.) 10 points for each successful bombing missiob). I point for every three trench hexes strafRetain fractions.c). 3 points for each enemy aircraft destroyeG ERM A N S:a). 8 points for each scheduled bombing missiN O T successfully completed by a British playb). 6 points for each enemy aircraft destroye

O R D E R S O F B TTLEG ERM A N BRITISHJASTA No. 5 4 Sqd. No. 8 4 S

RE, , .,,.dENT PI *Earliest d ate of arrival for replacem entsMISSION SCHEDULE WE THER EFFECTS T BLE

D A T E T R E N C H STRA FI N G BOMBING March 24 to 27 Apri l 6 andD I E R O L C AM PM AM

6 C C C CF - F o g (No flying possible)C - Clear (Flying possible) Q

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PAGE 4 THEGENERAL

rof ssiondPanzerBlitz Notes of a Professional Russian:The Combined Arms Offensive

b y Carl HoffmanWhy, the reader will ask, why that r idiculoustitle? No self-respecting PanzerBIitz player willsoon forget Dean Miller 's admirable analysis ofSitua tion 10, in which he lambasted th e profes-sional Russian from Kursk to Prochorovka andback again. The truth of the matter is that Mr.Miller's article set the wheels turni ng in the mindof at least one perennial Soviet player, trying todetermine if it's really that easy to be the R ussians.Mind you, I didn't becom e a professionalRussian by choice. To this day the superiority ofsome of the German AFV counte rs makes mymouth water, especially those with names insteadof numbers: Panther, Humm el, Nashorn, Wespe.The thought of maneuvering them across thegameboard, even in l imited numbers, sends me

into temporary nirvana. My naturally cooperativedisposition, however, combined with the psycho-logical propensities of my opponents, havecondem ned me to professional Russian-hoodfor the simple reason th at no body 1 play everwants to be anything but the hideous H un, and I 'mnot the pe rson to s tand in their way. By force ofcircumstan ces I've played the Slavic fall guy for aha l fdozen or so pbm and f t f opponents ben t onfollowing Mr. Miller's lead a s attac kers movingaggressively against overwhelming odds. Myyears on the steppes, however, have no t been spentin vain.One thing I've le arned, f or instance, is that byand large it 's easier to be the Russian tha n theGerman in PanzerBIitz he way it's easie r for anovice to fly a Sturmovik than a Messerschmitt262 The Russian is often able to make up in masswhat tie lacks in finesse, a luxury the Germancann bt afford, and in early games this may be themargin between, if n ot victory and defeat, a t leastdefeat and ignominious defeat. As a matte r of fact,1 think it advisable that even the most stalwartprofessional German serve a middling-longapprenticeship where he com man ds only Russiansagainst more experienced opponents. That wayhe'll learn the basics without gaining too manypainful memories, a nd will afterwards be able togo on to better things-either com mand of themore sophisticated German forces, or moresophisticated command of the Soviets. For,despite what i ts detractors m ay say, the Red Armyof PanzerBIitz is more than just mass. SuperiorRussian play is nearly a s intricate and challengingas superior German play, hinging on a propercombina t ion o f the th ree bas ic combat a rmsinfantry, armo r, an d arti l lery. As always, this factcomes most clearly into focus in those scenarioswhere each side com man ds a mobile force.Tank freaks who play PanzerBlitz (and let'sface it, how many of its players aren t tank freaks?)know tha t only four of the twelve scenarios thatcome with the game are satisfactory duels ofarmor: Situations 4,6,7, a nd 10. Of these, 7 and 10are more or less hopelessly one-sided in favor ofthe Russians simply because of the way the rulesare written. Situation 4 's victory conditions aref lawed so as to make fo r ano ther easy Sovie ttriumph; however, these can alw ays be changedfor a more even game. Situation 6 is also lopsid ed,this t ime towards the Germa ns, but i t is in nowhere

near the sha pe of 7 or 10. Of the quar tet of armor(i .e . mobile) scenarios then, only 4 and 6 aresalvageable without completely overhauling theoriginal rules (w hich, by the way, AH has to largeextent done with Panzer Leader). It is with thesetwo scenarios th at the remainder of thisarticle willbe concerned, for it is in them that the Russian'sskill as an offensive fighter is most decisivelytested, and most especially his prowess atorchestratin g a mobile combined arms offen-sive.

At first glance there is a fair resemblancebetween the two situations. In both of the ma largeRussian force is pitted again st a much weakerGerman battlegroup, the two doing battle thelength of the three boards with the Germ ans tryingto delay the Soviets and the latter attempting todestroy units and attain the farther end of theboard. In each case the composition of theGerman forces is approxim ately the same, singleWespe and Hummel 'SPA units accompan ied bytwo or th ree tank or T D p la toons and varioussupporting infantry and anti-tank arti l lery. TheRussian forces vary somewhat more, as does theterrain, matters which will be taken up brieflywhen we examine the individual situations. Themost important similarity between the twoscenarios, however, is that they each are exercisesin movement. Th e Russia n player is faced with thenecessity of outmaneu vering (th at is, gettingbehind) his opp onen t and a t the same time seekingto m aintain th e mobility which will enable him topursue the German to his ultimate destruction.This mobility must never be allowed t o slip awayby unloadin g too much infantry o r arti l lery unlessa large advantage can be obta ined. By the sametoken, the G erman is under the heavy burden ofno t staying t oo lon g in one place; if he dawdles hemay find himself up to his eyebrows in T-34's.

Spea king of T-34's: these are the Russian'smain w eapon in this mechanized du el, and despitethe range and firepower deficiencies of the Cmodel, they ar e admirab ly suited for the job,combinin g a m oderate protection factor with oneof the best m ovement factors in the game. Therehave been a multitude of occasions when that 1 Iin the lower right-hand corner of the count er hasenabled my T-34's to move the ext ra hex necessaryto complete a n encirclement. Given the constantnecessity for exposure, however, the T-34, andespecially the T-34c, cannot functio n alone. TheRussian will soo n find himself in a treadless wasteif he doesn't provide the second major ingredientof this brand of warfare, counterfire. For this hemus t roll up big guns in the form of SU-85's andSU-152's. These are my favorite Russian units,

both with good attac k, defense, and range factorsWhere the T-34's provide the immediate threat tGerman positions, the SU's provide the punch tremove them. In effect they say: Go ahead, yolousy kraut, go ah ead an d wipe out those T-34'See wha t you'll get.Of course this outline is a little too stratifieboth SU-85's and SU-152's can and should takthe place of T-34's in up-front spotting work, buthe SU's are the heart of any Soviet mobiloffensive, and the R ussian playe r will do well tfollow where they lead. With this general plan imind, let us move on t o consider the scenarioindividually, and see where the other twbranches, infantry and artillery, fit into thcombin ed arms overview.Situation 4 has always been one of the easiePanzerBIitz scenarios for me to visualize. Beinoriginally fr om the Midwest and k nowing wha t itlike in the summertime, I don't find it hard timagine the sunblasted plains near M insk in Jul1944, the clouds of dust raised by mechanizecolumns, the sweating individual soldiers (thmay n ot be th e way the battle actually was, but itthe way 1 picture it). In this scenario the oppo sinsides meet mainly on boards 2 and 3, decidedllevel terrain, and the Russian finds himself icom man d of a force rich in infantry as well aarm or and guns. There are a good many problemwith the victory conditio ns in Situatio n 4 becausthe Russian mu st reach only board 3 (the centrof the three boards laid end- toe nd ) to prevent hopponent from winning, and he gets to advancmore than half the distance to i t on Turn beforthe Ger man is even on the map . It seems to me theasiest way to improve the victory conditionwould be to let the German set up on the mabefore the Russian enters, or perhaps m ake boarI, the mapboard most distant, the necessary goaadding two o r three game turns. O ther players omy acquainta nce have proposed reinforcing thGerman battlegroup and making the west side othe north-south gully on board 3 paydirt . Ina nof these variants, however, alon g with the usutactics of movement a nd counterfire, the Russiashould keep in mind the possibility of what I likto call a tidal wave attac k. This tactic particularly suited to the op en cou ntry, victorconditions, an d infantry-heavy Russian force oSituation 4, and is as subtle and potentialldevastating as a S talin tank. This is how it work

The chances are that the German will bemploying the time-honored tactic of deployinhis SP A and o ther long-range units to the rear, the same time positioning a screen of transpo

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THE GENERAL PAGEa n d infantry (perhaps buttressed by a t ankplatoon o r two) well forward to impede theRussian's progress a n d expose him to bombard-ment f rom the big guns. In Si tua t i on4 , a s a mat terof fact, the almost-predictable first move by theGerman is advancing light units t o hill 129, thegully a n d road hexes a r o u n d 2-G-9, a n d the woodsnear 2-1-4, with Wespe a n d Hummel in Golod inant icipat ion of falling back to the slopes of hill 107o n T u r n 2. However, unless the German is veryprecise about the deployment of the forward unitsthere is a stron g possibility he will leave some holeopen , through which the Russian can advance oneo r more tank companies to threaten the SPA's .With Wespe a n d Hummel a n d the other big gunsfaced with the choice of firing a t the forwardRussian tanks o r retreating, the Soviets can thensurround the German screening units with massesof infantry a n d artillery. This is the tidal wave;the Russian should rank his uni ts two o r threedeep a r o u n d the forward Germans, leaving theunhappy H u n with the choice of using his heavyguns to blow a hole in the Slavic mul t i tude for thesurrounded units (and in al l probability findinghimself Hummel-less o n the following turn), o rretreating with the heavies a n d leaving the screento whatever mercy is in the Russian's heart. Itshould be noted here tha t t hough the crest of thet idal wave is necessarily the infantry (everytime 1gaze u p o n one of those Rifle companies with itsdefense factor of 16 soft points my eyescloud withtears of gratitude), the ant i -tank guns also playtheir role. A t close range a 76.2mm A T bat tery isa s effective as a company of T-34c's, a n d eventhough their defense factor isn't spectacular, theymake one more target the German must disperseo r destroy to ensure the safety of his forward units.And against halftracks, the kind of target they a r elikely to sight in on, they c a n be devastating.This, then, is the rout ine for Si tuat ion 4 arelentless tango of movement and counterfire,t ank probes a n d t idal waves. T h e Russian shouldpursue, pursue, pursue his opponent , keeping hiseyes open for a t idal wave at t ack by which he c a nsurround a n d dest roy carelessly placed enemyunits.It's rather a different story in Si tuat ion 6. Herethe Russian gets a few more tanks, in the shape ofT-34c's, but he's no t a s well supplied with infantry,the terrain is against him, a n d the victoryconditions a r e stiff, requiring ten Russian units o nboard 3, the one farthest away, by the end of thegame for a marginalvictory. This is n o small ordergiven the slightly larger German bat t legroup a n dhorrendous terrain over which the fighting takesplace. Additionally, the t idal wave is invalidatedbecause the number of German units dest royed islargely i rrelevant according to the victory con-ditions, a n d the many Russians required toexecute it would only slow down the offensive. T oput it succinctly, in Si tuat ion 6 the Russian is u pthe Dnieper. T h e solut ion for these problems issimple indeed; given the same basic setup, theRussian should be al lowed to move first. Thi s willenable him to reach the C ow of board 1 o n theinitial t u rn , bu t be won't have enough movementpoints to occupy either hills 104 o r 129, the latterbeing the German's favorite nest for SPA's. F r o mthere, given the channeling terrain of board 2, itshould still be a n exciting race (perhaps limited to8 o r 9 turns) to board 3.At this point the reader can be heard snort ingalmost audibly: al l right, smart aleck, what's thesurefire method of winning Si tuat ion 6? Un-leashing the Cossacks? Turn ing loose the Mongolhorde? The answer, of course, is obvious: there isno surefire method. The Russian can only play his

Continued on Page 20 Column

TR TEGIC SIMUL TION N D G ME DESIGNBy J o h n PradosWith a Game Development ddendaBy Donald GreenwoodStrategic simulations are still a recent innova-tion of gaming but they seem to be catching o nrapidly. There was a time, only a couple of yearsback, when people a t game companies were sayingthat strategic games ought to be avoided like theplague. T h e few tha t had been done were largelyregarded a s failures. Today can think of severalstrategic games already o u t a n d a s many more tha ta r e still in various stage