agricultural reform and rural transformation in china since 1949

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Agricultural Reform and Rural Transformation in China since 1949

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Historical Studies of Contemporary China

Series Editor

Thomas DuBois (Australian National University)

Editorial Board

Joel Andreas ( Johns Hopkins University)Liping Bu (Alma College)

Brian Demare (Tulane University)Xiaoping Fang (Nanyang Technological University)

Xiaofei Kang (George Washington University)Huaiyin Li (The University of Texas at Austin)

Glenn Tiffert (University of Michigan)Luman Wang (Virginia Military Institute)

Michael Szonyi (Harvard University)

VOLUME 2

The titles published in this series are listed at brillcomhscc

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Agricultural Reform and Rural Transformation in China

since 1949

Edited by

Thomas DuBois Huaiyin Li

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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issn 2352-7919isbn 978-90-04-29018-1 (hardback)isbn 978-90-04-32249-3 (e-book)

Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill nv Leiden The NetherlandsKoninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill Brill Hes amp De Graaf Brill Nijhoff Brill Rodopi and Hotei PublishingAll rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced translated stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic mechanical photocopying recording or otherwise without prior written permission from the publisherAuthorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center 222 Rosewood Drive Suite 910 Danvers ma 01923 usaFees are subject to change

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner

The SSAP logo and the CASS logo should appear flush-left on the Copyright Page above the subvention text The logos should appear side-by-side with the SSAP logo appearing to the left of the CASS logo

This book is a result of the co-publication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill nv These articles were selected and translated into English from the Chinese journal Contemporary China History Studies (《当代中国史研究》 Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu) sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary China Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

The translation has received financial support from the Innovation Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names DuBois Thomas David 1969- | Li HuaiyinTitle Agricultural reform and rural transformation in China since 1949

edited by Thomas DuBois Huaiyin LiDescription Leiden Boston Brill [2016] | Series Historical studies of

contemporary China ISSN 2352-7919 volume 2 | Includes bibliographical references and indexIdentifiers LCCN 2016016317 (print) | LCCN 2016017693 (ebook) | ISBN

9789004290181 (hardback alk paper) | ISBN 9789004322493 (e-book) | ISBN 9789004322493 (E-book)

Subjects LCSH Agriculture and state--China--History--20th century | Social change--China--History--20th century | Social problems--China--History--20th century | China--Rural conditions | China--Social policy | China--Politics and government--1949-1976 | China--Politics and government--1976-2002

Classification LCC HD2098 A355 2016 (print) | LCC HD2098 (ebook) | DDC 3381851--dc23LC record available at httpslccnlocgov2016016317

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Contents

List of ContributorsemspviiTranslatorrsquos Noteemspix

Introduction Chinese Agriculture and Rural Development Reexamined Western and Chinese Perspectivesemsp1

Huaiyin Li and Thomas DuBois

Part 1Political Programs in Practice

1 The Origins and Development of Chinarsquos ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquoemsp25Lu Xueyi

2 The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants after the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Land Reformsemsp52

Su Shaozhi

3 The Deep Plowing Movement of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquoemsp74Zhu Xianling Ding Zhaojun and Hu Huakai

4 A Study of the Construction of Terraced Fields in Liulin County Shanxi Province in the Era of Collectivizationemsp101

Hao Ping

5 Historical Observations Regarding the Large-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens in Hebei Provinceemsp115

Li Chunfeng

6 From Busy-Season Childcare Centers to Full-scale KindergartensmdashRural Childcare Organizations in Shanxi Province in the 1950semsp133

Han Xiaoli

7 Restitution Paid by Rural Peoplersquos Cooperatives in the 1960smdashAn Inquiry Focused on Jiangsu Provinceemsp155

Wang Yugui

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vi Contents

8 Transformations to Commune and Brigade Enterprises and the Rise of Rural Private Enterprises in Gaoyang County Hebei Province in the Early Days of Reform and Openingemsp192

Feng Xiaohong

9 Analysis of the Construction of Village Collective Economic Organizations and Related Issues in Changshu CitymdashFour Case Studiesemsp212

Zheng Yougui

Part 2Flows of Goods Money and People

10 The History of Rural Private Lending in Hubei Province 1952ndash1954emsp231

Su Shaozhi and Chang Mingming

11 The South-to-North and North-to-South Flows of Grains and CerealsmdashChanges to Directions and Quantities of Flows of Grains and Cereals between North and South in Contemporary Chinaemsp267

Zheng Yougui Ou Weizhong Kuang Chanjuan and Jiao Hongpo

12 Three Historic Changes to Inter-regional Grain Flows in the Peoplersquos Republic of China and Their Causesemsp287

Qu Shang and Su Shaozhi

13 Rural Population Flows in the Era of CollectivizationmdashA Study of the Border Region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guangdong Provincesemsp314

You Haihua

14 A Review of Research on the State Monopolyemsp330Wang Danli

Indexemsp361

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List of Contributors

Chang Mingming (常明明)PhD in economics is professor in the Institute of International Economics Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

Ding Zhaojun (丁兆君)is a lecturer in the university history museum University of Science and Tech-nology of China

Feng Xiaohong (冯小红)PhD in history is associate professor in the history department of Handan College

Han Xiaoli (韩晓莉)PhD in history is assistant professor in the history department of Capital Nor-mal University

Hao Ping (郝平)PhD in history is professor in the Institute of Social History of China and director of the Institute of History and Culture Shanxi University

Hu Huakai (胡化凯)PhD in history of science is a professor in the department of history of science and technological archaeology University of Science and Technology of China

Jiao Hongpo (焦红坡)is a researcher fellow in the department of contemporary agricultural history Institute of Rural Economics Ministry of Agriculture

Kuang Chanjuan (邝婵娟)is an associate research fellow Institute of Agricultural Resources and Regional Planning Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences

Li Chunfeng (李春峰)holds a Master of Laws and works in the Hebei Provincial Academy of Social Sciences History Center

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Lu Xueyi (陆学艺 1933ndash2013)was research fellow and doctoral thesis advisor Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (cass) President Chinese Sociological Association Director Insti-tute of Sociology cass President Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences Beijing University of Technology President Chinese Association for Rural Sociology

Ou Weizhong (欧维中)a noted agronomist and the former chairman of the Institute of Rural Econom-ics of the Ministry of Agriculture

Qu Shang (瞿商)PhD in economics is associate professor in Economics Institute Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

Su Shaozhi (苏少之)is professor in the School of Economics Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Director Institute of Economic History of China

Wang Danli (王丹莉)PhD in economics is assistant research fellow department of economic his-tory Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Wang Yugui (王玉贵)PhD in history is professor in the history department of Jiangsu University

You Haihua (游海华)PhD in history is professor in the School of Marxism Studies Zhejiang Gong-shang University

Zheng Yougui (郑有贵)is head of department of economic history Institute of Contemporary China Studies

Zhu Xianling (朱显灵)PhD is an associate research fellow in the department of history of science and technological archaeology University of Science and Technology of China

viii List of Contributors

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Translatorrsquos Note

The Chinese word nongmin is typically translated into English as ldquopeasantrdquo Its constituent characters are nong which can mean ldquofarmingrdquo ldquoagriculturerdquo or ldquorural areasrdquo in general and min which means ldquopersonrdquo or ldquopeoplerdquo A nong-min is thus literally a ldquofarmerrdquo or a ldquorural personrdquo Prior to the recent era most nongmin in China were peasants in the traditional definition operating un-der a feudal system Shortly after the communist liberation of China nong-min became a political denomination of class at which point the status of nongmin became preferable to that of dizhu or ldquolandlordrdquo So in discussions of Chinarsquos official class system of that time it is appropriate to translate nong-min as ldquopeasant(s)rdquo However around the same time the Peoplersquos Republic of China instituted the hukou or household registration system based on Soviet precedent This system divided Chinarsquos population into two categories nongye ldquoagriculturalrdquo or in other words ldquoruralrdquo and feinong ldquonon-agriculturalrdquo or in other words ldquourbanrdquo Citizens registered ldquoagriculturalrdquo generally belong to a vil-lage collective which allots them parcels of land some designated for farm-ing and some for homesteading Urban citizens are not allocated any land but have other advantages in the cities where they are registered in ease of finding employment and access to public schools and other public services Chinese people with either kind of registration are citizens who can apply for passports or party membership or official service ie with ldquocitizensrsquo rightsrdquo but there are distinct differences in the rights of either group In one of many examples one often hears of the hundreds of millions of ldquorural migrantsrdquo in China citizens registered ldquoruralrdquo despite living and working in urban areas and their lack of access to full rights In modern China when one uses the term nongmin especially in official literaturemdashan example being the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo or sannong wentimdashit is almost certainly in reference to hukou status especially when statistics are being given So in this book I almost always render the term nongmin as ldquorural citizen(s)rdquo as I feel this term succinctly captures the nature of the population being described unless in a particular instance it is clear that the author was referring to political class status or the occupation of farming in particular

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copy koninklijke brill nv leiden 6ensp|enspdoi 06397890043493_00

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Introduction

Chinese Agriculture and Rural Development Reexamined Western and Chinese Perspectives


Since the dismantling of the Peoplersquos Communes and the gradual introduction of the Household Responsibility System (hrs) in the early 1980s rural China has witnessed tremendous economic and social changes Grain production has grown prodigiously township and village enterprises (tves) have flour-ished huge numbers of migrant workers have flowed into the cities and the rapid process of urbanization has reduced the number of rural dwellers to just over half of Chinarsquos total population Observers have tended to juxtapose these recent developments against the poor economic conditions in the countryside prior to 1978 emphasizing the low agricultural productivity and widespread rural poverty that was prevalent before and during the era of collective ag-riculture Political and scholarly perspectives have largely agreed that it was the failure of Maoist agricultural policies that drove the decollectivization and reforms of the Deng Xiaoping era even as these reforms created new problems of wealth disparity environmental degradation and food insecurity

Agriculture has always been at the heart of prc policy the government in-herited a country that was overwhelmingly rural and predicated its social and economic revolution heavily on rural transformation Despite the stunning in-dustrial growth of the past few decades China remains heavily invested in ag-riculture Since the 1980s Chinese historians have revisited and reassessed the history of agricultural development in the Peoplersquos Republic from the dawn of the collective movement to the new realities of the 1980s and beyond This vol-ume brings together fourteen articles from the journal Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu to introduce Chinese scholarly perspectives on many of the most impor-tant issues about agricultural development and institutional changes in rural China during and after the Maoist era Beginning with an overall assessment of the challenges and prospects of agricultural growth and social change in rural China this volume includes articles on the background and dynamics of agricultural collectivization in the early to mid-1950s the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath in the late 1950s and early 1960s and various facets of rural industrialization and economic development following decollectivization in the early 1980s

li and DuBois2

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This introduction frames the work of these scholars by presenting an overall historical context for the topics and issues addressed in this volume Beginning with a survey of the Chinese statersquos overall strategy for economic development and its subsequent agricultural policies it emphasizes the microeconomic in-stitutions that shaped collectivized agriculture as well as the motivations that subsequently drove the Great Leap Forward decollectivization and rural in-dustrialization In the process we will suggest some of the ways that the work presented in this volume engages some of the perspectives and concerns pre-sented in English language scholarship on post-1949 rural China

Overview Economic Strategy and Agricultural Growth

The dynamics and complexity of agricultural growth and agrarian changes in post-1949 China cannot be fully comprehended without placing them into the larger context of the Chinese statersquos overall development strategy it was after all these long-term macroeconomic goals that determined the statersquos priori-ties in investment the formulation of microeconomic policies and plans for the relationships among different economic sectors Like many other develop-ing countries in Asia during the decades following World War ii the newly established Peoplersquos Republic of China was confronted with the urgent task of economic development through industrialization and had to choose be-tween two alternative strategies The first was to encourage the improvement of family-based agriculture by means of modern inputs (chemical fertilizers pesticides machines improved seeds etc) provided by the industrial sector and by integrating family farming with regional national and global markets In turn improved productivity would enable rural ldquosurplus laborrdquo to flow from agriculture into the industrial sector thus propelling industrialization with the supply of cheap labor force and the subsequent process of urbanization This was the course of agricultural growth and rural development widely seen in other East Asian economies in the postwar decades1 The second was to priori-tize industrial growth especially investment in capital-intensive heavy indus-try (the manufacturing of machinery energy smelting and transportation) without significant investment in agriculture and light industry for consumer goods In the absence of external capital such as foreign loans or direct foreign

1 In these regimes as well the development of family farming often included the marginaliza-tion of existing agrarian elites see TJ Pempel ldquoThe Developmental Regime in a Changing Worlds Economyrdquo Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed) The Developmental State in Historical Per-spective (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1999) pp 164ndash165

3Chinese Agriculture and Rural Development Reexamined

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investment high-speed industrial growth relied on state extraction of eco-nomic resources from agriculture which in turn necessitated forced measures of agrarian collectivization and mobilization The Soviet Union had already pioneered just such an approach successfully achieving its goal of rapid indus-trialization but at the expense of a stagnant agriculture sector and the peren-nial shortage of consumer goods

Throughout the Mao era the Chinese leadership oscillated between the two strategies outlined above but generally it was the latter that prevailed The former which served initially only as a temporary and supplementary solution to the problems caused by overly aggressive agrarian extraction would eventu-ally come to dominate Chinarsquos development strategy in the post-Mao period The key factor behind the Maoist statersquos preference for the strategy of heavy industrial development was primarily geopolitical Mao was prompted by the success of the Stalinist model the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s the Westrsquos embargo of China and his own eagerness to narrow the gap between China and industrial nations to advocate the policy of ldquoleaning to one siderdquo (yi bian dao)mdashborrowing Soviet political and economic institutions while pioneering its own strategy of economic growth As Perkins and Yusuf pointed out from the 1950s through the 1970s the economic planners in the central government persistently prioritized the expansion of heavy industry which accounted for from 40 percent to over 50 percent of the statersquos capital construction invest-ment in most years2 The limited availability of capital for investment in agri-culture drove the state to aggressively mobilize the rural workforce as the pri-mary means to increase grain output Compared to the phenomenal increase in industrial output grain production increased by only 225 percent annually from 1955 to 1980 which was no better than that in many other developing countries The sluggish growth of agricultural output was a result not only of the statersquos lack of investment in and excessive extraction from agriculture but also of the mismanagement of local collective organizations and the ineffi-ciency in labor input Therefore since the mid-1960s modern capital input especially in the application of chemical fertilizers and the introduction of new strains of crops became increasingly important for agriculture and con-tributed to at least half of the increases in agricultural production which grew ldquoat a respectable 4 percent or more per yearrdquo3

Mark Selden offers a nuanced analysis of Chinarsquos economy under Mao by distinguishing between the two phases before and after the summer of 1955

2 Dwight Perkins and Shahid Yusuf Rural Development in China (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press 1984)

3 Ibid 198

li and DuBois4

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Selden suggests that in its earlier stage Chinarsquos economic plan was incremen-tal and innovative combining farmersrsquo voluntary participation in cooperatives and the use of market elements for the shared well-being of a coalition of so-cial forces Afterwards however the state turned to what he calls ldquomobiliza-tional collectivismrdquo in the form of compulsory procurement of crops at low state prices the forced transition to collectives and low investment in agri-culture Although Selden acknowledges the obvious achievements of Maoist rural development the overall direction of policy worked against rural inter-ests and accounted for the stagnation in agricultural productivity and peasant income from the collectives the continued poverty of the rural population and a widening gap in living conditions between urban and rural areas4 In a similar vein Andrew Walder questions the effectiveness of Chinarsquos develop-ment strategy after 1956 He emphasizes the facts that per capita gdp growth in China from 1950 to 1973 was only 29 percent largely on par with India but significantly lower than the level achieved by its East Asian neighbors As late as 1978 30 percent of the Chinese rural population remained below the pov-erty line not to mention the death of tens of millions during the Great Leap Forward and another 11 to 16 million during the Cultural Revolution5

To date Philip Huang has provided the most sophisticated explanation of the dynamics of agricultural growth in Maoist China Huang agrees that the rapid expansion of state power in the rural society through collectivization and party networks at the village level made possible local government pro-grams to construct water-control and irrigation projects increase the use of chemical fertilizers and tractors and promote the double-cropping of hybrid rice in the Yangzi delta in the 1960s and 1970s However the most important factor that contributed to agricultural growth Huang argues was the full mo-bilization of womenrsquos labor by the collectives The demands of the rapidly ex-panding population for more income to satisfy their subsistence needs efforts by collectives to maximize crop yields and the disappearance of off-farm em-ployment opportunities drove farmers to intensify labor input in production until the marginal return of their added labor input disappeared Labor in-tensification did increase output per unit area which reached its highest level in the late 1970s just before the abolition of the collective system However these gains were achieved at the cost of stagnation and even decline in labor productivity or output per workday as best measured by the cash value of the

4 Mark Selden The Political Economy of Chinese Socialism (Armonk ny ME Sharpe 1988) pp 3ndash23

5 Andrew Walder China under Mao A Revolution Derailed (Cambridge ma Harvard University Press 2015) pp 315ndash334


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farmersrsquo daily work points which remained largely unchanged throughout the Maoist era Huang refers to this process as agricultural involution which in his opinion had existed in Chinarsquos rural economy for centuries before the Com-munist revolution6

This volume begins with one similarly sweeping meta-analysis Lu Xueyirsquos still timely perspective on the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo (san nong wenti) Unlike the chapters that follow this piece was a speech rather than an academic research article and as such it offers an unusually frank assessment of the ways in which the past decades of rural reform have succeeded and those in which they have not The success story has been the development of agriculture (nongye) by which Lu refers to the aggregate level of production Simply put decades of successful investment in agriculture mean that depletion of the national grain supply is no longer a threat even (as one later chapter notes) in the case of an international embargo However this success has come at the expense of rural areas (nongcun) which are poorly managed and burdened by high levels of official debt and the welfare of rural citizens (nongmin) who have fallen behind their urban counterparts and are owed a debt for their contribution to national construction Worth particular notice are Lursquos recommendations which include abolishing the system of registering households as urban or ru-ral (with severely restricted options for the latter) as well as deep structural reforms of local government and the reinstatement of the Rural Work Depart-ment As Lursquos listeners and later readers would no doubt have understood each of these proposed reforms speaks to a specific moment of decision during Chinarsquos decades of agrarian transformation

Agricultural Collectivization in the 1950s

Commencing after the 1952 completion of land reform the process of collec-tivization continued for five years and proceeded in three stages7 The first stage was the organization of ldquomutual aid teamsrdquo (huzhuzu) each of which consisted of a few to more than a dozen households Participating house-holds joined the teams voluntarily and retained ownership of land and other

6 Philip CC Huang The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta 1350ndash1988 (Stanford Stanford University Press 1990) especially Chapter 11

7 Land reform itself was a multi-stage process which commenced on a small scale in the agrar-ian soviets of the 1920s and continued gradually in areas under communist control The date of 1952 refers to the point at which the reforms had been completed in newly acquired re-gions and the program officially declared complete

li and DuBois6

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property such as draft animals and farm implements Generally villagers wel-comed this form of cooperation because they still controlled all of the harvest from their private fields while the poor and middle peasants (labels which had been first applied during land reform) within the teams benefitted from the availability of shared use resources The second stage began in 1954 with the state-led transition from mutual aid teams to ldquoagricultural production cooperativesrdquo (nongye hezuoshe also known as primary cooperatives and more generally as apcs)8 These cooperatives each comprised an average of 30 households which as before continued to retain ownership of land draft animals and large farming tools but were required to allow their collective use by the coop In return households received payments of land dividends Because state policy limited such dividends to 45 percent of a cooprsquos total dis-tribution to member households (the remaining 55 percent was based on labor contribution to the collective) the apcs were considered to be ldquosemi-socialistrdquo in nature The third stage began in the summer of 1956 with the transition to ldquoadvanced cooperativesrdquo (gaoji nongye hezuoshe) This new generation of agrarian cooperatives was both larger with each coop having an average of 250 households and fully socialist in nature Member households were required to renounce private ownership of land and farming tools and their income from the collective was determined solely by their labor contribution The advanced cooperative movement proceeded quickly and involved coercion by local gov-ernments in merging the original (primary) apcs and the mobilization of in-dependent households By the end of 1956 nearly 90 percent of all households in the non-minority provinces were participating in the advanced collectives

The statersquos strategy for agricultural transformation therefore underwent a dramatic change from its original scheme of voluntary and gradual transi-tion to the radical plan of accelerated compulsory collectivization During the early 1950s the consensus among prc leaders and economic planners seems to have been that agricultural collectivization would be a lengthy process re-quiring at least fifteen years They believed further that agricultural collectives could be established widely and firmly only when Chinarsquos national economy was sufficiently industrialized as to provide agricultural machinery and other modern inputs9 At the same time planners recognized that industrial growth would rely on agricultural development Agricultural surpluses were necessary

8 It should be noted that different types of agricultural cooperatization remain in use outside of China and that terminology such as apcs is shared with a broader current literature on agrarian development

9 Pang Xianzhi and Jin Congji Mao Zedong zhuan [The biography of Mao Zedong] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 2011) pp 1307ndash1308


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not only to feed the urban centers where industry was to be concentrated but also to repay development loans from the Soviet Union and to fund the con-struction of industry in the absence of investment capital As Wang Danli dis-cusses in Chapter 14 of this volume the grain crisis of 1953 marked the moment of decision in this obvious conflict of priorities between agricultural develop-ment and surplus extraction It was at this point that state planners moved from simply regulating the grain market and instituted the grain monopoly that would remain in place until 1978

As is well known Mao personally championed the move to accelerate the transition to advanced cooperatives He did so for both productive and ideo-logical reasons Long before the Communist revolution observers had agreed that Chinarsquos independent family farming was in the words of one party reso-lution ldquoisolated scattered conservative and backwardrdquo and that the ineffi-ciency of household agriculture constrained the larger project of national de-velopment10 The other and as Mao increasingly emphasized more important reason was the struggle between the two roads of socialism and capitalism in the countryside For Mao the continuation of independent farming would inevitably lead to differentiation among peasant families and give rise to the resurgence of capitalism in agricultural production in which rich peasants predominated The transition to socialism in the countryside was the single solution to both the backwardness of agricultural production and the problem of endemic rural exploitation

In sharp contrast with Maorsquos ideological rhetoric Western scholars have generally emphasized the practical economic difficulties that challenged the leadership in the mid-1950s The greatest challenge according to Mark Selden lay in the crisis of the First Five-Year Plan which projected an annual growth of nine percent in grain production in 1953 and 1954 whereas the actual growth in both years was less than two percent ldquoAcceleration of cooperative forma-tion Mao now held could stimulate productive energies making possible fulfillment of the plan and opening new possibilities for accumulationrdquo11 On the other hand the problems of polarization and class differentiation Selden suggests were not as acute as Mao claimed by 1954 ldquothe already diminished rich-peasant advantage over poor peasants in per capita cultivated acreage

10 The negative assessment of household farming went back to the agrarian economists of the Rural Reconstruction movement See for example Martin C Yang A Chinese Village Taitou Shantung Province New York Columbia University Press 1945 Quote from Pang and Jin 2011 1325

11 Selden 1988 82

li and DuBois8

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had dropped from 134 to 1271rdquo12 In her classic work on rural transformation in the early 1950s Vivienne Shue emphasized the threat that sluggish growth in agricultural production posed to the fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan as the leading reason behind Maorsquos decision to accelerate collectivization How-ever she also takes into account the factor of ldquostubborn persistence of wide disparities in wealth between classesrdquo which explained why poor and lower-middle peasants who made up 70ndash80 percent of all peasants were ldquoready and eager to join in cooperative farming venturesrdquo13 According to Louis Putterman however collectivization was not merely a tool by which the state could more effectively extract agrarian surplus but was more important as a means of projecting power into the countryside and breaking any remaining resistance among the former rural elite14

Three chapters in this volume highlight specific challenges as they were seen at the time While he does not mention the debate over Party motiva-tions in such terms it is clear that Wang Danli sees in 1953 a moment where the needs of production took precedence over those of the social revolution He attributes the formation of the state grain monopolymdasha fundamental change that coincided with the beginning of collectivizationmdashalmost solely to the economic priorities of industrialization with no mention of political or class conflict In a similar way Su Shaozhi and Chang Mingmingrsquos Chapter 10 on private lending presents an image of early rural reform that is far less focused on class leveling than on increasing productivity Su and Chang show that planners sought primarily to free up productive capital much of which was being hoarded by rich peasants In the years before collectivization cadres in Hubei not only tolerated private lending among peasants they positively encouraged it This process included even recognizing the validity of some debts incurred before the revolution ones that many lenders and borrowers alike had assumed would have been wiped clean under the new regime Cen-tral and provincial directives to protect the interests of creditors grew out of the recognition that private lending was necessary to keep capital flowing into agrarian improvements To that end rural cadres were instructed to assure rich peasants that money lent under fair terms of interest would indeed be repaid and would not have adverse implications for the class status of the lender

In Chapter 2 Su Shaozhi recreates the view from 1955 when cadres sought to assess the reemergence of rural class statification three years after

12 Ibid 7913 Vivienne Shue Peasant China in Transition The Dynamics of Development Toward Social-

ism 1949ndash1956 (Berkeley University of California Press 1980) p 28414 Louis Putterman Continuity and Change in Chinarsquos Rural Development Collective and Re-

form Eras in Perspective (Oxford uk Oxford University Press 1993) p 26


ltUNgt

the official conclusion of land reform Taking a broad national perspective Su found that a small stratum of rich peasants had begun to emerge in areas where land reform had been conducted early particularly in rapidly developing provinces such as Liaoning but had not yet appeared in areas where the reforms had been instituted more recently The more significant change was the one suggested by Selden the striking transition of people from poor to the ranks of middle peasants This latter change suggests that land reform was successful overall and was quite likely the reason behind the fact that cadres collecting the data did not seem to regard the reemer-gence of a small number of rich peasants as a crisis Their rather calm assessment that a certain number of peasants would always succeed by virtue of either hard work or good luck is particularly striking given that it was made just before the onset of the politically charged panic over the perceived reemergence of rural exploitation that pushed the acceleration of Maoist collectivism

The Great Leap Forward

The process of collectivization was on the whole relatively smooth and suc-cessful There was no widespread resistance of the sort that had been seen in the Soviet Union and the large number of grassroots rural cadres gradually learned to deal with the movementrsquos numerous logistical difficulties how to award different numbers of work points to individual peasants calculate the different forms of income distributed to peasant households coordinate tasks and labor remuneration between different production teams and requisition privately owned land to construct public projects15 Complete collectivization under the advanced coops actually made these problems easier to handle Ad-vanced coop cadres enjoyed complete control in assigning tasks and distribut-ing income even if coop members became more vulnerable to abuse Scholars have expressed different opinions about whether the advanced coop changed cadre loyalties Helen Siu suggests that the larger coops were more beholden to the state while others believe that they tended to remain true to their grass-roots origins16 Philip Huang is probably the most accurate in suggesting that

15 Carl Riskin Chinarsquos Political Economy The Quest for Development Since 1949 (Oxford uk Oxford University Press 1987) 81ndash95 Shue 1980 300ndash308

16 Helen F Siu Agents and Victims in South China Accomplices in Rural Revolution (New Haven Yale University Press 1989) p 168 Shue 1980 56 66ndash67 William Parish and Martin King Whyte Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago The University of Chicago Press 1978) pp 106ndash144

li and DuBois10

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the advanced coops held ldquodouble loyaltiesrdquo to both state and local communi-ties17 In either case it is clear that from the dual perspectives of extraction and control the advanced cooperatives were a success

The movement towards larger and more socialist cooperatives culminated in the Great Leap Forward (glf) from 1958 to 1960 Unlike the largely success-ful phases of land reform and agricultural collectivization that had come be-fore it the glf ended in disaster which in turn produced a profound impact on the course of institutional changes in Chinarsquos economic and political de-velopment over the decades to come Among the many puzzles surrounding the history of the glf the most intriguing is why Mao launched the program when he did After all Maorsquos stated objective of establishing socialist collective agriculture had already been declared complete with the formation of the ad-vanced cooperatives in 1957 Yet even these cooperatives did not last long Just one year later the glf merged the advanced coops into the gigantic Peoplersquos Communes (renmin gongshe) which had an average of approximately 4500 households and a population of 23000 and became the basic unit of planning production and distribution The Peoplersquos Communes were beset with prob-lems commune leaders (who no longer had the close ties to the grassroots) exerted arbitrary command over the labor force enforced overly egalitarian systems of labor remuneration and diverted the most able villagers from farm-ing to tasks such as the construction of earthwork projects and the smelting of useless iron and steel These problems together with drought the statersquos excessive procurement of grain and (at the outset) the wasteful consumption of food at collective canteens exacerbated nationwide crop failures causing severe food shortages in 1959 and 1960 and a nationwide famine that claimed millions of lives

Past studies have emphasized two major factors behind Maorsquos decision to embark on the glf Domestically party leaders were growing dissatisfied with the results of the First Five-Year Plan In 1957 the last year of the First Five-Year Plan grain production grew by only 13 percent and the industrial growth rate was the second lowest since the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic At the same time population growth accelerated reaching 2 percent annually in the 1950s in contrast to 1 percent in the first half of the twentieth century Increases in both the consumption needs of the people and industryrsquos demands for raw materials from agriculture placed unprecedented stress on grain production and supply As Roderick MacFarquhar observed for ccp leaders ldquohellipthe grain shortages of the late summer of 1957 must have indicated clearly enough that

17 Siu 1990 321


ltUNgt

a fundamental reappraisal of their development strategy was essentialrdquo18 Agricultural collectivization alone could not solve the bottleneck in economic growth

Externally the gradual souring of Chinarsquos relations with the Soviet Union behind which China still lagged economically naturally prompted the former to imitate elements of its neighborrsquos economic strategies and institutionaliza-tion The 1959 announcement of the Seventh Economic Plan for the Soviet Union with its stated objective of catching up with the United States in fifteen years in per capita industrial output clearly inspired Mao to claim that the glf would allow China to overtake Britain in the exactly same time period An un-spoken motive behind Maorsquos initiation of the glf was his personal rivalry with Nikita Khrushchev the new leader of the Soviet Union for supremacy in the ideological realm of socialist economic construction Mao disagreed openly with Khrushchevrsquos reversal of Stalin-era policies and his own goals for the glf were precisely and overtly Stalinist in that they prioritized the development of heavy industry at the expense of agriculture and production of consumer goods19 Maorsquos ultimate goal for the glf was to show to Moscow and the rest of the communist world that China could eventually surpass the Soviet Union in socialist construction and the transition to communism

Reports of food shortages and inefficiencies in production served only to radicalize the program putting pressure on local cadres to outdo each other in demonstrating enthusiasm Recurrent political movements in particular the 1957 Anti-Rightist campaign and the 1959 attack on Peng Dehuai and his ldquoanti-Party cliquerdquo demonstrated the price of honest criticism and the danger of being identified with ldquorightist deviationrdquo People at all levels had little choice but to join the fanaticism for poorly-planned projects exhibit support for obvi-ously nonproductive tasks and willingly suspend belief in the face of clearly exaggerated production figures The central governmentrsquos 1959 decision to ex-port as many as 42 million tons of grain in order to support some Third World countries and pay off Chinarsquos debt to the Soviet Union exacerbated further a food shortage that had plainly reached disastrous proportions20

Recent studies have focused on determining and prioritizing the reasons behind the famine that accompanied the failure of the glf Justin Lin for instance rejects the role of natural disasters local mistakes in production

18 Roderick MacFarquhar The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Vol 2 The Great Leap For-ward 1958ndash1960 (New York Columbia University Press 1983) p 3

19 Walder 2015 32020 Frank Dikoumltter Maorsquos Great Famine The History of Chinarsquos Most Devastating Catastrophe

1958ndash1962 (New York Bloomsbury 2010) 83 104ndash107

li and DuBois12

ltUNgt

planning and the inefficiencies of the oversized communes Instead he em-phasizes the loss of incentive and the prevalence of free riding by peasants who were unable to exit the collective after the 1958 formation of Peoplersquos Communes21 Others highlight differences at the provincial levels Dali Yangrsquos research finds that the death toll during the famine was linked positively to the popularity of public canteens which were found more commonly in provinces that were poorer had fewer ccp party members and leaders who tended to be more supportive of the radical policies22 Others have echoed the importance of provincial leadership but reached different conclusions about the exact significance of political status and ambitions Kung and Chen assert that those who were within sight of elevation to the Partyrsquos Central Committee were more likely to implement radical policies such as the excessive procure-ment of grain23 Three years later Dali Yang et al published a rejoinder to this theory attributing the most radical tendencies to leaders whom Mao had per-sonally appointed to the Central Committee24 In addition local conditions including population density level of rural development and natural agrarian productivity all played an enormous role in the way in which different regions experienced the famine

This volume presents a different perspective on the GLF by focusing on the local development of some of its most characteristic institutions Rather than addressing the level of political ambition as such three chapters offer instead different examples of how the politicization of production during the glf distorted perceptions and priorities Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the dissemina-tion of two production techniques terracing and deep plowing and hint at the ways that even technological innovation could take on the characteristics of a political movement The practice of terracing sloping land to increase ag-ricultural area was itself nothing new but it was vastly expanded during the 1950s due both to the prevalent attitude that bigger is always better and to the communesrsquo ability to mobilize labor on an mass scale Terraces such as those constructed in the model farms of Dazhai Shanxi were indeed marvels of

21 Justin Y Lin ldquoTizhi gaige he Zhongguo nongye zengzhangrdquo Institutional reforms and agri-cultural growth in China China Center for Economic Research Beijing University 2008 1ndash17

22 Dali Yang Calamity and Reform in China State Rural Society and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine (Stanford Calif Stanford University Press 1996)

23 James Kung and Shuo Chen ldquoThe Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during Chinarsquos Great Leap Faminerdquo American Political Science Review (2011) 105 1 27ndash45

24 Dali Yang Huayu Xu and Ran Tao ldquoA Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career incentives political loyalty and political radicalism during Chinarsquos Great Leap Forwardrdquo Journal of Contemporary China (2014) 23 89 864ndash883


ltUNgt

agricultural construction but they came at a price Similar projects in nearby Yanggao did increase yields but at the cost of diverted labor and lost yields that could scarcely be mentioned at the time The deep plowing campaign shows how the idea of the ldquomass linerdquo wherein the Party adopts the revolu-tionary genius that originates with and arises from the masses was replicated even in the realm of technological innovation According to the stylized nar-rative the technique of deep plowing was pioneered by peasants of a produc-tion brigade perfected by rural cadres and research institutes and broadly dis-seminated back to the masses Like terracing the technique of deep plowing did produce some advantages and did increase yields in some areas However the politically charged atmosphere of the glf demanded that the practice be accepted universally and eventually came to demand extreme investments of human input tens of millions of peasants would turn their backs on existing techniques to ldquowage war on the landrdquo often unable to admit when the tech-nique did not work

In Chapter 5 of this volume Li Chunfeng illustrates a similar trajectory be-hind the acceptance and criticism of public canteens one of the signature social and economic policies of the glf Like terracing and deep plowing the story of the formation of public canteens was presented as having arisen from the spontaneous initiative of the masses who set up military style messes near the fields during the busy seasons The acceptance and development of canteens closely tracks the events of the glf as they began to reveal serious drawbacks as food waste canteens quietly began to fall into disfavor Ironi-cally the political reaction to Peng Dehuairsquos criticism of the glf saved the canteens as Mao championed the cause personally and cadres nationwide again competed to demonstrate their enthusiasm for a policy that was clearly flawed

In a way the most important legacy of the glf was its undeniable failure In the aftermath opposing factions were emboldened to dramatically shift poli-cy in the hope of rehabilitating the ruined economy Although some of these new policies such as the introduction of ldquohousehold responsibility for produc-tion under contractrdquo (baochan daohu) and introduction of household plots did anticipate the market reforms of the 1980s it is important to view the policies of the 1960s in their own right Wang Yugui presents one view of this period in Chapter 7 of this volume in which he examines the 1961 campaign to provide restitution for property that had been illegally seized or destroyed during the previous years Nominally instituted at the urging of Mao himself in reality this campaign aimed to underscore the political shift away from the leftist poli-cies now branded as the ldquovogue of communismrdquo and to restore the damaged image of the Party in the countryside But here again the central state was by no means omniscient Like the glf the process of making reparations was

li and DuBois14

ltUNgt

only as good as the local cadres who implemented them in particular because the vague instructions they received left significant room for interpretation as well as abuses such as paying with unenforceable ious

We also note that the glf did leave some legacies that turned out to be positive for Chinarsquos economic growth in the long run For all the blindness and irrationality that often accompanied their planning projects such as the con-struction of water-control and irrigation systems aided rural development con-siderably The three-tiered commune system Carl Riskin argues also ldquoturned out to be a flexible instrument for organizing farmland capital construction facilitating technical change introducing some social welfare protection to rural people and instituting rural industrialization Many of the small and medium-size industries that sprang up in the countryside after 1962 originated in the backyard factories of the Leaprdquo25

One of the positive legacies of collectivization if not of the glf specifically was the fuller incorporation of women into the workforce the change that Philip Huang posits as the greatest productive transformation of the twentieth century26 Although traditionally women had been involved in various aspects of rural production particularly in handicrafts such as weaving it was the la-bor policies of the collectives that both encouraged (through the allocation of work points) and allowed (by freeing them from other duties) women to commit fully In Chapter 6 of this volume Han Xiaoli discusses the introduc-tion and evolution of collective childcare a key component in the evolution of this change In some contrast to the triumphant tone of some of the other chapters this one presents in some detail the struggles cadres faced in gaining acceptance of the practicemdashwomen who did not want to care for other peo-plersquos children others who were happy to let their own children run free in the fields and so on It was only with the professionalization of childcare both the provision of work points to village carers and their eventual replacement by politically vetted outsiders that allowed the centers to take root and transform into a stable element of the local landscape as kindergartens

Decollectivization and Rural Industrialization

The dismantling of collectivized agriculture was not a single event but rather a process that continued for years after Maorsquos death The official account of this

25 Riskin 1987 p 13826 Huang 1990


ltUNgt

process emphasized the peasantsrsquo own initiative epitomized by the actions of eighteen villagers from Xiaogang in Fengyang County Anhui Province who in the winter of 1978 secretly divided the fields of their production team to households for independent farming Over subsequent years collectives across China imitated this audacious but illegal act leading ultimately to the imple-mentation in agriculture of the Household Responsibility System This basic narrative has been widely accepted by scholars who agreed that the introduc-tion of the hrs was indeed a spontaneous bottom-up process in which villag-ers participated voluntarily27 According to this view it was the common recog-nition of the inefficiencies of collective agriculture and the ultimate failure of the collectives to improve rural living conditions that prompted the rapid and smooth acceptance of the hrs

However in reality reactions to decollectivization were more complex es-pecially at the local level It is true that the vast majority of the rural popula-tion was still living at the subsistence level by the end of the collective era and that in many localities the villagers indeed took the first step in dismantling the communes However the situation was often quite different in areas where collectivization had significantly enhanced production This was particularly true when the increase was clearly attributable to the use of modern inputs (improved crop varieties chemical fertilizers and improved water control) and material incentives (such as the wide implementation of the piece rate work point system and the increase in the work point share in grain distribu-tion) In fact the growth of agricultural production accelerated prior to 1978 in the country as a whole reaching the highest level in the most prosperous areas such as the Yangzi delta in 1978 just before the collective system was disman-tled28 In areas that had benefitted from collective agriculture the emphasis was instead on reform for example by upgrading the basic accounting unit from the production team to the larger brigades29 Thus although the hrs did indeed benefit many peasants not every part of the country embraced it spon-taneously At the national level it was only possible to implement it through a coordinated top-down effort30

27 Eg Susan Shirk The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley ca Univer-sity of California Press 1993) pp 38ndash41 Kate Xiaohong Zhou How the Farmers Changed China Power of the People (Boulder Colorado Westview Press 1996)

28 Stone Bruce 1988 ldquoDevelopments in Agricultural Technologyrdquo China Quarterly 116 Dec 767ndash822 818 Putterman 1993 36 Huang 1990 242

29 Putterman 1993 31 David Zweig Agrarian Radicalism in China 1968ndash1981 (Cambridge ma Harvard University Press 1989) 39

30 Riskin 1987 pp 286ndash290

li and DuBois16

ltUNgt

The transition to the hrs had two major consequences First it greatly im-proved the incentive for farmers to increase production From 1980 to 1984 total agricultural output across the entire country expanded by 4223 percent an average of 77 percent per year which was significantly higher than the an-nual growth rate of 29 percent from 1952 to 1978 According to Justin Linrsquos esti-mate the introduction of the hrs and hence of farmersrsquo improved incentives accounted for 49 percent of this growth while the increased application of chemical fertilizers contributed 32 percent and the increase in the statersquos pro-curement price of major crops contributed another 16 percent31

Another unanticipated but profound consequence of the transition to the hrs was the flow of labor from agriculture into non-agricultural sectors This move was by no means unprecedentedmdashas You Haihua shows in this volume significant population movement was quite common even during the collec-tive era State or commune authorities arranged some of this migration most notably the transfer of labor to work on large projects and especially the re-location to the countryside of the generation of sent-down youth However much of it was voluntary as people moved where their labor was more valued while others escaped into sparsely settled mountains

This trickle of voluntary movement greatly expanded with the implementa-tion of the hrs Released from their obligations as members of agricultural collectives hundreds of millions of rural dwellers suddenly were free to leave the land and engage in whatever work they chose so long as they paid an ag-ricultural tax and various fees to local governments and sold the contracted amount of harvest to the state under the procurement program As a result a growing number of villagers sought work in construction transportation and commerce or established their own family businesses

The most conspicuous feature of the economic and social transformation following decollectivization was the development of rural enterprise The first stage of this process had emerged within the collectives themselves Already possessing both managerial expertise and a structure for the allocation and remuneration of labor existing collective bodies began as early as 1978 to make the transition into profit-making Commune Brigade Enterprises (cbes) Feng Xiaohongrsquos chapter in this volume traces the process by which cbes in Hebei were encouraged by national and provincial legislation to branch into small scale industries such as weaving and acrylic knitting gradually building exper-tise networks and economies into zones of regional specialization

31 Justin Lin ldquoRural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in Chinardquo The American Economic Review 821 (1992) 34ndash51


ltUNgt

The opening of the labor market spelled the decline of cbes but it also laid the foundation for the rise of a new generation of rural entrepreneurs and for larger and more market oriented township and village enterprises (tves) Over time three patterns of tves began to emerge each geographically associ-ated with a different part of the country The first was the so-called Wenzhou model Typical of the coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian in this model private investors (mostly villagers) started small-scale factories to manufacture labor-intensive goods which were then sold to domestic consumers through nationwide marketing networks In the second pattern prevalent in the Pearl River Delta factories received investment from Chinese in Hong Kong or over-seas and manufactured goods primarily for export The third was the Sunan (southern Jiangsu) model best exemplified by the factories in southern Jiangsu province but also seen widely throughout rural China In this model village or township governments took advantage of the public funds they had accumu-lated during and after the Mao era and established collectively owned (ie not state owned) factories to manufacture a wide array of industrial goods Where-as vast numbers of migrant workers came to power the factories and populate the unplanned urban sprawl (often called ldquourban villagesrdquo) of the Pearl River Delta employees of the Sunan firms were largely local villagers who would ldquoenter the factory but not the cityrdquo (jinchang bu jincheng) and ldquoleave the farm but not the countrysiderdquo (litu bu lixiang)32

Local government cadres vigorously encouraged and promoted the new col-lectively-owned factories These cadres were incentivized to start new factories in their home villages or townships to obtain the extra revenue available from local governments to fuel public projects as well as for their personal material gain as they completely controlled the firms they established33 The greatest problem of such industrial firms therefore was the ambiguity and complexity of their ownership and property rights which further entangled local govern-ment officials in the management of the factories making it difficult for the tves to run as efficient profit-making businesses sensitive to market condi-tions As a solution to the innate problems of the tves under the Sunan model most of those enterprises underwent a process of privatization in the 1990s which they became integrated more fully into the market economy During and since the 1990s most of these enterprises have either reorganized their ownership structure or been privatized outright

32 Samuel Ho ldquoRural Non-Agricultural Development in Post-Reform China Growth Devel-opment Patterns and Issuesrdquo Pacific Affairs 683 (1995) 360ndash391

33 Jean C Oi Rural China Takes Off Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley University of California Press 1999)

li and DuBois18

ltUNgt

In this volume Zheng Yougui presents a closeup view of the Sunan model focusing specifically on the ability of the Bixi Township of Changshu City to produce successful firms and famous brands Zheng discusses in detail how new enterprises in Bixi faced the challenge of dividing shares of the collective economy and emphasizes how the professionalization of village and town-ship government eased the transition into a market economy However while other firms in the Sunan model relied heavily on promotion by local officials Bixi was somewhat unique in that it enjoyed attention from the highest levels Already in the early 1980s Li Peng and other central leaders were promoting the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo initially as a pilot project and later as a replicable model of successful development What is not stated of course is the effect that such high level promotion had on the region particularly on its ability to attract loans and investment Without downplaying the success of the region it is also worth noting the similar role that the state had played in promoting earlier generations of model production areas

Unique Perspectives and Contributions

Although many of the chapters in this volume run parallel to or in some way engage the major themes in English language scholarship on post-1949 rural China there are tangible differences in their approach and perspec-tive One obvious difference derives from the nature of sources Most of the scholars featured in this volume enjoyed access to local archival mate-rials and many augmented this detailed view with more or less extensive oral histories This combination of sources allows them to present a finely grained view of local institutions such as rural canteens and daycare On the other hand they tend to be rather less critical of the perspectives con-tained in the sources themselves presenting without additional commen-tary the somewhat stylized view of construction and technology during the Maoist period or the unqualified success of the Bixi Road This observation itself is not necessarily a criticism It is perhaps a bit too simple to dismiss as ideological extremism historical concerns over the reemergence of rich peasants or movements such as the deep plowing campaign Scholarship that speaks as many of these chapters do in the voice of the original sources is particularly able to recapture the considerations that went into the formation of these iconic policies

In some cases the perspectives in this volume present entirely new directions of inquiry Issues such as informal rural debt have been studied extensively in


ltUNgt

the periods before 1949 and since the 1980s but not in between34 Revealing the importance of how and why rural cadres encouraged debt adds an important facet to our understanding of their plans for rural reconstruction The most striking departure is found in Chapters 11 and 12 on the flow of grain between provinces35 Together these two chapters outline dramatic changes the ability after 1986 of provincial governments to negotiate grain prices and especially the historic shift in the mid-1990s when the movement of grain from north to south first exceeded in caloric terms the traditional flow in the opposite direction Like the others these two chapters are valuable for their attention to detail in this case on the realities of the trade for example the fact that corn produced in the vast new farmlands of northern Heilongjiang works better as animal feed than the produce of the traditionally fertile south

Needless to say the fourteen articles included in this volume limited in number and scope of investigation do not do justice to the rich and multifac-eted scholarship that the Chinese researchers have developed in the past de-cades in understanding agriculture and social change in Maoist and post-Mao China Nevertheless we hope that readers will find the new evidence and per-spectives presented in these studies a useful resource for understanding some of the most drastic experiments pitfalls and breakthroughs that the hundreds of millions in rural China have experienced since 1949

References

Chan Anita Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger 1992 Chen Village Under Mao and Deng Berkeley University of California Press

Dikoumltter Frank 2010 Maorsquos Great Famine The History of Chinarsquos Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958ndash1962 New York Bloomsbury

Ho Samuel 1995 ldquoRural Non-Agricultural Development in Post-Reform China Growth Development Patterns and Issuesrdquo Pacific Affairs 683 360ndash391

Huang Philip CC 1990 The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta 1350ndash1988 Stanford Stanford University Press

34 Walter H Mallory ldquoRural Cooumlperative Credit in Chinardquo The Quarterly Journal of Econom-ics 45 3 (1931) pp 484ndash498 Li Zhou and Hiroki Takeuchi ldquoInformal Lenders and Rural Finance in China A Report from the Fieldrdquo Modern China 36 3 (2010) pp 302ndash328

35 On provincial trade see also Thomas Lyons ldquoGrain in Fujian Intraprovincial Patterns of Production and Traderdquo China Quarterly 129 (1992) pp 184ndash215

li and DuBois20

ltUNgt

Kung James and Shuo Chen 2011 ldquoThe Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career Incen-tives and Political Radicalism during Chinarsquos Great Leap Faminerdquo American Political Science Review 105 (1) 27ndash45

Lin Justin 1992 ldquoRural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in Chinardquo The American Eco-nomic Review 821 34ndash51

Lin Justin Y 1990 ldquoCollectivization and Chinarsquos Agricultural Crisis in 1959ndash1961rdquo Jour-nal of Political Economy 986 1228ndash1252

mdashmdashmdash 1998 ldquoTizhi gaige he Zhongguo nongye zengzhangrdquo (Institutional reforms and agricultural growth in China) China Center for Economic Research Beijing University

Lin Yifu 2008 Zhidu jishu yu Zhongguo nongye fazhan (Institution technology and agricultural development in China) Shanghai Gezhi chubanshe

Lyons Thomas 1992 ldquoGrain in Fujian Intraprovincial Patterns of Production and Traderdquo China Quarterly 129 184ndash215

MacFarquhar Roderick 1983 The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Vol 2 The Great Leap Forward 1958ndash1960 New York Columbia University Press

Mallory Walter H 1931 ldquoRural Cooumlperative Credit in Chinardquo The Quarterly Journal of Economics 45 (3) 484ndash498

Oi Jean C 1989 State and Peasant in Contemporary China The Political Economy of Village Government Berkeley University of California Press

mdashmdashmdash 1999 Rural China Takes Off Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform Berkeley University of California Press

Pang Xianzhi and Jin Congji 2011 Mao Zedong zhuan (The biography of Mao Zedong) Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe

Parish William and Martin King Whyte 1978 Village and Family in Contemporary China Chicago The University of Chicago Press

Pempel TJ 1999 ldquoThe Developmental Regime in a Changing Worlds Economyrdquo in Mer-edith Woo-Cumings (ed) The Developmental State in Historical Perspective (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1999) 137ndash181

Perkins Dwight and Shahid Yusuf 1984 Rural Development in China Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press

Putterman Louis 1987 ldquoThe Incentive Problem and the Demise of Team Farming in Chinardquo Journal of Development Economics 26 (1) 103ndash127

mdashmdashmdash 1993 Continuity and Change in Chinarsquos Rural Development Collective and Reform Eras in Perspective Oxford UK Oxford University Press

Riskin Carl 1987 Chinarsquos Political Economy The Quest for Development Since 1949 Oxford UK Oxford University Press

Selden Mark 1988 The Political Economy of Chinese Socialism Armonk NY ME Sharpe


ltUNgt

Shirk Susan 1993 The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China Berkeley University of California Press

Shue Vivienne 1980 Peasant China in Transition The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism 1949ndash1956 Berkeley University of California Press

Siu Helen F 1989 Agents and Victims in South China Accomplices in Rural Revolution New Haven Yale University Press

Stone Bruce 1988 ldquoDevelopments in Agricultural Technologyrdquo China Quarterly 116 767ndash822

Unger Jonathan 2002 The Transformation of Rural China Armonk NY ME SharpeWalder Andrew 2015 China under Mao A Revolution Derailed Cambridge MA Har-

vard University PressYang Dali 1996 Calamity and Reform in China State Rural Society and Institutional

Change Since the Great Leap Famine Stanford CA Stanford University PressYang Dali Huayu Xu and Ran Tao 2014 ldquoA Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career

incentives political loyalty and political radicalism during Chinarsquos Great Leap Forwardrdquo Journal of Contemporary China 23 (89) 864ndash883

Yang Martin C 1945 A Chinese Village Taitou Shantung Province New York Columbia University Press

Zhou Kate Xiaohong 1996 How the Farmers Changed China Power of the People Boulder Colorado Westview Press

Zhou Li and Hiroki Takeuchi 2010 ldquoInformal Lenders and Rural Finance in China A Report from the Fieldrdquo Modern China 36 (3) 302ndash328

Zweig David 1989 Agrarian Radicalism in China 1968ndash1981 Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

ltUNgtltUNgt

Part 1

Political Programs in Practice

∵


ltUNgt

chapter 1

The Origins and Development of Chinarsquos ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquo1

Lu Xueyi 2

Abstract

The unique urban-rural relationship and urban-rural development strategy that have emerged through Chinarsquos course of Reform and Opening have given rise to the theory of the ldquothree ruralrdquo issues which is unique to China The construction and use of this theory are highly significant for deepening understanding of Chinarsquos basic national conditions for guiding socialist modernized construction and for researching similar issues faced by other countries The overall status of Chinarsquos ldquothree ruralrdquo issues is Our agricultural issues have been fundamentally resolved but we still face serious rural citizen and rural area issues The root cause of this situation is that the rural and agri-cultural policies developed under the planned economy have yet to be fundamentally changed In order to resolve our rural citizen and rural area issues we must continue to deepen rural reforms resolve to reform the household registration system reform the current land contracting system reform the current income distribution system and reform the political authorities vested in town governments particularly in fiscal matters

Keywords

ldquothree ruralsrdquo theory ndash productivity factors ndash agriculture ndash rural areas ndash rural citizens

1 This essay was first presented as an academic report at the Institute of Contemporary China Studies Third Annual National History Academic Symposium on September 16 2003 This written format was compiled from an audio recording of that report which the author has edited and approved

2 Lu Xueyi (陆学艺) was a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Lu passed away in 2013 in Beijing at the age of 80

Lu26

ltUNgt

i Origins of the ldquoThree Ruralsrdquo Theory

It is widely known that reforms in China begin at the level of the rural village Rural areas were the first to implement the Household Responsibility System and the first to shake off the fetters of the planned economy These reformsled to a great liberation of agricultural productivity and great increases in agricul-tural yields for many years consecutively In 1984 grain production hit its peak of 800 billion jin (400 billion kilograms) which initially resolved the problems of insufficient food and physical security for the populace Peasants in those years became their own masters and received tangible benefits from the re-forms Their lives were improved to a great degree and the urban-rural gap was further closed At the time it was proposed that the second stage of rural reforms be implemented

Beginning in 1985 however there were changes to Chinarsquos urban-rural strat-egy Income in the national economy began flowing more toward cities the focus of work began shifting toward cities and the level of energy expended on rural reforms began to decline In 1985 agricultural production fell with grain production down seven percent From this point forward rural Chinarsquos development was at times bearish and at times bullish and rural development again took yet another turn In the late 1980s some Chinese academics who were summarizing the experiences and lessons of socialist modernization di-vided Chinarsquos rural issues (each beginning with the Character nong which is alternatively used to indicate agriculture or rural areas) into issues of agricul-ture [nongye] rural areas [nongcun] and rural citizens [nongmin ie peasants or farmers] on the basis of Chinarsquos unique national conditions They analyzed both the relationship between these three issues as well as the problems to be solved within each of the issues thereupon they proposed the analysis frame-work of the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo [san nong wenti] which they established as the theoretical framework for understanding Chinarsquos true conditions and the analysis of Chinarsquos practical issues After more than ten years of practical im-plementation and propagation this framework has now become a consensus within both political and academic spheres in China

The ldquothree rural issuesrdquo are unique to China they are the product of Chinarsquos Reform and Opening The development track of countries which have already successfully modernized indicates that when a country or region endeavors to modernize itself it generally must begin by accumulating capital through agri-culture in rural areas then move on to primitive accumulation of capital then to the production of agricultural products and rurally-produced industrial raw materials and finally move on to the large scale construction of factories and development of enterprises and industry During this time a great amount of

27The Origins and Development of Chinarsquos ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquo

ltUNgt

rural labor will enter factories which are generally constructed on major traf-fic arteries Once there is an agglomeration of factories commerce and the service industry will begin to develop and cities will begin to rise At this point a large portion of the agricultural population will transform into city dwellers and so industrialization and urbanization go hand in hand with this process Once industrialization and urbanization reach a certain point they will begin to nurture agriculture they arm agriculture with modernized agricultural ma-terials (farm equipment fertilizers and pesticides) thereby bringing about the modernization of agriculture At this time rural citizens will become the mi-nority Under the effects of the market (and sometimes government interven-tion) the prices of agricultural products will rise and rural incomes gradually rise near to (and sometimes greater than) urban income levels Once urban industry is developed and the state treasury is amply stocked rural areas will be repaid this time with infrastructure such as roads irrigation works electric-ity telecommunications and so on This process leads to the modernization of rural areas which in turn causes urban-rural integration So other developed countries never linked together the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo during the course of their development Rather they considered only rural production rural area and rural citizen issues separately and conducted focused research in each area At the most some merged rural rural citizen or rural area and rural pro-duction issues together for joint research

Chinarsquos unique course of Reform and Opening gave rise to a unique urban-rural relationship and a unique urban-rural development path This path in turn led to Chinarsquos unique theory of the ldquothree ruralrdquo issues The construction and use of this theory is highly significant to understanding Chinarsquos fundamen-tal national conditions and to guiding the implementation of socialist mod-ernization For a relatively long time we have placed great emphasis on the resolution of Chinarsquos agricultural issues and have striven to solve production problems in both grain and major agricultural products in order to ensure effective supply However following the first bumper cropharvest of Reform and Opening in 1984 such problems as difficulty selling grain and cotton have emerged in rural areas Thereafter another series of problems presented them-selves such as the issuance of deferred payment slips (some of which were never repaid) by governments in lieu of cash for grain purchases heavy bur-dens on rural citizens increased number of clashes between rural cadres and rural citizens social instability in the countryside widening of the urban-rural gap and so on The emergence of these diverse problems led some academics and some people working in government departments performing real work to realize that rural work should not be centered on only agricultural issues but must also include resolution of rural citizen and rural area issues and that

Lu28

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agricultural rural area and rural citizen issues must be analyzed and studied together These academics and government workers then wrote a series of persuasive works on these issues Since the mid-1990s some academics and workers in government departments performing real work have composed treatises on agricultural rural citizen and rural area issues all three of which were studied and analyzed jointly The ldquothree ruralrdquo issues theory is now a con-sensus around China it has been widely cited in documents the media and all manner of written work In October 1998 the ldquoccp Central Resolutions on Several Major Issues in Agricultural and Rural Workrdquo 中共中央关于农业和

农村工作若干重大问题的决定 were issued reading ldquoThe issues of agricul-ture rural areas and rural citizens are major issues affecting the big picture of Reform and Opening as well as modernization Without stability in rural areas there can be no nationwide stability Without moderate prosperity for rural citizens there can be no agricultural modernization and thus there can be no modernization of the entire national economy If we can maintain stability in rural areas we will be able to take the initiative in controlling the big picturerdquo

The ldquothree rural issuesrdquo theory is also highly significant for studying the problems of other countries In 1998 I accepted an invitation from Waseda University to visit Japan At an academic conference there I conducted com-parative analysis on the countrysides of China and Japan on the basis of the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo theory this opportunity enabled me to elucidate a number of issues Japanrsquos path to modernization is fundamentally similar to that of de-veloped countries in North America and Europe However Japan is a country with a large population and small landmass Further since the 1960s the Japa-nese government has been importing agricultural products on a large scale in an effort to greatly increase exports of industrial products and develop markets for said products ignoring the costs to domestic agriculture Therefore since the 1970s most or all of the foodstuff cotton and other raw materials used in Japanese industry have been imported At present over 50 percent of Japanrsquos foodstuffs agricultural raw materials and industrial raw materials are import-ed thus Japanrsquos food prices are the highest in the entire world Importation of such a large quantity of foodstuffs has inevitably exerted a certain degree of influence on the quality of life for Japanese citizens It is thus evident that Japan a major economic powerhouse has problems in the area of agriculture If we analyze Japan on the basis of the ldquothree ruralsrdquo theory we see that Japan has solved its rural citizen issues and has fundamentally solved its rural area is-sues but its agricultural issues remain unsolved China is exactly the opposite Since the advent of Reform and Opening Chinarsquos agricultural policy has been ldquoDriven firstly by policy secondlyby sciencerdquo As a result of reforms and de-velopment we enjoyed several consecutive years of bumper crop harvests In


ltUNgt

1996 Chinese grain production exceeded 1 trillion jin (500 billion kilograms) and Chinese cotton production exceeded 84 million dan [Chinese unit of mea-sure equivalent to 50 kilograms] Since that time China has reversed its pre-vious long-standing shortages of grain and other major agricultural products and has now achieved year-to-year stability and agricultural surpluses China which contains nearly 10 percent of total arable land in the world feeds over 21 percent of the total global population Furthermore since 1997 Chinarsquos annual net exports of agricultural products have held steady at around usd $5 billion So if we use the ldquothree ruralsrdquo theory to analyze contemporary China we can see that agricultural issues have been fundamentally solved but rural citizen and rural area issues remain unsolved

ii The ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquo in Contemporary China

Why do I hold that China has already fundamentally solved its agricultural issues but has yet to solve its rural area and rural citizen issues I will discuss just this question in this section

(A) Agricultural IssuesFrom a historical perspective the issues of supply of grain and other agricul-tural products from the former Soviet Union and other socialist countries have never been well resolvedfollowing the implementation of traditional collec-tive economic systems in rural areas These issues have long been a thorn in the side of socialist countries

Before the Peoplersquos Republic of China implemented collectivization and indeed during the early years of Chinarsquos collectivization (prior to 1958) China was a net exporter of grains and agricultural products Beginning in 1961 how-ever Chinese citizens have been eating imported grains and China became a net importer of grain cotton and other major agricultural products

In 1959 the Chinese state put forward the notion that agriculture was the foundation of the national economy and that grain was the foundation of that foundation Thereafter the state consistently placed primary emphasis on the development of agriculture within national economic work casting enormous amounts of labor and financial resources into that field However shortages of grain and agricultural products were not thoroughly solved until the dissolution of peoplersquos communes Problems of insufficient food for the citizenry weighed heavily on the hearts of the first generation of leadership from Chairman Mao to the economic architects Chen Yun and Li Xiannian One could say that in his late years Chairman Mao was a physiocrat in economic matters He was the

Lu30

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first to propose such ideas as ldquothe Constitution of Eight Characters for Agricul-turerdquo ldquoagriculture is the foundation of the national economyrdquo ldquograin is the guid-ing principlerdquo ldquolearning agriculture from Dazhairdquo ldquoagricultural mechanization is imperativerdquo and so on Chen Yun even went on the record to say that ldquowith grain in your hand there can be no panic in your heartrdquo At one point Li Xian-nian personally oversaw the allocation and transport of grain convoys

Experience confirms that it was not that our party or government didnrsquot place emphasis on agriculture nor was it that our land was insufficient or that our rural citizens didnrsquot know how to plant crops Rather it was the peoplersquos commune system of collective labor unified management and equal distribu-tion that failed us

In the wake of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Com-munist Party of China rural areas took the lead in implementing reforms In ru-ral areas the household contract responsibility system was implemented and rural citizens obtained autonomy in their business operations Rural citizens benefited from this system which provided them with great work incentive in agricultural production There were bumper crop harvests in consecutive years and by the mid-1980s problems of insufficient supply of grain cotton and other major agricultural products had fundamentally been resolved Such fundamental resolution initially resolved problems of insufficient food and warmth Of course agricultural development hasnrsquot been an unbroken chain of good news over these past 20 years There have been some bumps on the road but the overall trend has been continuous progress and development As of 1996 Chinarsquos agricultural issues ie issues of guaranteeing effective agricul-tural supply have been fundamentally resolved

From the beginning of Reform and Opening to 1996 the general course of Chinarsquos agricultural development has been abumper crop harvest and major upgrade to agriculture about once every six years In 1978 total grain produc-tion was 6095 billion jin 317 kilograms per capita There were bumper crop harvests every year following the implementation of the household contract responsibility system in rural areas Total grain production in 1984 was 8146 billion jin this was the first year in which grain surpluses led to difficulty in selling grain In 1985 the state grain monopoly was abolished In its place the state implemented the contract system for grain purchasing This new policy suppressed grain prices and led to a decrease in grain production productivity among rural citizens grain production fell seven percent in this year leading to renewed vacillation on the grain issue Policies were adjusted again in 1986 and in 1990 there was a second bumper crop harvest total grain production hit 8925 billion jin just shy of 900 billion jin The bumper crop grain harvest in this year was widely unexpected Many in Beijing did not believe the numbers


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as a State Council spokesperson initially reported 840 billion jin then later 850 billion jin and the National Bureau of Statistics ultimately reported 8925 billion jin Relevant leadership fearing inflated reporting passed a Standing Committee resolution to report the yearrsquos grain production as 870 billion jin The National Bureau of Statistics disagreed with this resolution In the 1991 Tongji nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook] the Bureau reported 870 billion jin holding off on adding digits to the figure but at the same time did not report figures for such grain classes as rice and corn Following the major floods in An-hui and East China of 1991 the whole world joined together to provide disaster relief but in the end grain production on the year was reported at 8706 billion jin with no apparent year-on-year drop In 1992 the Bureau corrected the total figure reported for 1990

There was a drop in grain production in 1991 but slight increases in 1992 and 1993 However following Deng Xiaopingrsquos ldquosouthern tourrdquo in 1992 a surge of economic construction unfolded across the country A large number of devel-opment zones were established and peasant laborers flooded into cities There was a stark increase to urban populations as well as to demand for grain and agricultural products in the cities Beginning in autumn 1993 grain and agri-cultural product prices rose sharply some areas that had previously phased out the grain coupon system reinstated it The state had no choice but to re-new large-scale imports of grain in 1994 at the same time state officials greatly increased purchase prices for domestic grain In 1995 domestic grain produc-tion increased by 43 billion jin Even with agriculture on the rebound relevant leadership still feared instability and so again resolved to greatly increase grain purchase prices in 1996 reporting this to the masses ahead of time This resolu-tion provided rural citizens the incentives to plant grain Some migrant labor-ers even decided to return to the countryside to till grain fields With all those factors plus excellent weather 1996 saw the third bumper crop harvest with total annual grain production hitting 50454 million tonnes ie an excess of one trillion jin In the 1950s under the leadership of Mao Zedong the central government passed agricultural production plans that set the target for annual grain output at 400 then 500 and finally 800 jin per mu of land These targets were finally met in 1996

Chinarsquos history of agricultural development hit a milestone in 1996 the year that marked the end of the era of chronic food shortages and the beginning of that of supply-demand equilibrium accompanied by occasional surpluses China was no longer a buyer but a seller of major agricultural products China no longer pursued quantity exclusively in agricultural products rather equal emphasis was placed on quantity and quality and in some cases quality was given preference From this point forward Chinarsquos agricultural production

Lu32

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entered a phase of being restricted by not only resources but also by markets Thus one could say that following the bumper crop harvest of 1996 Chinarsquos agricultural development entered a new phase and at the same time Chinarsquos rural area development also entered a new phase

While Chinarsquos agriculture and rural areas had entered a new phase our understanding or policy approach to the new situation did not change cor-respondingly Such a lack of corresponding change caused the emergence of a new series of issues in agriculture and rural areas which we are currently experiencing One reason is that years of chronic food shortage seared the fear and anxiety about insufficient production into the collective memories of the Chinese people who are trying to stay in a state of perpetual preparedness

To this day academics and relevant departments have been unable to ex-plain why after 1996rsquos grain production figure in excess of one trillion jin the following six yearsmdashexcluding 1998 and 1999 in both of which years grain pro-duction exceeded one trillion jinmdashsaw grain production figures between 900 billion and 980 billion jin It is possible that grain production in 2003 will fall short of 900 billion jin These past seven years the population has increased by 730 million and urbanization has increased a full ten percentage points demand for grain agriculturally produced industrial raw materials and other agricultural products has clearly risen greatly That being the case why has supply exceeded demand in grain and other major agricultural products Why have grain reserves held steady at over 400 billion jin

One explanation for the grain situation is that the bounty of 1996rsquos harvest was not limited to just grain but was true also ofa range of other agricultural products There was a change to grain circumstances following 1997 but hus-bandry fisheries and aquaculture vegetables fruits and other agricultural sec-tors continued to grow by great margins In 2001 total grain production was 485 percent higher than in 1978 with a per capita increase of 123 percent over 1978 However in that same year total production of oil-bearing crops was 449 percent higher than in 1978 a per capita increase of 315 percent Over the same period meat output increased 640 percent from an annual per capitaoutput of 89 kilograms to 395 kilograms a 444-fold increase Output in fisheries and aquaculture increased 842 percent from an annual per capita output of 47 kilograms to 344 kilograms a 732-fold increase Fruit output increased 913 percent from an annual per capita output of 73 kilograms to 52 kilograms a 712-fold increase It is a tradition of the Chinese people to refer to grains as ldquomain foodsrdquo (ie staple foods) and to refer to all other foods as ldquoauxiliary foodsrdquo (ie non-staple foods) but it has been in these ldquoauxiliary foodsrdquo where China has experienced multiple-fold growth Now the majority of Chinese urban dwellers and more affluent rural citizens have reversed the old order


ltUNgt

consuming more ldquoauxiliaryrdquo than ldquomainrdquo foodstuffs Consumption of fowl fish other meat vegetables and fruits has greatly increased while consumption of grain has greatly decreased This structural shift indicates that there has been a fundamental change to the Chinese peoplersquos food consumption pattern particularly that of urban dwellers Thus despite decreases to overall grain output following 1996 grain sales have been sluggish and grain prices have remained low

To summarize after 1996 Chinarsquos agriculture entered a new phase a phase in which the major objective of guaranteeing effective supply had been achieved In other words Chinarsquos agricultural issues have been fundamentally resolved The reason we say that the issues have been fundamentally solved or that reso-lution had been fundamentally realized is that there is no one-time ultimate resolution to agricultural issues Just below the surface there are still factors of uncertainty such as land and water shortages worsening of agricultural and ecological environments less-than-ideal states of infrastructure such as irriga-tion works insufficient ability to resist natural disasters unsoundness of the agricultural technology propagation system and incomplete construction of pre-production and post-production agricultural service systems We now rely primarily on an economy composed of multitudes of small family farms for ag-ricultural output Both labor productivity and commodity rates of agricultural products are low We remain very far from achieving the objective of modern-izing agriculture and there is still much work for us to do in this field

(B) Rural Citizen IssuesIssues of rural citizens lie at the core of the ldquothree ruralrdquo issues Agriculture is the enterprise of rural citizens or in other words it is their profession Rural citizens are the laborers in the agricultural industry and rural areas are the communities in which rural citizens produce live and make their homes

Rural citizen issues are of particular importance in China traditionally a major agricultural country In 1950 Mao Zedong said ldquoPeasants [nongmin ie rural citizens] comprise the majority of Chinarsquos population The revolution was successful only because of support from the peasants The success of the statersquos industrialization will also be reliant upon support from the peasantsrdquo Experience has proven that this statement is entirely accurate Over these past 50 years our socialist modernization has been through many phases with both ups and downs One trend among these experiences has been particu-larly outstanding In all those phases in which party and state policies have adhered to the wishes and interests of the majority of rural citizens socialist enterprises have advanced smoothly and grown (such as Land Reform Reform and Opening the household contract responsibility system the development

Lu34

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of township and village enterprises and so on) In all those phases in which party and state policies have not adhered to reality or have even been det-rimental to the interests of the masses of rural citizens work has been diffi-cult the development of enterprises such as economic construction has been sluggish and social problems have multiplied The Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China summarized one very important basic experience that the only way to spur productivity among the masses of rural citizens is to ldquobe fully concerned with their material interests in economic matters and grant true protection to their democratic rights in mat-ters of governancerdquo The plenum went on to declare that this was the ldquoutmost starting point for determining agricultural policy and rural economic policiesrdquo

So in which areas do we face rural citizen issues now

1 The Rural Population Remains Enormous Now 900 Million StrongChina has always been a major agricultural country and so a preponderance of rural citizens is merely an objective reality What I mean here when I say that our rural population is large is that over the course of industrialization a countryrsquos rural population should naturally decrease but in China at the same time as we industrialize and urbanize our rural population continues to grow This pattern does not conform to the regular patterns of industrialized development and has given rise to a number of social issues

In 1949 the total population was 54167 million the agricultural popula-tion was 48402 million or 894 percent of the total In 1952 the total popu-lation was 57482 million the agricultural population was 50139 million or 872 percent of the total In 1958 the total population was 65994 million the agricultural population was 54704 million or 828 percent of the total In 1978 the total population was 96259 million the agricultural population was 79014 million or 8008 percent of the total Over the 20 years from 1958 to 1978 the rural population grew by 24310 million an average annual increase of 12155 million In 1998 the total population was 124810 billion the agricultural popula-tion was 86868 million or 696 percent of the total Over these 20 years the rural absolute population grew by 7854 million an average annual increase of 392 million In 1999 the total population was 25786 billion the agricultural popula-tion was 82038 million or 652 percent of the total In 2000 the total popu lation was 126743 billion the agricultural population was 80837 million or 638 per-cent of the total In 2001 the total population was 127627 billion the agricultural population was 79563 million or 623 percent of the total

Publicly available population figures indicate that the rural population de-creased rapidly after 1999 with a total population loss of 789 million over just three years an average annual decrease of 263 million These figures however


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are based on records of residency in either urban or rural areas If records of household registrations (either agricultural or non-agricultural) were used in-stead one would find that there were still over 900 million citizens holding agricultural registrations in 2001

Our rapidly industrializing country is both developing industry on a large scale and experiencing great increases to the rural population (500 million in 1952 up to 900 million in 2001 an increase of 400 million over fifty years) with only limited increases to such major production resources as arable land These two factors are the root cause of the severe rural citizen issues China is experiencing today It is not possible for a country to be industrialized and modernized with a 75 percent absolute majority of its population engaged in agriculture A major task we must accomplish in the coming years is to figure out how to reduce the rural population

2 Rural Citizensrsquo Lives Have Markedly Improved but Rural Citizens Remain Poor and Burdened

I have two things to say about the poverty and heavy burden borne by rural citizens First rural citizensrsquo lives have been greatly improved since the advent of Reform and Opening They have experienced great increases to income and the vast majority of them are no longer worried about not having enough to eat this is unprecedented Net per capita income for rural citizens was 134 yuan in 1978 and 2366 yuan in 2001 after adjustment for inflation that repre-sents an annual increase of 46 percent This increase is quite an accomplish-ment and a great step forward Second the poverty and heavy burden borne by rural citizens can be understood only through comparison to their urban coun-terparts and through comparison to our economic accomplishments The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has declared that we must build an overall moderately prosperous society that benefits over a billion peo-ple Chinarsquos gross domestic product (gdp) more than octupled over the span of 1978 to 2001 with average annual growth of 935 percent That said the ru-ral citizens who comprise seventy-five percent of Chinarsquos population did not benefit correspondingly Particularly after 1997 after agricultural development entered a new phase supply was greater than demand in agricultural prod-ucts which led to sluggish sales and low prices At the same time the degree of increase to rural citizensrsquo incomes fell relatively consistently nine percent in 1996 46 percent in 1997 43 percent in 1998 38 percent in 1999 21 percent in 2000 42 percent in 2001 and 46 percent in 2002 The slight increases in recent years is attributable to the income rural citizens earn from work they do as migrant laborers or non-agricultural activities The truth is that sixty-two percent of Chinese rural citizens count farming as their sole source of income

Lu36

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In recent years such income has suffered decreasesmdashfor the past seven years consecutively in fact That is to say that the majority of rural citizens are ex-periencing either stagnation or reductions in income In comparison urban citizensrsquo per capita disposable income grew by 3415 yuan over the years 1995 to 2002 an average annual increase of 487 yuan Over that same period rural citizensrsquo per capita net income grew from 1577 to 2476 yuan a net increase of only 899 yuan or an average annual increase of only 128 yuan This situation further exacerbated the urban-rural income gap which grew from 272 to one in 1995 to 292 to one in 2001 and further to 31 to one in 2002

We have been saying since the mid-1990s that we must increase rural in-comes reduce rural citizensrsquo burdens and maintain social stability by any means conceivable Then we started saying that we should ldquotake less give more and open furtherrdquo A number of years have passed and the government has come up with and implemented a number of plans However rural incomes remain low rural burdens remain high and the urban-rural gap continues to widen How can we expect to maintain social stability given such conditions In 2001 I participated in a small academic symposium in Shanghai At the sym-posium a county government committee leader from the Midwest said that the countryside had not been as well offmdashin terms of reforms and develop-mentmdashin the 1990s as they had been in the 1980s As of 1997 said the leader things in the Midwestern countryside were growing worse by the year People from Shanghai on the other hand said that Shanghai was doing much better in the 1990s than it had in the 1980s and that things in Shanghai were growing better by the year following 1995 My job is to study rural issues I previously worked in Shanghai and still often travel there I am familiar with the situations presented by both of these people and can affirm that both of their statements are true This is the problem that one is growing better by the year while the other is growing worse and that the gap between them continues to widen

3 Rural Citizens Have Grown Less HomogeneousInternal differentiation among rural citizens began in the 1980s with the im-plementation of the household contract responsibility system Occupation was the first in which this differentiation occurred as rural citizens were no longer only farmers In 1989 rural citizens I divided rural citizens into eight strata based on occupation agricultural laborer migrant laborer hired laborer individual industrial and commercial unit rural intellectual rural enterprise manager private enterprise owner and rural village manager This process of differentiation picked up pace in recent years

The second area in which internal differentiation among rural citizens oc-curred is income The rural income figures given above were averages and


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those averages actually conceal a great number of issues In 2001 for example per capita net income was 2366 yuan but 58 percent of citizens fell below that average In total 1322 percent of rural citizens earned less than 1000 yuan in that year which is to say that 1195 million of them were impoverished Another 2268 million rural citizens earned less than 500 yuan which means they were living in absolute poverty The current national poverty line has been estab-lished at 625 yuan per year in income Per this standard thirty million rural citizens are living in poverty with another ninety million hovering just above the poverty line

In recent years some regions have achieved affluence ahead of others and at the same time some people have become rich before others In 2001 only ten provinces or direct-controlled cities exceeded the national average in terms of per capita rural income They were in order Shanghai (5871 yuan) Beijing (5026 yuan) Zhejiang (4582 yuan) Tianjin (3947 yuan) Jiangsu (3784 yuan) Guangdong (3770 yuan) and Fujian (3381 yuan) Twenty-one provinces au-tonomous regions and direct-controlled cities fell below the average The low-est was Tibet (1404 yuan) followed by Guizhou (1412 yuan) Shaanxi (1491 yuan) Gansu (1509 yuan) Yunnan (1534 yuan) and Qinghai (1557 yuan) Av-erage income in Shanghai the highest was 418 times that of Tibet the lowest

There are even great discrepancies in rural citizensrsquo incomes within coun-ties towns and sometimes villages A minority of rural citizens particularly those in rural areas of Chinarsquos East or those near the edges of mid-sized and large cities have indeed become rich from businesses other than agriculture Some have even grown extremely rich in a short time Some households in those same areas nevertheless remain in poverty with the discrepancy be-tween rich and poor quite egregious in some cases A popular saying in the 1990s held that the richest people lived in rural villages and so did the poorest people This saying was rooted in fact

4 Rural Citizens are at a DisadvantageRural citizens are currently facing an extremely onerous problem Officials in many regions around the country are seizing and occupying rural citizensrsquo contracted land at an unprecedented scale rallying on such slogans as ldquoaccel-erate urbanizationrdquo ldquorun the city like a businessrdquo ldquogrow riches from the landrdquo and so on Rural citizens are being compensated for their land at extremely low rates which are still calculated based on standards established during the days of the planned economy Furthermore displaced rural citizens are not being properly relocated Such unequal transactions have resulted in tens of millions of rural citizens dispossessed of their land (some hold the total to be around forty million) At the same time some government officials and

Lu38

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unscrupulous real estate firms have profited immensely from the transactions which has objectively speaking given rise to a situation in which ldquothe more land is seized the more the government profits and the more government de-partments benefitrdquo Such government behavior is the fundamental reason that repeated efforts from the central government to enact protection of arable land as a fundamental national policy have continued to fall short of thorough implementation

An article written by Liu Tian appearing in the journal Zhongguo tudi (No 9 2001) the official magazine of the Ministry of Land and Resources reads ldquoOver the past 20 years the state has requisitioned about 100 million mu of land from rural citizenshellip The statehellip has used monopolistic tier-one market institutions and cut-rate price scissors (the difference between land prices on the market and actual compensations paid out for land requisitioning) to take from rural citizens a total amount of land resources valued at over two trillion yuan (this is clearly a conservative estimate)rdquo The over two trillion yuan Liu mentions has become a secondary treasury for many local governments in recent years These funds are used primarily in urban construction and urban expansion which in turn impose even greater losses on rural villages Some have estimat-ed that if a portion of these funds had been used for rural public products and infrastructure rural development would bear a much different face and the urban-rural disparity would be greatly diminished

It is particularly noteworthy that a new round of land requisitioning is cur-rently underway particularly in east and central China where the movement is proceeding at a spectacular pace in developed regions Per incomplete data from twenty-four provinces (and autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities) over 3500 new development areas have been opened on requisitioned land occupying a total area of 36000 square kilometers (fifty-four million mu) Everybody expects that land prices will skyrocket in the future and so some officials lacking a sense of responsibility and unscrupulous businessmen (in-cluding foreign businessmen) have colluded to seize rural citizensrsquo arable land under every guise conceivable Wherever this happens crops are destroyed old homes are torn down ancestral tombs are dug up and rural citizens are forced to relocate This process is dressed up under such names and excuses as ldquobroad swath developmentrdquo ldquostate constructionrdquo and ldquonecessary for urban-izationrdquo Rural citizens are at present a vulnerable group They have no rights no power and no organization All they can do is watch as their homes are stripped from them Nobody in local governments listens to their pleas and so all they can do is file reports with either provincial governments or the central government In recent years the majority of audiences sought with high-level authorities have been related to land requisitioning


ltUNgt

The land that rural citizens contract serves three functions provides re-sources for production retains household financial resources and serves as a means of subsistence So requisitioning a rural citizenrsquos land is tantamount to taking the source of that citizenrsquos livelihood from him On top of that there is a lack of proper relocation performed for these citizens So how can these tens of millions of people survive and how can we continue to develop One in-vestigation indicates that the majority of the fifty-four million mu of land req-uisitioned in the recent round of land-grabs is concentrated in economically developed regions in the Southeast particularly in the Yangtze River Delta the Pearl River Delta and in the outskirts of mid and large cities Most is extremely productive agricultural land In these places there are multitudes of people but only scarce land and so the number of people affected is in excess of fifty million Most of these rural citizens were relatively affluent to begin with ow-ing to their proximity to cities The loss of their land means that a considerable portion of these rural citizens will go from riches to rags in some cases becom-ing unpropertied migrants Such an enormous group is bound to give rise to a multitude of social issues Can the state sit back and watch this happen In the recent era it has been imperative for any country or region which desires to modernize industrialize and urbanize to first expand the size of its cities In all such cases the land used to that end has been agricultural land However in other countries the government or private enterprises must conduct fair transactions to purchase the land The land purchasing party must pay market prices and rural citizens are compensated fairly Rural citizens then use their funds to invest in secondary or tertiary industries or go buy land elsewhere All parties are thus satisfied and disputes after the fact are rare

At present we have brought about a socialist market economy but in the appropriation of rural citizensrsquo land we continue to use methods leftover from the planned economy (despite some small changes they remain on the whole unchanged) We seize rural citizensrsquo lands with inadequate compensation us-ing unequal powers and often relying upon administrative orders In the short term such measures simplify matters (no need for equal consultations) save money (low compensation levels) and speed things along (one administra-tive order and the deal is closed) However whatrsquos to be done about the rural citizen who loses his land Without a means to make a living hersquos going to come looking for you When it becomes difficult to make ends meet hersquos going to come looking for you When hersquos old and infirmed hersquos going to come look-ing for you When his progeny encounter trouble hersquos going to come looking for you Since land is the very lifeblood of a rural citizen if you take away the source of his livelihood with no or very little compensation of course hersquos go-ing to come looking for you (the Ministry of Water Resources is still receiving

Lu40

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petitions from rural citizens displaced with no or low compensations during the construction of large reservoirs in the 1950s) Real estate firms and foreign bosses pocket the money and walk away but we are the peoplersquos government Can we just shirk responsibility and let the chips fall where they may There is no end to the troubles for tomorrow wersquore sowing today by using land req-uisitioning methods leftover from the planned economic system Itrsquos bad for rural citizens bad for rural development and bad for the statersquos plans for urban development Because it does not conform to economic laws it is also detri-mental to the interests of the vast majority of rural citizens On the one hand some local cadres have come up with a plan summed up as ldquogrow riches from land build the city with those riches attract merchants with the city grow rich from the merchants and get promoted as a result of those richesrdquo But if we take a look at officials who have fallen from grace as a result of corruption such as Cheng Kejie 成克杰 Hu Changqing 胡长清 Mu Suixin 慕绥新 Ma Xiangdong 马向东 Yu Fei 于飞 (Guangdong) and Li Jiating 李嘉廷 can you tell me which one didnrsquot get his start by growing riches from the land

The number of civil law suits filed against officials is growing daily The num-ber of rural citizen petitions exceeded the number of those coming from urban areas for the first time in 2000 A total of seventy-three percent of petitions made to the Ministry of Land Resources in the first half of the year pertained to disputes over land requisitioning Of those forty percent of petitioners com-plained of disputes arising over land requisitioning Eighty-seven percent of these petitioners claimed insufficient compensation or inadequate relocation accommodations In 2002 the State Bureau for Letters and Calls received a to-tal of 4116 initial petitions concerning land requisitions in all these petitions rural citizens complained about problems caused by the loss of land and occu-pation The provinces of Zhejiang Jiangsu Fujian Shandong and Guangdong accounted for forty-one percent of these petitions Over fifty percent of all let-ters and visits received by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2001 and 2002 were related to land requisitions and rural relocation plans

(C) Issues of Rural AreasIn the Qing Dynasty and before Chinarsquos central government interceded no low-er than the county level dispatching officials to administer counties No cen-tral officials were dispatched to the level of towns or lower Those areas were all administered by country gentlemen or bodies similar to our modern autono-mous organizations Even in the Republican Era when the central government called for autonomy of towns and villages some provinces still installed re-gional or town administrative offices in towns and villages run by officials appointed from the county government Immediately after the founding of


ltUNgt

the Peoplersquos Republic of China we continued the old tradition establishing regional and town governments below the county level After the passage of the constitution in 1954 towns became tier-one government organizations and town peoplersquos government committees were founded After collectivization in 1958 governments and communes were unified with administrative powers granted to commune committees Peoplersquos communes then implemented a system of ldquothree-tier ownership with the production brigade as the founda-tionrdquo Production brigades were established under peoplersquos communes and under those were established production teams Officials thus unified the gov-ernment and communes as they were both collective economic organizations as well as administrative organizations Peoplersquos communes were abolished in 1983 at which point governance was separated from communes Communes were then reorganized into town peoplersquos governments production brigades into village committees and production teams into village small groups Over these past twenty years some towns and villages have been merged and some have otherwise been restructure In 2001 there were 40161 towns and 709257 villages across the country 365 million village small groups or natural villages 24432 million rural households and 90398 rural citizens (citizens holding agricultural registration) The administrative framework at use now is still the one previously employed during the era of the peoplersquos commune

The question we should study now is as follows Is this base-level adminis-trative framework suitable for modern rural China in which the norm is small-scale agricultural production divided into households not brigades That is to say is the higher level of construction suitable to the economic infrastructure and is it suitable for future agricultural modernization

Immediately after the household contract responsibility system went into practice there was a tranquil period during which neither cadres nor the masses found fault with each other ldquoWith land in your hand what of a cadre could you demandrdquo the saying went After the bumper crop harvest of 1984 it became difficult for rural citizens to sell their grain In 1985 the state grain monopoly system was nixed in favor of the purchase by contract system There was a drop in grain output in that year and grain prices on the market esca-lated much higher than the price levels stipulated in the purchase by contract system A common task of grassroots government organizations at this time was forcing rural citizens to hand over their grain stocks Town and village cad-res saw great increases to both their workloads and their levels of authority Beginning in the mid-1980s many construction projects and government-run enterprises were developed in rural areas on the tails of the development of urban-rural economic construction Such projects included roads irrigation projects compulsory education eradication of illiteracy greening village and

Lu42

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town construction and so on With such a slew of tasks being handed down cadres found themselves quite busy In eastern coastal regions and on the out-skirts of mid to large cities Township Village Enterprises (tves) rose up around the country the majority being collective economic bodies founded from with-in towns or villages As the tves grew considerable income began flowing into towns and villages With economic backing behind them local cadres could employ more people to work in town and village governments Such backing gave rise to a multitude of economic committees industry and communica-tions offices transportation management stations power plants and other autonomously founded governmental bodies The functions which had origi-nally been handled by assistants such as planned birth assistants civil affairs assistants culture and education assistants forestry assistants land manage-ment assistants and so on now were assumed by a great number of dedicated offices and stations As long as this continued the number of local officials continued to rise in some cases village governments previously staffing only thirty employees ended up with a hundred or even hundreds of cadres In the late 1980s some town governments built themselves eight-story office build-ings and some even had dozens of stores News of such happenings drifted to Chinarsquos central and western regions where the economy had not grown in any significant way yet local officials added superfluous government organs and increased their employee rosters dozens at a time all the same Town and village governments in these regions had neither local economic backing nor fiscal allocations from higher levels of government Their only choice was to apportion the increased financial burden to local rural citizens whose burdens grew heavier by the year

By 1992 central authorities had become aware of increasing rural citizen burdens heightening tensions between rural cadres and the rural masses and escalating conflicts Fresh from the closing of 14th National Conference of the Communist Party of China Jiang Zemin 江泽民 personally visited Hubei to convene a conference of cadres aimed at resolving the increasing burdens on rural citizens and social instability in the countryside A series of policies call-ing for the income and personnel attrition in the countryside was thereafter issued alleviating a portion of such rural issues

In 1993 the state began macroeconomic adjustments implementing major reforms to state finances taxation foreign reserves foreign trade and other areas These adjustments were enacted to increase the proportion of tax rev-enues within gdp as well as to increase the proportion of central-level funds to overall central and local fiscal incomes Experience has proven that this reform was both necessary and correct This reform led to great increases to state in-come State fiscal incomes greatly increased as did central-level fiscal incomes


ltUNgt

and such increases played an active role in augmenting the centerrsquos power to exert macroeconomic controls in ensuring healthy economic growth and in withstanding the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis The problem with this reform was that although it alleviated problems of fiscal allocations between the central and provincial levels it did not fully solve the problems of fiscal allocations and authorities between provincial governments and prefectural-level governments between prefectural-level governments and county gov-ernments and between county governments and town governments What happened in the end was that all stable fiscal and tax income was sent up the chain while all the difficulties and burdens were sent down

The town is the most basic level of government authority If you establish a state taxation bureau a local taxation bureau and a finance bureau in towns in the central or western regions where most lack tax revenue from secondary and tertiary industries then where are the funds going to come from to pay the several hundred new salaries One way is to extract it from local rural citizens and another is to borrow the money In both cases the burden on rural citi-zens grows heavier At present there are still many town governments in China unable to pay salaries on time and most town governments are saddled with debt The results of an investigation performed by the Ministry of Agriculture and five other departments in 1998 indicate that the average town government debt in the central and western regions is four million yuan and 200000 yuan for the average village in those regions Data released by the Ministry of Finance indicate that in 2000 the total debt burden borne by town and village governments is 320 billion yuan but some academics now estimate the figure to be in excess of 500 billion

Without reforms to the current fiscal system we will not only not be able to repay old debts but in fact may be unable to ensure financial resources to maintain normal operations of town governments That is because town cad-res have to go out on their own to find the money to pay their peoplersquos salaries The daily routine of many town chiefs and party secretaries contains a great deal of borrowing repaying and dodging debt collectors They are however nothing more than mice caught in the bellows stuck between fire on the one side and a hammer on the other When some town governments run out of money rendering them incapable of continuing normal operations their only choice is to declare a long holiday as a last resort but the truth is that when this happens the government is effectively paralyzed Some members of the State Councilrsquos Research Development Institute conducted research on a re-mote town in Ningxia The first three times they visited the town government hall was locked The fourth time seeing the door still locked they asked an old man tending to his sheep not far from the government hall ldquoWhere did all the

Lu44

ltUNgt

town leaders gordquo they asked ldquoI havenrsquot seen them for a long timerdquo responded the old man

iii Analysis

I have two things to say about the rural work thatrsquos been performed in the over 50 years since the founding of the country particularly in the twenty-plus years since Reform and Opening First we have accomplished an enormous amount in rural work it is fair to say that wersquove made historical progress Chinarsquos ag-ricultural issues have been fundamentally resolved Whatrsquos more we solved those problems on a foundation of a small agricultural economy centered on individual household units There have been earthshaking changes across all of Chinarsquos countryside and the lives of rural citizens have universally improved Some rural citizens have even grown rich No amount of praise for this accom-plishment could be excessive and the successful experience we attained in this area should be fully and deeply summarized However the other side of the coin is that now that we are faced with the objective of building a mod-erately developed socialist modernized country by the middle of this century and the demand to build a moderately prosperous society that benefits over a billion people in the coming twenty years our rural citizen and rural area is-sues remain quite serious We need to deeply consider these issues and find the reasons behind these issues and ultimately we need to establish correspond-ing guiding principles and policies

In order to solve rural citizen and rural area issues we must first analyze the reasons that these issues emerged in the first place Said reasons can be divided by and large into the following categories

(A) China Remains in a Transitory Phase in Which the Former Planned Economic System is Still Transitioning into a Socialist Market Economy

All the rural citizen and rural area issues we are currently facing are the result of the former planned economy They are all remnants of an era gone by

It has been clearly proposed since the 14th National Congress of the Com-munist Party of China that we must build a socialist market economy Howev-er such institutional reforms have been unable to permeate to the countryside since 1985 In that year rural areas entered the second phase of reforms but the truth is that the second round of reforms was unsuccessful in rural areas What was the second round of rural reforms intended to change To this day it remains unclear whether they were intended to promote development of


ltUNgt

tves to bring about industrialization or to develop small urban centers It would be fair to say that the second round of rural reforms reformed nothing That is because nothing was changed in the rural household registration sys-tem in the circulation system or in the land system Problems leftover from the planned economy such as population problems land problems grain circulation problems rural money lending systems and so on have lingered to this day The planned economy was inherently detrimental to the interests of rural citizens Under the planned economy rural citizens were defined by Stalin as a part of the populace intended to make special contributions to the state In other words their purpose was nothing more than primitive accu-mulation of capital for the state on its way to industrialization Immediately following its inception the former Soviet Union instituted the Prodrazvyorstka policy under which peasants were forced to hand over surplus grain to the state Even though a fixed contract purchasing system for grain later took the place of Prodrazvyorstka grain prices remained extremely low making life ex-tremely difficult for the Soviet peasantry We began learning from the Soviets at the time of our own countryrsquos inception implementing the planned economy and cooperativization Such systems stripped rural citizens of the power to sell their own produce The task given to agriculturalists was to guarantee supply in order to meet state demands for agricultural products The state fixed the prices at which rural citizens sold grain and other agricultural products to the state When rural citizens sold grain to the state it was called ldquomaking a con-tribution to the staterdquo or ldquoselling patriotic grainrdquo Such sales were in no way an equal value exchange So the rural citizen and rural area issues we are dealing with today are rooted in the rural area and agricultural policies established under the planned economy To this day we have yet to solve these issues At their root the rural citizen and rural area issues we face today are problems that require further deepening of reforms

(B) Under the Planned Economy We Governed Urban and Rural Citizens Differently Based on Their Household Registrations Which Gave Rise to Chinarsquos Urban-Rural Dual Social Structure This Structure Remains Unchanged to This Day and it is an Important Reason for the Ever-widening Urban-Rural Disparity

Under Chinarsquos long-standing household registration system the agricultural population is concentrated in rural areas and the non-agricultural population in urban areas It is for this reason that we say ldquodifferent governance for ur-ban and rural one country with two policiesrdquo This arrangement is beneficial to urban populations but detrimental to rural populations In economic terms citizens with agricultural household registrations receive different treatment

Lu46

ltUNgt

from their urban counterparts in taxation property ownership employment and other areas Whatrsquos more the degree of disparity in treatment is striking As for democracy one delegate to the National Peoplersquos Congress is elected per 240000 citizens in urban areas but 960000 in rural areas The difference is a factor of four In social terms rural citizens receive different treatment from their urban counterparts in education healthcare social security and other areas One statistician claimed that there are fourteen differences in treatment between urban and rural populations The result of this policyrsquos long-term im-plementation has been our countryrsquos urban-rural dual social structure with the urban-rural gap growing ever wider

(C) The Current State of Income Distribution is Detrimental to Both Rural Areas and Rural Citizens

Why have we long been unable to solve the issues of rural compulsory edu-cation Who is to blame The root cause is that current funding allocations for compulsory education are egregiously skewed against the interests of rural citizens and rural areas The Compulsory Education Law 义务教育法 stipu-lates that rural compulsory education be guided by central leadership but that local leadership be responsible for its implementation however the law does not clearly stipulate exactly which level of local leadership be responsible The results of an investigation conducted by the State Councilrsquos Development In-stitute indicate that the central government contributes only two percent of total funding to rural compulsory education Another eleven percent comes from the provincial and city levels nine percent from the county level and the remaining seventy-eight percent from the township level Some communi-ties have recently begun establishing ldquohope projectsrdquo which are in themselves good things deserving of praise but we cannot establish compulsory education in this way Some have even said that the ldquohope projectrdquo method is inherently ldquohopelessrdquo and they are not wrong The issue is that since wersquore mandating compulsory education across the country we ought to integrate urban and ru-ral education systems funding for all of which should be provided by the state or at the very lowest at the provincial level How can we hope to fundamentally solve compulsory education problems on the strength of well-intended ldquohoperdquo contributions of thirty and forty yuan at a time

The following is how the current funding allocation system operates in com-pulsory education as well as in the state healthcare funding system Annual state healthcare expenditures total in the hundreds of billions of yuan but of that total eighty-five percent goes to urban areas and only fifteen percent to rural areas At present the rural cooperative healthcare preventative sys-tem has more or less collapsed many rural areas lack doctors and drugs and


ltUNgt

some town governments have even been forced to sell their hospitals It was an extremely wise decision on the central governmentrsquos part to forbid university students and migrant laborers to return home during the outbreak of sars Had the epidemic spread to the countryside with the rural healthcare system in such shambles the results would have been unthinkable We often say that many areas have been improved following the advent of Reform and Opening in 1978 but the reality is that some areas have in fact worsened since 1978 One example is the rural healthcare system At least there were still cooperative healthcare and healthcare stations during the era of the peoplersquos commune Now even these are gone

(D) Reforms to Chinarsquos Economic Foundation and Superstructure in Recent Years Have Been Successful in Many Areas but Unsuccessful in Others

In recent years rural areas have entered a second round of reforms but it remains unclear exactly what is to be reformed Nobody is sure about what township governments are supposed to change where township-level finan-cial resources are supposed to come from and exactly what township govern-ments are supposed to be controlling Many reforms enacted in recent years have been successful but some have not In fact some have only reinforced those aspects leftover from the planned economy that are particularly detri-mental to rural development

A few years ago there was a trend in China for reorganizing counties and lower-level administrative areas into cities and districts For example Chang-ping County 昌平县 became Changping District 昌平区 and Jiangyin Coun-ty 江阴县 became Jiangyin City 江阴市 This reorganization gave rise to a unique situation in which ldquomayorsrdquo could be at one of five levels of authority the provincial level the deputy provincial level the prefectural level the depu-ty prefectural level or the county level Such different layers of authority exist-ing in one person had two results First it raised the level of the cadres involved and increased the total number of cadres Second it became easier to appro-priate rural land in regions once they had been elevated to the level of city or district The ease of appropriation was beneficial to cities but detrimental to rural citizens Even worse for rural citizens was the reorganization of lower-level regions into cities Before they had been converted into cities regions had jurisdiction over their counties and had to ensure a certain amount of govern-ment funding for each of these counties Once they were cities all funds al-located for them by the central government for culture education healthcare and so on got held up at the city government level no longer did these regions have to allocate portion of funding to their counties Itrsquos plain to all that nearly

Lu48

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all prefectural-level cities are well-constructed look respectable and contain modern facilities and a number of high-end hotels Almost nobody has ever heard of a cadre or a teacher working in a prefectural-level city not receiving wages on time This is why The result of this methodology has been to further exacerbate the urban-rural disparity

(E) Inadequate Understanding of the SituationAfter 1996 Chinarsquos agriculture left the phase of simply increasing output and ensuring supply and entered a new phase Some of our cadres however have been unable to adjust to this change their understanding of the situation is severely lagging In 1999 I met an official responsible for the agriculture of a Northeastern province at an agricultural conference I asked him how the har-vest had been that year Can you guess what he answered ldquo[Unfortunately] we just might see increasedoutput figures again this yearrdquo Evidently his un-derstanding hadnrsquot caught up with new conditions His job was to oversee agricultural production he should have been happy about increased output figures The times now however are different Increased agricultural output means added pressure as it costs the government money to buy agricultural products from the farmers not to mention the costs of transportation storage and operating the pricing mechanismfor agricultural products He was wor-ried because he hadnrsquot had access to the practical experience of processing agricultural products for added value and establishing a circulation system for agricultural products He was the very face of officialsrsquo being behind the times

Another question is whether it is now time for China to repay its debt to agriculture Fifty years have passed from the founding of the country to pres-ent Over this span of time we have consistently turned to agriculture to pro-vide the capital and raw materials necessary for industrialization Over these fifty years wersquove made ten five-year plans and wersquove basically achieved our goals of industrializing the country Is it not now time for the country to repay its debt to agriculture by boosting investment in it Industrialized countries and regions that developed following the Second World War generally began to increase investment in agriculture about twenty years after the beginning of industrialization Such was the case for Japan South Korea and Taiwan as well Taiwan began to boost investment in agriculture in 1973 and 1974 On the mainland itrsquos been over fifty years but wersquore still mostly taking from the ru-ral citizenry Not only has Chinarsquos urban-rural gap not been reduced in recent years but it has in fact continued to widen in two ways Such widening has caused the price scissors existing between urban and rural areas to cut broader and broader swaths


ltUNgt

One way is through migrant laborers Ministry of Agriculture statistics indicate that in 2002 there were 946 million migrant rural laborers employed in secondary and tertiary industries in Chinese cities Although they are also technically considered part of the laboring class their political and economic status is far different from that of their urban counterparts Even when work-ing identical jobs rural and urban citizens are paidunequally In 2001 the body of migrant rural laborers over 90 million strong created over 23 trillion yuan in gdp for Chinese cities an average of 25000 yuan in value created per mi-grant laborer yet the average migrant laborer earned only 8000 yuan on the year meaning that the remaining 17 trillion yuan was their contribution to the cities where they toiled It has been shown that the more migrant laborers employed in a city the faster that city develops Such was the case in Shenzhen and in Shanghai and Beijing as well The city of Shenzhen itself was built by several million migrant laborers

The second way is through land appropriations Ministry of Land and Re-sources data indicate that a total of 295 million mu of land was requisitioned under different programs around the country in 2002 The real figure is in fact much greater than that All that land was requisitioned at low prices using the methodology of the planned economy era and then flipped at high prices On average a single mu of land can be sold for between tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of yuan That means several hundreds of billions of yuan for all land requisitioned around the country Of course a portion of those funds are handed up the chain to the central government but in the end the lower-level governments transacting land sales come away with enormous profits Hence the saying ldquoGrow money from the landrdquo The more land a re-gion requisitions the faster it becomes wealthy and the greater the benefits re-ceived by local cadres Such requisitioning has further exacerbated the already yawning gap between Chinarsquos rural and urban areas

iv Recommendations

The overall status of Chinarsquos ldquothree rural issuesrdquo is as follows Our agricultural issues have been fundamentally solved but we remain far from resolving our rural citizen and rural area issues as we have yet to solve issues of institutional restrictions The summary report of the 16th National Congress of the Commu-nist Party of China puts forward that there have been no fundamental changes to Chinarsquos urban-rural social duality that the urban-rural disparity and inter-regional disparities continue to grow and that there are still a great deal of

Lu50

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people living in poverty in the countryside For these reasons the tasks of increasing rural incomes by any means conceivable reducing rural citizensrsquo burdens by any means conceivable and maintaining rural stability by any means conceivable remain extremely arduous

The following are a few recommendations for how we can solve rural citizen issues and rural area issues given todayrsquos circumstances

(A) We Must Continue Deepening Reforms to the Rural SystemThe second round of rural reforms should continue We must continue to deepen reforms to the rural system in order to drag the rural economy and social system from the era of the planned economy into the new era of the socialist market economy and to further liberate our rural citizens from the fet-ters of the planned economy The aforementioned is the only way to overcome the urban-rural economic duality and bring about urban-rural integration We cannot sacrifice our rural citizens in order to bring about modernization in our cities If we implement the market economy in cities alone while leaving rural areas in the planned economic system our cities will flourish while our rural areas descend into poverty In other words the prosperity of our cities will be built on the poverty of our rural areas If that is the case we will be unable to build socialist market economy Even if we were able to build it it would be less than perfect

(B) We Must Reform the Household Registration SystemOur current household registration system is a product of the planned econ-omy It artificially divides our population into two sectorsmdashagricultural and non-agriculturalmdashand it restricts the free movement of the population This situation is the primary reason for the urban-rural duality and this situation is no longer suitable for our present conditions It is also a major obstacle to achieving urban-rural integration We must commit to thoroughly reforming the current household registration system

(C) We Must Reform the Current Land Contracting SystemLand issues lie at the core of our rural citizen and rural area issues As the saying goes ldquoif land is stable all under heaven will be stablerdquo The state gov-ernment has repeatedly gone on the record to say that the current land con-tracting system will continue unchanged In 1998 the government announced that the system will remain intact for the coming thirty years However ex-perience has proven that Chinarsquos rural land system has undergone constant changes The reason is that the current land contracting system has not funda-mentally solved issues of land ownership and land usage rights I suggest that


ltUNgt

we implement state ownership of all land that all land ownership rights be restored to the state with usage rights given to rural citizens This system should then be maintained in perpetuity Such a system would allow rural citizens to transfer usage rights of their land to other people who desire to produce on that land effectively ensuring reasonable fluidity of rural land I further suggest that homestead plots be returned to rural citizens At present rural citizensrsquo homestead plots belong to village collectives which leaves the citizens themselves unable to sell or mortgage the property This should be changed

(D) We Must Reform the Current Income Distribution SystemChinarsquos current income distribution system is skewed in favor of cities and is detrimental to both rural citizens and rural areas This system should be re-formed In order to shrink the urban-rural gap and fundamentally solve rural citizen and rural area issues we must skew the income distribution system in favor of rural areas and rural citizens particularly in such areas as education healthcare culture and other public services

(E) We Must Reform the Political Powers Vested in Town Governments Particularly Their Fiscal Powers I Also Recommend We Restore the Rural Work Department

At present town governments are saddled with debt and there is no end to conflicts between town officials and citizens This is not a problem caused by any given official but rather is the result of the town-level political system particularly in fiscal affairs We must commit to undertaking reforms in this area Furthermore if we want to fundamentally solve the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo of such a large country as China merely issuing documents will not suffice The central government should establish a dedicated body tasked with guiding the process Thus I recommend that the Rural Work Department be restored


ltUNgt

12

1 Su Shaozhi （苏少之） is a professor in the Economics School of the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law 430060

2 Nongcun jingji yu nongmin fudan diaocha ziliao《农村经济与农民负担调查资料》

Materials Regarding Investigations into Rural Economies and the Burden on Peasants] volume

chapter 2

The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants after the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Land Reforms

Su Shaozhi1

Abstract

Between the conclusion of Land Reform and the eve of the agricultural cooperative movement few new rich peasants were created around the country and those who did were created slowly There was only a real correlative relationship between the degree of rural affluence and the proportion of new rich peasant households to total rural households across all provinces however there was a positive correlation be-tween these two factors within individual provinces The proportion of new rich peas-ant households to the total number of rural households in areas with relatively high degrees of rural cooperatization and restrictive policies on new rich peasants was not necessarily lower thanmdashand in some cases was higher thanmdashother areas These data indicate that many factors influenced the creation and development of new rich peas-ants and that analysis of a single factor would be insufficient to explain the complex socioeconomic issue of new rich peasants

Keywords

new rich peasant ndash scale ndash distribution

A rural investigation report issued by the Ministry of Finance in 1952 defines ldquonew rich peasantsrdquo as follows ldquoThey are rich peasants produced following land reforms New rich peasants are delineated on the basis of the stipula-tions regarding rural class differentiation issued by the State Administrative Council All those whose total of exploitation (including hiring laborers and issuing debt) exceed twenty-five percent of their total income shall be known as rich peasantsrdquo2 In 1955 the leadership of the Peoplersquos Republic of China

53The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants

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made the following judgment new rich peasants were emerging everywhere following land reforms polarization grew more severe daily and capitalist forces spread unchecked This appraisal of rural conditions at the time was an important reason behind the acceleration of both agricultural cooperatization and collectivization In recent years many academics studying the issues of agricultural cooperatives have noted that under historical conditions of the time appraisals of polarization were frequently made too harshly However there has been no dedicated research performed on the key reason behind said polarization the concrete conditions for the creation of new rich peasants On the basis of data I have been able to collect on the issue I have performed research into the scale and distribution of new rich peasants created in the Chinese countryside between the end of land reforms and the eve of collectiv-ization Owing to the scattered nature of historical materials in this area and my own limited abilities as a researcher this essay should be considered no more than an initial foray into this field I hope that any academic colleague interested in this issue will send me valuable opinions

i The General Trend for the Creation of New Rich Peasants

Back during the War of Resistance against Japan peoplersquos democratic regimes were established in resistance bases These regimes either reduced rents and interests or outright launched land revolutions (for example in some border regions of Shaanxi Gansu and Ningxia) Feudal land ownership systems were either abolished or greatly weakened At the same time with the encourage-ment and support of democratic governments the proactivity of peasants (nongmin) to produce was increased and economic development caused im-portant changes to the class structure of rural areas Specifically those chang-es were a weakening of the old economy run by landlords and rich peasants a reduction in the number of poor peasants and an increase of middle peas-ants Among those ranks a minority of formerly poor peasants experienced rapid economic development and were elevated to the ranks of rich peasants A classic example of a new rich peasant from this era was Wu Manyou 吴满有

from the border region around Shaanxi Gansu and Ningxia During the war against Japan the democratic regimes adopted policies to encourage new rich peasants honoring those who remembered their roots after becoming rich ac-tively developed the economy and supported the democratic governments In the land reforms that followed the War of Liberation new rich peasants were

2 ed Central Peoplersquos Government Ministry of Finance Bureau of Agricultural Taxation （中央人民政府财政部农业税司） Shaanxi Provincial Archives D9-8-23 68

SU54

ltUNgt

345

3 For more information on the new rich peasant issue during the War of Resistance Against Japan see my article ldquoGenjudi xinfunong wenti yanjiu 根据地新富农问题研究 [Research Into the Issue of New Rich Peasants in Base Areas]rdquo Jindai shi yanjiu 《近代史研究》 1 (2004)

4 The demarcation line between ldquoold areasrdquo (ie old liberated areas) and ldquonew areasrdquo (ie newly liberated areas) changed constantly during the War of Liberation ldquoOld areasrdquo as referred to in this essay refer to those areas which completed land reforms prior to June 1950 ldquoNew areasrdquo as referred to here are those in which land reforms were implemented after the winter of 1950

5 Liaodong was one of nine provinces in Republican-era Northeast Many of the smaller prov-inces were disbanded between 1949 and 1954 leaving the current three provinces of Liaon-ing Jilin and Heilongjiang

again attacked particularly during the fervor for land reforms incited in winter of 1947 by the issuance of the Outline Land Law of China 中国土地法大纲 as egalitarianist ldquoleftistrdquo erroneous tendencies began emerging and even middle peasants and those working in industry and commerce saw their interests in-fringed This situation was initially remedied following an enlarged meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) Central Committee in December 1947 which called for appropriate care to be accorded to new rich peasants who had become rich through their own labor and that they should be treated politi-cally as wealthy middle peasants The meeting also emphasized that new rich peasants should be continued to exist in new democratic rural areas following the success of the revolution Some regions even wrote into policy that new rich peasants whose interests had been egregiously infringed should be com-pensated Nevertheless these policies were never thoroughly implemented So during this great movement to evenly divide the land those new rich peasants who had been created with the encouragement and support of democratic governments in resistance bases during the war against Japan were mostly re-duced to the status of middle peasants and in some cases beaten down to the level of poor peasants although in general they fared better than landlords and old rich peasants Also the economic model which new rich peasants had brought to the countryside was fundamentally abolished3

Immediately before and after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of Chi-na old areas4 gained peaceful stable social environments as they were the first to implement land reforms Rural economies in those areas were restored and began developing anew relatively early and so this is where new rich peas-ants first appeared A telegram sent on May 17 1949 by the ccp Provincial Party Secretary of Liaodong Province5 Zhang Wentian 张闻天 to the Northeast Bu-reau 东北局 and Mao Zedong 毛泽东 indicates that the lives of the major-ity of rural citizens (ie peasants) had improved as a result of rural economic development and that class division had already begun The majority of poor


ltUNgt

67

6 Zhang Wentian xuanji 《张闻天选集》[Selected Works of Zhang Wentian] (Beijing Ren-min chubanshe 1985) 447ndash448

7 Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 《中国土地改革史料选编》[Selected Historical Materials from Chinarsquos Land Reforms] ed China Land Reforms Editing Department and the Modern Economic History Department of the China Academy of Social Sciences Economic Institute (Beijing Guofang daxue chubanshe 1988) 690

peasant and hired farmhand households had been elevated to the status of middle peasant households which now comprised the majority in rural ar-eas Some poor peasant and hired farmhand households which had been al-located land and livestock still faced difficulties A minority of those originally deemed to be middle peasants had quickly become new rich peasants6 Per a report the North China Bureau dispatched to the ccp Central Committee in May 1950 following the production movement of 1948 and 1949 the majority of poor peasants hired farmhands and middle peasants inhabiting the coun-tryside in ldquoold areasrdquo of North China which had completed land reforms in 1947 had shirked off poverty and had seen their status rise in those areas middle peasants now comprised the absolute majority A survey conducted in 3097 households in twenty-three villages of the provinces of Hebei and Chahar in-dicates that the proportion of poor peasant and hired farmhand households to total rural households fell from fifty-one percent prior to land reforms down to fifteen percent while the proportion of middle peasant households grew from 376 percent to seventy-seven percent only one formerly affluent middle peas-ant household had elevated his status to that of new rich peasant7 These data regarding new rich peasants publicized long ago indicate that the new rich peasants of the Peoplersquos Republic of China were created against a socioeco-nomic background of recovering rural economic growth universal economic improvement for rural citizens and the fact that middle peasant households came to comprise the majority in rural areas

A large amount of materials regarding new rich peasants was later pub-lished but the movement for agricultural collectivization that followed land reforms overshadowed the issue and the Chinese countryside did not again engage in universal open class division The records that do exist pertain-ing to new rich peasants are scattered across a variety of rural investigative reports Many of these investigations were conducted on small scales offer piecemeal explanations are scattered or are incomplete It is not possible to shed light on the broader picture of new rich peasants across China from only these few fragmentary documents To write this essay I compiled and organized all the materials I could collect pertaining to this issue selecting for use those written by authoritative investigative bodies those covering a wide

SU56

ltUNgt

8

8 The materials I used to write this essay can be divided into two groups The first consists of rural investigation materials conducted by provincial regional city-level and county-level organizations The second consists of investigations conducted into rural household expenditures and incomes for 1954 by the National Bureau of Statistics in spring 1955 All of these investigations were one-off and so none is exactly the same in the body conducting the investigations the scope or targets of the investigations investigative methodology or statistical bore Thus none of the reports are strictly suitable for conducting vertical or hori-zontal comparisons It is now impossible to remedy shortages of research materials caused by historical reasons These materials can however give us a general impression of the basic conditions of new rich peasants at the time

scale those which collected a large quantity of samples and those which employed relatively scientific methodologies Such sampling enabled me to paint a comprehensive picture of the creation of new rich peasants in the Peoplersquos Republic of China8

Letrsquos first look at old areas in the Northeast Of four reports written by the ccp Central Northeast Bureau Rural Work Department regarding surveys con-ducted in 5510 households in seventeen typical villages of four counties in the three provinces of Heilongjiang Jilin and Liaodong some reports did not even touch on the issue of new rich peasants Some reported not having discovered any new rich peasants and some reported that there were ldquovery fewrdquo new rich peasants without providing any concrete data Only one of the reports makes mention of the example of one single new rich peasant household Of course this may just be a reflection of the fact that rural economic investigations con-ducted at the time did not place emphasis on rural class division

The conditions of new rich peasants in northeastern regions in 1951 and 1952 are indicated in Tables 21 and 22

Tables 21 and 22 indicate that there was relatively rapid growth in the num-ber of new rich peasants in the Northeast during the years 1951 and 1952 as compared to the years prior to 1950 The total proportion in 1951 was less than one percent but exceeded one percent in 1952

Lastly letrsquos take a look at the situation in the Northeast in 1953 and 1954 The results of an survey conducted in 8930 households in thirty-three typical villages of six provinces of the NortheastmdashHeilongjiang Songjiang Jilin Lia-oning Liaoxi and Rehemdashindicate that new rich peasants accounted for 142 percent of the total population surveyed (see Table 23)

The results of an investigation conducted in 1954 by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1735 households in the three Northeastern provinces of Heilongji-ang Jilin and Liaoning indicate that new rich peasants accounted for 133 per-cent of the total population surveyed (see Table 24)


ltUNgt

Table 21 The conditions of new rich peasants as reflected by a rural economic survey into the six provinces of the northeast in 1951

Province Typical villages surveyed

Total households

New rich peasant households

Percentage of new rich peasant households ()

Heilongjiang Yongrsquoan and Xirsquoan Villages in 16th Dist Hailun County

394 3 067

Xiangyang Village Nehe County

470 5 106

Songjiang Mengjing Village Hulan County

234 2 086

Gonghe Changsheng and Haihong Villages Acheng County

366 None found

Liaoxi Cuijiatun Village 2nd Dist Heishan County

260 None found

Liaodong 4 villages in Tonghua Region

421 4 095

Guanfansi Village Hai-cheng County Nuanquan Village Gaiping county

988 15 152

Rehe 9 villages in Beipiao Ningcheng and Longhua Counties

1938 None found

Total of above

23 villages in 5 provinces 5071 29 057

Jilin Province-wide comprehensive rural economic data

Total 1

Data source compiled from ten rural economic investigative reports from 1951 contained within the 1950ndash1952 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji 《 1 9 5 0 ~ 1 9 5 2 年东北农村调查汇集》 [Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations Years 1950ndash1952] edited by the ccp Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department

SU58

ltUNgt

9

9 ldquoZhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu ge sheng 26 ge cun diaocha de huibao jiyao (1953 nian 12 yue)《中共中央东北局农村工作部关于各省2 6个村调

查的汇报纪要（ 19 5 3年 1 2月）》[Summary of Reports Conducted by the cpc Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department into 26 Villages in Every Province (December 1953)]rdquo in 1953 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji 《 19 5 3年东北农村调查汇集》

[Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations 1953] vol 2 ed cpc Central Northeast Bureau Rural Work Department 3

Table 22 The Conditions of new rich peasants in fourteen typical villages of three provinces of the northeast in 1952

Total rural households


Percentage of new rich peasant households to total ()

5 villages in Keshan Hailun and Zhaoyuan Counties Heilongjiang Province

1055 32 303

6 typical villages of Rehe Province 1488 18 123 villages of Liaoxi Province 1132 1 0114-village totals 3675 51 139

Data source compiled from four rural economic investigative reports from 1952 contained within the 1950ndash1952 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji《 1 9 5 0 ~ 1 9 5 2 年东北农村调查汇集》 [Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations Years 1950ndash1952] edited by the ccp Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department

The above data indicate that in the Northeast from the end of land reforms in 1948 until 1950 very few new rich peasants were created as the rural economy recovered From 1951 to 1952 the new rich peasant economy began to grow as economic rejeuvenation trended toward growth From 1953 to 1954 there was a slowing to the creation of new rich peasants Of course even within the Northeast conditions from province to province varied widely The summary of a survey report issued by the ccp Northeast Bureau Rural Work Department in December 1953 indicates conditions in 1953 ldquoThere are slightly fewer new rich peasants in Northern Manchuria than in 1952 but slightly more in the Southern Manchuria Special Production Zonerdquo9


ltUNgt

Table 23 The proportion of new rich peasants to total rural populations as indicated by rural economic investigations conducted in six provinces of the northeast in 1953

Province Region county village Total rural households



Heilongjiang 9 villages in Baicheng Keshan Hailun and Zhaoyuan Counties

1776 21 118

Songjiang Nongfeng Tianmao and Jinbu Villages in 7th Dist Shuangcheng County

1074 4 037

Jilin Xinyu Xinrsquoan and Xinzao Villages in 10th Dist Yongji County

1256 25 199

Jiefang and Guangming Villages in 13th Dist Yushu County

696 18 267

Liaoning Sitaizi Dongguantun and Beilitun Villages in 2nd Dist Gaiping County

552 7 17

Liaoxi 6 villages in Lishu and Yi Counties

1855 46 25

Rehe 7 villages in Chengde Chifeng and Zhaoyang Counties

1721 6 035

Totals 33 villages in 6 provinces 8930 127 142

Data source Compiled from six investigative reports and two summary reports contained in issues 1 and 2 of 1953 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji《 1 9 5 3年东北农村调查汇集》 [Compilation of Rural Investigations in the Northeast in 1953] edited by the ccp Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department

SU60

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 2

4 Ne

w ri

ch p

easa

nts i

n tw

enty

-one

pro

vinc

es a

roun

d th

e cou

ntry

in 19

54

Regi

onPr

ovin

ceH

ouse

hold

s su

rvey

edN

ew ri

ch p

easa

nt c

ondi

tions

No

of n

ew

rich

pea

sant

ho

useh

olds

Clas

s sta

tuse

s at t

he e

nd o

f lan

d re

form

sPe

rcen

tage

of

new

rich

pe

asan

t ho

useh

olds

to

prov

inci

al to

tal

()

No

of n

ew

rich

pea

sant

ho

useh

olds

in

regi

on

Perc

enta

ge o

f ne

w ri

ch p

eas-

ant h

ouse

hold

s to

regi

onal

tota

l (

)

Poor

pea

sant

s (h

ouse

hold

s)M

iddl

e pe

asan

ts

(hou

seho

lds)

Land

lord

s (h

ouse

hold

s)

Nor

thea

stLi

aoni

ng50

09

27

ndash1

823

133

Jilin

537

92

7ndash

168

Hei

long

jiang

698

52

3ndash

072

Nor

th C

hina

Heb

ei1

019

5ndash

41

049

100

47Sh

anxi

893

4ndash

4ndash

048

Inne

r Mon

g27

81

ndash1

ndash0

36Ea

st C

hina

Jiang

su50

02

ndash2

ndash0

421

057

Anhu

i98

47

25

ndash0

71Zh

ejia

ng46

01

1ndash

ndash0

16Sh

ando

ng1

054

102

8ndash

095

Fujia

n49

91

ndash1

ndash0

2N

orth

wes

tG

ansu

600

2ndash

2ndash

033

120

62Q

ingh

ai20

01

ndash1

ndash0

5


ltUNgt

Dat

a so

urce

Com

pile

d fro

m Y

ijiuw

usi n

ian

quan

guo

nong

jia sh

ouzh

i dia

ocha

zilia

o《一

九五

四年

全国

农家

收支

调查

资料

》[I

nves

tigat

ive

Mat

eria

ls Re

gard

ing

Nat

ionw

ide

Rura

l Hou

seho

ld E

xpen

ditu

res a

nd In

com

es in

1954

] ed

ited

by th

e Pe

ople

rsquos Re

publ

ic o

f Chi

na N

atio

nal B

urea

u of

Sta

tistic

s (M

ay

1956

) Am

ong

the

twen

ty-fi

ve p

rovi

nces

and

regi

ons o

f the

cou

ntry

at t

he ti

me

Reh

e Ji

angx

i an

d G

uang

xi d

id n

ot re

port

rele

vant

figu

res

and

the

figur

es

repo

rted

by

Yunn

an d

id n

ot a

dher

e to

nat

iona

l uni

fied

stan

dard

s Th

us I

have

incl

uded

dat

a on

143

34 h

ouse

hold

s fro

m th

e re

mai

ning

twen

ty-o

ne p

rovi

nces

G

uang

dong

Pro

vinc

ial A

rchi

ves W

A07-

61middot2

22

Shaa

nxi

100

08

ndash8

ndash0

8Xi

njia

ng14

01

ndash1

ndash0

71So

uth-

cent

ral a

nd

Sout

h Ch

ina

Hen

an99

33

ndash3

ndash0

315

047

Hub

ei70

01

ndash1

ndash0

14H

unan

697

1ndash

1ndash

014

Gua

ngdo

ng81

610

37

ndash1

23So

uthw

est

Gui

zhou

500

ndashndash

ndashndash

ndashndash

Sich

uan

1140

ndashndash

ndashndash

Tota

l14

344

8114

661

057

81

SU62

ltUNgt

The overall situation of the Northeast shows us the general trends of new rich peasant creation in old and new areas However widely varying socio-economic conditions across different regions meant great disparities in the degree of new rich peasant creation A survey conducted into 6023 households in twenty typical townships of Shanxi Province indicates that new rich peas-ant households accounted for only 008 percent of total households surveyed in 1952 That figure was down to 006 percent in 195410 That is to say that the development trend of new rich peasants here was roughly similar to that of the Northeast but the proportion of new rich peasant households here was significantly lower than in the Northeast

Land reforms in new areas began in the autumn and winter of 1950 with most complete by 1951 or 1952 That left only two or three years of time for the rural individual economy to grow before the advent of agricultural coop-eratives After 1952 there were great changes to the rural policy environment Therefore there was little time for new rich peasants to be created in new ar-eas and those who were created mostly did not fall into standard patterns A survey conducted into 3754 households in twelve townships of Hubei prov-ince discovered no new rich peasant households in 1952 and only twelve in 1954 accounting for 032 percent of total households surveyed11 A survey con-ducted into 3575 households in nine townships of Hunan province indicates the proportion of new rich peasant households to total households to be 017 percent in 1952 025 percent in 1953 and 011 percent in 195412 A survey con-ducted by the Jiangxi Provincial Committee in 3638 households in nine typi-cal townships of Jiangxi indicates that no new rich peasant households were created in 1952 but four emerged in 1954 accounting for 011 percent of total households surveyed13 A survey conducted in 2893 households of ten town-ships of Anhui province indicates that 072 percent of households surveyed 10111213

10 Shanxi sheng 20 ge dianxing xiang diaocha ziliaothinspmiddotthinsptudi gaige jieshu shiqi (1952ndash1954) 《山

西省2 0个典型乡调查资料 middot 土地改革结束时期(1952~1954 年)》[Investigation Materials Regarding 20 Typical Townships of Shanxi Provincethinspmiddotthinspthe End of Land Reforms (1952ndash1954)] May 1956 Shanxi Provincial Archives 6805

11 Hubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongji biao (1955 nian) 《湖北省十二个典

型乡调查统计表（ 19 5 5年)》[Statistical Tables from Investigations into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province (1955)] Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-154

12 See Note on Hunan rural economic investigations in References13 Guanyu quansheng (9 ge dianxing xiang) jingji diaocha zonghebiao 《关于全省（9个

典型乡)经济调查综合表》[Comprehensive Tables Regarding Economic Investigations into 9 Typical Townships Across the Province] ed Jiangxi Provincial Committee Investiga-tive Group 1956 Jiangxi Provincial Archives X006-2-13


ltUNgt

were new rich peasant households down to 045 percent in 195414 Hunan Hubei and Jiangxi completed land reforms well after the provinces of the Northeast generally finishing in 1952 The ccp Central South-Central Bureau Rural Work Department launched an investigation into twelve typical town-ships of Guangdong at the end of 1953 Surveyors there reported an even lower proportion of new rich peasant households than in Hunan Hubei and Jiangxi A nationwide survey into rural household expenditures and incomes in 1954 revealed that the proportion of new rich peasant households in Guangzhou was 123 percent (see Table 24) That gave Guangdong a relatively high propor-tion of new rich peasant households as compared to the rest of the country

In summary after land reforms new rich peasant creation hit its peak more or less between 1953 and 1954 Beginning in the second half of 1955 China ex-perienced a fervor for establishing rural collectives at which point the new rich peasant and rural individual household economies abruptly died out In the spring of 1955 the National Bureau of Statistics and rural work departments of all provinces conducted a concentrated investigation into rural economic conditions over 1954 in order to aid the development of rural cooperatives Their work provided us with relatively systematized data for the study of the new rich peasant issue Thus in the following section we shall use 1954 as our focus year for the study of the scale distribution and economic characteristics of the creation of new rich peasants prior to the cooperative movement Of course we must also incorporate analysis of conditions prior to 1954 as the general line for the transitionary period was established in 1953 at which time central officials instituted the state monopoly for grains cotton oil and other important agricultural products exerting a great influence on the develop-ment of the new rich peasant economy

ii The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants in 1954

Prior to the spring planting of 1955 the National Bureau of Statistics conducted an investigation into the 1954 expenditures and incomes of rural households in twenty-five provinces and autonomous regions For this investigation the Bu-reau designed a unified methodology for sample collection The investigation sent 5000 active cadres into 16468 rural households in 824 villages around the 14

14 Anhui sheng nongcun dianxing diaocha (tudi gaige jieshu zhi 1954 nian) 《安徽省农村典

型调查（土地改革结束至 19 5 4年)》[Typical Investigations into Rural Areas of Anhui Province ( from the End of Land Reforms to 1954)] ed cpc Anhui Provincial Committee Rural Work Department 中共安徽省委农村工作部办公室

SU64

ltUNgt

country Once complete the Bureau compiled data from 15432 households from twenty-three provinces After the data were collected the entire inves-tigation was examined and studied before being made public For this reason this document is an important piece of evidence for understanding the chang-es and trends in class changes taking place in rural areas across the country up to 1954 The conditions of new rich peasants from most of the countryrsquos prov-inces regions and autonomous regions are indicated in Table 24

Table 44 indicates that new rich peasant households accounted for 057 percent of all surveyed rural households included in the tablersquos datamdash14344 households across twenty-one provinces At the time land reforms ended 815 percent of these new rich peasant households had been middle peasant households 173 percent had been poor peasant households and 12 percent had been landlord households Although most had been deemed middle peas-ant households a substantial amount had also been classified poor peasant households

If we break the data down by province or autonomous region we can see that Liaoning had the highest proportion of new rich peasant households at 18 percent Other provinces or autonomous regions exceeding the national aver-age were in order Jilin Guangdong Shandong Shaanxi Heilongjiang Anhui and Xinjiang all exceeding 07 percent The provinces with the fewest new rich peasant families were in order Sichuan Guizhou Hubei Hunan Zhejiang and Fujian all coming in below 03 percent The remaining provinces and au-tonomous regions of Qinghai Hebei Shanxi Jiangsu Inner Mongolia Gansu and Henan all registered between 03 and 05 percent

If we break it down by larger administrative divisions the Northeast had the highest proportion of new rich peasant households followed by the North-west East Chinarsquos proportion was even with the national average North China and central China both fell below the national average and two provinces of the Southwest did not report discovering any new rich peasants

iii Analysis of the Factors Determining the Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants

In order to study the patterns behind the creation of new rich peasants we broke the data into units of provinces (or autonomous regions) and selected such indicators as rural per capita income levels the proportion of commune-member rural households to total rural households and the proportion of middle peasant households to total rural households as well as such factors as differentiation between new and old areas We used these criteria to ana-lyze the factors behind the scale and distribution of the creation of new rich


ltUNgt

peasants We also examined the influence on the creation and development of new rich peasants of the time at which land reforms were completed the level of rural economic development the level of middle-peasant-ization the degree of severity of rural policies and the political climate in a given area

The correlation coefficient between the proportion of new rich peasant households to total households and the level of rural per capita income is 0266 calculated based on the data in Table 25 That is to say that there is a

Table 25 Comparisons of per capita (total) incomes and proportions to total rural population of new rich peasant households commune member households and poor peasant households in twenty provinces and regions in 1954

Province Total households surveyed

Per capita income (yuan)


Percentage of middle peasant + commune member households ()

Percentage of commune member households ()

Hebei 1019 14957 049 8116 815Shanxi 839 16715 048 8641 2062Shaanxi 1000 19712 08 643 05Shandong 1054 13218 095 6831 398Henan 993 13365 03 6294 111Liaoning 500 18215 18 718 9Jilin 537 16486 168 6536 95Heilongjiang 698 19189 072 5602 831Inner Mong 278 21615 036 6007 791Gansu 600 19011 033 6533 133Qinghai 200 26550 05 69 05Jiangsu 500 15517 04 65 12Anhui 984 12893 071 5132 274Zhejiang 640 16359 016 6688 078Hubei 700 13787 014 7229 186Hunan 697 14904 014 6901 029Sichuan 1140 14383 0 6202 053Guangdong 816 17367 123 5453 208Guizhou 500 9454 0 682 2Fujian 499 19495 02 6814 441

Data source Same as Table 24 The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was omitted from this list as data on its class structure at the time are incomplete

SU66

ltUNgt

15

15 See Note on Hunan rural economic investigations in References

positive correlation between these two factors but the correlation is weak In other words the correlation between the number of new rich peasants and the degree of economic development is not strong

However if we look at different periods of time within a single province we discover a different situation Letrsquos take Hunan as an example The harvests of nine typical Hunan towns surveyed in 1952 and 1953 were relatively good The per capita annual grain income of households in the survey increased from 14267 jin to 1572 jin an increase of 102 percent Of these same households the proportion of new rich peasant households increased from 017 percent to 025 percent In 1954 widespread crop failures due to waterlogging caused decreases in agricultural output Rural household per capita grain income fell to 12277 jin a drop of 219 percent from the previous year there was a corresponding reduction of the proportion of new rich peasant households of 011 percent (see Table 26) These data reported by the Hunan government indicate that as the rural economy developed and rural incomes increased the number of new rich peasants also increased at the same time the income disparity be-tween new rich peasants and other classes of peasant households shrank The data also indicate that as agricultural output fell so did rural income levels and the overall proportion of new rich peasant households at the same time the income disparity between new rich peasants and other classes of peasant

Table 26 Per capita rural incomes and the proportion of new rich peasant households to total rural households in nine townships of hunan province 1952ndash195415

Total house holds surveyed

Per capita income (in jin of grain)

Non-new-rich-peasants New rich peasants

Year Number of households


Number of households

Percentage of total households ()


1952 3488 14267 3482 14251 6 017 211151953 3284 1572 3276 15715 8 025 1998841954 3575 12277 3571 12262 4 011 20061


ltUNgt

1617

16 I must clarify here that the reason behind the reduction of new rich peasant per capita income in 1953 might be that newly created new rich peasant households lagged eco-nomically behind existing new rich peasant households This may have resulted in the per capita income drop When there was a reduction to the total of new rich peasant households in 1954 economically weak new rich peasants fell from the stratum of new rich peasants as a result of the crop failures This may have caused the rebound to per capita income levels in this year

17 These data reflect the degree of middle-peasant-ization This is because most peasant households joining communes at this time had originally been middle peasants and be-cause commune-member households were on nearly identical economic footing with middle peasant households

households grew16 Such disparities indicate that in the nine Hunan towns of the survey reduction to the income of other classes of peasant households was not a prerequisite for the creation of new rich peasants Rather the creation of new rich peasants was attributable to economic development and universal increases to rural incomes

Using data contained in Table 25 we calculated a coefficient of correlation of minus0144 between the proportion of middle peasant households+commune-member households and new rich peasant households across the provinces and autonomous regions17 That is to say that there is a negative correlation between the two but the correlation is relatively weak In other words there was a weak relationship between the number of new rich peasants and the degree of middle-peasant-ization

Also using data contained in Table 25 we calculated a coefficient of correla-tion of 0347 between the proportion of rural commune-member households to total rural households (which reflects the level of agricultural cooperatiza-tion) and the proportion of new rich peasant households to total rural house-holds This coefficient indicates a positive correlation but a weak one It is generally held that the higher the level of agricultural cooperatization in an area the more rigorous that arearsquos policies were toward new rich peasants the higher the political pressure on them and thus the more restrictions were im-posed on the creation of new rich peasants If this were the case there should have been a negative correlation between the two variables but we found the case to be the opposite This conclusion indicates that many factors influenced the creation and development of new rich peasants Analysis of a single factor would be insufficient to explain the complex socioeconomic factors influenc-ing the creation of new rich peasants

Letrsquos break down the 21 provinces and provincial-level areas into three groups old areas new areas and crossover zones between old and new ar-eas As shown in Table 27 there was a higher proportion of new rich peasant

SU68

ltUNgt

households in old areas than in crossover zones and the proportion was high-er in crossover zones than in new areas That said proportions varied widely from province to province even within similar areas Table 24 shows us that the highest proportions of new rich peasant households were concentrated in the three northeastern provinces and Shandong Provincemdashin old areasmdashand provinces like Shaanxi in the crossover zone but also in areas such as Guang-dong Anhui Xinjiang and so on All provinces containing proportions of new rich peasant households less than 03 percent were in the new areas However such provinces as Hebei and Shanxi in the old areas and Henan in the cross-over zone exhibited proportions of new rich peasant households lower than the national average

The above analysis leads us to the following conclusionsFirst generally speaking old areas were the first to complete land reforms

and experience rejuvenation in rural economies Thus relatively higher pro-portions of affluent peasant households appeared in the old areas It would have been impossible for all peasants to have identical experiences amid rural individual economic competition across the country therefore it was inevi-table that new differences in economic conditions would arise

Second there was not a clear relationship between the degree of rural af-fluence and the proportion of new rich peasant households to total peasant households from province to province However the situation is different if one looks within similar areas For example rural conditions in Hunan from

Table 27 The proportion of new rich peasant households to total rural households in old areas new areas and the crossover zone between old and new areas in 1954

Total households surveyed



Old areas total 4674 42 09Crossover zone total 1993 11 055New areas total 7694 28 036

Data source Same as Table 24 Here the old areas include such provinces as Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Hebei Shanxi and Shandong The crossover zones include the provinces of Shaanxi and Henan New areas include such provincial-level regions as Inner Mongolia Xinjiang Qinghai Gansu Hubei Hunan Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Guangdong Sichuan and Guizhou This is very rough division


ltUNgt

1952 to 1954 indicate that the situation was not as some have surmised it to be that a small number of people swallowed up the resources of others in order to engage in capital accumulation thus causing the majority to fall into poverty Rather the situation was that most peasants were hardworking strove for busi-ness success and saw their economic stars rise Some made economic gains faster than others which caused them to become new rich peasants Of course some peasants made economic gains slowly or struggled to make any gains at all There is not however a definite direct correlation between this phenom-enon and the emergence of new rich peasants this was rather a reflection of individual natures These peasants and their families had little resources to begin with and did not benefit amply from land reforms Some had little or in some cases no capacity for labor Some were not gifted in business and some suffered natural or man-made calamities Some were just lazy An investiga-tion into thirty-five townships in the South-central region in 1953 indicates that of two thirds of poor peasant households which comprised about thirty percent of total rural households had experienced economic growth following land reforms as a result of government assistance and were near to the level of middle peasant households The remaining third (about ten percent of total rural households) had not experienced any economic improvement and had in fact suffered economic losses Some of these troubled households possessed insufficient means of production and some had suffered natural or man-made calamities The primary reason for their condition however was insufficient capacity for labor The majority of such households consisted of widowers widows orphans the childless the elderly and the infirmed and the families of martyrs of the revolution they were in need of assistance and support from the government

Third before the agricultural cooperative movement hit its crescendo the proportion of new rich peasant households to total households in areas with relatively high degrees of rural cooperatization and restrictive policies on new rich peasants was not necessarily lower thanmdashand in some cases was higher thanmdashother areas This proportion reflects the contradictory nature of rural economic policies in the period before the agricultural cooperative movement peaked In other words the only way to promote rural economic development following land reforms was to give policy support to individual peasant house-holds striving to increase output and run their businesses At the same time the government was encouraging the masses of peasants to strive to increase output and expand accumulation it was also restricting the emergence of eco-nomic disparities amid economic competition of individual rural families as well as the creation of new rich peasant households These two policy direc-tions were in direct conflict with one another It was precisely this conflict that

SU70

ltUNgt

18

18 National Bureau of Statistics 1954 nian woguo nongjia shouzhi diaocha baogao 《 19 5 4

年我国农家收支调查报告》[Investigative Reports into the Expenditures and Incomes of Chinese Rural Households in 1954] (Beijing Tongji chubanshe 1957) 13ndash14

caused the government to later accelerate the pace of agricultural cooperatiza-tion and collectivization thereby rooting out the driver of the creation of new rich peasants by eliminating the individual economy

In the above sections we have analyzed the scale and geographic distribu-tion of the creation of new rich peasants around the country in the period of time following land reforms but before the crescendo of the agricultural cooperative movement So what influence did the creation of new rich peas-ants exert on the changes taking place to rural class structure Per an inves-tigation into rural household expenditures and incomes conducted in 1954 poor peasant households accounted for 571 percent of total rural households at the time land reforms ended By the end of 1954 469 percent of poor peas-ant households (ie 268 percent of total rural households) had been elevated to the status of middle peasants This status elevation caused an important change to the rural class structure That is to say that the proportion of poor peasant households to total rural households fell to 29 percent while the pro-portion of middle peasants to the total rose from 358 percent at the end of land reforms to 622 percentmdashnearly two thirds of total householdsmdashby the end of 1954 causing them to comprise the bulk of the rural population At the same time old rich peasant households accounted for 36 percent of total rural households at the end of land reforms By the end of 1954 565 percent (21 percent of the total rural population) of old rich peasant households had fallen to the level of either middle or poor peasants At this time scarcely any new rich peasants were created and those who did get created were created slowly such households came to comprise only 06 percent of total rural households Thus the proportion of both old and new rich peasant households combined by the end of 1954 to total rural households was only 21 percent a reduction of 15 percent from the end of land reforms18 On the basis of the above analysis we can conclude that the trend of changes to rural class structure in the period of time between the end of land reforms to the crescendo of the agricultural cooperative movement was reduction at both extremes and concentration in the middle Of course it was not possible for all peasants to take identi-cal paths toward affluence following land reforms Very few new rich peasants were created as a result of economic competition in small-scale commerce among peasants Some peasant households made economic gains slowly or struggled to make any gains at all This phenomenon was inevitable during the


ltUNgt

19

19 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu shang 若干重大决策与事

件的回顾 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 1] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1991) 208

course of middle-peasant-ization This process did not in any way conform to what is generally referred to as ldquopolarizationrdquo As the government enacted a series of new democratic policies following land reforms to actively aid and support peasants in poverty this process of differentiation was limited to a cer-tain scope I agree with Bo Yiborsquos 薄一波 assessment in his book A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events In Borsquos view although there was a nega-tive side to the differentiation occurring in rural populations under historical conditions of the times this differentiation was beneficial to promoting gains in productivity So long as we perform our work well the negative side wonrsquot result in any destructive consequences19

References

1950ndash1952 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji《 1950~ 1952年东北农村调查汇集》

[Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations Years 1950ndash1952] ed CPC Cen-tral Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department

Anhui sheng nongcun dianxing diaocha (tudi gaige jieshu zhi 1954 nian)《安徽省农村

典型调查(土地改革结束至 1954年)》[Typical Investigations into Rural Areas of Anhui Province ( from the End of Land Reforms to 1954)] ed CPC Anhui Provincial Committee Rural Work Department 中共安徽省委农村工作部办公室

Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu shang《若干重大决策与

事件的回顾》上[A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 1] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1991)

Guanyu quansheng (9 ge dianxing xiang) jingji diaocha zonghebiao《关于全省(9个

典型乡)经济调查综合表》[Comprehensive Tables Regarding Economic Investiga-tions into 9 Typical Townships Across the Province] ed Jiangxi Provincial Committee Investigative Group 1956 Jiangxi Provincial Archives X006-2-13

Hubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongji biao (1955 nian)《湖北省十二个

典型乡调查统计表( 1955年)》[Statistical Tables from Investigations into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province (1955)] Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-154

National Bureau of Statistics 1954 nian woguo nongjia shouzhi diaocha baogao 《 1954 年我国农家收支调查报告》[Investigative Reports into the Expenditures and In-comes of Chinese Rural Households in 1954] (Beijing Tongji chubanshe 1957)

Nongcun jingji yu nongmin fudan diaocha ziliao 《农村经济与农民负担调查资

料》[Materials Regarding Investigations into Rural Economies and the Burden on

SU72

ltUNgt

Peasants] volume 2 ed Central Peoplersquos Government Ministry of Finance Bureau of Agricultural Taxation （中央人民政府财政部农业税司） Shaanxi Provin-cial Archives D9-8-23

Shanxi sheng 20 ge dianxing xiang diaocha ziliaomiddottudi gaige jieshu shiqi (1952ndash1954) 《山西省 20个典型乡调查资料 middot 土地改革结束时期 (1952~1954年 )》 [Investi-gation Materials Regarding 20 Typical Townships of Shanxi Provincemiddotthe End of Land Reforms (1952ndash1954)] May 1956 Shanxi Provincial Archives 6805

Zhang Wentian xuanji 《张闻天选集》[Selected Works of Zhang Wentian] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1985)

ldquoZhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu ge sheng 26 ge cun diaocha de huibao jiyao (1953 nian 12 yue) 中共中央东北局农村工作部关于

各省26个村调查的汇报纪要（ 1953年 12月） [Summary of Reports Conducted by the CPC Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department into 26 Villages in Every Province (December 1953)]rdquo in 1953 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji 《 1953年东北农村调查汇集》[Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations 1953] vol 2 ed CPC Central Northeast Bureau Rural Work Department 中共中央

东北局农村工作部 Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 《中国土地改革史料选编》[Selected

Historical Materials from Chinarsquos Land Reforms] ed China Land Reforms Editing Department and the Modern Economic History Department of the China Academy of Social Sciences Economic Institute (Beijing Guofang daxue chubanshe 1988)

Note on Hunan rural economic investigations Data compiled from investigations conducted into nine townships from 1952 to 1953 and eight townships in 1953 as follows

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Xiangtan xian Qingxi xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于湘潭县清溪

乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from In-vestigations into the Economy of Qingxi Township Xiangtan County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Pro-vincial Archives 146-1-176

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Xiangtan xian Changle xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于湘潭县

长乐乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Changle Township Xiangtan County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-197

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Anxiang xian Zhulinyuan xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于安乡

县竹林垸乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables


ltUNgt

from Investigations into the Economy of Zhulinyuan Township Anxiang County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-205

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Anxiang xian Jianjiadu xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于安乡

县蹇家渡乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Jianjiadu Township Anxiang County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-204

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Yuanling xian Xiaojiaqiao xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于沅陵

县肖家桥乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Xiaojiaqiao Township Yuanling County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-246

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Yuanling xian Mengfu xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于沅陵县

蒙福乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Mengfu Township Yuanling County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Pro-vincial Archives 146-1-272

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Yuanling xian Mumaxi xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于沅陵县牧

马溪乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Mumaxi Township Yuanling County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-260

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Changsha xian Juantang xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于长沙县

卷塘乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Juantang Township Changsha County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-153

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Changsha xian Caotang xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于长

沙县草塘乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Caotang Township Changsha County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-265


ltUNgt

chapter 3

The Deep Plowing Movement of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo

Zhu Xianling Ding Zhaojun and Hu Huakai1

Abstract

From 1957 to 1958 Mao Zedong upheld the experience of Lijiazhai Village 厉家寨

村 in Shandong Province and Changge County in Henan Province in increasing crop yields through deep plowing He called for the entire country to learn from their ex-ample and meet objectives for increased yields through deep plowing In August 1958 the ccp Central Committee issued directives calling for all arable land in the country capable of being plowed to a depth of one chi or more to be so plowed within two to three years A spectacular nationwide frenzy for deep plowing erupted In the ensu-ing movement officials from around the country actively organized teams to learn from Changge Countyrsquos experience and methodologies in deep plowing dispatching the masses to the fields to launch a ldquodecisive military campaignrdquo against the earth Re-searchers developed or revised farm implements specifically for deep plowing and sci-entists summarized and argued for the effectiveness of deep plowing measures Some also conducted experiments for increasing yields through deep plowing Although it was scientifically possible to increase yields to a certain extent through deep plowing many problems arose around the country in 1958 as deep plowing was taken too far done on too much land or performed improperly in some cases decreasing soil fertil-ity The movementrsquos anticipated objectives were never met

Keywords

ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo ndash deep plowing ndash deep plowing implements

1 Zhu Xianling (朱显灵 ) is a doctorate in Confucian idealist philosophy and an associate research fellow in the department of science and technology history and archaeology at the University of Science and Technology of China Ding Zhaojun (丁兆君 ) is a lecturer in the museum of history at the University of Science and Technology of China Hu Huakai (胡化凯 ) is a professor in the department of science and technology history and archaeol-ogy at the University of Science and Technology of China

75The Deep Plowing Movement of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo

ltUNgt

i Genesis of the Deep Plowing Movement

Land reforms were completed swiftly following the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China many rural citizens founded mutual aid teams and cooper-atives Some cooperatives made efforts in irrigation projects and land reclama-tion both of which markedly increased agricultural yields In 1951 the Liyueju 厉月举 team of Lijiazhai Village 厉家寨村 Yingnan County 莒南县 Shan-dong Province began experimenting with deep plowing They experienced in-creased yields in their very first year In 1953 the Liyueju teamrsquos average yield per mu of land was 228 kilograms an increase of 1255 kilograms per mu over the previous year In 1954 the Liyueju deep plowing system sparked a mass fervor for deep plowing In December 1955 the Lijiazhai Village advanced ag-ricultural producersrsquo collective began a program of large-scale irrigation works construction The slogan used for this program was ldquocleave ridges and fill in ravines change the courses of rivers turn over the land and advance into the mountainsrdquo Through hard work the collective changed the courses of five riv-ers flattened eleven mountains filled in twenty-one large ponds and over 300 ravines merged over 1000 scattered pieces of farmland into 118 large fields and increased arable land by an area of 192 mu Leadership at all levels took notice and lauded them for their fighting spirit2 On October 9 1957 Mao Zedong wrote the following memo upon reading the ldquoReport On the Repeated Bumper crop Harvests Achieved by Any Means Conceivable Realized by the Dashan Ag-ricultural Cooperative of Lijiazhai Township Yingnan County Shandong Prov-incerdquothinsp山东省莒南县厉家寨乡大山农业社千方百计争取丰收再丰收

的报告 ldquoLijiazhai is a good example for reforming China with the spirit of yu gong yi shan [a Chinese saying that can be interpreted as lsquowhere therersquos a will therersquos a wayrsquo or more literally as lsquothe foolish old man who moves an entire mountain through sheer determinationrsquo]rdquo3 From this point forward Lijiazhai was extolled as the supreme example for agricultural and irrigation construc-tion around the country and deep plowing became an important experience for increasing agricultural yields

Around the same time in 1954 Director Ma Tongyi 马同义 of the Shengli 胜利 Number One Cooperative of Mengpai Village 孟排村 Changge County

2 Wang Ribin and Su Qinshu 王日彬孙钦书 ldquoMao Zedong san ge dianxing jingyan pishi gei women de qishi 毛泽东三个典型经验批示给我们的启示 [Inspirations that Three of Mao Zedongrsquos Classic Experiences and Memos Give to Us]rdquo Lingdao ganbu wang 领导干

部网 accessed from httpwww1dgbcomcnE_ReadNewsaspNewsID=815913 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 6 ce 《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第6 册 [Mao Zedong

Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 6] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chu-banshe 1992) 599

ZHU DING AND HU76

ltUNgt

Henan Province summarized his deep plowing methodology He first applied sixty percent of his base fertilizer to the surface of mature soil then dug up that fertilized soil into piles He then applied the remaining 40 percent of his base fertilizer to the immature soil below and mixed up that soil layer with the fertilizer Then he pushed the previously fertilized mature soil back on top of the now fertilized immature soil Once an entire field had been so fertilized he moistened it with water and plowed the soil level in preparation for plant-ing Marsquos method called for plowing approximately thirty centimeters deep His reported yield of early corn was 5365 kilograms per mu4 The government of Changge County promoted Marsquos deep plowing method across the county in the winter of 1955 and spring of 1956 with a total of 29426 mu thus treated In the winter of 1957 the county government promoted the slogan ldquoturn up thousand-year-old soil and strive for output of 1500 jin per murdquo This slogan too set off a frenzy for deep plowing5

In May 1958 the first party secretary of the Changge County Committee Luuml Bingguang 吕炳光 made a report on deep plowing at the second meeting of the Communist Party of China (ccp)rsquos Eighth National Congress Luuml claimed that there were ten great advantages to deep plowing and went on to give a de-tailed explanation of his countyrsquos deep plowing methods and changes needed in farming implements to make the methods work Luuml said that 330000 mu of land in his county had been deep plowed to a depth of about 15 chi [unit of measure equal to one third of a meter] as of the end of April 1958 He also reported that the county committee had planned to have all 112 million mu of land in the county deep plowed and hoped to yield 800 jin of grain per mu He also gave several examples to show that deep plowing was an important mea-sure in the process of increasing yields He shared the following slogans ldquoplow deeper by one cun [unit of measure equal to one third of a decimeter] and cap it with manurerdquo and ldquowater is blood manure is grain and deep plowing is constructing granariesrdquo6 Luumlrsquos speech appeared in Renmin ribao 人民日报 the Peoplersquos Daily on May 137

4 Changge xian zhi 《长葛县志》 [Records of Changge County] (Shenghuomiddotdushumiddotxinzhi sanlian shudian 1992) 648

5 cpc Changge County Committee 中共长葛县委会 ldquoNongju da gexin tudi da fanshen 农具大革新土地大翻身 [Great Revolution in Farm Implements Great Turning of the Earth]rdquo Zhongguo nongbao 《中国农报》 3 (1958)

6 Although Luumlrsquos speech was based in fact the figures he presented regarding deep plowing methods and increased yields were exaggerated

7 Luuml Bingguang 吕炳光 ldquoTudi da fanshen zhengqu muchan babai jin 土地大翻身争取

亩产八百斤 [Great Turning of the Earth Strive for 800 Jin of Production per Mu]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 May 13 1958 fourth edition


ltUNgt

In a speech to the second meeting of the Eighth ccp Congress Mao Zedong called for the entire country to promulgate Changge Countyrsquos experience He said ldquoDeep plowing of one chi and five cun is a great invention Changgersquos ex-perience poses a question to all other counties if Changge can deeply plow all of its 112 million mu can other counties not do the same If one year isnrsquot enough then take two years If two years isnrsquot enough then take three If three years isnrsquot enough then take four If four years isnrsquot enough surely five years can do the trickrdquo8 Maorsquos high appraisal of deep plowing touched off a wave of enthusiasm for the method among cadres at all levels After the meeting the entire country mobilized from the upper echelons down to the grassroots levels formally kicking off the deep plowing movement of the entire people

ii Apex of the Deep Plowing Movement

On July 11 1958 the Ministry of Agriculture convened the ldquoNationwide Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Improvementrdquo 全国深耕农具和改良土壤 on-the-spot meeting in Changge County With over 200 party leaders agriculture specialists and farm machinery technologists from around the country in at-tendance the Ministry promoted Changgersquos experiences in deep plowing and soil improvement The countyrsquos delegate to the meeting announced that the county had run a control with corn millet cotton sweet potatoes sesame and tobacco on soil that had not been deeply plowed The root systems of all crops planted in soil plowed between one and two chi deep had grown strong and ldquoyields were at least double those of fields not deeply plowed and in some cases multiple times higherrdquo At the meeting it was decided that the following principles were essential to deep plowing and soil improvement living soil on top donrsquot disrupt soil layers administer water and fertilizer together improve soil from the bottom up and strengthen the earthrsquos productivity Also impor-tant were making proper adjustments based on location and season and not blindly copying Changgersquos precedent word-by-word It was further decided that political leadership take control of the movement at all levels The entire party and entire population were mobilized under the mass debate of deep plowing and soil improvement unifying understanding and overcoming rightist con-servative thought Leadership demanded that every level of the state estab-lish plans clarify tasks involved grasp the key time period organize dedicated

8 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与事件

的回顾》下 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 2] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1997) 708

ZHU DING AND HU78

ltUNgt

teams and launch an all-out assault Leaders at the meeting demanded that the country strive to deeply plow and improve the soil of all of the over 16 bil-lion mu of arable land in the country before spring of 1959 The stated goal was to plow fields to a depth of about 15 chi two to three or more chi in particularly productive soil fertilize multiple layers of soil and convert all poor soil in the country into good soil9 This meeting abundantly confirmed the effects of deep plowing it turned out to be the pivotal moment when leading cadres from the Ministry of Agriculture mobilized the country to bring about Maorsquos vision of deep plowing

An enlarged meeting of the ccp Central Politburo was convened from August 17 to 30 1958 in Beidaihe On August 29 the meeting passed the ldquoccp Central Directives on Deep Plowing and Soil Improvementrdquo 中共中央关于

深耕和改良土壤的指示 which stressed that deep plowing was the core technical measure to be used to bring about increased agricultural yields The Directives noted that during the spring and summer plantings of 1958 only 120 million mu of landmdashless than one tenth of total arable land in the countrymdashhad been deeply plowed and that it would not be possible to deeply plow all land in the country even given ten years So the Directives demand-ed that all land which could be deeply plowed in the following two to three years be deeply plowed and that the deep plowing process be repeated on all previously deeply plowed land once every three years The standard for deep plowing established by the Directives was a depth of over one chi and over two chi in particularly productive land The Directives also made the following demands of all governments around the country ldquoguidance by political lead-ership mobilization of the entire party and action by the entire populacerdquo ldquoincite a frenzy for the deep plowing and soil improvement movementrdquo and ldquomake the high tide of output centered on deep plowing and soil improvement even higher in 1958 than in 1957 and ensure that an even greater leap is made in agricultural output in 1958 than was made in 1957rdquo10 On September 2 of that year Renmin ribao published an editorial extolling the advantages of deep plowing claiming that immature soil could be converted into mature soil and

9 Qu Mingzhen 曲明振 ldquoShengeng shenfan daliang zengchan quanguo jiang xianqi shen-fan he gailiang turang yundong 深耕深翻大量增产全国将掀起深翻和改良土壤

运动 [Deep Plowing Greatly Increases Yields The Entire Nation Will Launch a Move-ment for Deep Plowing and Soil Improvement]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 July 27 1958 fifth edition

10 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 11 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》

第 11 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 11] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1995) 459ndash462


ltUNgt

mature soil into particularly fertile soil thereby greatly increasing overall soil fertility and allowing a single mu of land to produce as much as it had taken several mu to produce in the past The article claimed that deep plowing gener-ally increased agricultural yields by between fifty and 100 percent and in some cases as much as much as 300 to 500 percent or higher The editorial includ-edcomparison of Changge Countyrsquos agricultural productivity before and after deep plowing to illustrate the effectiveness of the method The author called for leadership around the country to be sufficiently decisive and for the entire party to mobilize the masses into a grand and spectacular movement11 Agri-cultural departments increased propagation and guided work per the Direc-tives and leadership from every region in the country dispatched delegates to Changge for observations A nationwide frenzy for the deep plowing and soil improvement was then swiftly launched

iii Methods and Measures of Deep Plowing

Once the movement had been launched the Peoplersquos Daily Zhongguo nongbao 中国农报 Nongye gongzuo tongxun 农业工作通讯 and other periodicals frequently published articles discussing new deep plowing methods that had been developed around the country The two most representative cases were those of Lijiazhai Village and Changge County Lijiazhai adopted two deep plowing methods ldquosparrow somersaultrdquo and ldquotwo immature soil layers around one mature soil layerrdquo Changge adopted over ten methods including ldquotwo-layer deep plowing and widespread turning of earthrdquo ldquoman-power widespread deep turningrdquo ldquoman-power ditch turningrdquo ldquocombined man-and-beast plowingrdquo ldquofirst shallow single plowing then double deep plowingrdquo ldquoplowingfollowed by pick-ingrdquo ldquotriple plowings to build a ridgerdquo ldquoplowing high and planting low methodrdquo ldquosingle-layer deep plowing and turningrdquo ldquosparrow big somersaultrdquo ldquodeep plow-ing in the middle shallow plowing on both sidesrdquo ldquoleaving immature soil intact while moving mature soilrdquo and others The ldquotwo-layer deep plowing and wide-spread turning of earthrdquo method consisted of one person driving two draft ani-mals to plow andturn the earth to a net depth of 12 chi driving the plowhead to a depth of 15 chi and turning three mu of earth per day The ldquoman-power widespread deep turningrdquo and ldquoman-power ditch turningrdquo methods were both man-powered the former used progressive deep soil turning and the latter used interlaced deep soil turning In the ldquocombined man-and-beast plowing

11 ldquoRang tudi lai ge da fanshen 让土地来个大翻身 [Let there Be a Great Turning of the Earth]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 2 1958 fourth edition

ZHU DING AND HU80

ltUNgt

methodrdquo a team of people drove draft animals to pull a seven cun walking plow to turn the surface soil followed by a team of people using hand-held plows to dig up the earth while applying fertilizer at the same time In the ldquofirst shal-low single plowing then double deep plowingrdquo method first a shallow walking plow is used followed by a deep double plow to dig up lower soil layers In the ldquodeep plowing in the middle shallow plowing on both sidesrdquo method first a double-layer double-furrow plow is used to turn the earth after which the soil is fertilized and then a seven cun shallow walking plow is used to plow shal-lowly piling the mature soil from either side into the middle to form ridges This last method calls for four people and four draft animals and can be used to plow five to six mu per day The depth in the middle is 12 chi and seven cun on either side This method is suitable for planting corn tobacco sweet potatoes and other wide-ridged crops12 Table 31 lists the depths and work efficiencies of the primary deep plowing methods used in Changge County

Table 31 shows that ldquoman-power widespread deeprdquo turning was the deepest of all the primary methods in Changgersquos deep plowing arsenal hitting depths of between two and three chi as compared to the other methods which came in at just over one chi in plowing depth Nevertheless the work efficiency of most deep plowing methods was low The ldquoman-power widespread deep turningrdquo method required twelve workers to turn a single mu of land The ldquoman-power ditch turningrdquo method required seven workers and the ldquocombined man-and-beast plowingrdquo method required three The above indicate that deeper plowing required more workers The use of improved deep-plowing implements (ie plows) markedly increased work efficiency but they reached no deeper than 15 chi In order to reach plowing depth of 15 chimdashand in some cases over a metermdashgovernments around the country drastically increased the number of workers deployed to perform this work

The Henan provincial government mobilized an army of millions of laborers organized into several specialized brigades They lived and ate in the fields where they worked spending day and night deep plowing the earth The government of Xiayi County 夏邑县 placed a high premium on deep plowing Officials there organized a troupe of laborers 200000 strong com-manded in military style organized into regiments battalions and companies This force was divided across over sixty ldquobattlefieldsrdquo where they launched an all-out assault on the land night and day The different tiers of government in Hebei Province also generally took deep plowing very seriously There party

12 Zhang Junchang and Niu Pu 张君常钮溥 ldquoChangge xian shenfandi de fangfa he kexue genju 长葛县深翻地的方法和科学根据 [The Methods and Scientific Basis of Changge Countyrsquos Deep Plowing]rdquo Nongye kexue tongxun 《农业科学通讯》 9 (1958)


ltUNgt

Tabl

e 3

1 M

etho

ds d

epth

s an

d wo

rk ef

ficie

ncy o

f dee

p pl

owin

g co

nduc

ted

in C

hang

ge C

ount

y H

enan

Pro

vinc

e

Met

hod

Two-

laye

r dee

p pl

owin

g an

d w

ides

prea

d tu

rnin

g of

ear

th

Man

-pow

er

wid

espr

ead

deep

turn

ing

Man

-pow

er

ditc

h tu

rnin

gCo

mbi

ned

man

-and

-be

ast

plow

ing

Plow

ing

follo

wed

by

pick

ing

Trip

le p

low

ings

to

bui

ld a

ridg

ePl

ow h

igh

and

plan

t low

Sing

le-la

yer

deep

plo

win

g an

d tu

rnin

g m

etho

d

Plow

ing

dept

h (c

hi)

15

2ndash3

15

15

12

12

Dra

ft an

imal

s re

quire

d

23

32

Labo

r (p

eopl

e x

days

mu)

029

127

03

02

00

331

00

30

Data

sour

ce c

cp C

hang

ge C

ount

y Co

mm

itte

e ldquoN

ongj

u da

gex

in t

udi d

a fa

nshe

n《农

具大

革新

土地

大翻

身》

[Gre

at R

evol

utio

n in

Farm

ing

Impl

emen

ts G

reat

Tur

ning

of

the

Eart

h]rdquo

Zhon

gguo

non

gbao

中国

农报

3 (19

58)

ZHU DING AND HU82

ltUNgt

secretaries were put in charge of the program and the entire party and entire populace were mobilized deep plowing command headquarters were estab-lished at every level of government from the county down to the commune The majority of agricultural cooperatives and peoplersquos communes organized deep plowing brigades and groups Those peoplersquos communes and peoplersquos mi-litia production and fighting brigades which had already completed labor-mil-itary integration comprised the bulk of the ldquofighting forcerdquo13 Statistics indicate that at this time Henan Hebei Shandong Shanxi Beijing Shaanxi Gansu Anhui Jiangsu and Hubei had already collectively deeply plowed a total of over 129 million mu Of those 10 provinces and cities the movement was par-ticularly vast in Henan Shandong Hebei and Beijing where a force over 32 million strong was waged war on the land night and day14

In early October 1958 the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee convened telephone conferences on deep plowing for party secretaries at the provincial city and county levels successively followed by a conference broadcast on mass media regarding a mass pledge to go all out in deeply plowing thereby completing concrete deployments and deep mobilization Provincial leaders called for party committees at every level to arouse the masses to take action of their own accord in the deep plowing movement In early October over 42 million people around the province participated in the war of deep plowing Over 877 million mu of land was deeply plowed five times the area that the mass pledge conference had called for15 The movement was taken seriously in

13 ldquoShenfan yi chi tu duo chan wan jin liang Henan Hebei qianbaiwan laodong dajun riye tuji fandi 深翻一尺土多产万斤粮河南河北千百万劳动大军日夜突击翻

地 [Deeply Plow and Increase Grain Yields by 10000 Jin Armies Millions Strong Staging an Earth-Turning Assault Day and Night in Hebei and Henan]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日

报》 September 12 1958 sixth edition14 ldquoXunsu tuiguang xianjin jingyan he shengsuo qianyin li ba shenfan tudi yundong

tuixiang gaochao 迅速推广先进经验和绳索牵引犁把深翻土地运动推向高潮 [Swiftly Promulgate Advanced Experience and Rope-Pulled Plows Push the Deep Plow-ing Movement to Crescendo]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 29 1958 third edition

15 ldquoMingnian nongye dafanshen xian yao jinnian tudi dafanshen Liaoning xingqi ri fan bai-wan mu yundong sibaiwan dajun jizhan yi zhou shenfandi babaiqishi duo wan mu 明年农业大翻身先要今年土地大翻身辽宁兴起日翻百万亩运动四百万大军激

战一周深翻地八百七十多万亩 [We Must Bring About a Soil Revolution This Year in Order to Realize an Agricultural Revolution Next Year a Movement to Plow a Million Mu per Day Rising in Liaoning an Army Four Million Strong can Deeply Plow Over 8700000 Mu in a Week of Fierce Fighting]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 19 1958 first edition


ltUNgt

both the agricultural and semi-agriculturalsemi-husbandry regions of Inner Mongolia There many peoplersquos communes promoted the ldquosix in-the-fieldsrdquo (ie command in the fields eating in the fields living in the fields holding meetings and debates in the fields learning in the fields and entertainment in the fields) and the method of rotating people and oxen but never stopping the plowing process deep plowing proceeded night and day in this province as well16 In the ldquosatelliterdquo fields of Shouzhang County Shandong Province lead-ership demanded that deep plowing go 12 zhang [a unit of measure equal to three and one third meters] deep In this county youth platoons waged the ldquonight battlerdquo Teams were frequently composed of three people top middle and bottom The soil dug up by the bottom person was lifted to the middle per-son who then hauled it to the top person who then hauled it to fill a ditch17

iv Development of Implements for Deep Plowing

Human-powered deep plowing not only called for an immense amount of labor but it also consumed great amounts of time It became imperative to develop new implements specialized in deep plowing to complete the task Officials from Changge County unveiled the plowing implements they had developed for deep plowing at the same time they shared their experience with the country The most famous of said implements was the double-layer double-furrow plow invented by farmer Wang Yushun 王玉顺 This plow is fitted with a guiding wheel on the front and regulators for both depth and width of plowing It is fitted in the middle with two plow columns The front plowshare was an eight cun walking plow and the back was composed of a plow furrow and a plow frog The plowshare was an eight cun walking plow and plow frogs were also installed on the plow columns There were four holes on the top to adjust the plow headrsquos depth of entry into the soil The plow was 220 centimeters long twenty-five centimeters wide and 118 centimeters tall When in use this implement could plow a width of twenty centimeters

16 ldquoZhuajin nongshi jiasu qiugeng Neimenggu Jilin fandi yundong jinru gaochao 抓紧农

时加速秋耕内蒙古吉林翻地运动进入高潮 [Firmly Grasp the Farming Season and Accelerate Autumn Plowing The Plowing Movement Hitting Crescendo in Inner Mongolia and Jilin]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 24 1958 fourth edition

17 Tong Pingya 佟屏亚 ldquoNongye lsquoda yuejinrsquo kaoliang nongye kexuejiamdashxie zai 1958 nian nongye lsquoda yuejinrsquo 50 zhou nian 农业ldquo大跃进rdquo考量农业科学家mdash mdash 写在 1958 年农业ldquo大跃进rdquo50 周年 [Agricultural Scientists Consider the Agricultural lsquoGreat Leap Forwardrsquo ndash Written on the 50th Anniversary of the Agricultural lsquoGreat Leap Forwardrsquo]rdquo Nongye kaogu 《农业考古》 4 (2008)

ZHU DING AND HU84

ltUNgt

turning all soil to the right side The back plow didnrsquot turn the earth but loos-ened it in a swath twenty centimeters wide It required one person and three draft animals and could plow 35 mu of earth per day to a depth of forty centi-meters deeper than the average walking plow by twenty centimeters18 Wangrsquos plow was held up as a great invention The plow itself became the prototype of the farm implement revolution and Wang himself was hired as a special research fellow in the China Academy of Agricultural Sciences Mechanization Institute

On July 11 1958 the Ministry of Agriculture convened the National Confer-ence on Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Improvement 全国深耕农具和

改良土壤会议 in Changge County The primary goals of the conference were to promulgate Changge Countyrsquos experience with deep plowing and appraise various experiments which had been conducted in deep plowing implements A total of fifty-seven newly invented implements were displayed at the confer-ence (of which twenty-onemdash368 percent of the totalmdashcame from Changge itself) Of those thirty-six were chosen for field testing They were appraised based on their plowing depth pulling capacity and efficiency as well as on their ability to turn earth loosen earth and flatten ditch bottoms During the testing some plows were unable to function properly due to poor design Some were equipped with weak parts which warped during testing render-ing them likewise unable to function properly The malfunctioning models excluded only twenty-six plows ended up being appraised (see Table 32) These twenty-six could be divided into three groups based on their working conditions and basic design dry farming deep plows paddy field deep plows and double-wheel double-furrow deep plows They were basically all com-plex plows meaning that their tops turned the topsoil while their rear ends loosened the earth below the plow

On-the-spot testing showed that all the double-wheel double-furrow com-plex deep plows met the demands of deep plowing but they required a great deal of pulling capacity Some even required the capacity needed to pull over 700 kilograms of weight which even three draft animals working in concert would be hard pressed to provide rendering them impractical The paddy field plows were tested in dry sandy soil and so testing results were less than ideal The fore-plows and subsoil shovels among the dry farming deep plows reached a depth of 33 centimeters with a minimum capactiyto pulla weight of 250 kilograms which made them practical for teams of three draft ani-mals working in light soil however the subsoil shovel was often incapable of

18 Nongju tupu di yi juan 《农具图谱》第 1 卷 [Illustrated Farm Implements Vol 1] ed Peoplersquos Republic of China Ministry of Agriculture (Tongsu duwu chubanshe 1958) 34


ltUNgt

Tabl

e 3

2 Te

chni

cal a

ppra

isals

for n

ewly

inve

nted

dee

p pl

owin

g im

plem

ents

Nam

eSp

onso

rD

esig

nPl

owin

g de

pth

(cm

)Pu

lling

cap

acity

Mai

n pl

owSu

bsoi

l sho

vel

Tota

l dep

thK

g

8 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le c

urve

d rid

ge d

oubl

e-la

yer p

low

Wan

g Yu

shun

of

Chan

gge

Coun

tyM

ain

plow

8 cu

n

furr

ow-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

2210

532

525

97

Dee

ply

curv

ed h

oe-s

tyle

do

uble

-laye

r plo

wW

ang

Yush

unM

ain

plow

8 cu

n h

oe-

styl

e su

bsoi

l sho

vel

216

1738

546

7

7 cu

n fu

rrow

-col

umn-

styl

e do

uble

-laye

r plo

wW

ang

Yush

unM

ain

plow

8 cu

n

furr

ow-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

99

1827

926

37

7 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le d

oubl

e-la

yer p

low

Wan

g Yu

shun

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

fu

rrow

-sty

le su

bsoi

l sh

ovel

2312

135

127

66

Dou

ble-

furr

ow d

oubl

e-la

yer

plow

Wan

g Yu

shun

Mai

n pl

ow se

lf-m

ade

fu

rrow

-sty

le su

bsoi

l sh

ovel

1418

3227

4

7 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le fo

ur-la

yer

plow

Wan

g Yu

shun

Mai

n pl

ow 7

cun

fu

rrow

-sty

le su

bsoi

l sh

ovel

735

2532

449

5

ZHU DING AND HU86

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 3

2 M

etho

ds d

epth

s an

d wo

rk ef

ficie

ncy o

f dee

p pl

owin

g co

nduc

ted

in C

hang

ge C

ount

y H

enan

Pro

vinc

e (co

nt)

Nam

eSp

onso

rD

esig

nPl

owin

g de

pth

(cm

)Pu

lling

cap

acity

Mai

n pl

owSu

bsoi

l sho

vel

Tota

l dep

thK

g

8 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le d

eepl

y cu

rved

dou

ble-

laye

r plo

wCh

angg

e Co

unty

Fa

rmM

ain

plow

8 cu

n

furr

ow-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

222

64

286

272

5

8 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le d

eepl

y cu

rved

dou

ble-

laye

r plo

wSo

ngzh

ai V

illag

e 宋

砦村

Cha

ngge

Co

unty

Hen

an

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

fu

rrow

-sty

le su

bsoi

l sh

ovel

209

1232

927

1

Dee

ply

curv

ed h

oe-s

tyle

do

uble

-laye

r plo

wH

enan

Pro

vin-

cial

Agr

icul

tura

l Bu

reau

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

hoe

-st

yle

subs

oil s

hove

l21

49

430

825

63

8 cu

n ho

e-st

yle

extr

a de

ep

plow

Shua

ngm

iao

Tow

nshi

p 双

庙乡

Cha

ngge

Co

unty

Hen

an

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

hoe

-st

yle

subs

oil s

hove

l20

23

723

919

44

8 cu

n do

uble

-laye

r col

umn-

styl

e pl

owLi

anfe

ng 连

丰

Coop

erat

ive

Ch

angg

e Co

unty

H

enan

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

old

fu

rrow

subs

oil s

hove

l18

88

727

529

51


ltUNgt

8 cu

n do

uble

-hoo

k-st

yle

extr

a de

ep p

low

Zhen

ping

Cou

nty

镇平

县 H

enan

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

ho

ok-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

204

34

238

186

5

7 cu

n ho

e-st

yle

extr

a de

ep

plow

Tong

xu C

ount

y 通

许县

Hen

anM

ain

plow

7 cu

n h

oe-

styl

e su

bsoi

l sho

vel

2514

3940

0

7 cu

n do

uble

-laye

r hoe

-sty

le

deep

plo

wH

ejia

n Co

unty

河间

县 H

enan

Mai

n pl

ow 7

cun

hoe

-st

yle

subs

oil s

hove

l20

1636

516

Old

plo

w p

lus s

ubso

il sh

ovel

Chan

gge

Coun

ty

Hen

an6

0815

211

188

7 cu

n th

ree-

laye

r dee

p pl

owSo

ngzh

uang

To

wns

hip

宋

庄乡

Lus

han

Coun

ty 鲁

山县

H

enan

Old

7 cu

n m

ain

plow

ho

ok-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

201

67

268

257

5

Old

styl

e do

uble

-laye

r plo

wN

anya

ng S

teel

-w

orks

Hen

anIm

prov

ed m

ain

plow

ho

e-st

yle

subs

oil

shov

el

235

65

3031

25

7 cu

n ho

e-st

yle

3-la

yer p

low

Chin

a Ac

adem

y of

Ag

ricul

tura

l Sci

-en

ces A

gric

ultu

ral

Mec

hani

zatio

n In

stitu

te

One

shov

el h

ole

in

mid

dle

254

1439

444

8

Two

shov

els

hole

in

mid

dle

174

1431

629

5

One

shov

el h

ole

on

top

2516

441

451

0

Two

shov

els

hole

on

top

185

1836

533

2

ZHU DING AND HU88

ltUNgt

Com

poun

d de

ep p

low

Fujia

n Fa

rm

Impl

emen

t Tes

t-in

g Ce

nter

Mai

n pl

ow a

pad

dy

plow

hoe

-sty

le su

b-so

il sh

ovel

213

37

2526

35

7 cu

n sh

ould

er-c

arrie

d ho

e-st

yle

deep

plo

wG

uang

xi Z

huan

g M

inor

ity A

ut-

nom

ous R

egio

n Ba

ise

Farm

Ma-

chin

ery

Fact

ory

Mai

n pl

ow a

pad

dy

plow

hoe

-sty

le su

b-so

il sh

ovel

196

41

237

201

7 cu

n do

uble

-toot

h-st

yle

deep

pl

owG

uang

xi A

uton

o-m

ous R

egio

nM

ain

plow

a li

ght

wal

king

plo

w h

ook-

styl

e su

bsoi

l sho

vel

217

21

238

192

5

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

plu

s su

bsoi

l sho

vel

East

Chi

na A

gri-

cultu

ral S

cien

ces

Inst

itute

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

fro

nt p

low

repl

aced

w

ith su

bsoi

l sho

vel

204

88

292

323

Nam

eSp

onso

rD

esig

nPl

owin

g de

pth

(cm

)Pu

lling

cap

acity

Mai

n pl

owSu

bsoi

l sho

vel

Tota

l dep

thK

g

Tabl

e 3

2 M

etho

ds d

epth

s an

d wo

rk ef

ficie

ncy o

f dee

p pl

owin

g co

nduc

ted

in C

hang

ge C

ount

y H

enan

Pro

vinc

e (co

nt)


ltUNgt

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

plu

s su

bsoi

l sho

vel

Shan

dong

Pro

vin-

cial

Far

m Im

ple-

men

t Ref

orm

O

ffice

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

fro

nt p

low

repl

aced

w

ith su

bsoi

l sho

vel

186

89

275

236

Dou

ble-

whe

el p

low

plu

s su

bsoi

l sho

vel

Shan

dong

Pr

ovin

ceD

oubl

e-fu

rrow

plo

w

on a

turn

ing

rack

for

plow

ing

in fr

ont a

nd

loos

enin

g in

bac

k

284

1038

468

6

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

plu

s su

bsoi

l sho

vel

Anhu

i Pro

vinc

ial

Farm

Impl

emen

t Re

sear

ch In

stitu

te

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

fro

nt p

low

repl

aced

w

ith su

bsoi

l sho

vel

185

127

312

365

Dou

ble-

furr

ow d

oubl

e-la

yer

deep

plo

wD

ahui

大会

Tech

ni-

cal G

roup

Dou

ble-

furr

ow a

nd

doub

le-s

hove

l22

610

326

740

Data

sour

ce T

echn

ical

Gro

up o

f th

e Na

tion

al C

onfe

renc

e fo

r De

ep P

low

ing

Impl

emen

ts a

nd So

il Im

prov

emen

t ldquoS

heng

eng

nong

ju sh

iyan

jia

ndin

g zo

ngjie

深耕

农具

试验

鉴定

总结

[Sum

mar

y of

Tes

ts a

nd A

ppra

isal

s on

Deep

Plo

win

g Im

plem

ents

]rdquo N

ongy

e jix

ie 《

农业

机械

》3

(195

8)

ZHU DING AND HU90

ltUNgt

effectively loosening soil This problem indicates that some of the deep plow-ing implements of the time required such great pulling capacity as to be im-practical while others were practical only in a minority of soil conditions Oth-erwise they were limited in depth and efficiency The conference demanded that further research and development be performed with the focus of future efforts on improving the design and manufacture of subsoil shovels so as to reduce required pulling capacity and increase efficiency19

The deep plowing implement revolution hit its apex after this conference with all manner of vibrating rotating single-layer double-layer combined-man-and-beast-powered and machine-powered deep plowing implements emerging from every corner of the country For example the China Academy of Sciences (cas) Mechanical Institute conducted tests on a vibrating deep plow (referred to as Machine Development No 1) in September 1958 The device was intended for dry farming designed to plow to a depth of fifty-three centime-ters turn a swath of earth fifteen centimeters wide and loosen another thirty-eight centimeters of soil with a vibrating shovel It required very little pulling capacity it could be pulled by a thirty-five-horsepower tractor burning little gas half of what machine-pulled plows at the time required Another bene-fit of the machine was that its high-frequency vibrations killed pest insects collapsed soil capillaries and reduced losses of water through evaporation20 Although it did not perform well in field tests its innovative design was met with approbation After this a number of work units around the country began designing their own innovative deep plowing implements In late September the Tianjin Tractor Factory collaborated with the Institute to convert a four-furrow plow into a three-furrow vibrating plow The Sixth Division of the First Ministry of Machine-Building 一机部六局农机所 borrowed that idea and converted a three-furrow plow into a two-furrow vibrating plow In December the cas Mechanical Institute collaborated with the Farm Machine Institute of the First Ministry of Machine-Building to test a four-furrow vibrating plow Nevertheless all these vibrating plows indicated a number of problems in field testing The vibrating engines of some were improperly sized while others had problems in vibration frequency or amplitude Some were improperly

19 Technical Group of the National Conference for Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Im-provement ldquoShengeng nongju shiyan jianding zongjie 深耕农具试验鉴定总结 [Sum-mary of Tests and Appraisals on Deep Plowing Implements]rdquo Nongye jixie 《农业机

械》3 (1958)20 Nongye jixiehua dianqihua de jiejing 《农业机械化电气化的捷径》 [Shortcuts to Ag-

ricultural Mechanization and Electrification] ed Ministry of Agriculture Office of Farm Implement Reform 农业部农具改革办公室 (Nongye chubanshe 1958) 189


ltUNgt

curved or had subsoil shovels of inappropriate size The transmission belts of some fell off easily The list went on and on21

In March 1959 the Ministry of Agriculture and the First Ministry of Machine-Building together convened the National Conference for Selection through Ap-praisal and Lectures Regarding Deep Plowing Implements A total of 144 deep plowing implements were submitted from around the country Experts chose twenty-four out of these for assessment eleven animal-powered plows eight plow slings three rope-pulled plows and two machine-driven plows However the fields used for testing were small and the time allotted tight On top of that nonstop rain made tests difficult to manage and testing results far from ideal The implements failed to meet requirements for depth (one chi in paddy fields and 15 to two chi in dry fields) quality (at turning soil and not disturbing soil layers) speed (low required pulling capacity and high efficiency) stability (solid stable reliable and long-lasting) economy (simple manufacture low costs) convenience (ease of use and simple technology) and so on22 In sum-mary although the objectives of the deep plowing implement were straightfor-ward and requirements clear no great achievements were made This lack of achievements was attributable not only to technological handicaps but also to misguided thinking on behalf of leadership

There was a positive correlation between plowing depth and required pull-ing capacity ie the deeper a plow was to go the more pulling capacity it re-quired At the time there were no high-powered tractors in China and draft animals were generally able to plow no deeper than one chi The central prob-lem in the design of new deep plowing implements was to achieve plowing depths of between one and 15 chi while at the same time reducing pulling capacity required of draft animals and small to mid-sized tractors Inventors working on this problem took one of two paths The first was to design a dou-ble-level plow that turned topsoil with a furrow and loosened subsoil with a shovel The second was to design a rotating deep plow that cut horizontally while lifting soil vertically thus achieving the objective of loosening the soil

21 Da yuejin zhong nongjiju de chuangzao faming 《大跃进中农机具的创造发明》 [Creation and Invention of Farm Machines and Implements during the Great Leap For-ward] ed First Ministry of Machine Building Sixth Administrative Bureau of Machinery Industry 第一机械工业部第六机器工业管理局 (Jixie gongye chubanshe 1959) 40ndash47

22 ldquoQuanguo shengeng nongju pingxuan jiangxihui zongjie (zhaiyao) 全国深耕农具评

选讲习会总结 (摘要 ) [Summary of the National Conference for Selection through Appraisal and Lectures Regarding Deep Plowing Implements (Abstract)]rdquo Nongye jixie 《农业机械》 6 (1959)

ZHU DING AND HU92

ltUNgt

Most double-layer deep plows were redesigned based on existing walking plows although there were differences between old and new in design of plow furrows and subsoil shovels shape size and working efficiency Some double-layer plows required a relatively small pulling capacity and in light soil could achieve a plowing depth of over one chi pulled by a draft animal These plows were not however able to meet the demands for deep plowing of the time First they could not achieve a plowing depth of 15 chi or more Second they frequently ended up mixing immature soil with subsoil which is bad for farm-ing Third it was not possible to achieve fertilization of different layers with these plows Fourth the pulling capacity required to operate these plows in heavy clay soil made them unusable

Although the theory behind rotating deep plows was scientific and their design reasonable they encountered many problems in field testing Not only were they difficult to manufacture but they required many diverse parts and their structures were complex They were designed to rotate move forward and elevate soil all at the same time It was difficult to coordinate the various necessary movements and their parts wore out quickly The reason for this is that soil environments are highly complex Different areas vary in soil quality and structure and vary widely in soil composition and hardness Even in a sin-gle patch of land a rotating deep plow could encounter rapidly changing levels of obstacles which could overload the engine and break the machine down

There were too many demands on deep plowing implements as well as too many different categories So despite the greatest efforts on the part of techni-cians limitations on engine power for farm machines at the time made it pos-sible for only a very small number of new deep plowing implements to meet demands

v Evidentiary Support for Deep Plowing and Experimentation in High Yields

Once the nationwide deep plowing movement had been launched a number of agricultural education and scientific research organs actively began research-ing the issue They wrote reports and articles expounded on the theoretical basis of deep plowing and proved the effectiveness of deep plowing In July 1958 the cas Soil Institute 中国科学院土壤研究所 dispatched a team to Changge County to make observations Team leader Xiong Yi 熊毅 read a report titled ldquoUsing Soil Science to Study the Question of Deep Plowingrdquo 从土壤科学

来研究深翻问题 at the National Conference on Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Improvement In his report he claimed that deep plowing was a great


ltUNgt

revolution of the soil and that we would no longer be able to make judgements of soil distribution and changes from solely the perspective of the natural en-vironment It was more important Xiong said to study soil changes caused by the power of the great laboring masses Therefore he said we must use not only natural dialectics but also historical materialist dialectics to study the soilHis conclusion based in argumentation was this ldquoDeep plowing is a method that can be employed in all ordinary soil Except in a very few extreme cases it generally is only beneficial and not harmfulrdquo Deep plowing could cause ldquotheo-retical changes to the soilrdquo said Xiong who continued ldquoWe must scientifically summarize the experience of the agricultural masses seek patterns and cause the soil to develop in the direction of our demandsrdquo23 A researcher from the Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University wrote an essay titled ldquoThe Sci-entific Basis behind Changge Countyrsquos Deep Plowing Methodsrdquo 长葛县深翻

地的方法和科学根据 after having concluded investigations in Changge In the essay he divides the countyrsquos deep plowing practices into ten methods and explains the effectiveness of deep plowing on increasing yields He discusses the scientific basis behind the deep plowing methods and points out the five great advantages of deep plowing He notes that in Changge it was absolutely possible to produce 200000 jin of sweet potatoes per mu after plowing to a depth of one to 15 chi24

On September 11 1958 Renmin ribao convened a symposium of agricultural scientists and workers to discuss the meaning of the deep plowing movement Deputy Secretary of the China Institute of Agricultural Sciences 中国农业

科学院 Liu Chunrsquoan 刘春安 addressed the assembly saying that fertiliza-tion as performed in deep plowing had destroyed the ldquolawsrdquo of soil and fer-tilizer science and that this experience had been created by farmers during the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo25 In an article that appeared in the Peoplersquos Daily

23 Xiong Yi 熊毅 ldquoCong turang kexue lai yanjiu shenfan wenti 从土壤科学来研究深翻

问题 [Using Soil Science to Study the Question of Deep Plowing]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民

日报》 September 12 1958 sixth edition24 Zhang Junchang and Niu Pu 张君常钮溥 ldquoChangge xian shenfandi de fangfa

he kexue genju 长葛县深翻地的方法和科学根据 [The Methods and Scientific Basis of Changge Countyrsquos Deep Plowing]rdquo Nongye kexue tongxun 《农业科学通讯》 9 (1958)

25 Liu Chunrsquoan 刘春安 ldquoXuexi nongmin weida de chuangzao jingshen tamen de shijian dapo le nongye kexue shang hen duo chenfu de guiluuml 学习农民伟大的创造精神他们

的实践打破了农业科学上很多陈腐的规律 [Learning from the Great Innovative Spirit of Farmers Their Experience Has Broken Many Old Decayed Laws of Science]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 8 1958 seventh edition

ZHU DING AND HU94

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in October that same year Gao Shiqi 高士其 wrote that this had proven that deep plowing could transform dead soil into living soil and that multi-level fertilization could effectively turn living soil into particularly fertile soil Deep plowing wrote Gao could change the appearance and characteristics of soil and made crops grow better in the soil26 Clearly scientists and researchers at the time had been affected by the prevailing political and social atmosphere of the time Their arguments were not based on strict experimentation and this led them to slant their views Their writings attached the word ldquosciencerdquo to the deep plowing movement thus giving the foolhardy behaviors of the movement a ldquoscientificrdquo basis

In addition to making theoretical arguments for the scientific nature and necessity of deep plowing many scientific institutes dispatched researchers to the countryside to participate in deep plowing labor and run experiments to prove that yields were indeed higher The China Institute of Water Resourc-es and Hydropower Research 中国水利科学院 conducted experiments on three mu of land within the Institutersquos grounds plowing the earth to a depth of six chi (a feat performed by Institute employees using spades and shovels) In the experiment one chi of soil was considered a layer and every layer was dug up and moved to a pre-selected location Once the lowest layer of soil had been dug up every layer was replaced in its original order The experiment was con-ducted on the basis of ldquobeing in accordance with the precise demands of and rigorously masteringrdquo the ldquoEight Character Constitutionrdquo 八字宪法 One thou-sand jin of wheat was planted on each mu with dedicated personnel in charge of fertilizing irrigating and weeding Fans were used at regular intervals to promote air circulation and music was played to facilitate the happy growth of wheat seedlings Electric lights were used to increase photosynthesis and trestles were erected to support the wheat stalksThe wheat yield per mu ended up at over 1500 jin as a result of great efforts on the part of the Insti-tutersquos entire staff27 This was an extremely high yield for the time but it still fell far short of the target yield of 300000 jin The China Academy of Sciences Biology Division likewise established a deep plowing high-yield field testing

26 Gao Shiqi 高士其 ldquoBa situ biancheng huotu ndash cong shenfandi tan dao turang de gaizao 把死土变成活土mdashmdash 从深翻地谈到土壤的改造 [Transform Dead Soil into Living Soil ndash a Discussion of Deep Plowing to Soil Reformation]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日

报》 October 17 1958 eighth edition27 Zhou Sun 周孙 ldquoShuikeyuan yijiuwuba nian gaochan shiyan tian jishi 水科院一九五

八年高产试验田纪实 [Records from Field Tests Performed in 1958 by the China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research]rdquo accessed from httpbbs chinaunixnetarchivertid-1058420html


ltUNgt

committee The committee planted wheat on six mu which staff plowed to a depth of 10 chi Committee employees planted between 260 to 400 jin of seeds and used between 400000 to 600000 jin of manure fertilizer per mu During the day the team used fans to increase carbon dioxide and at night used electric lights to increase photosynthesis In the end the most produc-tive mu of their experiment yielded only 900 jin of wheat28 Their experiments proved that deep plowing combined with other technical measures did indeed increase yields but within certain limitations and that it would certainly be impossible to bring about yields of over 10000 jin per mu In fact in many places deep plowing was taken too far ldquodead soilrdquo from deep in the earth got mixed with fertile topsoil which not only didnrsquot increase yields but in some cases reduced them29

The Peoplersquos Daily published an article written by the Meng County 孟县 Committee of Henan Province on July 7 1959 The committee wrote ldquoOur experience from the first year of deep plowing indicates that there is no clear difference in results between plowing to a depth of over two chi and plowing to a depth of only one chihellip Three to five times the amount of labor required to plow to a depth of one chi are required to plow to a depth of two chi Thus as both human labor and draft animals are in short supply we have found it appropriate to plow to a depth of one chirdquo30 On September 5 1959 the Peoplersquos Daily published an article by a researcher at the China Academy of Agricul-tural Sciences which read ldquoOwing to limited supply of human labor draft animals and machine power a plowing depth of between six to eight cun is appropriate for most dry land both in the South and the North a depth of approximately six cun is appropriate for paddy fieldsrdquo31 This logic indicates

28 Luo Pinghan 罗平汉 1958ndash1962 nian zhongguo de zhishijie 《 1958 ~1962 年中国的知识

界》 [Chinarsquos Intelligentsia from 1958 to 1962] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 2008) 115

29 Qi Zhengxin 戚正欣 ldquoJiaoguan yu shenfan 绞关与深翻 [The Plow Sling and Deep Plowing]rdquo Qinzhou xinwen wang 秦州新闻网 accessed from httpwwwtznewscnArticlelvyouducj20081130921html

30 ldquoYunyong lsquoba zi xianfarsquo yingde xiaomai gaochan Henan Meng xian xiaomai da mianji fengchan fang jishu jingyan zongjie 运用ldquo八字宪法rdquo赢得小麦高产河南孟县

小麦大面积丰产方技术经验总结 [Use of the lsquoEight Character Constitutionrsquo Brings about Big Wheat Yields Summary of the Technological Experience of Meng County Henan Province in Big Wheat Yields over a Large Area]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 July 7 1959 third edition

31 China Academy of Agricultural Sciences Institute of Crop Breeding and Cultivation 中国农业科学院作物育种栽培研究所 ldquoGuanyu jinnian qiubo xiaomai jishu cuoshi de ji dian yijian 关于今年秋播小麦技术措施的几点意见 [Some Opinions

ZHU DING AND HU96

ltUNgt

that those people who held to practical experience and sober thought arrived at a logical understanding of the effects of deep plowing and made more reasonable demands

vi Commentary on the Deep Plowing Movement

Experience shows that reasonable deep plowing is useful for increasing agri-cultural yields First deep plowing improves the physical and chemical proper-ties of the soil A plow layer 10 centimeters deep may form in fields in which farm machines have long exerted pressure An over-shallow plow layer can se-verely affect the growth of crop root systems Deep plowing breaks up the plow layer thickens the living soil layer increases soil porosity reduces soil density increases soil breathability and water retention and increases soil capacity for holding water and fertilizer If one combines deep plowing with multi-layer fertilizing especially with organic fertilizers such as farmyard manure or green manure one may accelerate the maturation of lower layers of soil and improve the soilrsquos aggregate structure Second deep plowing promotes the growth of crop root systems down into deep soil layers allowing them to absorb more nutrition from the soil Third deep plowing enables one to turn insect eggs and larva and pathogenic bacteria to the surface which helps reduce the effects of pests on crops32 The experiences of Lijiazhai Village and Changge County in increasing yields through deep plowing and intensive agriculture constitute effective evidence in support of the positive effects of deep plowing

That said one must use reasonable plowing depths and appropriate plow-ing methods in order to increase yields deeper is not always better Excessive deep plowing can ruin the structure of good topsoil making said soil extreme-ly vulnerable to erosion which not only does not lead to increased yields but may also incite other side effects During the deep plowing movement some locations dug to a depth of three chimdashand in some cases three metersmdash turning ldquodead soilrdquo and sand up into the topsoil layer Such methods not only destroyed the topsoil structure but also sapped away the soilrsquos existing fertility rendering it incapable of fostering crop growth Such ldquodeep plowingrdquo was never going to bring about increased yields

Regarding Technical Measures Used in This Yearrsquos Autumn Wheat Planting]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 5 1959 seventh edition

32 Liu Jiansheng et al 刘健生等 Woguo nongju de chuangzao gailiang ji qi zonghe liyong 《我国农具的创造改良及其综合利用》 [The Creation Improvement and Comprehensive Use of Chinarsquos Farm Implements] (Nongye chubanshe 1959) 7


ltUNgt

This means of increasing crop yields invented by farmers working on their own was first promoted into a nationwide movement and then completely petered out The reasons are that the methods employed in Changge County were never seriously studied or converted into effective science for the rest of the country Changge County arrived at its deep plowing methods only after years of experimentation People there employed different implements and methodologies in different soil and for different crops along the way improv-ing a few basic plows to increase the effectiveness of their deep plowing They never plowed deeper than one chi and they never deeply plowed more than 30000 mu even over the course of several years Their increased yields were experienced over a small area and the increases were confined to hard limita-tions Changge Countyrsquos party secretary clearly overstated the results of the countyrsquos experiments in deep plowing when delivering his report to the Cen-tral Committee boasting about deep plowing objectives he had only imagined The Central Committee not knowing this called on the entire country to emu-late Changge County in the hope that such increased yields could be extended everywhere This call was made to bring about the agricultural ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo which in the end caused deep plowing to become a political move-ment The concurrent backyard steel furnace movement and large-scale irriga-tion movement had led to shortages in labor and machinery in the countryside at the time and so the high targets imposed on deep plowing were entirely infeasible Although governments in some places employed the human wave strategy or organized veritable armies of plowhands the only results garnered were the widespread waste of labor and material resources The ultimate goals of deep plowing were unattainable

The lesson that the deep plowing movement can give us today is that in promoting technical measures we absolutely cannot contradict the laws of science In Chairman Maorsquos words ldquoWe must begin from the true conditions of our own country and abroad from within and without provinces from within and without counties and from within and without onersquos own area We must draw from these conditions intrinsic facts not those which have been fabricat-ed In other words we must find the internal connections between incidents and allow them to guide us in our actionsrdquo33 In such actions we should move forward positively and steadily on the basis of scientific experimentation and large quantities of practical experience Things will only go against our wishes if we violate the rules of science and act rashly

33 Mao Zedong xuanbian di 3 juan 《毛泽东选集》第3 卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 3] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1991) 801

ZHU DING AND HU98

ltUNgt

References

Changge xian zhi 《长葛县志》 [Records of Changge County] (Shenghuomiddotdushumiddotxinzhi sanlian shudian 1992)

China Academy of Agricultural Sciences Institute of Crop Breeding and Cultivation 中国农业科学院作物育种栽培研究所 ldquoGuanyu jinnian qiubo xiaomai jishu cuoshi de ji dian yijian 关于今年秋播小麦技术措施的几点意见 [Some Opin-ions on Technical Measures Used in This Yearrsquos Autumn Wheat Planting]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 5 1959 seventh edition

CPC Changge County Committee 中共长葛县委会 ldquoNongju da gexin tudi da fan-shen 农具大革新土地大翻身 [Great Revolution in Farm Implements Great Turning of the Earth]rdquo Zhongguo nongbao 《中国农报》 3 (1958)

Da yuejin zhong nongjiju de chuangzao faming《大跃进中农机具的创造发明》

[Creation and Invention of Farm Machines and Implements during the Great Leap Forward] ed First Ministry of Machine Building Sixth Administrative Bureau of Machinery Industry 第一机械工业部第六机器工业管理局 (Jixie gongye chubanshe 1959)

Gao Shiqi 高士其 ldquoBa situ biancheng huotu ndash cong shenfandi tan dao turang de gaizao 把死土变成活土mdashmdash 从深翻地谈到土壤的改造 [Transform Dead Soil into Living Soil ndash a Discussion of Deep Plowing to Soil Reformation]rdquo Renmin ribao《人

民日报》 October 17 1958 eighth editionJianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 6 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第6 册 [Mao Ze-

dong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 6] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992)

Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 11 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 11 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 11] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1995)

Liu Chunrsquoan 刘春安 ldquoXuexi nongmin weida de chuangzao jingshen tamen de shijian dapo le nongye kexue shang hen duo chenfu de guiluuml 学习农民伟大的创造精

神他们的实践打破了农业科学上很多陈腐的规律 [Learning from the Great Innovative Spirit of Farmers Their Experience Has Broken Many Old Decayed Laws of Science]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 October 8 1958 seventh edition

Liu Jiansheng et al 刘健生等 Woguo nongju de chuangzao gailiang ji qi zonghe liyong 《我国农具的创造改良及其综合利用》[The Creation Improvement and Comprehensive Use of Chinarsquos Farm Implements] (Nongye chubanshe 1959)

Luuml Bingguang 吕炳光 ldquoTudi da fanshen zhengqu muchan babai jin 土地大翻身争

取亩产八百斤 [Great Turning of the Earth Strive for 800 Jin of Output per Mu]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 May 13 1958 fourth edition

Luo Pinghan 罗平汉 1958ndash1962 nian zhongguo de zhishijie《 1958~1962 年中国的知

识界》[Chinarsquos Intelligentsia from 1958 to 1962] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 2008)


ltUNgt

Mao Zedong xuanbian di 3 juan《毛泽东选集》第3 卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 3] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1991)

ldquoMingnian nongye dafanshen xian yao jinnian tudi dafanshen Liaoning xingqi ri fan baiwan mu yundong sibaiwan dajun jizhan yi zhou shenfandi babaiqishi duo wan mu 明年农业大翻身先要今年土地大翻身辽宁兴起日翻百万亩运动

四百万大军激战一周深翻地八百七十多万亩 [We Must Bring About a Soil Revolution This Year in Order to Realize an Agricultural Revolution Next Year a Movement to Plow a Million Mu per Day Rising in Liaoning an Army Four Million Strong can Deeply Plow Over 8700000 Mu in a Week of Fierce Fighting]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 October 19 1958 first edition

Nongju tupu di 1 juan《农具图谱》第 1 卷 [Illustrated Farm Implements Vol 1] ed the Peoplersquos Republic of China Ministry of Agriculture (Tongsu duwu chubanshe 1958)

Nongye jixiehua dianqihua de jiejing《农业机械化电气化的捷径》[Shortcuts to Agricultural Mechanization and Electrification] ed Ministry of Agriculture Office of Farm Implement Reform 农业部农具改革办公室 (Nongye chubanshe 1958)

Qi Zhengxin 戚正欣 ldquoJiaoguan yu shenfan 绞关与深翻 [The Plow Sling and Deep Plowing]rdquo Qinzhou xinwen wang 秦州新闻网 accessed from httpwwwtznews cnArticlelvyouducj20081130921html

Qu Mingzhen 曲明振 ldquoShengeng shenfan daliang zengchan quanguo jiang xianqi shenfan he gailiang turang yundong 深耕深翻大量增产全国将掀起深翻和

改良土壤运动 [Deep Plowing Greatly Increases Yields The Entire Country Will Launch a Movement for Deep Plowing and Soil Improvement]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 July 27 1958 fifth edition

ldquoQuanguo shengeng nongju pingxuan jiangxihui zongjie (zhaiyao) 全国深耕农具评

选讲习会总结(摘要) [Summary of the National Conference for Selection through Appraisal and Lectures Regarding Deep Plowing Implements (Abstract)]rdquo Nongye jixie《农业机械》 6 (1959)

ldquoRang tudi lai ge da fanshen 让土地来个大翻身 [Let there Be a Great Turning of the Earth]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 September 2 1958 fourth edition

ldquoShenfan yi chi tu duo chan wan jin liang Henan Hebei qianbaiwan laodong dajun riye tuji fandi 深翻一尺土多产万斤粮河南河北千百万劳动大军日夜突击翻

地 [Deeply Plow and Increase Grain Yields by 10000 Jin Armies Millions Strong Staging an Earth-Turning Assault Day and Night in Hebei and Henan]rdquoRenmin ribao《人民日报》 September 12 1958 sixth edition

Technical Group of the National Conference for Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Improvement ldquoShengeng nongju shiyan jianding zongjie 深耕农具试验鉴定总

结 [Summary of Tests and Appraisals on Deep Plowing Implements]rdquo Nongye jixie 《农业机械》 3 (1958)

Tong Pingya 佟屏亚 ldquoNongye lsquoda yuejinrsquo kaoliang nongye kexuejia ndash xie zai 1958 nian nongye lsquoda yuejinrsquo 50 zhou nian 农业ldquo大跃进rdquo考量农业科学家mdashmdash 写在

ZHU DING AND HU100

ltUNgt

1958 年农业ldquo大跃进rdquo50 周年[Agricultural Scientists Consider the Agricultural lsquoGreat Leap Forwardrsquo ndash Written on the 50th Anniversary of the Agricultural lsquoGreat Leap Forwardrsquo]rdquo Nongye kaogu《农业考古》 4 (2008)

Wang Ribin and Sun Qinshu 王日彬孙钦书 ldquoMao Zedong san ge dianxing jingyan pishi gei women de qishi 毛泽东三个典型经验批示给我们的启示

[Lessons from Mao Zedongrsquos Commentaries on Three Classic Cases]rdquo Lingdao ganbu wang 领导干部网 accessed from httpwww1dgbco mcnE_ReadNewsaspNewsID=81591

Xiong Yi 熊毅 ldquoCong turang kexue lai yanjiu shenfan wenti 从土壤科学来研究深

翻问题 [Using Soil Science to Study the Question of Deep Plowing]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 12 1958 sixth edition

ldquoXunsu tuiguang xianjin jingyan he shengsuo qianyin li ba shenfan tudi yundong tuixiang gaochao 迅速推广先进经验和绳索牵引犁把深翻土地运动推向高

潮 [Swiftly Promulgate Advanced Experience and Rope-Pulled Plows Push the Deep Plowing Movement to Crescendo]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 September 29 1958 third edition

ldquoYunyong lsquoba zi xianfarsquo yingde xiaomai gaochan Henan Meng xian xiaomai da mianji fengchan fang jishu jingyan zongjie 运用ldquo八字宪法rdquo赢得小麦高产河南孟

县小麦大面积丰产方技术经验总结 [Use of the lsquoEight Character Constitutionrsquo Brings about Big Wheat Yields Summary of the Technological Experience of Meng County Henan Province in Big Wheat Yields over a Large Area]rdquo Renmin ribao《人

民日报》 July 7 1959 third editionZhang Junchang and Niu Pu 张君常钮溥 ldquoChangge xian shenfandi de fangfa he

kexue genju 长葛县深翻地的方法和科学根据 [The Methods and Scientific Bas-es of Changge Countyrsquos Deep Plowing]rdquo Nongye kexue tongxun《农业科学通讯》 9 (1958)

Zhou Sun 周孙 ldquoShuikeyuan yijiuwuba nian gaochan shiyan tian jishi 水科院一九五


ldquoZhuajin nongshi jiasu qiugeng Neimenggu Jilin fandi yundong jinru gaochao 抓紧农

时加速秋耕内蒙古吉林翻地运动进入高潮 [Firmly Grasp the Farming Sea-son and Accelerate Autumn Plowing The Plowing Movement Hitting Crescendo in Inner Mongolia and Jilin]rdquoRenmin ribao《人民日报》 October 24 1958 fourth edition


ltUNgt

chapter 4

A Study of the Construction of Terraced Fields in Liulin County Shanxi Province in the Era of Collectivization

Hao Ping1

Abstract

The construction of terraced fields is an important measure in water and soil conser-vation work During the era of collectivization in Liulin County Shanxi Province the movement to construct terraces grew from nothing into a major agricultural move-ment The Hechang Agricultural Cooperative and the Hanjiayu Brigade spurred tech-nological upgrading of terrace construction on the Loess Plateau where locals were first apprehensive toward the idea but later embraced and promulgated it The major reason for that was the increased agricultural yields made possible by terrace construc-tion on sloped farm fields Increased yields were the greatest value the construction of terraces brought to the ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess plateau in the battle against erosion during the era of collectivization

Keywords

Terraced fields ndash terraces ndash collectivization ndash water and soil conservation ndash Shanxi Province ndash Liulin County

Chinarsquos Loess Plateau the worldrsquos largest deposit of loess is currently facing a series of environmental problems the most prominent of which is soil ero-sion Liulin County 柳林县2 is located in the heartland of the Loess Plateau and the Luumlliang Mountain Range 吕梁山 Its territory is full of interlacing

1 Hao Ping (郝平 ) is an associate professor in the Chinese Social History Institute of Shanxi University

2 After the founding of Peoplersquos Republic of China Liulin County was under the administration of Lishi County but was reorganized as an independent county in 1971 The areas I discuss in this essay lie within the jurisdiction of Liulin County During the era of collectivization

HAO102

ltUNgt

round-topped mountains and its topography of ridges and ravines is typical of the Loess Plateau It has also been hard hit by soil erosion It was precisely for that reason that the party and government established soil and water con-servation as a strategic task in remedying Yellow River floods and developing agriculture in impoverished areas during the era of collectivization launching large-scale programs to control and preserve water and recreate nature Liulin has been the forerunner in soil and water conservation on the Loess Plateau when it was the Liulin Commune 柳林公社 under jurisdiction of Lishi Coun-ty 离石县 and remained so after it became a county in its own right The most prominent feature of Liulinrsquos efforts in this area is terraced field construction Compared with the construction of alluvial flood control damsmdashparticularly the Jiajiayuan Dam3mdashthat took place hundreds of years earlier development of terraced fields proceeded rapidly in Liulin In only thirty years beginning shortly after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China Liulinrsquos terracing technology evolved from slope-style terraces to level terraces to broad terraces During this time the county also saw the rise of advanced typical models like the Hechang Agricultural Cooperative 贺昌农业社and the Hanjiayu Brigade 韩家峪大队 4 How were the terraces understood and spread by the common people What was the process of terrace replacement What were the effects of terraces on water and soil conservation work performed on the Loess Plateau during the era of collectivization In this essay I shall attempt to answer these questions with the aim of providing insights and valuable lessons to those working in water and soil conservation and irrigation works construction today5

Liulin County was the typical model for construction of terraced fields on the Loess Plateau The rest of the country looked to this area for guidance in sustainable irrigation projects

3 The Jiajiayuan Dam is located in Jiajiayuan Village Liulin County It was first built in the 12th year of the reign of the Jiaqing Emperor of the Qing Dynasty (1807) It is Shanxi Provincersquos oldest and largest alluvial flood control dam

4 Prior to 1958 in the Chinese countryside first came the founding of primary agricultural co-operatives followed by the founding of advanced agricultural cooperatives In this essay I re-fer to both by the single term ldquoagricultural cooperativesrdquo After the founding of rural peoplersquos communes in August 1958 rural grassroots administrative units turned into production bri-gades I refer to both collectively as ldquobrigadesrdquo

5 Academic research into Chinese society during the era of collectivization has been in the ascendant in recent years Many great achievements have been made in the research of policy changes rural life rural culture and other areas Likewise much good work has been done in the study of soil erosion and erosion prevention on the Loess Plateau Cheng Fulong (成甫隆) made an inital foray into the subject in his book Huanghe zhiben lun《黄河治

本论》 [On Treating the Root Cause of the Yellow Riverrsquos Problems] (Pingmin ribaoshe 1947)

103A Study of the Construction of Terraced Fields

ltUNgt

i The Construction and Promotion of Terraced Fields

Terraced fields are constructed primarily to aid in water and soil conservation and to increase agricultural yields They first appeared as early as the Qin and Han Dynasties primarily in the mountainous regions of Jiangnanmdasha geo-graphic area comprising lands immediately to the south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River including the southern part of the Yangtze Deltamdashwith the majority now found in Guangxi and Yunnan These areas are rich in mountains but poor in plains and so local farmers build terraced fields to suit a maximum area of their mountainous terrain to rice planting Terraced field construction began considerably later in Northern Shaanxi and Western Shanxi the practice in these regions was widely popularized only in the 1950s The Loess Plateau is typified by low Guangxi and poor soil fertility The construction of terraced fields here not only helps mitigate soil erosion on sloped fields but also helps to increase yields through increased water retention and soil improvement It has been shown that terraced fields achieve an average water retention rate of 832 percent and a soil retention rate of 839 percent in Lishi County Shanxi Yanrsquoan City 延安市 Shaanxi and Suide County 绥德县 Shaanxi all three of which are located in mountainous regions of the Loess Plateau6 Terraced fields are an extraordinarily effective means of conservation in sloped farm fields and so have developed rapidly in Western Shanxi and Northern Shaanxi Liulin alone built terraces on a total area of 114338 mu of arable landmdashtwenty percent of the countyrsquos 577880 mu of total arable landmdashover the thirty-plus

Shi Nianhairsquos (史念海 ) Huangtu gaoyuan lishi dili yanjiu 《黄土高原历史地理研究》 [A Study of the History and Geography of the Loess Plateau] (Huanghe shuili chubanshe 2001) was the culmination of all work done so far in the field There are however few works on the subject of soil and water conservation work performed during the era of collectiviza-tion Other than a few essays published in small local publications there are very few aca-demic treatises on this subject the major exception being Gao Yunrsquos (高芸 ) ldquolsquoYi liang wei gangrsquo zhengce de shishi dui shaanbei huangtu qiuling gouhe qu shuitu baochi gongzuo de yingxiangmdashyi Suide xian weili ldquo以粮为纲 rdquo 政策的实施对陕北黄土丘陵沟壑区水土

保持工作的影响mdashmdashmdash以绥德县为例 [The Effects on Soil and Water Conservation Work in the Loess Plateau Hills and Ravines of Northern Shaanxi of the Implementation of the lsquoTaking Grain as the Key Linkrsquo Policymdashusing Suide County as an Example]rdquo (masters thesis Shaanxi Normal University 2007)

6 Wu Faqi and Zhang Yubin 吴发启张玉斌 ldquoHuangtu gaoyuan shuiping titian de xush-uibaotu xiaoyi fenxi 黄土高原水平梯田的蓄水保土效益分析 [Analysis of the Effec-tiveness at Water and Soil Conservation of Level Terraces on the Loess Plateau]rdquo Zhongguo shuitu baochi kexue 《中国水土保持科学》 1 (2004)

HAO104

ltUNgt

years from the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China to 19807 Terraces are now an important component of the countyrsquos arable land

Liulinrsquos terraces were not however built overnight At first locals were op-posed to the idea of terraces but eventually their understanding changed and they came to accept them

Residents of Liulin had abundant experience in digging ditches and build-ing dams but terraced fields were a completely alien concept to them at first In August 1954 the first Peoplersquos Congress of Shanxi Province passed the ldquoRes-olutions on the Planned Performance of Water and Soil Conservation Work throughout the Provincerdquo 关于在全省范围内有计划地开展水土保持工

作的决议 They read ldquoImportant measures in properly performing water and soil conservation work include changing unreasonable land usage customs promoting the widespread construction of terraced fields on sloped arable land and changing the extensive farming method of lsquoplanting widely but reap-ing littlersquordquo8 In the ldquoShanxi Province fifteen-year Long Range Plan for Water and Soil Conservationrdquo 山西省水土保持十五年远景规划 that followed the government turned its attention to the ridge-and-ravine areas of the Loess Pla-teau where soil erosion was the most severe The Plan read ldquoWe must imple-ment a widespread program of water and soil conservation In other words we must flatten stretches of earth at fixed intervals on sloped arable land building earthen ridges at their outskirts Water should then be irrigated into the newly flattened land making it suitable for planting Every year the ridges should be rebuilt and reinforced and the earth should be plowed more deeply every year In this way terraced fields will eventually be formedrdquo9 At this time the Lishan County government assembled a total of 381 agricultural cooperative directors production brigade chiefs and technicians from 379 cooperatives around the county and dispatched them to study the construction of terraced fields at Daquan Mountain 大泉山 Yanggao County 阳高县 the provincial

7 Liulin xian shuili zhi 《柳林县水利志》 [Irrigation Records of Liulin County] ed Chen Baohua 陈保华 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 2006) 93 Liulin xian zhi 《柳林县志》 [Re-cords of Liulin County] ed Li Jiulin 李九林 (Zhongguo haichao chubanshe 1995) 114

8 ldquoGuanyu zai quan sheng fanwei you jihua di kaizhan shuitu baochi gongzuo de jueyi 关于

在全省范围有计划地开展水土保持工作的决议 [Resolution Regarding Promoting Planned Water and Soil Conservation Work throughout the Province]rdquo Shanxi ribao 《山西

日报》 August 12 1954 second edition9 Shanxi shuitu baochi zhi 《山西水土保持志》 [Records of Water and Soil Conservation in

Shanxi] (Huanghe shuili chubanshe 1998) 93


ltUNgt

model for water and soil conservation works10 Officials in Liulin still under the jurisdiction of Lishan County 离山县 made the earliest forays into terrace construction One of their pilot programs was established at the Wangjiagou water and soil conservation station 王家沟水土保持站 One of two methods was employed in tests at Wangjiagou depending on the degree of slope and general topography of an area The first was to build the terraces all in one go The second was to build terraces gradually over the course of several years Ag-ricultural cooperatives at the time generally employed the all-at-once method on land with a slope of six degrees or lower as a relatively small amount of la-bor was required On land with slopes between six and twenty-fivedegrees co-operatives would use a combination of cultivation techniques and engineering measures digging level ditches across the slope along predetermined horizon-tal lines set at fixed distance from one another Above the ditches they built ridges and then they flattened the earth behind those ridges Over the years a combination of working the earth and natural rainfall established the terraces more firmly and built the ridges higher In the end slope-style terraces with a slope between three and five degrees resulted

The construction of slope-style terraces required only a small amount of changes to a hillside which made the process relatively simple However the process was slow particularly the gradual building up and adding of ridges and this slow pace did not conform to the rapid pace at which cooperatization was sweeping the country It took two years to complete terrace construction in the Wanjiagou basin coming to total an area of less than 100 mu of terraced fields11 Construction methods were not very scientific and so the process of gradual leveling of the terraced fields ended up ruining fertile topsoil render-ing those fields incapable of increasing grain yields One person with inside knowledge had this to say ldquoIn the early 1950s owing to our lack of experience we had an insufficient understanding of topsoil issues while constructing the terraced fields The result was that the majority of soil contained in the ter-raced fields was immature soil with the cultivatable soil buried deep below

10 Lishi xian zhi 《离石县志》 [Records of Lishi County] ed Li Wenfan 李文凡 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1996) 746

11 Shanxi sheng Lishan shuitu baochi shiyan zhan ( jingliu guance ziliao zhengli) 《山西省

离山水土保持试验站 (径流观测资料整理 )》 [LishanWater and Soil Conservation Testing Station of Shanxi Province Compiled from Runoff Observation Materials] ed Shanxi Provincial Agricultural Construction Bureau Department of Farm Fields and Irrigation and the Lishan Water and Soil Conservation Testing Station 山西省农业建设厅农田

水利局离山水土保持试验站 (1959) 5

HAO106

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The immature soil was not only insufficiently loose but even worse it lacked the organic matter necessary for agricultural production The result of these construction methods was that grain output did not increase but rather de-clined Locals referred to this method of terrace construction as lsquothree years of povertyrsquordquo12 For these reasons locals did not truly accept terraced fields at this time and the method was not promulgated

Beginning in 1958 the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo was launched on the agricul-tural front Although this movement resulted in great losses to socialist con-struction to a certain extent it did spur construction of terraced fields on the Loess Plateau Lishan County began attempts at one-off construction of level terraces in order to accelerate the pace of water and soil conservation work A much larger amount of labor was required in this method than in the slope-style method but it did result in the replacement of high-degree slopes with terraces This method also eliminated erosion due to gravity and stabilized soil water content by thickening the soil and increasing the soil layerrsquos adsorption capacity Thus from this point forward terraced fields were highly effective in both water and soil conservation and in increasing grain yields

The Hechang Agricultural Cooperative of Liulin Township was the first group to attempt ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo The cooperative built an area of 230 mu at the Sanlangbao 三郎堡 site in the Tianjiagou 田家沟 basin using this method Throughout the process cooperative members worked as a team and pooled wisdom to arrive at common goals They employed a method of matur-ing immature soil in which they combined soaked soil stove ashes mule and horse manure bituminous coal corn stalks and other fertilizers in trenches for a period of time before returning the mixture to the terraced fields and plowing deeply This method enabled them to overcome the various shortcom-ings of previous terrace construction they both avoided destroying the topsoil level and increased agricultural yields at the same time In 1958 alone yields per mu in terraced fields rose to 363 jin eighty-three percent higher than in slope-style terraces13 One Soviet water and soil conservation expert lauded the terraces as ldquoa pioneering undertaking in water and soil conservationrdquo14 At this time began the great ldquoone-time level terracerdquo movement that subsequently swept across Liulin not to mention the rest of the ridge-and-ravine areas of the Loess Plateau Thereafter such areas as Jinluo Village 金罗村 Zhongyang County 中阳县 and Anye Village 安业村 Lin County 临县 in Shanxi and

12 From an interview with a cadre surnamed Dong (78 years old) from the Liulin County Water Conservation and Irrigation Department conducted on April 20 2010

13 Lishi xian zhi 20214 Liulin xian shuili zhi 519


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Suide County in Shaanxi also began promoting ldquoone-time level terracerdquo con-struction More importantly locals began to approve of the method as the soil maturation process ensured that topsoil was not damaged and increased grain yields Once this improved method had been invented terraces were built with even greater speed By the end of 1959 5799 mu of terraced fields had been built in Liulin County alone15

In the 1960s and 1970s Liulin County adopted the ldquoconcentrate topsoil in the middlerdquo method the ldquoinvert layersrdquo method and other methods on the basis of Dazhairsquos ldquotriple retention fieldsrdquo All these merged into a top-to-bottom theory of slope management which was used to guide the large-scale construction of terraces in the area Of all groups working in this field the Hanjiayu Bri-gade made the greatest strides at increasing yields with their ldquobroad terracerdquo method From this point forward terraced fields were elevated to the status of ldquohigh yield fieldsrdquo and the total area of land converted to terraced fields grew many times over up to 54638 mu in 1970 and again to 114338 mu in 198016 No longer lamented as ldquothree years of povertyrdquo terraced fields came to be known among locals as ldquoriches this yearrdquo on the strength of their stable high yields Terraces in Liulin were first lamented and then widely accepted In that era in which grains were scarce and indeed having enough to eat was one of the greatest issues of the times terraces came to be supported and welcomed by the masses The effectiveness of the terraces at water and soil conservation was thus considered less important at that time than their effectiveness at increas-ing agricultural yields

ii The Establishment of Typical Models and the Replacement of Terraced Fields

The Hechang Cooperative and Hanjiayu Brigade were the forerunners of ter-race construction of Liulin County changing the reputation of terraces from ldquothree years of povertyrdquo to ldquoriches this yearrdquo Their work also served as a model in water and soil conservation across the ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess Plateau in both Western Shanxi and Northern Shaanxi

(A) The Hechang Cooperativersquos ldquoOne-time Level TerracerdquoThe Hechang Cooperative was not the first group to build ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo Back in early 1957 the Shanxi Provincial Water and Soil

15 Ibid 9316 Ibid

HAO108

ltUNgt

Conservation Station had tried this method in the Wangjiagou basin but with limited success There was great dissent regarding how ldquoone-time level ter-racesrdquo should be tested owing to the nascent nature of the technology Many officials and members of the public were strongly opposed to the method as it required a great deal of labor to build andnecessitated sacrificing ten to fifteen percent of slope land to ridge-building and because the plowing up of im-mature soil affected yields One reason that testing in ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo was conducted by the Hechang Cooperative was that Hechang had been the home of the Hechang martyrs of the ccp Fifth Central Committee Another reason was a brave quote attributed to the leader of the Hechang Cooperativersquos seventh production team Yang Tingrsquoan 杨庭安 ldquoThere are always losses and gains to any story Itrsquos not so bad that our yields dropped this year When yoursquore hit with one year of losses replace it with gains year after yearrdquo17 For these reasons the Lishan County Party Committee chose the Hechang Cooperative to conduct the testing

The Hechang Cooperative was located in the Tianjiagou basin in the lower reaches of the Sanchuan River 三川河 It was by no means an advanced unit in water and soil preservation at the time The cooperative managed 600 mu of paddy fields and 4400 mu of mountainous terrain but over the three years of cooperatization the area suffering from soil erosion in the Cooperative ac-counted for only six percent of the total size of the area suffering from soil ero-sion in this area Once tests had begun in ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo secretary of the Lishan County Committee and secretary of the Liulin Township 柳林乡 Party Committee Wang Jian 王健 was dispatched to the Hechang Coopera-tive to oversee work Although Wang was a native of the area just like the co-operativersquos members he wasnrsquot very sure about whether terraces could actu-ally increase grain output His strategy then was ldquocrossing the river by feeling the stonesrdquo Wang ventured deeply into the countryside paying visits to many old farmers with experience in this area in order to make breakthroughs with ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo In addition he convened ldquoassemblies of geniuses and heroesrdquo to hear a broad array of suggestions With all members working togeth-er as a team the Hechang Cooperative conducted multiple tests ultimately arriving at their method of erecting level terraces without ruining the topsoil The method was described thusby one official at the time ldquoShovel the top-soil to the side and dig up the immature soil from the bottom After building

17 ldquoLishan xian chuxi nongcun shehuizhuyi jianshe xianjin danwei daibiao dianxing cailiao (1958 nian 10 yue) 离石县出席农村社会主义建设先进单位代表典型材料 (1958 年 10月 ) [Representative Typical Materials from Liulin Countyrsquos Participation in a Rural Socialist Construction Advanced Unit]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ 1-9-48-54


ltUNgt

ridges with the immature soil press the rest down to the bottom and cover with mature soil Next deeply plow and fertilize At the same time to economize labor on land sloping more than fifteen degrees make the terraces slightly nar-rower and intertill on land sloping less than fifteen degrees Then use an ox to deeply plow once or twice and then flatten In addition Chinese yams barley beans and other high-yield crops can be planted in immature soilrdquo18 Local of-ficials then mobilized all 300 members of the cooperative in the construction of ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo The guiding policy was ldquoSpecialized teams work during the busy farming season and the entire populace launches an all-out assault during the slow seasonrdquo The overall situation at the time was summed up as ldquoEvery village is taming its slopes and building terracesrdquo Over the course of one year the total area of terraced land increased drastically and agricultur-al yields increased by 83 percent from when farming was done on sloped fields This change in methodology from treating symptoms to treating the root cause of the problem laid a good foundation for later construction of basic farmland Commendations and encouragement from the State Councilrsquos Water and Soil Conservation Committee 水土保持委员会 established the Hechang Cooper-ativersquos status as a typical model in water and soil conservation What followed was a mass movement for the construction of ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo across all ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess Plateau

In the 1950s the ccp promoted development of agricultural productivity and initiated the agricultural cooperative movement in order to rapidly lift the countryside out of poverty and backwardness At the end of 1955 the ccp Central General Office published a three-volume series called The Socialist Up-surge in Chinarsquos Countryside 中国农村的社会主义高潮 which introduced the various typical models of the cooperative movement being conducted throughout the country Interim secretary of the Lishan County Committee Liu Yaorsquos 刘耀 essay ldquoIt is Entirely Feasible to Launch Large-scale Water and Soil Conservation Work on the Strength of Cooperatizationrdquo 依靠合作化开

展大规模的水土保持工作是完全可能的 and Yanggao County Commit-tee Secretary Wang Jinrsquos 王进 ldquoLook Daquan Mountain Has Changedrdquo 看大泉山变了样子 were two of a very small number of works on typical models of water and soil conservation in mountainous regions accepted for this rea-son they became prototypes for mountain management and water conserva-tion Another model for water and soil conservation at the time was the highly

18 ldquoLishan xian chuxi nongcun shehuizhuyi jianshe xianjin danwei daibiao dianxing cailiao (1958 nian 10 yue) 离石县出席农村社会主义建设先进单位代表典型材料 (1958年 10月 ) [Representative Typical Materials from Liulin Countyrsquos Participation in a Rural Socialist Construction Advanced Unit]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ 1-9-48-54

HAO110

ltUNgt

celebrated Daquan Mountain Lishan County was formally made a national model in water and soil conservation for its planning but the ldquofairytalerdquo story of Gao Jincai 高进才 and Zhang Fenglinrsquos 张凤林 Daquan Mountain was altogether different The success of ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo ended the Loess Plateaursquos reliance on traditional methods of mountain management and wa-ter conservation It was a one-off exploration and revolution in water and soil conservation aided by collectivization It also overcame the myriad apprehen-sions and misgivings people had toward terraced fields at the time At the time the basic farmland system was established the status of ldquohigh-yield farmlandrdquo accorded to terraces made them an important practical measure for water and soil conservation in the ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess Plateau

Wang Jian the actual executor of national policy during the era of collec-tivization truly made deep incursions with laborers He excavated the diverse scattered experiences and wisdom of the masses exceeding what was pos-sible with labor alone and bringing about a sublimation of the wisdom of the masses

(B) The Hanjiayu Brigadersquos ldquoBroad TerracesrdquoldquoBroad terracesrdquo were another form of level terraces The ldquobroadrdquo in their name refers to the width of the area of arable land within individual terraces The standards for this width varied from region to region and from one period of time to another In the 1970s six meters was the dividing line with terraces be-tween three to five meters wide referred to as ldquonarrow terracesrdquo and anything over six meters referred to as ldquobroad terracesrdquo One difference between these and ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo was the equipment necessary to build them All level terraces built in the 1950s and 1960s were ldquonarrow terracesrdquo because the most common equipment for terrace-building at the time was limited to spades shovels hoes and bamboo baskets As a result the work efficiency of terrace construction was low Further compounded by the nascent nature of the technology terrace construction was generally limited to a width of be-tween three and five meters The spread of mechanization was a turning point in the construction of ldquobroad terracesrdquo which are intrinsically more effective at water and soil conservation The Hanjiayu Brigade was the first group in all of Liulin County to attempt trials with broad terraces Their success at moving away from narrow terraces led to an updating of terrace construction technology

The Hanjiayu Brigade was one of the most successful models for water and soil conservation during the ldquolearn from Dazhai in agriculturerdquo movement The Brigade administered a total of 1268 mu of farm land the vast majority of which was located on slopes in the region of Liuliangjiugou which means ldquosix


ltUNgt

ridges and nine ravinesrdquo This region had long been mocked as ldquonine apologies every ten yearsrdquo owing to severe erosion and poor land management In 1970 the Brigade launched a mass water and soil conservation movement based on Dazhairsquos experience with ldquosponge fieldsrdquo ie fields of soil with loose soft tex-ture Specialized conservation teams were at the core of the movement with the participation of all other laborers ensured via labor competitions quota management and other means The focus of their work was the construction of terraced fields Over the course of three years the Brigade built a total area of 812 mu of terraces which together with their pre-existing 300 mu of terraces meant that terraces comprised ninety-two percent of the Brigadersquos land That was quite an impressive accomplishment Terraces improved soil conditions and the Brigade experienced bumper crop grain harvests for several years running Their total grain yield in 1970 was 200000 jin In 1972 the figure was 300000 meaning a per capita grain yield of 400 jin19 The most striking differ-ence between Hanjiayu and other model areas in water and soil conservation was that all of the over 800 mu of terraces built by the Brigade were ldquobroad terracesrdquo over six meters wide Before this time terrace construction had been carried out using an array of basic tools wooden rafters wooden tamps and hoes The Hanjiayu Brigade had at its disposal certain amounts of push carts flatbed carts walking tractors and other more advanced implements These possessions represented a technological upgrade in the construction of ter-races Seeing that narrow terraces made tractor plowing and irrigation diffi-cult the Hanjiayu Brigade boldly broke through the previous width limitations of three to five meters making tractor plowing and irrigation possible It was for this reason that at the Province-wide Shanxi Region ldquoLearn from Dazhairsquos Experiencerdquo Exchange Conference convened by Liulin County in 1972 the Hanjiayu Brigade was confirmed as an advanced model in building terraces on sloped fields and in ldquogoing from rags to richesrdquo More important were the advantages of ldquobroad terracesrdquo in bringing about increased grain yields and the guiding effect of this model The Hanjiayu Brigade played an important role in pushing the change from ldquonarrow terracesrdquo to ldquobroad terracesrdquo on the Loess Plateau in the 1970s This change in turn played an innovative and leading role in the widening and general upgrading of level terraces in the region

19 ldquoShanxi sheng xishan diqu nongye xue dazhai jingyan jiaoliuhuiyi cailiao (1972 nian 10 yue) 山西省西山地区农业学大寨经验交流会议材料 (1972年 10月 ) [Materials from the Exchange Conference for Learning from Dazhairsquos Agricultural Experience in the Western Mountain Regions of Shanxi Province]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ1-4-12-14

HAO112

ltUNgt

iii Conclusions

China has been a major agricultural country since antiquity Between the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China and the end of the 1970s grain was constantly a major problem in the development of Chinarsquos socialist economy Mao Zedong addressed the conference of the secretaries of provincial and municipal party committees convened in 1957 saying the following ldquoYou must be aware that not paying special attention to grain is very dangerous If you donrsquot pay attention to grain sooner or later there will be great upheavals under the heavensrdquo20 The greatest threat to grain in Liulin County inhabiting the ridge-and-ravine topography of the Loess Plateau was soil erosion That is why from the very outset of the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China officials here launched a long-lasting movement of water and soil conservation One of the most important measures of that movement was the construction of terraced fields Over time local attitudes toward terraces changed from op-position to acceptance A major reason for that change was increased grain yields brought about by terraced fields Officials established both the ldquoone-time level terracerdquo and ldquobroad terracerdquo as official models specifically because of increased grain yields The mobilization of grassroots labor during the era of collectivization made the wide scale construction of terraces possible A virtuous cycle emerged between the struggle to control soil erosion and the realization of higher grain yields in terraced fields which had been officially deemed ldquohigh-yield farmlandrdquo This cycle made them an important practical measure in water and soil conservation in the ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess Plateau At the same time an important characteristic of the era of col-lectivization was the excavation concentration refinement and sublimation of the experience of the people especially as manifested during the upgrading of terracing technology

Thirty years of unflagging efforts to control erosion spurred vigorous de-velopment to Liulinrsquos terraced fields and brought about mature theories and technological achievements during the era of collectivization One must also remember however that there are also lessons to be learned from the ter-race building of this period For example some poorly designed terraces went barren after only a few years of use meaning that a great deal of labor and material resources had been squandered for nothing In another example pressure to increase grain output and the success of the ldquoone-time level ter-racerdquo prompted the people to pursue higher yields of grain per mu but in the

20 Mao Zedong wenji di 7 juan 《毛泽东文集》第7 卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 7] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1999) 199


ltUNgt

end many terraces were built on land too narrow or too steep to be suitable for terrace construction leading to increased soil erosion in those areas21

In summary the major reasons behind the deficiencies of water and soil conservation work of this era lay in restrictions of leftist wrong though and in technological limitations In the pursuit of speed and quantity many areas overlooked efficiency and quality in their conservation work More important-ly water and soil management wasmdashjust like the construction and explora-tions of the Peoplersquos Republic of China at the timemdashin an exploratory period There was little experience to draw from during this time of performing prac-tical work without having first completed research Those factors in addition to scarcity of resources and capital and low levels of technology caused some endeavors to end unsuccessfully Historical researchers should however view the past with a dialectical attitude One could even say that it was the unbro-ken chain of attempts and failures of those explorers on the front line that propelled the great advances made in terrace construction in Liulin County Those successes and failures have now become valuable treasures for further water and soil conservation work on the Loess Plateau

The appeals of the masses and the creation of official models forged the glowing glamor of terraces in the era of collectivization After the start of Reform and Opening there was a new surge in rural irrigation construction as the countryrsquos overall national prowess steadily increased Recent achieve-ments have been made in water and soil conservation on the Loess Plateau on the strength of abundant capital and advanced technology that overshadow any achievements made in times gone by The dense network of terraces are a major component in the engineering system currently used to administer the regionrsquos mountainous regions Whereas in the past increased grain yields were the major driver of water and soil conservation at present the foremost objective in this field is environmental improvement Improved agricultural yields are now a secondary concern such a status conforms to our current social environment of increased attention to environmental issues One can-not however overlook the fact that explorations made in terraced field con-struction during the era of collectivization not only laid a solid theoretical and practical foundation for the achievements of today but the experiences and lessons gained from that time still exert a strong impact on the water and soil conservation work being performed today Now as farming irrigation projects have become the focus of the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo the abundant resources and

21 From an interview with a cadre surnamed Lei (55 years old) from the Liulin County Water Conservation and Irrigation Department conducted on April 21 2010

HAO114

ltUNgt

experiences accumulated during the era of collectivization are still extremely valuable to our socialist construction today

References

ldquoGuanyu zai quan sheng fanwei you jihua di kaizhan shuitu baochi gongzuo de jueyi 关于在全省范围有计划地开展水土保持工作的决议 [Resolution on Promot-ing Planned Water and Soil Conservation Work throughout the Province]rdquo Shanxi ribao 《山西日报》 August 12 1954 second edition

ldquoLishan xian chuxi nongcun shehuizhuyi jianshe xianjin danwei daibiao dianxing cailiao (1958 nian 10 yue) 离石县出席农村社会主义建设先进单位代表典型材

料(1958年 10月) [Representative Typical Materials from Liulin Countyrsquos Participa-tion in a Rural Socialist Construction Advanced Unit]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ 1-9-48-54

Lishi xian zhi《离石县志》 [Records of Lishi County] ed Li Wenfan 李文凡 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1996)

Liulin xian shuili zhi 《柳林县水利志》 [Irrigation Records of Liulin County] ed Chen Baohua 陈保华 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 2006) 93

Liulin xian zhi 《柳林县志》 [Records of Liulin County] ed Li Jiulin 李九林 (Zhong-guo haichao chubanshe 1995)

Mao Zedong wenji di 7 juan 《毛泽东文集》第7 卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 7] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1999)

ldquoShanxi sheng xishan diqu nongye xue dazhai jingyan jiaoliuhuiyi cailiao (1972 nian 10 yue) 山西省西山地区农业学大寨经验交流会议材料(1972 年 10 月) [Materials from the Exchange Conference For Learning from Dazhairsquos Agricultural Experience in the Western Mountain Regions of Shanxi Province]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ1-4-12-14

Shanxi shuitu baochi zhi 《山西水土保持志》 [Records of Water and Soil Conserva-tion in Shanxi] (Huanghe shuili chubanshe 1998)

Wu Faqi and Zhang Yubin 吴发启张玉斌 ldquoHuangtu gaoyuan shuiping titian de xushuibaotu xiaoyi fenxi 黄土高原水平梯田的蓄水保土效益分析 [Analysis of the Effectiveness at Water and Soil Conservation of Level Terraces on the Loess Pla-teau]rdquo Zhongguo shuitu baochi kexue 《中国水土保持科学》 1 (2004)


ltUNgt

chapter 5

Historical Observations Regarding the Large-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens in Hebei Province

Li Chunfeng1

Abstract

Between the first half of 1958 and June 1961 rural public canteens in Hebei Province first exploded in number then became difficult to sustain then were forcibly rein-stated and finally were completely abolished The fate of rural canteens in Hebei was closely related to the rise and fall of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and the peoplersquos com-mune movement Rural public canteens in Hebei grew prodigiously as the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and peoplersquos commune movement were in the ascendant but the rural can-teen movement ended in failure just as the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo came to its close

Keywords

Hebei Province ndash rural public canteens ndash the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo movement ndash the peoplersquos commune movement

Between the first half of 1958 and June 1961 rural public canteens in Hebei Province first exploded in number then became difficult to sustain then were forcibly reinstated and finally were completely abolished The fate of rural canteens in Hebei was closely related to the rise and fall of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and the peoplersquos commune movement Rural public canteens in He-bei grew prodigiously as the Great Leap Forward and peoplersquos commune move-ment were in the ascendant but the rural canteen movement ended in failure just as the Great Leap Forward came to its close In this essay I shall attempt to present a thorough review and some observations of the historical processes by which rural public canteens were widely established in Hebei Province dur-ing the Great Leap Forward era

1 Li Chunfeng (李春峰 ) is a master of laws in the Hebei Provincial Academy of Social Sciences History Center

LI116

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i Headlong Rush to Action

The genesis of the rural public canteen movement in Hebei Province lay in the rural cooperative movement During this time farmers voluntarily and spon-taneously established simple or mobile canteens on a temporary or seasonal basis amid the fields to increase the work efficiency of farming As the busy seasons wound down these simple canteens were temporarily closed These temporary canteens were similar in style and substance to the public canteens that followed One might say they were the embryonic form of the public can-teens they laid the foundation for the widespread establishment of public canteens during the Great Leap Forward

On September 24 1957 the ccp Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued the ldquoResolutions Regarding the Large-scale Launch of the Farm-land Irrigation and Manure Collection Movement in Winter of this Year and Spring of Next Yearrdquo 关于今冬明春大规模地开展兴修农田水利和积肥

运动的决定 which called for governments around the country to launch a ldquoleapingrdquo upsurge in output centered on construction of irrigation works in rural areas In order to thoroughly implement the spirit of the Central Com-mittee directives and comprehensively promote the construction of rural irrigation works the Hebei Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Peoplersquos Committee between October 14 and 20 of that year jointly convened a congress of irrigation and manure collection activists at which it was demanded that the entire rural population of the province initiate an upsurge in the move-ment for irrigation works construction and manure collection and promote the Great Leap Forward in agricultural production The Xushui County 徐水县 government implemented a large-scale collective irrigation works labor strat-egy of ldquomilitarized organization battle-style action and collectivized livingrdquo which brought about unified control of labor over a wide area In response all manner of busy season canteens and ldquoon-work-premise canteensrdquo were es-tablished to increase labor productivity and to integrate modes of living and modes of production By July 1958 every commune and production brigade of Xushui County had established public canteens which made Xushui the first county in Hebei to bring about county-wide ldquocanteen-izationrdquo It was reported that ldquoall the 247 agricultural cooperatives of Xushui County have established a total of 1771 rural canteens serving a total of 275000 people more than 80 percent of the total population of the countyrdquo2

2 ldquoLaoli da jiefang shengchan da yuejin Xushui xian sheshe ban qi gonggong shitang 劳力大

解放生产大跃进徐水县社社办起公共食堂 [Great Liberation of Labor Great Leap

117Historical Observations

ltUNgt

In the first half of 1958 the Great Leap Forward was launched in every corner of the country On August 17 officials at a meeting of the ccp Central Politburo in Beidaihe 北戴河 attended by non-members passed the ldquoccp Central Resolutions Regarding Issues of Establishing Peoplersquos Communes in Rural Areasrdquo 中共中央关于在农村建立人民公社问题的决议 The Resolutions mandated that communes implement a distribution system combining a supply system (ie rationing system) and a wage system and that communes erect public canteens From August 13 to 15 the Hebei Provincial Committee convened on-the-spot conferences on canteens in Anci and Wuqing to promulgate canteen experience On August 29 the Hebei Provin-cial Committee issued the ldquoDirectives Regarding Construction of Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于建立人民公社的指示 which demanded that the govern-ments of all provincial and city-level regions establish peoplersquos communes and establish public canteens Xushui County was ahead of nationwide trends at the time Under the guidance of ccp Central Xushui officials began to estab-lish ldquocommunist pilotsrdquo and implemented the ldquosupply system of the entire peoplerdquo which was also known as the ldquofifteen includedsrdquo3 With the central government vigorously promoting ldquofactors of communismrdquo this ldquopioneering workrdquo of Xushui County caught the attention of the Central Committee who lent the region their enthusiastic support This official support led to the rapid spread of public canteens throughout the province

On September 1 Hong qi Magazine published an editorial titled ldquoWelcom-ing the Climax of Peoplersquos Commune Transformationrdquo 迎接人民公社化高潮 as well as the general regulations of the Cuoyashan Satellite Commune 嵖岈

山卫星公社 of Suiping County 遂平县 Henan Province The regulations stipulated a distribution system that combined a wage system and a food sup-ply system State regulations of the time established the standard for food supply as the establishment of public canteens within production units On September 4 the Peoplersquos Daily 人民日报 published an editorial lavishing praise on the Cuoyashan Satellite Communersquos food supply system and its pub-lic canteens The Cuoyashan Satellite Communersquos provisions regarding public canteens stipulated that the communersquos public canteens be a model for the

Forward in Production All Communes of Xushui County Establishing Public Canteens on a Wide Scale]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 July 12 1958

3 On September 23 1958 Xushui County First Party Secretary Zhang Guozhong further ex-plained the concept of ldquofifteen includedsrdquo to a meeting convened by the county committee The full list of ldquoincludedsrdquo was food clothing housing shoes socks towels soap lamp oil matches heating subsidies showers haircuts watching movies healthcare subsidies and burial

LI118

ltUNgt

promulgation of such canteens throughout the country Once word got out officials in every corner of the country began emulating the communersquos food supply system The most common method of establishing food supply systems at the time was as follows a portion of food rations pre-established for dis-tribution to individual commune members was retained per state regulations and appropriated to public canteens where commune members could eat for free If one holds that the 1958 Beidaihe conference was the precursor to the public canteen movement then one must agree that the publication of the Cuoyashan Satellite Communersquos general regulations lit the fuse that spread the movement to every peoplersquos commune in the country The regulations also provided the model for the rapid rise of public canteens in neighboring Hebei On October 25 the Peoplersquos Daily published an editorial titled ldquoProper Opera-tion and Management of Public Canteensrdquo 办好公共食堂 which read ldquoThe collective welfare enterprise of properly establishing communes particularly the establishment of public canteens has become an extremely important component of the work involved in the peoplersquos commune movement It is the crux behind solidifying peoplersquos communesrdquo4 As the peoplersquos commune move-ment of the Great Leap Forward and the ldquoGreat Forging of Steel and Iron of the Entire Populacerdquo [aka ldquobackyard furnacerdquo] movement swept the country rural public canteens sprouted in every corner of Hebei as vigorously as bamboo shoots after a spring rain ldquoBy November 1958 over 230000 public canteens were established in all rural areas of the province with ninety-four percent of commune members participatingrdquo5

ii Difficulties in Sustaining

The Great Leap Forward movement was plagued with problems including the ldquovogue of communismrdquo (a trend by which egalitarianism was held supreme and labor and material resources were transferred arbitrarily regardless of which commune they belonged to) the tendency of officials to exaggerate yield figures special treatment of cadres the trend of excessively forceful or-ders and other ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes These severely impacted the national econo-my and plunked the economy of Hebei into a mire of difficulties

4 ldquoBan hao gonggong shitang 办好公共食堂 [Proper Operation and Management of Public Canteens]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 25 1958

5 Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 《河北省志 middot政府志》 [Records of Hebei ProvincemiddotGovernment Records] (Renmin chubanshe 2000) 522


ltUNgt

At the end of 1958 there were severe food shortages in Hebei where it became difficult to sustain the multitudes of public canteens that had been recently set up The first reason was that the policy of providing food free of charge in public canteens led to enormous wastes Two official policies of public canteens in Hebei instituted from the outset were ldquoeat for freerdquo and ldquoall you can eatrdquo One estimate based on incomplete statistics was that ldquoover 3 bil-lion kilograms of food were thrown away or left to rot across the provincerdquo6 A second reason was that the ldquoGreat Forging of Steel and Ironrdquo large-scale con-struction of irrigation works and other ldquolarge-scalerdquo rural collective initiatives siphoned off an enormous quantity of fit young laborers This loss of laborers led to a severely insufficient labor pool dedicated to agriculture and in many cases there was nobody available to harvest fields full of ripe grain which in turn led to a condition known as ldquopoor yields despite healthy cropsrdquo One farmer in Qingyuan County Baoding District said this of the situation ldquoFields of ripe beans rotting on the ground and to pick the cotton therersquos no one aroundrdquo7 The third reason was ldquoexcessive grain requisitioningrdquo caused by over- ambitious estimates of grain yields The Hebei Provincial Committee convened a province-wide financial and economic work conference at the end of August 1958 at which provincial officials apportioned the work of ldquogreat purchasing and great sellingrdquo of agricultural products and by-products At the conference grain output for the entire province was estimated at the enormous figure of 225 billion jin but the actual yield from 1958 was only 837 billion jin Of that total 2641 billion jin of grain was requisitioned 3155 percent of total grain output In February 1959 the Hebei provincial government convened a con-ference for the purchase and sale of agricultural products At this conference the province-wide grain yield was estimated at 30 billion kilograms officials demanded requisitioning of 435 billion jin to be realized by force if neces-sary The requisitioning figure was reduced to 335 billion kilograms in October The true grain yield in 1959 was 739 billion kilograms a drop of 980 million kilograms from 1958rsquos total but a total of 3323 billion kilogramsmdash4496 per-cent of the totalmdashwas requisitioned by the government After requisitioning rural citizens were left with 1235 kilograms of grain per capita a reduction of ten kilograms from the previous year Inflated estimates and increased requi-sitioning intensified the burden on rural citizens and severely dampened their

6 Hebei sheng zhimiddotliangshi zhi 《河北省志 middot粮食志》 [Records of Hebei ProvincemiddotGrain Records] (Zhongguo chengshi chubanshe 1994) 3

7 Ibid 45

LI120

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incentive It was reported that by 1958 ldquoover forty counties across the province were in famine with over 40000 people having fled from hungerrdquo8

By the end of 1958 the Hebei government ordered that grains and pota-toes be allotted together in public canteens and demanded that all local gov-ernments enforce planned eating and reasonable distribution of grain On December 30 Hebei ribao 河北日报 published an article reading ldquoPeoplersquos communes must enforce planned consumption of grains with the prerequi-site that commune members eat well and eat enough All food that is retained within peoplersquos communes after state requisitioning tasks are fulfilled must be reasonably distributedrdquo9 In May of the following year there were 255 se-vere incidents of canteens running out of food in fifty-five natural villages of the province10 These incidents indicate that Hebei did indeed face a dire food shortage many public canteens were forced to stop operating once food stocks had been exhausted

The ccp Central Committee convened a series of meetings from late 1958 to early 1958 to mitigate the negative influence of ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes on economic development and rectify peoplersquos communes On January 14 1959 the Hebei provincial government convened an assembly of delegates from advanced work units in rural socialist construction At the assembly provincial officials demanded that delegates thoroughly implement the ldquoResolutions Regard-ing Several Issues of Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于人民公社若干问题的决议 passed by the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Central Committee and the ldquoResolutions Regarding Rectifying and Solidifying Rural Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于整顿巩固农村人民公社的决议 passed at the second meeting of the Hebei Provincial Party Congress Officials further demanded that delegates grasp the opportunities of winter that year and spring the following year and over the course of about four months mobilize the entire party and entire pop-ulace to perform one-time deep rectification and solidification work within all peoplersquos communes11 With public canteens facing severe food shortages the Hebei Provincial Committee began taking proactive measures to mitigate the pressure that the food situation was exerting On April 21 the Hebei Provincial

8 Ibid9 ldquoGonggong shitang yong liang hai yao bu yao jihua 公共食堂用粮还要不要计划

[Should We Make Further Plans for Grain Demand in Public Canteens]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 December 30 1958

10 Liang Shuzhen 梁淑珍 ldquoDa ban nongcun gonggong shitang de lishi jiaoxun 大办农村

公共食堂的历史教训 [Historical Lessons from the Wide-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens]rdquo Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu 《中共党史研究》 3 (2000)

11 ldquoXie Xuegong tongzhi de kaimuci 解学恭同志的开幕词 [The Opening Address of Comrade Xie Xuegong]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 January 15 1959


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Committee held a telephone conference on resolution of food shortages Officials demanded that grain sale figures be reduced that a system of fixed per capita rations be instituted in rural canteens that emphasis be placed on food allocations and that more grain be purchased12 On April 23 the Hebei Provincial Committee transmitted to subordinate government bodies the ccp Central Committeersquos directives on feasibly reducing grain sales figures which demanded a reduction of urban grain sales by about one tenth The Central Committee had not however fully understood the level of danger posed by maladies plaguing rural public canteens this is reflected by the continued em-phasis on properly establishing public canteens contained in the ldquoResolutions Regarding Several Issues of Peoplersquos Communesrdquo In addition Mao Zedong had during the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Congress written the follow-ing memo regarding the publication of the Biography of Zhang Lu 张鲁传 ldquoIt is most interesting that those who eat in roadside eateries did not need to pay This was a harbinger of the public canteens in our peoplersquos communesrdquo13

As the various ills of public canteens gradually came to light the ccp Central Committee and Mao Zedong also gradually became aware of the severity of the issue In April 1959 some experts and academics from the Institute of Econom-ics of the China Academy of Sciences 中国科学院经济研究所 conducted an investigation into the problems caused by the large-scale establishment of public canteens in rural Changli County 昌黎县 Hebei Province Their inves-tigations yielded two reports ldquoDo Rural Canteens have any Advantages at Allrdquo 农村食堂究竟有无优越性 and ldquoRecent Working Conditions and Problems in Communes of Changli County Hebei Provincerdquo 河北省昌黎县最近公

社的工作情况和问题 In these reports researchers point out seven abuses that were taking place in rural public canteens in Changli County as well as across the country Mao approved the latter report and on May 2 wrote the following memo ldquoThe situation in Changli County Hebei Province and the opinions they raise are universal in nature Party committees in every location and at every tier should lay emphasis on the resolution of these problems the faster the betterrdquo14 That same month an enlarged meeting of the ccp Central Politburo in Shanghai issued a meeting summary titled ldquoRegarding Eighteen

12 Hebei sheng zhimiddotliangshi zhi 36213 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 7 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第7 册 [Mao

Zedong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 7] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992) 627

14 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 8 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第8 册 [Mao Zedong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 8] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1993) 241

LI122

ltUNgt

Issues of Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于人民公社的十八个问题 In it officials noted the following ldquo Communes may institute a meal ticket system in their canteens on the basis of per capita food rationing Once per month commune members who do not use all their tickets may exchange them for grain or cash to be considered their private propertyrdquo15 On May 26 the ccp Central Commit-tee issued the ldquoDirectives Regarding the Distribution of Summer Harvests in Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于人民公社夏收分配的指示 which stipulated the following

We must earnestly reform public canteens through the distribution of the summer harvest Public canteens must be founded properly and positively and participation therein is to be voluntary We must ensure that participa-tion in public canteens by commune members be truly voluntary but at the same time we cannot adopt a laissez-faire attitude and allow the canteens to disappear like the windhellip We may establish canteens in which all commune members participate or we may also establish canteens in which only a por-tion of commune members participate Canteens may be run all year long or they may be run only during busy farm work seasons They may also be flexibly operated with more running in busy seasons and fewer in slack seasons Those canteens which are too big may be appropriately scaled down Food supplies should be distributed directly to households and commune members on the basis of per capita rationing The rations of those people who eat in canteens should be distributed to canteens with less going to individuals The entirety of rations should be distributed to those people who do not eat in canteens for their own safekeeping and consumption16

In order to practically implement the spirit of the ccp Central Committeersquos ldquoDirectives Regarding the Distribution of Summer Harvests in Peoplersquos Com-munesrdquo on May 30 the Hebei Provincial Committee and Provincial Peoplersquos Committee jointly issued the ldquoDirectives Regarding the Solid Performance of Summertime Rural Work including Harvest Retention Government Pur-chases Utilization and Plantingrdquo 关于切实做好夏季农村工作实现收

好留好征购好用好种好的指示 The Directives made the follow-ing demands ldquoCanteen work must be improved and integrated with summer harvest distributionhellip They should be proactively rectified in accordance with the principles of proactivity voluntary participation by the masses diversity of methodology and being advantageous to production Various manners of

15 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 12 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第

12 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 12] ( Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 173

16 Luo Pinghan 罗平汉 Nongcun renmin gongshe shi 《农村人民公社史》 [The History of Rural Peoplersquos Collectives] (Fujian renmin chubanshe 2003) 141


ltUNgt

canteens should be established based on different seasons different condi-tions and different demands of the masses Canteens should continue to be run using methods of per capita rationing meal ticket systems and limited quantities of food being allotted to individualsrdquo17 On June 20 the Hebei Pro-vincial Peoplersquos Committee issued a statement demanding the reinstatement of the system of retaining private plots of land by individual households and the allowance of commune members to feed their own livestock and fowl and to operate private family side-businesses All income from these enterprises was to belong to commune members and no grain requisitioning was to be imposed on these incomes As to the issues of public canteens the statement stipulated the following ldquoFood rations are to be distributed to individual households on the basis of per capita rationing standards Those commune members who voluntarily choose to eat in canteens should have a portion of their rations distributed to canteensrdquo18 This relaxation of rural policy enabled rural citizens to engage in a certain extent of individual production and played an important role in the restoration and development of agricultural produc-tion Once rural citizens had been allowed to engage in individual production many local governments abolished their supply systems and dissolved a por-tion of public canteens This abolishment did not however fundamentally treat the chronic illness plaguing public canteens a fact which was to come to light after the forcible reinstatement of the public canteen policy

The reform of public canteens from early policies of ldquoeat for freerdquo and ldquofill up your bellyrdquo into a system of distributing rations directly to households served to mitigate the anarchy that had beset public canteens This reform was the result of adjustments made to the public canteen system caused by food short-ages These adjustments however did not change the overarching central push for the large-scale establishment of public canteens which continued to be considered part of the countryrsquos ldquobudding communismrdquo

iii Forcible Reinstatement

The Lushan Conference intended to correct ldquoleftistrdquo tendencies was con-vened in July and August of 1959 At the conference Peng Dehuai 彭德怀

17 ldquoQieshi zuo hao xiaji nongcun gongzuo zhong zhonggong Hebei shengwei sheng renmin weiyuanhui fachu zhishi 切实做好夏季农村工作中共河北省委省人民委员会

发出指示 [Solidly Carry Out the Instructions Issued by the Hebei cpc Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Peoplersquos Committee in Summertime Rural Work]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 June 12 1959

18 Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 254

LI124

ltUNgt

Zhang Wentian 张闻天 and other leaders raised criticisms of the Great Leap Forward and the peoplersquos commune movement including criticisms of public canteens Peng denounced the supply system and public canteens claiming that ldquoallowing the people to eat for free too soonrdquo and ldquoencouraging people to fill their belliesrdquo were ldquoboth lsquoleftistrsquo tendenciesrdquo19 Zhang proclaimed that ldquoso-cialism does not necessarily require such methods as the supply system and public canteensrdquo20 The conference denounced the views of Peng Zhang and others as ldquotrends of pessimistic thoughtrdquo Peng and others were condemned as rightist opportunists and members of anti-party cliques Maorsquos view was that disbanding public canteens was ldquoan extremely bad thought trend that will cor-rode the party and corrode the people It is in opposition to the will of the proletariat and mass of poor farmers and it is in opposition to Marxism and Leninismrdquo21 The atmosphere of the Lushan Conference quickly deteriorated into an ldquoanti-rightistrdquo movement

The attitude of the Hebei Government toward public canteens merged with the prevailing trend of attacking rightists and the policy for proactively estab-lishing public canteens was restored On September 12 the Hebei Provincial Committee issued the ldquoDirectives Regarding Proactively Establishing Rural Public Canteensrdquo 关于积极办好农村公共食堂的指示 which called for putting a stop to the growth of rightist thought and the negative emotions of letting things fall by the wayside They also called for the rapid restoration of public canteens22 From August 24 to September 16 an enlarged meeting of the eighth plenum of the First Hebei Provincial Committee was convened in Tianjin This meeting passed the ldquoResolutionon Opposing Right-leaning Ten-dencies Boosting Incentives and Launching a Movement to Increase Output and Promote Conservationrdquo 关于反右倾鼓干劲深入开展增产节约

运动的决议 The Resolution further criticized rightist thought The meet-ing made the following demands of all local governments in the province ldquo Actively engage in such collective welfare enterprises as establishing can-teens kindergartens childcare centers homes for the elderly and so on As for public canteens leading organizations and leading cadres at all levels should feasibly implement the centerrsquos guiding policy of lsquoproactive establishment and voluntary participationrsquo and enthusiastically support them lead them

19 Peng Dehuai zhuan 《彭德怀传》 [Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe 1993) 600

20 Zhang Wentian xuanji 《张闻天选集》 [Selected Works of Zhang Wentian] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1985) 497

21 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 8 ce 41022 Liang Shuzhen


ltUNgt

and cause them to grow better day by dayrdquo23 On September 25 and 26 the Hebei provincial government convened an enlarged meeting of the Provincial Peoplersquos Committee at which officials transmitted the resolutions issued by the eighth plenum of the Eighth ccp Central Committee and the spirit of the resolutions issued by the eighth plenum of the First Provincial Committee On October 15 the ccp Central Committee approved and issued the Ministry of Agriculture party organizationrsquos ldquoReport on the State of Rural Areas since the Lushan Conferencerdquo 关于庐山会议以来农村形势的报告 which claimed that ldquoeliminating a portion of the supply system closing down public can-teens and other measures run defiantly against the spirit of socialismrdquo The report further called for ldquoexposing such reactionary repulsive things as much as possiblerdquo and ldquocriticizing them and holding them to accountrdquo24

At this point the issue of public canteens became organically mixed to-gether with the anti-rightist movement as a negative attitude toward public canteens was taken as one of the marks of a rightist The Hebei provincial government ceased to give due consideration to objective reality and began fiercely attacking any ldquorightist speech and thoughtrdquo that was allegedly criti-cal of the supply system and public canteens Provincial officials then forcibly reinstated public canteens On October 14 Hebei ribao summarized the experi-ence of the Dongziyan Production Brigade 东紫烟生产队 of the Chengguan Commune 城关公社 of Xinle County 新乐县 extolling the 10 great advan-tages of public canteens suitability to collectivized production liberation of women convenience to the masses economization of labor efficient use of food and coal improvements to commune membersrsquo lives the fostering of the spirit of collectivism strengthening unity of the masses bringing harmony to families and driving the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo in production25 These moves strongly repoliticized the issue of public canteens and exacerbated the spread of ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes Even with food supplies still extremely tight public can-teens many of which had been forced to close due to exhausted supplies

23 ldquoGuanyu fanyouqing gu ganjin shenru kaizhan zengchan jieyue yundong de jueyi 关于

反右倾鼓干劲深入开展增产节约运动的决议 [Directives Regarding Opposing Rightists Encouraging Enthusiasm and Launching a Movement to Increase Production and Increase Savings]rdquo Hebei Ribao 《河北日报》 September 22 1959

24 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 12 ce 62125 ldquoDongziyan sheyuan zhengkua shitang hao zongjie jingyan ba shitang ban de geng hao

东紫烟社员争夸食堂好总结经验把食堂办得更好 [Members of Dongziyan Commune Sing Praises of Canteens Summarizing Experience Makes Canteens Better]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 October 14 1959

LI126

ltUNgt

were resuscitated It was reported that ldquo100000 canteens have been rectified or developed amid the movement of the Great Leap Forward in productionrdquo26

In late February 1960 the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee issued the ldquoReport on the Current Conditions of Rural Public Canteensrdquo 关于目前农村

公共食堂情况的报告 which read ldquoCanteens are also a battlefield position of socialism which we defend tenaciously If we lose this position it will be impossible for peoplersquos communes to maintain their strength and there will be no guarantee for the Great Leap Forwardrdquo27 This report caught the attention of the ccp Central Committee and Mao In a memo regarding this report the Central Committee reversed the position on the distribution of food rations to households which it had taken in 1959rsquos ldquoDirectives Regarding the Distribution of Summer Harvests in Peoplersquos Communesrdquo The memo read ldquoThe principles of food distribution are send quotas to householdssend physical materials to canteens eat on the basis of meal tickets and reduce the amount that goes to individuals These are prerequisites for properly establishing canteensrdquo ldquoThis practice should be emulated across the country with no exceptionsrdquo28 The forcible reinstatement of public canteens and reversals on policies for distrib-uting food directly to households further stripped rural citizens of their rights to private ownership and demand for food Without a doubt this reinstate-ment added to their already heavy burden

On March 18 the ccp Central Committee issued the ldquoMemo on Strengthen-ing Leadership of Public Canteensrdquo 关于加强公共食堂领导的批示 which Mao had drafted himself The Memo demanded that all local governments across the country continue to reinstate and promulgate public canteens As early as February 17 at the second meeting of the Second Hebei Provincial Peoplersquos Congress public canteens were established as a focus of rural work The congress demanded that ldquoin the countryside we must place central em-phasis on grain make canteens the focus and feasibly plan the lives of the massesrdquo29 In November the central government issued the ldquoUrgent Instruc-tions on Current Policy Issues in Rural Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于农村人民

公社当前政策问题的紧急指示信 (more commonly known as the ldquoTwelve

26 ldquoWosheng nongcun da yuejin gaochao xiongyong pengpai 我省农村大跃进高潮汹涌

澎湃 [The Surging Tide of the Great Leap Forward in the Rural Areas of this Province]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 October 21 1959


13 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 13] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 47

28 Ibid 43ndash4429 Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 517ndash518


ltUNgt

Instructionsrdquo) intended to reverse severe economic hardship in the country-side The Instructions ended the ldquoanti-rightistrdquo movement begun at the Lushan Conference and took initial steps toward reversing ldquoleftistrdquo practices However the Instructions continued to refer to public canteens as battlefield positions of socialism which must be stalwartly defended The Instructions read as fol-lows ldquoPublic canteens must be properly established The key to properly es-tablishing canteens is for lsquopolitics to enter the canteen and cadres to enter the kitchenrsquohellip Resolutely implement per capita rationing sending quotas to households sending food to canteens enforcing the meal ticket institution and reducing distribution to individualshellip The institution of public canteens must be persisted inrdquo30 In 1960 Hebei suffered a severe natural disaster that greatly stressed food supply yet the official line still held that public canteens must be persisted in On December 31 Hebei ribao reprinted an editorial that had appeared in Dong feng Magazine titled ldquoStriving to Increase Agricultural Yields in 1961rdquo 为争取 1961年的农业丰收而奋斗 The editorial read that ldquoagriculture has suffered from two consecutive years of natural disasters par-ticularly in 1960 when the scale of the disaster was unprecedentedrdquo but ldquothe proper establishment of public canteens enables the masses to participate in the production movement with healthy bodies and abundant spirit This is an extremely important condition for ensuring bumper crop agricultural yields This is an extremely important task that we should fully implement through-out the entire yearrdquo31

iv Complete Abolition

The Great Leap Forward threw the national economy into a quagmire As a result of the movement the national economy became severely imbalanced and total output values of both industry and agriculture fell several years con-secutively During this period there were great losses to productivity in the cities and rural areas of Hebei Province particularly in grain production These losses led to famine and the abnormal deaths of humans and livestock in some regions of the province Grain output in Hebei during the Great Leap For-ward fell to the level of 1953 ldquoAfter 1960 when grain purchase and sale figures were reduced overall grain conditions worsened to an unusual extent In 1961

30 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 13 ce 67131 ldquoWei zhengqu 1961 nian de nongye fengshou er fendou 为争取 1961年的农业丰收而

奋斗 [Fight to Increase Agricultural Yields in 1961]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 December 31 1960

LI128

ltUNgt

province-wide per capita grain output was 1561 kilograms and oil crop output was 305 kilograms the rural per capita grain ration fell to 134 kilograms from 184 kilograms in 1957 a reduction of fifty kilogramsrdquo32

The ccp Central Committee took a series of measures to mitigate the dam-age done to the national economy In January 1961 the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Congress formally passed the Eight Character Guiding Policy 八字方针 intended to ldquoadjust solidify replenish and increaserdquo the national economy and also commit to implementingthoroughly the ldquoTwelve Instruc-tionsrdquo in the countryside At the plenum Mao emphasized the ideological line and working method of seeking truth from facts calling for the entire party to incite a trend of investigation and research Faced with a strong public out-cry against public canteens Mao dispatched teams to conduct rural investiga-tions in Zhejiang led by Tian Jiaying 田家英 to Hunan led by Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木 and to Guangdong led by Chen Boda 陈伯达 The ccp Central Com-mittee convened the ldquoThree Souths Conferencerdquo 三南会议 and ldquoThree Norths Conferencerdquo 三北会议 in February and March collectively as a central work conference in Guangzhou To address the various abuses which had appeared in the peoplersquos communes the conference passed the ldquoWorking Regulations for Rural Peoplersquos Communes (Draft)rdquo 农村人民公社工作条例(草案) This draft did not however change the stipulations of the ldquoTwelve Instructionsrdquo regarding public canteens Rather this document held that ldquoproduction teams should actively establish public canteens in all places that meet conditionsrdquo33 The masses however had by this time long been dissatisfied with public can-teens At the ldquoThree Souths Conferencerdquo somebody transmitted the four great disadvantages of public canteens as had been reported by the branch secre-tary of a production brigade in Guangdong they destroy the mountains and forests they waste labor they have no meat and theyrsquore disadvantageous to production34 Itrsquos plain to see that public canteens had become an onerous problem that desperately needed to be solved On March 7 the Hebei Provin-cial Peoplersquos Committee convened an enlarged meeting to analyze the reasons

32 Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 52733 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与

事件的回顾》下 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 2] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1997) 926

34 Liang Yaoji 梁耀基 ldquoYi wei yinqi Mao Zedong guanzhu de nongcun dang zhibu shuji -- -- Liang Jinan fanying gongshe gonggong shitang wenti de guocheng 一位引起毛泽东

关注的农村党支部书记mdashmdash梁纪南反映公社公共食堂问题的过程 [One Rural Branch Secretary Who Caught Mao Zedongrsquos Attention mdash Liang Jinanrsquos reporting of the Problems of Public Canteens in Communes]rdquo Guangdong dangshi 《广东党史》 5 (2002)


ltUNgt

behind economic hardships in the province The committee also proposed concrete measures to overcome hardship and demanded that all provincial and city-level regions concentrate efforts in agriculture and grain output In the first half of that year Hebei Provincial Committee Secretary Liu Zihou 刘子厚 led an investigation in the Rencheng Commune 任城公社 of Julu County 巨鹿县 after which he wrote the ldquoReport on the Issues of Canteensrdquo 关于食堂问题的报告 to Mao In the report he noted the problem of egali-tarianism that had emerged in public canteens primarily in excessive use of labor excessive expenditures and a reduction of the value of workpoints

After the Guangzhou Central Working Conference 广州中央工作会议 leaders at every level from the center to the village left their offices and vis-ited public canteens to study their problems At the end of April Zhou Enlai 周恩来 travelled to Handan 邯郸 Hebei to receive reports from provincial cadres From May 3 to 7 Zhou personally visited several impoverished mid-dle peasant households in the Boting Commune 伯延公社 of Wursquoan County 武安县 Hebei where he made inspections of collectivized canteens This visit gave Zhou first-hand experience of a number of the problems taking place in public canteens He discovered that the central directives on developing can-teens and maintaining a portion of the supply system did not conform to the real conditions of the countryside These were in fact two issues about which both cadres and the masses had the most vehement complaints Zhou report-ed his findings to Mao who was in Shanghai at the time35 Further investiga-tions were then conducted by Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 in Hunan Zhu De 朱德 in Sichuan and Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 and Peng Zhen 彭真 in the outskirts of Beijing They all reported the various severe problems of public canteens to Mao and the fact that the masses were unanimous in their desire to abolish the institution Their reports ended up compelling the ccp Central Commit-tee and Mao to change the policies calling for persistence in public canteens

From the end of May to the beginning of June The ccp Central Committee convened a working conference in Beijing at which the ldquoWorking Regulations for Rural Peoplersquos Communesrdquo were debated and revised The revised draft stipulated the following ldquoThe decision whether or not a production team establishes a canteen is to be decided entirely by debate among commune membershellip All commune membersrsquo rations should be distributed to house-holds regardless of whether the production team has established a public canteen these rations are to be used at the discretion of individual commune

35 Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949ndash1976) zhong juan 《周恩来年谱 (1949~1976)》中卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1949ndash1976) Vol 2] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1997) 409

LI130

ltUNgt

membersrdquo36 In order to thoroughly implement the spirit of the Central Committeersquos instructions on public canteens on May 25 the Hebei provincial government drafted the ldquoSupplemental Working Regulations for Rural Peoplersquos Communes (Revised Draft)rdquo 农村人民公社工作补充条例(草案修改稿) this document adopted a policy of ldquogenerally not establishingrdquo public canteens By the end of May all public canteens in Hebei province were disbanded ush-ering the public canteen off the stage of history

References

ldquoBan hao gonggong shitang 办好公共食堂 [Proper Operation and Management of Public Canteens]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 25 1958

Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与事

件的回顾》下 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 2] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1997)

ldquoDongziyan sheyuan zhengkua shitang hao zongjie jingyan ba shitang ban de geng hao 东紫烟社员争夸食堂好总结经验把食堂办得更好 [Members of Dongzi-yan Commune Sing Praises of Canteens Summarizing Experience Makes Canteens Better]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 October 14 1959

ldquoGonggong shitang yong liang hai yao bu yao jihua 公共食堂用粮还要不要计划 [Should We Make Further Plans for Grain Demand in Public Canteens]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 December 30 1958

ldquoGuanyu fanyouqing gu ganjin shenru kaizhan zengchan jieyue yundong de jueyi 关于反右倾鼓干劲深入开展增产节约运动的决议 [Directives Regarding Opposing Right-Leaning Tendencies Boosting Incentives and Launching a Move-ment to Increase Output and Promote Conservation]rdquo Hebei Ribao 《河北日报》 September 22 1959

Hebei sheng zhimiddotliangshi zhi 《河北省志 middot粮食志》 [Records of Hebei ProvincemiddotGrain Records] (Zhongguo chengshi chubanshe 1994)

Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 《河北省志 middot政府志》 [Records of Hebei ProvincemiddotGovernshyment Records] (Renmin chubanshe 2000)

Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 7 ce 《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第7 册 [Mao Zeshydong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 7] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992)




ltUNgt


Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 12 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第

12 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 12] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996)


Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 14 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》

第 14 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 14] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1997)

ldquoLaoli da jiefang shengchan da yuejin Xushui xian sheshe ban qi gonggong shitang 劳力大解放生产大跃进徐水县社社办起公共食堂 [Great Liberation of Labor Great Leap Forward in Production All Communes of Xushui County Establishing Public Canteens on a Wide Scale]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 July 12 1958

Liang Shuzhen 梁淑珍 ldquoDa ban nongcun gonggong shitang de lishi jiaoxun 大办农村

公共食堂的历史教训 [Historical Lessons from the Large-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens]rdquo Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu 《中共党史研究》 3 (2000)

Liang Yaoji 梁耀基 ldquoYi wei yinqi Mao Zedong guanzhu de nongcun dang zhibu shuji -- -- Liang Jinan fanying gongshe gonggong shitang wenti de guocheng 一位引起

毛泽东关注的农村党支部书记 mdashmdash梁纪南反映公社公共食堂问题的过程 [One Rural Branch Secretary Who Caught Mao Zedongrsquos Attention mdash Liang Jinanrsquos reporting of the Problems of Public Canteens in Communes]rdquo Guangdong dangshi 《广东党史》 5 (2002)

Luo Pinghan 罗平汉 Nongcun renmin gongshe shi 《农村人民公社史》 [The Hisshytory of Rural Peoplersquos Collectives] (Fujian renmin chubanshe 2003)

Peng Dehuai zhuan 《彭德怀传》 [Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe 1993)

ldquoQieshi zuo hao xiaji nongcun gongzuo zhong zhonggong Hebei shengwei sheng renmin weiyuanhui fachu zhishi 切实做好夏季农村工作中共河北省委省

人民委员会发出指示 [Feasibly Carry Out the Instructions Issued by the Hebei CCP Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Peoplersquos Committee in Summer Rural Work]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 June 12 1959

ldquoWei zhengqu 1961 nian de nongye fengshou er fendou 为争取 1961年的农业丰收而


ldquoWosheng nongcun da yuejin gaochao xiongyong pengpai 我省农村大跃进高潮汹

涌澎湃 [The Surging Tide of the Great Leap Forward in the Rural Areas of this Province]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 October 21 1959

LI132

ltUNgt

ldquoXie Xuegong tongzhi de kaimuci 解学恭同志的开幕词 [The Opening Address of Comrade Xie Xuegong]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 January 15 1959

Zhang Wentian xuanji 《张闻天选集》 [Selected Works of Zhang Wentian] (Bei-jing Renmin chubanshe 1985)

Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949ndash1976) zhong juan 《周恩来年谱(1949~1976)》中卷 [Chronshyicles of Zhou Enlai (1949ndash1976) Vol 2] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1997)


ltUNgt

chapter 6

From Busy-Season Childcare Centers to Full-scale KindergartensmdashRural Childcare Organizations in Shanxi Province in the 1950s

Han Xiaoli 1

Abstract

In the 1950rsquos rural childcare in Shanxi Province evolved from seasonal childcare cen-ters into model kindergartens and from voluntary mutually beneficial arrangements between cooperative members into full-fledged public welfare enterprises Theregion-ally diverse seasonal childcare organizations became standard model kindergartens with standards of education and enrollment as their objectives evolved from the liberation of women to the education of children Changes that took place in rural childcare organizations reflected the statersquos efforts to develop rural public welfare en-terprises amid social transformations of the time Throughout this process there were both popular innovations that met the true needs of rural areas as well as the problem of exaggerated figures and adventurism A look back on the lessons of history is help-ful not only for more deeply understanding changes that took place to Chinese rural society in that particular era and comprehending efforts and explorations on the part of the government and the masses to build an ideal society but also in resolving to-dayrsquos rural social issues particularly as related to the issue of migrants leaving children behind in their villages an now issue widely discussed in China

Keywords

busy-season childcare centers ndash model kindergartens ndash social reformation

In recent years there has been a great deal of attention paid to research of Chinese rural society during the era of the agricultural cooperative How did the ccp promote the agricultural cooperative and peoplersquos commune movements

1 Han Xiaoli (韩晓莉 ) holds a PhD in history and was conducting postdoctorate research in the history department of Capital Normal University at the time this essay was written

HAN 134

ltUNgt

under new social structures and social relations How were the masses mobi-lized and organized in such an enormous social revolution These have been the foci of academic research in this field In the 1950s many different forms of childcare organizations emerged in rural China They were popularized and touted as safeguards for the cooperative movement and components of rural welfare enterprises In this essay I shall focus on Shanxi Province and make use of local records field surveys2 and materials published in newspapers to conduct a deep investigation into rural childcare organizations from the time of cooperatization to the advent of the peoplersquos commune I hope this will pro-vide valuable lessons for the resolution of modern rural social issues

i Pilots in Busy-Season Childcare Centers

The emergence of rural childcare organizations is closely related to the entry of women into the workforce The liberation and mobilization of women was an important social policy of governments in communist base areas since the beginning of the revolution After the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China the guiding ideology concerning women in the workforce was to en-able women to leave the house and become involved in socialist reformation and construction On October 20 1949 the Shanxi provincial government con-vened a womenrsquos congress at which it was proposed that as part of the great production movement of 1950 seventy percent of women would participate in agricultural work3 The first step to meeting this objective was to liberate women from the burden of caring for children

Shortly after the beginning of the cooperative movement some rural gov-ernments of Shanxi began pilots in childcare mutual aid teams and childcare centers that opened during busy farm work seasons in order to free up more of the female labor pool In spring 1951 Xigu Village 西故村 Tunliu County 屯留

县 established a busy-season childcare team one of the first childcare teams in Shanxi As the initial childcare team was highly effective at liberating female

2 Some records and materials used to write this essay came from field surveys conducted by professors and students of the Chinese History Institute of Shanxi University They are stored in the archives of that Institute

3 ldquoQuan sheng funuuml daibiao huiyi jueding funuuml ying zuo de shiqing 全省妇女代表会议决定

妇女应做的事情 [Province-wide Womenrsquos Congress Determines Things Women Should Do]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 November 10 1949 second edition

135From Busy-Season Childcare Centers to KINDERGARTENS

ltUNgt

labor the number of such groups quickly grew from one to six4 The provincial government lauded Xigursquos experience and quickly introduced the model of childcare teams and busy-season childcare centers to the rest of the province

Although government officials believed that the establishment of busy- season childcare centers helped reduce womenrsquos burdens in the home the public was highly apprehensive of the practice at first Some even displayed doubts or feelings of revulsion In 1952 a womenrsquos symposium was convened by the government of Xinhe Village 新河村 Wutai County 五台县 in prepa-ration for the establishment of a nursemaid group ldquoAt the symposium some older women expressed fear that the children would cry that there would be much urine and feces and that there would be disharmony among the adults if children were not cared for properly Young women who took the podium said they were not willing to allow others to take their children away from them and that if it was tiresome for them to care for the children it would be even more so for older peoplerdquo5 After the agricultural cooperative of Hongjing Village 洪井村 Licheng County 黎城县 had established a busy-season child-care center only two women sent their children there The rest of the women preferred letting their children run wild in the fields to sending them to the cen-ter When the female deputy commune director visited individual households one mother asked her ldquoHow could somebody see a child as kin if they didnrsquot bear the child or rear himrdquo Another mother said ldquoMy child is still small hersquoll be bullied by the older children if I send him to the centerrdquo The nurses and maids had their own concerns One said ldquoItrsquod be fine if you asked us to raise pigs but we donrsquot dare to take the responsibility of watching childrenrdquo6 When the Nanyujiao Cooperative 南余交农业生产合作社 of Qin County 沁县 opened a pilot busy-season childcare centers nursemaids there raised four things that gave them fear ldquoFirst we fear gossip Second we fear that the mothers wonrsquot trust us Third we fear the children will fall ill Fourth we fear that watching children is exhaustingrdquo Mothers were either afraid that their children would

4 ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao le 屯留县西故村农忙托儿

所办得更好了 [Childcare Centers in Xigu Village Tunliu County Now Better Run]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 April 21 1952 second edition

5 ldquoXinhe cun chengli le baomu xiaozu dai haizi de funuuml shang le minxiao 新河村成立了

保姆小组带孩子的妇女上了民校 [Xinhe Village Has Established a Guardian Group Women with Children Now in Peoplersquos School]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 December 14 1952 fourth edition

6 ldquoBa haizi song dao nongmang tuorsquoersuo qu 把孩子送到农忙托儿所去 [Send Children to Busy-Season Childcare Centers]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 June 1 1955 third edition

HAN 136

ltUNgt

not be well looked after in the childcare center or were resentful of the work-points that would be allocated to the nursemaids7

The awkwardness that plagued busy-season childcare centers was mitigat-ed as the cooperative movement deepened One reason for this mitigation of awkwardness was that the various cooperatives improved the organization and administration of childcare centers on the basis of real circumstances elimi-nating the concerns of mothers and nursemaids alike Another reason was the policy for paying women and men equally for equal work which greatly in-creased womenrsquos incentives for participation in labor By the spring of 1952 there were ten childcare centers in Xigu Village with twenty-five nursemaids caring for 125 children making ninety-eight female laborers available for work outside the home8 The Womenrsquos Federation of Sigouhui Village 寺沟会村 Kelan County 岢岚县 founded three childcare teams in the village with three nursemaids supervising all the children in the village9 The Baiyangyu Agricul-tural Cooperative 白羊峪农业生产合作社 of Xiyang County 昔阳县 solved the childcare problems for twenty-four women through the establishment of various forms of childcare teams allowing them to participate in production10

The establishment of busy-season childcare centers played an active role in spurring women to participate in work outside the home the centers them-selves gradually came to be accepted by the public In early 1952 the women of Xigu Village worked alongside with male workers to dig twenty-five wells and four cisterns They also dug one cistern and one well and weeded 973 mu of grain fields on their own Ninety-eight women with children enrolled in child-care centers sun-dried the grain harvest from twenty-six mu of land11 The fifth production team of the Nanyujiao Agricultural Cooperative of Qin County was

7 ldquoNanyujiao nongyeshe zuzhi nongmang tuorsquoersuo tengchu you xiaohai funuuml canjia tian-jian shengchan 南余交农业社组织农忙托儿所腾出有小孩妇女参加田间生产 [Nanyujiao Agricultural Cooperative Organizes Busy Season Childcare Centers Frees Women with Children to Participate in Agricultural Production]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山

西农民》 July 7 1954 second edition8 ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao lerdquo9 ldquoSigouhui cun de funuuml bianyang la 寺沟会村的妇女变样啦 [The Women of Sigouhui

Village Have Changed]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 August 14 1952 second edition

10 ldquoBaiyangyu nongye shengchan hezuoshe shixing nannuuml tong gong tong chou funuuml can-jia shengchan de jijixing gengjia tigao 白羊峪农业生产合作社实行男女同工同酬妇女参加生产的积极性更加提高 [Baiyangyu Agricultural Cooperative Implements Equal Pay for Equal Work for Men and Women Womenrsquos Proactivity in Participating in Production Further Increased]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 September 5 1953 second edition

11 ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao lerdquo


ltUNgt

the first there to run a pilot childcare center which allowed four women with children to participate in production work outside the home Female coopera-tive member Wang Ehai 王娥孩 had this to say ldquoBefore I was so tired because of the child(ren) that I couldnrsquot even go into the fields and I was often very angry Now that the child(ren) is (are) looked after I can get in more days of laborrdquo12 As a result cooperative members began actively demanding the rees-tablishment of busy-season childcare centers

Some cooperatives when liberating female laborers from childcare to par-ticipate in production outside the home also used the same childcare model to enable women to study In 1952 Dongcheng Village 东城村 Quwo County 曲沃县 established an ldquointensive literacy classrdquo for women Most students brought their children however who turned the classroom into a playground greatly compromising the efficiency of the class The village government then established a childcare center to look after all the children in one place One villager had this to say ldquoIt has become convenient for women to participate in production outside the home and to engage in studies since the founding of the childcare center This has made them more at ease during their studies The women in the intensive literacy class are making progress quite quicklyrdquo13 The womenrsquos school of Xinhe Village District One Wutai County adopted a similar method There twenty-two senior villagers were organized into a child nursemaid group to watch forty-two children Every day after lunch the female students of the school sent their children to the nursemaid group before head-ing off to classes atthe school14

The establishment of busy-season childcare centers not only liberated wom-en laborers from childcare but also brought about a certain degree of change to the social atmosphere Once women worked outside the home their incomes in-creased and relations among family members became increasingly harmonious In the Gucheng Zhang Bingyi Agricultural Cooperative 故城张炳义农业生

产合作社 of Wuxiang County 武乡县 ldquoold women were organized to watch after the children giving them something to do and a sense of satisfaction With women joining the labor force fifteen men were freed up to engage in secondary enterprises Some of these men packaged grain in the granary and

12 ldquoNanyujiao nongyeshe zuzhi nongmang tuorsquoersuo tengchu you xiaohai funuuml canjia tian-jian shengchanrdquo

13 ldquoQuwo Dongcheng cun chengli le tuorsquoersuo jiejue le dai haizi funuuml de xuexi kunnan 曲沃东城村成立了托儿所解决了带孩子妇女的学习困难 [Dongcheng Village of Quwo Founds Childcare Center Resolves Difficulties Experienced by Women with Chil-dren in Attending School]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 December 1 1952 fourth edition

14 ldquoXinhe cun chengli le baomu xiaozu dai haizi de funuuml shang le minxiaordquo

HAN 138

ltUNgt

some became carpenters These men earned a considerable amount of money and so they too were happy The women were able to earn more workpoints from their work outside the home now that their children were in childcare centers and so they were also satisfied Economic production was going well and we had achieved satisfaction by three different groupsrsquordquo15

ii Organization and Administration of Busy-Season Childcare Centers

Although at first rural citizens founded busy childcare centers on their own later agricultural cooperatives began to play an important role in their intro-duction in other areas At this time childcare centers were administered in ac-cordance with the principle of voluntary mutual benefit between cooperative members Administratorsrsquo greatest functions were coordination and oversight

(A) The First Problems to Solve were Reasonable Labor Exchange Arrangements Addressing Womenrsquos Concerns and Compensation for the Nursemaids

When childcare centers first appeared the greatest concern of mothers and nursemaids alike was how the workpoints they would earn (or lose) would be calculated Rural mothers were concerned that too many workpoints would be allocated to the nursemaids which would make it not worth their while to work outside the home The nursemaids by contrast felt that caring for chil-dren was dirty tiring work and if too few workpoints were allocated for this work they might as well be toiling in the fields instead Cooperatives had to find a way to keep everybody satisfied and so they established measures in-formed with input from both sides

Cooperatives first helped their female members figure out the economics Letrsquos examine the example of Gu Jinzhi 顾金枝 mother of two and member of the Nanguan Village Agricultural Cooperative 南关村农业合作社 of Tiejiahui Township 铁家会乡 Fanzhi County 繁峙县 When the cooperative founded its childcare center a total of ten workpoints were assigned for one day of work outside the home Gu could earn seven or more points every day they worked and she could work about eighty days out of the year Sending her children to a childcare center for those eighty days would earn a nursemaid a

15 Wuxiang funuuml yundong shiliao xuanbian di 2 ji《武乡妇女运动史料选编》第2 集 [Selected Historical Materials from the Womenrsquos Movement in Wuxiang Vol 2] ed Wux-iang County Womenrsquos Movement History Office 武乡县妇运史办公室 (1985) 40


ltUNgt

total of twenty-nine workpoints which left her a total of 771 paid days of work and an income of 8481 yuan If she had opted to stay at home with her children and forego working outside the home she would have earned no income This calculation eliminated the worries of mothers who collectively declared their position ldquoWe are willing to send our children thererdquo16 Gong Yumei 弓玉梅 member of the Donghongyi Agricultural Cooperative 东洪驿农业生产合作

社 of Anze County 安泽县 had this to say ldquoAfter they showed us the compari-son I came to truly understand that participating in cooperative production was much better than spinning thread at home I can earn at least six points a day of which I give two and a half to the nursemaid That leaves me with a net earning of three and a half points Who would give me even one point for staying at homerdquo Having been persuaded the mothers of the village sent their thirty-nine children into the care of seven nursemaids greatly freeing up female labor for participation in production outside the home17

The various cooperatives generally made compensation for the nursemaids flexible depending on local conditions The Nanyujiao Agricultural Coop-erative of Qin County made the following stipulation ldquoOne and half points shall be awarded per child per day for small children unable to walk For older children able to walk 08 points shall be awarded per child per dayrdquo18 The Xigu Village Agricultural Cooperative of Tunliu County made this stipula-tion ldquoWorkpoints shall be awarded based on the age of children supervised Two and a half points shall be awarded for watching small children two years of age and under Two points shall be awarded for caring children four years and under One point shall be awarded for caring for children six years and under Ten workpoints are equivalent to one day of a womanrsquos laborrdquo19 The government of Quwo County made the following stipulation ldquoAll nursemaid compensations shall be borne by the mothers These compensation should be

16 Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇女联合会 ldquoTiejiahui xiang Nanguan cun gongnong lianmengshe shi zenyang ban qi tuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan de (1956 nian 7 yue 3 ri) 铁家会乡南关村工农联盟社是怎样办起托儿所幼儿园的 (1956年7月3 日 ) [How the Worker-Peasant Alliance of Nanguan Village Tiejiahui Township Established Childcare Centers and Kindergartens (July 3 1956)]rdquo Xinzhou City Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 6ndash2

17 Shanxi Provincial Democratic Womenrsquos Federation 山西省民主妇女联合会 ldquoFunuuml ertong fuli gongzuo jingyan jieshao (1956 nian 3 yue) 妇女儿童福利工作经验介绍

(1956年3月 ) [Introduction to the Experience of Womenrsquos and Childrenrsquos Welfare Work (March 1956)]rdquo 8

18 ldquoNanyujiao nongyeshe zuzhi nongmang tuorsquoersuo tengchu you xiaohai funuuml canjia tianjian shengchanrdquo


HAN 140

ltUNgt

according to seasonal fluctuations to the age of the children being watched and the quality of the care The ultimate principle to be observed is voluntary mutual interest between mothers and nursemaidsrdquo20

(B) Second Systems were to be Tailored to Local Conditions and a Variety of Models of Childcare Service were to be Adopted

Local governments encouraged officials in all localities to establish childcare centers that suit local conditions to operate cooperatives in accordance with the principles of thrift and industry and to offer flexibility in childcare ser-vices In 1956 the government of Quwo County issued the ldquoUrgent Notice on the Large-scale Establishment of Busy-Season Childcare Centersrdquo 关于大力

举办农忙托儿所的紧急通知 which read as follows ldquoEarnestly and thor-oughly implement the principle of thrift and hard work in operating coopera-tives set your goals according to a realistic understanding of your means and capabilities The best method to adopt at present is unified leadership over a number of child supervision centers It is appropriate for onenursemaid to watchtwo to three children This makes it easy to solve the housing problem and to meet hygiene and sanitation standards and helps prevent the spread of communicativediseasesrdquo21 The Womenrsquos Federation of Qi County 祁县 is-sued this statement ldquoActively build all manner of childcare organizations on the basis of the principle of running cooperatives by abiding by the princi-ples of thrift and hard work the needs of production and the demands of the peoplerdquo22

By 1956 there were 104 childcare groups and centers in Wuxiang County where childcare services were divided into three categories The first category featuredmultiple childcare facilities under unified leadership In such child-care facilities each nursemaid was charged with watching three to six chil-dren with a total of over 100 children among all the facilities Childcare centers in the second category putall the nursemaids and all the children in their care together for centralized education there were over fifty children cared for in

20 ldquoQuwo xian renmin weiyuanhui guanyu dali juban nongmang tuorsquoersuo de jinji tongzhi (1956 nian 5 yue 28 ri) 曲沃县人民委员会关于大力举办农忙托儿所的紧急通知

(1956年5月28日 ) [Urgent Notice of the Quwo County Peoplersquos Committee on Striving to Establish Busy Season Childcare Centers]rdquo Houma City Shangpingwang Village Archives 131ndash5

21 Ibid22 Qi County Democratic Womenrsquos Federation 祁县民主妇女联合会 ldquoQiuji funuuml gong-

zuo anpai de chubu yijian (1956 nian 10 yue 3 ri) 秋季妇女工作安排的初步意见 (1956年 10月3日 ) [Initial Opinions on Womenrsquos Autumn Work Plans (December 3 1956)]rdquo Qi County Li Village Archives 42ndash63


ltUNgt

centers in this category The third category involved mutual aid among fami-lies and neighbors in this category nursemaids and children were assembled together twice a month forclasses23 The childcare center of the Nanguan Co-operative 南关社 of Tiejiahui Township Fanzhi County adopted the model of multiple facilities under unified leadership on the basis of how far one lived from thesefacilities Nursemaids there care for children by themselves at home or together with two or three other Nursemaids24 During my investigation in Nanyukou Village 南峪口村 Dongshan Township 东山乡 Fanzhi County I discovered that mutual aid between neighbors and family members had been particularly widespread during the era of cooperatization One senior still living there Mrs Zhao Xiuying 赵秀英 recalled that when the village cooperative was formed because of her poor healthshe stayed at home watching her three children and two neighborsrsquo children ldquoBack then we had no childcare centers to speak of It was just people in the village helping each other out It was enough for people to express their gratitude by sharing some grain after the autumn harvest This was very common in the villagerdquo25

(C) Oversight was Strengthened Nursemaid Duties Clarified and the Level of Care Increased

Agricultural cooperatives all imposed concrete requirements on nursemaids to ensure that busy season childcare centers continue to function over the long term Some cooperatives improved nursemaidsrsquo abilities through fixed-interval education Most nursemaids were older women from villages no longer able to participate in work outside the home and so their generally low levels of edu-cational attainment determined that the primary means of supervision imple-mented in childcare facilities was household education At this time the funda-mental requirement to which cooperatives subjectednursemaidswas to ensure the health of children under their care The Tinghebao Village 停河堡村 Busy-Season Childcare Center of Licheng County 黎城县 was a model childcare center in the area The extent to which nursemaids there took care of children in their care was described thus ldquoThey fed the children mixed soup when it was time to eat Once they had gotten full the older children were made to

23 Wuxiang funuuml yundong shiliao xuanbian di 3 ji《武乡妇女运动史料选编》第3集 [Selected Historical Materials from the Womenrsquos Movement in Wuxiang Vol 3] ed Wuxiang County Womenrsquos Movement History Office 武乡县妇运史办公室 (1985) 4ndash5

24 Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇女联合会 ldquoTiejiahui xiang Nanguan cun gongnong lianmengshe shi zenyang ban qi tuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan de (1956 nian 7 yue 3 ri)rdquo

25 From an interview I conducted with the 89-year old Zhao Xiuying in Nanyukou Village Dongshan Township Fanzhi County on February 21 2013

HAN 142

ltUNgt

lead the younger children in games The younger children were both comfort-able and happyrdquo26 In addition to imposing basic requirements for maintaining childrenrsquos health some cooperatives with the means to do so opted to increase nursemaid standards by establishing childcare center committees convening meetings at fixed intervals offering nursemaid education and implementing other methods as well In March 1952 the government of Xigu Village Tunliu County convened a meeting composed of delegates from the village childcare center nursemaids and mothers Delegates summarized a year of achieve-ments and shortcomings and established institutions to address issues of sani-tation and nursemaid shift changes The cooperative ldquoimplemented nursemaid education that was good for oneself good for others and good for the state [Officials] described the conditions of childcare centers in the Soviet Union and recounted to them some common sense knowledge about sanitation The patriotic convention of childcare centers requires that nursemaids not only take good care of children and see to their health but also that they tend to the childrenrsquos patriotic education and internationalist educationrdquo27

Local governments and cooperatives operating on the principle of volun-tary mutual benefit between cooperative members played an important role in the organization and administration of busy season childcare centers they established objectives that satisfied both mothers and nursemaids Although preschool education practices taken in busy-season childcare centers at the time pales in comparison with modern practices the basic demands of flexibly customizing service according to the specific conditions in different places and prioritizing childrenrsquos health fit the true social needs of rural areas at the time

iii Establishing Model Kindergartens

In 1958 changes began taking place in the nature of rural childcare organiza-tions as the peoplersquos commune movement began taking off At this time child-care centers and kindergartens both important components of rural public welfare system were accorded special significance Lenin once called the con-struction of public canteens childcare centers and kindergartens the begin-nings of the great enterprise of communism28 In August local governments

26 ldquoNongmang tuorsquoer huzhuzu 农忙托儿互助组 [Busy-Season Childcare Mutual Aid Groups]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 May 17 1952 third edition

27 ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao lerdquo28 Cao Guanqun 曹冠群 ldquoJinyibu jiefang funuuml laodongli wei duokuai haosheng di jianshe

shehui zhuyi fuwu 进一步解放妇女劳动力为多快好省地建设社会主义服务


ltUNgt

across the country accelerated the pace of the construction of public canteens and kindergartens with communist characteristics in response to the upsurge of the peoplersquos commune movement Incomplete data indicate that by the end of October 475 million childcare centers and kindergartens had been built across the country29 The quantity of rural childcare centers and kindergartens at this time was unprecedented Moreover many communes began working to standardize preschool education in order to demonstrate their advanced nature From this point many standardized kindergartens began to emerge

In 1959 the Yingzhao Peoplersquos Commune 应朝人民公社 of Yangcheng County established a model kindergarten with five rooms one hall one kitch-en and a playground The slogan for this operation was ldquoattempt to establish a model create experience and propel the entire countryrdquo The five rooms in-cluded a classroom a sleeping room a washroom a teachersrsquo room and an of-fice The hall was a meal hall equipped with tables and chairs The kitchen was a childrenrsquos kitchen with food rations allocated under the unified guidance of the production brigade The playground was a facility for sports and activi-ties equipped with rocking horses see-saws swiveling chairs and a basketball goal One report described the facility this way ldquoThe interior and exterior of the kindergarten are as beautiful as a park It is truly a rural nursery that mothers have been expecting that everybody can love that is not tiring to the eyes that is grand and awesome that is fresh and beautiful and that can accommodate 180 childrenrdquo30 Although that description was slightly exagger-ated the construction of the Nanguan Village 南关村 Kindergarten did indeed conform to standards of the time this was proven through a field investigation The Nanguan Village Kindergarten is still operating today currently under its fourth principal It has one of the best reputations of private kindergartens in the area Former principal Cui Xuetao 崔雪桃 told me that the kindergarten was originally established in the Bai Family Courtyard 白家四合院 a very large

[ Further Liberating Female Labor Serves the Faster More Economical Construction of Socialism]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 June 2 1958 second edition

29 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与


30 ldquoYangcheng xian yingzhao renmin gongshe fejin dadui bu hu yi fen qian you ban tuoyoursquoeryuan ban cheng quan tuo baoyuyuan de zhuanti cailiao (1959 nian) 阳城县应

朝人民公社飞进大队不花一分钱由半托幼儿园办成全托保育园的专题材料

(1959年 ) [Dedicated Materials on How the Feijin Brigade of the Yingzhao Commune of Yangcheng County Converted Half-care Kindergartens into Full-care Nurseries Without Spending a Penny]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 18ndash11

HAN 144

ltUNgt

space Children were sent to the kindergarten to eat and rest during the day and were sent home at night The installation of see-saws and spinning chairs might seem like nothing compared to modern kindergartens but it was quite advanced for the time The Nanguan Village Kindergarten was commended as a model kindergarten in the county immediately upon its founding Observers from other parts of the country were often given tours of the facility Li Dequan 李德全 at the time serving as deputy chairman of the Chinese Peoplersquos Politi-cal Consultative Conference (cppcc) National Committee lauded the kinder-garten after making an inspection

Another school to be held up as a county-level model was the Yongquan Kindergarten 涌泉幼儿园 of Wuxiang County A busy-season childcare cen-ter founded in 1951 was its predecessor which was founded after the peoplersquos commune movement of 1958 The school was enlarged to include a nursing room (breastfeeding room) a childcare center and a kindergarten all in one full-time (ie boarding) facility that provided care for 134 children ldquoThe entire facility included three halls (dining hall lecture hall and shower hall) and six rooms (washroom exhibition room isolation room receiving room health room and infant room) In order to improve the childrenrsquos lives the school included a vegetable garden and fruit orchard as well as facilities for raising sheep pigs and chickens The childrenrsquos meals were improved slightly every five days and greatly every half month to ensure their nutritional needs were metrdquo In 1959 the kindergarten was again enlarged this time adding over thirty teachers and over thirty rooms The children were given cookies and candies at fixed intervals and all children had to wear identical uniforms31 The Yongquan Kindergarten is also a privately run school still operating today According to local accounts the village kindergarten was founded at the same time as pub-lic canteens The commune allocated the school a courtyard and appointed female activists as teachers As the school was well run county officials often sent groups to make observations there32

Busy-season childcare centers opened during the era of cooperatization made use of traditional household child-rearing techniques Sending children to kindergartens for centralizedcare however was something quite new for rural society Rural communes were able to provide facilities and equipment that met the standards of the time but a lack of experience on the part of the staff thrust many rural kindergartens into a mire of difficulties from their very first day of operation The kindergarten of the Daoping Production Team

31 Wuxiang funuuml yundong shiliao xuanbian di 3 ji 127 and 14232 I interviewed the 76-year old Wang Guifen in Yongquan Village Wuxiang County on

February 17 2013 Two of Mrs Wangrsquos children had attended the Yangquan Kindergarten


ltUNgt

道坪生产队 of the Yuci County Satellite Commune 榆次县卫星公社 had two teachers and thirty students when it first opened To prevent the chil-dren from running away the teachers locked the doors causing the children to cry for an entire day One parent said ldquoI canrsquot trust these people who lock my children in the kindergarten to cry all dayrdquo All kids were gone from the kindergarten within a matter of days33 In another example shortly after the opening of the Dajia Production Team 大甲队 Kindergarten of the Hongx-ing Peoplesrsquo Commune 红星公社 Wanrong County 万荣县 the two teachers on staff were completely unable to control the crying screaming and fighting of the several dozen students Parents were dissatisfied and soon thereafter the school was closed34 Faced with these problems in newly established kin-dergartens local governments sought to find women with more child-rearing experience to serve as teachers asked parents to donate toys and ordered teachers to make toys to attract students Local officials also demanded that teachers pay attention to education as well as supervision and proposed the introduction of pre-school lessons Teachers in the Daoping Production Team Kindergarten divided class levels based on the studentsrsquo situations and de-veloped curricula for music handicrafts drawing arithmetic environmental understanding and other areas Both students and parents were happy and the kindergarten was saved from the brink of collapse35 Teachers at the Da-jia Kindergarten created all manner of toys for the kids and taught them to sing dance and play games Such toy creation greatly enriched the childrenrsquos lives The experience of the Dajia Kindergarten was held up and introduced by county and township government officials who in 1959 sent a total of 200 people over six observation tours to inspect the facility36

Shortly after the advent of the peoplersquos commune the government began placing great emphasis on kindergartens at this point a large number of model kindergartens were established in response While one must com-mend attempts and explorations made in childcare at this time for the sake of improving welfare in rural China one must also note that many mistakes were

33 Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyangmdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi《幼儿园

的教养工作mdashmdash 托儿所幼儿园工作经验选辑之一》[The Education Work of KindergartensmdashVolume One of Selected Works on the Work Experience of Childcare Centers and Kindergartens] ed Shanxi Provincial Department of Civil Affairs and Shanxi Pro-vincial Womenrsquos Federation 山西省民政厅山西省妇女联合会 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1959) 25

34 Ibid 2035 Ibid 2736 Ibid 21ndash24

HAN 146

ltUNgt

made at this time as a result of adventurism and exaggerated reporting The political environment at the time was of course one of the pursuits of ldquofirst big and second publicrdquo37 in peoplersquos communes and of making a ldquoGreat Leaprdquo in all areas For example in October 1958 the Fenghuo Peoplersquos Commune 烽火人

民公社 Qin County announced that over the course of only seven days it had realized full-time childcare via the construction of fifty-three kindergartens to which 1480 children were sent38 The Xiangyuan County 襄垣县 Womenrsquos Federation announced that over twenty days of bitter battle a total of 1414 childcare centers and kindergartens had been founded across the county and that 964 percent of all children were receiving collective education39 The Chengguan Peoplersquos Commune 城关人民公社 Fanzhi County announced that it had built fifty-seven kindergartens by the end of 1959 with fourteen youth canteens serving them County officials further announced that 100 per-cent of children in the county were attending the kindergartens and that this was done to meet the especially large ldquoGreat Leaprdquo of 196040 Many of these fig-ures were exaggerated of course Through interviews I conducted with women over the age of seventy-five in the capital of Fanzhi County I discovered that none of them had formed a particularly deep impression of the establishment of the kindergartens They did recall that kindergartens had been founded in the county capital at the same time as public canteens but they attracted few children and were soon disbanded Per their recollections most children in the villages were looked after by older family members at home some older children watched over the play of younger children out on the land Li Baoting 李宝廷 formerly the chief accountant for the Dongshandi Commune Brigade 东山底公社大队 told me that at the time a sign reading ldquokindergartenrdquo was

37 Translatorrsquos note This is a popular slogan of the time meaning that communes are better the bigger and the more non-private they are

38 ldquoShanxi sheng funuuml shehui zhuyi jianshe jiji fenzi daibiao huiyi fayan gao 山西省妇女

社会主义建设积极分子代表会议发言稿 [Manuscript of Speeches Delivered at the Shanxi Provincial Congress of Women Socialist Construction Activists]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 156ndash136

39 Shixian wu hua jiefang le funuuml laodongli 《实现五化解放了妇女劳动力》 [Bringing About the Five Changes Liberated Female Labor] ed Shanxi Provincial Womenrsquos Federa-tion 山西省妇联 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1958) 23

40 Fanzhi County Chengguan Commune Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县城关公社妇联会 ldquoChengguan gongshe guanyu samba jie qian funuuml gongzuo renwu ji yaoqiu (1960 nian 2 yue 7 ri) 城关公社关于三八节前妇女工作任务及要求 (1960年2月7日 ) [Cheng-guan Communersquos Work Tasks and Requirements of Womenrsquos Work Prior to the March 8 Womenrsquos Day Holiday]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 32ndash19


ltUNgt

hung outside somebodyrsquos house just to maintain the appearance of there being a kindergarten in case higher-ranking officials came to inspect41

iv Collective Welfare Enterprises under the Governmentrsquos Guidance

Over less than ten years rural childcare services evolved from busy-season childcare centers to model kindergartens There were also great changes to the nature methods and significance of childcare services These changes re-flected explorations and attempts made by local governments and the public to build an ideal society

(A) From Nursemaids to Kindergarten TeachersWith the movement to establish kindergartens begun in 1958 nursemaids were replaced by childcare workers nursery teachers and kindergarten teachers No longer were the positions filled by older local women who lacked the ability to work outside the home They were instead filled by women of outstand-ing political character chosen by commune leadership and now they received regular training from higher-level departments

In 1958 the Jishan County 稷山县 government began pushing for the large-scaleestablishment of kindergartens The County Bureau of Culture and Edu-cation selected nearly 700 teachers from all the cooperatives of the county for training centered in political education Culture and education officials also increased childcare professionalsrsquo skills levels through observation studies the convening of on-the-spot meetings lectures and other methods To further guide the work being done in kindergartens the Bureau of Culture and Educa-tion issued several pamphlets including ldquoA Primer on Kindergartens and Pre-school Educationrdquo 幼儿园和幼儿教育的基础知识 and ldquoRural Kindergarten Workrdquo 农村幼儿园工作 These pamphlets provided work and rest schedules and curriculum schedules for all kindergartens in the county42 The Nanguan Village Yingzhao Peoplersquos Commune Yangcheng County made these demands for selecting kindergarten workers ldquoThey must be politically reliable hold prestige among commune members have amiable attitudes and love chil-drenrdquo The commune organized professional education activities for teachers every seven days convened meetings on residential issues at the kindergarten

41 From interviews I conducted with Jia Zhenghua (78 years old) Du Qiaoyun (89 years old) Li Yingying (82 years old) Li Xianying (78 years old) Li Baoting (78 years old) and others in Fanzhi County Shanxi Province on February 20 2013

42 Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyangmdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi 5ndash7

HAN 148

ltUNgt

every ten days and convened meetings with mothers twice a month43 In September 1959 the government of Chengguan Town Fanzhi County and the local Womenrsquos Federation jointly issued a notice on group training for all kindergarten teachers in the townrsquos jurisdiction The notice demanded that all areas dispatch ldquopeople who are politically clear and ardently love womenrsquos and childrenrsquos workrdquo and added that ldquoit is absolutely forbidden to not send enough peoplerdquo44 The quality of rural kindergarten teachers was improved through the governmentrsquos selection and training programs these programs formed the foundationfor the establishment of model kindergartens At the same time changes to the identities of youth educators reflected the change that had taken place in rural childcare from popular organizations formed voluntarily for mutual benefit into collective social enterprises under the direct guidance of the government

(B) From Decentralized Childcare to Concentrated CareDuring the era of the peoplersquos commune local governments began promoting the ldquobigrdquo and the ldquopublicrdquo in their construction of kindergartens in response to the ideology of ldquofirst big and second publicrdquo which prevailed at the time Such an ideology was a radical departure from the traditional household childcare methods previously employed

In May 1958 the Beiliu Qingfeng Brigade 北留庆丰大队 of Yangcheng Coun-ty founded a kindergarten In April officials announced that the kindergarten was now providing full-time care and had been selected as an advanced work unit in socialist construction by the county government45 In 1958 the Xiawudu Farm 下五渡农场 of the Kuangqu Commune 矿区公社 of Yangquan City 阳泉市 founded a kindergarten Attendance at this school escalated from 22 to 116 ie attendance by 100 percent of children living in the schoolrsquos jurisdiction This facility was selected as an advanced work unit in agricultural socialist

43 ldquoYangcheng xian yingzhao renmin gongshe fejin dadui bu hu yi fen qian you ban tuoyoursquoeryuan ban cheng quan tuo baoyuyuan de zhuanti cailiao (1959 nian)rdquo

44 Fanzhi County Chengguan Town Peoplersquos Committee 繁峙县城关镇人民委员会 ldquoGuanyu 1960 nian lsquosan barsquo jie qian xunlian yi pi baoyuyuan baojianyuan jieshengyuan de tongzhi (1960 nian 2 yue 22 ri) 关于 1960年 ldquo三八 rdquo 节前训练一批保育员保健员

接生员的通知 (1960年2月22日 ) [Notice on Training a Slew of Nursemaids Health Workers and Midwives Before the ldquoMarch Eighthrdquo Holiday of 1960 (February 22 1960)]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 32ndash27

45 ldquoBeiliu qingfeng dadui yoursquoeryuan shi zenme ban qilai de (1958 nian 11 yue) 北留庆丰

大队幼儿园是怎么办起来的 (1958年 11月 ) [How the Kindergarten of the Beiliu Qingfeng Brigade was Established (November 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 157ndash50


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construction46 The Hongqi Peoplersquos Commune 红旗人民公社 Xiabai Town-ship 下柏乡 Jiang County 绛县 instituted the ldquocommunal living institution for childrenrdquo soon after founding a kindergarten All forty-one students boarded there eating and sleeping in the school47 Children at the boarding kindergar-ten of the Fenghuo Commune Qin County were each given monthly allocations of twenty jin of refined grains and half a jin of starch noodles in addition to daily allocations of half a jin of vegetables All other food consumed was reim-bursed on the basis of actual consumption with the commune settling monthly accounts for the school Individual production teams were tasked with deliver-ing coal to the school and it was mandated that the children not eat the same meal twice in a week The commune further planned to provide two coats to the children every year48 In 1959 The Yuci Satellite Commune Daoping Kin-dergarten announced that 100 percent of children in the jurisdiction were in attendance that a youth canteen had been established and that each child was guaranteed a daily ration of 12 liang [a unit of measure equal to 50 grams] of processed grains The children were given physical inspections by the school and the local health center once a week Their hair was cut once a month and their clothes washed once every seven days All children were given masks49

If one puts aside the possible exaggerations in the above figures and looks only at the governmentrsquos approbation of these model kindergartens one can see that concentrated care conducted in the form of a public welfare enter-prise was the direction and objective of rural kindergarten construction in the era of the peoplersquos commune However such kindergartens that exemplified the positive nature of collectivization were not suitable to rural social condi-tions at the time On the one hand it was very difficult for local governments which were under tight economic constraints to guarantee the meeting of standards for the supply of material resources to these kindergartens in the long term On the other hand full-time ldquocollective youth living institutionsrdquo ran counter to traditional rural concepts of child-rearing In the materials I reviewed I found many instances of parents unwilling to send their children to these kindergartens

46 Shi Yuying 师玉英 ldquoWomen de yoursquoeryuan shi ruhe ban hao de (1958 nian 12 yue) 我们的幼儿园是如何办好的 (1958年 12月 ) [How Our Kindergarten Was Founded ( December 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 163ndash8

47 Chen Yanjiao 陈燕皎 ldquoQuanxin quanyi peiyu zuguo de huaduo (1958 nian 11 yue) 全心全意培育祖国的花朵 (1958年 11月 ) [Cultivating the Flowers of our Ancestral Homeland With All Our Hearts (November 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 156ndash85

48 ldquoShanxi sheng funuuml shehui zhuyi jianshe jiji fenzi daibiao huiyi fayan gaordquo49 Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyangmdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi 16ndash18

HAN 150

ltUNgt

(C) Transitioning from a Focus on Womenrsquos Liberation to a Focus on Childrenrsquos Education

The primary objectives for the founding of childcare centers in the era of the agricultural cooperative were liberating women and enlarging the labor pool By the era of the peoplersquos commune changes had taken place in the objects of this service following changes to the nature of childcare By this time pre-school education had come to the forefront and the core objective of this edu-cation had become the fostering of successors to the enterprise of communism

In 1958 the Jishan County Bureau of Culture and Education noted that the objective behind founding kindergartens was to liberate female labor and educate the younger generation in the spirit of communism ldquoThe concrete task in kindergarten education is to develop children into a new generation of communism endowed with culture the love of labor and healthy bodiesrdquo50 The Womenrsquos Federation of Fanzhi County demanded that ldquochildren entering kindergartens receive pre-school education and become good children who are polite understand reason are brave are vivacious and have worry-free demeanorsrdquo51 Some kindergarten teachers who had received training began to attempt new methods per government demands on kindergarten education Chen Yanjiao 陈燕皎 a teacher in the kindergarten of the Hongqi Peoplersquos Commune of Xiabai Township Jiang County was also the deputy secretary of the communersquos youth league committee and director of the communersquos womenrsquos federation She proposed moral character education that taught chil-dren to love labor love studying and love their motherland She developed vegetable gardens in the kindergarten which the children watered weeded and fertilized She taught her students stories of the martyrdom of Huang Ji-guang 黄继光 and Liu Hulan 刘胡兰 as well as reading and singing52 The kindergarten of the Xiawudu Farm of the Yangquan Mining District Commune divided children into different grades according to their age and organized a health group and singing team to take to the streets and spread official politi-cal teachings of the time Teachers there also taught morning exercises games and dance in addition to formal classes to all able students They also brought the children out into the fields to observe planting to work sites to observe the construction of buildings and to wild areas surrounding the village to observe

50 Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyangmdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi 251 Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇联会 ldquoGao hao yoursquoeryuan ji dian jianyi

(1958 nian 8 yue) 搞好幼儿园几点意见 (1958年8月 ) [Some Opinions on Founding Kindergartens (August 1958)]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 25ndash40

52 Chen Yanjiao


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nature thus enriching the childrenrsquos lives53 The Guanjiabao 贯家堡 Kinder-garten of Taigu County 太谷县 established a curriculum that included classes in languages arithmetic handicrafts music and sports Teachers there ldquooften tookthe children outdoors where they learned the difference between wheat and chives and between corn and sorghum The children heard the whirring of electrical waterwheels and the rumbling of boilers they saw the deep green of grain seedlings and lush orchards full of fruithellip This fostered in the children a sense of respect for workers and peasants ardent love of work and labor and an attitude of stewardship toward public propertyrdquo54

As peoplersquos communes were integrated with local governments at the time kindergartens a collective welfare enterprise were constructed on a large scale over a very short period of time Rural kindergartens were the continuation and development of busy-season childcare centers but they were also suscep-tible to the influence of the vogue of communism and fantastical notions well ahead of their time To a certain extent this trend led to rural kindergartensrsquo being out of touch with rural realities at the time With the onset of the three years of hardship most rural kindergartens were closed at the same time as rural public canteens and childcare reverted to previous models of neighbors helping each other or care by grandparents Nevertheless rural kindergartens of this era left behind experiences in increasing professionalism among teach-ers and developing pre-school education that deserve to be commended today

Rural childcare service providers in the Peoplersquos Republic of China evolved from busy-season childcare centers to public welfare kindergartens Through-out that process there were popular innovations made in pre-school education on the basis of the real needs of rural areas but there were also problems asso-ciated with exaggerated reporting and adventurism A look back on the history and summarizing the lessons learned helps us achieve a deeper understanding of the changes that took place to Chinese rural society in that particular era and of the efforts and explorations by the government and the public to build an ideal society Moreover such a reflection can also be valuable towards ef-forts to resolve some of todayrsquos rural social issues particularly those related to children left behind in the villages by their migrant parents For example we must build a rural pre-school education and supervision system based on the true needs of rural society In this we must avoid vanity projects and projects meant to advance officialsrsquo political careers The government can try to

53 Shi Yuying54 Luuml Fenghua 吕凤花 ldquoDang hao peiyu zuguo huaduo de yuanyishi (1958 nian 12 yue)

当好培育祖国花朵的园艺师 (1958年 12月 ) [How to Be Good Gardeners Cultivating the Flowers of our Ancestral Homeland (December 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 155ndash32

HAN 152

ltUNgt

encourage private capital and civic organizations to establish different forms of childcare service organizations which would with policy guidance develop into mutually beneficial sustainable enterprises While supervising rural childcare organizations the government should also make use of resource advantages to improve childcare conditions and play a greater role in improving the quality of childcare workers So doing would allow rural children to be both cared for and educated in a way that would satisfy parents children and the government

References

ldquoBa haizi song dao nongmang tuorsquoersuo qu 把孩子送到农忙托儿所去 [Send Children to Busy-Season Childcare Centers]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 June 1 1955 No 3

ldquoBaiyangyu nongye shengchan hezuoshe shixing nannuuml tong gong tong chou funuuml canjia shengchan de jijixing gengjia tigao 白羊峪农业生产合作社实行男女同

工同酬妇女参加生产的积极性更加提高 [Baiyangyu Agricultural Cooperative Implements Equal Pay for Equal Work for Men and Women Womenrsquos Proactivity in Participating in Production Further Increased]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 September 5 1953 No 2

ldquoBeiliu qingfeng dadui yoursquoeryuan shi zenme ban qilai de (1958 nian 11 yue) 北留庆丰

大队幼儿园是怎么办起来的(1958年 11月) [How the Kindergarten of the Beiliu Qingfeng Brigade was Established (November 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 157ndash50



Cao Guanqun 曹冠群 ldquoJinyibu jiefang funuuml laodongli wei duokuai haosheng di jianshe shehui zhuyi fuwu 进一步解放妇女劳动力为多快好省地建设社会

主义服务 [Further Liberating Female Labor Serves the Faster More Economical Construction of Socialism]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 June 2 1958 No 2

Chen Yanjiao 陈燕皎 ldquoQuanxin quanyi peiyu zuguo de huaduo (1958 nian 11 yue) 全心全意培育祖国的花朵(1958年 11月) [Cultivating the Flowers of our Ancestral Homeland with All Our Hearts (November 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 156ndash85

Fanzhi County Chengguan Commune Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县城关公社妇联会 ldquoChengguan gongshe guanyu samba jie qian funuuml gongzuo renwu ji yaoqiu (1960 nian 2 yue 7 ri) 城关公社关于三八节前妇女工作任务及要求(1960年2月7日) [Chengguan Communersquos Work Tasks and Requirements of Womenrsquos Work Prior to the March 8 Womenrsquos Day Holiday]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 32ndash19


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Fanzhi County Chengguan Town Peoplersquos Committee 繁峙县城关镇人民委员会 ldquoGuanyu 1960 nian lsquosan barsquo jie qian xunlian yi pi baoyuyuan baojianyuan jiesh-engyuan de tongzhi (1960 nian 2 yue 22 ri) 关于 1960年ldquo三八rdquo节前训练一批保

育员保健员接生员的通知(1960年2月22日) [Notice on Training a Slew of Nursemaids Health Workers and Midwives Before the ldquoThree Eightrdquo Holiday of 1960 (February 22 1960)]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 32ndash27

Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇联会 ldquoGao hao yoursquoeryuan ji dian jianyi (1958 nian 8 yue) 搞好幼儿园几点意见(1958年8月) [Some Opinions on Found-ing Kindergartens (August 1958)]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 25ndash40

Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇女联合会 ldquoTiejiahui xiang Nanguan cun gongnong lianmengshe shi zenyang ban qi tuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan de (1956 nian 7 yue 3 ri) 铁家会乡南关村工农联盟社是怎样办起托儿所幼儿园

的(1956年7月3日) [How the Worker-Peasant Alliance of Nanguan Village Tiejia-hui Township Established Childcare Centers and Kindergartens (July 3 1956)]rdquo Xinzhou City Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 6ndash2

Luuml Fenghua 吕凤花 ldquoDang hao peiyu zuguo huaduo de yuanyishi (1958 nian 12 yue) 当好培育祖国花朵的园艺师(1958年 12月) [How to Be Good Gardeners Cultivat-ing the Flowers of our Ancestral Homeland (December 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 155ndash32

ldquoNanyujiao nongyeshe zuzhi nongmang tuorsquoersuo tengchu you xiaohai funuuml canjia tianjian shengchan 南余交农业社组织农忙托儿所腾出有小孩妇女参加

田间生产 [Nanyujiao Agricultural Cooperative Organizes Busy Season Childcare Centers Frees Women with Children to Participate in Agricultural Production]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 July 7 1954 No 2

ldquoNongmang tuorsquoer huzhuzu 农忙托儿互助组 [Busy-Season Childcare Mutual Aid Groups]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 May 17 1952 No 3

Qi County Democratic Womenrsquos Federation 祁县民主妇女联合会 ldquoQiuji funuuml gong-zuo anpai de chubu yijian (1956 nian 10 yue 3 ri) 秋季妇女工作安排的初步意见

(1956年 10月3日) [Initial Opinions on Womenrsquos Autumn Work Plans (December 3 1956)]rdquo Qi County Li Village Archives 42ndash63

ldquoQuan sheng funuuml daibiao huiyi jueding funuuml ying zuo de shiqing 全省妇女代表会

议决定妇女应做的事情 [Province-wide Womenrsquos Congress Determines Things Women Should Do]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 November 10 1949 No 2

ldquoQuwo Dongcheng cun chengli le tuorsquoersuo jiejue le dai haizi funuuml de xuexi kunnan 曲沃东城村成立了托儿所解决了带孩子妇女的学习困难 [Dongcheng Vil-lage of Quwo Founds Childcare Center Solves Difficulties Experienced by Women with Children in Attending School]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 December 1 1952 No 4

ldquoQuwo xian renmin weiyuanhui guanyu dali juban nongmang tuorsquoersuo de jinji tong-zhi (1956 nian 5 yue 28 ri) 曲沃县人民委员会关于大力举办农忙托儿所的紧急

HAN 154

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通知(1956年5月28日) [Urgent Notice of the Quwo County Peoplersquos Committee on Striving to Establish Busy Season Childcare Centers]rdquo Houma City Shangpingwang Village Archives 131ndash5

ldquoShanxi sheng funuuml shehui zhuyi jianshe jiji fenzi daibiao huiyi fayan gao 山西省妇

女社会主义建设积极分子代表会议发言稿 [Manuscript of Speeches Delivered at the Shanxi Provincial Congress of Women Socialist Construction Activists]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 156ndash136

Shi Yuying 师玉英 ldquoWomen de yoursquoeryuan shi ruhe ban hao de (1958 nian 12 yue) 我们的幼儿园是如何办好的(1958年 12月) [How Our Kindergarten Was Founded (December 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 163ndash8

Shixian wu hua jiefang le funuuml laodongli 《实现五化解放了妇女劳动力》 [Bring-ing About the Five Changes Liberated Female Labor] ed Shanxi Provincial Womenrsquos Federation 山西省妇联 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1958)

ldquoSigouhui cun de funuuml bianyang la 寺沟会村的妇女变样啦 [The Women of Sigouhui Village Have Changed]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 August 14 1952 No 2

ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao le 屯留县西故村农忙

托儿所办得更好了 [Childcare Centers in Xigu Village Tunliu County Now Better Run]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 April 21 1952 No 2

Wuxiang funuuml yundong shiliao xuanbian di 2 ji《武乡妇女运动史料选编》第2 集 [ Selected Historical Materials from the Womenrsquos Movement in Wuxiang Vol 2] ed Wuxiang County Womenrsquos Movement History Office 武乡县妇运史办公室 (1985)

ldquoXinhe cun chengli le baomu xiaozu dai haizi de funuuml shang le minxiao 新河村成

立了保姆小组带孩子的妇女上了民校 [Xinhe Village Has Established a Nurse-maid Group Women with Children Now in Peoplersquos School]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山

西农民》 December 14 1952 No 4ldquoYangcheng xian yingzhao renmin gongshe fejin dadui bu hu yi fen qian you ban

tuoyoursquoeryuan ban cheng quan tuo baoyuyuan de zhuanti cailiao (1959 nian) 阳城

县应朝人民公社飞进大队不花一分钱由半托幼儿园办成全托保育园的专

题材料(1959年) [Dedicated Materials on How the Feijin Brigade of the Yingzhao Commune of Yangcheng County Converted Half-care Kindergartens into Full-care Nurseries Without Spending a Penny]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 18ndash11

Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyang gongzuomdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi 《幼儿园的教养工作mdashmdash 托儿所幼儿园工作经验选辑之一》 [The Edu-cation Work of KindergartensmdashVolume One of Selected Works on the Work Experi-ence of Childcare Centers and Kindergartens] ed Shanxi Provincial Department of Civil Affairs and Shanxi Provincial Womenrsquos Federation 山西省民政厅山

西省妇女联合会 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1959)


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chapter 7

Restitution Paid by Rural Peoplersquos Cooperatives in the 1960smdashAn Inquiry Focused on Jiangsu Province

Wang Yugui1

Abstract

Just as in the rest of China the effects of the ldquofive things in voguerdquomdashmost notably the ldquovogue of communismrdquomdashwere extremely severe in rural Suzhou during the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and peoplersquos commune movements As the entire Party was commit-ted to redressing ldquoleftistrdquo errors in the early 1960s the local governments of rural Su-zhou began the task of cataloguing funds and materials that had been appropriated from production brigades communes and individuals during the Great Leap Forward movement with the aim of making restitution or reparation Reviewing the experi-ence and lessons of this work in rural Suzhou is of particular significance to our further understanding and evaluations of the peoplersquos commune movement as well as further-ing research in the history of peoplersquos communes

Keywords

peoplersquos communes ndash reparation and restitution work ndash rural Suzhou

In the 1960s the entire Party and governments across the country began to redress egregious errors made during the Great Leap Forward movement At the same time the national government began making comprehensive

This essay was one of the results of the research performed by the author during his project ldquoStructural Transformations to the Ownership System and Socioeconomic Changes to Rural Areas of Contemporary Jiangnanrdquo《所有制的结构性变革与当代江南农村社会经济

的变迁》 (Project Serial No Su Guihua 苏规划[09ndash3001]) subsidized by the Jiangsu pro-vincial governmentrsquos ldquoNinth Five-Year Planrdquo social sciences fund

1 Wang Yugui (王玉贵 ) was born in 1965 and is a doctorate of history and lecturer in the his-tory department of Jiangsu University

WANG156

ltUNgt

adjustments to the economy and severe hardship was soon mitigated One important measure taken to redress previous ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes and correct the economy was to settle accounts and make restitution for errors stemming from poor leadership the negative effects of the vogue of communism and ldquomis-appropriation of resources and personnelrdquo which had taken place during the peoplersquos commune movement Until now no academic research has been pub-lished on this topic Having made a deep reading of a large volume of materials to serve as the basis of this essay which focuses specifically on Jiangsu Province I hope to make a contribution in the further study of the issue of restitution

i

Amid the Great Leap Forward and the peoplersquos commune movements launched in 1958 poor leadership led to many egregious errors including ldquorunning into communismrdquo the large-scale establishment of public canteens The enthusi-asm of the timeled to the widespread emergence of the ldquofive things in voguerdquo2 most particularly the ldquovogue of communismrdquo (a trend by which egalitarian-ism was held supreme and labor and material resources were transferred ar-bitrarily regardless of which commune they belonged to) In November 1958 Mao Zedong 毛泽东 commenced an initiative to redress some of these errors demanding that ldquoold accounts must be settledrdquo and held that ldquosettling accounts is the only way to realize the objective value of thingsrdquo3 Thereafter govern-ments across the country began making initial settlements and restitution and reparation for ldquomisappropriations of funds and materialsrdquo The Suzhou govern-ment in April 1959 began launching pilots in settlement and restitution work in some communes and production teams in Changshu County 常熟县 Wu County 吴县 and other areas officials also made reparation to people in some areas for what had been appropriated from them during the ldquoGreat Forging of Steel and Ironrdquo movement4 However this work came to a grinding halt when

2 Translatorrsquos note In addition to the ldquovogue of communismrdquo the ldquofive things in voguerdquo also included boastful aggrandizement arbitrary commands cadre exceptionalism and counter-productive direction of production

3 Peoplersquos Republic of China State Agriculture Commission General Office 中华人民共和国

国家农业委员会办公厅 Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian (1958ndash1981) xia 《农

业集体化重要文件汇编 (1958~1981)》下 [Selected Important Documents on Agricultural Collectivization (1958ndash1981) Vol 2] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1981) 163

4 ldquoChangshu xian diyi er pi gongshe suanzhang dahui de zongjie (chugao) 常熟县第一

二批公社算账大会的总结 (初稿 ) [Summary of the Changshu County Conference

157Restitution Paid by Rural Peoplersquos Cooperatives in the 1960s

ltUNgt

at the Lushan Conference the decision was made to launch party-wide criti-cism and clampdown of the so-called ldquorightist opportunismrdquo

As the consequences of the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward further intensified large numbers of abnormal deaths occurred in many rural areas across the country Even southern Jiangsu a region long known to be prosper-ous was no exception The Bacheng Commune 巴城公社 of Kunshan Coun-ty 昆山县 was worst affected with 558 deaths between November 1959 and February 1960 a loss of 38 percent of the total rural population Among the dead were 180 people of working age and 168 children or seniors 178 were ab-normal deaths ie thirty-two percent of the total One hundred and thirty-one of those who died had a pre-existing disease which were exacerbated by food shortages they accounted for twenty-three percent of total deaths A total of 1263 members of the commune or 78 percent of the total population had contracted edema cyanosis wasting disease gynecological diseases or other diseases Most brigades in the region saw their food supplies exhausted some for thirty days but most for around forty days The most severely affected bri-gades were without food supplies for over sixty days In these instances great numbers of people fled the famine At the apex of the flight 1312 peoplemdash92 percent of the total rural population in the areamdashwere on the move looking for food The most severely affected brigade was the Yangmu Brigade 杨木大队 where thirty-nine percent of commune members took to flight5 In 1959 594 members of the Zhouzhuang Commune 周庄公社 were diagnosed with ede-ma that number rose to 1394 in 1960 Over two years 500 members of that commune died from starvation Of those 482 were members of the Panlong Brigade 蟠龙大队 There 115 people contracted edema fifty-two women contracted amenorrhea and four women suffered uterine prolapse Fourteen

on Settlements in the First and Second Batches of Communes (Draft)]rdquo June 3 1959 H5-1-1959-34 Peasant and Worker Department of the Suzhou Prefectural Committee of the Communist Party of China 中国共产党苏州地委农工部 ldquoWu xian puzhuang gongshe de liang bi zhang 吴县浦庄公社的两笔账 [Two Accounts of the Puzhuang Commune of Wu County]rdquo April 3 1959 ldquoChangshu xian dirsquoer pi suanzhang dahui youguan shuzi tongji 常熟县第二批算账大会有关数字统计 [Relevant Figures and Statistics from the Changshu County Conference on the Second Batch of Settlements]rdquo May 1959 ldquoChangshu xushi pian suanzhang dahui de zongjie baogao 常熟徐市片算账大会的总结报告 [Sum-mary Report on the Settlement Conference for the Xuzhou Region of Changshu]rdquo (original report untitled this title was formulated by the author) June 3 1959 H5-2-1959-59

5 Kunshan County Committee of the Communist Party of China 中共昆山县委员会 ldquoGuanyu bacheng gongshe zaocheng duanliang siwang shijian de diaocha baogao 关于巴城公社造成断粮死亡事件的调查报告 [Investigative Report Regarding In-cidents of Running out of Food and Deaths in the Bacheng Commune]rdquo June 20 1960 H1-2-1960-209

WANG158

ltUNgt

members of the brigade starved to death6 The emergence of the above situ-ations caused central policy-making departments to become more deeply aware of the severity of rural circumstances as a result restitution work found its way back onto the agenda In November 1960 the ccp Central Committee issued the ldquoUrgent Directives on Current Policy Issues in Rural Peoplersquos Com-munesrdquo 关于农村人民公社当前政策问题的紧急指示信 The directives called for earnest accounting and decisiverestitution to be made for any hous-es furniture land vehicles livestock agricultural products and by-products building materials or any other property seized without compensation as a result of the vogue of communism which had swept through the Great Leap Forward and peoplersquos commune movements In cases where the seized objects were still available they must be returned In all other cases reparation must be made after the fair value of the misappropriated objects had been deter-mined7 Not long thereafter the ccp Central Committee issued the ldquoInstruc-tions on the Thorough Implementation (of the Urgent Directives)rdquo 关于贯彻

执行〈紧急指示信〉的指示 which read as follows ldquoThorough accounting of and decisiverestitution for all misappropriated funds and materials are im-perative This is the only way to further improve the incentives of the masses to work In some cases some communes and brigades will be unable to afford restitution and may not be able to guarantee full settlement prior to the spring plowing of next year In these cases provincial prefectural sub-provincial and county governments should prepare funds to assist these communes and bri-gades In cases where provincial sub-provincial and county governments fall short financially the central government will provide necessary assistancerdquo8 In December that year the ccp Central Committee convened a working meet-ing to discuss further cleaning things in up in rural areas and in the communes and issues related to the thorough implementation of the urgent directives of the ldquoTwelve Instructionsrdquo After the meeting the Central Committee issued the ldquoccp Central Committee Summary of Minutes of the Discussions of Cleaning

6 Martial Protection Division of the Zhouzhuang Commune 周庄公社武保科 ldquoDui panlong dadui gaizao fucha qingkuang de zongjie 对蟠龙大队改造复查情况的总结 [Summary of Circumstances Discovered During a Reinvestigation of Reforms Implemented in the Pan-long Brigade]rdquo September 1 1961 Zhouzhuang County Committee of the Communist Party of China 中共周庄公社党委 ldquoSan nian lai gongzuo de jiancha baogao 三年来工作的检

查报告 [Report on Investigations into Work Done These Past Three Years]rdquo September 15 1961 Zhouzhuang Town Archives

7 cpc Central Literary Research Department 中共中央文献研究室 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 13 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 13 册 [Selected Important Doc-uments Since the Founding of the Nation Vol 13] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 662

8 Ibid 679


ltUNgt

Things up in Rural Areas and Communes and Several Policy Issuesrdquo 中央工作会

议关于农村整风整社和若干政策问题的讨论纪要 which made clearer and more concrete stipulations regarding restitution and reparation work9 This document mandated that officials act decisively in making restitution for all misappropriated funds and materials made since the beginning of the peoplersquos commune movement and that they proceed in accordance with the principle of ldquoleaving nothing that had been misappropriated unaccounted or uncompensated forrdquo Officials were to use the restitution process to solidify the three-tier ownership system of peoplersquos communes the foundation of which was the production team Restitution was to be made to educate both cadres and the masses and to help everybody better understand the Marxist prin-ciple of not exploiting peasants and the principles of exchange of equivalents and ldquoto each according to his contributionsrdquo Restitution work the document declared must walk the road of the masses must adhere to democratic prin-ciples and must advocate the partyrsquos policies to the masses All matters related to restitution work were to be fully discussed in poor peasant committees or commune member congresses Restitution was to be made in all instances in which the majority of masses present found them necessary The document declared that reparation is to be resorted to only whenrestitution was not fea-sible In cases where reparation is made the money comes from three sources namely in descending order are cash resources of the commune or brigade then small public cash reserves of county governments or public enterprise work units and finally extra budgetary funds and state-allocated stipends of provincial prefectural or autonomous region governments It was forbidden for departments at all levels to take out bank loans to pay for reparations or to use the moneyfor any other purpose Settlements were to be made in full for all cases in which cadres had embezzled funds or overdrawn from public accounts

Mao placed great emphasis on restitution work often stressing that efforts tocorrect the ldquofive things in voguerdquo ought to focus on the ldquovogue of commu-nismrdquo according to whose core principles there would be egalitarianism in materials supply and food provision and production resources of production brigades are subject to indiscriminate appropriation by the commune10 He further noted that ldquothe question of restitutionis very important we must car-ry out this work inearnestrdquo ldquoCounty and commune governments must make

9 Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian (1958ndash1981) xia 435ndash43610 cpc Central Literary Research Department 中共中央文献研究室 Jianguo yilai Mao

Zedong wengao di 9 ce 《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第9 册 [Mao Zedong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 9] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 352

WANG160

ltUNgt

restitutioneven if they have to sacrifice family enterprises and go bankrupt That is because we have exploited the peasantry which is absolutely not al-lowed by Marxism Our misappropriation of the fruits of peasant labor are more egregious than the exploitation by landlords and capitalists At least capitalists have to pay something for what they take albeit less than the equiv-alent value but we give nothing at all in our misappropriation We must per-sist in making restitution all departments all industries and all enterprises must persist in making restitution for all items misappropriated It would even be acceptable for commune resources to be exhausted by saidrestitution to have only a few people and a few grass huts leftrdquo ldquoCounty governments and communes as well as all relevant departments must make restitution those with material resources should compensate with material resources and those with money must compensate with moneyrdquo ldquoAny government body school factory or military unit that misappropriated must make restitutionrdquo ldquoTo cor-rect the lsquovogue of communismrsquo we must truly make good on our pledge to make restitution We would learn nothing if we did not experience some pain and suffering in this process The only way to understand the Marxist principle of exchange of equivalents is through experiencing some pain and sufferingrdquo He further noted that ldquothere must be boundaries set in restitution and repara-tion The state will pay a portion of restitution in relation tothe large-scale con-struction of hydraulic projects transportation projects and processed foods production hubs Counties and communes cannot be made to make those portions of restitution or reparation which the state should make Cadres at the county and commune levels must be convinced of the justification forres-titution their errors cannot be corrected if they are notrdquo11 On January 8 1961 Mao made the following comments upon hearing the report of leading cad-re of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee ldquoIt is not enough for only the central and provincial governments to have resolve We will fail if prefectural and county governments lack resolve If prefectural and county governments have resolve then even if some communes or production teams fail it will be only a question of time We must make them truly understand the difference between communism and socialism and the difference between ownership by all the people and collective ownership We cannot exploit the peasantry exchanges must be made among equals We can exploit landlords exploiting peasants is unheard of Such an ideadoes not buildsocialism but destroys itrdquo12

11 Mao Zedong wenji di 7 juan 《毛泽东文集》第7 卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 7] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1999) 227ndash228

12 Gu Longsheng 顾龙生 Mao Zedong jingji nianpu 《毛泽东经济年谱》 [Economic Chronicles of Mao Zedong] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1993) 528ndash529


ltUNgt

On January 9 after hearing reports at a central working conference he said that he had written a draft for the ldquoThree Great Disciplinary Laws and Eight Matters of Attentionrdquo 三大纪律八项注意 Part of this document read ldquoAr-ticle Five Those things which are borrowed must be repaid Article Six Res-titution must be made for those things that are destroyed Here we primarily mean that one may not engage in appropriating from othersrdquo13 On January 18 he made the following comment at the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Na-tional Congress ldquoWe must resolutely implement central control over account-ing exchange of equivalents distribution according to contribution and the principle of the more one works the more one getsrsquo Leaders in rural areas must resolutely rectify the lsquoFive Things in Voguersquo should makerestitution or repara-tion in all instances where they are warranted and may not choose not tordquo14 It was Maorsquos belief that ldquoresolutely correcting errors of uncompensated appro-priations making full restitution or reparationrdquo was ldquothe only way to promote the development of agricultural production the only way to create beneficial conditions for industrial development and the only way to further solidify the alliance of workers and peasantsrdquo15 In May of that year Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 returned to his home to conduct an investigation In a discussion with resi-dents of his native Tanzichong Village 炭子冲村 he said that restitutionwork ldquomust not be left half-finished or disposed of perfunctorily We must make firm settlements of every account and be prepared to experience some pain in this processrdquo ldquoOnce accounts are settled in full you should mark this by erecting a stele or hanging a framed catalogue [of what has been done] in the communerdquo ldquoWe must pass the lesson not to commit this error again down through the generationsrdquo16 Around this same time the Central Secretariat convened several meetings at which it was ordered to conduct concrete investigations and make arrangements for restitution work in rural areas17

It was on this basis that in June 1961 the ccp Central Committee issued the ldquoRegulations on Persisting in Correcting the Errors of Uncompensated Appropriations and Making Thorough Restitution and Reparationrdquo 关于坚决

13 Ibid 530ndash53114 Ibid 53515 Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian (1958ndash1981) xia 44716 Liu Shaoqi xuanji xia juan 《刘少奇选集》下卷 [Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi Vol 2]

(Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1985) 33117 Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆 Yang Shangkun riji xia 《杨尚昆日记》下 [Diary of Yang

Shangkun Vol 2] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 2001) 28ndash30 34 35 and 38 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与


WANG162

ltUNgt

纠正平调错误彻底退赔的规定 18 which further clarified and solidified regulations regarding the scope of restitution concrete principles work plans leadership organization the raising of materials and money and other areas The Regulations stipulated that the time period to be covered in the restitu-tion of uncompensated appropriations would begin primarily from the time of the founding of peoplersquos communes Although restitution should be made in full for any appropriation from commune members that took place before the establishment of communes said accounts were not to be considered ldquoun-compensated appropriationrdquo Restitution was to be made primarily in kind and reparation wasresorted to only if needed The principle of compensating all whose property was lost due to uncompensated appropriations was to be persisted in In cases in which means of production means of making a living or labor had been thus appropriated those materials urgently necessary for production or making a living by the peasantry were to be repaid first Restitu-tion work was to be conducted in installments over time in a planned and orderly manner All restitution workwas to be finished in five years The task of ensuring supply of all construction materials farm implements and oth-er tools required to make restitution was enjoined to relevant departments which were to adopt feasible effective measures and organize production Res-titution committees or restitution groups were to be established at every level of government from the center down to the production team which were also to establish task forcesto oversee all aspects of restitution work These task forces were to oversee allocations and manufacture of all materials required in restitutionwork and investigate and resolve all disputes arising from restitu-tion work Restitution work the Regulations demanded was to fully walk the ldquomass linerdquo

ii

The Regulations were made in response to the situation across the entire coun-try and to a certain extent were meant to confer guiding principles Beginning in late 1960 the Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee first selected regions heavily affected by uncompensated appropriations launching the first pilot in restitutionwork in the Mocheng Commune 莫城公社 of Changshu County

18 Huang Daoxia et al 黄道霞等 Jianguo yilai nongye hezuohua shiliao huibian 《建国以

来农业合作化史料汇编》 [Compiled Historical Materials on Agricultural Cooperati-zation Since the Founding of the Nation] (Beijing Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe 1992) 688ndash690


ltUNgt

in accordance with the unified deployments of both the Central Committee and Jiangsu Provincial Committee in order to provide a true basis for restitu-tion work to be performed in the Suzhou region19 Upon the basis of initial experience gained in cleaning up the communes the Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee issued several documents including the ldquoOpinions on Handling the Several Concrete Issues of Correcting the Errors of Uncompensated Appro-priations and Making Thorough Restitution (Draft)rdquo 关于纠正平调错误彻

底退赔中若干具体问题的处理意见（初稿） the ldquoOpinions on Handling the Several Concrete Policy Issues of Restitution Workrdquo 关于退赔工作中若

干具体政策问题的处理意见 the ldquoOpinions on Handling the Several Con-crete Issues of Restitution Work in the Mocheng Commune (Discussion Draft)rdquo 莫城公社关于退赔中若干具体问题的处理意见（讨论稿） and oth-ers20 These documents provided detailed concrete stipulations for policies and work deployments taking place in restitution in the Suzhou region

The above documents raised the following opinions regarding housing is-sues (1) Cases in which commune membersrsquo houses had been destroyed were to be handled in one of the two following methods In the first full restitution was to be made to those who had lost everything due to the taking of all or some of the materials of their houses In the second in cases in which part or most of the materials of a house were taken restitution was to be made for all materials taken as well as all labor and construction fees (2) In cases in which commune members were rallied to pull down a house restitution was to be made on the basis of actual damage done as well as for costs due to material losses excepting in those cases in which people were paid fees for having their houses pulled down in accordance with regulations (3) Full restitution was to be made for all building materials subject to uncompensated appropriations (4) In all cases in which commune membersrsquo houses had been occupied the original inhabitants were to be restored and rent to be paid for the duration of the occupation All damage done to such housing was to be fully repaired Any costs incurred from any repair or additions work done to such housing

19 cpc Suzhou City Committee Party History Research Department 中共苏州市委党史研

究室 Zhongguo gongchandang Suzhou dashiji 《中国共产党苏州大事记》[Record of Major Communist Party of China Events in Suzhou] (Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe 2000) 90

20 These documents can be found in the Suzhou City Archives Suzhou Prefectural cpc Com-mittee Peasant and Worker Division under Nos 56 and 57 in the permament category and No 86 in the long-term category See also ldquoXiong Renmin tongzhi zai suanzhang tuipei huiyi shang de fayan (jilu gao) 熊人民同志在算账退赔会议上的发言（记录稿） [The Speech of Comrade Xiong Renmin at the Conference on Settling Accounts and Mak-ing Restitutions (Transcription)]rdquo January 20 1961 H5-1-1961-56

WANG164

ltUNgt

during the period of occupation was to be deducted from rents Rent was to be exempted in cases when housing was occupied for grand tactics operations the construction of irrigation works or temporary support provided by visiting members of other communes however the sponsor of such activities was to be liable for making full restitution for any damage done to such housing (5) In cases in which the pulling down or occupation of a house caused its occupants to incur moving costs or renovations costs or in which furniture household implements or other property were damaged or lost as a result of the pulling down or occupation and in which the masses could testify to the veracity of the situation restitution was to be made on the basis of these losses in addi-tion to the loss of the house itself (6) Restitution was not to be made in the fol-lowing cases in which authorities did not deem losses to fall within the scope of uncompensated appropriations those commune members whose houses had been pulled down or occupied but who had been given new houses which were lost due to fire and those commune members who had sold their hous-es to other commune members or to the production team on the basis of an agreement but who were in disputes regarding the sale of their house owing to incomplete payments made (7) The county government was to be respon-sible for making restitution for all damages and construction costs incurred as a result of the tearing down of houses done for the Great Forging of Steel and Iron the large-scale construction of ponds and dykes the large-scale construc-tion of pig farms the construction of concentrated settlements the large-scale establishment of public canteens and assembly halls the construction of kin-dergartens or the celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the founding of the country excepting all materials to be compensated by the work unit respon-sible for the uncompensated appropriation

The documents made the following stipulations regarding farm imple-ments (1) All large and mid-sized farm implements paid for and introduced into common ownership at the time of the advanced agricultural cooperative were to be settled as old accounts In cases in which full payment had not been made interest should be made on the remaining sum calculated based on bank interest rates over the period of time over which local authorities had ex-ceeded the originally determined date of payment (2) All large and mid-sized farm implements which had not been formally appropriated by cooperatives but which had been collectively used following the peoplersquos commune move-ment could either be paid for by the commune or returned to their original owners with a reasonable compensation for time used (3) All privately owned small farm implements were to be handled on the basis of the individual com-mune memberrsquos circumstances Commune members who had experienced normal damages to implements which they had used themselves were to be


ltUNgt

solely responsible for such damages Restitution was to be made for damages incurred as a result of military units waging battle No restitution was to be made for those implements which had been returned to original owners after uncompensated appropriations but rent was to be paid for the duration of the uncompensated transfer The production brigade was to be responsible for making restitution for damages incurred to small implements seized and dam-aged due to collective usage as a result of blind direction of production caused by the merger of multiple teams Production teams were to conduct invento-ries and proactively return all implements which had been circulated to them from other teams All implements which went unclaimed were to become common property of the production team The production team was to make restitutionfor all damages incurred as a result of usage by the production team

The documents made the following stipulations regarding land (1) For all land which had been occupied by county governments communes or any public enterprise work unit restitutionwould be made by the unit responsible for the uncompensated appropriationfor both land usage and crops destroyed All land which had been seized but not used was to be returned in full to the production brigade and rent and agricultural taxes were to be paid for the du-ration of the land seizure (2) In cases in which land had been dug up packed down or rendered useless either the county government or the host unit was to be responsible for restitution depending on circumstances (3) All cultivat-ed and uncultivated land planted by public enterprise work units was to be returned unconditionally to the production team of original ownership (4) In cases in which buildings on homestead plots had been razed but new housing had been allocated to original occupants the homestead plot in question was to be returned to the production team In such cases in which new housing had not been allocated to original occupants the plot was to be restored to the original occupants

The documents made the following stipulations regarding labor (1) The county government or commune was to be responsible for paying labor com-pensations in cases in which either the county government or communersquos name had been invoked in making an uncompensated appropriation of labor (2) Mandatory labor performed in any of the ldquolarge-scalerdquo projects was allowed to be exempt from compensation (3) Labor settlements were to be made ac-cording to average unit prices effective in the years 1958 and 1959

The documents made the following stipulations regarding uncompensated appropriations of furniture utensils and construction materials (1) Restitu-tion was to be made for materials costs and labor costs for constructing kitch-en stoves in all cases in which commune membersrsquo kitchen stoves had been removed during any of the ldquolarge-scalerdquo movements regardless of whether the

WANG166

ltUNgt

original materials had been removed The county government was to make restitution in all cases of destruction of kitchen stoves performed during the Great Forging of Steel and Iron The commune was to be responsible in all cases of destruction of kitchen stoves performed during the manure collection movement The production team was to be responsible in all cases in which kitchen stoves were destroyed for the large-scale establishment of public can-teens (2) The production team was to be responsible for making restitution for damages incurred to utensils borrowed from commune members for the large-scale establishment of public canteens but it was not necessary to return those utensils which commune members had been encouraged to donate for collective use in public canteens (3) The work unit in charge of any ldquolarge-scalerdquo movement which had borrowed and damaged utensils of commune members was to be responsible for making restitution (4) It was not necessary to compensate commune members for any vegetables provided for common consumption in public canteens

The documents made the following stipulations regarding waters and fish ponds (1) All occupied rivers on which taxes were paid were to be returned to their original work units with rent and agricultural taxes paid for the duration of the occupation (2) Reimbursements were to be paid for all unreasonable prices paid for fish ponds used collectively by communes

The documents also made the following concrete stipulations regarding uncompensated appropriations of agricultural products and processed food products and fields used for high-yield experiments as well as pricing stan-dards for restitution (1) For all cases of unreasonable prices given for copper iron tin timber bamboo fishing nets and other materials seized for the ldquosev-en contributionsrdquo of the peoplersquos commune movement restitution was to be made to make up deficiencies in prices paid (2) Commune members who sold large quantities of means of production or living to meet distribution require-ments during the time of large-scale investments were to be compensated (3) Many commune membersdonated their own grain to public canteens and some exhausted their own grain quota through consuming meals at the pub-lic canteens There are three types of settlement for such a situation First no refund was necessary in cases where canteens had issued the member meal coupons in equivalent value For those whose ration of food had been fully used by the public canteens compensation in kind would be made to them when and if a bumper harvest made a surplus available For those who had consumed above and beyond what their quota allowed they would have to pay back the extra-quota portion provided this did not cut into their current rations (4) For those cases in which households had been raided for grain the following stipulations were made For those households which had been


ltUNgt

raided in 1958 but which belonged to communes that passed ldquoeat all you canrdquo policies in canteens reimbursement was to be paid for all grain seized but no in-kind compensation would be given All grain seized from households dur-ing home raids as part of the ldquostamping out underreporting of yields and keep-ing the unreported portion to oneselfrdquo campaign of 1959 was to be restored to original owners These policies were a synthesis of relevant central policies and concrete stipulations made in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region 苏州专

区 They were highly feasible and targeted and so I have given a detailed de-scription of them here

In order to strengthen integrated leadership and comprehensive planning of restitution work the Suzhou sub-provincial regional government and all party committees and organizations of the region established restitution offic-es or restitution task forces under the guidance and organization of rural work departments and financial departments per the instructions of superiors party committees of work units at the county level and below were given pri-mary responsibility over this work Archival records indicate that once restitu-tion work formally began restitution organs at every level convened meetings with financial planning commercial and other departments to discuss and address relevant issues The Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee convened several standing committee meetings and standing committee meetings with wider attendance then committee members to establish restitution work plans make decisions solve problems and provide guidance for the continu-ation of the work That is how restitution work in the Suzhou area was begun

The first order of business in making accurate restitution was to make a close accounting of all uncompensated appropriations Just as in the rest of the country various forms of uncompensated appropriations in Suzhou most notably those which took place as a result of the ldquovogue of communismrdquo were particularly egregious during the Great Leap Forward movement There were however some notable differences between uncompensated appropriations in Suzhou and those elsewhere in China In most of the country the ldquovogue of communismrdquo mostly affected the large-scale establishment of public canteens and in the founding of public enterprises by communes Uncompensated ap-propriations took place in even more projects in the Suzhou area the dredg-ing of the Taipu River 太浦河 the Liu River 浏河 the Wangyu River 望虞河 and Zhangjia Harbor 张家港 other irrigation works projects which took place at the same time as the Four Major Projects 四大工程 including Yanglint-ang 杨林塘 in Taicang 太仓 the Dongheng River 东横河 in Jiangyin 江阴 Xuputang 许浦塘 in Changshu the Western Tai Lake Dam 西太湖大堤 in Wu County the destruction of land crops and objects on the land such as houses and so on as a result of said dredging costs for the promulgation of

WANG168

ltUNgt

advanced tools and small tools land resources given by the collective and individual commune members for the Great Forging of Steel and Iron labor and materials appropriated without compensation for transportation projects as well as houses demolished land occupied crops destroyed and other rel-evant objects such means of production as new farm implements machinery chemical fertilizers and pesticides promulgated or provided by industrial and commercial public enterprises for which prices were set very low or not set at all funds allocated by the state for construction such as funds intended to compensate for the restoration of the Shanghai-Nanjing Road or for pro-vincial irrigation works projects which were misappropriated land laborers and capital seized or appropriated without compensation by government organs military units public enterprises and other such units in the develop-ment of departmental business activities such as labor used for technologi-cal innovation houses dismantled and trees chopped peasant land occupied for production self-sufficiency means of production and labor used without compensation for experiments in high yield agriculture and land occupied by government organs or public enterprises for blind construction or expansion21 It is easy to see that the scope of uncompensated appropriations was wider and their consequences more severe in the Suzhou area

Just as in the rest of the country steady progress was made in giving full accounting for uncompensated appropriations in Suzhou Statistics from spring of 1961 indicate that the total value of uncompensated appropriations from the entire region was 5115 million yuan of which 27588599 yuan were from the county level or higher22 Statistics recalculated in June 1961 indicate that the regional total was in fact 534005 million yuan of that total 271183 million yuan was owed to individual commune members 169428 million yuan to collectives and 93394 million yuan to distributions Of the total sum 2165 million was the responsibility of county-level and higher governments 1621 million of communes and higher and 1554 million of production teams and brigades23 Further rough calculations made in February 1962 indicated that

21 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu xian yishang jiguan dui renmin gongshe suanzhang tuipei de chubu fangrsquoan (chugao) 苏州专区县以上机关对人民公社算账退赔的初步方案（初

稿） [Initial Plan for Settlements and Restitutions to be Made in Peoplersquos Communes by Organs at the County Level and Higher in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region (Draft)]rdquo January 7 1961 H5-1-1961-56

22 See cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公

室 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangrsquoan 苏州专区退赔方案 [Suzhou Sub-provincial Re-gion Restitutions Plan]rdquo January 12 1962 H5-1-1962-63

23 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Settlement Fulfillment Leading Group （中共苏

州）地委算账兑现领导小组 ldquoGuanyu dangqian suanzhang tuipei qingkuang de


ltUNgt

the regional total of uncompensated appropriations was 11810 million yuan of that total eighty million yuan (sixty-eight percent) was owed to commune members and 3810 million (the remaining 32 percent) was owed to collec-tives24 A further rough calculation performed not long thereafter again raised the figure to 15174 million yuan with 10174 million yuan (sixty-seven percent) owed to commune members 2700 million (178 percent) to be distributed into collective incomes and 2300 million (152 percent) belonging to collective ac-cumulations This round of uncompensated transfer calculation set the state restitution burden at 8481 million yuan (558 percent) the county burden at 2716 million yuan (eighteen percent) and the peoplersquos commune burden at 2417 million yuan (sixteen percent) The final assessments of objects subject to uncompensated appropriations were as follows 154487 houses razed 145697 mu of land destroyed 506955 million working days of labor 765899 woks and 49863 million farm implements25 Final tallies are shown in Table 71

An examination of uncompensated appropriations of houses further in-dicates the severity of the problem in Suzhou Incomplete statistics indicate that a total of 62044 households and 154487 total structures were destroyed in the region (statistics released in late October 1962 set the total of structures at over 17780026 but the figure was later revised to 154270)27 Of structures destroyed 84584 or 548 percent were tile-roof houses and the remaining

baogao 关于当前算账退赔情况的报告 [Report on Current Conditions of Settle-ments and Restitutions]rdquo June 9 1961 and ldquoGuanyu dangqian suanzhang duipei de qin-gkuang he yijian 关于当前算账退赔的情况和意见 [Opinions on and the Current Situation of Settlements and Restitutions]rdquo June 24 1961 H5-1-1961-56

24 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Workers and Peasants Committee 中共苏州地委

农村工作部 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangrsquoan de kuangji shuoming 苏州专区退赔方

案的匡计说明 [Explanation of Rough Estimates of the Restitutions Plan in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo February 2 1962 H5-1-1962-63

25 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公室 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangrsquoan 苏州专区退赔方案 [Restitutions Plan of the Suzhou Sub-Provincial Region]rdquo February 12 1962 H5-1-1962-63

26 Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee Settlement Fulfillment Leading Group Office 中共

苏州地委退赔领导小组办公室 ldquoGuanyu tuipei fangwu gongzuo huiyi qingkuang he jindong mingchun yijian de baogao 关于退赔房屋工作会议情况和今冬明春意

见的报告 [Report on Conditions of the Working Meeting of Housing Restitutions and Opinions for Winter this Year and Spring Next Year]rdquo October 30 1962 H5-1-1962-63

27 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangwu anzhi chaiqian hu gongzuo qingkuang he yijian (chuxi sheng tuipei huiyi ziliao) 苏州专区退赔房屋安置拆迁户工作情况和意见（出席

省退赔会议资料） [Conditions of and Opinions on Restitutions to Households Re-located after Forcible Demolition of their Homes in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region (Materials from the Provincial Restitutions Conference)]rdquo March 7 1964 H5-1-1964-74

WANG170

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 7

1 Ac

coun

ting

for u

ncom

pens

ated

app

ropr

iatio

ns in

the S

uzho

u re

gion

by c

ateg

ory

Obj

ect o

f unc

ompe

nsat

ed

tran

sfer

Uni

tQ

uant

ityCa

sh e

quiv

alen

t (y

uan)

Not

es

1La

ndRe

stitu

tion

on c

olle

ctiv

e la

nd su

bjec

t to

unco

m-

pens

ated

app

ropr

iatio

ns w

as g

ener

ally

cal

cula

ted

for a

ppro

pria

tions

occ

urrin

g up

to sp

ring

1961

Fo

r exa

mpl

e o

rigin

ally

land

des

troy

ed b

y

irrig

atio

n w

orks

con

stru

ctio

n w

as c

ompe

nsat

ed

at a

rate

of t

wo

year

s of n

orm

al p

rodu

ctio

n

ie 1

45 y

uan

per m

u b

ut n

ow o

nly

62 is

giv

en

No

com

pens

atio

ns w

ere

give

n fo

r lan

d de

stro

yed

by ir

rigat

ion

wor

ks c

onst

ruct

ed b

y co

mm

unes

Land

des

troy

ed b

y irr

igat

ions

w

ork

cons

truc

tion

Mu

585

263

636

mn

Land

affe

cted

but

not

des

troy

ed

by ir

rigat

ions

wor

k co

nstr

uctio

nM

u40

145

512

000

Requ

isiti

oned

for i

nfra

stru

ctur

eM

u19

790

237

48 m

nO

ccup

ied

Mu

253

1063

270

0Cr

ops d

estr

oyed

Mu

273

2621

780

0

2H

ousi

ngH

ouse

s dem

olis

hed

with

out r

eloc

atio

n w

ere

com

pens

ated

at a

rate

of 2

60 y

uan

per s

truc

ture

H

ouse

s raz

ed w

ere

com

pens

ated

at a

rate

of 1

25

yuan

per

stru

ctur

e fo

r rel

ocat

ed h

ouse

hold

s H

ouse

s occ

upie

d w

ere

com

pens

ated

by

the

pay-

men

t of t

hree

yea

rs o

f ren

t and

the

cost

s of r

e-pa

irs n

eces

sary

afte

r sev

eral

yea

rs o

f occ

upat

ion

Des

troy

edSt

ruct

ures

134

838

471

93 m

nRe

loca

ted

Stru

ctur

es19

649

153

1 m

nO

ccup

ied

Stru

ctur

es17

983

04

316

mn

3La

bor

Labo

r req

uisi

tione

d by

the

coun

ty g

over

nmen

t fo

r the

con

stru

ctio

n of

irrig

atio

n w

orks

was

co

mpe

nsat

ed a

t sev

en ji

ao p

er d

ay N

o co

mpe

n-sa

tions

wer

e pa

id fo

r any

labo

r on

cons

truc

tion

of ir

rigat

ion

wor

ks b

y co

mm

unes

Irrig

atio

n w

orks

100

00

labo

r day

s4

608

2510

60

mn

Infra

stru

ctur

e an

d ot

her

100

00

labo

r day

s46

13

369

04 m

n


ltUNgt

Data

sou

rce

Suz

hou

Pre

fect

ural

Par

ty C

omm

itte

e Re

stit

utio

n Of

fice

中共

苏州

地委

退赔

办公

室 ldquo

Suzh

ou z

hua

nqu

tuip

ei f

angrsquo

an

苏州

专区

退赔

方案

[Su

zhou

Sub

-pro

vinc

ial

Regi

on R

esti

tuti

on P

lan]

rdquo Fe

brua

ry 12

196

2 H

5-1-

1962

-63

4M

ater

ial g

oods

and

oth

erFa

rm m

achi

nery

and

impl

emen

ts in

clud

e sm

all

impl

emen

ts o

f com

mun

e m

embe

rs su

bjec

t to

unco

mpe

nsat

ed a

ppro

pria

tions

The

re a

re a

to

tal o

f 997

259

hou

seho

lds i

n th

e en

tire

regi

on

the

num

ber o

f suc

h im

plem

ents

was

roug

hly

cal-

cula

ted

at fi

ve p

er h

ouse

hold

Far

m im

plem

ents

al

so in

clud

e w

oks a

nd so

up p

ots t

aken

for t

he

Gre

at F

orgi

ng o

f Ste

el a

nd Ir

on t

he n

umbe

r of

such

impl

emen

ts w

as ro

ughl

y ca

lcul

ated

at s

ix

per h

ouse

hold

The

num

ber o

f bric

ks a

nd ti

les

was

roug

hly

calc

ulat

ed to

be

740

00 p

er b

rigad

e

ther

e w

ere

3627

brig

ades

in th

e re

gion

The

qu

antit

y of

woo

d an

d ba

mbo

o w

as ro

ughl

y es

ti-m

ated

to b

e 12

50 d

an p

er b

rigad

e T

he a

mou

nt

of a

gric

ultu

ral p

rodu

cts a

nd b

y-pr

oduc

ts w

as

roug

hly

estim

ated

to b

e 80

0 da

n pe

r brig

ade

Ca

pita

l doe

s not

incl

ude

the

usin

g of

brig

ade

ac-

cum

ulat

ions

by

com

mun

es T

he o

ther

cat

egor

y in

clud

es o

bjec

ts o

n la

nd d

estr

oyed

in W

ujia

ng

Coun

ty b

y th

e dr

edgi

ng o

f the

Tai

pu R

iver

whi

ch

acco

unte

d fo

r 391

000

yua

n in

loss

es

Farm

mac

hine

ry a

nd

impl

emen

tsPi

eces

498

63 m

n17

452

mn

Boat

sEa

ch1

202

841

400

mn

Plow

oxe

nH

ead

417

417

1 m

nFu

rnitu

rePi

eces

598

35 m

n17

95

mn

Live

stoc

kH

ead

862

501

725

mn

Fow

lEa

ch23

542

589

00Br

ick

and

tile

Piec

es25

389

mn

380

8 m

nW

ood

and

bam

boo

Dan

440

7 m

n22

035

mn

Agric

ultu

ral p

rodu

cts a

nd

by-p

rodu

cts

Dan

246

2 m

n7

4047

mn

Capi

tal

Yuan

345

000

WANG172

ltUNgt

699903 or 452 percent were thatched cottages Razings of entire areas destroyed 196 natural villages six small towns 217 homestead plots 6810 households and 22103 structures About 20000 households and 45000 structures were destroyed as a result of piecemeal demolitions28 The Xieqiao Commune 谢桥公社 of Changshu County was the most severely affected in the region There a total of 1632 households were razed or 2087 percent of total households affecting 6998 people or 2571 percent of the population A total of 5520 structures were razed including 40575 thatched cottages and 14625 tile-roof buildings29 Large numbers of structures in the Jinxing 金星 Mingxing 明星 and Chenqiao 陈桥 Brigades of the Xieqiao Commune were razed as a result of the rerouting of the Wangyu River the Great Forging of Steel and Iron the large-scale establishment of collective settlements and stud farms and the large-scale establishment of public canteens Statistics indicate that in these three brigades 244 householdsmdash4326 percent of the totalmdash and 830 structuresmdash3679 percent of the totalmdashwere razed affecting 1047 people 4345 percent of the total population The campaign to reorganize production teams and villages alone led to the destruction of eleven villages and ten production teams as well as 171 householdsmdash70 percent of total households razed in the three brigadesmdashand 583 structuresmdashlikewise seventy percent of total structures razed The Jinxing Brigade saw the destruc-tion of five villages three production teams and fifty-nine households or seventy percent of total households The Mingxing Brigade saw the destruc-tion of three villages two production teams and forty-five households or sev-enty percent of total households The Chenqiao Brigade saw the destruction of three villages five production teams and sixty-seven households also

Explanation One reason for the discrepancies between earlier and later figures of demol-ished housing lay in the fact that some cases of house demolition were only later included in the scope of restitutions as policies were adjusted and the degree of restitution work escalated further clarifying the situation of uncompensated transfers Another reason is that some demolished houses which were initially included in the scope of uncom-pensated appropriationsrestitutions were later removed from that scope as conditions became clearer

28 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu pingdiao tuipei qingkuang 苏州专区平调退赔情况 [Conditions of Restitutions for Uncompensated Transfers in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 13 1962 H5-1-1962-63

29 ldquoGuanyu Changshu xian Xieqiao gongshe chaiqian minfang anzhi qingkuang de diaocha 关于常熟县谢桥公社拆迁民房安置情况的调查 [Investigation into Conditions of Forced Demolition and Relocation of Members of the Xieqiao Commune of Changshu County]rdquo October 6 1962 H1-2-1962-270


ltUNgt

seventy percent of total households30 These three brigades were a heavily-hit disaster area of the Xieqiao Commune

Progress was slow in restitution work at the outset One reason for the de-lay lay in the major adjustments being made to the national economy in the 1960s which intertwined many areas of work together and made the overall situation highly complex Another reason was an insufficient understanding of the importance of restitution work on the part of leaders in some areas which slowed the pace of their work and slowed overall progress of the entire enterprise31 On top of that the work itself was quite intricate and difficult Most officials lacked experience at the beginning and were unclear on which losses of property should be considered uncompensated appropriations how to calculate figures for those losses which were thus deemed and finally how to go about paying restitution Such lack of experience too affected the pace of work By the end of 1961 a total of 46927 million yuan in restitution had been paid in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region That figure consisted of 1455 million yuan in material goods 23247 million yuan in cash 4254 million yuan of debt repaid with objects of similar value and 4871 million yuan of bank promissory notes32 Progress in the various localities of the region was poorly balanced Progress was relatively fast in Suzhou City (and suburbs) where work entered its final stages after March 1961 A total of over 459000 yuan was disbursed around the city (and suburbs) accounting for 779 percent of total restitution

30 ldquoGuanyu (Changshu xian) Xieqiao gongshe jinxing mingxing chenqiao 3 dadui chaiq-ian hu anzhi qingkuang de chubu diaocha baogao 关于 (常熟县 )谢桥公社金星

明星陈桥3个大队拆迁户安置情况的初步调查报告 [Investigative Report on the Conditions of Households Who Were Relocated after Forced Demolition of their Houses in the Jinxing Mingxing and Chenqiao Brigades of the Xieqiao Commune of Changshu County]rdquo (the authorship and time of publication of this document are un-clear) H1-2-1962-270

31 See ldquoXiong Renmin tongzhi zai suanzhang tuipei huiyi shang de fayan (jilu gao)rdquo ldquoMocheng gongshe guanyu jianjue jiuzheng pingdiao cuowu chedi tuipei gongzuo de chubu fangrsquoan 莫城公社关于坚决纠正平调错误彻底退赔工作的初步方案 [Mocheng Communersquos Initial Plan for Resolutely Redressing the Errors of Uncompen-sated Transfers and the Work of Full Restitutions]rdquo 1961 H5-1-1961-57 and ldquoGuanyu Wu xian Xietang gongshe shenxu dadui jiehe tiaozheng hesuan danwei zuohao suanzhuang tuipei gongzuo de qingkuang 关于吴县斜塘公社沈许大队结合调整核算单位做

好算账退赔工作的情况 [Conditions of Combining Adjusted Accounting Units in Or-der to Properly Perform Restitution Work in the Shenxu Brigade of the Xietang Commune of Wu County]rdquo March 1 1962 H5-1-1962-64

32 Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee Restitutions Office ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangrsquoanrdquo

WANG174

ltUNgt

for uncompensated appropriations A total of over 152000 yuan was paid out in material goods 331 percent of total compensations paid out at the time33

In mid-June 1961 Chen Yun 陈云 at the time deputy chairman of the ccp Central Committee and deputy premier of the State Council traveled to Su-zhou to convalesce and conduct research He convened symposiums of both county committee secretaries and production brigade branch secretaries He was highly concerned with restitution work and gave concrete instructions in this area34 After the ldquoConference of 7000 Cadresrdquo of 1962 the understanding of the entire party of the severity and danger of ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes was further deepened and more emphasis was placed on restitution work As a result restitution work in Suzhoumdashas in the rest of the countrymdashwas ramped up the emphasis now being on persistently implementing the ldquorepay debts to the point of bankruptcyrdquo spirit of the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Congress35

Restitution work in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region consisted primarily of settlements and restitution made for housing land instruments (including those used for production and living) labor and other areas Letrsquos first take a look at how restitution was handled for labor At the height of the Great Leap Forward movement mistakenly high estimates of agricultural yields led to the assumption that agricultural issues had been solved As a result large numbers of young capable laborers were removed from the front lines of agriculture and sent to work on the Great Forging of Steel and Iron the large-scale es-tablishment of commune and brigade public enterprises and all manner of irrigation works projects On top of all that were blind direction of production large-scale recruitment for grand tactics campaigns and so on uncompensat-ed appropriations were particularly severe in the area of labor For an example letrsquos take a look at the Baowei Production Brigade 保圩大队 of the Weitang Commune 渭塘公社 in Wu County There labor provisions for agriculture decreased yearly beginning in 1957 while at the same time the proportions of old weak infirmed handicapped and female increased Table 72 shows these trends

Although Southern Jiangsu Province has long been plagued by a dearth of land for its abundant population the area has long been home to agricultural

33 Zhongguo gongchandang Suzhou dashiji 9334 Ibid 9435 Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee Settlement Fulfillment Leading Group Office

ldquoGuanyu tuipei fangwu gongzuo huiyi qingkuang he jindong mingchun yijian de baogaordquo ldquoSong Lianfang buzhang zay sheng tuipei hui shang fayan gao 宋连芳部长在省退赔会

上发言稿 [Speech of Minister Song Lianfang at the Provincial Conference on Restitu-tions]rdquo 1962 (no exact date specified) H5-1-1962-63


ltUNgt

Tabl

e 7

2 La

bor p

lann

ing

cond

ition

s in

the B

aowe

i brig

ade o

f the

Wei

tang

com

mun

e of W

u co

unty

Indu

stry

1957

1958

1959

1960

Peop

le

empl

oyed

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal (

)

Peop

le

empl

oyed

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal (

)

Peop

le

empl

oyed

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal (

)

Peop

le

empl

oyed

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal (

)

Agric

ultu

re72

396

91

640

879

156

877

852

575

21

Side

line

indu

strie

s7

094

152

0644

603

547

74

Wel

fare

60

818

247

354

843

616

Com

mun

e-ru

n in

dust

ry1

014

243

330

411

375

3

Irrig

atio

n1

014

50

6914

192

10

14Tr

ansp

orta

tion

and

ship

ping

91

236

081

30

42

Cultu

re a

nd

educ

atio

n2

027

101

3818

247

223

15

Data

sou

rce

ldquoW

eita

ng g

ongs

he

baow

ei d

adui

lao

li d

iaoc

ha

qing

kuan

g 渭

塘公

社保

圩大

队劳

力调

查情

况 [

Find

ings

of

a La

bor

Inve

stig

atio

n in

th

e Ba

owei

Bri

gad

e of

th

e W

eita

ng C

omm

une]

rdquo Ju

ly 15

196

0 H

5-1-

1960

-48

WANG176

ltUNgt

production and operations methods suitable to local conditions and a high population density ie intensive agriculture maintained by a vast labor pool With a large number of laborersin small areas multiple cropping allowed farmers to achieve higher labor productivity Surplus labor was funneled into family side businesses and handicraft industries which were highly developed Shortly after the advent of the peoplersquos commune movement there were no substantive changes to methods of agricultural production and operations ie levels of production but there were great changes to the organizational methods employed in production and operations Household economies were abolished as vestiges of the private ownership system at this point the sole income of all households came from collective production units When young able-bodied laborers were taken out of agricultural production the repercus-sions weregrave Moreover agricultural production is highly seasonal early or late planting or harvesting bears an extremely negative impact on overall agricultural yields Low agricultural yieldsled to insufficiencies in basic rural rations which in turn adversely affected the physical health of agricultural laborers Declines in the health of laborers then gave rise to a vicious cycle In response to this situation governments at every level in Suzhou began conduct-ing sweeping investigations of labor infringements and labor appropriations Officials then began taking measures to rectify the situation adopting such methods as planning squeezing protecting reforming managing regulating and others in order to solve labor insufficiencies in the agricultural sector Squeezing and protecting helped solve current issues Planning and manag-ing were used for the long term Reforming and regulating were used as assur-ances that the problem be fundamentally solved Here ldquoplanningrdquo refers to the guiding policy of ldquocomprehensive planning with agriculture as the foundation and grain as the guiding principlerdquo which demanded a plan considering all fac-tors comprehensive planning and reasonable arrangements of proportions of labor sent to every battle front in rural areas ldquoSqueezingrdquo refers to squeezing all possible labor out of every single industry by every means conceivable in order to support agricultural production ldquoProtectingrdquo refers to cherishing and protecting labor and ensuring that all available labor be able to participate in the production battle front full of vigor ldquoReformingrdquo refers to persisting in the mass line large-scale reforms to tools large-scale technological innovations in agriculture and the technical revolution ldquoManagingrdquo refers to strengthening of the management of operations in communes and brigades ldquoRegulatingrdquo re-fers to the establishment of institutions and regulations on the administration and demand for labor Relevant documents made concrete stipulations regard-ing the above in order to cause labor management to be truly standardized and achieve results in the real world The ccp Suzhou Prefectural Committee


ltUNgt

Rural Work Department issued fifteen regulations regarding labor administra-tion summarized as follows (1) From now onward integrated administration must be implemented over rural labor No one may wantonly transfer laborers much less organize labor cooperatives or use grand tactics at will which thwart the labor usage plans of contracting units The organization of labor coopera-tives must be conducted voluntarily by parties involved and approved by the party committee one level above (2) All personnel hired privately or recklessly by any commune system or work unit since 1960 must be identified and sent back to their original production units (3) All communes and brigades which use labor to go through back doors or engage in cooperatives must be identi-fied and sent back (4) No government or department at any level is permitted to seize laborers at will If indeed labor is required permission must be granted by the county committee Earnest investigations must be conducted for all la-borers already thus seized all those who should not have been appropriated must be sent back to the countryside (5) No commune is permitted to estab-lish its own full-time construction team (6) Industrial enterprises founded by communes are in no case allowed to siphon off rural laborers within the next two years Such enterprises should be conducted in accordance with the spirit of small-scale production during the busy farming season and large-scale pro-duction during the slack farming season Some personnel may be transferred to assist during the busy season and all laborers may be transferred during the slack season This will lead to gains in both industry and agriculture with-out the need to bring on additional laborers (7) Brigades may not establish dedicated transportation teams All boats and laborers already appropriated from production teams must be returned to their original production teams for participation in agricultural production (8) All agricultural schools red and expert schools and agricultural middle schools founded in communes must go on holiday during the busy farming season All staff of these schools ex-cepting those required for production within the school must be returned to their original brigades to participate in production during these holidays (9) Government organs schools and public enterprises may not seize agricultural labor in the development of production in secondary enterprises All laborers already thus seized must be returned to the countryside (10) All song-and-dance troupes must conduct activities in their spare time none may be released from their duties (11) Earnest efforts should be made to persuade commune mem-bers who have absconded to return home and to participate in production They should be given necessary help in the resolution of difficulties in produc-tion and in their lives and should not be discriminated against or attacked (12) The training of peoplersquos militias must be conducted during the slack farm-ing season (13) All communes and directly subordinate public enterprises

WANG178

ltUNgt

must comprehensively list out projects in order of priority and down-size all non-production work forces Brigades may not hire dedicated correspondents purchasing agents or accountants (14) The following stipulations are hereby made regarding determining staff numbers and quotas in welfare enterprises secondary industry production enterprises and so on one cook is to bear the meal burden of at least 50 people one gardener is to bear the meal burden of at least 50 people one childcare worker is to supervise at least 10 children and one pig keeper is to tend to at least 30 pigs (15) There must be a universal tidy-ing up of all rural labor Labor levels are to be reappraised in order to provide good conditions for planned production and labor arrangements36 Per these regulations all county governments made efforts to rectify labor which had been appropriated without compensation and shore up the agriculture On the whole there were no great variations to this work and the work was mostly completed by the second half of 1961 after all large-scale campaigns concluded in particular commune-founded enterprises Laborers who had been appropri-ated without compensation were not only returned to the agricultural produc-tion front line but also received corresponding compensations

Next came land settlements and land restitution During the Great Leap Forward a great quantity of precious land resources was squandered due to infringements and appropriations made during the various large-scale cam-paigns These appropriations were particularly injurious to Jiangsu a province in which land resources were tight to begin with As such in accordance with demands from the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee the Suzhou regional government began processing initial settlements and restitution for all agricul-tural land that had been requisitioned but not used requisitioned but not en-tirely used and appropriated without compensation At the outset however many work units that had engaged in uncompensated appropriations pos-sessed an insufficient understanding of the importance of the work Some gave back much less than they had taken Some made airs of returning land but in truth retained control Some gave back land while taking more at the same time Some gave back public land but not private land Some production teams feared that a return of land which had been subject to uncompensated appro-priations would increase the teamrsquos requirements for grain production which would in turn further strain commune members these teams were not terribly eager to reclaim taken lands an attitude that further slowed work progress By


农村工作部 rdquo Guanyu zhengdun nongcun laodongli wenti zuotan huiyi de qingkuang 关于整顿农村劳动力问题座谈会议的情况 [Conditions of the Symposium on Rectifying Rural Labor Issues]rdquo August 3 1960 H5-1-1960-48


ltUNgt

June 1962 settlements had been made on only 261279 mu of agricultural land in the region Of that total 690045 mu were deemed land leftover from exces-sive requisitioning Another 934627 mu had been subject to uncompensated appropriations and another 509518 mu of land was compensated as a result of destruction by the leveling or digging up of fields Another 4786 mu fell into the category of ldquovegetables replaced with grainrdquo Another 4164 mu fell into the category of fixed quotas or fixed obligations as a result of continued cultivation by state-run farms and public enterprises37 In March 1963 to respond to this situation and in accordance with the spirit of State Council instructions the ldquoSixty-Article Regulations for Agriculturerdquo 农业六十条 and other relevant documents the ccp Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitution Work Leading Group made the following concrete regulations (1) Regarding the issues of re-turning ownership of land to production teams The ldquoRegulationsrdquo stipulate that all land requisitioned but not used be unconditionally returned to produc-tion teams that no requisitioning fees be levied and that ownership of the land go to the state In cases of need arising hereafter the land will be returned for usage at no cost after approvals procedures are completed All production team land requisitioned without compensation must be unconditionally re-turned with ownership going to the production team In addition compensa-tions must be paid for all losses incurred during the time of occupation (2) The spirit of State Council regulations is to be abided in the question of handling crops The principle of ldquohe who planted shall reaprdquo shall be observed for crops already mature or nearing maturation For crops still far from maturation seedlings shall be handed over and the production team shall pay compensa-tions for seeds and labor at its discretion (3) Production teams are responsible for the protection of buildings and other fixture and may not destroy them If a production team wishes to borrow one it must obtain permission from the original work unit All small attachments related to production teams which are not needed by original work units may be given to that production team for use after a price is reached through negotiations (4) All mature land received by production teams shall be included within planning area and state requisi-tioning requirements will be levied thereupon All land which was only mildly damaged and can be restored to full arability through minor efforts shall be included within planning area in the first year such land will be appropriately cared for so as to establish a quota for grain production and in the second year state grain requisitioning requirements will be levied thereupon All land

37 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Rural Work Department 中共苏州地委农村工作

部 ldquoGuanyu qingli tudi de qingkuang baogao 关于清理土地的情况报告 [Report on Conditions of Land Settlements]rdquo June 19 1962 H5-1-1962-65

WANG180

ltUNgt

which was heavily damaged and thus requires the expenditure of a great deal of production team labor to return to arability shall be considered uncultivat-ed land and measures for handling the cultivation of uncultivated land shall be observed (5) All land belonging to private citizens of cities or towns and any other private land not part of collectives shall be directly handed over to production teams by the work unit which has occupied it No private citizen may receive land If any person desires to plant land he may join a local com-mune and transfer into an agricultural registration he shall then be allocated a plot of land for personal needs as a member of a commune (6) Some work units which make seasonal use of large swaths of farmland may adopt one of the following measures according to their own conditions The first is that the unit may use a production team for planting with duties regularly rotated but this may not affect usage on the part of the work unit The second is that the unit may plant the land itself and establish its own tasks of turning production over to higher authorities The third is that the unit may reduce its scope re-serving a portion and withdrawing from a portion per the principle of econo-mizing land use (7) The following measures may be employed for large swaths of arable land surrounded by containing walls or fences per concrete condi-tions The first is to reduce the size of the wall and free up some land The sec-ond is for commune members to enter the walled-in area to plant The third is for a work unit to plant the land and establish tasks of turning production over to higher authorities (8) All land occupied by schools except areas necessary for exercise and approved agricultural middle schools or other production land belonging to specialized schools must be returned in entirety to produc-tion teams No excuses of necessity for labor training or living welfare will be accepted for the continued occupation of such land If the return of such land leads to difficulties in procuring ample vegetables to eat local commercial de-partments and production teams shall be responsible for supplying such In individual cases in which a school is located in a remote area or is responsible for a large number of people and local commercial departments and produc-tion teams are unable to meet their vegetable needs a certain amount of vegetable-planting land may be reserved with permission from the local coun-ty committee (9) Per the central tenet of the ldquoSixty-Article Regulations for Agriculturerdquo land planted by communes and brigades must generally be va-cated and returned to production teams In some cases in which there is a con-crete value to retaining said land with permission from the county committee it shall be acceptable to vacate a portion and retain a portion or to retain the land in entirety (10) A great number of issues are involved in land belonging to state-run farms vegetable bases belonging to cities and towns land belonging to laogai [reform through labor] units land belonging to military departments


ltUNgt

and other land occupied under special circumstances Preliminary opinions should be established through consultations with relevant units and control-ling departments and reported in a dedicated report to the research depart-ments of all party committees for handling38 Although some areas continued to handle things in their own fashions39 after the issuance of these highly oper-able ldquoregulationsrdquo the majority of local governments rapidly came in line with the work of land settlements and restitution After further comprehensive ear-nest land settlements a total of 13857421 mu of land occupied but not used or occupied without compensation had been returned across the Suzhou region by September 1963 That total added to all the land returned in the years prior accounted for over ninety percent of the 45103 mu in the region that had been requisitioned or occupied since 1958 (not including land destroyed for the con-struction of irrigation works) At this point basically all land that could be returned had been returned40 This process spurred the development of pro-duction increased incomes of production teams and commune members and solidified the collective economy Its effects were particularly striking for com-munes and teams in the outskirts of towns and cities which had always been heavily populated but poorly endowed in land and in which land requisition-ing had been heavy-handed

Restitution work related to housing was the most difficult of all restitution tasks its progress also the slowest One reason for such difficulty is that of all the things that were appropriated without compensation housing accounted for the largest proportion Another reason was that housing was most closely related to the daily lives of commune members moreover there is no substi-tute for housing which made this issue closest to the hearts of commune mem-bers At the time fund raising for house building materials such as timber and bamboo was the most difficult By March 1962 restitution had been made for only 46450 structures only thirty percent of the total for which restitution was due Of that total an equivalent of 22075 structures (fourteen percent) were

38 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Leading Group 中共苏州地委退赔领

导小组 ldquoGuanyu tuipei fangwu qingli tudi huiyi de qingkuang baogao 关于退赔房屋

清理土地会议的情况报告 [Report on the Conference on Restitutions Housing and Land Settlements]rdquo March 24 1963 H1-2-1963-306

39 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公室 ldquoGuanyu Wu xian jinshan gongshe qingli tuipei tudi qingkuang de baogao 关于吴县金

山公社清理退还土地情况的报告 [Report on Land Settlements and Restitutions in the Jinshan Commune of Wu County]rdquo June 6 1963 H5-2-1963-111

40 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Rural Work Department ldquoGuanyu qingli tudi gongzuo zongjie 关于清理土地工作总结 [Summary of Land Settlement Work]rdquo H5-1-1963-70

WANG182

ltUNgt

compensated in the form of state-owned housing Another 16393 structures (eleven percent) were compensated through the tearing down of state-owned housing to construct new buildings or the reconstruction of old buildings The funding for 7962 structures (five percent) was raised independently by the public and the remaining percentage of restitution was paid out in cash41 Support for restitution work picked up and the pace of said work accelerated beginning in the second half of 1963 as the economy further recovered The Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee reported to the Jiangsu Provincial Com-mittee that a total of restitution for 94900 structuresmdashmade either through compensations or the construction of new housingmdashhad been made in the re-gion as of the end of August accounting for 599 percent of the 158500 private structures destroyed in the region42 In October of that year the Suzhou Pre-fectural Commissionerrsquos office arranged for 20000 stalks of bamboo outside of state planning figures to be brought in from Jiangxi province Thereafter the Jiangsu provincial government appropriated 60000 yuan and 200 cubic meters of timber to the Suzhou region for house restitution In November the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region Supply and Marketing Cooperative Means of Production Station arranged for 15000 stalks of bamboo outside of state planning to be brought in from Anhui province43 By Spring Festival of 1964


42 Zhongguo gongchandang Suzhou dashiji 10543 The above materials came from the following sources in this order cpc Suzhou Prefec-

tural Committee Restitutions office and Suzhou Provincial Supply and Marketing Coop-erative Suzhou Sub-provincial Region Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公室江苏省供

销合作社苏州专区办事处 ldquoGuanyu fenpei yipi jihua wai maozhu yong yu shenghuo he tuipei jianwu de tongzhi 关于分配一批计划外毛竹用于生活和退赔建屋的通

知 [Notice on Unplanned Allocation of Bamboo to be Used for Living and Restitutions to Reconstruct Houses]rdquo October 21 1963 Jiangsu Provincial Dedicated Bureau of Finance for Suzhou and cpc Suzhou Prefectural Restitutions Office 江苏省苏州专员公署财政

局中共苏州地委退赔办公室 ldquoGuanyu fenpei yi pi tuipei jingfei de tongzhi 关于

分配一批退赔经费的通知 [Notice on Allocating Funding for Restitutions]rdquo October 21 1963 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office and Jiangsu Provincial Dedicated Planning Committee for Suzhou 中共苏州地委退赔办公室江苏省苏

州专员公署计划委员会 ldquoGuanyu fenpei yi pi tuipei zhuanyong mucai de tongzhi 关于分配一批退赔专用木材的通知 [Notice on Allocation of Wood to be Used for Res-titutions]rdquo October 21 1963 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office and Jiangsu Provincial Supply and Marketing Cooperative Sub-provincial Region Office 中共

苏州地委退赔办公室江苏省供销合作社苏州专区办事处 ldquoGuanyu fenpei yi pi anpai shenghuo zhuanyong maozhu de tongzhi 关于分配一批安排生活专用毛竹


ltUNgt

a total of 92499 structures had been built as restitution accounting for 5997 percent of all private structures that had been razed Initial plans indicated that 111 communes (fifty-one percent of the total) and 1872 brigades (sixty-eight percent of the total) had resolved or basically resolved the housing prob-lems for households in urgent need44 By March the number of structures built as restitution rose to 93999 accounting for over 60 percent of razed private housing structures accounting for about ninety percent of all rural households45 Statistics indicate the following allocations from the provincial and sub- provincial regional governments used for housing restitution from 1962 to spring of 1965 6375 cubic meters of wood 93600 stalks of bamboo 2975 tonnes of coal 299 million bricks and 1059 million tiles46 A total of 101377 structures were constructed for restitution in the region accounting for 657 percent of total razed structures See Table 73 for details

Statistics from June 1964 indicate that by the time restitution work ended in the region about 9000 housing structures which should have been compen-sated had not been The most seriously affected region was Changshu County with over 5000 structures for which restitution had not been made The least affected region was Wujiang County 吴江县 with only over 200 such struc-tures47 See Table 74 for detailed figures

的通知 [Notice on the Allocation of Bamboo to be Used for Living]rdquo November 23 1963 H5-2-1963-110

44 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangwu anzhi chaiqian hu gongzuo qingkuang he yijian (chuxi sheng tuipei huiyi ziliao) 苏州专区迟赔房屋安置拆迁户工作情况和意见（出

席省退赔会议资料） [Conditions of and Opinions on the Work of Restitutions and Relocations for Razed Households in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 7 1964 H5-1-1964-74 Figures given in some documents may be erroneous For example statis-tics issued in October 1963 indicate that a total of 94092 structures for restitutions had been constructed this figure is only 593 percent of the total number of houses razed See ldquoTuipei huiyi qingkuang de baogao 退赔会议情况报告 [Report on Conditions at the Restitutions Conference]rdquo October 25 1963 H5-1-1963-69

45 ldquoGuanyu jieshu tuipei fangwu anzhi chaiqian hu gongzuo de chubu fangrsquoan 关于结束退

赔房屋安置拆迁户工作的初步方案 [Initial Plan for Ending the Work of Relocating Families of Razed Homes]rdquo April 1964 H5-1-1964-74

46 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu 1961 nian dao 1964 nian fenpei tuipei jianwu wuzi huizongbiao 苏州

专区 1961年到 1964年分配退赔建屋物资汇总表 [Summary Table of Resources Allo-cated to the Construction of Restitutions Housing in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region from 1961 to 1964]rdquo July 12 1965 H5-1-1965-77

47 Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee Restitutions Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公室 ldquoDangqian tuipei anzhi gongzuo qingkuang 当前退赔安置工作情况 [Current Condi-tions of the Work of Restitutions and Relocation]rdquo June 13 1964 H5-1-1964-74

WANG184

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 7

3 Re

stitu

tion

and

relo

catio

n (f

or ra

zed

hous

es) i

n th

e Suz

hou

regi

on

Uni

t St

ruct

ures

Regi

onFo

rcib

le re

loca

tions

Relo

catio

ns a

nd re

stitu

tion

Hou

seho

lds

Stru

ctur

es

raze

dTo

tal

stru

ctur

esPe

rcen

tage

of

tota

l str

uctu

res

raze

d (

)

By y

ear

Prio

r to

1962

Spri

ng 19

62 to

w

inte

r 196

3Sp

ring

1963

to

win

ter

1964

Spri

ng 19

64 to

w

inte

r 196

5

Tota

l59

904

154

269

101

377

657

719

1715

987

724

36

230

Wux

i4

994

117

756

063

515

4387

51

313

341

521

Jiang

yin

476

411

702

636

054

546

351

011

420

294

Shaz

hou

166

2933

259

262

3779

184

552

951

52

397

52

433

Chan

gshu

186

1955

842

344

235

617

222

695

627

02

764

312

0Ta

ican

g1

950

628

84

489

714

3758

611

120

Kuns

han

511

114

201

128

995

908

103

995

163

258

628

2W

u Co

unty

383

08

717

427

149

3184

785

530

15

Wuj

iang

400

712

485

663

453

248

285

141

331

25

80

Data

sou

rce

Suz

hou

Pre

fect

ural

Par

ty C

omm

itte

e Re

stit

utio

n Of

fice

ldquoSu

zhou

zh

uanq

u tu

ipei

anz

hi f

angw

u qi

ngku

ang

苏州

专区

退赔

安置

房屋

情况

[Co

ndit

ions

of

Hou

sing

Res

titu

tion

and

Rel

ocat

ions

in t

he

Suzh

ou S

ub-p

rovi

ncia

l Re

gion

]rdquo Ju

ly 8

196

5

H5-

1-19

65-7

7


ltUNgt

Policies regarding restitution to be made for implements for production or liv-ing consistently emphasized that material goods should be used for restitution in a maximum of cases but in most actual cases damage to small farm imple-ments was officially deemed to have fallen within the scope of ldquonormal wear and tearrdquo and thus no restitution was made (generally all implements thus af-fected were small farm implements belonging to rural citizens the majority of large farm implements had been bought with cash or collective sharehold-ing into collectives at the time of the cooperative movement) As there were a great quantity of classifications for ldquoliving implementsrdquo it was difficult to make objective verifications of circumstances on the basis of which to make resti-tution The more feasible option was to appraise their value and compensate with promissory notes

Beginning in the second half of 1963 some local governments of the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region began preparing to wrap up restitution work

Table 74 Plans for final tasks in housing restitution and relocations in the Suzhou sub- provincial region

Unit Structures

Region Number of restitution structures still required

Structures razed for mid to large sized irrigation works

Structures razed for small irriga-tion works

Structures razed for oth-er large-scale campaigns

Total 5094 3048 846 1200Changshu 2500 1784 416 300Shazhou 1591 856 250 485Wujiang 301 258 10 33Wuxi 332 100 232Jiangyin 250 150 50 50Kunshan 120 20 100

Explanation (solution) Materials on hand in each county sufficient to construct 700 to 800 structures provincially-allocated materials and funding sufficient to construct around 1500 structures local government resources plus mass-raised funds sufficient to construct 1000 to 1300 struc-tures 1400 to 1800 structures still lackingData source ldquoQuan zhuanqu tuipei anzhi saowei renwu guihua 全专区退赔

安置扫尾任务规划 [Plans for Final Tasks in Housing Restitution and Reloca-tions across the Sub-Provincial Region]rdquo July 16 1965 H5-1-1965-77

WANG186

ltUNgt

in accordance with the unified deployments of superior governments48 After April 1964 the entire region had entered the final stages of restitution work49 All restitution work was completed by the second half of 1965 with relevant organs withdrawing from the process and handing down the small quantity of remaining issues to civil affairs departments for integrated processing A total value of over 23 million yuan in material goods and cash had been distrib-uted in the region all allocated from the provincial and sub-provincial govern-ments50 A large quantity of promissory notes was also issued as restitution in the region See Table 75 for details

iii

One can arrive at the following conclusions after an objective consideration of the above historical processes First rural restitution work in Suzhou was conducted and completed within the scope stipulated by central policy frame-works just like all other work Also like all other work rural restitution work went through repetitions as a result of changes to central policies The overall trend however was one toward continual deepening and thoroughness which not only redeemed the image of the party and government which had been adversely affected for a time but also played an important positive role in the rapid restoration of agriculture and alleviation of difficulties across the vast countryside Second insufficient understanding of the importance of restitu-tion work and insufficiently thorough comprehension of policies on the part of some cadre in addition to the problems caused by the various ldquothings in voguerdquo gave rise to the following malpractices in restitution work (1) The on-slaught of uncompensated appropriations hit as fiercely and as quickly as a lightning strike but restitution work proceeded slowly incomprehensively and in some cases not at all owing to a number of factors Some rural households did not receive restitution of material goods of guaranteed quality sufficient

48 ldquoTuipei anzhi gongzuo qingkuang yu yijian (taolun gao) 退赔安置工作情况与意见

（讨论稿） [Conditions of and Opinions on the Work of Restitutions Relocations (Dis-cucssion Draft)]rdquo December 7 1963 H5-2-1963-109

49 ldquoGuanyu jieshu tuipei fangwu anzhi chaiqian hu gongzuo de chubu fangrsquoanrdquo50 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu peitui anzhi gongzuo qingkuang he quanmian jieshu de yijian 苏州专

区退赔安置工作情况和全面结束的意见 [Conditions of Restitution Work of Hous-ing Relocation in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region and on Bringing Said Work to a Com-plete Close]rdquo (date and authorship unclear) H5-1-1965-77 The actual figure was likely 2331972 yuan See ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu 1961 nian dao 1964 nian fenpei tuipei jianwu wuzi huizongbiaordquo


ltUNgt

Tabl

e 7

5 Pr

omiss

ory n

otes

issu

ed a

s res

titut

ion

in th

e Suz

hou

regi

on

Uni

t Yu

an

Coun

tyQ

uant

ity is

sued

Qua

ntity

re

calle

d by

ba

nks

Qua

ntity

unr

ecal

led

Tota

lBr

igad

es a

nd

prod

uctio

n te

ams

Com

mun

e m

embe

rsO

ther

Tota

lBr

igad

es a

nd

prod

uctio

n te

ams

Com

mun

e m

embe

rsO

ther

Tota

l5

785

102

333

952

02

350

561

769

3915

413

54

172

260

240

693

91

762

025

762

54W

uxi

134

090

858

628

675

414

022

543

71

053

984

463

885

652

099

Jiang

yin

948

040

651

004

267

064

299

7241

665

453

138

643

550

410

540

9Sh

azho

u53

935

314

498

738

433

662

946

466

407

831

3137

926

413

011

Chan

gshu

708

642

284

507

377

168

469

6723

639

547

224

716

429

526

173

746

217

Taic

ang

765

898

351

975

413

923

238

472

527

426

277

960

246

950

251

6Ku

nsha

n30

568

628

903

016

656

711

2523

456

120

379

016

261

145

10W

u Co

unty

865

7536

470

425

3518

060

685

1518

700

422

45W

ujia

ng10

900

099

526

194

739

272

266

817

734

759

674

580

60

Data

sou

rce

Suz

hou

Pre

fect

ural

Par

ty C

omm

itte

e Re

stit

utio

n Of

fice

ldquoSu

zhou

zh

uanq

u tu

ipei

qip

iao

qing

kuan

g 苏

州专

区退

赔

期票

情况

[Co

ndit

ions

of

Prom

isso

ry N

otes

for

Res

titu

tion

in t

he

Suzh

ou S

ub-p

rovi

ncia

l Re

gion

]rdquo O

ctob

er 15

196

4 H

5-1-

1965

-77

WANG188

ltUNgt

quantity or fair pricing by the conclusion of reparations work but instead received promissory notes that could not be redeemed in the short term this led to further intangible losses (2) Many material goods that had been subject to uncompensated appropriations had been depreciated but restitution work was conducted in accordance with careful calculations and strict budgets Offi-cials in many areas feared ldquoexcessiverdquo restitution would burst budgetary limits and chose not to make restitution in many cases Some opportunistic cadre members profited from the campaign through embezzlement Others took more than their fair share misappropriated funds made unjust allocations or redeemed promissory notes ahead of time These behaviors exacerbated the already poor situations of those whose property had been subject to un-compensated appropriations making both living and production more diffi-cult for rural citizens When making restitution for appropriated houses some substituted shoddy materials for good ones cut corners in craftsmanship or sold inferior goods at high prices All the above compounded the dissatisfac-tion of rural citizens at the time and detracted from the image and prestige of the party and government51 (3) Some official documents of the time clearly stipulated that losses attributable to blind direction of production should be accounted for politically and not economically52 As the Great Forging of Steel

51 ldquoGuanyu tongrsquoan gongshe suanzhang tuipei gongzuo de jiancha baogao 关于通安公社

算账退赔工作的检查报告 [Investigative Report on the Settlement and Restitution Work of the Tongrsquoan Commune]rdquo H5-2-1961-86 See also Suzhou Prefectural Party Com-mittee Restitutions Office （中共苏州）地委退赔办公室 ldquoGuanyu Kunshan xian tuipei minfang zhuanyong qicai de shengchan diaobo shiyong qingkuang xiang diwei de baogao 关于昆山县退赔民房专用器材的生产调拨使用情况向地委的报

告 [Report to Prefectural Party Committee on the Production Allocation and Utilization of Materials for Construction of Restitutions Housing in Kunshan County]rdquo April 16 1962 ldquoChangshu xian zai tuipei jianhuan fangwu zhong cailiao bei tanwu nuoyong he ganbu duo zhan de qingkuang 常熟县在退赔建还房屋中材料被贪污挪用和干部多占

的情况 [Building Materials Meant for Restitutions Housing Embezzled or Excessively Appropriated by Cadres in Changshu County]rdquo H5-2-1962-97

52 Losses attributable to blind direction of production during the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo were enormous A rough accounting conducted by the Jiangyin County Party Committee Res-titutions Office regarding the Beiguo Commune of that county indicated that during the three years of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo the commune lost 313 million jin of grain over 15 million cubic meters of lumber over 2500 dan of tree wood over 1500 dan of bamboo over 9500 dan of firewood and about 150000 days of labor totaling about 670000 yuan 40 yuan per capita or 130 yuan per household See ldquoGuanyu shengchan xia zhihui feng suo zaocheng de jingji sunshi de diaocha 关于生产瞎指挥风所造成的经济损失的

调查 [Investigation into Economic Losses Caused by the Wind of Blind Direction of Pro-duction]rdquo September 16 1961 H5-2-1961-86


ltUNgt

and Iron had been a mass movement of the entire party and entire popula-tion no compensations were to be made for labor contributed thereto Many reparation for objects damaged as a result of uncompensated appropriations was calculated according to the prices of these objects at the time of the ap-propriation and not at the time of reparation53 There had been a great in-crease to prices of the vast majority of commercial goods between the time of uncompensated appropriations and the time of restitution work Such price increases were yet another great intangible loss suffered by rural citizens at the time In addition officials in many places unable to make a clear accounting of values or losses of instruments or farm implements either opted to make no restitution or handled the matter with a symbolic promissory note (4) In the end central authorities stepped in to prevent grassroots cadres from trying to get out of returning objects which should be returned and from stubbornly holding their hands out for more government money as well as to make sure that restitution work wouldteach people a profound lesson As such the cen-tral government made the following clear regulation in the question of resti-tution the principle of ldquohe who decides shall be responsible for restitutionrdquo shall beadhered to and grassroots cadre shall be the first ones forced to make thorough restitution ldquolest they learn nothingrdquo54 Mao Zedong had this to say ldquoWhen it comes to restitution do not first look for money from the state but counties and communes should try to make restitution using their own funds even if risking bankruptcy In the end it will suffice for the state to provide a slight degree of subsidies otherwise counties and communes will become dependent on the staterdquo55 This regulation played a positive role in increasing work incentives among grassroots cadre and gave them the resolve to persist in restitution work and helped them gain the trust of the people improve rela-tions between officials and the public further development of work that fol-lowed and so on There were however some problems Those grassroots work units (and cadres) which had benefited from uncompensated appropriations were also themselves victims there were often great limitations to the mate-rial goods and money in their possession to be used for restitution Thus the continual emphasis on making grassroots units (and cadres) responsible for

53 ldquoXiong Renmin tongzhi zai suanzhang tuipei huiyi shang de fayan (jilu gao)rdquo ldquoGuanyu jiuzheng pingdiao cuowu chedi tuipei zhong ruogan juti wenti de chuli yijian (chugao) 关于纠正平调错误彻底退赔中若干具体问题的处理意见（初稿） [Opinions on Handling Several Concrete Problems of Restitutions and Thoroughly Redressing the Errors of Uncompensated Transfers]rdquo August 31 1961 H5-1-1961-56

54 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 13 ce 67955 Gu Longsheng 539

WANG190

ltUNgt

restitution put them in an awkward predicament If they didnrsquot make restitu-tion they would face censure from superiors and dissatisfaction from citizens but if they wanted to make restitution they were faced with insufficient re-serves of material goods and cash Grassroots cadres often went to great lengths to perform this thankless duty but seldom were met with satisfaction from ei-ther above or below In many cases they either made restitution at qualities or quantities less than demanded or had to resort to substituting shoddy ma-terials or falsifying reports No matter which route they chose relations with superior policy-making bodies and the masses were doomed to deteriorate These doomed relationships were one of the major reasons for the launching of the socialist education movement targeting grassroots cadres that followed soon thereafter56 Third the myriad problems that emerged amid the restitu-tion campaign should lead us to a deeper understanding of this principle any major policy that closely affects the personal interests of the masses should be subject to repeatedtestingon the basis of scientific evidence until proven sound before it is issued

References



CCP Central Party Document Research Department 中共中央文献研究室 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 9 ce 《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第9 册 [Mao Zedong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 9] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996)

CCP Central Party Document Research Department 中共中央文献研究室 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 13 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 13 册 [Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Nation Vol 13] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 662

The Peoplersquos Republic of China State Agriculture Commission General Office 中华

人民共和国国家农业委员会办公厅 Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian

56 See ldquoHengtang gongshe shuangqiao dadui zai qing jingji dingrsquoan tuipei gongzuo zhong cunzai de jige wentirdquo 横塘公社双桥大队在清经济定案退赔工作中存在的几个

问题 [Some Problems Existing in the Restitution Work of the Plan to Clean up Finances in the Shuangqiao Brigade of the Hengtang Commune] in Shejiao qingkuang jianbao (wu) 《社教情况简报》（五） [Brief Report on Conditions of the Socialist Education Movement (Five)] October 28 1965 Suzhou City Archives


ltUNgt

(1958ndash1981) xia 《农业集体化重要文件汇编(1958~1981)》下 [Selected Impor-tant Documents on Agricultural Collectivization (1958ndash1981) Vol 2] (Beijing Zhong-gong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1981)

Suzhou City Party Committee Party History Research Department 中共苏州市委

党史研究室 Zhongguo gongchandang Suzhou dashiji 《中国共产党苏州大事

记》 [Record of Major Communist Party of China Events in Suzhou] (Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe 2000)

Gu Longsheng 顾龙生 Mao Zedong jingji nianpu 《毛泽东经济年谱》 [Economic Chronicles of Mao Zedong] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1993)

Huang Daoxia et al 黄道霞等 Jianguo yilai nongye hezuohua shiliao huibian 《建国

以来农业合作化史料汇编》 [Compiled Historical Materials on Agricultural Cooperatization Since the Founding of the Nation] (Beijing Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe 1992)

Liu Shaoqi xuanji xia juan 《刘少奇选集》下卷 [Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi Vol 2] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1985)


Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆 Yang Shangkun riji xia 《杨尚昆日记》下 [Diary of Yang Shangkun Vol 2] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 2001)


ltUNgt

chapter 8

Transformations to Commune and Brigade Enterprises and the Rise of Rural Private Enterprises in Gaoyang County Hebei Province in the Early Days of Reform and Opening

Feng Xiaohong1

Abstract

In the late 1970s and early 1980s Commune Brigade Enterprises (cbes) grew rapidly under the collective ownership system with support from state policies After the im-plementation of the household contract responsibility system cbes changed rapidly some spun directly into individually-owned business or private enterprises and some contracted out under different variations of the responsibility system There is a close connection between the transformation of cbes and the rise of rural private enterpris-es with the former being the starting point for the latter The transformation of cbes into rural private enterprises led to accumulations of valuable experience and lessons for later reforms to small and mid-sized urban enterprises

Keywords

Commune and Brigade Enterprises ndash transformation ndash private enterprises

A great deal of economic research has been done on Commune Brigade Enterprises (cbes) which were most common in the late 1970s and early 1980s particularly in the development circumstances existential issues and reform

This essay was one of the initial products of the Hebei Provincial Social Sciences Fund project ldquoTypical Cases of Chinarsquos Rural Industrializationmdasha Study of the Hundred Year History of the Textile Industry in Gaoyang Hebei as well as the Laws that Governed its Developmentrdquo《中国乡村工业化的典型个案mdashmdash 河北高阳织布业百年历程及发

展规律研究》 (HB07LS002) 1 Feng Xiaohong (冯小红 ) holds a doctorate in history and is an associate professor in the

history department of Handan College

193Transformations to Commune and Brigade Enterprises

ltUNgt

directions for such enterprises at the time As cbes gradually faded from existence research in this field also declined with only a few doctoral and masterrsquos theses published on the subject Most of these theses however focused on the period of time ending in the mid-1980s very few drew connections be-tween cbes and the development of rural private enterprises that followed2 After the mid-1980s a large number of academics in economics and the other social sciences conducted research on rural private enterprises focusing pri-marily on their present conditions prospects for future development and theories for understanding them Very little of this research however drew connections between rural private enterprises and cbes For example Zhang Renshou 张仁寿 et al noted in their research of the ldquo Wenzhou Modelrdquo that the splitting up of cbes had been one of the channels by which Wenzhoursquos cottage industries had arisen but they did not perform detailed analysis on the exact process by which cbes had developed into cottage industries Shi Jinchuan 史晋川 et al on the other hand concluded that cbes had not at all been the logical starting point for the development of private enterprises in Wenzhou3 To this end I have made an initial study into the development and transformation of cbes and the rise of rural private enterprises in the early years of Reform and Openingmdashfocusing specifically on Gaoyang County 高阳县 Hebei Province4mdashin order to show the historical relationship between the two

2 For a more comprehensive list of research performed into Commune and Brigade Enterprises see the references section of Liu Yantaorsquos (刘燕桃 ) ldquoHebei sheng shedui qiye yanjiu河北省社队企业研究 [Research into Enterprises Managed by Communes and Pro-duction Teams in Hebei Province]rdquo (2008 masterrsquos thesis Hebei Normal University)

3 Zhang Renshou and Li Hong 张仁寿李红 Wenzhou moshi yanjiu《温州模式研

究》[A Study of the Wenzhou Model] (Zhongguo Shehui kexue chubanshe 1990) 47 Shi Jinchuan Jin Xiangrong and Zhao Wei 史晋川金祥荣赵伟 Zhidu bianqian yu jingji fazhan Wenzhou moshi yanjiu《制度变迁与经济发展温州模式研究》[Institu-tional Changes and Economic Development Study of the Wenzhou Model] (Zhejiang daxue chubanshe 2002) 64

4 The primary reason that this essay focuses on Gaoyang County Hebei Province is that the textile industry there has developed for 100 years making it a typical case in the field of eco-nomic history For more research into the Textile Industry of Gaoyang County see also Gu Lin 顾琳 Zhongguo de jingji geming ershi shiji de xiangcun gongye 《中国的经济革命二

十世纪的乡村工业》 [Chinarsquos Economic Revolution Rural Industry in the 20th Century] translated from the Japanese by Wang Yuru et al 王玉茹等 (Jiangsu renmin chubanshe 2009) Zhao Zhilong 赵志龙 ldquoGaoyang fangzhiye de bianqian (1880ndash2005) 高阳纺织业

的变迁 (1880~2005) [Changes in the Gaoyang Textile Industry (1880ndash2005)]rdquo (2005 doctoral thesis Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and Feng Xiao-hong 冯小红 ldquoGaoyang zhibuye de jindaihua Jincheng 高阳织布业的近代化进程 [The

FENG 194

ltUNgt

i Outline of the Development of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s

cbes gradually grew out of traditional rural handicrafts and family side indus-tries as well as from commune and brigade industries and sideline industries cbes came into existence shortly after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China and later evolved through the adjustments and cutbacks of the 1960s and the winding development path of the 1970s The Third Plenum of the Elev-enth Communist Party of China (ccp) Congress issued the ldquoResolutions on Several Issues of Accelerating the Development of Agriculturerdquo 关于加快农

业发展的若干问题的决定 which proposed the following

There must be great development of Commune and Brigade Enterprises and we must gradually increase the proportion of income from cbes to total income of the three-tiered economy of communes5 Agricultural products and by-products should gradually transition to being processed by cbes in all cases when doing so is economically reasonable Urban fac-tories must allocate a portion of their production capacity for products or parts which are suitable forbeing processedin rural areas to cbes in a planned manner they should also give equipment and technical support The production supply and marketing of cbes should come in different forms and should link up with every level of national economic planning in order to ensure unobstructed supply and marketing channels The state government shall grant tax breaks or tax exemptions to cbes on the basis of their differing situations6

Shortly thereafter the State Council issued the ldquoRegulations on Several Issues of the Development of Commune and Brigade Enterprisesrdquo 关于发展社

队企业若干问题的规定 which established the guiding policy for the de-velopment of cbes established the business scopes funding sources and ownership structures of cbes and called for all industries to actively support

Gaoyang Textile Textile Industryrsquos Course of Modernization]rdquo (2002 masterrsquos thesis Hebei University)

5 Translatorrsquos note The three tiers are communes brigades and production teams6 Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 《新时期农业和农

村工作重要文献选编》 [Selected Important Works on Agriculture and Rural Work in the New Era] ed cpc Central Committee Literary Research Department and State Council Development Research Center 中共中央文献研究室国务院发展研究中心 (Bei-jing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992) 39


ltUNgt

the development of cbes7 Having been thus commanded by the central government local governments around the country responded by issuing concrete measures supporting the development of cbes The Gaoyang County government issued six measures in 1979 the primary contents of which were as follows incorporate cbes into state planning and industry in the county capital shall support cbes8

With the support of party committees and governments at every level cbes developed rapidly from 1978 to 1980 which turned out to be a short period of prosperity Per statistics released by the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises by April 1978 110 brigades in the county (fifty-nine per-cent) had established enterprises of one kind or another and 580 production teams (thirty percent) had begun industrial or sideline enterprise production9 By July 1978 the number of brigades running enterprises rose to 175 (ninety-seven percent) and the number of production teams running enterprises rose to 710 (forty-six percent)10 Over the short span of a few months the number of county brigades operating cbes grew fifty-nine percent and the number of pro-duction teams operating cbes grew twenty-two percent extremely fast growth

See Table 81 for the basic conditions of commune and brigade enterprises in Gaoyang County between 1978 and 1980

Table 81 shows that over the three-year period from 1978 to 1980 Gaoyang County experienced growth in both the number of cbes and the number of people employed in cbes The countyrsquos gross domestic product (gdp) grew

7 ldquoGuowuyuan banfa lsquoguanyu shedui qiye ruogan wenti de guiding (shixing caorsquoan) de tong-zhi (1979 nian 7 yue 3 ri) 国务院颁发〈关于社队企业若干问题的规定(试行草

案)〉的通知 (1979 年7月3日 ) [Notice Regarding the State Councilrsquos lsquoRegulations on Several Issues of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (Trial Draft) (July 3 1979)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 10-276-3

8 ldquoGaoyang xian yi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye fazhan guihua (1978 nian 12 yue) 高阳县一

九七九年社队企业发展规划 (1978年 12月 ) [Gaoyang County Development Plan for Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1979 (December 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-557-4

9 ldquoKaizhan duozhong jingying dali fazhan shedui qiye wei nongye dagan kauishang jilei daliang zijin (1978 nian 4 yue 14 ri) 开展多种经营大力发展社队企业为农业

大干快上积累大量资金 (1978年4月 14日 ) [Develop Multiple Forms of Operations Strive to Develop Commune and Brigade Enterprises Go All Out and Go Fast to Accu-mulate Large Quantities of Capital for Agriculture (April 14 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-1

10 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju yi jiu qi ba nian shang ban nian gongzuo zongjie (1978 nian 7 yue 24 ri) 高阳县社队企业局一九七八年上半年工作总结 (1978年7月24日 ) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Work Summary for the First Half of 1978 (July 24 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-2

FENG 196

ltUNgt

342 percent from 1978 to 1979 We are unable to compare 1980rsquos figures with those from the two previous years as the Bureau of cbes began reporting total revenues instead of gdp for that year nevertheless growth to the number of people employed by cbes in 1980 would seem to indicate a continued growth to gdp in that year

cbes in Gaoyang County were distributed over a wide range of industries County cbe Bureau data indicate that county cbes were involved in over sixty fields and manufactured over 400 varieties of products County cbes were pri-marily involved in textiles export processing the repair and manufacture of small and mid-sized farm implements planting and husbandry construction tile kiln operation and food processing11 See Table 82 for details

Table 82 shows the industries over which cbes were distributed in Gaoyang County Some industries were omitted from the table as their output values were small or their business activities hard to categorize including brigade-run commercial enterprises (commission stores) traditional handicrafts (straw-weaving wooden forks brooms whips shoe soles and reed mats)

11 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu shedui qiye ziyuan he jingji qingkuang de huibao (1980 nian 8 yue 13 ri 高阳县社队企业局关于社队企业资源和经济情况的汇报

(1980年8月 13日 ) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Re-port on the Resources and Economic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (August 13 1980)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-6-1

Data source ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu yi jiu qi ba nian gongzuo zongjie baogao 高阳县社队企业局关于一九七八年工作总结报告 [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Work Summary Report for 1978]rdquo ldquoYi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye jiben qingkuang dengjibiao 一九七九年社队企业基本情况登记表

[Registration Form of Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1979]rdquo and ldquoYi jiu ba ling nian shedui qiye jiben qingkuang dengjibiao 一九八年社队企业

基本情况登记表 [Registration Form of Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1980]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-4 26-4-1 and 26-5-1Note Figures from 1979 and 1980 were calculated based on 1978 constant prices figures for 1980 are total revenues

Table 81 Basic conditions of commune and brigade enterprises in Gaoyang County 1978ndash1980

Year Number of cbes Number of people employed by cbes gdp (yuan)

1978 1051 9650 1448 million1979 1171 15148 19438 million1980 1238 16723 1593 million


ltUNgt

Table 82 Primary industry distribution of commune and brigade enterprises in Gaoyang County 1980

Industry Fields Product varieties

Annual income (yuan)

Machinery Farm machinery repair and manufacture industrial equipment (electrical materials) metals for production metals for daily use

66 6846292

Smelting Small castings factories 4 207000

Chemicals Plastic processing rubber processing manufacture of daily use chemical products (glasses)

13 52534

Forestry Wood processing 5 43300Construction materials

Construction teams brick factories tile kilns treated felt asbestos tile processing

23 1930250

Textile sewing and leather

Textile acrylic fiber processing sewing leather goods dye houses cotton processing synthetic fibers

60 2858292

Paper-making and culturaleducation goods

Embroidery arts and crafts (enamel balls cloisonneacute wickerwork) pa-permaking printing carpets

44 955785

Food Rice and noodle processers vinegar factories canteens oil mills tofu factories sugar refineries popsicle producers

63 346359

Other Mops pharmaceuticals tobacco factories inns for carters chaste tree weaving bicycle repairs and parts carpet factories tarpaulin painting coal briquettes

13 673300

Agriculture Orchards breeding stations 21 71114Total All 45 fields 312 13984226

Data source ldquoQuan xian gongshe dadui qiye jiben qingkuang huiji (1980 nian 6 yue 26 ri) 全县公社大队企业基本情况汇集 (1980年6月26日 ) [Compilation of Materials on Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Across the County (June 26 1980)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-7-1

FENG 198

ltUNgt

transportation industries (the Jiucheng Brigade transportation team and the Nanjie transportation team) small-animal husbandry and fisheries (fish bees and rabbits) plant-product industries (mushrooms) and so on12

Before 1979 cbes were run the same way agricultural enterprises had been using the ldquobig pot of ricerdquo method13 (ie recording workpoints) From 1979 to 1980 as the household contract responsibility system was introduced some cbes began to adopt the system of contracting out an entire task with a quota and the system of giving rewards for exceeding said quota In one example the Tuanding Brigade 团丁大队 electrical materials factory was permitted to hire a total of nine people Its quota for annual net income was 10000 yuan for which each employee would be rewarded eight workpoints per day and given an eight percent bonus If the factory earned 15000 yuan an additional twelve percent bonus would be paid on the extra 5000 yuan on top of the original eight percent bonus and daily workpoints would be increased to nine If another 5000 yuan was earned the staff would be given a fifteen percent bonus on that 5000 yuan and daily workpoints would be increased to ten If the factory failed to meet the quota however one workpoint per day per worker would be deducted for every 1000 yuan by which the factoryrsquos earnings fell short The Yangjiawu Brigade implemented a system in which three things were fixed fixed size of the staff fixed tasks and fixed rewards and punish-ments The number of workers was set at thirty-two and the quota for monthly net income was set at 2000 yuan which if accomplished would mean the staff would receive a seven percent bonus The staff would be given a fifteen percent bonus on any revenue earned on top of the quota of 2000 yuan in addition to eight workpoints If the quota was not met no rewards would be given and the staff rsquos salaries would be docked by the percentage of the amount by which they fell short14

12 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye fenlei dengjibiao (1981 nian 8 yue) 高阳县社队企业分类

登记表 (1981年8月 ) [Registrations of Commune and Brigade Enterprises by Category in Gaoyang County (August 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-571-19

13 Under this kind of management enterprises were fully financially supported by the gov-ernment so it mattered little how well or poorly they performed similarly salary was guaranteed and was not linked with job performance

14 ldquoShedui qiye kai xin hua tong xin tong de gao sihua ndash xiyan gongshe yi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye gongzuo zongjie (1979 nian 12 yue 20 ri) 社队企业开新花同心同德搞

四化mdashmdash 西演公社一九七九年社队企业工作总结 (1979年 12月20日 ) [New Blos-soms on Commune and Brigade Enterprises Bringing About the Four Changes with One Heart and One Mind ndash Work Summary of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in Xiyan Commune 1979 (December 20 1979)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-4-2


ltUNgt

ii Changes to cbes after the Implementation of the ldquoBig Responsibility Systemrdquo in Agriculture

In 1979 the Gaoyang County government began to implement the household responsibility system in agriculture By the end of 1982 1646 of the countyrsquos total 1652 production teams had implemented its main form the Household Responsibility System15 which fomented major changes to cbes

(A) The Quantity of cbes Decreased DramaticallyThe implementation of the Household Responsibility System also known as the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo exerted an enormous effect on cbes most no-tably in a rapid decline to their number At the end of 1980 there were 1238 cbes in Gaoyang County thirty-five run at the commune level 424 at the bri-gade elevel and 779 at the production team level16 By the end of 1981 there were only 580 cbes in the county forty at the commune level 246 at the bri-gade level and 294 at the production team level17 By the end of 1982 there were only 248 cbes remaining in the county thirty-five at the commune level 210 at the brigade level and a paltry three at the production team level18 On the whole after the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo was put in place the reduction to the number of cbes at the commune level was minimal brigade-run cbes were reduced by half and nearly all production-team-run cbes vanished

(B) New Trends Emerged in Management MethodsThree different trends emerged in management methods of cbes after the implementation of the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo

15 ldquoGaoyang xian jiben qingkuang (fu yi jiu ba san nian guomin jingji zhongyao zhibiao shexiang) (1982 nian 12 yue) 高阳县基本情况(附一九八三年国民经济重要指标

设想 )(1982年 12月 ) [Basic Conditions in Gaoyang County (Including Tentative Impor-tant Indicators for the National Economy in 1983) (December 1982)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-584-6

16 ldquoYi jiu ba ling nian shedui qiye jiben qingkuang 一九八年社队企业基本情况 [Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1980]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-5-1

17 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju yi jiu ba yi nian gongzuo jianjie he yi jiu bae r nian jianyao anpai 高阳县社队企业局一九八一年工作简结和一九八二年简要安排 [Brief Work Summary of the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises for 1981 and Brief Plans for 1982]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-1

18 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo jianjie (1882 nian 12 yue 23 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于一九八二年工作简结 (1982年 12月23日 ) [Brief Work Summary of the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises for 1982 (December 23 1982)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-3

FENG 200

ltUNgt

1 Some cbes were forced to shut down The primary reasons were as follows (1) Machinery manufacturers such as the Gaozhuang Communersquos 高庄公社 repair and manufacturing plant were forced to close due to long-term substandard technology and balance sheet losses (2) Some enterprises such as the Taokou Brigadersquos 陶口大队 asbestos plant and the Zhaobu Brigadersquos 赵布大队 pearlite factory were forced to close due to lack of reliable materials sources or regular sales channels (3) Some enterprises such as small castings factories and hardware manufacturers were forced to close due to poor management and sustained unprofit-ablity or losses19

2 Some cbes attempted to emulate the responsibility system which had been implemented in agriculture This trend took place in most commune-run enterprises and a portion of brigade-run enterprises This trend came in one of two forms either contracting by the factory direc-tor personally or contracting by the collective Collective contracting was more common happening in sixty-five percent of cases20 In most cases where the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo was adopted meaning that the commune or the brigade relinquished direct management of the enterprise and allowed the contracting party to take full control All tools and equipment were handed over to the factory director or collective who was in turn responsible for autonomous direction of the factory Profit distributions were handled via various methods They include the following (1) ldquoContracts based on fixed output quotas in which factories retain all output in excess of quotas and exercise full control over how extra profitsaredistributedrdquo In this method the commune or brigade established a fixed sum to be paid at a regular interval by the contracting party All profits earned in excess of that sum went to the contracting party the commune or brigade did not interfere in allocations of profits earned in excess of the pre-established sum One example was the leath-er factory of the Bianjiawu Brigade 边家务大队 Biandukou Commune

19 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu shedui qiye qingkuang de diaocha baogao (1981 nian 8 yue 25 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于社队企业情况的调查报告 (1981年8月25日 ) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Investigative Report on the Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (August 25 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-9-18

20 ldquoDangqian shedui qiye ji ge qingkuang de huibao (1983 nian 11 yue 13 ri) 当前社队企业

几个情况的汇报 (1983年 11月 13日 ) [Report on Some Present Situations of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (November 13 1983)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-15-5


ltUNgt

边渡口公社 21 (2) ldquoContracts based on fixed output requirement extra profits to be divided and piece-rate wagesrdquo In this method the commune or brigade seta fixed output sum for the contractor All profits earned in excess of that amount were to be divided between the contractor and the commune or brigade at a pre-determined ratio The commune or brigade also paid a piece-rate wage to the contractor One example was the Gaozhuang Communersquos machine kiln22 (3) ldquoContracts based on fixed output requirements bonuses to be paid for extra profits and fixed wag-esrdquo In this method the commune or brigade established a fixed amount of output to be produced by the contractor at a regular interval The con-tractor was paid a bonus at a fixed rate for any profits earned in excess of the output quota The commune or brigade also paid the contracting party a fixed wage One example was the Pukou Communersquos 浦口公社

repair and manufacturing plant23 (4) ldquoContracts based on fixed output requirement and floating wagesrdquo In this method the commune or bri-gadeset a fixed output requirement to be fulfilled by the contractor at a regular interval The amount of basic wage is set which would increase or decrease as a percentage of the amount of money earned above or below the output requirement24 (5) ldquoFixed output requirment bonuses paid for extra profits and profit splittingrdquo In this method the commune or brigade set a fixed output requirement The contractor would receive fixed bonuses for exceeding that quota and all profits were split between the contractor and the commune or brigade at a pre-determined ratio One example was the Bianjiawu Brigadersquos textile plant25

3 Some cbes handed their operations over to rural households to be directly run as part of the individual economy This trend was most prominent in production-team-run enterprises and a portion of brigade-run enterprises The production team was the basic unit for agriculture and industrial and sideline industry production During the era of col-lectivization production teams containing industrial or sideline industry enterprises generally divided their members into two groups agricultural

21 ldquoBianjiawu dadui shixing baogandaohu de zuofa (1981 nian 4 yue 29 ri) 边家务大

队实行包干到户的做法 (1981年4月29日 ) [Bianjiawu Brigade Adopts Methods of Responsibility System (April 29 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 10-168-10

22 ldquoDangqian shedui qiye ji ge qingkuang de huibao (1983 nian 11 yue 13 ri)rdquo23 Ibid24 Ibid25 ldquoBianjiawu dadui shixing baogandaohu de zuofa (1981 nian 4 yue 29 ri)rdquo

FENG 202

ltUNgt

and sideline industries with the workpoint system used to govern both After the implementation of the household contract responsibility sys-tem those production team members who had originally been assigned to sideline industries were also allocated land At this time the level of agricultural mechanization was extremely low nearly all planting was done by hand This low level of mechanization required these production team members to expend a great deal of time and energy in the fields for which they were responsible which made concentrated production in industrial and sideline industry enterprises unsustainable Given these conditions the most common and most practical option of production teams was to sell equipment to people in rural areas at cut-rate prices or in some cases to just give them out for free Some brigades opted for similar measures as well The Liguozhuang Brigade 李果庄大队 of the Xiaowang Guozhuang Commune 小王果庄公社 for example directly allocated the looms from its textile factory to individual housholds who then operated the business in their own homes with all income going to said households and the collective taking only commissions26 Several production teams of Jilang Village 季郎村 Xingnan Commune 邢南公

社 sold their acrylic fiber plants to rural individuals at low prices after the household contract responsibility system had been put in place The production teams of the Nanyuba Brigade 南于八大队 Yuba Commune 于八公社 which had either individually or jointly established eight acrylic fibers plants maintained ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo operations for nearly a year after the implementation of the Household Responsibil-ity System thereafter all the production teams sold the plants to those people who had been operating them Some places implemented the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo in name but in truth allowed the individual econ-omy to take charge The textile factory of the Luotun Brigade 骆屯大队

of the Beisha Commune 北沙公社 for example contracted its looms out to individual households at the fixed price of five yuan per year per loom At that time five yuan was approximately equivalent to the annual depreciation cost of a loom and so this method was tantamount to handing looms to rural households free of charge In other areas poor management led to instances of ldquosolo practitionersrdquo Managing cadres taking special privileges in the textile factory of the Liuhetun Brigade

26 ldquoFahui youshi yang chang bi duan geti jingji xunmeng fazhan ndash liguozhuang dadui jingyan (1982 11 yue 20 ri) 发挥优势扬长避短个体经营迅猛发展mdashmdash李果庄大队经验 (1982年 11月20日 ) [Taking Advantage of Strengths Downplaying Weaknesses Rapid Growth of Small Privately-owned Enterprises ndash the Experience of the Liguozhuang Brigade]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-45


ltUNgt

六合屯大队 of the Xingnan Commune caused a mass uproar which led to the closing of the factory and distribution of its machinesamong local residents27

(C) Industries Suitable to Rural Household Operations Began Trending Toward the Individual Economy

The majority of enterprises in industries suitable for operation by rural house-holds such as textiles garments embroidery straw and wicker weaving parts repairs and so on gave their equipment directly to rural households who then became part of the individual economy Such methods brought about the transformation of the collective economy into the individual economy cbes not suitable to household operation or those in suitable industries but of large scale such as some textile plants electrical materials plants plastic compres-sion plants rice and flour processors brick and tile kilns orchards restaurants hotels and so on opted instead to implement the Household Responsibility System

iii The Rise of Rural Private Enterprises

In the mid-1980s rural private enterprises in Gaoyang County experienced explosive growth and became the primary means by which riches were made in the countryside By the end of 1982 there were a total of 5753 households who either specialized in a single type of production activities in an agriculture-related industry or made notable contribution to the local tax revenue and 885 partnership enterprises in the county28 By the end of 1983 the numbers were 8791 and 1257 respectively By the end of 1984 the numbers were 13466 and 1760 respectively29

Rural private enterprises rose primarily by the following three methods

27 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu dangqian shedui qiye qingkuang he anpai yijian de baogao (1981 nian 5 yue 10 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于当前社队企业情况和安

排意见的报告 (1981年5月 10日 ) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Report on Current Circumstances of Gaoyang Commune and Brigade Enter-prises and Opinions on Planning (May 10 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-9-10

28 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo qingkuang de baogao (1983 nian 2 yue 26 ri) 中共高阳县委关于一九八二年工作情况的报告 (1983年2 月26日 ) [cpc Gaoyang County Committee Report on Work Conditions of 1982 (February 26 1983)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-584-1

29 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei yi jiu ba si nian gongzuo zongjie (1985 nian 1 yue 2 ri) 中共

高阳县委一九八四年工作总结 (1985年 1月2日 ) [cpc Gaoyang County Committtee Work Summary for 1984 (January 2 1985)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-598-1

FENG 204

ltUNgt

(A) Privately or Individually Owned Businesses That Had Evolved Directly from cbes Grew Rapidly Accounting for the Largest Share in Private Enterprises

The textile industry which was suitable to household operation was the most typical example At the end of 1981 cbes around the county owned a total of over 2000 looms By the end of 1982 that figure had grown to 3001 with 804 collectively owned and 2197 individually owned30 By January 1984 there were 4790 looms in the county all owned by either individuals or partner-ships Of that total 4207 belonged to individually-owned businesses of which there were 4512 in the county the remaining 583 belonged to partnerships of which there were over 100 in the county31 By the end of 1984 there were over 6000 looms in the county with fifteen villages dedicated to the textile industry A total of over 20000 laborers manned those looms but the total of industry workers topped 40000 if one counts pre-production and post-production ser-vice workers The Gaoyang textile industry turned out sixty million meters of fabric of all varieties sold in fifteen provinces direct-controlled cities and au-tonomous regions in the South Southwest Northeast North and Northwest making the textile industry the predominant industry of Gaoyang Countyrsquos rural areas32 The brigade-run textile factory of Liguozhuang a village special-izing in textiles claimed only seventy manually powered looms and annual per capita revenue of only twenty-nine yuan in 1979 After the looms had been distributed to local households the majority used the manual looms for only four or five months before using accumulated capital to buy electric looms By 1982 not a single manual loom remained in the village which now claimed 470 electric looms and annual per capita revenue of 1564 yuan The twelve-person household headed by Han Pingrsquoan 韩平安 which had hitherto lived in abject poverty bought two electric looms a few months after the brigade-run factory had folded Thereafter the household needed to weave only one roll of fabric to achieve an average daily revenue of ten yuan and an average annual revenue

30 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo jianjie (1882 nian 12 yue 23 ri)rdquo

31 ldquoGaoyang xian nongcun gongfuye fuwu gongsi guanyu dangqian nongcun gongfuye qing-kuang de diaocha baogao (1984 nian 1 yue 25 ri) 高阳县农村工副业服务公司关于当

前农村工副业情况的调查报告 (1984年 1月25日 ) [Gaoyang County Rural Industrial and Sideline Industry Service Company Investigative Report on Current Rural Industrial and Sideline Industry Conditions (January 25 1984)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-16-1

32 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu da bu shengchan de diaocha baogao (1985 nian 7 yue 18 ri) 中共高阳县委关于大布生产的调查报告 (1985年7月 18日 ) [cpc Gaoyang County Committee Investigative Report on Widespread Distribution of Production (July 18 1985)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-599-24


ltUNgt

of over 3600 yuan33 By 1985 there were 615 electric looms in the village and annual textile revenue totaled 515 million yuan or 1327 yuan per capita34

The acrylic knitting industry was another typical example Gaoyangrsquos knit-ting industry was concentrated in Nanyuba Village of the Yuba Commune Nanjianwo Village 南尖窝村 of the Jianwo Commune 尖窝公社 and Jilang Vil-lage of the Xingnan Commune all located to the west of the county capital All knitting in these villages had previously been controlled by production-team-run enterprises which owned over 200 looms collectively The knitting industry grew rapidly after the machines had been distributed to individual households By January 1984 there were over 1000 looms in the three villages which were posting annual revenues of over five million yuan primarily from the sale of scarves35

(B) A Large Portion of Private Enterprises Rose by Copying cbre Products

After the implementation of the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo some people for-merly employed in cbes on the strength of the technical and management skills they had acquired as well as the network of relationships they had built during their stints in cbes established individually-owned kiosks or partner-ship enterprises which copied the products made in cbes For example prior to 1980 there had been four production-team-run felt factories in Taokoudian Village 陶口店村 Pukou Township 蒲口乡 After the household contract responsibility system had gone into place former felt factory workers got to-gether to raise the funds to build thirteen felt factories on the strength of the technical and management expertise they had acquired in the cbe Another example centers on the brigade-run glasses factory of Xiwangcaozhuang Vil-lage 西王草庄村 Jianwo Township 尖窝乡 With the new responsibility sys-tem in place thirty-two rural households emulated the former cbe and col-lectively founded nine small glasses factories The compression molding plant of Sanfangzi Village 三坊子村 Longhua Township 龙化乡originally imple-mented collective contracting unified direction of labor by the production

33 ldquoFahui youshi yang chang bi duan geti jingji xunmeng fazhan ndash liguozhuang dadui jing-yan (1982 11 yue 20 ri)rdquo

34 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei bangongshi guanyu liguozhuang cun gongtong zhifu de diaocha baogao 中共高阳县委办公室关于李果庄村共同致富的调查报告 [cpc Gaoyang Committee General Office Investigative Report on Liguozhuang Villagersquos Collective Wealth Creation]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-609-14

35 ldquoGaoyang xian nongcun gongfuye fuwu gongsi guanyu dangqian nongcun gongfuye qingkuang de diaocha baogao (1984 nian 1 yue 25 ri)rdquo

FENG 206

ltUNgt

team led to over-involved management and low production proactivity on the part of laborers After 1983 some local households left the plant this led to the founding of twenty partnership enterprises and the establishment of sixteen specialized households36

(C) Some Private Enterprises Arose from the Contracting Out of cbesBeginning in 1981 the cbes of Gaoyang County all began to implement con-tracting systems mostly modeled on the Household Responsibility System nearly all brigade-run enterprises that had not been dissolved opted to use this method This method was effective at boosting work incentives but many contractors neglected maintenance and repair of equipment and facilities in their pursuit of ever higher profits This method gave rise to the phenomena of ldquomaking exhaustive useof equipmentrdquo and ldquopillaging-style productionrdquo There were abuses of profit sharing systems and a lack of awareness of public accu-mulations negatively influenced and limited the expansion and reproduction of enterprises Many such enterprises had no choice but declare bankruptcy after only a few years cbes that implemented the contract responsibility sys-tem provided good conditions for the rise of private enterprises in one of two ways The first was it allowed the contractor to accumulate capital technology and management experience which laid the foundations for the later estab-lishment of a private enterprise The Gaoyang County cbe Bureau came to the following conclusion when summarizing the issues inherent to cbe contract-ing ldquoAll those people whose had had their lsquotuitionrsquo paid by town or village col-lective enterprises in either business or production technology all took off on their own to start their own businesses once they had gained enough business or production technology knowledge and accumulated enough capitalrdquo37 The

36 ldquoGaoyang xian fazhan nongcun shangpin shengchan dianxing cailiao xuanbian (xubian yi) (1984 nian 10 yue) 高阳县发展农村商品生产典型材料选编 (续编一 )(1984年

10月 ) [Selected Materials on Typical Cases of the Development of Rural Commercial Products in Gaoyang County (Continuation One) (October 1984)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 32-3-7

37 ldquoXiang (zhen) cun ban jiti qiye ruhe shixian zheng qi fenkai zizhu jingying ndash Gaoyang xian xiangzhen qiye guanli xianzhuang ji jinhou yijian de diaocha (1986 nian 9 yue 5 ri) 乡(镇)村

办集体企业如何实现政企分开自主经营 mdashmdash高阳县乡镇企业管理现

状及今后意见的调查 (1986年9月5日 ) [How the Government was Separated from Enterprises and Autonomous Operations Were Brought About in Township (Town) and Village-run Collective Enterprises ndash Current Conditions in Management of Town and Vil-lage Enterprises in Gaoyang County and Opinions for the Future (September 5 1986)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-21-10


ltUNgt

second way was for private enterprises to use factories or equipment which had been left idle after the bankruptcy of a cbe In one example a newly es-tablished partnership enterprise made use of the factory and machinery of the village-run textile factory of Zhaoguanzuo Village 赵官佐村 Xingnan Town-ship by buying shares of the village collective to found a wool factory (which produced carpets)38

I summarized the above three methods from the overall course of develop-ment of private enterprises in Gaoyang County In many cases a combination of these methods was used in individual industries or villages in which cases the rise of private industries could be attributed to the ldquointerlaced influence ef-fectrdquo The development of private industries under the influence of the ldquocopy-ing effectrdquo could be characterized as coming in waves or growing progressively After the first individually-owned business and partnership enterprises spun out of former cbes had begun to achieve economic success other rural house-holds were quick to emulate their models Thus came the second and third waves in the development of rural private enterprises Once a particular indus-try had grown in a given village surrounding villages were sure to quickly copy expanding the scale of that industry For this reason the countryside played host to specialized production zones characterized by ldquosmall scales and large communitiesrdquo By 1987 Gaoyang County had become host to six specialized production zones ldquoone big and five smallrdquo The ldquoone bigrdquo was the textile indus-try which covered fifteen towns 149 villages over 3900 individually-owned or partnership enterprises 6500 looms over 23000 specialty workers and an-nual revenues of over twenty million yuan The ldquofive smallrdquo were the electronic materials plastics garments felt and cloisonneacute industries These industries collectively covered one or two towns over a dozen villages production zones encompassing over 10000 people and annual output values of over ten million yuan39

In conclusion the course of development of rural industries in Gaoyang County indicates that there was a close historical connection between the

38 ldquoZhaoguanzuo cun hu lianban qiye shi yi tiao hao luzi (1986 nian 10 yue 15 ri) 赵官佐

村户联办企业是一条好路子 (1986年 10月 15日 ) [The Joint Founding of Enterprises by Households in Zhaoguanzuo Village is a Good Road (October 15 1986)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-608-22

39 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu xiangzhen qiye da diaocha de baogao (1987 nian 6 yue 7 ri) 中共高阳县委关于乡镇企业大调查的报告 (1987年6月7日 ) [cpc Gaoyang County Committee Report on the Great Investigation into Town and Village Enterprises (June 7 1987)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-620-19

FENG 208

ltUNgt

transformation of cbes and the rise of rural private enterprises Some cbes evolved directly into private enterprises Others provided production samples capital technology management experience and sales channels for the rise of private enterprises Viewed from this perspective the transformation of cbes was the starting point for the development of the rural private economy fol-lowing Reform and Opening The transformation of cbes into rural private en-terprises led to the accumulation of valuable experience and lessons for later reforms targeting small and mid-sized urban enterprises

References

ldquoBianjiawu dadui shixing baogandaohu de zuofa (1981 nian 4 yue 29 ri) 边家务大队实

行包干到户的做法(1981年4月29日) [Bianjiawu Brigade Adopts Methods of Re-sponsibility System (April 29 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 10-168-10

ldquoDangqian shedui qiye ji ge qingkuang de huibao (1983 nian 11 yue 13 ri) 当前社队企

业几个情况的汇报(1983年 11月 13日) [Report on Some Present Situations of Com-mune and Brigade Enterprises (November 13 1983)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-15-5

ldquoFahui youshi yang chang bi duan geti jingji xunmeng fazhan ndash liguozhuang dadui jingyan (1982 11 yue 20 ri) 发挥优势扬长避短个体经营迅猛发展mdashmdash李果庄

大队经验(1982年 11月20日) [Taking Advantage of Strengths Downplaying Weak-nesses RapidGrowth of Small Privately-owned Enterprises ndash the Experience of the Liguozhuang Brigade]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-45

ldquoGaoyang xian fazhan nongcun shangpin shengchan dianxing cailiao xuanbian (xu-bian yi) (1984 nian 10 yue) 高阳县发展农村商品生产典型材料选编(续编一)(1984年 10月) [Selected Materials on Typical Cases of the Development of Rural Commercial Products in Gaoyang County (Continuation One) (October 1984)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 32-3-7

ldquoGaoyang xian jiben qingkuang (fu yi jiu ba san nian guomin jingji zhongyao zhibiao shexiang) (1982 nian 12 yue) 高阳县基本情况(附一九八三年国民经济重要指

标设想)(1982年 12月) [Basic Conditions in Gaoyang County (Including Tentative Important Indicators for the National Economy in 1983) (December 1982)]rdquo Gaoy-ang County Archives 1-584-6

ldquoGaoyang xian nongcun gongfuye fuwu gongsi guanyu dangqian nongcun gongfuye qingkuang de diaocha baogao (1984 nian 1 yue 25 ri) 高阳县农村工副业服务公

司关于当前农村工副业情况的调查报告(1984年 1月25日) [Gaoyang County Rural Industrial and Sideline Industry Service Company Investigative Report on Current Rural Industrial and Sideline Industry Conditions (January 25 1984)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-16-1


ltUNgt

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye fenlei dengjibiao (1981 nian 8 yue) 高阳县社队企业分类

登记表(1981年8月) [Registrations of Commune and Brigade Enterprises by Cat-egory in Gaoyang County (August 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-571-19

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu dangqian shedui qiye qingkuang he anpai yijian de baogao (1981 nian 5 yue 10 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于当前社队企业情况

和安排意见的报告(1981年5月 10日) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Report on Current Circumstances of Gaoyang Commune and Brigade Enterprises and Opinions on Planning (May 10 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-9-10

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu shedui qiye qingkuang de diaocha baogao (1981 nian 8 yue 25 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于社队企业情况的调查报告(1981年8月

25日) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Investigative Report on the Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (August 25 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-9-18

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu shedui qiye ziyuan he jingji qingkuang de huibao (1980 nian 8 yue 13 ri 高阳县社队企业局关于社队企业资源和经济情况的汇

报(1980年8月 13日) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterpris-es Report on the Resources and Economic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (August 13 1980)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-6-1

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo jianjie (1882 nian 12 yue 23 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于一九八二年工作简结(1982年 12月23日) [Brief Work Summary of the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enter-prises for 1982 (December 23 1982)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-3

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju yi jiu ba yi nian gongzuo jianjie he yi jiu bae r nian jian-yao anpai 高阳县社队企业局一九八一年工作简结和一九八二年简要安排 [Brief Work Summary of the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises for 1981 and Brief Plans for 1982]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-1

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju yi jiu qi ba nian shang ban nian gongzuo zongjie (1978 nian 7 yue 24 ri) 高阳县社队企业局一九七八年上半年工作总结(1978年7月24日) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Work Summary for the First Half of 1978 (July 24 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-2

ldquoGaoyang xian yi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye fazhan guihua (1978 nian 12 yue) 高阳县一

九七九年社队企业发展规划(1978年 12月) [Gaoyang County Development Plan for Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1979 (December 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-557-4

ldquoGuowuyuan banfa lsquoguanyu shedui qiye ruogan wenti de guiding (shixing caorsquoan) de tongzhi (1979 nian 7 yue 3 ri) 国务院颁发〈关于社队企业若干问题的规定(试行草案)〉的通知(1979年7月3日) [Notice Regarding the State Councilrsquos lsquoRegula-tions on Several Issues of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (Trial Draft) (July 3 1979)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 10-276-3

FENG 210

ltUNgt

ldquoKaizhan duozhong jingying dali fazhan shedui qiye wei nongye dagan kauishang jilei daliang zijin (1978 nian 4 yue 14 ri) 开展多种经营大力发展社队企业为农业大

干快上积累大量资金(1978年4月 14日) [Develop Multiple Forms of Operations Strive to Develop Commune and Brigade Enterprises Go All Out and Go Fast to Accumulate Large Quantities of Capital for Agriculture (April 14 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-1

ldquoShedui qiye kai xin hua tong xin tong de gao sihua ndash xiyan gongshe yi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye gongzuo zongjie (1979 nian 12 yue 20 ri) 社队企业开新花同心同

德搞四化 mdashmdash西演公社一九七九年社队企业工作总结 (1979年 12月 20日 ) [New Blossoms on Commune and Brigade Enterprises Bringing About the Four Changes with One Heart and One Mind ndash Work Summary of Commune and Bri-gade Enterprises in Xiyan Commune 1979 (December 20 1979)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-4-2

Shi Jinchuan Jin Xiangrong and Zhao Wei 史晋川金祥荣赵伟 Zhidu bianq-ian yu jingji fazhan Wenzhou moshi yanjiu 《制度变迁与经济发展温州模式

研究》 [Institutional Changes and Economic Development Study of the Wenzhou Model] (Zhejiang daxue chubanshe 2002)

ldquoXiang (zhen) cun ban jiti qiye ruhe shixian zheng qi fenkai zizhu jingying ndash Gaoyang xian xiangzhen qiye guanli xianzhuang ji jinhou yijian de diaocha (1986 nian 9 yue 5 ri) 乡(镇)村办集体企业如何实现政企分开自主经营mdashmdash高阳县乡镇

企业管理现状及今后意见的调查(1986年9月5日) [How the Government was Separated from Enterprises and Autonomous Operations Were Brought About in Township (Town) and Village-run Collective Enterprises ndash Current Conditions in Management of Town and Village Enterprises in Gaoyang County and Opinions for the Future (September 5 1986)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-21-10

Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 《新时期农业和

农村工作重要文献选编》 [Selected Important Works on Agriculture and Rural Work in the New Era] ed CCP Central Committee Literary Research Department and State Council Development Research Center 中共中央文献研究室国务院

发展研究中心 (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992)ldquoYi jiu ba ling nian shedui qiye jiben qingkuang 一九八年社队企业基本情况

[ Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1980]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-5-1

Zhang Renshou and Li Hong 张仁寿李红 Wenzhou moshi yanjiu 《温州模式研

究》 [A Study of the Wenzhou Model] (Zhongguo Shehui kexue chubanshe 1990)ldquoZhaoguanzuo cun hu lianban qiye shi yi tiao hao luzi (1986 nian 10 yue 15 ri) 赵官佐村

户联办企业是一条好路子(1986年 10月 15日) [The Joint Founding of Enterprises by Households in Zhaoguanzuo Village is a Good Road (October 15 1986)]rdquo Gaoy-ang County Archives 1-608-22


ltUNgt

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei bangongshi guanyu liguozhuang cun gongtong zhifu de diaocha baogao 中共高阳县委办公室关于李果庄村共同致富的调查报

告 [CCP Gaoyang Committee General Office Investigative Report on Liguozhuang Villagersquos Collective Wealth Creation]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-609-14

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu da bu shengchan de diaocha baogao (1985 nian 7 yue 18 ri) 中共高阳县委关于大布生产的调查报告(1985年7月 18日) [CCP Gaoyang County Committee Investigative Report on Widespread Distribution of Production (July 18 1985)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-599-24

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu xiangzhen qiye da diaocha de baogao (1987 nian 6 yue 7 ri) 中共高阳县委关于乡镇企业大调查的报告(1987年6月7日) [CCP Gaoyang County Committee Report on the Great Investigation into Town and Village Enterprises (June 7 1987)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-620-19

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo qingkuang de baogao (1983 nian 2 yue 26 ri) 中共高阳县委关于一九八二年工作情况的报告(1983年

2月26日) [CCP Gaoyang County Committee Report on Work Conditions of 1982 (February 26 1983)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-584-1

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei yi jiu ba si nian gongzuo zongjie (1985 nian 1 yue 2 ri) 中共高阳县委一九八四年工作总结(1985年 1月2日) [CCP Gaoyang County Committtee Work Summary for 1984 (January 2 1985)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-598-1


ltUNgt

chapter 9

Analysis of the Construction of Village Collective Economic Organizations and Related Issues in Changshu CitymdashFour Case Studies

Zheng Yougui1

Abstract

In the 1980s Changshu City was designated a pilot area for agricultural moderniza-tion reforms Over the years a number of features and trends in village cooperative economic organizations in Changshu City as a whole and the four model villages forrural modernization became increasingly evident They include a simplified orga-nizational structure a new kind of relationships with the government town manage-ment of village accounts and professionalization of village officials These measures have had many positive effects including rapid economic growth for Changshu City and increases in thevalue of village collective assets revenue for village governments employment participation in non-agricultural industries among rural population and village resident incomes The entry of rural Changshu City into this state ofsound de-velopment wasan inevitable consequence of the evolution on the Southern Jiangsu Model

Keywords

Changshu City ndash village collective economy ndash Bixi Road ndash Southern Jiangsu Model

i Success of the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo and the ldquoSouthern Jiangsu Modelrdquo

Changshu City 常熟市 is located in southern Jiangsu Province In the early 1980s the successful experience of Bixi Township 碧溪乡 Changshu City which came to be known as the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo was affirmed by Li Peng 李鹏 and

1 Zheng Yougui (郑有贵 ) is an associate research fellow in the Contemporary Agricultural History Department of the Ministry of Agriculturersquos Institute of Rural Economics

213Analysis of the Construction OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

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other central leaders2 and caught the attention of the entire country The ldquoBixi Roadrdquo means simultaneous development of industrial and agricultural Town-ship Village Enterprises (tves) with the bulk of said tves operating within the collective economy In other words the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo was what would later give rise to the ldquoSouthern Jiangsu Modelrdquo The primary characteristics of ru-ral Southern Jiangsu were a strong collective economy and coordinated de-velopment between agriculture and industry In the 1980s Changshu City was designated a pilot area for agricultural modernization reforms and at present the rural areas of Changshu are considered to be at the forefront of rural ar-eas in East China To research this topic we selected the four Changshu vil-lages of Jiangxiang 蒋巷 Menglan 梦兰 Kangbo 康博 and Changnan 常南 which are outstanding among the total of 410 villages located in Changshu and all of which are key model villages for rural modernization in the city (only ten villages were thus designated in all of Changshu) Three of these villages were responsible for the creation of three ldquofamous Chinese brandsrdquo Bosideng Menglan and Longliqi The other one was responsible for the creation of a provincial ldquofamous brandrdquo The Party secretary of each of these villages was ei-ther a delegate to the Sixteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) or a delegate to the National Peoplersquos Congress They were given esteemed titles such as outstanding ccp member national model workers Chinese rural celebrities and so on It would seem likely that some common factors were behind the success of so many famous villages and enterprises within a single county-level city I studied these four villages of Changshu City and their unusually high level of development in an attempt to discover those common factors and trends that may suit the needsof future rural economic development

ii Organization and Construction of Changshursquos Village Collective Economies and Their Operation

There are four characteristics of the organization and construction of village collective economies in Changshu in recent years as well as their operation

2 On an observations tour on January 8 1986 Li Peng noted the following of Bixi Township it was centered on the collective economy with a focus on the industrial economy it walked a road of common prosperity and it persisted in the direction of socialism He also had this to say ldquoShirk off commonness without leaving the township enter the factory without entering the city both industrial and agricultural collectively grow rich the town is small but well informed build two civilizationsrdquo

ZHENG214

ltUNgt

1 Simplification of Village Political OrgansThere were originally three government organs presiding over village gover-nance in Changshu City the village party branch committee the village peo-plersquos committee and village economic cooperative Now only the village party branch committee and village peoplersquos committee remain There is no longer an independent body controlling village collective economic organization village collective assets are now controlled by the village peoplersquos committee

2 Emergence of New Government-Enterprise RelationsIn traditional government-enterprise relations the village government controls local enterprises However new government-enterprise relations emerged in Jiangxiang Menglan Kangbo and Changnan In these four villages while it is the same person who serves as both village Party secretary and as the president of the dominant local enterprise this does not mean that there is no separa-tion between government and business or that the village government controls theenterprise The actual nature of government-enterprise relations in these four villages is that as the pillar company grows the government becomes in-creasingly extricated from it The village governmentthen implements either a shareholding or contracting system on the enterprise and the enterprise be-gins to exert influence on local governance Such exertion of influence can be seen primarily in two phenomena The first is that in Changnan Kangbo and Menglan the village Party secretary took up that position only after having become president of the local pillar company The second is that once those company heads had become local Party secretaries they worked to help in-crease the income and improve welfare for the entire village population3 while at the same time promoting further development in rural modernization and establishing allocations of resources such as village land that served the inter-est of their companies

3 ldquoTown Management of Village AccountsrdquoThe central government has demanded implementation of openness in village government affairs and finances in order to reduce the burden on rural citi-zens this means allowing rural citizens oversight of village affairs and finances Local governments across the country made explorations in this area While investigating the countryside of Xianyou County 仙游县 Fujian Province in May 2002 I observed that villages there had established sound institutions for

3 The presidents of Bosideng Longliqi and Menglan do not receive salaries from their villages but their companies provide such resources as employment opportunities capital for mod-ernist construction and so on to the villages


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village finance regulation as well as dual-oversight thereover ldquoDual-oversightrdquo means openness of village affairs and finances to enable oversight by the local population as well as oversight by superior tiers of government Town govern-ments there have implemented a system of monthly concentrated accounting of village finances officials in town government oversight stations perform a concentrated auditing of income and expenditures from the previous month and fix any problems as soon as they emerge In late June 2002 the Changshu City government instituted the ldquotown management of village accountsrdquo policy to further computerize the work of regulating village collective finances and assets In concrete terms this policy dictates that each town government estab-lish village-level financial regulation service centers where officials are com-missioned by village leadership to make an accounting of the books prepared by village governments under the unified leadership of the town economic service center This policy operates under the principle of the ldquofive constantsrdquo They are Work units at the village level that keep independent accounts re-main constant ownership of usage rights to and beneficiaries of village assets (capital) remain constant the bodies authorized to manage village finances village debtsmdashboth what it owes and what is owed to the villagemdashremain constant approval procedures for expenditures and income on village capital remain constant and the final constant is that village accountants must be officials within the system The policy further stipulates that no work unit or individual has the right to make uncompensated appropriations divert funds or violate any legal rights of the village collective economic organization The policy also laid out a set of corresponding regulation institutions including primarily a system for village financial regulation pre-approved budgets and financial accounting for villages openness of village affairs and finances a contract management system for village economies assessments based on maintaining or increasing the value of village collective assets (to determine the compensation and promotions of local officials) a system for managing records a system of job responsibility for financial and accounting personnel a system for assessing bonuses and punishments and so on The directorship of town government village-level financial regulation service centers is held by the leading cadre for rural economics in the town economic service center The centers are staffed by one chief accountant (usually one chief accountant per four to six villages) a certain number of bookkeepers and only one village accountant per village The Changshu government sees the ldquotown manage-ment of village accountsrdquo policy as an important attempt in rural financial regulation reforms officials are promoting it as an important corresponding measure in reforms to rural taxation The thorough implementation of this measure in Changshu is advantageous to strengthening oversight over the use

ZHENG216

ltUNgt

of village collective assets and the imposition of regulation measures over collective assets It is also beneficial to standardizing the work order of ac-countants and financial management behaviors as well as to improving the pre-approved budget and accounting system for village-level finances It is beneficial to reducing the number of village-level officials by choosing for the best to decreasing non-production expenditures to increasing and stabiliz-ing village collective revenues and to feasibly reducing the burden on rural citizens

4 Increased Professionalism among Village OfficialsIncreased professionalism among village officials can be seen primarily in the following two areas (1) Open hiring ensures that outstanding talent from technical and vocational schools are attracted to village governments The Changshu City government has executed a policy of open hiring of village officials which has been met with a positive response over 100 graduates of technical and vocational schools have been appointed as ldquovillage officialsrdquo In one example from Jiangxiang Village one three-year technical school graduate was first employed as an assistant in the village government but later came to be appointed deputy director of the village peoplersquos committee owing to excel-lent work performed (2) The government has eliminated worries about the future on the part of officials through basic compensations institutions as well as granting them pension insurance and health insurance this enables them to cast themselves into their work mind and body ldquoBasic compensationsrdquo for village officials (in reality their wages) and bonuses are based on such stan-dards as increases to the value of village collective assets economic growth population figures and so on Village officialsrsquo basic compensations and in-surance fees come ldquoprimarily from the village with planning from the town and subsidies from the cityrdquo On the whole village officials earn more than the average rural per capita income In 2001 basic compensations for village officials in Changshu fell generally in the range of 15000 to 20000 yuan but many also earned bonuses (in some cases bonuses far exceeded yearly basic compensations)

iii The Effectiveness of Economic Models in the Four Villages

The operations of village collective economic organizations in Changshu are effective primarily in the following areas First the economy of Changshu City is growing rapidly In 2001 the cityrsquos gross domestic product (gdp) was 303 bil-lion yuan a year-on-year growth of 176 percent and its fiscal revenues totaled


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3046 billion yuan a year-on-year increase of twenty-five percent Also in 2001 the per capita savings rate was 19000 yuan Second village collective assets are gaining value In 2000 for example the total value of all village collective assets in the city grew by over 100 million yuan over the previous year which breaks down to an average increase of over 200000 yuan per village Of all vil-lages in the city over seventy percent realized increases to village collective net assets the average net increase to village collective assets in those villages was over 600000 yuan Less than thirty percent of villages experienced net losses to village collective assets Third village governments had large quantities of financial resources available for spending In 2001 the average quantity of fi-nancial resources available for the year at the village level in Changshu was 101 million yuan In 2002 those villages with financial resources available for the year totaling 300000 yuan or less were deemed financially troubled villages and financial subsidies were allotted to them Fourth the ratio of rural citizens (those with agricultural household registrations) employed in non-agricultural industries was high with over two thirds of rural citizens employed in non-agricultural industries Fifth rural per capita net incomes were high in 2001 the average rural per capita income in the city was 5853 yuan 25 times the national average

Next we shall evaluate the effectiveness of the village collective econom-ic organizations in Jiangxiang Menglan Kangbo and Changnan based on their economies collective assets and citizen income and welfare levels (see Table 91 for an outline)

First letrsquos look at the village economies The overall economies of all four villages were large and have already entered the track of rapid development Industry provided the largest contribution to economy in each village as each village is home to one large-scale pillar enterprise that accounts for a large proportion of total village gdp The village-collective-run enterprise in Jiangx-iang Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltd accounts for 897 percent of total vil-lage gdp which is low compared to the other villages but still a generally high figure all other industrial agricultural and service companies in the village account for minuscule proportions of total village gdp These four pillar en-terprises cannot be considered tves in the traditional sense of that term They are modern corporations with human resources and branding strategies that have achieved success through product quality The ldquofamous Chinese brandsrdquo Bosideng Menglan and Longliqi as well as Jiangsu provincial ldquofamous brandsrdquo are their important intangible assets as well as the basis for their strength in market competition Officials in all four villages have enacted policies of ldquousing industry to build the countrysiderdquo thus simultaneously promoting rural indus-trialization and agricultural and rural modernization

ZHENG218

ltUNgt

Second total asset values of village collectives were either maintained or increased Government-enterprise separation has been implemented in all four villages No matter whether a given village government has enacted reforms to property rights institutions the pillar enterprises in all four villages have grad-ually established modern corporate systems and have either maintained or in-creased total collective asset values through system protections The methods through which village collective asset values are increased can be divided into two types The first is used in Jiangxiang Village where there have been no property rights reforms enacted in village collective enterprises but the pillar enterprise has still grown quickly bringing the total value of village collective assets up with it Village government revenues there are high coming from en-terprise contracting revenue operations revenue and housing rental revenue The second method is employed in Menglan Kangbo and Changnan Villages where the pillar enterprises are shareholding corporations There are great in-centives under such conditions for enterprise operators to earn profits and so the enterprises have a strong capacity for sustained growth As the enterprises grow so do dividends paid on village collective shares Village government

Table 91 Conditions in the Four Villages in 2001

Jiangxiang Menglan Kangbo Changnan

Total population 739 812 1672 2680Total households 187 197 430 900Total arable land (million mu) 1049 1045 2525 2577gdp (million yuan) 5800 8133 83093 25438Industrial sales revenue (million yuan)

25018 46188 258036 83552

Industrial profits and taxes (million yuan)

2416 5290 44386 13138

Village collective assets (million yuan)

10465 1336 3885 728

Available resources for year (million yuan)

606 308 1243 960000

Per capita income (yuan) 9500 9021 6419 5550New village construction (structures)

86 39 210 Preparing

Old village restoration (structures)

197


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revenues in those three villages come primarily from corporate dividends collective-held shares contracting fees paid for small enterprises that the village founds with earnings from the sale of its shares real estate and rent paid for housing and other collective-owned assets The governments of these villages have a great deal of financial resources available every year

Third citizen incomes and collective welfare levels are relatively high The pillar enterprises of the four villages have solved the employment issues for village labor4 and have made enormous contributions to increasing local in-comes Economic strength of the village collectives has provided conditions for the improvement of welfare for all village citizens and has solved such problems as enterprise labor senior care healthcare employment insurance and so on The villages are also mostly newly constructed Jiangxiang Meng-lan and Kangbo have already completed construction of new villages or reno-vations of existing villages and Changnan is currently in the planning phase for new village construction which will take place soon

In summary the villages of Changshu City particularly the four on which we are focusing are in a good state with rapidly growing economies village collective asset values increasing and citizen income and welfare levels on the rise Next letrsquos take a look at the conditions of each of the four villages individually

1 Jiangxiang VillageLeader Chang Desheng 常德盛 the village Party secretary has been a ccp member for over 30 years was a delegate to the 16th ccp National Congress has been named outstanding Party member and also serves as chairman and presi-dent of the Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltd 江苏常盛集团有限公司

Economic conditions Under the leadership of Chang Desheng the village has provided an excellent development environment for locals to become wealthy The government has enacted policies of people should do what they are best suitable for whether it be agricultural sideline industries or business and the most suitable model should be adopted whether it is as part of a col-lective or privately operated The village government operates a contracting system for collective enterprises It encourages the development of individual and private enterprises for which officials have opened a dedicated industrial zone and issued a policy whereby enterprises pay no fees to the village col-lective for their first sixteen years of operation Village gdp was 27890 billion yuan in 2001 to which the collective-run enterprise Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltd contributed 897 percent Total economic output of individual and

4 These enterprises also attract a great deal of laborers from outside their villages as well as a great deal of graduates from specialized and vocational schools

ZHENG220

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private industrial enterprises was 2232 million yuan contributing eight per-cent of village gdp The agricultural economic output of the village was 360 million yuan contributing 13 percent to village gdp and economic output of tertiary industries was 280 million yuan contributing one percent to village gdp

Pillar enterprise The village-collective-run enterprise Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltd is the dominant company in the village In 2001 the companyrsquos industrial sales revenue totaled 25018 billion yuan in addition to profit and tax revenue of 2416 million yuan Even after the two rounds of property rights reforms to tves in Changshu City Changsheng has remained a collective-run enterprise as compared to the other three villages all of which have enacted shareholding systems

Collective assets As the pillar enterprise remains village-owned the value of collective assets in this village is high 10465 billion yuan In 2001 the vil-lage government had a large amount of disposable financial resources for the year 606 million yuan most of which came from Changsheng which paid 588 million yuan to the collective for the year accounting for 932 percent of all disposable government income Table 92 shows collective revenues and ex-penditures in Jiangxiang

The greatest portion of collective expenditures went to welfare and ben-efits which accounted for 571 percent of total expenditures The second great-est portion went to agricultural investments (mostly ecological construction including bamboo forests and orchards) accounting for 326 percent of the total this is attributable to the villagersquos policy of ldquousing industry to build the countrysiderdquo Operating expenditures were low leaving a total of 147400 in surplus funds Management fees made up the smallest portion of all expen-ditures coming in at only 39 percent This trend is in stark contrast to most villages in the country where management fees represent a large proportion of total expenditures

Agriculture Rights to land in the village are auctioned by the collective on the basis of the household contract responsibility system (the village govern-ment provides 600 jin of rice per mu free of charge) to fifteen major plant-ing households Newly-constructed ecological gardens (bamboo gardens orchards and so on) are run directly by the village government as agricultur-al factories the government hires a small number of old farmers to cultivate these areas at their leisure for which hourly wages are paid

Citizen income and welfare levels The villagersquos per capita income is high reaching 9500 yuan in 2001 Welfare distributions are also high in the village (see Table 92) Now sixty-eight local households reside in small villas con-structed by the village government


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2 Menglan VillageLeader Qian Yuebao 钱月宝 serves as village Party secretary was a delegate to the Ninth and 10th National Peoplersquos Congresses was named one of the ten most distinguished women in the country and is chairman and president of the Jiangsu Menglan Group Co 江苏梦兰集团公司

Pillar enterprise Jiangsu Menglan Group Co is the dominant company in the village Its primary constituent enterprises hold assets valued at 450 mil-lion yuan In 2001 the company earned sales revenues of 460 million yuan and additional profits and taxes of fifty-three million yuan

Unit Yuan

Table 92 Village-level collective revenues and expenditures in Jiangxiang Village 2001

Revenue Expenditures Notes

Item Sum Item Sum

Total revenues 64826 mn Total expenditures

62526 mn Agricultural investments include 164000 yuan in field and irrigation con-struction 823600 yuan for rural road and bridge construction and 10513 mn yuan in orchard cultivationManagement fees include cadre compen-sations entertainment fees and office feesWelfarebenefits expen-ditures include special care for servicemen sup-ply stipends cooperative healthcare payment of senior pensions greening fees and social welfare enterprises

Operating revenues

544200 Operating expenditures

396800

Fees for contracting out water resources

13900 Agricultural investments

20389 mn

Rent income 2000 Management fees

244900

Money paid up by collective enterprises

588 mn Welfarebenefits expenditures

3572 mn

Additional revenue from two taxes

12500 Enterprise investments

Other revenues

30000 Other expenditures

Previous yearrsquos balance

172000 Balance on year

230000

ZHENG222

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Collective assets A total net asset is value at 1366 million yuan and dispos-able government financial resources in 2001 totaled 308 million yuan The vil-lage collective owns fifteen percent of Jiangsu Menglan Group

Agriculture Rights to the over 1200 mu of farmland in the village are auc-tioned out on the basis of the Household Responsibility System (grain rations and a certain quantity of liquid petroleum gas are provided free of charge) for scale operation to two major planting households and three village-run con-tracted farms

Citizen income and welfare levels The villagersquos per capita income is high reaching 9021 yuan in 2001 Welfare distributions are also high in the village Enterprises in the village have to provide pension workersrsquo injury unemploy-ment health and maternity insurance to all employees and are responsible for paying pensions to the over 170 seniors residing in the village Some citizens reside in small villas constructed by the village government which has also built a rehabilitation and activities center a tennis facility a rural citizen park a supermarket and other corresponding facilities

3 Kangbo VillageLeader Gao Dekang 高德康 serves as the village Party secretary was a delegate to the Tenth National Peoplersquos Congress is a rural celebrity in Chi-na and is the chairman and president of the Jiangsu Bosideng Corp Ltd 江苏波司登股份有限公司

Pillar enterprise Jiangsu Bosideng Corp Ltd is the dominant company of the village This is the most economically viable of all four of the village pillar companies in this study Its assets were valued at 2284 billion yuan and its net assets at 580 million yuan at the end of 2001 The companyrsquos operating assets totaled 236 billion yuan on the year

Collective assets Village collective assets total 3885 million yuan and dis-posable government financial resources in 2001 totaled 1243 million yuan

Agriculture The village operates the household contract responsibility system

Citizen income and welfare levels In 2001 per capita net income was 6419 yuan and some citizens now reside in the Kangbo Gardens (a villa complex) constructed by the village government

4 Changnan VillageLeader Xu Zhiwei 徐之伟 serves as the village Party secretary and as chairman and president of the Jiangsu Longliqi Group 江苏隆力奇集团

Pillar enterprise Jiangsu Longliqi Group is the dominant company of the vil-lage In 2001 its industrial sales revenues totaled 830 million yuan in addition to 130 million yuan in profits and taxes


ltUNgt

Collective assets Collective net assets are valued at 728 million yuan and disposable government financial resources in 2001 totaled 960000 yuan


Citizen income and welfare levels There are 457 agricultural laborers 1024 construction and industrial laborers and 519 tertiary industry laborers in the village Per capita net income was 5550 yuan in 2001 A high-standard villa area is currently being planned

A look at the effectiveness of operations of the collective economic or-ganizations of these four villages leads us to the following conclusions The economic models of Changshu City and these four village collectives are all beneficial to economic growth increases to collective asset values gains to per capita income levels and improvement of welfare distributions

iv Lessons and Further Discussion

There are lessons to be learned from the economic models being practiced by these four successful village collectives in Changshu but there are also some issues which merit further exploration

1 Is the Professionalization of Officials Something That Necessarily Occurs When the Economic Development Reaches a Certain Level

As the countryside develops socially and economically so does the demand for high quality talent there Officials in economically developed Changshu City put this in practice by hiring graduates from specialized and vocational schools The professionalization of officials means viewing village government positions as job positions and several conditions must be met for this to be accomplished First graduates of specialized and vocational schools need to be able to earn a relatively ideal salary in rural government positions Second these graduates need to have a purpose in their jobs so as to have some value to their lives Third there must be an economic foundation in the village town or county in which they work sufficient to pay the salaries of professionalized officials These conditions have been met in fiscal affairs of Changshu at the village town and county levels as well as in the state of socioeconomic de-velopment of some villages So now there are many graduates of specialty and vocational schools employed as ldquovillage officialsrdquo in Changshu In other words it is the strong economy and developed society of Changshu that have made the professionalization of officials possible which presents us with a ques-tion is the professionalization of officials an inevitable trend once a place reaches a certain degree of economic strength Also would we thwart the

ZHENG224

ltUNgt

professionalization of officials by demarcating village community economies as cooperative economies These are practical questions but also questions that must be answered through theoretical inquiries

2 Should We Classify Village Community Economic Organizations as Collective Economic Organizations or as Cooperative Economic Organizations

In political terms the model of economic organization at the village level in Changshu can be summarized as follows the only controlling political bodies are the village Party committee and the village peoplersquos committee village economic cooperatives have been abolished and village officials are becoming increasingly professionalized In terms of management there has been a separation of government from enterprises and two groups oversee collective assets (primarily land real estate enterprises or shares in corpora-tions) and operations thereof this ensures either maintenance of or gains to total asset values The ldquotown management of village financesrdquo policy is advan-tageous to reducing the burden on rural citizens as it reduces the number of village officials Under this model enterprises grow rapidly and rural citizens experience increased incomes The value of collective assets is secure and col-lective income can grow stably primarily from business revenues contracting fees of collective assets dividends from collective-held corporate shares and so on All of this goes to ensure continued improvement to villagersrsquo well-being and welfare In other words this system has propelled rural Changshu into a positive development state in which the economy grows fast collective assets maintain or increase in value and citizen incomes and welfare continue to grow This model which has been highly efficient in economically developed regions is worthy of our attention No political bodies are established to guide the collective economy in regions where village collectives are of strong eco-nomic viability (nearly 10 years of successful operations demonstrate the ef-ficiency of this mode of administration) that ought to tell us something about the necessity of such bodies in ldquoempty shell villagesrdquo This fact also presents us with a question should we define village community economic organiza-tions as collective economic organizations or as cooperative economic orga-nizations There is great dissent regarding this question in academic circles as different methods are employed in different areas In some places village community economic organizations are called cooperatives but this is a fact in name only as they are not operated on the principles of the cooperative system This trend can be seen in the following areas First the directors of cooperatives are appointed the position usually filled by the Party secretary or director of the village peoplersquos committee but appointment of a leader does


ltUNgt

not conform to the principles of cooperatives If we persist in calling village community economic organizations cooperative economic organizations it will be very difficult for the leader of a cooperative to also be the leader of a village peoplersquos committee selected under the system of autonomy of village residents If it does end up being the same person then wersquoll have double the democracy and double the costs (the costs of elections committee meetings and so on) and that is not beneficial to reducing the burden on rural citizens Second the objective behind merging administrative villages is to reduce the number of village officials and thus reduce the burden on rural citizens Such a merging is extremely necessary but it is a government action If the assets of village collectives were merged in the same way (which would be in real-ity tantamount to a redistribution of the collective property rights of village residents) it would not be a voluntary union asked for by villagers That is to say that if collectives were made into cooperatives the various property rights of the members of those cooperatives would not be truly protected Third the law stipulates that land belongs to village collectives village residents who leave community economic organizations cannot take the land with them Thus if village community economic organizations are run under a system of autonomy by village residents and all land belongs to the collective we should clarify that village community economic organizations are in fact col-lective economic organizations under the direct control of the village peoplersquos committee (in theory it should be a relationship of agency by commission ie village residents entrust the peoplersquos committee with the power to regulate) and we should not insist on calling them cooperative economic organizations Such a move would be beneficial both to reducing the number of village-level officials and to shrinking the burden on rural citizens Of course if a commu-nity economic organization just so happens to operate on the principles of a cooperative then it should be called a cooperative economic organization

3 Is the Entry of Rural Changshu into a Positive Development State of Rapid Economic Growth Sustained or Increased Values of Collective Assets and Rising Village Resident Income and Welfare Levels the Inevitable Result of the Southern Jiangsu Model

This model which establishes mechanisms for rapid economic growth ensures value retention or value growth of collective assets and brings about increases to village resident incomes and welfare levels has long been a major topic of discussion All four of our focus villages entered a positive develop-ment state of rapid economic growth sustained or increased values of collec-tive assets and rising village resident income and welfare levels regardless of whether the pillar enterprise had been subject to shareholding reforms There

ZHENG226

ltUNgt

are two primary reasons for this phenomenon First each village has a good leader Jiangxiang has been under the control of public servant Chang Desheng who disregards personal gains and losses and gives his absolute all for the de-velopment of the collective enterprise The governments of Menglan Kangbo and Changnan have all implemented shareholding systems in their pillar en-terprises but resident incomes and welfare levels have risen in those three vil-lages as well That is because the chiefs of theirpillar enterprises also serve as local Party secretaries who solve the employment issues for their villages and bring about general prosperity through growing the pillar enterprise and driv-ing development of related industries They also give back to the community5 Second each village has delinked government from business and enacted both systems for collective asset management and modern corporate governance structures To improve collective asset management the Changshu City gov-ernment has enacted assessment protocols by which the salaries and bonuses of village officials are linked to the maintenance and growth of collective asset values This linking ensures maintenance or growth of collective asset values and encourages officials to make active use of said assets which in turn leads to stable income for the village collective and ensures increases to income and welfare levels for citizens All four of the villages delinked government from business and established modern corporate governance structures regardless of whether they enacted shareholding systems and the contracting system was implemented in those enterprises not subject to property rights reforms Village collective enterprises now employing the shareholding system have ex-perienced rapid growth as a result of ample incentives on the part of operators The reason that these villages have entered a positive development state of rapid economic growth sustained or increased values of collective assets and rising village resident income and welfare levels is therefore the competence of village leaders and the effectiveness of village political institutions

Further analysis indicates that the entry of rural Changshu into this posi-tive state is indeed the inevitable consequence of the Southern Jiangsu Model There are two reasons I came to this conclusion The first is that the Southern Jiangsu Model laid a solid foundation for village collective economies Even if the village collective sells its shares in the mainstay foundation it is rewarded with a sizeable amount of capital which can be used to invigorate collective assets and spur value increases thereto The second is that changes to politi-cal institutions have been reliant upon government ways and means Some

5 They also engage in a number of activities to give back to society outside of their villages Examples include the founding of the ldquoBosideng Ten Million Yuan Green Hope Project Fund to Protect Our Mother Riverrdquo and the adoption of a great number of orphans


ltUNgt

village collectives have not sold out and still retain a few points or in some cases over ten percent of the ownership of pillar enterprises the dividends from which represent an important contribution to collective income If we defined the Southern Jiangsu Model on the basis of ownership alone then aca-demics would conclude that the Southern Jiangsu Model has already run its course If however we see the Southern Jiangsu Model as an extension and a development of the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo then the Southern Jiangsu Model should still have more to offer

ltUNgt

Part 2

Flows of Goods Money and People

∵


ltUNgt

chapter 10

The History of Rural Private Lending in Hubei Province 1952ndash1954

Su Shaozhi and Chang Mingming1

Abstract

Private lending had long been an important component of the rural financial system before the liberation of China Surveys conducted in rural Hubei Province from 1952 to 1954 indicated that owing to economic backwardness the weakness of household economies lack of a sound social security system and non-existence of a modern fi-nancial system private lending after 1949 was subject to some suppression Neverthe-less lending also saw some development and was characterized by relative procedural simplicity and lower interest rates Most private lending after 1949 was done to provide mutual aid The expansion of state banking services into the countryside as well as the rise of such modern financial organizations as rural credit cooperatives shrank the space for private lending but they were in no way able to completely replace the role played by private lending

Keywords

borrowing rates ndash lending forms ndash loan uses ndash influencing factors

From the end of Land Reform to the peak of the agricultural collectivization movement private lending remained a major component of Chinarsquos rural fi-nancial system Chinese government policies first encouraged freedom and then came to chastise the ldquofour great freedomsrdquo one of which was the free-dom to lend money privately At the same time officials attempted to bring about collectivization quickly to solve the production and living difficulties of rural citizens and to excoriate the exploitative practice of usury However

1 Su Shaozhi (苏少之 ) is a professor in the Institute of Chinese Economic History of Zhong-nan University of Economics and Law Chang Mingming (常明明 ) holds a PhD from Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

SU AND CHANG232

ltUNgt

some materials indicate that even during the eras of agricultural cooperatives and peoplersquos communes rural private lending including loan sharking had not been eradicated Following Reform and Opening rural private lending has reemerged and many are placing a great deal of attention on this issue this is what piqued our interest in rural private lending in the 1950s It is unfortu-nate that little research has been done on this topic to date In this essay we attempt to provide further insight into the issue of private lending in Chinarsquos countryside from the years from 1952 to 1954 with a particular focus on Hubei Province

i The Development of Rural Private Lending in Hubei from 1952 to 1954

(A) Rural Private Lending in Hubei a Year or Two after Land Reforms1 Private Lending Following Land ReformsDebt burdens on poverty-stricken peasants in China before 1949 were partic-ularly heavy Studies have shown that between fifty to sixty percent of rural households in Hubei were in debt in the 1930s and 1940s2 Land reforms led by the ccp abolished the debts owed by the laboring masses to the landlord class

After 1949 Hubei a newly liberated area launched a movement to de-crease rents decrease interest and in some cases return deposits made prior to land reforms In the land reforms that began there in autumn of 1950 all debts owed by rural citizens (nongmin alternatively referred to as peasants) to landlords were forgiven as ordered by the Central Peoplersquos Government State Administrative Council in the ldquoMeasures for Handling Rural Debt Disputes in the Countryside of New Areasrdquo 新区农村债务纠纷处理办法 The measures ordained thatall other debtsbe handled based on their specific circumstances For disputes in which laboring peasants owed debts to rich peasants and the interest owed was equal to the principal interest was eliminated and only the principal would need to be repaid In cases in which interest was twice the principal or more both interest and principal were forgiven In cases in which interest was less than the principal the creditorrsquos rights of the rich peasant remained in force In cases in which interest was greater than the principal but less than twice the principal the debt agreement was cancelled once twice the interest was paid The measures for handling debts owed to rich peasants

2 Li Jinzheng 李金铮 Minrsquoguo xiangcun jiedai guanxi yanjiu《民国乡村借贷关系研究》 [A Study of Rural Lending Relationships in the Republic of China] (Beijing Renmin chuban-she 2003) 25

233The History of Rural Private Lending in Hubei Province

ltUNgt

were also observed in cases in which peasants and other laborers had incurred interest-bearing debt prior to liberation to those who made a living from interest on loans or to schools Debts owed to ancestral temples religious tem-ples or other social organizations were generally cancelled Both interest and principal were required to be repaid in all debts owed to public granaries per original agreements regardless of who the borrower was All debts owed in the transaction of material goods or other commerce were also to be resolved on the basis of original agreements signed by both parties All ordinary debts incurred by peasants to other peasants prior to 1949 also remained in effect3 Thus even after land reforms some old debts lingered in the countryside

A survey conducted in Yangbu Township 杨步乡 Mianyang County 沔阳县 indicated that by the end of 1952 there were still debts between twenty householdsmdash543 percent of the total of 368 households in the areamdashleftover from before land reforms4 Another survey conducted in Xishui County 浠水

县 indicated that in early 1953 there were still debts leftover from before 1949 affecting seventy householdsmdash3153 percent of the 222 households investi-gated in six selected areas of Nanyue Township 南岳乡 5 These two surveys were conducted in small areas with few samples taken and there was a great disparity in the situations they reported Another survey conducted in seven Hubei townships in early 1953 indicated debts from before land reforms still af-fected 780 households 2281 percent of the total 3419 households in the survey Of those 548 householdsmdash1602 percent of total householdsmdashwere borrow-ers borrowing on average 1043 jin of grain (investigators denominated debt of both material goods and money in grain at the time) per household Another 232mdash679 percent of total householdsmdashwere lenders lending on average 943 jin of grain (calculated in the same way as for borrowers) per household6 This

3 Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 《中国土地改革史料选编》 [Selected Historical Materials from Chinarsquos Land Reforms] (Guofang daxue chubanshe 1988) 677ndash678

4 ldquoMianyang xian yangbu xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha 沔阳县杨

步乡土改后农村经济基本情况调查 [An Investigation into Basic Rural Economic Con-ditions in Yangbu Township Mianyang County after Land Reforms]rdquo April 1953 Hubei Pro-vincial Archives SZ18-1-42

5 Wang Xuezhe 王学者 ldquoXishui xian nanyue xiang nongcun siren jiedai guanxi diaocha 浠水

县南岳乡农村私人借贷关系调查 [An Investigation into Rural Lending Relationships in Nanyue Township Xishui County]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 August 8 1953

6 Original data came from ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuang 荆州专区

农村私人借贷情况 [Private Lending in the Countryside of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42 ldquoDangyang xian guanling xiang jingji diaocha 当阳县关陵乡经济调查 [Economic Investigation of Guanling Township Dangyang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives and ldquoGuanghua xian bailiansi

SU AND CHANG234

ltUNgt

investigation took a large quantity of samples and so was more indicative of the general situation of old debt in rural Hubei at the time Although the find-ings of the above surveys were not entirely similar on the whole they all indi-cate that even after the elimination of debt owed by peasants to the landlord class carried out during land reforms some degree of debt between peasant households incurred prior to land reforms lingered

Most debt incurred before 1949 that remained unpaid in the Nanyue Town-ship survey existed between peasants but some was owed to rich peasants those who made a living from interest on loans and business people Most borrowers were poor peasants and vagrants accounting for 8677 percent of all borrowers Peasants by and large believed that the capital issued as debt by rich peasants those who made a living from interest on loans and busi-nesspeople (282 percent of lenders) had been accumulated through exploita-tion and thus they were generally unwilling to repay said debts Of all debt between peasants incurred prior to 1949 385 percent of borrowers had paid a total of interest less than the amount of principal and 118 percent had paid one to two times the principal in interest Only 47 percent had paid over two times the principal in interest and 45 percent had paid neither interest nor the principal Borrowers who had borrowed little and had the ability to repay had all repaid their debts Some poor peasants and hired farmhands in difficult situations took the initiative in negotiating with creditors and arrived at agree-ments to repay the debt in installments or to postpone debt repayment Some non-repayment of debt on the part of peasants was attributable to economic hardship Some others however thoughtthey might put it off indefinitely since they were not going to be able to repay fully anyway some tried torepudiate their debt altogether Most of those who had paid two times their principal in interest either negotiated to have the debt cancelled or simply desisted from repaying

2 Development of Borrowing and Lending One or Two Years after Land Reforms

The feudal land system was abolished after land reforms and peasants were given new life both politically and economically Nevertheless sluggishness of economic development in rural areas kept the majority of rural families at a very low economic level A sampling survey conducted at the time indicated that at the completion of land reforms the average rural household in Hubei

xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji dioacha baogao 光化县白莲寺乡土改后农村经济调查

报告 [Investigative Report into the Rural Economy of Bailiansi Township Guanghua County After Land Reforms]rdquo January 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47


ltUNgt

was in possession of 1209 mu of arable land 052 cows 001 horses 002 donkeys 072 pigs and 41 structures their farm implements were crude and untidy and average income was low Peasant households operated small-scale economies had low capacity for both production and withstanding natural disasters earned low incomes and lacked accumulation These facts meant that they would experience difficulties in both production and daily life when-ever a natural or man-made disaster hit At the time there was neither a sound social security system nor a modern rural financial system So when peasants landed on hard times their best option was often to borrow money from pri-vate citizens to tide them over

We shall first examine borrowing and lending that occurred after land reforms and then come back to make comparisons with old debts remaining from before land reforms The findings of asurvey conducted in early 1953 of 3419 households in five townships of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region 荆州专区 one township of Dangyang County 当阳县 and one township of Guanghua County 光化县 concerning borrowing and lending that oc-curred after rural land reforms and comparisons to old debts are contained in Table 101

Data in the table indicate that 781 of the 3419 householdsmdash2284 percentmdashin the survey either borrowed or lent after land reforms Of those 484 householdsmdash146 percent of total households surveyedmdashwere borrowers with average household borrowing at 540 jin The other 297 householdsmdash869 percent of total households surveyedmdashwere lenders The proportion of house-holds in a debt relationship to total households held roughly steady before and after land reforms but the proportion of borrowers was slightly lower and the proportion of lenders slightly higher There was a great change however in amounts borrowed Old debts accounted for 6861 percent of the total of 833277 jin of grain borrowed both before and after land reforms with new debts accounting for only 319 percent New debt borrower households were in debt for an average of 540 jin of grain only 5177 percent of the average debt of 1043 jin borrowed by old debt households The number of households that neither borrowed nor lent was approximately the same before and after land reforms but quantities borrowed after land reforms were much smaller than before

Another survey conducted in eleven townships of rural Hubei indicated that excluding landlord households about ten percent of rural households had been lenders prior to 1949 with an average of 80000 jin of grain lent per township After land reforms the percentage of lending households held relatively steady coming in at 98 percent but the volume of the loans had dropped dramatically down to an average of 25000 jin of grain per township

SU AND CHANG236

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 10

1 Ne

w a

nd o

ld p

rivat

e len

ding

rela

tions

hips

in se

ven

tow

nshi

ps o

f rur

al H

ubei

pro

vinc

e in

1952

Num

ber o

f bo

rrow

er

hous

ehol

ds

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal

hous

ehol

ds

Tota

l gra

in

borr

owed

(jin

)Av

erag

e gr

ain

borr

owed

per

ho

useh

old

(jin)

Num

ber

of le

nder

ho

useh

olds

Perc

enta

ge o

f ho

useh

olds

su

rvey

ed

Tota

l gra

in

lent

(jin

)Av

erag

e gr

ain

lent

(jin

)

Old

deb

t54

816

03

571

716

1043

232

697

218

755

943

New

deb

t48

414

16

261

561

540

297

869

415

262

140

Data

sour

ce ldquo

Jingz

hou

zhua

nqu

nong

cun

sire

n jie

dai q

ingk

uang

荆州

专区

农村

私人

借贷

情况

[Pri

vate

Len

ding

in t

he C

ount

rysi

de o

f th

e Jin

gzho

u Su

b-pr

ovin

cial

Reg

ion]

rdquo M

arch

1953

Hub

ei P

rovi

ncia

l Ar

chiv

es S

Z18-

1-42

ldquoDan

gyan

g xi

an g

uanl

ing

xian

g jin

gji d

iaoc

ha 当

阳县

关陵

乡

经济

调查

[Eco

nom

ic In

vest

igat

ion

of G

uanl

ing

Tow

nshi

p Da

ngya

ng C

ount

y]rdquo

Mar

ch 19

53 H

ubei

Pro

vinc

ial

Arch

ives

SZ18

-1-47

and

ldquoGua

nghu

a xi

an b

aili

ansi

xia

ng t

ugai

hou

non

gcun

jing

ji di

oach

a ba

ogao

光化

县白

莲寺

乡土

改后

农村

经济

调查

报告

[Inv

esti

gati

ve R

epor

t in

to t

he

Rura

l Ec

onom

y of

Bai

lian

si T

owns

hip

Guan

ghua

Cou

nty

Afte

r La

nd R

efor

ms]

rdquo Ja

nuar

y 19

53 H

ubei

Pro

vinc

ial

Arch

ives

SZ1

8-1-4

7Exp

lana

tion

Bo

rrow

ing

figu

res i

n th

e ab

ove

tabl

e ar

e m

uch

grea

ter

than

len

ding

fig

ures

Thi

s phe

nom

enon

is p

rim

aril

y be

caus

e le

nder

s wer

e un

wil

ling

to

exp

ose

thei

r w

ealt

h fo

r fe

ar t

heyrsquo

d be

dep

icte

d as

hig

h-in

tere

st u

sure

rs L

ow r

epor

ting

of

quan

titi

es l

ent

mad

e it

dif

ficu

lt t

o as

cert

ain

the

trut

h of

the

situ

atio

n A

s bor

row

ers h

ad l

ess t

o fe

ar f

rom

bei

ng t

ruth

ful

it is

lik

ely

that

the

fig

ures

the

y re

port

ed w

ere

clos

er t

o th

e tr

uth

Rep

orti

ng t

rend

s wer

e si

mil

ar in

inve

stig

atio

ns c

ited

bel

ow


ltUNgt

Of that total forty percent had been borrowed forcibly with less than 15000 jin of grain per township loaned voluntarily7 So if one excludes lending done by landlords and rich peasant households there was a great reduction to the scale of lending between peasant households

Next we shall take a look at the class distribution of rural private lending after land reforms A survey conducted of 3165 rural households8 indicated that 701 rural households (2215 percent) had engaged in either entered new borrowing or lending between the end of land reforms and the end of 1952 Of those 426 (1346 percent of total households surveyed) were borrower house-holds borrowing on average 403 jin of grain per household There were 275 lender households (896 percent of total households) lending an average of 3853 jin per household

The majority of new borrower households were poor peasant and hired farmhand households accounting for 632 percent of total borrower house-holds and borrowing 629 percent of total grain lent However only 171 per-cent of households in the poor peasant and hired farmhand class were bor-rowers slightly higher than the average percentage of borrowers per class but they borrowed slightly less on average than other classes averaging only 389 jin per household One major change in the class distribution of borrowing and lending from Old China to the Peoplersquos Republic of China was that poor peas-ant and hired farmhand households came to account for a large proportion of lender households in the Peoplersquos Republic of China accounting for 5564 percent of total lender households and lending 5381 percent of total grain lent Of course such a fact does not indicate that poor peasant and hired farm-hand households had more surplus capital than households in other classes it is rather representative of the fact that over fifty percent of all rural house-holds at this time fell into this class A total of 965 percent of all households in the poor peasant and hired farmhand class were borrowers slightly higher than the average for all classes but their average total lent was 373 jin slightly

7 ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan) 农村借贷情况与活

跃农村借贷问题（草案） [Rural Lending Conditions and the Issue of Invigorating Rural Lending (Draft)]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-18-1-40

8 ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuang 荆州专区农村私人借贷情况 [Pri-vate Lending in the Countryside of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42 ldquoDangyang xian guanling xiang jingji diaocha 当阳县关陵乡

经济调查 [Economic Investigation of Guanling Township Dangyang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47 and ldquoGuanghua xian bailiansi xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji dioacha baogao 光化县白莲寺乡土改后农村经济调查报告 [Investigative Re-port into the Rural Economy of Bailiansi Township Guanghua County After Land Reforms]rdquo January 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

SU AND CHANG238

ltUNgt

less than the average for all classes In terms of both lending and borrowing poor peasant and hired farmhand households had experienced a boost to their economic status after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China If we combined figures for the poor peasant and hired farmhand class the middle peasant class and other laboring classes we would see that they accounted for 939 percent of all borrowing households 9745 percent of all grain bor-rowed 9419 percent of all lending households and 9427 percent of all grain lent These figures indicate that most borrowing and lendingthat took place in the countryside since the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China occurred among the laboring masses

Lastly letrsquos take a look at the overall situation of borrowing and lending in rural China at the time both old and new A survey conducted of 6795 house-holds in four townships of the Xiangyang region 襄阳地区 five townships of the Xiaogan region 孝感地区 and five townships of the Jingzhou region from late 1952 to early 1953 indicated that 1760 households (259 percent) were in lending relationships Of those 1171 households (1723 percent of total house-holds surveyed) were borrower households and 589 (867 percent of total households surveyed) were lender households Of the households covered in this survey a higher proportion were either borrowers or lenders than had been in the one represented in Table 101 as this survey included old debt but the total of old and new debt in this survey was much lower than in the previ-ous survey That is because old and new debts were listed in the previous sur-vey but in reality many households with new debt also had old debt making it difficult to list out the ratios of old and new independently In class distribu-tion of debt 952 percent of all borrower households and 928 percent of total grain borrowed in both old and new debts came from the classes of poor peas-ants hired farmhands middle peasants and laborers These classes accounted for 8811 percent of all lender households and 8432 percent of all grain lent in-dicating that on the whole most lending was taking place between households of the laboring masses and most of it was done toward objectives of mutual aid or mutual succor

On the whole there was new development in rural private lending in Hubei over the one to two years following land reforms but said development was not vigorous In other words rural private lending had fallen into stagnation That does not mean that all old debts remaining after the cancellation of all debts to the landlord class had fallen into a state of near-death but rather that there were relatively few new debts The survey depicted in Table 101 indicates that the quantity of lending occurring in new debt was only thirty-one percent that of old debt (all debts owed to the landlord class were cancelled as were most debts owed to rich peasants or those who made a living from interest on loans


ltUNgt

most borrowingand lending existed between households of the laboring mass-es) Of course such a comparison is of only relative significance To determine whether rural private lending relationships had fallen into stagnation we must perform analysis of actual supply and demand for private lending existing in rural economic life at the time The rural household economy was weak follow-ing land reforms Over half of rural households were still poor peasants From the perspective of the difficulties they faced in both production and living ru-ral demand for private lending was quite strong With the national economy still in tatters state banks were eeking together capital to give loans to rural citi-zens and the government was still actively advocating for and organizing rural credit cooperatives indicating both the demand for capital in the countryside and the lack thereof There were countless instances of rural citizens on hard times ldquoforcibly borrowingrdquo from their more affluent neighbors indicating that capital issued by state banks and credit cooperatives as loans as well as capital freely lent between rural households was insufficient to meet rural demand Thus private lending needed to be further developed to meet demand

Now letrsquos look at the supply of private capital Although wealth was redis-tributed following land reforms there was still some idle capital in the coun-tryside available for private lending Surveys indicated that the average middle peasant household in the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region had lent out 1000 jin of grain prior to 1949 but the lending figure had dropped to 450 jin after land reforms9 The reason for this drop was that middle peasant households were unwilling to lend even if they had excess grain for fear of ldquoexposing wealthrdquo or ldquostanding outrdquo or ldquoelevating statusrdquo or being labeled ldquousurersrdquo A survey con-ducted of 275 rural households of Yutai Township 雨台乡 in Jiangling 江陵 Zhonghe Township 中和乡 in Gongrsquoan 公安 Dengping Township 邓平乡 in Echeng 鄂城 and other townships of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region indi-cated that these households collectively possessed 265000 jin of surplus grain an average of 964 jin per household and the average townshiprsquos middle peas-ant households sat on a total of between five to ten thousand yuan in surplus capital Very little however was lent out A survey conducted in four town-ships of the Xiangyang Sub-provincial Region indicated that only 64 percent of surplus social capital was used in lending and lending was well developed in fewer than ten percent of townships10

9 ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuang 荆州专区农村私人借贷情况 [Private Lending in the Countryside of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42

10 ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan)rdquo

SU AND CHANG240

ltUNgt

Most rural borrowing at the time was done just to meet living needs to tide a household over for a year or a season of famine or other unexpected hard-ships Stagnation in rural private lending made it difficult for rural households to make it through hard times An oft-heard phrase at the time was ldquoall four doors are closed tight and we cannot borrow moneyrdquo

(B) Reasons for Stagnation in Private Lending Measures Taken to Resolve the Issue and Their Results

1 Reasons for the Stagnation of Rural Private Lending after Land Reforms

Land reforms cancelled all debts owed to the landlord class This was a severe blow to the creation of debt as the landlord class owned the most private prop-erty The primary causes of stagnation in rural private lending following land reforms were egalitarian ideology and policies skewed against private lending This stagnation was manifested in the following areas

(a) Deviations in the implementation of land reform policies between different areas A distinction was made in land reform policies of the Peoplersquos Republic of China regarding ldquothose who made a living from interest on loansrdquomdashzhaili shenghuozhemdash(the term ldquousurerrdquo gaolidaizhe was generally avoided to reduce contention over whetherone gavehigh or low interest loans) and ldquothe landlord classrdquo The law read as follows ldquoThose who have issued a large amount of debt over a long period of time and rely solely or primarily on income from this debt for a living shall be accorded the status of lsquothose who make a living from interest on loansrsquo The property of people in this class is not to be touched during land reforms but all debts incurred by peasants and laborers to such persons prior to 1949 shall be handled in accordance with measures for han-dling debt incurred before 1949 owed by peasants to rich peasants In other words interest shall be forgiven and only principal repaid for debts in which accumulated interest is twice the principal and payments shall be altogether halted on repayment of debts for which accumulated interest is twice the prin-cipal or even morerdquo11 In the actual implementation of land reform policies however many of those who made a living from interest on loans rich peas-ants and affluent middle-income peasants were mistakenly labeled as mem-bers of the ldquoexploiter classrdquo for having engaged in lending at interest and were thus mistakenly accorded the status of landlords or other classes and conse-quently subject to persecution For example twelve households who made a living from interest on loans in Yihe Township 义和乡 Yingcheng County 应城县 were struggled against had all debts owed to them cancelled and had

11 Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 725


ltUNgt

all their property confiscated12 The result of these actions was that rural citi-zens came to believe that lending was the primary form of feudal exploitation that lending was ldquoillegalrdquo and ldquounreasonablerdquo and that it was not an error to renege on debts

(b) There were no legislative protections for rural private lending after land reforms After the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China no system of civil laws was established Rural private lending relationships were adjusted primarily through policies Policies of land reforms differentiated between dif-ferent kinds of old debt and officials announced that ldquoyou shall henceforth be free to lend and interest shall be determined by negotiations between both partiesrdquo They further decreed that disputes arising from rural debts should generally be resolved through the peoplersquos government or peasant association with jurisdiction those disputes which local governments could not resolve were to be passed up to county-level justice administration organs for adjudi-cation There was not however a clear basis for said adjudication The primary method actually used to resolvedebt matters was consultation or mediation held by rural government authorities or peasant associations In the materials wersquove been able to find all instances of forcible borrowing were either tac-itly allowed or in some cases directly organized by grassroots authorities We found no instances of authorities forcing debtors to repay their private debts

(c) Old debts that remained after land reforms were not well handled Re-payment on most of these debts were postponed for a long time Creditors did not dare to put pressure on debtors for to collect repayment both debtors and creditors decided to wait and see what was coming Some townships badly mangled the handling of old rural debts The method employed by officials in Guandu Township Songzi was to cancel interest and order repayment of only principal for debts in which the debtor had the ability to pay immediately debts which could not be immediately repaid were classified as new debts at two percent interest Officials in Yannian Township 延年乡 Zhongxiang 钟祥 outright abolished all old debts existing between peasant households13

(d) The principle of voluntary lending was violated in new lending Offi-cials in some townships stressed ldquounity and fraternal loverdquo or ldquomutual aid and mutual lendingrdquo This principle encouraged some peoplemdashincluding both offi-cials and members of the publicmdashwho were too lazy to work for themselves to coerce households with excess grain to put it up for loans For example

12 ldquoXiaogan zhuanqu wu ge xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 孝感专区五个乡农村经济

调查 [A Rural Economic Investigation into Five Townships of Xiaogan Sub-provincial Region]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-14

13 ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuangrdquo

SU AND CHANG242

ltUNgt

three rich peasant households of Gaoqiao Township Enshi were coerced into putting 610 jin of grain up for loan by a mob shouting ldquovoluntary lendingrdquo14

(e) Interest was not clearly stipulatedon new debts and high-interest lend-ing was not clearly differentiated from ordinary lending The bulk of the masses had only one all-inclusive concept ldquolending money at interest is illegalrdquo Some people knew the policy of ldquoallowing free lending and interest to be negotiated by both partiesrdquo but did not know exactly how much interest was legal For ex-ample one middle peasant in Zhouyan Township 周严乡 Xianning 咸宁 had this to say ldquoIn lending if the interest is too low then itrsquos not worth it If itrsquos too high yoursquoll try to get interest from him but hersquoll come after your principalrdquo15 This statement is highly representative of general thinking on the part of the erarsquos middle peasants who dared not to lend

2 Policies to Invigorate Rural Private Lending and Their EffectsTo promote rural private lending and invigorate the rural economy the South-central Military Administrative Commission 中南军政委员会 issued ten pol-icies regarding spring plowing and production at the opportune moment of spring plowing in both 1950 and 1951 calling for free lending in the countryside On March 6 1953 the Commission issued a decree this time clearly calling for ldquoprotection of the freedom to lendrdquo Governments at all levels around Hubei began enacting clear measures to resolve the situation Those measures called for actions in the following areas

(a) The proper handling of old debt As detailed above old debt accounted for 8405 percent of all rural debt at this time Most creditors belonged to the poor peasant hired farmhand middle peasant or other laboring classes Thus even though their private property rights were upheld some old debts were labeled high-interest or usurious as interest in these debts was several times or in some cases dozens of times the principal Officials made the following regulations to protect creditorsrsquo rights as well as to ensure the ability of debtors to repay First creditorsrsquo rights in debts between peasants and other laboring classes incurred before 1949 were upheld but interest was cancelled in all debts in which interest was twice the principal or more For debts in which interest was between one and two times the principal the debt was restructured and interest determined by negotiation Interest was to be renegotiated in debts in which interest owed was less than the principal to be calculated based on the time of non-payment Second officials reaffirmed debts incurred by peasants

14 ldquoEnshi gaoqiao xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 恩施高桥乡农村经济调查 [Rural Eco-nomic Investigation of Gaoqiao Township Enshi]rdquo Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47



ltUNgt

or other laboring classes before 1949 owed to rich peasants or households who made livings from interest on loans which were to be handled in accordance with the second article of the ldquoMeasures for Handling Disputes in Rural Debts in New Areasrdquo 新区农村债务纠纷处理办法 issued by the State Council in October 1950 Third all debts incurred after 1949 were fully upheld

(b) All lending from this point forward was to rigorously abide the May 6 1953 proclamation of the South-central Military Administrative Commission ldquoEnsure lending freedom with the amount of interest determined by negotia-tions between both parties no government or peasant association at any level may interfererdquo16

(c) Interest rate standards for private lending were established Reason-able interest rate standards were established to alleviate the concerns of ru-ral citizens including ldquospring debts are to be repaid in autumnrdquo and monthly interest between three and five percent There were three reasons for such standardization of rates First there was generally a five to eight percent regional price deviation and a twelve to fifty percent seasonal price deviation in rural commercial crops For example a survey conducted in the Xiangyang Sub- provincial Region indicated that in 1952 wheat sold for 162 yuan per dan at the time of the harvest but 216 yuan per dan at the time of planting and so interest on wheat was set at 33 percent In the same survey sesame oil sold for 04 yuan per jin in October but 06 yuan per jin in March and so interest on sesame oil was set at five percent17 There was a twenty-five per-cent price deviation between newly harvested grain sold in autumn and old grain sold in spring in the Xiaogan Sub-provincial Region18 There was a great deal of idle grain in the countryside but it was dispersed widely over countless households who were completely free to either hoard it or lend it out If they couldnrsquot get an interest rate on lending out their grain better than the seasonal price deviation then they would hoard it to sell it at speculative prices later in the year this directly obstructed the development of private lending Sec-ond interest rates were generally determined by the supply and demand of capital available for lending With rural private lending mired in stagnation those households wishing to lend often complained that ldquothere is no point to lendingrdquo as interest rates were too low Third the tradition handed down from

16 ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan)rdquo17 ldquoXiangyang zhuanqu si ge xiang jiedai zudian diandang maimai guanxi de diaocha 襄

阳专区四个乡借贷租佃典当买卖关系的调查 [An Investigation into the Relation-ships of Lending Tenancy Pawning and Commerce in Four Townships of Xiangyang Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-14

18 ldquoXiaogan zhuanqu wu ge xiang nongcun jingji diaochardquo

SU AND CHANG244

ltUNgt

Old China regarding interest was ldquofive points on grain three points on cashrdquo It was reversed in economically developed areas along waterways ldquothree points on grain five points on cashrdquo Interest rates had soared as a result of runaway inflation during the Republic of Chinarsquos rule Multiple surveys indicated that interest rates began to return to normal as prices stabilized following 1949

(d) Officials advocated for loans issued in currency with monthly interest rates Loans denominated in cash instead of material goods at monthly inter-est rates facilitated rapid capital turnover and helped to resolve seasonal dif-ficulties of farmers without resulting in excessive indebtedness

The above policies were made from considerations of both reinvigoration of rural private lending and of the ability to repay debt of some heavily indebted rural households They enabled creditors to profit from lending without forc-ing debtors into long-term excessive indebtedness These policies spurred development in rural private lending for a time The ccp Central Committee South-central Bureaursquos Rural Work Department conducted a survey into ten townships of Hubei Hunan and Jiangxi (of which five were in Hubei) that indicated that 2889 percent of rural households had engaged in private lend-ing or borrowing in 1953 a 555 percent increase over the 2334 percent ratio of 1952 A total of 252528 jin of grain was lent out in these townships in 1953 a 4496 percent increase over the 174211 jin lent out in 195219

(C) Development of Rural Private Lending from 1953 to 19541 Important Factors Influencing the Development of Rural Private

LendingAfter the general line for the transitionary period had been proposed in the second half of 1953 rural private lending hiring relationships land sales and land renting were denounced as the opposite of mutual aid and cooperation It was held that they were ldquoall advantageous to rich peasants and affluent middle peasantsrdquo and that their ldquoresults would be the development of a minority of rich peasants and taking the capitalist roadrdquo20 Thereafter there were chang-es to the governmentrsquos understanding of rural private lending In May 1951 Peoplersquos Bank of China President Nan Hanchen 南汉宸 made this statement at the First Nationwide Rural Financial Conference ldquoPrivate lending is done freely So long as debts are repaid and interest is negotiated between the two

19 ldquoZhongnan qu 1953 nian nongcun jingji diaocha tongji ziliao 中南区 1953年农村经济

调查统计资料 [Statistical Data from a Rural Economic Investigation of South-central Regions in 1953]rdquo July 1954 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-J-40 73ndash74

20 Mao Zedong xuanji di 5 juan 《毛泽东选集》第5 卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 5] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1977) 117 and 123


ltUNgt

parties we do not interfere So will this practice grow into loan sharking No it wonrsquot That is because we have more than one kind of credit cooperative and bank organizations are being promoted in the countryside so loan sharking will not developrdquo21

While conducting a study of ldquoSoviet Socialist Economic Issuesrdquo in late 1953 deputy director of the Peoplersquos Bank of China Rural Financial Administration Bureau 中国人民银行总行农村金融管理局 Wang Peilin 王沛霖 made this comment

The existence and development for a certain period of time of free lend-ing is not only inevitable but also plays to a certain extent a positive role in enlivening rural capital and resolving a portion temporary difficulties in production or living experienced by poverty-stricken rural households So we should permit the existence and development of free lending for a certain period of timehellip However free lending is established on a founda-tion of individual self-initiated development of rural citizens Its primary objective is the pursuit of profit and so it is a kind of lending relationship beneficial to development of the rich peasant economy If we allow it to develop freely it shall lead to exploitative usury and class differentia-tion Furthermore once mutual aid and cooperation are universally de-veloped and the demand for capital loans needed to expand production and buy new equipment for cooperative organizations grows larger and more concentrated free lending will no longer be suitable to such devel-opment needs as the capital used in such lending is extremely dispersed Therefore the future development direction of rural lending should be the active and stable development of credit cooperatives and the gradual reformation of free lending At the same time we should economically struggle against loan sharking22

21 ldquoNan hangzhang zai diyi jie quanguo nongcun jinrong huiyi de zongjie baogao 南行长

在第一届全国农村金融会议的总结报告 [The Summary Report of Bank Presdient Nan at the First Nationwide Rural Financial Conference]rdquo Zhongguo jinrong 《中国金

融》 7 (1951) Vol 1 1722 Wang Peilin 王沛霖 ldquoJiaqiang dui zhengzhi jingjixue faze de yanjiu zuo hao nongcun

jinrong gongzuomdashlsquosulian shehui zhuyi jingji wentirsquo xuexi xinde 加强对政治经济学

法则的研究作好农村金融工作 mdashmdash〈苏联社会主义经济问题〉学习心得

[Strengthening Study of Political and economic Laws Performing Rural Economic Work WellmdashLessons Learned from lsquoSoviet Socialist Economic Issuesrsquo]rdquo Zhongguo jinrong 《中

国金融》20 (1953) 3

SU AND CHANG246

ltUNgt

While affirming that rural private lending had played a positive role in the past Wang laid particular emphasis on the negative role it was playing under the conditions of the time his final conclusion was that rural private lending was more negative than positive The ideology at the time held that rural private lending would inevitably evolve into usury and so officials took actions to re-strict and attack it The political atmosphere that resulted from the issuance of the general line for the transitionary period doubtlessly had a major impact on the development of rural private lending

Another survey conducted of 3754 rural households of twelve Hubei town-ships in 1955 by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department indicated that after land reforms there was growth in agricultural production mutual aid teams in rural Hubei A total of 3712 percent of households surveyed par-ticipated in such teams in 1952 reaching 7110 percent in 1954 A total of 614 householdsmdash1636 percent of total households surveyedmdashwere members of cooperatives accounting for twenty-three percent of all households partici-pating in teams23 In agricultural teams rural citizens were able to overcome the difficulties of solo household production through alliances of man-power beast-power and farming implements Such alliances were particularly typical of agricultural cooperatives which coordinated unified allocations of produc-tion capital and were key targets of focus rural assistance loans from the state As production cooperatives developed so did their public accumulation funds and public welfare funds Public accumulation funds were used to drive agri-cultural development and public welfare funds were used to develop public welfare enterprises within the cooperative Cooperative members could draw a portion of cash or material goods in advance based on their actual needs In one example total revenues for 1954 of the Raoxingli Agricultural Coop-erative 饶兴礼农业生产合作社 of Xishui County Hubei Province came to 19176 yuan of which over 15000 was distributed as advanced pay to coopera-tive members24 Thus the development of agricultural cooperatives and teams reduced rural demand for loans to a certain extent

23 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiao 湖北省十二个典型乡调查

统计表 [Statistical Tables from Investigations into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province]rdquo 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-1-154

24 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dangrsquoan ziliao xuanbian (1953ndash1957) 《中华人民共

和国经济档案资料选编 (1953~1957)》 [Selected Economic Records and Materials from the Peoplersquos Rebpulic of China (1953ndash1957)] ed Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and China Central Archives 中国社会科学院中央档案馆 (Zhongguo wujia chuban-she 2000) 427


ltUNgt

2 Development of Rural Private Lending from the End of 1953 to 1954The same private lending survey conducted of 3754 rural households in twelve Hubei townships by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department in 1955 in-dicated the following differences in rural private lending in 1954 as compared to 195225

First the percentage of households that engaged in either borrowing or lending was lower In the twelve townships in 1954 it was 2589 percent a 08 percent decrease from 2669 percent in 1952 The share of borrowing house-holds of total households fell 263 percent from 2226 percent in 1952 to 1963 percent in 1954 The share of lending households oftotal households was 626 percent in 1954 an increase of 183 percent over 1952 At the same time the total amount borrowed decreased The average size of the loan per household fell by 21 yuan from 1626 yuan in 1952 to 1416 yuan in 1954 The average loan per household fell 1049 yuan from 2923 yuan in 1952 to 1874 yuan in 1954 indicating a reduction to the scale of rural private lending

Second most households that became engaged in borrowing and lending at this time were middle-income peasant households accounting for 5509 per-cent of total number of borrowing households and 6142 percent of the total loan amount Middle-income peasant households accounted for 7106 percent of total lending households and 6210 percent of the total loan amount Such was the case because in the two to three years following land reforms about half of former poor peasant and hired farmhand households were elevated to the status of middle-income peasants The total proportion of middle-income peasant households in the survey grew from 2979 percent in 1952 to 6401 per-cent in 1954 Of course this did not affect the fact that most rural private lend-ing at the time happened between peasant and laboring classes

Third in the 1955 survey there emerged a new class one which garnered a great deal of attention at the time new rich peasants One of the 12 new rich peasant households discovered in the survey lent out a total of 2643 yuan indicating a relationship between the ascendance of new rich peasants and their ability to lend money or rather that their new wealth afforded them abundant capital to be used in lending activities That said only one of the 12 householdsmdash833 percent of total new rich peasant householdsmdashhad made loans at all not very far from the overall ratio of lender households to total households indicating that there was not an inevitable or universal connection between the creation of new rich peasants and the development of rural lending

25 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiaordquo

SU AND CHANG248

ltUNgt

ii The Forms of Loans Made Interest on Those Loans and Creditworthiness in Rural Hubei after Land Reforms

(A) Forms of Loans Made and Interest on Those Loans in Rural Hubei after Land Reforms

Rural private lending in Hubei was complex prior to 1949 and loan sharking had been one of the most important means the feudal landlord class used to exploit the peasant masses Surveys conducted after 1949 indicated that in the period between land reforms and the imposition of the state grain monopoly most rural private loans were in grain that even those made in cash were de-nominated in terms of grain and that forms of loans were simpler than they had been prior to 1949 Once the state monopoly had been instituted most loans were made in the form of cash A survey conducted of five townships of Hubei indicated that loans made in currency accounted for only 263 percent of total loans made before the state monopoly on grain and 7525 percent af-terward26 Loans and interest thereof generally came in the following forms

1 Interest-free loans Most of these were made between members of mu-tual aid teams family members friends and neighbors to facilitate short-term capital turnover needs The amount of grain lent was often small These loans were popular virtually everywhere For example 586 percent of all loans in Zhonghe Township Gongrsquoan were interest-free27 as were 2128 percent of all loans in Yannian Township Zhongxiang28 Of all loans in Longxing Township 龙兴乡 Yicheng 宜城 22 were interest-free loans with three- to five-month terms between family and friends and another 1781 percent were interest-free loans made to troubled households29 Such was the case primarily because

26 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha baogao 湖北省十二个典型乡调查报

告 [Investigative Report into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province]rdquo 1956 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-J-526

27 ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuangrdquo ldquoDangyang xian guanling xiang jingji diaochardquo and ldquoGuanghua xian bailiansi xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji dioacha baogaordquo

28 ldquoJingzhou zhongxiang xian di shiyi qu yannian xiang tugai fucha hou nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha 荆州钟祥县第十一区延年乡土改复查后农村经济基本

情况调查 [An Investigation into Basic Rural Economic Conditions after Land Reforms in Yannian Township Eleventh District of Zhongxiang County Jingzhou]rdquo December 1952 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-7

29 ldquoYicheng xian longxing xiang nongcun jingji diaocha ji ge cailiao de zhengli 宜城县龙兴

乡农村经济调查几个材料的整理 [Some Arranged Materials from a Rural Economic Investigation into Longxing Township Yicheng County]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-5


ltUNgt

creditors at the time were afraid of being labeled usurers and so they did not discuss interest at the time of making the loan However debtors often repaid loans at two to three points interest regardless or otherwise repaid the favor through invitations gifts helping with work or through other means

2 Loans made at two three four or five percent annual interest (includ-ing loans made in spring and returned in autumn) In Zhonghe Township Gongrsquoan 266 percent of loans were made at two to three percent annual inter-est and 146 percent were made at four to five percent annual interest In Yan-nian Township Zhongxiang 5319 percent of loans were made at two percent annual interest 213 percent at three percent annual interest 638 percent at four percent annual interest and 426 percent at five percent annual interest In Xinglong Township Yicheng 5839 percent of loans were made at five per-cent annual interest and fifteen-percent made at three to four percent annual interest

3 Loans made at over five percent annual interest These comprised a minority of loans Only 016 percent of loans in Zhonghe Township fell into this category In Xinglong Township 552 percent of loans were made between six and eight percent annual interest rate and 166 percent of loans required interest equal to principal Most of these were given to the elderly the infirm and others who could not work who required this income to cover basic living expenses

4 Loans made in times of temporary shortages These loans were made in grain but denominated in currency to be repaid at the same or higher rates in grain at the time of the autumn harvest

5 ldquoNewly harvested grain moneyrdquo and ldquonewly spent moneyrdquo (known col-loquially as ldquowangqirdquo or ldquogreen sproutsrdquo debt) In Zhonghe Township in times of temporary shortages loans were made denominated in grain generally fifty percent lower than market rates repaid in grain after the autumn harvest at interest of sixty-six to seventy percent or more

6 Loans of grain repaid in grain Rural citizens generally lacked grain to eat during spring and summer famines At these times they would take out loans of coarse grain to be repaid in refined grain or other refined goods Interest rates were concealed in the changes that took place to objects borrowed with minimum monthly interest rates of 125 percent and maximum monthly rates of 333 percent This method was highly popular before the state grain monop-oly One survey into five Hubei townships revealed that the practice fell 8928 percent after the state monopoly had been put in place30

30 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha baogaordquo

SU AND CHANG250

ltUNgt

7 Loans of cash repaid with labor These accounted for a small percentage of total loans In these loans rural citizens would borrow money paid at work rates for the slack farming season to be repaid in labor once the busy season arrived

These surveys indicate that rural citizens were universally willing to accept loans at monthly interest rates between three and five percent One rural citi-zen had this to say ldquoInterest rates of five percent or higher are too high peo-ple canrsquot afford to borrow at that rate Three percent is too low though as itrsquos not worth it for the lenderrdquo31 Interest-free loans were beneficial to some poor peasant and hired farmhand households for a period of time but they did not remain popular for long as most lenders who gave these loans did not do so voluntarily Thus excessive emphasis on or forcible imposition of interest-free loans had adverse impact on rural private lending

After land reforms the Chinese government imposed maximum interest rate standards for rural private lending The maximum standard for cash loans was three percent monthly interest For material goods the standard was to return 13 to 15 dou in autumn for one dou borrowed in spring32 This was also the standard used to determine if a given loan was usurious The truth is that the vast majority of private loans made in rural Hubei after land reforms were made at low interest rates A survey conducted by the Hubei Provincial Bureau of Statistics into rural private lending in 35 townships revealed the following (1) Poor peasant households borrowed 4396 jin of grain only 13 percent of these loans bore interest Middle peasant households borrowed 894 jin of grain and only twenty-five percent of these loans bore interest Landlord households borrowed 331 jin of grain and only 465 percent of these loans bore interest (2) Cash loans totaled 4251 yuan Commune members borrowed a total of sixty-nine yuan only thirty-nine percent of these loans bore interest Poor peasant households borrowed a total of 866 yuan only 154 percent of these loans bore interest Middle peasant households borrowed a total of 3002 yuan only 122 percent of these loans bore interest Landlord households borrowed a total of 163 yuan and rich peasant households borrowed a total of 151 yuan eitherwith or without interest Interest rates were generally around two percent with the highest being no higher than three to four percent33

31 ldquoXiangyang zhuanqu si ge xiang jiedai zudian diandang maimai guanxi de diaochardquo32 Zhongguo nongcun jinrong lishi ziliao (1949ndash1985) 《中国农村金融历史资料( 1949~

1985)》 [Historical Materials of Financing in Rural China (1949ndash1985)] ed Lu Hanchuan 卢汉川 (Hubei sheng chuban shiye guanliju 1986) 188

33 ldquo1954 nian nongcun jingji diaochao baogao 1954年农村经济调查报告 [1954 Rural Eco-nomic Investigative Report]rdquo December 5 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ44-2-118


ltUNgt

These rate levels indicate that the vast majority of rural private lending in Hubei was done without interest toward the objective of mutual aid Even those loans that bore interest were made at interest rates below the government-mandated maximum Usurious loans were in the minority A por-tion of both production and living difficulties of rural citizens were resolved through private lending At the same time as rural credit cooperatives spread interest rates employed in rural private lending decreased Thus it is clear that we cannot simply assume that allowing rural private lending inevitably leads to usury and thus must be restricted Interest rates in rural private lending are determined primarily by the supply and demand of capital and the degree of risk involved With state agricultural loans and rural credit cooperatives un-able to meet all rural demand for capital the imposition of restrictions on nor-mal lending not only does not prevent usury but in fact leads to the creation of hidden usury Adam Smith gives us another historical example ldquoIn the reign of Edward vi religious zeal prohibited all interest This prohibition however like all others of the same kind is said to have produced no effect and probably rather increased than diminished the evil of usuryrdquo34

(B) Creditworthiness in Rural Private Lending after Land ReformsPrior to 1949 rural private lending generally required consent from both parties and the drafting and signing of a written agreement or in some cases a third party to act as guarantor These agreements generally required collateral usually in the form of farmland houses livestock large farming implements or other goods If an agreement required no collateral it would generally re-quire a third party as guarantor and a written loan receipt For example pre-1949 landlords in Sanhe Township 三合乡 Jiangling County used the ldquothree dependsrdquo when making loans first it depends on if the borrowing family can afford to repay and has goods to serve as collateral second it depends on how the borrower is as a laborer (so he can serve as a long-term laborer to work off his debt in the case he is unable to repay) and third it depends on if the guar-antor is solid or not The only way to borrow from a landlord was to meet these three criteria otherwise the landlord would not even open his door to you35

34 Adam Smith Guofu lun 《国富论》 [The Wealth of Nations] translated from the English by Yang Jingnian 杨敬年 (Shaanxi renmin chubanshe 2001) 115

35 ldquoZhongnan qu yibai ge xiang diaocha ziliao xuanbian (jiefang qian bufen) 中南区一百

个乡调查资料选集 (解放前部分 ) [Selected Materials from an Investigation into 100 Townships in the South-central Region (Portion from Before Liberation)]rdquo ed South-central Military Administration Commission Land Reform Committee Investigation and Research Department 中南军政委员会土地改革委员会调查研究处 29

SU AND CHANG252

ltUNgt

After land reforms rural private lending usually proceeded in one of the three following fashions The first was surreptitious borrowing and lending This type of loan was most common between friends and family members ldquoMost lending households and borrowing households were either members of the same family or had previously had deep-seated personal affectionrdquo ldquoBoth borrowers and lenders were deeply afraid of having the loan be found out by third partiesrdquo36 Lenders preferred to make loans far away and in remote town-ships rather than nearby Loans made between friends and family members were made entirely on trust there were no guarantors or collateral Rather lender households frequently made these loans through agents in different townships The second was loans made during times of shortage or famine as a result of political coaxing from rural leadership Such lending was generally coerced Most rural citizens saw this as a form of relief Borrowers did not plan on repaying the loan and lenders dared not make demands The third were open loans made by rural activists poor peasant and hired farmhand house-holds and the elderly without support These loans were generally made on trust alone without the need for collateral on the basis of either an oral or written agreement indicating that there were changes to the forms taken by rural private lending in Hubei after land reforms as compared to the time be-fore 1949 Specifically much fewer loans required collateral and most loans were made either on faith or with a third party serving as guarantor Those debtor families who were not deeply in debt and capable of repaying did so quickly Those rural households on hard times and without the means to repay generally came to an agreement with their creditors to repay in installments or postpone repayment An extremely small portion of rural citizens opted to mortgage their land to repay debt this was entirely the result of credit On the whole the ability of rural citizens to come to loan agreements depended en-tirely on the respect debtors and creditors had for each otherrsquos private property rights as well as the amount of faith they had in one another

iii Reasons behind and Uses for Rural Loans after Land Reforms

(A) The Reasons behind Rural Loans Issued after Land ReformsA survey conducted of twenty rural Hubei townships indicated that prior to 1949 2425 percent of all lender households belonged to the rural exploitative

36 ldquoNanzhang xian di er qu xiaoxi xiang nongye shengchan dianxing diaocha zongjie 南漳县第二区消溪乡农业生产典型调查总结 [Summary of an Investigation into Typical Cases of Agricultural Production in Xiaoxi Township Second District Nanzhang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47


ltUNgt

class ie landlords rich peasants and those who made a living from interest on loans this class also accounted for 501 percent of the total value of loans The interest rates on their loans were high and the goal of these loans was ex-ploitation by usury After land reforms as new production relationships were established there were changes to the reasons that rural citizens made loans In concrete terms rural citizens began to issue loans for the following reasons

1 Crisis preparedness and preparation for old age These lenders were gen-erally seniors who were infirmed or lived on their own Unable to labor some relied on interest from loans for their livings Others used income from interest to bolster their agricultural livelihoods A survey conducted of four villages of two Zhouyan 周严 and Huangpi 黄陂 Townships Xianning 咸宁 indicated that nine householdsmdash3212 percent of the total of twenty-eight lender house-holds in the surveymdashfell into this category lending a total of 3955 jin of grain 2803 percent of all 14111 jin of grain lent37 There were eight such householdsmdash exactly half of the sixteen lender householdsmdashdiscovered in a survey in Yihe Township Yingcheng lending out a 3635 jin of grain 4138 percent of the 8775 jin lent in total38 The elderly hired farmhand Chen Tianru of Xiaoxi Township Nanzhang lived alone with his senior wife In 1952 they had an income of 154 dan which meant they had a surplus of grain in addition to their 05 cows and a plow thus they had a low level of difficulties in production There were seven such lender households in the township accounting for twenty-eight percent of the total twenty-five lender households in the township39

2 Surplus capital and the pursuit of profit Most such lendinghouseholds were poor peasants hired farmhands or the elderly the infirm and those without family members They had few concerns besides profits whenmaking loans One hired farmhand in Gaoqiao Township 高桥乡 Enshi 恩施 said ldquoI earned this money by being a long-term laborer so itrsquos only right to want interest on itrdquo40 There were thirteen such households discovered in a survey of four villages of Zhouyan and Huangpi Townships accounting for 463 percent of all lending households in the survey lending 6611 jin of grain 4685 percent of total loans in the survey A survey identified five such households in Yihe Township Yingcheng accounting for 3125 percent of total lender households and lending 3005 jin of grain 3421 percent of total grain lent in the survey Six households were identified as belong to this category in Xiaoxi

37 ldquoXiaogan zhuanqu wu ge xiang nongcun jingji diaochardquo38 ldquoYingcheng xian yihe xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 应城县义和乡农村经济调查

[ Rural Economic Investigation into Yihe Township Yingcheng County]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-45

39 ldquoNanzhang xian di er qu xiaoxi xiang nongye shengchan dianxing diaocha zongjierdquo40 ldquoEnshi gaoqiao xiang nongcun jingji diaochardquo

SU AND CHANG254

ltUNgt

Township 消溪乡 Nanzhang 南漳 accounting for twenty-four percent of lender households there These surveys also indicated that only an extremely small minority of rural households improved their economic status via lending Of the four affluent middle-income peasant and new rich peasant households in Zhouyan Township only two had reached that status from middle-income-peasanthood through loan sharking41

3 Mutual aid between family members and neighbors A survey identified five such households in four villages in Zhouyan and Huangpi Townships ac-counting for 1786 percent of lending households in that survey lending 2015 jin of grain accounting for 1428 percent of total grain lent Only two such households were identified in the Yihe Township survey accounting for 125 percent of lender households and lending 615 jin of grain or seven percent of total grain lent

4 Coercive loans spurred by local officials Only one such household was discovered in the Zhouyan and Huangpi Townships survey accounting for 357 percent of total lender households lending 1530 jin of grain 1084 percent of total grain lent Again only one such household was discovered in the Yihe Township survey accounting for 625 percent of total lender households and lending 1530 jin of grain or 1742 percent of total grain lent Another survey conducted in eleven townships of rural Hubei found that forty percent of grain lending following land reforms had been coerced42

(B) Uses of Rural LoansA survey conducted of 4971 households in ten rural Hubei townships indicat-ed the loaning out of 35268275 jin of grain to 663 borrower households The primary reason for borrowing in these townships was the resolution of living difficulties with 4249 percent of total borrower households borrowing for this reason Of those 4480 percent were middle peasant poor peasant or hired farmhand households with middle peasant households alone accounting for 3319 percent To a certain extent this reflects the poverty experienced at the time by a portion of rural households who had no choice but to rely on loans A total of 1808 percent of borrower households in the survey had borrowed to invest in production of those 1610 percent were poor peasant or hired farmhand households and 2529 percent were middle peasant households43

41 ldquoXianning xian di yi qu zhouyan xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 咸宁县第一区周严乡

农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation into Zhouyan Township First District Xianning County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

42 ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan)rdquo43 Ibid


ltUNgt

A total of 2004 percent of borrower households had borrowed money to use for weddings or funerals making this the second largest borrowing category among rural private borrowing in the survey indicating that a large portion of rural private borrowing after land reforms was used for reasons other than survival Spending was exaggerated in this category of consumption as a result of bad customs which further exacerbated total debt burdens

In three of the ten surveyed townships thirty-eight percent of loans were used for production and another twelve percent were used for basic means of living The proportion of those using loans for production was twenty-six percentage points higher than of those using loans for living The reason here is that these townships were all near to cities where rural industry commerce and sideline industries were highly developed and most rural households were engaged in production in sideline industries44 In relatively affluent areas where production and business were relatively accessible the proportion of loans taken for production was high This trend was widespread

The paying of interest on loans by rural citizens after land reforms inevitably added to their economic burdens So did some rural households go bankrupt from repaying their debts An investigation into land pawning and sales after land reforms in Tanzhuang Township 谭庄乡 of Xiangyang Bailiansi Town-ship 白莲寺乡 of Guanghua and Longxing Township of Yicheng indicated that a total of 2313 mu of land had been pawned by all rural households in the survey accounting for only 017 percent of total arable land in the townships Of households who pawned land forty percent of cases were for weddings funerals or illnesses thirty percent for living difficulties owing to decreased labor abilities ten percent for concerns arising from inability to plant the fields pawned ten percent for repayment of old debts and ten percent because of gluttony and indolence Very little land was sold after land reforms Of all households in Bailiansi and Longxing Townships only three had sold land and the total sold was only 376 mu The reasons for land sales there were as follows The middle-income peasant household of Li Renfu 李仁富 in Bailiansi Town-ship owed twenty-eight jin of ginned cotton to the poor peasant household of Li Chengyin 李成银 this debt necessitated the sale of 105 mu Another household was poor to begin with was inefficient at production and was also gluttonous and lazy and subsequently ran out of food shortly after the autumn harvest this household sold 31 fen of land to people outside the township for three dou of wheat without letting local officials know The last household sold

44 ldquoHanyang meifu xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 汉阳梅福乡农村经济调查 [Rural Eco-nomic Investigation into Meifu Township Hanyang]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-45

SU AND CHANG256

ltUNgt

24 mu of land because they lived in a different township and could not plant the land45 Some households in the survey sold land to repay debt but they didnrsquot sell all their land nor did they go bankrupt Some households in the above surveys took loans to ldquocatch their breathrdquo and make it through a hard time Some households increased their difficulties by piling on debt burden However very few households went bankrupt as a result of repayment of debt after land reforms

iv The Effects of State Agricultural Loans and the Development of Credit Cooperatives on Private Lending

(A) The Effects of the Development of State Agricultural Loans on Rural Private Lending after Land Reforms

After the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China state banks began developing rural loan work in the countryside according to the economic development needs of the countryside and potential financial resources there In this they helped rural citizens resolve production problems such as lacks of seeds fertilizer farm implements and draft animals They also laid emphasis on loans for small irrigation projects to be used for the digging of ponds and trenches A survey conducted of 3754 households in twelve townships by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department in 1955 indicated that most rural pri-vate loans issued by state banks at the time were made to assist poor peasant and hired farmhand households middle peasant households were in second place In 1952 4149 percent of poor peasant and hired farmhand households received state bank agricultural loans the average loan issued per borrowing household was 744 yuan and the average of loans to total households in this class was 309 yuan Of middle peasant households 2495 percent received state agricultural loans an average of 75 yuan per borrowing household and an average of 187 yuan per total households in the class These two classes accounted for 9863 percent of total agricultural loans issued borrowing 994 percent of total agricultural loan capital In 1954 3422 percent of poor peasant and hired farmhand households received state bank agricultural loans the av-erage loan issued per borrowing household was 1120 yuan and the average of loans to total households in this class was 883 yuan Of middle peasant house-holds 1950 percent received state agricultural loans an average of 94 yuan per borrowing household and an average of 277 yuan per total households in the class In both 1952 and 1954 poor peasant and hired farmhand households

45 ldquoXiangyang zhuanqu si ge xiang jiedai zudian diandang maimai guanxi de diaochardquo


ltUNgt

took out the most loans and were the focus of poverty assistance A great increase to the number of households in the middle peasant class meant a great increase to the proportion of total quantity of loans and total loan capital taken out by middle peasant households

After the blueprint for the countryrsquos overallpath for the transitionary period was introduced the state strengthened loans issued for state-run agriculture agricultural cooperatives and production mutual aid teams in order to spur the development and solidification of agricultural collectivization In Hubei growth in loans to individual rural households slowed Rural households were recipients of only 2941 percent of state agricultural loans in 1954 a 32 percent drop from 1952 but the average household received 277 yuan in loans a 035 yuan increase over 195246 There was a slight increase to total lending in state agricultural loans from 1952 to 1954 but the number of recipients of said loans decreased

State agricultural loans were used primarily to resolve production difficul-ties of rural citizens A survey conducted in Zengji Township 曾集乡 Jingmen County 荆门县 indicated that all state loans issued in the township in 1952 to-taled 16824 yuan Of that total 316 yuan was used to buy plow oxen 9074 yuan for sideline industries 145 yuan for rural industry and commerce 735 yuan for purchasing seeds and fertilizer thirty-six yuan for irrigation thirty-three yuan for construction and 1715 yuan for other uses47 State agricultural loans gen-erally bore monthly interest of around one percent lower than private loans therefore rural citizens were willing to develop production with these loans State agricultural loans played an extremely important role in supporting the development of production of rural citizens To a certain extent they replaced rural private lending in the accumulation of means of production However the impact of state agricultural loans on private lending was highly limited The first reason for that is that agricultural loans were rigorously administered and terms on agricultural loansmdashexcluding those for irrigationmdashwere gener-ally very short Loans issued for sideline industries for example carried terms of only three months One local said ldquoYou have to return the money as soon as you borrow itrdquo At the same time banks strictly enforced repayment of loans Some rural citizens complained that government loans were inflexible Pay-ments could not be delayed even by a single day Loan payments were general-ly due after grain and cereal harvests when prices of grainswere low It was not

46 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiaordquo47 ldquoJingmen xian di ba qu zengji xiang nongcun jingji diaocha ziliao 荆门县第八区曾集乡

农村经济调查资料 [Data from a Rural Economic Investigation into Zengji Township Eighth District Jingmen County]rdquo December 1952 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-6

SU AND CHANG258

ltUNgt

economically prudent for rural citzens to sell grains to repay their loans but despite the low interest rates on their loans penalties for non-payment were severe Rural households of Dunzitang Township 墩子唐乡 Yingshan County 应山县 for example did not dare take a loan for their spring digging of ponds Local Cai Yuanlin 蔡远林 had this to say ldquoIf I borrow it will be difficult if I canrsquot repay when the loan comes due so itrsquos best not to borrowrdquo48 Even though the state placed emphasis on the issuance of agricultural loans to poor peas-ant and hired farmhand households loan officials sought out only households with the capacity to work to do business or to use capital in the short term ef-fectively downplayinga given householdrsquos general poverty or lack of means of production It was difficult for impoverished rural households lacking means of production labor and business ability to receive these loans some didnrsquot dare ask The second reason was that agricultural loans were meant to be used for specific production purposes but the needs of rural citizens were diverse Some rural citizens used loan funds to buy food for marriages and funerals for sickness to build houses and to do business Limited state finances at the time made agricultural loans incapable of satisfying the diverse lending demands of rural citizens

(B) The Effects of the Development of Rural Credit Cooperatives on Rural Private Lending

In July 1951 the Hubei provincial government began launching pilots in new credit cooperatives in the countryside By the end of 1953 344 such coopera-tives had been established around the province with a membership of 257000 people capital shares of 390000 yuan and 177000 yuan in deposits By the end of 1954 there were 10674 new credit cooperatives around the province accounting for 891 percent of all credit cooperatives Their membership had grown to 58 million with capital shares of 876 million yuan and deposits of 658 million yuan49

A survey conducted by the Hubei Rural Work Department into nine credit cooperatives of nine townships (with 1801 member households 6617 percent of the total of 2787 households in the area surveyed) in July 1955 indicated that the cooperatives had actively developed business activities based on the

48 ldquoYingshan xian dunzitang xiang nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha baogao 应山县墩子唐乡农村经济基本情况调查报告 [Investigative Report on Basic Rural Economic Conditions in Dunzitang Township Yingshan County]rdquo Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-44

49 Hubei nongcun jingji (1949ndash1985) 《湖北农村经济 (1949~1985)》 [Rural Economy in Hubei (1949ndash1985)] (Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 1990) 91


ltUNgt

needs of members and on the characteristics of seasonal production Deposits in the nine cooperatives totaled 6707 yuan with a remaining balance of 2306 yuan and a total of 9321 yuan was out on loan with a remaining loan balance of 5319 yuan The cooperatives supported production of their members and helped members overcome living difficulties through loans50 Incomplete sta-tistics from five townships including Jiangtai and Fuwan indicated that 1505 households had taken out loans accounting for a total of 83 percent of coop-erative membership in those five townships Those loans totaled 24222 yuan of which 7149 yuanmdash2952 percent of the totalmdashwas issued as agricultural loans These loans were used to purchase 86393 jin of fertilizer (in cake form) fifty-seven plow oxen 15197 jin of seeds and 217 farm implements A total of 955 yuan in loans were issued to eighty-nine households for healthcare needs Another 924 yuan in loans were issued to thirty-one households for marriage and funeral expenses Another 573 yuan in loans were issued to sixteen mem-ber households for house construction and 1385 yuanmdash572 percent of total loansmdashin loans were issued for sideline industries51

Capital for credit cooperatives came from three places shares purchased by members member deposits and state bank loans The first two accounted for the bulk of capitalization Deposits and loans of credit cooperatives could be viewed as an organized means for invigorating rural private capital surpluses The surveys indicated that cooperative loans were not as strictly limited to a single purpose as state agricultural loans and so the development of credit cooperatives inevitably influenced the development of rural private lending A survey conducted of 541 households of three townships in three counties by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department in July 1955 indicated that 164 of those householdsmdash3031 percent of the totalmdashhad been in rural pri-vate borrowing and lending prior to the coming of credit cooperatives but that figure dropped to 148 householdsmdash2736 of the totalmdashafter the coming of credit cooperatives Thatrsquos a reduction of 295 percent The total value of rural private lending before cooperatives was 231423 yuan down to 96592 yuan after cooperatives a decrease of 5826 percent A total of 106 households had been engaged in high-interest loans prior to the coming of credit coopera-tives Thirty-seven of those were lenders accounting for 6727 percent of total

50 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiaordquo51 ldquoXiaogan xishui jiangling dangyang he gucheng deng xian xinyong hezuoshe qing-

kuang diaocha biao 孝感浠水江陵当阳和谷城等县信用合作社情况调查

表 [Tables from an Investigation into Conditions of Credit Cooperatives in Xiaogan Xi-shui Jiangling Dangyang and Gucheng Counties]rdquo July 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-161

SU AND CHANG260

ltUNgt

lender households lending out 182421 yuan 7883 percent of total funds lent After the coming of credit cooperatives only twenty-one households were in-volved in high-interest loans Of those eight were lenders accounting for 1379 percent of private lender households lending out 20250 yuan 2096 percent of total funds lent52 A survey conducted by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department in July 1955 into 817 households of five townships including Fu-wan 付湾 in Gucheng County 谷城县 and Jiangtai 将台 in Jiangling County indicated that there had been a great reduction to private high-interest loans after the coming of cooperatives In such loans there was a reduction of 741 percent to lender households and 8005 percent to total funds lent there was also a reduction of 639 percent of borrower households and 697 percent to total funds borrowed Conditions in the townships indicated that decreases to the extent of high-interest lending varied with the timing of the arrival of credit cooperatives and how well they developed business activities For ex-ample there was a 9798 percent decrease in borrowers of high-interest loans after the founding of the credit cooperative (old cooperative) in Jiantai Town-ship Jiangling County Only one of the 217 households of Dishui Township 滴水乡 Enshi had taken out any such loans and for a total of only nineteen yuan There was a reduction of only forty-four percent in the number of households taking out high-interest loans and a reduction of only forty-two percent to the amount of such loans after the founding of the credit cooperative in Huchang Township 胡场乡 Dangyang (new cooperative) The number of high-interest lender households was four a drop of only 333 percent lending out a total of 250 yuan a decrease of only 1455 percent53 In summary credit cooperatives replaced a portion of rural private lending and caused changes to the forms taken by rural private loans In other words there was a reduction to the issu-ance of high-interest loans and an increase to the percentage of low-interest loans mutual aidmdashie no-interestmdashloans

Of course the above surveys indicated a reduction to the scale of rural pri-vate lending in Hubei by 1954 but not a complete disappearance thereof for the following reasons

First credit cooperatives had not been around for long rendering them incapable of covering the entire countryside In addition they lacked man-agement experience and there were problems in the development of their business activities At this time credit cooperatives had not gained the trust of the entire rural population and they did not develop well at first A sur-vey conducted of the fourth and fifth districts of Jiangtai Township Jiangling County in 1955 indicated that over the four years since the establishment of

52 Ibid53 Ibid


ltUNgt

a local credit cooperative only fifty-one householdsmdash147 percent of the total 347 households surveyedmdashhad made deposits there deposits totaled 1816 yuan a per household average of 356 yuan A total of 866000 jin of surplus grains had been sold there in 1954 totaling 45900 yuan in sales but deposits of only 1486 yuanmdashonly 324 percent of total grains sale dividendsmdashhad been made in the cooperative between autumn 1954 and July 195554 For the above reasons the ability of credit cooperatives to satisfy rural lending demand remained highly limited

Second credit cooperatives were mutual aidcooperative economic organi-zations used by the masses of rural citizens for the circulation of credit In or-der to maintain long-term healthy growth they needed to both attain sources of capital and ensure normal turnover of that capital to make slight profits through development of credit loans Thus it was often difficult for impover-ished rural households lacking credit to take out loans from credit coopera-tives Some were so poor they couldnrsquot afford to buy into the cooperative at all A survey conducted in 1955 into Wangcheng Jiangtai Taizi 太子 and Fuwan Townships indicated that 126 poor peasant households had not joined credit cooperatives Of those seventy-eight (6191 percent of the total) had declined to join due to inability to buy in Some credit cooperatives feared that poor peasant households would not be able to repay loans and so excluded such households A survey conducted of 833 households of Wangcheng Township Xishui and Taizi Township Xiaogan indicated that poor peasant households and both new and old lower-middle-income peasant households had taken out loans totaling 3973 yuan a per household average of 155 yuan Of that total new and old lower-middle peasant households took out a total of 684 yuan in loans a per-household average of 129 yuan Only 89 percent of upper- middle-income peasant households had taken out loans for a per household loan average of 1715 yuan About forty percent of poor peasant households and new and old lower-middle peasant households had received no support what-soever from credit cooperatives as cooperative officials felt that issuing loans to poor peasants was akin to tossing money into a ldquopool of stagnant waterrdquo55 Under the political circumstances of the times the above methods were criti-cized as coming from a purely business perspective and not thoroughly imple-menting a correct class line The truth however was that credit cooperatives were financial organizations and as such they had to establish ldquothresholdsrdquo for entry it would have been impossible for them not to consider the ability of borrowers to repay As compared to private lending loans made by coopera-tives lacked the touch of human sentiment and so there was no way for such

54 Ibid55 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha baogaordquo

SU AND CHANG262

ltUNgt

loans to replace private lending completely Of course some credit coopera-tives forced affluent peasant households to buy in while placing the focus of lending work on assistance to the impoverished in order to fully execute the governmentrsquos policies regarding class and class division This behavior irked some affluent peasants while failing to solve fully the problems of impover-ished rural households It also led to a great deal of bad debt which in the end the state treasury had to buy up at which point these loans became pure economic relief

Based on all the above we can come to the following conclusionsFirst the primary reasons behind rural private lending after land reforms

were the backwardness of the rural economy weakness of household econo-mies the lack of a social security system and non-existence of a modern fi-nancial system Most private lending took place between poor peasant hired farmhand and middle peasant households Most rural private loans were taken out to resolve living difficulties but some were used to develop pro-duction Rural private lending played a positive role in resolving some rural capital shortages and restoring growth to the rural economy A minority of rural households were mired further into poverty as a result of inability to repay loans Another small percentage of rural households elevated their sta-tus through income earned from interest on loans So long as there is lending at all such phenomena are inevitable but that does not negate the positive effects of private lending

Second forms taken by rural private loans in this period were much simpler than prior to 1949 Most rural private loans were denominated in grains before the imposition of the state grain monopoly and in cash afterwards Interest rates for most private loans were between three to five percent but some low-interest or interest-free mutual aid loans were also made as were a small quan-tity of high-interest loans Interest rates in rural private loans were determined by many factors including supply and demand of capital and the degree of risk involved Excessive promotion of interest-free loans or the forcible imposi-tion of low interest rates not only hampers the normal development of private lending but also leads to an increase in the incidence of ldquohiddenrdquo usurious loans

Third private lending in rural Hubei over the 1952ndash1954 period was lack lus-ter For a period of time after land reforms the government encouraged lend-ing freedom during which time rural private lending grew After the blueprint for the countryrsquos general path for the transition period the number of rural private borrowing and lending and the total value of rural private loans both decreased as lending freedom came under attack and was restricted Private lending was restricted by both the political and social atmospheres of the time


ltUNgt

Fourth the extension of state banking services to the countryside and the development of modern financial organizations like rural credit cooperatives replaced private lending remedied shortages in rural capital and caused a re-duction to rural private lendingmdashall to a certain extent State banks and rural credit cooperatives were however formal financial institutions Their controls were strict and their procedures complicated and they emphasized that loans were to be used for a single purpose Private loans on the other hand were much more flexible often with no restrictions on the use of funds borrowed making them more practical for their immediate usage in production or to meet living needs Thus no one financial organization or financial tool could completely satisfy all demand for rural financial services Private lending was an irreplaceable component of the rural financial system at the time and con-tinues to exist to this day (although administration and guidance are needed) Private lending still exists in many forms today even in developed countries with highly effective financial institutions that just goes to prove this point

References

ldquo1954 nian nongcun jingji diaochao baogao 1954年农村经济调查报告 [1954 Rural Economic Investigative Report]rdquo December 5 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ44-2-118

ldquo1954 nian quanguo nongjia shouzhi diaocha ziliao 1954年全国农家收支调查资料 [Data from an Investigation into Nationwide Rural Household Income and Expen-ditures in 1954]rdquo Guangdong Provincial Archives MA07-61-222

ldquoDangyang xian guanling xiang jingji diaocha 当阳县关陵乡经济调查 [Economic Investigation of Guanling Township Dangyang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Pro-vincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoEnshi gaoqiao xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 恩施高桥乡农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation of Gaoqiao Township Enshi]rdquo Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoGuanghua xian bailiansi xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji dioacha baogao 光化县白莲

寺乡土改后农村经济调查报告 [Investigative Report into the Rural Economy of Bailiansi Township Guanghua County After Land Reforms]rdquo January 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoHanyang meifu xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 汉阳梅福乡农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation into Meifu Township Hanyang]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-45

Hubei nongcun jingji (1949ndash1985) 《湖北农村经济(1949~1985)》 [Rural Economy in Hubei (1949ndash1985)] (Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 1990)

SU AND CHANG264

ltUNgt

ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha baogao 湖北省十二个典型乡调查报


ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiao 湖北省十二个典型乡调

查统计表 [Statistical Tables from Investigations into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province]rdquo 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-1-154

ldquoJingmen xian di ba qu zengji xiang nongcun jingji diaocha ziliao 荆门县第八区曾

集乡农村经济调查资料 [Data from a Rural Economic Investigation into Zengji Township Eighth District Jingmen County]rdquo December 1952 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-6

ldquoJingzhou zhongxiang xian di shiyi qu yannian xiang tugai fucha hou nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha 荆州钟祥县第十一区延年乡土改复查后农村经济基

本情况调查 [An Investigation into Basic Rural Economic Conditions after Land Reforms in Yannian Township Eleventh District of Zhongxiang County Jingzhou]rdquo December 1952 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-7

ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuang 荆州专区农村私人借贷情况 [Private Lending in the Countryside of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42

Li Jinzheng 李金铮 Minrsquoguo xiangcun jiedai guanxi yanjiu 《民国乡村借贷关系

研究》 [A Study of Rural Lending Relationships in the Republic of China] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 2003)

Mao Zedong xuanji di 5 juan《毛泽东选集》第5 卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 5] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1977)

ldquoMianyang xian yangbu xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha 沔阳县杨步乡土改后农村经济基本情况调查 [An Investigation into Basic Rural Economic Conditions in Yangbu Township Mianyang County after Land Reforms]rdquo April 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42

ldquoNan hangzhang zai diyi jie quanguo nongcun jinrong huiyi de zongjie baogao 南行长

在第一届全国农村金融会议的总结报告 [The Summary Report of Bank Pres-dient Nan at the First Nationwide Rural Financial Conference]rdquo Zhongguo jinrong 《中国金融》 7 (1951) Vol 1

ldquoNanzhang xian di er qu xiaoxi xiang nongye shengchan dianxing diaocha zongjie 南漳县第二区消溪乡农业生产典型调查总结 [Summary of an Investigation into Typical Cases of Agricultural Production in Xiaoxi Township Second District Nan-zhang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan) 农村借贷情况

与活跃农村借贷问题(草案) [Rural Lending Conditions and the Issue of Invigo-rating Rural Lending (Draft)]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-18-1-40

Smith Adam Guofu lun《国富论》[The Wealth of Nations] translated from the Eng-lish by Yang Jingnian 杨敬年 (Shaanxi renmin chubanshe 2001)


ltUNgt

Wang Peilin 王沛霖 ldquoJiaqiang dui zhengzhi jingjixue faze de yanjiu zuo hao nong-cun jinrong gongzuomdashlsquosulian shehui zhuyi jingji wentirsquo xuexi xinde 加强对政治

经济学法则的研究作好农村金融工作 mdashmdash〈苏联社会主义经济问题〉学

习心得 [Strengthening Study of Political and economic Laws Performing Rural Economic Work WellmdashLessons Learned from lsquoSoviet Socialist Economic Issuesrsquo]rdquo Zhongguo jinrong 《中国金融》 20 (1953a)

Wang Xuezhe 王学者 ldquoXishui xian nanyue xiang nongcun siren jiedai guanxi diaocha 浠水县南岳乡农村私人借贷关系调查 [An Investigation into Rural Lending Relationships in Nanyue Township Xishui County]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 August 8 1953b

ldquoXiangyang zhuanqu si ge xiang jiedai zudian diandang maimai guanxi de diaocha 襄阳专区四个乡借贷租佃典当买卖关系的调查 [An Investigation into the Relationships of Lending Tenancy Pawning and Commerce in Four Townships of Xiangyang Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-14

ldquoXiaogan zhuanqu wu ge xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 孝感专区五个乡农村经济调

查 [A Rural Economic Investigation into Five Townships of Xiaogan Sub-provincial Region]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-14

ldquoXiaogan xishui jiangling dangyang he gucheng deng xian xinyong hezuoshe qing-kuang diaocha biao 孝感浠水江陵当阳和谷城等县信用合作社情况调

查表 [Tables from an Investigation into Conditions of Credit Cooperatives in Xiao-gan Xishui Jiangling Dangyang and Gucheng Counties]rdquo July 1955 Hubei Provin-cial Archives SZ18-1-161

ldquoXianning xian di yi qu zhouyan xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 咸宁县第一区周严乡

农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation into Zhouyan Township First Dis-trict Xianning County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoYicheng xian longxing xiang nongcun jingji diaocha ji ge cailiao de zhengli 宜城县

龙兴乡农村经济调查几个材料的整理 [Some Arranged Materials from a Rural Economic Investigation into Longxing Township Yicheng County]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-5

ldquoYingcheng xian yihe xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 应城县义和乡农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation into Yihe Township Yingcheng County]rdquo 1953 Hu-bei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-45

ldquoYingshan xian dunzitang xiang nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha baogao 应山

县墩子唐乡农村经济基本情况调查报告 [Investigative Report on Basic Rural Economic Conditions in Dunzitang Township Yingshan County]rdquo Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-44

Zhongguo nongcun jinrong lishi ziliao (1949ndash1985) 《中国农村金融历史资料

( 1949~ 1985)》 [Historical Materials of Financing in Rural China (1949ndash1985)] ed Lu Hanchuan 卢汉川 (Hubei sheng chuban shiye guanliju 1986)

SU AND CHANG266

ltUNgt

Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 《中国土地改革史料选编》 [Selected His-torical Materials from Chinarsquos Land Reforms] (Guofang daxue chubanshe 1988)

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dangrsquoan ziliao xuanbian (1953ndash1957) 《中华人民共

和国经济档案资料选编(1953~1957)》 [Selected Economic Records and Materials from the Peoplersquos Rebublic of China (1953ndash1957)] ed China Academy of Social Sci-ences and China Central Archives 中国社会科学院中央档案馆 (Zhongguo wujia chubanshe 2000)

ldquoZhongnan qu 1953 nian nongcun jingji diaocha tongji ziliao 中南区 1953年农村经

济调查统计资料 [Statistical Data from a Rural Economic Investigation of South-central Regions in 1953]rdquo July 1954 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-J-40

ldquoZhongnan qu yibai ge xiang diaocha ziliao xuanbian (jiefang qian bufen) 中南区一百

个乡调查资料选集(解放前部分) [Selected Materials from an Investigation into 100 Townships in the South-central Region (Portion from Before 1949)]rdquo ed South-central Military Administration Commission Land Reform Committee Investiga-tion and Research Department 中南军政委员会土地改革委员会调查研究处


ltUNgt

chapter 11

The South-to-North and North-to-South Flows of Grains and CerealsmdashChanges to Directions and Quantities of Flows of Grains and Cereals between North and South in Contemporary China

Zheng Yougui Ou Weizhong Kuang Chanjuan and Jiao Hongpo1

Over the more than forty years since 1949 there have been major historical changes to the directions and quantities of grains and cereals flows between Chinarsquos North and South The most important of these changes was a funda-mentalshift from the dominance of southern grains and cereals support for the North to that ofnorthern support for the South Flows of grains and cereals between northern and southern China has had a major impact on both intra-regional and inter-regional socioeconomic development that is why regional balance of grains and cereals supply and demand has become a major topic of discussion On August 22 1970 Mao Zedong 毛泽东 made this comment at a meeting of the ccp Politburo Standing Committee ldquoAfter 1949 we unified the country but issues of south-to-north grains and cereals transfer and north-to-south coal transfer emerged These issues existed before 1949 but we didnrsquot know about them I donrsquot know if northern coal was shipped southward under Chiang Kai-shekrsquos reign And grains and cereals did he send southern grains and cereals northward It would seem that we need to find a progressive solu-tion to this questionrdquo2 The historical trajectorythrough which the dominance

1 Zheng Yougui (郑有贵 ) is an assistant research fellow and deputy director of the Contem-porary Agricultural History Research Department of the Institute of Rural Economics of the Ministry of Agriculture he resides in Beijing Ou Weizhong (欧维中 ) is a high-level agrono-mist and the former chairman of the Institute of Rural Economics of the Ministry of Agricul-ture he resides in Beijing Kuang Chanjuan (邝婵娟 ) is an associate research fellow in the China Academy of Agricultural Sciences Bureau of District-Dividing she resides in Beijing Jiao Hongpo (焦红坡 ) is an intern researcher in the Contemporary Agricultural History Re-search Department of the Institute of Rural Economics of the Ministry of Agriculture and resides in Beijing

2 Wang Dongxing 汪东兴 ldquoYi Lushan jiu jie er zhongquanhui 忆庐山九届二中全会 [Re-calling the Second Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress at Lushan]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》 3 (1994) 11

ZHENG et al268

ltUNgt

of southern support for the north in terms of grains and cereals supply transi-tioned into the dominance of northern support for the south is an important topic for contemporary agricultural history research This topic is of profound historical and practical importance

By ldquonorthern Chinardquo we refer to an area that consists of the fifteen prov-inces autonomous regions and cities under the directcontrol of the central government including Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Liaon-ing Jilin Heilongjiang Shandong Henan Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia and Xinjiang ldquoSouthern Chinardquo consists of the fifteen provinces autonomous regions and cities under the directcontrol of the central government includ-ing Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Hubei Hunan Guang-dong Hainan Guangxi Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan and Tibet3

This essay covers the period from 1949 to 1994

i Stages of Changes to Direction and Quantities of Flow of Grains and Cereals between Northern and Southern China Since 1949

To determine the stages of change to the direction and quantities of flow of grains and cereals betweennorthern and southern China we must first dif-ferentiate between the quantity of grains and cereals flowing from the South to the North and the quantity flowing between northern and southern China During the period in which more grains and cereals flowed from southern to northern China grains and cereals transfers were primarily the result of gov-ernment allocations under the planned economy we will refer to this period as the ldquoSouth-to-North grain transferrdquo period The period in which more grain was shipped from north to south was primarily the result of marketization reforms we will refer to this period as the ldquoNorth-to-South grain transferrdquo period

Statistics compiled by the Ministry of Commerce (mofcom) for total quan-tities of grain transfers per annum include intra-regional transfers (such as the flow of rice from Hunan to Guangdong in the South and the flow of wheat from Henan to Shanxi in the North) as well as inter-regional transfers Statistics were not compiled purely on the basis of transfers of grains and cereals from north to south or south to north Owing to a shortage of historical data for this essay we have compiled statistics for total transfers in and out of northern and south-ern China based on statistics for annual grains and cereals transfers per prov-ince compiled by mofcom (see Table 111) To these we have added nationwide

3 Hainan was delinked from Guangdong and made an independent province in 1988 Before this there were 14 provinces autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities in the South

269The South-to-North and North-to-South Flows

ltUNgt

Table 111 Net inbound or outbound shipments of grains and cereals in China by region and net international exports and imports 1953ndash1992

Unit million tonnes

Year Net change in grain supply Net international grain out-boundor inbound shipments southSouth North Nationwide

1953 2573 0432 1953 25731954 1659 1065 1954 16591955 2653 0547 1955 26531956 3451 minus0870 1956 34511957 4264 minus1611 1957 42641958 4325 minus0121 1958 43251959 4383 1515 1959 43831960 3083 minus1388 1960 30831961 0191 minus4285 1961 01911962 0262 minus3594 1962 02621963 1303 minus4281 1963 13031964 2308 minus3515 1964 23081965 2631 minus4461 1965 26311966 201 minus1796 1966 2011967 1646 0117 1967 16461968 1975 minus1735 1968 19751969 187 minus2563 1969 1871970 1917 minus1987 1970 19171971 239 minus150 1971 2391972 1815 minus392 1972 18151973 1594 minus3901 1973 15941974 2275 minus2815 1974 22751975 1451 0547 1975 14511976 0708 minus1255 1976 07081977 0115 minus406 1977 01151978 minus1052 minus5749 1978 minus10521979 minus0870 minus5075 1979 minus08701980 minus266 minus7867 1980 minus2661981 minus3017 minus7932 1981 minus30171982 minus2214 minus10192 1982 minus22141983 minus3024 minus8074 1983 minus30241984 minus2261 minus7287 1984 minus22611985 3825 2777 1985 3825

ZHENG et al270

ltUNgt

grains and cereals import and export figures as well as comprehensive analysis of empirical judgments We have divided the history of changes to grains and cereals transfers between northern and southern China since 1949 into three stages the ldquosouth-to-north grain transferrdquo period the transitional period be-tween ldquosouth-to-north grain transferrdquo and ldquonorth-to-south grain transferrdquo and the ldquonorth-to-south grain transferrdquo period The following is a brief history of these three periods

(A) The ldquoSouthndashNorth Grain Transferrdquo PeriodThis period ran roughly from the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China to the mid-1970s The transfer of grains and cereals from south to north was small at first in the 1950s but then grew larger in the 1960s

On the whole in the 1950s there were net transfers of grains and cereals out of both the North and the South There was very little circulation of grains and cereals between the North and South but some southern grains and ce-realswas shipped to the North Officials began recording statistics for annual grains and cerealsflows between North and South in 1953 Over the 1953ndash1955


1986 minus1825 minus5727 1986 minus18251987 minus6067 minus8979 1987 minus60671988 minus9415 minus3792 1988 minus94151989 minus5827 minus9863 1989 minus58271990 minus3303 minus503 1990 minus33031991 minus0128 0161 1991 minus01281992 minus0577 0098 1992 minus0577

Notes (1) Data sources Calculation of net change to grain supply in the North and South is based on materials compiled by the Ministry of Commerce international grains and cereals inbound orout-boundshipment figures were compiled from several years of the Zhongguo tongji nianjian 中国统计年鉴 [China Statistical Yearbook] (2) Negative numbers indicate netgain in grain supply positive numbers indicate net loss in grain supply (3) Grain shipment figures from 1981 to 1990 were calculated based on both fixed and negotiated prices Figures from 1991 to 1992 were calculated on the basis of fixed prices only and do not include inbound orout-boundshipments made at negotiated prices

Table 111 Net inbound or outbound shipments of grains and cereals in China by region and net international exports and imports 1953ndash1992 (cont)


ltUNgt

periods as well as in the single year of 1959 northern China was a net exporter of grains and cereals but a net importer over the three years from 1956 to 1958 Over the years from 1953 to 1959 northern Chinarsquos tally of inbound shipment of grains and cereals to the South totaled 174 million tonnes an annual average of 249000 tonnes of out-bound shipment The tally of southern exports of grains and cereals from 1953 to 1959 totaled 23308 million tonnes an annual average of 333 million tonnes During this period China was a net out-bound shipment of grains and cereals internationally with national net out-bound shipments growing from 116 million tonnes in 1950 to 416 million tonnes in 1959 Chinarsquos most inbound and out-bound shipment in terms of agricultural productsat this time were rice and soybeans and its most impor-tant inbound shipment in terms of agricultural product was wheat although quantities of wheat imports were low at between 20000 and 220000 tonnes per year The following were the conditions of domestic inbound and out-bound shipment of gains and cereals involving all the northern and southern provinces (and autonomous regions and central government-controlled cit-ies) Of the fourteen southern provinces twelve were net grain out-bound shipment of grains and cereals Shanghai was a net inbound shipment region and there were no data for Tibet Sichuan Hunan and Jiangxi were the largest out-bound shipment provinces but Zhejiang Anhui Guizhou Guangdong and Guangxi also posted significant out-bound shipment figures Of the fif-teen northern provinces ten were net grain out-bound shipment provinces Shanxi Inner Mongolia Jilin Heilongjiang Shandong Henan Shaanxi Gan-su Ningxia and Xinjiang The largest northern grain out-bound shipment provinces were in order Heilongjiang Jilin and Inner Mongolia Five north-ern provinces and cities tallied net imports of grains and cereals in order Liaoning Beijing Hebei Tianjin and Qinghai with a small quantity

Grain output in China began to fall in 1959 owing to the influence of the ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and the rural peoplersquos commune movement Grain output figures were restored to 1958 levels only in 1966 Reductions in grain yields greatly strained grain supply and demand relation-ships and in 1961 China ceased to be a net exporter and became a net im-porter of grains and cereals From 1960 to 1969 there were no longer five but ten net inbound shipment of grains and cereals provinces in the North with Shandong Henan Gansu Shanxi and Shaanxi joining the ranks At this time in the North only Heilongjiang Jilin Inner Mongolia Ningxia and Xinjiang were net out-bound shipment provinces but during this period there was a reduction to total grain shipped out of Heilongjiang Jilin and Inner Mongolia as compared to the 1950s Over these ten years the North ceased to be a net out-bound shipper of grains and cereals and became a net inbound shipment region importing a net total of 2750 million tonnes an annual average import

ZHENG et al272

ltUNgt

quantity of 275 million tonnes In the 1960s the formerly twelve southern net out-bound shipment of grain provinces fell to eleven with Fujian becoming a net inbound shipment province Over these ten years the South remained a net out-bound shipment region making out-bound shipments of a net total of 17279 million tonnes an annual average of 1728 million tonnes a 616 percent reduction from the annual average for the 1953ndash1955 periods We can also see that net southern out-bound shipments of grain totaled 1728 million tonnes 1022 million tonnes less than the Northrsquos net inbound shipment of 275 mil-lion tonnes This was the case because the South shipped not only grain but also rice to the North That is to say that at this time people in the North ate not only grains and cereals grown in the South but also a sizeable amount of grains and cereals imported internationally During this period the quantity of northern inbound shipments of grain was large and the imbalance in south-north grain flow had already emerged

In 1970 the State Council convened the Northern Region Agricultural Con-ference at which officials redressed some ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes and proposed the strategic objective of reversing the south-north grain transfer as quickly as possible demanding acceleration to agricultural production in northern re-gions lacking grain Officials also placed particular emphasis on ldquomaking grain prominentrdquo in the state guiding policy for agriculture which called for ldquotak-ing grain as the key link and promoting comprehensive developmentrdquo These central policies in addition to improvements to northern agricultural condi-tions and advances in technology at this time caused great increases to pro-duction of wheat and corn There was a marked increase in overall agricultural production capacity which spurred gains to the Northrsquos grain self-sufficiency From 1970 to 1975 there were still five net out-bound shipment provinces and ten net inbound shipment provinces of grain in the North The three major agricultural provinces of Hebei Shandong and Henan switched from being net inbound shipment to being net out-bound shipment while Inner Mongo-lia Ningxia and Xinjiang became net importers Changes during this period caused a reduction in total grains and cereals imports by the North to drop to 13576 million tonnes an average annual net import of 2253 million tonnes a 177 percent reduction over the average annual import quantity of the 1960s At this time the number of net grain bound shipment provinces in the South fell to ten with Guizhou becoming a net inbound shipment province Over this period the southern grain out-bound shipment total was 11442 million tonnes an net annual average of 1907 million tonnes a 103 percent increase over the annual average in the 1960s Southern net out-bound shipments of grains and cereals remained smaller than northern net inbound shipments as all shortfall was made up of through inbound shipments


ltUNgt

In simple terms the North went from being a net out-bound shipment region for grains and cereals in the early 1950s to being a net inbound shipment region in the mid to late 1950s Net northern grain inbound shipment was larg-est during the 1960s falling somewhat in the 1970s as the North grew in grain self-sufficiency Over this period the South was consistently a net grain out-bound shipment region Southern grain out-bound shipment quantities were high in the 1950s fell somewhat in the 1960s but rose again in the early 1970s though not back to the level of the 1950s Between 1960 and 1975 southern grain out-bound shipments were insufficient for meeting northern demands shortfall was mitigated by supplies from central government granaries and through international imports Southern grain ships to the North went mostly to large and mid-sized cities like Beijing and Tianjin heavy industry bases some areas of concentrated production of cash crops (mostly cotton-grow-ing areas of the Huang-Huai-Hai Region) and some areas lacking conditions for grain production they were mainly used for direct human consumption Although corn production in the South at this time accounted for a small pro-portion of total nationwide corn output the modern livestock feed industry had not developed at this time most livestock feed was made locally in both the North and South at this time

(B) Transitional PeriodThe mid-1970s to mid-1980s was a transitional period between ldquosouth-to-north grain transferrdquo and ldquonorth-to-south grain transferrdquo During this period there was a great adjustment to the varieties of grains and cereals transferred be-tween the North and the South A great deal of southern rice was transferred northward and a great deal of northern corn flowed southward

There were great changes to supply and demand for grains and cereals in the South in the mid to late 1970s Grain out-bound shipment quantities from the South were small in 1976 and 1977 and in 1978 the South became a net grain inbound shipment region shipping a total of 1052 million tonnes of grain The South has been a net grain inbound shipment region ever since From 1976 to 1984 the only net out-bound shipment provinces in the South were Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Jiangxi Hubei Hunan and Guangxi all in the middle to lower reaches of the Yangtze delta but total out-bound shipment quantities in all of these provinces fell from previous years The quantities of grains and cereals shipped out of Jiangsu Hunan and Jiangxi originally the three largest out-bound shipment provinces fell greatly and Sichuan Guang-dong and Yunnan all switched from being net out-bound shipment to net in-bound shipment provinces Most striking is Sichuan which had been a major net grain out-bound shipment province in the 1950s and 1960s this change had

ZHENG et al274

ltUNgt

enormous impact on the quantities and directions of grain flows between the North and the South During this time seven southern provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities became net grain in-bound shipment provinces They are Shanghai Fujian Guangdong Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan and Tibet Over the period from 1978 to 1984 southern in-bound shipments of grain exceeded out-bound shipments making the region a net grain inbound shipment province A total of 15098 million tonnes of grain were shipped to the South over these seven years for an annual average of 2157 million tonnes

Over the nine years from 1976 to 1984 the North remained a net grain inbound shipment region and in fact northern grain inbound shipment sincreased in scale reaching 57491 million tonnes over the period an annual average of 6388 million tonnes 132 times the annual average net inbound shipment for the decade of the 1960s and 182 times the annual average net inbound ship-ment for the period from 1970 to 1975 During this period the North received some shipments of southern rice and some northern corn was shipped to the South From 1976 to 1983 the annual average of northern corn shipped to the South was less than one million tonnes In 1983 major northern corn-producing provinces including Liaoning Jilin Hebei Henan and others shipped a total of 685600 tonnes of corn to the South Of those Jilin shipped out the most corn followed by Henan Corn from Jilin was shipped to coastal regions stretching from Shanghai to Guangxi inland provinces including Yunnan Guizhou and Sichuan and Hubei and Hunan in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River a total of eleven provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities Corn from Henan was shipped to thirteen provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities of the South all except Tibet

During this period the state drafted and implemented many policies for international inbound shipment of grains and cereals in order to reduce pres-sure on domestic production and provide necessary conditions for restructur-ing of rural industry From 1976 to 1984 the quantity of net grains and cereals inbound shipments was large an annual average of 9353 million tonnes

(C) The ldquoNorth-to-South Grain Transferrdquo PeriodThe mid- to late 1980s marked a historic turning point for grain flows between the North and South as shipments of northern grain to the South gradually exceeded those of southern grains and cereals to the North This was the begin-ning of the ldquonorth-to-south grain transferrdquo period

So why did this historic turning point arrive in the mid-1980s We shall first analyze the directions and quantities of rice and corn being transferred be-tween the North and South and then offer some judgments


ltUNgt

As rice cultivation grew in the North there was an increase to northern rice self-sufficiency and in fact some high-quality northern rice was even shipped to the South Fluctuations in southern rice output during this period led to reduced shipments of southern rice to the North and by the mid-1990s net out-bound shipment of rice fromthe South to the North was no longer fea-sible Corn production in the North however developed rapidly The South on the other hand accounts for less than twenty percent of nationwide corn output and so major development in the southern livestock feed industry also prompted a great deal of shipment of northern corn to the South We shall now perform objective analysis of transfers of southern rice to the North and of northern corn to the South Table 112 indicates total inbound and out-bound shipments of corn and rice in both the North and the South This table gives us an idea of the quantities of southern rice being shipped to the North and northern corn being transferred to the South

1 Quantity of southern rice shipped to the North Rice is one of Chinarsquos traditional export products and even during the 1960s and 1970s when China was a net grain importer the country still exported rice Most rice exported by China comes from the South Out-boundshipments of southern rice include both exports to foreign countries to earn foreign ex-change and domestic shipment to the North Most rice consumed in the North comes from the South It is thus fair to surmise that the quantity of northern inbound shipments of rice should be roughly equivalent to that of southern out-bound shipments of rice Net transfers of southern rice to the North totaled 734000 tonnes in 1975 806000 tonnes in 1980 1354 million tonnes in 19854 and 125 million tonnes in 1990

2 Quantity of northern corn shipped to the South In the years prior to 1984 China alternated from being a net exporter and a net importer of corn but overall import and export quantities were never large China was a net international exporter of corn from 1984 to 1994 and thus it is fair to surmise that the quantity of southern inbound shipments of corn should be roughly equivalent to that of northern out-bound shipments of corn Net shipment of northern corn to the South totaled 485000 tonnes in

4 Per statistics issued by the grain bureaus of Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Jiangxi Hubei and Hunan the nationrsquos major suppliers of rice the following are yearly outflows of unprocessed rice from these six provinces to the north 2933 million tonnes in 1983 2585 million tonnes in 1984 and 215 million tonnes in 1985 Once these figures are converted to processed rice they match up with our estimate of total rice outflow from the South to the North in 1985 These figures also demonstrate a gradual falling off of transfers of rice from the South to the North

ZHENG et al276

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 11

2

Chan

ges t

o ne

t out

-bou

nd sh

ipm

ents

of r

ice a

nd co

rn in

the n

orth

and

sout

h

Uni

t to

nnes

Year

Rice

Corn

Net

am

ount

of s

outh

ern

ship

men

t of r

ice

to th

e no

rth

min

us n

orth

ern

out-b

ound

ship

men

ts o

f co

rn to

the

sout

h co

rn

tran

sfer

Net

am

ount

ex

port

ed

from

the

sout

h

Net

am

ount

of

nort

hern

ex

port

Net

am

ount

of

sout

h-to

-nor

th

tran

sfer

Net

am

ount

ex

port

ed to

th

e so

uth

Net

am

ount

of

nort

hern

ex

port

Net

am

ount

of

nort

h-to

-sou

th

tran

sfer

1975

224

mn

734

000

734

000

485

000

969

000

485

000

249

000

1980

938

000

806

000

806

000

154

3 m

n26

500

026

500

0 5

410

0019

852

085

mn

135

4 m

n1

354

mn

187

8 m

n5

832

mn

187

8 m

nminus5

240

0019

902

005

mn

125

mn

125

mn

271

4 m

n3

195

mn

271

4 m

nminus1

464

mn

Not

es (

1) D

ata

sour

ce c

ompi

led

from

mof

com

dat

a (2

) Fig

ures

for f

low

of r

ice

and

corn

in 19

75 c

alcu

late

d on

stab

ilize

d pr

ices

Fig

ures

from

1980

to 19

90 w

ere

calc

ulat

ed b

ased

on

stab

ilize

d an

d ne

gotia

ted

pric

es (

3) W

e es

timat

ed th

e am

ount

of r

ice

ship

men

t fro

m S

outh

to N

orth

the

am

ount

of c

orn

ship

men

t fro

m

Nor

th to

Sou

th a

nd th

e fig

ures

for n

et a

mou

nt o

f Sou

th-to

-Nor

th ri

ce o

ut-b

ound

ship

men

t min

us N

orth

-to-S

outh

cor

n ou

t-bou

ndsh

ipm

ent


ltUNgt

1975 265000 tonnes in 19805 1878 million tonnes in 19856 and 2714 mil-lion tonnes in 1990 Of course there were flows of other kinds of grain between the North and the South during this period as well but their quantities paled in comparison to those of rice and corn

This data shows us that beginning in the mid-1980s the quantity of corn shipped from North to South was much greater than the quantity of rice trans-ferred from south to north By 1990 the disparity had grown to nearly 15 million tonnes Thus we can say that we entered the ldquoNorth-to-South grain transferrdquo period in the mid- to late 1980s By the 1990s the quantity of North-to-South grain transfer had grown much higher than in the 1980s making this the great imbalance in grains and cereals output between the North and the South This imbalance had an increasingly large impact on economic development in all the regions of across both the North and the South and has become a major topic for discussion in the field of balancing regional supply of and demand for grains and cereals

ii Analysis of the Characteristics of Flows of Grains and Cereals between the North and South

We can conclude therefore that grains and cereals transfers between the North and South in the over forty years since 1949 have had the following characteristics

Firstly rice has comprised the bulk of southern grain out-bound shipment to the North where it has served mostly as food for direct human consump-tion Corn has comprised the bulk of northern grain shipment to the South where it has mostly been used to manufacture livestock feed

Northern grain inbound shipment figures indicate that inbound shipment for the two cities of Beijing and Tianjin were greater than some other north-ern provinces and autonomous regions in the period from 1953 to 1960 as well as in the years 1967 1968 1971 1975 1976 1985 1986 1988 and 1990 a total of

5 This is because southern rice imports were greater than northern corn exports in this year Thus we used the figure for northern corn exports in this year

6 Per statistics issued by the grain bureaus of Jilin and Liaoning in the Northeast and Hebei Shandong and Henan in the Huang-Huai-Hai Rivers Region the nationrsquos major suppliers of corn the following are yearly outflows of corn from these six provinces to the south 685600 tonnes in 1983 14221 tonnes in 1984 and 13381 tonnes in 1985 These figures match up with our estimate of total corn outflow from the North to the South of 1878 million tonnes in 1985

ZHENG et al278

ltUNgt

seventeen years Excluding those years during the other twenty-one years over the period 1961 to 1990 grain inbound shipmentfor other northern provinces and autonomous regions were all greater than those for Beijing and Tianjin Jilin Province long a heavy industry base was the large net grain inbound shipment province in the North in the 1950s and 1960s This fact indicates that Beijing Tianjin and Liaoning have been the major destination of grain inbound shipments to the North Some other provinces and autonomous regions also subsisted on shipped grains and cereals from other provinces but at smaller amount than these two cities and one province and most inbound shipments in those areas went to concentrated cash crop production areas (mostly cotton-growing areas of the Huang-Huai-Hai Region) and some ar-eas lacking conditions for production Letrsquos look at out-bound shipment of southern rice to the North in 1975 as an example In 1975 net Southern rice out-bound shipment totaled 224 million tonnes The nine southern provinces and autonomous regions including Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Hubei Hunan Guangdong and Guangxi were net out-bound shipment prov-inces Hunan led the pack followed by Jiangxi with Fujian coming in last Shanghai was the largest net rice inbound shipment province in the South Sichuan Guizhou and Tibet were all also net rice inbound shipment prov-inces but at much smaller amount In 1975 Liaoning was the only northern province to be a net out-bound shipment of rice but at a small quantity Excluding Liaoning and Ningxia the other thirteen provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities of the North were all net inbound shipment provinces of rice for a total of 734000 tonnes In summary most southern grain import to the Northwent to large and mid-sized cities such as Beijing and Tianjin heavy industry bases concentrated cash crop production areas and some areas that cannot produce for itself

In North-to-South grain transfers the South received shipments of a total of 2714 million tonnes of corn in 1990 with thirteen provinces autonomous regions and central government directly controlled cities making net inbound shipments Shanghai Sichuan Guangxi and Zhejiang led the rest and only Anhui was a net out-bound shipment province of corn but in small amounts Corn comprises the bulk of northern grain shipped to the south although a small amount of northern soybeans are also shipped southward One could call the true nature of this transfer ldquoshipping of northern livestock feed to the Southrdquo

The most important types of grains and cereals shipped between the North and South are rice and corn although small amounts of other types of grains and cereals were also shipped between the regions This grain shipment structure is the result of the distribution of grain varieties in China and the


ltUNgt

structure of production areas Major grains and cereals7 in China include rice wheat corn soybeans tubers and other assorted grains and cereals Rice wheat and corn make up the bulk of grain varieties in China The share of combined output of rice wheat and corn in total grain output in the country rose from 632 percent in 1952 to 841 percent in 1994 Rice dominates grain out-put in the South with fourteen of the fifteen southern provinces producing rice as the major grain crop Dry farming dominates the North where wheat corn and soybeans are the major crop varieties and rice production is minimal Although rice cultivation is growing rapidly in the North the South remains the major rice producing region consistently accounting for over ninety per-cent of national rice output The South accounted for 959 percent of national rice output in 1952 947 percent in 1965 933 percent in 1975 93 percent in 1984 and 903 percent in 1994 The North on the other hand has consistently accounted for less than ten percent of national rice output Although North-ern diet is marked by a domination of wheat consumption rice consumption persists there and has in fact been steadily growing this is the factor that has long determined flows of rice from the South to the North Most corn in China is cultivated in the North where the crop has developed rapidly The propor-tion of northern corn production to national total has grown consistently from nearly seventy percent in the 1950s to over 80 percent in the 1990s Northern corn production accounted for 691 percent of national output in 1952 678 percent in 1965 782 percent in 1975 774 percent in 1984 and 813 percent in 1994 A great deal of northern corn has been shipped to the South since Reform and Opening as the modern livestock feed processing industry has grown most notably in the South Chinese wheat production has long been insuffi-cient to meet domestic demand and inbound shipments have been used to fill the gap There is therefore some flow of wheat between the North and the South but not much Most tubers have been consumed where they are produced with the exception of the years of food shortages in the early 1960s most tubers are not shipped between regions Beans and assorted grains and cereals are shipped interregionally with most shipments going from the North to the South but at much smaller amounts then those of rice and corn We can say therefore that rice and corn account for the majority of grain shipments between the North and South with the bulk of south-to-north shipment being of rice and the bulk of north-to-south grain shipment being of corn That is not to say however that there have been no transfers of other grain variet-ies between the North and South It is also not to say that no northern rice is

7 Translatorrsquos note The Chinese word liangshi is generally translated as ldquograins and cerealsrdquo in English but it also includes major cash crops such as soybeans and potatoes

ZHENG et al280

ltUNgt

transferred to the South We are merely saying that rice is the primary south-ern grain shipped northward and corn is the primary northern grain shipped southward all other grain varieties shipped are of secondary importance

Secondly the socioeconomic backgrounds to the period of south-to-north grain shipments and the period of north-to-south grain shipments are pro-foundly different in the following ways (1) The economic systems were dif-ferent During the South-to-North grain transfer period out-bound shipments of southern grain to the North were decided under the planned economy The government used administrative measures to execute out-bound shipments to meet consumption demands in the North mostly in large and mid-sized cities like Beijing and Tianjin in heavy industry bases in some areas of concentrated production of cash crops (mostly cotton-growing areas of the Huang-Huai-Hai Region) and some areas lacking conditions for production By contrast deci-sions about shipments of northern grain southward reflected reforms drive to create a market economy under which grains and cereals in regions with sur-pluses finds their way to regions with shortages and flow is established between regions with different prices (2) Consumption patterns are different During the South-to-North grain transfer period rice was the primary southern grain shipped to the North Centrally-made grain allocation decisions at this time were made to ensure adequate food supply in regions with shortages These al-location decisions reflected low levels of both production and consumption of grain During the North-to-South grain transfer period the primary northern grain shipped to the South has been corn which has mostly gone to meet the de-mand for feed production for the animal farming These allocation decisions in-dicate that per capita grain consumption in China has increased markedly and that there have been substantive changes to consumption patterns (3) Grain product industries developed to different levels During the South-to-North grain transfer period total amount of southern grain shipped to the North was low reflecting a low level of development of grain processing industries during this period During the North-to-South grain transfer period a greater amount of northern grain has been shipped southward indicating a higher level of de-velopment to Chinese grain processing industries in this period

Thirdly most provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities require adjustments to grain varieties planted due to mismatch between what they grow and their dietary preferences What we mean to stress here is that even large grain out-bound shipping provinces made inbound shipments of some grain varieties to correct the mismatch a lot of For example Jiangxi and Hunan are major out-bound shipment prov-inces of rice but both rely on large amount of northern corn to meet the needs of their livestock feed industries In another example in 1995 Jilin Province


ltUNgt

led the country in per capita grain output at 7811 kilograms nearly double the national average of 3939 kilograms Nevertheless although the province shipped a large amount of corn out of the province it relies on large amount of interregional and international wheat imports

Fourthly most provinces autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities saw changes to their identity as either net grain inbound shipment provincesor net grain out-bound shipment provinces Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Tibet and Hainan have consistently been net importers of grain All other provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities have been both Some shifting back and forth between the two

Fifthly since 1990 southern shortages of grain for feed production have in-creased with grain self-sufficiency rates falling particularly in southeastern coastal regions As reforms to the grain circulation system have deepened as commodification and marketization have increased in Chinarsquos food industry the flow of grains and cereals have become complex The most prominent im-balance in grain supply is the flow of northern grains southward to mitigate shortages in the feed production industry The regional supply and demand situation in corn is characterized as Northern surpluses coupled with Southern shortages In recent years corn surpluses have been concentrated in three large regions The first is the corn-basket of the three northeastern provinces and Inner Mongolia where corn surpluses average nearly twenty million tonnes annually The second are the Huang-Huai-Hai Region provinces of Shandong Hebei and Henan where corn surpluses average between five and ten mil-lion tonnes annually The third region consists of Shaanxi and Xinjiang in the Northwest where corn surpluses average nearly two million tonnes annually In 1994 corn production in these nine provinces and autonomous regions to-taled 7369 million tonnes accounting for seventy-four percent of national annual corn output of that total 4227 million tonnes were surplus account-ing for ninety percent of national total of corn surpluses Corn is in short sup-ply mostly in the South where eleven provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities see an annual corn shortfall of one million tonnes or more These include Guangdong Hunan Sichuan Ji-angxi Hubei Jiangsu Zhejiang Fujian Anhui Guangxi and Shanghai8 The Southrsquos chronic shortage of grain for manufacturing livestock feed is one of the

8 State Planning Commission Rural Economic Department and National Bureau of Statistics Rural Investigation Team 国家计委农经司国家统计局农调总队 ldquoZhongguo liang-shi gongxu pingheng wenti yanjiu 中国粮食供需平衡问题研究 [Research in the Topic of Balancing Chinarsquos Supply and Demand of Grains and cereals]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun guancha 《中国农村观察》 1 (1996)

ZHENG et al282

ltUNgt

major imbalances in nationwide grain supply and demand To address south-ern shortages of corn for manufacturing feed and their impact on the pig-raising industry in 1994 and 1995 the State Council freed up two million tonnes of state corn reservesmdashin two batchesmdashfrom Jilin Liaoning Heilongjiang Inner Mongolia and other regions to be allocated to the South to mitigate shortages

There are also imbalances in rice supply and demand particularly in south-eastern coastal regions which are already seeing a deficit The five provinces of Hunan Jiangxi Hubei Anhui and Jiangsu in the mid-and lower reaches of the Yangtze River make up Chinarsquos major rice producing regions Total arable land being used for rice cultivation in these regions fell by 21655 million mu from 1990 to 1994 and total rice output subsequently fell by 6045 million tonnes over this period Total arable land being used for rice cultivation in the South China rice producing region of Guangdong Fujian Guangxi and Hainan de-creased by 11457 million mu from 1990 to 1994 with output falling by 5665 mil-lion tonnes a margin of decrease second only to that of the aforementioned region These changes have led to shortages in rice supply In regional terms such has meant a reduction in the size of net rice out-bound shipment regions and an increase in that of net rice inbound shipment regions as well as an in-crease to the volume of international rice imports In 1984 the combined rice shipped from the seven southern provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities of Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Fujian Guangdong Guangxi and Hainan was 1509 million tonnes By 1994 they were receiving net shipmentsof a total of 148 million tonnes of rice9

iii Lessons from the Shift from South-to-North to North-to-South Grain Flow

We have gained a great deal of experience over the forty years of changes to the direction and quantities of grain transfers between the North and the South These experiences have left us profound lessons primarily in the fol-lowing areas

(A) Increases to Comprehensive Agricultural Productivity are the Foundation for the Development of Grain Output in Both the North and the South

Since 1949 there have been significant increases to comprehensive agricultural productivity in both the North and the South These increases have provided

9 Ibid


ltUNgt

the material basis for sustained increases to Chinese grain output which grew from 11318 million tonnes in 1949 to 490 million tonnes in 1996 Agricultural production conditions in the North were originally worse than in the South but over the last forty-plus years gains to comprehensive agricultural productiv-ity have brought about not only self-sufficiency but also surpluses in northern grain output This is a typical example There have been two primary reasons behind increases to grain output in the North The first lies in improvements to overall northern agricultural conditions beginning with large-scale develop-ment of farm fields and irrigation works in the 1950s In 1966 the ccp Central Committee and the State Council determined to establish agricultural groups in eight provinces (and autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities) under the personal direction of Premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 to eliminate backwardness in northern agriculture In 1970 the State Council convened a conference dedicated to agriculture in the North at which offi-cials strengthened leadership in agricultural work in the North and proposed strategic objectives for reversing the ldquoSouth-to-North grain transferrdquo There was another upsurge in the construction of farm fields and irrigation works during the ldquolearn from Dazhai in agriculturerdquo movement of the 1960s and 1970s and great achievements were made in the leveling of land in the erection of ter-raced fields on sloped land and in improving and cleaning up saline-alkaline soil All of these played an important role in improving agricultural conditions in the North The second reason was the development of chemical fertilizers farming machinery and other material gains in the development of agricul-tural industry There were great increases to investments in essential factors of production for chemical fertilizers and farming machinery this played an important role in improving northern agriculture The third reason was in the selection of improved varieties of corn and wheat and improvements in plant-ing techniques that came on the heels of advances to agricultural science and technology As agricultural production conditions gradually improved yields per unit of area planted grew rapidly Grain output per mu in the North grew 266 times over the period 1952 to 1994 an average annual increase of 31 per-cent 07 percent higher than the same average annual increase experienced in the South of 24 percent The fourth reason was the formation the Northrsquos Corn Belt which spurred rapid growth in northern corn production as well as increases to corn processing From 1985 to 1994 the North increased the size of corn-producing land by 3211 million mu which accounted for 619 percent of the national increase of 51474 million mu Over this period northern corn output increased by 32144 million tonnes accounting for 907 percent of the national gain in corn output over this period which was 35421 million tonnes During this period the Northrsquos contribution to national corn output increased

ZHENG et al284

ltUNgt

from 761 percent to 813 percent As commercial processing of corn for added value in the North grew most of Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning Inner Mongolia and Shanxi as well as parts of Hebei Shaanxi and Gansu became concen-trated producing regions for spring corn These regions also accounted for the bulk of nationwide commercial corn production In 1994 the central govern-ment purchased a total of 1675 million tonnes from these eight provinces or autonomous regions accounting for 767 percent of total central government corn purchases Of that total 7125 million tonnes of corn were purchased from the North via the fixed quota system from these eight provinces and autono-mous regions accounting for 828 percent of total fixed quota corn purchase in that year Most of that corn was exported to earn foreign exchange or exported to the South Increases to the Northrsquos comprehensive agricultural productiv-ity were an important reason behind the reversal ofdirection of grain flow between the North and South

(B) Reasonable Adjustments have been Made to Crop Growing Varieties and Dietary Patterns Tomitigate Imbalances in Grain between the North and the South

Analysis of the above characteristics of grain flows between the North and South clearly show that the North-to-South grain transfer is largely attribut-able to the Northrsquos need for southern grain as raw material in feed production In fact the total amount of interregional grain shipment used toward feed production exceeded the amount of northward shipment of southern grain during the south-to-north grain transfer period This fact speaks volumes of the degree of mismatch between what are grown and what are needed in each region A certain flow of grain between the North and South is allow-able and in some cases necessary but excessive flows have more negative than positive consequences To mitigate these imbalances we must begin by adjusting imbalances to regional grain production structures and consump-tion patterns To this end the North should continue to develop potential grain output capacity and play up the advantages of the Corn Belt while also making adjustments to grain production structures where there is excessive corn production capacity Officials in the North must also increase produc-tion of wheat rice and other crops to help ameliorate the damage years of planting only corn has had on the soil This decision would also help to meet local demand for diversity in grain supply At the same time officials should increase local processing of grains The South should increase grain output including corn early rice barley and other grains used as raw materials in feed production The goal should be increased self-sufficiency especially with respect to direct human consumption


ltUNgt

(C) Provide Policies Support for Grain Production and Give Grains a Certain Degree of Development Advantages in Regional Economies

Because grain production enjoys different degrees of relative development advantages in the North and the South over an extended period of time this ultimately led to sustained output increase in the North andstagnation in the South grain output and a northward shift of the center of grain production in China As market reforms have been deepened in both the economy in gen-eral and in grain sales in particular there have been increasing policy support for the grain industry The development advantages of grain production in re-gional economies have thus become more pronounced As a result grain pro-ducers can increase their incomes by increasing production These measures explain greater incentive among farmers to plant grains which has in turn driven output growth The government has put in place a number of measures to make growing grain more attractive to farmers The first is to increase the profitability of grain production through preferential pricing and investment policies The second is through integrating the trade industrial and agricul-tural dimensions of grain production and sales When farmers work closely with markets through companies and other intermediary organizations the different parties can share both benefits and risks Such behavior can promote not only food processing for grain in the North but also grain production in the South to meet the needs of feed production The third has been the promotion in select areas of large-scale grain production in order to take advantage of the economy of scale In these areas grain planting has yielded greater return through increases to labor and land productivity

(D) The Construction of an Integrated Nationwide Grain Market is an Imeasure for Ensuring Orderly Flows of Grains between the North and South and a Balancing of Supply and Demand

In 1985 the central government abolished the state grain monopoly and imple-mented contract purchasing and market purchasing systems giving green light to the sale of grain through multiple channels This change helped alleviate dif-ficulties in the sales of grain Long-term cooperation between producers and traders are now being established in grain producing regions Nevertheless an orderly system for the circulation of grain has yet to be truly established owing to stagnant development of Chinarsquos grain markets This oversight is a major reason behind grain price fluctuations and supply and demand imbalances in recent years Promoting sound flows of grain between the North and South must be a macroeconomic policy objective for the central government The central governmentrsquos emergency allocation of reserve grains to alleviate short-ages in 1995 played an important role in stabilizing the market for grains used

ZHENG et al286

ltUNgt

for feed production The central government should also adopt corresponding policies to avoid importing grain when there are domestic surpluses or export-ing it when there are domestic shortages In summary promoting sound flows of grain between the North and South and greater balance in regional supply and demand requires the establishment of an integrated orderly nationwide grain market supported by state macroeconomic policies and controls on im-ports and exports to avoid surpluses and shortages

(E) Ensuring Regional Equilibrium in Supply and Demand through Distribution of Grain Reserves

Climates vary widely between different regions in China and grain harvests are affected to a great degree by environmental factors Over the past ten or so years grain output has gone through cycles of about five years each with two years of increases one year of no changes and two years of decreases This conclusionis based on overall production figures We should pay more at-tention to differences in yields for different grain varieties and identify those that ill suit local conditions Furthermore the North and South are separated by great distances and shipping grain between them takes a great amount of resources It will be particularly difficult to resolve such problems as regional reductions to grain output owing to natural disasters and in particular to fluctuations in the grain markets This problem calls for sound distribution of central grain reserves in both the North and South and greater emphasis on reasonable blending of grain varieties We are presently shoring up the grain reserve system and strengthening the governmentrsquos role by separating the public policy functions of grain departments from their commercial functions This should prove helpful toward ensuring ample grain reserves

Since the 1980s we have experienced some periods in which either selling or storing grain was difficult both hurt the stable development of grain produc-tion Sluggishness in the construction of infrastructure for grain circulation is largely to blame We must address this problem


ltUNgt

chapter 12

Three Historic Changes to Inter-regional Grain Flows in the Peoplersquos Republic of China and Their Causes

Qu Shang and Su Shaozhi1

Abstract

Over the more than fifty years since the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China government allocation of grain has gradually given way to market allocation There were three historic changes to the direction and quantities of grain flows over this period from South-to-North grain transfer to North-to-South grain transfer then to Northrsquos dominance in international exports and Southrsquos dominance in international imports and finally to exporting by both the North and South An analysis of this process and related factors indicates that these three major shifts were the result of marked-directed imbalance in regional economic development This imbalance also had a large impact on further development and adjustments to regional economies the national economy and the global economy

Keywords

grain ndash South-to-North grain transfer ndash North-to-South grain transfer ndash exporting by the North and importing by the South ndash exporting by both the North and South

i The History of the South-to-North Grain Transfer and the First Historic Shift to North-to-South Grain Transfer

The agricultural civilization of the Chinese people was born in the Yellow River Valley After the Tang and Song Dynasties as the Yangtze and Pearl

1 Qu Shang (瞿商 ) was born in 1968 and is a lecturer in the Hubei University of Technology and a doctoral student in the Institute of Chinese Economics of the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Su Shaozhi (苏少之 ) was born in 1948 and is a professor in the Institute of Chinese Economics of the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

QU AND SU288

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River Valleys came within the pale of Chinese civilization the center of Chinarsquos economy gradually shifted southward By the Southern Song Dy-nasty Chinarsquos economic heart was firmly located in the South After unifica-tion of the country in the Yuan Dynasty officials built the Grand Canal and roads leading to the capital ie Yuan Dadu to ensure ample grain supply to the North This was how ldquoSouth-to-North grain transferrdquo got its start and it was a spectacular undertaking at the time The South-to-North grain transfer remained a key tool in maintaining regional food balances across the country through the Ming and Qing Dynasties as well as during the Republic of China

For a long time after the founding of The Peoplersquos Republic of China the South-to-North grain transfer remained in force After the state monopoly on grain and other agricultural products was imposed in 1953 all grain allocation was done by the central government Per data we compiled regarding net ship-ments in and out of the North and South2 based on yearly grain shipment data published by the Ministry of Commerce (mofcom) in the early 1950s both the North and South were net exporters of grain with most out-transfers of grain from both regions going to other countries The primary grain shipped out of the South was rice while the primary northern grain shipped to the South was soybeans

This development of exports is mostly attributable to economic recovery between land reforms and the agricultural cooperative movement Condi-tions for agricultural production improved and labor productivity increased bringing about marked increases to grain yields which in turn led to grain surpluses available for export The state monopoly under which the central government exercised absolute control over every aspect of grain from pro-duction to consumption ended Chinarsquos long tradition of keeping the rights and freedom to store grain in the hands of the people At this point grain was no longer simply a consumer good but would also be used to further socialist modernization It was precisely at this time that the state relied on exports of primary agricultural products to earn foreign currency badly needed to meet the capital technological and equipment demands of industrialization Thus grain exports particularly exports of southern rice increased steadily during this time Over the eight year period from 1954 to 1960 the net total of exports added to in-shipments of northern and southern grain totaled 1944 million tonnes Over the same period net out-shipments of grain from the North and

2 Here the ldquoSouthrdquo refers to the fifteen provinces autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities of East China (excluding Shandong) and South-central China (excluding Henan) The ldquoNorthrdquo refers to the fifteen provinces autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities of the Northeast North China and the Northwest

289Three Historic Changes to Inter-regional Grain Flows

ltUNgt

the South together came to 26743 million tonnes with a difference of 7303 million tonnes in grain shipments between the two regions These figures in-dicate that inter-regional grain transfers ie flows of grain between the North and South were relatively small A small amount of northern soybeans and corn were shipped to the South at this time Excluding the portion that went to exports a small amount of southern rice was shipped to the North primar-ily to the two cities of Beijing and Tianjin and the major industrial province of Liaoning We also discovered that of all annual grain shipment figures from the North and South in the 1950s twelve of the fourteen southern provinces au-tonomous regions and direct-controlled cities were net out-shippers of grain with relatively large export figures Over this eight-year period total exports from the South stood at 26391 million tonnes an annual average of nearly 330 million tonnes The North was a net exporter of grain in the years 1953 to 1955 as well as in 1959 with a small amount of exports (an annual average of 880000 tonnes) but in the other four years of the period from 1953 to 1960 the North was a net grain importer (at an annual average of 800000 tonnes) In other words over this eight-year period grain shipment from the North southward was 352000 tonnes only 13 percent of the amount shipped northward from the South Evidently the South was the major grain producing region in China in the 1950s making enormous contribution to Chinarsquos international grain ex-ports and mitigating northern grain shortages in the mid and late 1950s During this period the North and the South were both net exporters but it was also at this time that the South-to-North grain flow began to take shape

Grain production efficiency and total grain output fell in the 1960s due to the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and the rural peoplersquos commune movements This shortfall placed enormous strain on supply and demand for grain nationwide and so in 1961 China ceased to be a net grain exporter and became a net grain importer Grain output began to grow again in 1962 but at the same time the population was also growing dramatically and so grain shortages continued for a long time Throughout the decade of the 1960s net grain exports from the South totaled 16113 million tonnes while the North was a net grain importer in every year of the decade except 1967 Previously only five provinces autono-mous regions and central government directly-controlled cities had been net grain importers but that number now rose to ten The total amount of grain imports over this period was 2810 million tonnes The difference of 11987 mil-lion tonnes was made up primarily through imports China imported a total of 3349 million tonnes of grain in the 1960s mostly wheat that went to the North Three characteristics distinguished the 1960s from the 1950s The first is that the South remained a net exporter of grain and maintained grain sur-pluses but the total amount of outward shipments fell markedly The second

QU AND SU290

ltUNgt

Table 121 Net inbound or outbound shipments of grain in China by region and net exports and imports 1953ndash1992

Year Grain shipments in and out Net nationwide grain exports and importsSouth North Nationwide

1953 2573 mn 432000 3005 mn 182 mn1954 1659 mn 1065 mn 2724 mn 168 mn1955 2653 mn 547000 320 mn 205 mn1956 3451 mn minus870000 3364 mn 250 mn1957 4264 mn minus1611 mn 2653 mn 192 mn1958 4325 mn minus121000 4204 mn 266 mn1959 4383 mn 1515 mn 5898 mn 416 mn1960 3083 mn minus1388 mn 1695 mn 265 mn1961 191000 minus4285 mn minus4094 mn minus445 mn1962 262000 minus3594 mn minus3332 mn minus389 mn1963 1303 mn minus4281 mn minus2978 mn minus446 mn1964 2308 mn minus3515 mn minus1207 mn minus475 mn1965 2631 mn minus4461 mn minus1829 mn minus399 mn1966 201 mn minus1796 mn 214000 minus355 mn1967 1646 mn 117000 1763 mn minus171 mn1968 1975 mn minus1735 mn 240000 minus200 mn1969 187 mn minus2563 mn minus693000 minus145 mn1970 1917 mn minus1987 mn minus70000 minus324 mn1971 239 mn minus150 mn 890000 minus5500001972 1815 mn minus392 mn minus2105 mn minus184 mn1973 1594 mn minus3901 mn minus2307 mn minus424 mn1974 2275 mn minus2815 mn minus540000 minus448 mn1975 1451 mn 547000 1998 mn minus9300001976 708000 minus1255 mn minus547000 minus6000001977 115000 minus406 mn minus3945 mn minus569 mn1978 minus1052 mn minus5749 mn minus6801 mn minus695 mn1979 minus870000 minus5075 mn minus5945 mn minus1071 mn1980 minus266 mn minus7867 mn minus10527 mn minus1181 mn1981 minus3017 mn minus7932 mn minus10949 mn minus1348 mn1982 minus2214 mn minus10192 mn minus12406 mn minus1534 mn1983 minus3024 mn minus8074 mn minus11098 mn minus1234 mn1984 minus2261 mn minus7287 mn minus9548 mn minus722 mn

Unit million tonnes


ltUNgt

is that most southern outward shipments of grain in the 1950s went toward exports whereas most southern shipments of grain in the 1960s consisted of rice used to mitigate food shortages in the North where the rest of shortages were resolved through importation of wheat The third is that grain imports were greater than exports in the 1960s whereas China was a net grain exporter in the 1950s The south-north grain transfer remained the status quo in the 1960s with inter-regional allocations growing larger In imports and exports the North became a net importer of wheat The general situation at this time was north-south grain transfer and northern import of grain

In the 1970s the South-to-North grain transfer began to decline but grain imports into the North continued unabated This change was primarily be-cause the North improved the conditions and technology for agricultural pro-duction which spurred great increases to yields per unit area planted of wheat and corn thus augmenting the Northrsquos grain self-sufficiency At the same time the promotion of hybrid rice plants and other improved varieties in the South greatly increased grain yields per area planted there but population growth cancelled out the positive impact these had on general grain supply Thus the South maintained seven years of net exports of grain during the 1970s

Notes (1) Data sources Calculation of net change to grain supply in the North and South is based on materials compiled by the Ministry of Commerce international grain import and export figures were compiled from several years of the Zhongguo tongji nianjian《中国统计

年鉴》[China Statistical Yearbook] (2) Negative numbersindicate netgain in grain supply positive numbers indicate net loss in grain supply (3) Grain shipment figures from 1981 to 1990 were calculated based on both fixed and negotiated prices Figures from 1991 to 1992 were calculated on the basis of fixed prices only and do not include imports and exports made at negotiated prices


1985 3825 mn 2777 mn 6602 mn 332 mn1986 minus1825 mn minus5727 mn minus7552 mn 169 mn1987 minus6067 mn minus8979 mn minus15046 mn minus891 mn1988 minus9415 mn minus3792 mn minus13207 mn minus816 mn1989 minus5827 mn minus9863 mn minus1569 mn minus1002 mn1990 minus3303 mn minus503 mn minus8333 mn minus789 mn1991 minus128000 161000 330000 minus259 mn1992 minus577000 98000 minus479000 189 mn

QU AND SU292

ltUNgt

becoming a net grain in-transferer region only in 1978 Southern grain exports in this decade totaled only 5766 million tonnes the annual average of the de-cade being only 175 percent that of the 1950s and 358 percent that of the 1960s Northern net grain imports in this decade totaled 35595 million tonnes a 267 percent increase over the 1960s The continued need for imports was mostly attributable to rapid growth of the population which led to a grain shortage of 29829 million tonnes which was remedied through government grain reserves and wheat imports A total of 4780 million tonnes of grain was imported over this ten-year span with wheat accounting for over ninety percent of imported grain

Outward shipments of southern grain began to decline in the 1980s At this time rapid economic growth in the southeastern coastal regions spurred by Reform and Opening caused a massive influx of population from the interior which exacerbated grain shortages in Fujian and other provinces of in South-ern China With the added growth of Township Village Enterprises (tves) and of the livestock feed manufacturing industry the South was not only incapable of sustaining net shipments of grain to the North but also used a great deal of grain to manufacture feed At this point the South-to-North grain transfer could no longer continue At the same time agricultural productivity in the North grew greatly A ldquoCorn Beltrdquo developed in the Northeast where prov-inces gained comparative advantages New methods of grain planting greatly increased the Northrsquos grain self-sufficiency Nevertheless the North remained dependent on imports to mitigate grain shortages while northern grain began to be shipped to the South manufacture feed Through the decade of the 1980s the South imported a total of 33128 million tonnes of grain (mostly northern corn and imported wheat as southern rice production was sufficient to meet inter-provincial demand within the region) A total of 64099 million tonnes of grain were shipped into the North over the decade with imports of wheat over the ten-year span hitting 11446 million tonnes an annual average of 11446 million tonnes3 The North and South were collectively short by 97227 mil-lion tonnes of grain one third of total annual grain output in the late 1970s Imports were used to remedy this shortcoming but total grain imports in the 1980s totaled only 9020 million tonnes For this reason the trend of South-to-North grain transfer was fully reversed in the 1980s replaced by imports by both the North and the South as well as the emergence of the North-to-South grain transfer

3 Long Guoqiang 隆国强 Daguo kaifang zhong de liangshi liutong 《大国开放中的粮食流

通》 [Grain Circulation of a Major Nation during Opening] (Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe 1999) 110


ltUNgt

In the mid-1990s the historical shifttoward the North-to-South grain trans-fer of Chinarsquos inter-regional grain circulation was complete In this decade northern grain supply greatly exceeded the regionrsquos demand at which point the North began providing abundant grain for the development of the south-ern feed industry

ii Analysis of the Factors behind the Historical Shift from the South-to-North Grain Transfer to the North-to-South Grain Flow

(A) Factors behind the South-to-North Grain TransferThe South-to-North grain transfer was a product of Chinarsquos historical devel-opment and economic growth The following are the factors that led to its emergence

One the particularities of grain production Prior to the 1980s grain produc-tion relied on traditional techniques which inevitably made grain yields sub-ject to the whims of nature In simple terms that means differences in climatic and geographic conditions Southern China has abundant water resources is hot gets plenty of sunshine and is endowed with fertile soil Irrigation in the South is highly developed after thousands of years of sustained agriculture Rice grows quickly and gives abundant yields there The South is Chinarsquos pri-mary grain-producing region The North by contrast is largely arid with low levels of soil fertility and poor water resources Yields per unit area for the pri-mary northern cash crops of wheat and corn are low as is overall output Thus the North suffered severe grain shortages prior to the 1980s

Two the first great successes in the cultivation of hybrid grain varieties in China were made in rice Improved varieties of the primary northern crops of wheat and corn came only later Conditions for grain production in the North and South constituted a major difference between the regions prior to the 1980s

Three the North and the South operated different modelsof grain produc-tion Soil in the North is mostly barren and unsuitable for intensive agriculture and so most farming there is done extensively given the lack of reliable irriga-tion conditions Most soil in the South however is fertile and water resources there are abundant thus making the region suitable for multiple cropping and intensive agriculture Yields there are higher as well With the large population of the region most people opt for intensive farming methods

Four prior to Reform and Opening Chinarsquos foreign trade including trade of grains was subject to sanctions and blockades from capitalist countries So in Chinarsquos ldquoself-reliantrdquo closed economic system the best method for resolving northern grain shortages was to ship southern grain surpluses northward

QU AND SU294

ltUNgt

In summary the primary reason behind the south-north grain transfer was a comparative advantage on the part of the South owing to differences in geo-graphic and climatic conditions Differences in grain output between the two regions and the closed nature of the economy made the South-to-North grain transfer most prominent in the 1960s and 1970s thereby making the South-to-North grain transfer the basic characteristic of inter-regional grain flows dur-ing that time

(B) Analysis of the Factors behind the Historic Shift toward the North-to-South Grain Transfer

First since Reform and Opening the central government has established a state of openness in economic special zones and in regions along the coast and along major rivers it has also accorded preferential policies to these places The exemplary and guiding effects of the ldquowindow on the Southrdquo have caused the pace of Reform and Opening to proceed much faster in the South than in the North Economic growth in the South is consequently much faster The duties of economic restructuring in the South were much more urgent and completed with much more vigor and over a much wider area Furthermore global economic growth cycles have also been smoothly adjusted since the 1980s The result of all these adjustments was rapid growth in secondary and tertiary industries in the South particularly in tves which propped up not only the southern economy but the entire national economy At this point ag-riculture and grain production took a backseat The land water and enormous amount of labor required for grain production have increased the opportunity costs of grain production in the South Even though the South remains the countryrsquos major grain-producing region non-agricultural industries there have become more attractive to laborers4 Rural citizens there however are more willing to work in secondary and tertiary industries ie as technicians or in producing more labor-intensive products with higher added value than grain This dichotomy pitted grain production in the South in a conflict of interest with the development of secondary and tertiary industries These industries which have greater comparative advantages (higher returns for resources used) competed for resources with grain production This competition has forced the South to exchange land resources for guaranteed grain supply

4 Wu Shanlin 伍山林 ldquoZhongguo liangshi shengchan quyu tezheng yu chengyin fenxi ndash shichanghua gaige yilai de shizheng fenxi 中国粮食生产区域特征与成因分析mdashmdash市

场化改革以来的实证分析 [Analysis of Regional Characteristics and Contributing Fac-tors for Chinese Grains Production ndash Empirical Analysis of the Period since Marketization Reforms]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》 10 (2000)


ltUNgt

Second Reform and Opening has proceeded more slowly in the North where the level of the economy and economic growth are both lower than in the South The North is also Chinarsquos central region for production of commod-ity grains this fact has imposed constraints in the form of economic factors as well as government policies on industry restructuring With economic growth in the North slow the state implemented policies to support grain production there notably by raising grain prices thus lowering the opportunity costs of grain production in the North Sluggish growth in secondary and tertiary in-dustries in the North has meant a scarcity of non-agricultural employment opportunities for denizens of the region The great amount of northern la-bor mired in agriculture serve as a guarantee for sustained grain production This increase in northern production has been ideal for the South which is exchanging money for northern grain as well as freeing up resources for other enterprises

Third advances in grain production technologies and introduction of improved grain varieties in the North have greatly increased rice and wheat yields (the products of which are refined white rice and wheat flour collective-ly referred to in China as xiliang or ldquorefined grainsrdquo) and of corn Production of refined grains has grown rapidly in China From 1979 to 1989 annual growth in refined grains was 38 percent in the Northeast 48 percent in North China and 45 percent in the Northwest Growth in southern refined grain production over that same period held below three percent particularly in the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan Guizhou and Zhejiang where annual growth held below two percent5 Total size of the area planted with grains in these regions also fell dramatically In this way the North gradually became grain self- sufficient and then began to see surpluses The major grain- producing regions of the South in the mid- and lower reaches of the Yangtze River were barely able to meet southern demand much less to produce surpluses for export There was also an enormous shortage of grain in the livestock feed manufac-turing industry (see Table 122)

Fourth differences in grain production structures and consumption pat-terns between the North and the South have led to the mismatch between pro-duction of corn in the North and demand for grain from the southern feed and animal products industries Rice is the primary grain produced in the South where the two food items consumed the most are rice and poultry Growth in demand for poultry was the result of rapid economic growth in the South

5 Yan Ruizhen et al 严瑞珍等 Jingji quanqiuhua yu zhongguo liangshi wenti 《经济全球化

与中国粮食问题》 [Economic Globalization and Chinarsquos Grain Problem] (Beijing Zhong-guo renmin daxue chubanshe 2001) 304

QU AND SU296

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which also drove growth in the southern husbandry and feed manufacturing industries Using rice to manufacture feed is not just uneconomical but in fact wasteful So the South was in need of large quantities of northern grain to reduce the costs of manufacturing feed Statistics indicate that since the beginning of the 1990s the North has accounted for eighty percent of national corn output and the South has accounted for the remaining twenty percent The North however consumes only fifty percent of Chinarsquos corn and the South accounts for sixty-seven percent of nationwide meat production This supply-demand gap grew as a result of regional imbalances in economic growth and differences in southern and northern grain production structures and consumption patterns There was surplus grain in the North but insuffi-cient supply of grain in the South for feed manufacturing the ldquoNorth-to-South grain transferrdquo has helped to mitigate grain shortages in the South The true nature of the transfer then was ldquosouthbound flows of northern feed grainrdquo

Table 122 Changes to production consumption and sales of grain in the north and south

1978ndash1980 1981ndash1985 1986ndash1990 1991ndash1994 1997

South Amount produced

18946 mn 22213 mn 23596 mn 24065 mn 268292 mn

Amount consumed

18440 mn 20661 mn 23061 mn 25290 mn 282791 mn

Sales ()

1027 1075 1022 952 949

North Amount produced

12969 mn 14851 mn 17314 mn 20410 mn 13295 mn

Amount consumed

13370 mn 14546 mn 16192 mn 18109 mn 11725 mn

Sales ()

970 1021 1069 1127 1134

Sales in Northeast ()

1144 1145 1282 1441

Data source Xiao Yun 肖云 Zhongguo liangshi shengchan yu liutong tizhi gaige 《中国粮食生产与流通体制改革》[Reforms to Chinarsquos System for Production and Circulation of Grain] ( Jingji kexue chubanshe 1998) 44Note Figures marked with an denote nationwide figures for corn production consumption and sales in 1998 the authors calculated figures for 1997 and all Northeastern figures

Unit tonnes


ltUNgt

Fifth the North gradually gained a certain degree of regional comparative advantage in grain production through its course of economic development Table 123 indicates that nine provinces and autonomous regions maintained comparative advantages in grain production in the mid- to late 1980s four of which in the South By 1990 only seven southern provinces and autonomous regions still maintained comparative advantages in grain production down to six in 1993 at which time the Northrsquos count had risen to nine If we calcu-late based purely on cereal grain production then in 1993 eleven provinces autonomous regions or central government directly-controlled cities of the North had comparative advantages as compared to only four in the South This distribution of comparative advantages coupled with regional industrial comparative advantages in the South propelled the historic change toward the northndashsouth grain transfer In recent years while strengthening grain pro-tection and increasing grain prices the state has increased levels of capital and technological investments in agriculture augmented infrastructure for grain production improved conditions for agricultural production increased the number of mid- to low-yielding fields greatly increased both aggregate and per-unit-of-area grain output and reduced the opportunity costs of grain production In addition comparative advantages for grain production in the North have become more evident as more area of land per capita is planted with grain in the North than in the South as the northern plains are highly convenient for mechanized agriculture and as land and labor costs in the North are low

In this essay Jireduces fractions of market distortion factors to compute grain production comparative advantage coefficients for each province autonomous region and direct-controlled city His formula is as follows

Note Figures enclosed in parentheses are comparative advantage coefficients for cereal grains

Sixth prominent development in secondary and tertiary industries in the overall economic development of the South has not only attracted surplus agricultural labor within the region but has also attracted a large number of workers from around the country which led to a dramatic increase in the float-ing population in the South which further exacerbated pressure on supply of grain and poultry products in the South This exacerbation was another factor behind the emergence of the North-to-South grain transfer

The historic change toward the North-to-South grain transfer is the product of Chinarsquos economic development since the advent of Reform and Opening

λ=thinsp  Total value of national grain output total national grain output    _____________________________________________________    Total value of local grain output local grain output 

λ= Total value of national grain output  total national grain output Totalvalueoflocalgrainoutputlocalgrainoutput

QU AND SU298

ltUNgt

Data source Ji Mingfeng 冀名峰 ldquoWoguo liangshi shengchan de quyu bijiao youshi fenxi 我国粮食生产的区域比较优势分析 [Analysis of Regional Comparative Advan-tages of Grain Production in China]rdquo Nongye jingji wenti《农业经济问题》5 (1996)

Table 123 Grain production comparative advantage coefficients for each province autonomous region and central government directly-controlled city

Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Beijing 098 066 068 084 085 086 094 (094)Tianjin 072 060 051 068 070 072 080 (088)Hebei 107 107 103 104 105 094 095 (099)Shanxi 107 106 098 099 095 097 107 (113)Inner Mongolia

085 085 083 092 090 095 093 (114)

Liaoning 086 086 076 095 094 098 099 (105)Jilin 104 108 117 115 113 110 110 (118)Heilongjiang 091 097 103 096 095 092 093 (114)Shanghai 101 103 086 089 090 091 073 (067)Jiangsu 091 088 095 095 095 095 088 (088)Zhejiang 105 106 102 102 100 103 096 (093)Anhui 089 086 087 094 102 104 095 (097)Fujian 113 104 105 099 096 096 088 (983)Jiangxi 123 134 132 112 114 123 120 (115)Shandong 092 085 089 091 096 100 113 (108)Henan 085 088 084 102 098 092 108 (104)Hubei 102 100 101 100 099 116 109 (107)Hunan 132 146 140 110 108 111 106 (100)Guangdong 094 090 086 095 094 092 084 (079)Guangxi 137 148 141 112 112 112 106 (100)Hainan 052 056 083 085 087 074 (080)Sichuan 116 120 127 112 110 106 103 (096)Guizhou 098 089 095 101 097 095 111 (108)Yunnan 125 137 129 098 099 098 095 (090)Tibet 061 066 067 052 048 056 065 (070)Shaanxi 091 098 091 092 094 091 095 (099)Gansu 083 095 101 094 093 091 106 (116)Qinghai 081 083 080 079 081 087 100 (108)Ningxia 089 092 092 095 091 089 100 (104)Xinjiang 108 092 097 101 103 098 103 (105)


ltUNgt

It is also the product of economic restructuring in the South It is likewise the product of differences in the speed of economic growth in the North and the South combined with other factors (such as the factors we analyzed above) The primary factor behind the North-to-South grain transfer however is eco-nomic restructuring in the South Southern economic restructuring was an integral part of economic development there and was also the manifestation of the differential comparative advantage between the North and the South In other words it was the combination of the Southrsquos comparative advantages in secondary and tertiary industries over primary industries with regional com-parative advantages It was also the result of optimized resource allocation both by region and by industry

iii Analysis of the Second Change toward Northern Exports and Southern Imports and Factors behind the Change

In the mid to late 1990s Chinarsquos grain trend was ldquoexports from the North and imports to the Southrdquo In other words the North exported a large amount of grainwhile the South was the imported an appropriate amount This was the second major change (see Table 124) a result of Chinarsquos further integration with the global economy It was also a result of the ample use of international and domestic resources and markets as guided by the market Finally it was a result of an increase in the use of space outside the country for grain produc-tion as well as the extension of industry comparative advantages abroad We shall analyze this change by examining Chinese policies for grain circulation the economy in general as well as economic globalization

(A) Marketization Reform Policies for Grain Circulation Drove the Second Major Change toward Northern Exports and Southern Imports in a Circuitous Manner

Macro-control of inter-regional grain circulation was held firmly in the hands of the central government during the era of the planned economy In 1986 Central Document Number One 中央一号文件 mandated that prices for grain to be distributed by the system be negotiated by the government in each province autonomous region and central government directly-controlled city excluding grain produced under the household contract responsibility system bringing inter-regional grain circulation into what has been called the ldquotwo-track systemrdquo In 1993 after the state monopoly on grain and inter-provincial planned allocations of grain had been abolished the market came to con-trol all inter-provincial flows of grain Thereafter grain output fell and grain

QU AND SU300

ltUNgt

Data source Zhongguo tongji nianjian《中国统计年鉴》[China Statistical Yearbook] (1985ndash2000)Note Figures in parentheses are of imports

prices rose which caused rural citizens to be unwilling to sell their grain and exerted strain on supply and demand In 1995 the ldquorice sackrdquo system which placed responsibility on provincial governors once again mandated that pro-vincial governments of major grain-producing provinces meet government-set requirements for inter-provincial grain allocations The central government further augmented support for grain production at this time In 1994 the state raised official grain purchasing prices by forty percent and in 1996 raised prices another forty-two percent from the 1994 level6 In 1997 the state took further steps to protect grain prices and bring about grain surpluses These policy measures effectively protected the interests of grain-planting rural citizens particularly those living in major grain-producing regions and in-creased incentives to grow grain At the same time the state placed nation-al focus on improvement of mid- to low-yielding farmfields construction of irrigation works and investments toward economic restructuring in the North beginning in the early 1990s In 1994 the state began five consecutive years of annual allocations of five billion yuan in loans to support the development of rural agriculture in major commodity-grain-producing counties These fiscal

6 Song Hongyuan et al 宋洪远等 Gaige yilai zhongguo nongye he nongcun jingji zhengce de yanbian 《改革以来中国农业和农村经济政策的演变》 [The Evolution of Chinarsquos Ag-ricultural and Rural Economic Policies since Reform and Opening] (Zhongguo jingji chuban-she 2000) 92

1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Total grain imports and exports

932 mn (600 mn)

656 mn (1658 mn)

583 mn (1372 mn)

1086 mn (1345 mn)

1364 mn (1175 mn)

1535 mn (752 mn)

1346 mn (1920 mn)

214 mn (2081 mn)

198 mn (1223 mn)

834 mn (417 mn)

889 mn (388 mn)

738 mn (339 mn)

Net imports and exports

332 mn minus1002 mn minus789 mn minus259 mn 189 mn 773 mn 426 mn minus1867 mn minus1025 mn 417 mn 501 mn 399 mn

Rice 101 mn 320000 330000 690000 950000 143 mn 152 mn 50000 270000 940000 (330000)

375 mn (240000)

271 mn (170000)

Soybeans (corn in 1997)

114 mn 125 mn 940000 111 mn 660000 (120000)

370000 (100000)

830000 (50000)

380000 (290000)

190000 (110 mn)

662 mn 469 mn (250000)

431 mn (70000)

Wheat (541 mn) (1488 mn) (1253 mn) (1237 mn) (1058 mn) (642 mn) (718 mn) (1159 mn) (825 mn) (186 mn) (149 mn) (450000)

Table 124 Changes to Chinese imports and exports of grainUnit million tonnes


ltUNgt

measures provided further guarantees for stable and high grain output In the mid- to late 1990s Chinarsquos overall grain output reversed its downward trend thus providing the material conditions for the second major change in inter-regional grain circulation Seen from this vantage the trend toward northern exports and southern imports of grain was the result of changes to Chinarsquos grain circulation system

(B) Various Factors at the Economic Level were the Primary Causes of the Second Major Change

Since the implementation of Reform and Opening smooth adjustments made to industry structures in developed southern areas led to reductions to the comparative profitability of grain production and most rural citizens became unwilling to grow grain Economic growth also increased living standards brought about rapid growth in the husbandry industry and increased demand for grain in the feed manufacturing industry and other industries further exac-erbating southern grain shortages In 1995 the ldquorice sackrdquo system led to gradual increases in area of land planted with grain in every region of the South miti-gating southern grain shortages to a certain extent However driven by market mechanisms resource allocations on the whole became skewed toward sec-tors and regions with high efficiency and high returns making it impossible for major grain producing regions and major grain consuming regions to meet in the middle on domestic markets The short period of North-to-South grain transfersmdashan integral part of the statersquosgrain allocations prior to the 1990smdashfurther intensified the conflicts between major grain producing regions

1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999


932 mn (600 mn)

656 mn (1658 mn)

583 mn (1372 mn)

1086 mn (1345 mn)

1364 mn (1175 mn)

1535 mn (752 mn)

1346 mn (1920 mn)

214 mn (2081 mn)

198 mn (1223 mn)

834 mn (417 mn)

889 mn (388 mn)

738 mn (339 mn)



Rice 101 mn 320000 330000 690000 950000 143 mn 152 mn 50000 270000 940000 (330000)

375 mn (240000)

271 mn (170000)


114 mn 125 mn 940000 111 mn 660000 (120000)

370000 (100000)

830000 (50000)

380000 (290000)

190000 (110 mn)

662 mn 469 mn (250000)

431 mn (70000)


QU AND SU302

ltUNgt

and grain consuming regions This intensification of conflicts stymied the North-to-South grain transfer and ultimately led to Northrsquos dominance in inter-national exporting and Southrsquos dominance in international importing Below we shall analyze the economic factors behind this change

First northern dominance in exporting and southern dominance in im-portinggrew out of the North-to-South grain transfer This dominance was the result of the continued role played by regional and industry comparative ad-vantages during the period of the North-to-South grain transfer (see Table 125) Most grain crops had become initially centralized in regions with comparative advantages such as the Corn Belt in the Northeast and the Rice Belt in the mid to lower reaches of the Yangtze River The formation of these belts optimized grain distribution and reduced costs of grain production and purchasing

Second beginning in the early 1990s economic globalization was further accelerated by great reductions in transaction costs spurred by rapid devel-opment in information and transportation technology Many developing countries including China were swept up by the wave of globalization in which markets served to optimize resource allocations China was then able to make ample use of resources on both domestic and international markets helping to extend the aforementioned regional and industry comparative ad-vantages abroad which gave rise to international and domestic market link-age mechanisms in the optimization of resource allocations Driven by these

Table 125 Grain location quotient values for the eight major agricultural regions of China in the early 1990s

Region North China

Northeast Huang-Huai-Hai

Mid and lower reaches of the Yangtze

Southeastern coastal regions

South China

Southwest Northwest

Location quotient

107 110 110 110 079 085 096 170

Data source Yuan Yongkang 袁永康 Zhongguo liangqing liutong zhidu de bianqian 《中国粮情流通制度的变迁》[Changes to Chinarsquos Grain Situation and Grain Circulation System] (Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe 1994) 153 Note Location quotient = (XAXB) divide (YAYB) This value indicates the degree of specialization (concentration) of an industry in this areaXA and YA are the quantative characteristics X and Y of region AXB and YB are the quantitative characteristics X and Y of the national average for all regions


ltUNgt

mechanisms overseas demands for the superior resources of grain producing regions in Northern China encouraged exports of grain from the region At the same time the South began to take advantageof the comparative advantag-es in grain production abroad by importing a certain amount of grains from abroad Thus in the early to mid-1990s spatial exchanges of grain production resources between the North and South which had eroded profits for Chinarsquos major grain-producing region were corrected by international market mecha-nisms Under these mechanisms both northern grain producers and southern grain consumers were able to reach the levelof surplus each was either capable of or in need of The trend of northern exports and southern imports brought about economic efficiency and optimization of resource allocations

Third this situation was the result of the ldquorice sackrdquo system of responsibil-ity of provincial governors for grain production implemented in the mid to late 1990s The true nature of 1995rsquos ldquorice sackrdquo system was to establish inter- regional balance in grain supply and demand on the foundation of balance within each individual province and region as well as to have major grain pro-ducing regions proactively complete state-mandated tasks of inter-provincial grain allocations The objective of this policy was to properly allocate means of production via administrative measures But with marketization reforms for grain consumption already in place the transportation costs of moving northern grain two to three thousand kilometers made that grain pricier than imported grain for the South making grain producers in major grain producing regions of the North unwilling to ship their products to the South and south-ern grain consumers unwilling to accept the higher price of northern grain The ldquorice sackrdquo systemrsquos design ensured dissatisfaction in both the North and the South Strides in marketization reform and the countryrsquos greater opening to the outside encouraged both the North and the South to turn to interna-tional markets eventually leading to the Northrsquos dominance in exporting and the Southrsquos dominance in importing

The fourth cause is the high costs of transportation between the distant North and South An ancient saying holds that ldquoyou donrsquot ship grain across a thousand lirdquo Vast distances separate North China from South China and the primary grain-producing and the primary grain-consuming regions are located at opposite extremes Grain takes up a lot of space but itrsquos of low value and con-sumed quickly It must travel two to three thousand kilometers from primary production regions to reach primary consumption regions These properties of grain lead to enormous investments of labor and material resources and is very expensive During the era of planned allocations the state bore the costs of transportation As the grain circulation system became marketized the costs of transportation were shifted onto consumers in primary consumption

QU AND SU304

ltUNgt

regions the result of which was rising grain prices These costs which had been hidden now came to light Thus low-cost grain imports from nearby countries became more appealing to southern consumersthan expensive do-mestic grain from the distant North Grain imports began to rise in the South At the same time the North began accumulating grain surpluses As reforms to the trade system had already been put in place northerners made use of their geographical advantage and exported excess grain to nearby countries thereby using their comparative advantage on the international market to protect the interests of grain producers

Fifth differences in grain production structures and consumption patterns led southerners to hold grain in storage while importing grain at the same time as a result of stimulation by open purchasing policies coupled with state-mandated ldquograin protectionrdquo prices As the economy and living standards grew standards for the quality of grain consumption began to appear especially in consumption of grain consumed by humans The Northrsquos primary grain sur-plus was of corn while the Southrsquos greatest grain import was of rice Southern climates are more favorable to the cultivation of rice which can be planted twice and sometimes three times a year in the South For this reason there are many different seasonal varieties of rice early rice middle rice and late rice as well as long-grained and short-grained rice These seasonal differences in turn gave rise to different quality standards for different rice varieties It is generally held that early long-grain rice is of poor quality but high yields whereas mid-dle and late long-grain rice as well as short-grain rice taste good but givelower yields In 1997 the state implemented a policy of open purchases at a state-mandated protection price This policy did not differentiate between varieties or qualities and as such the price difference between early long-grain and late long-grain middle long-grain and short-grain rice was generally around three yuan per fifty kilograms That led to income losses of between eighty and 100 yuan per mu for planting middle and late rice varieties The result was that nearly all grain purchased in the South was early long-grain rice The provinces and autonomous regions of the South had previously remedied grain surpluses and shortages by selling to or buying from nearby regions but the state grain purchasing policy made it so that nearly all surplus grain available for pur-chase was inferior quality early long-grain rice Provinces with grain shortages such as Guangdong and Fujian were unwilling to buy inferior quality grains per previously settled agreements for ldquograin adjustmentsrdquo instead preferring to import superior quality rice from abroad to meet consumer demands This preference was a further reason behind the rise of southern grain imports Viewed from this perspective the southern turn toward grain imports was a kind of revolutionary change At the same time major grain producing prov-inces and autonomous regions of the South such as Hubei Anhui Hunan and


ltUNgt

Jiangxi built up overstocks of early long-grain rice which ended up rotting in warehouses This waste exerted a heavy fiscal burden on the state

Sixth to avoid erosion of profits from value-added processing on grain many northern grain producing regions began to develop grain processing en-terprises Most of these enterprises operated at low technological levels and multiple similar companies were established in the same area They lacked not only technology but also access to economically developed markets and so they were largely ineffective This ineffectiveness indicates the closed mental-ity of protectionism in northern grain producing regions which hurt effective allocation of grain resources At another level this planrsquos lack of effectiveness gave no choice to northern grain producers but to set their sights abroad to find more suitable markets to sell their grain giving rise to two consequenc-es solidifying the flow of northern grain abroad and reducing the quantity of northern grain sent to the South

(C) Economic Globalization and Expansion of Chinarsquos ldquoOpeningrdquo were the External Factors behind the Rise of Northern Dominance in Exporting and Southern Dominance in Importing

Comparative advantages in international trade lie in the comparative advan-tages in natural resource endowments of different countries It is just such com-parative advantages that gave rise to international trade in the first place and that drive economic globalization which in turn drives the development of the economies of different countries International trade then helps the countries of the world turn their comparative advantages into profits In the early 1990s China increased its degree of openness to the outside and actively participated in international trade and exchanges of technology At this time China also reformed the foreign trade system and greatly reduced the scope and degree of state controls on foreign trade allowing China to strengthen its competitive edge in international trade while also providing the opportunity for foreign industries with comparative advantages to compete in Chinese markets It was these advantageous internal and external conditions that opened up channels for northern exports of surplus grain and southern imports of grain to mitigate shortages The Northrsquos dominance in exporting and the Southrsquos in importing grain thereby fully took shape

iv Economic Impact of the Northern Exports and Southern Imports of Grain

The Southrsquos importing of grain was one result of successful adjustments to tertiary industries in Chinarsquos southern coastal regions which abound with

QU AND SU306

ltUNgt

plentiful ports and access to maritime trade indicating not only the compara-tive advantage in industry the South had attained through its rapid economic development but also the Southrsquos successful use of foreign resources now available as a result of opening The Southrsquos use of domestic and foreign mar-kets and resources granted that region a comparative advantage which played a role in boosting the Southrsquos economic development Putdifferently this move was an overseas extension of the Southrsquos domestic industrial comparative ad-vantage This extension was advantageous not only to upgrading of the Southrsquos industry structure but also to helping the South use its industrial compara-tive advantages to compete in international markets In the end it helped the South further increase its international competitiveness

The Southrsquos importing of grain was just the result of internal adjustments to the grain industry structure and agriculture in the South The Southrsquos pri-mary grain shortages are of grain for feed manufacturing and grain for human consumption in southeastern coastal regions One reason for these particu-lar shortages is that using the Southrsquos major grain crop rice to manufacture feed would be wasteful and costly The second reason is that the quality of feed manufactured from rice is inferior to that made from corn Southern corn production however is concentrated in the Yunnan-Guizhou plateau and in Sichuan and even in those regions production is limited Corn grown in oth-er regions of the South is planted in between other crops which leads to low quality and low yields For all these reasons southern corn production falls far short of southern demands Furthermore when we say ldquosouthern grain short-agesrdquo we mean shortages experienced by some but not all parts of the South Southeastern coastal regions primarily Guangdong Fujian and Shanghai ac-count for the majority of grain shortages but Guizhou also suffers from some degree of deficit

Since the early 1990s primary southern rice producing regions along the mid- and lower reaches of the Yangtze River have maintained self- sufficiency and even seen surpluses in grain output (for direct human consumption) Surpluses from these regions are generally sufficient to meet demand for grain for human consumption in nearby southern provinces and autonomous re-gions Primary grain producing regions generally sign grain allocation and sales agreements with nearby provinces and regions with shortages However the primary grain variety sold under such agreements is early long-grain rice which does not meet the quality demands of consumers in economically de-veloped southern provinces and regions These inter-provincial agreements are often unenforceable and provinces and regions with shortages often end up importing superior quality rice from abroad The South had previously im-ported only wheat but now the region imports both wheat and rice which has


ltUNgt

led to a vicious cycle in which southern early long-grain rice piles up in ware-houses while wealthier regions continue to import foreign rice This abnormal phenomenon has had a large adverse impact on the coordinated economic development of regions of the South both those with and those without grain surpluses One major repercussion is the loss of precious foreign reserves through grain purchases and another is the enormous waste of southern surplus grain reserves exerting pressure for capital on both economically de-veloped primary consumption regions as well as relatively backward primary production regions To correct this abnormality we must eliminate overstock of early long-grain rice as quickly as possible and find sales channels for it We must also optimize the product structure of grain production as quickly as possible We must make appropriate adjustments to the amount of area planted with early long-grain rice and increase the area planted with superior quality rice such as drought-resistant Brazilian upland rice At one level the rise of southern grain imports is the result of internal adjustments to agri-culture and the grain industry structure At another level this phenomenon has exerted enormous pressure on internal adjustments to agriculture and the grain industry structure in the South It has however given us an enor-mous opportunity for development To resolve these issues the government will need to make use of micro and macroeconomic policies and measures to guide support and protect

The Southrsquos dominance in importing is beneficial to a transitioning of the southern agricultural population toward secondary and tertiary industries which in turn can help mitigate land resource scarcity in the South and lay a material foundation for agriculture and grain production and sales at an appropriate scale This is a rare opportunity for both reducing opportunity costs of agriculture in general and for grain production in particular as well as for promoting agricultural mechanization If we take advantage of this opportunity agriculture and grain production in China will become increas-ingly less dependent on the labor-intensive and family-based petty peasant economy and will become more socially-oriented of larger scale and more mechanized

What then are the economic effects of ldquonorthern exportsrdquo of grain Firstthis situationgrew out of the North-to-South grain transfer They are the result of northerners in regions with grain surpluses developing international markets in the mid to late 1990s Chinarsquos traditional grain exports are southern rice and northern soybeans Since the mid to late 1990s however Chinarsquos major grain exports have been primarily of southern rice and northern corn with north-ern corn accounting for the overwhelming majority The North also accounts for 30 percent of international rice exports In 1999 the North accounted for

QU AND SU308

ltUNgt

7225 percent of nationwide grain exports7 Northern grain exports have made enormous contributions to Chinarsquos foreign reserves as well as to guaranteeing increases to the incomes of northern rural citizens

ldquoNorthern exportsrdquo are likewise the results of the overseas extension of the Northrsquos geographical advantages and industry advantages in grain production at home Following Chinarsquos accession to the World Trade Organization (wto) in 2001 the degree of unilateral trade protection on agriculture and grain pro-duction will gradually diminish and eventually we will be completely in line with international trends The reduction of protectionism will pose a severe challenge to agriculture and grain production in China It has been estimated that China still possesses a degree of international comparative advantage in rice production since accession to the wto but Chinarsquos comparative ad-vantages in other grains have diminished (see Table 126 and 127) Thus as the economy becomes further globalized whether or not the international comparative advantages and location advantages of Chinese grain output particularly in the North can rapidly be converted into international compara-tive advantages and geographical advantages will exert an important influence on Chinarsquos grain economy and on the development of the overall national economy

7 Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian (2000 nian) 《中国农村统计年鉴(2000年)》 [China Rural Statistical Yearbook (2000)] (Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 2000) 229ndash230

Table 126 Comparisons in international prices under grain production costs in China and abroad (prices from mid-November 2001)

Domestic price (yuantonne)

International price (yuantonne)

Price after importation to China (yuantonne)

Wheat 1150 843 1500Rice 1450 1323 1800Corn 1050 678 1100Soybeans 1800 1356 2050

Data source Bian Chongjing 卞崇静 ldquoGuoneiwai nongchanpin jiage bijiao ji jing-zhengli fenxi 国内外农产品价格比较及竞争力分析 [Comparisons of Domestic and International Prices for Agricultural Products and Analysis of Competitiveness]rdquo Liangyou shichang bao《粮油市场报》 March 14 2002 Note Domestic price figures are wholesale prices in primary sales regions International prices have been converted to renminbi from usd Rice prices are based on Thai rice All other prices are based on products of the usa Prices for importation to China are based on taxation within quota (one percent)


ltUNgt

In summary Chinarsquos North-to-South grain transfer has rapidly evolved into the coexistence of northern dominance in exporting and southern dominance in importing as a result of both domestic and international factors Both north-ern exports and southern imports of grain are the results of adjustments to economic development and to interests in the North and South in recent years They are also a positive result of the role played by economic factors In other words they are the positive result of the growth of industry comparative ad-vantages and geographical advantages amid the course of unbalanced devel-opment of regional economies These will play a positive role in promoting economic growth and in upgrading Chinarsquos industry structure and are also a positive result of Chinarsquos integration with the global economy These trends will however pose a serious challenge to adjustments to the structure of Chinese agriculture and grain production

v The Third Historical Change of Exports by Both the North and the South and Restoration of the North-to-South Grain Transfer

It seems at present that the northeastern Corn Belt will remain sustainable for a period of time Here are some of the important reasons

First corn produced in the Corn Belt of Chinarsquos Northeast is not genetically modified (gmo) whereas most corn grown in the us is gmo American gmo

Table 127 Comparative advantages in Chinese wheat corn and rice (calculated based on purchasing price indices) 1990ndash1996

Year Wheatcorn Wheatrice Cornrice

1990 1 1 11991 1068 0982 09201992 1087 1110 10211993 0960 0939 09781994 0966 0928 09601995 0913 1022 11201996 1045 1072 1026

Data source Zhong Funing et al 钟甫宁等 ldquoZhongguo dui oumeng zhuyao nongchanpin bijiao youshi biandong fenxi 中国对欧盟主要农产品比较优势变动分析 rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji《中国农村经济》2 (2002)

QU AND SU310

ltUNgt

corn has a price advantage as its production costs are low but international doubts regarding the safety of gmo foods have led the worldrsquos two greatest im-porters of cornmdashJapan and South Koreamdashto turn away from American corn opening large market space for Chinese corn

Second there are inherent geo-economic ties between Japan South Korea Russia and North Koreaand Chinarsquos northeastern Corn Belt In South Korea and Japan in particular it is customary and traditional to import corn from China It costs them about as much to import American corn as it does for China to import American corn As shown in Table 126 the domestic price advantage of American corn is offset by the costs of long-distance overseas transportation In other words Chinarsquos northeastern Corn Belt still has a regional export price advantage

Third unlikecorn from the us which must be transported on large trans-continental ships north eastern corn has a regional advantage in that exports to nearby nations can be made on small ships This ability increases flexibility and speed and reduces warehousing costs

Fourth corn producers in the northeastern Corn Belt can make use of the ldquoyellow box policyrdquo allowed under wto regulations Under this policy original subsidies of export corn are continued (the state paid 260 yuan in subsidies per tonne of corn prior to wto accession) to the circulation and production industries More matching policies are currently being drafted This policy has a large impact on the sustaining of exports of northeastern corn

While exports of northern corn have garnered the most attention re-cent northern exports of rice as well as shipments of northern rice to the South are also noteworthy Rice grown in the Northeast is of superior qual-ity and its flavor makes it more suitable to demand for rice consumption in the South than early long-grain rice That gives northern rice an outstanding advantage in both domestic and international markets In recent years grain companies in cities and provinces in the Yangtze Plain with grain shortages such as Shanghai Zhejiang Jiangsu and others have signed agreements re-garding the construction of rice producing bases with northeastern produc-ers ldquoGo plant grain in the Northeastrdquo has become a popular saying The Lehui Rice Company Ltd of Shanghai has not only invested in the construction of a large rice processing facility in Northern Jiangsu but has also signed an agree-ment with the Heilongjiang Farm and Land Reclamation Bureau to produce ldquoLehuirdquo brand beidahuangmdashgreat northern wildernessmdashrice with an annual production capacity of 138 million tonnes8 The Heilongjiang Rice Compa-ny has signed an agreement with the Hangzhou Grain Bureau regarding the

8 Liangyou shichang bao《粮油市场报》 May 14 2005


ltUNgt

construction of a storage processing and sales base for Heilongjiang rice in Hangzhou This facilityrsquos production line slated to produce a million tonnes of rice per day will provided 10000 tonnes per annum of late short-grain rice as city-level grain reserves to the Hangzhou government The Heilongjiang Farm and Land Reclamation Bureau has also invested 360 million yuan into the con-struction of a green oil center in Wenzhou Zhejiang These steps have greatly changed the situation in which the South relies on imports of rice to remedy grain shortages while also reducing southern imports of Thai rice and Ameri-can corn to southern China In order to remove the obstacle of high costs to the North-to-South grain transfer and reclaim the market for consumption of southern corn feed the State Planning Commission has resolved to exempt railroad construction fees for the transportation of grain and other agricultural commodities from 2002 until December 31 2005 This policy will reduce the transportation costs of domestic corn sales by between twenty and 130 yuan per tonne and will reduce the price of corn from the northeastern Corn Belt in the South below the cif (cost insurance and freight) price of imported corn (in March 2002 the cif price of American corn in China was 1150 yuantonne)9 In this way it will be nearly impossible for any corn outside of quotas to enter grain markets in Chinarsquos South This situation has provided some of the conditions for restoration of the North-to-South grain transfer Imports of rice to southeastern coastal regions will persist as the short distance from Thailand to South China means lower prices for Thai rice than for northeastern rice In the short term provinces and autonomous regions with grain shortages such as Guangdong Fujian Guangxi and Hainan will not consume large quanti-ties of northeastern rice This situation basically divides the grain-scarce prov-inces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities of the south into two large zones those in the Yangtze River Delta where the North-to-South grain transfer has been restored and those in the Pearl River Delta where rice imports will continue The quantity of rice imports however is relatively stable at about 300000 tonnes per year

The North and the South are now both net exporters of rice Chinarsquos inter-national rice exports greatly exceeded imports in the mid to late 1990s North-ern rice exports account for 30 percent of nationwide total rice exports but southern long-grain rice also has a strong price advantage and general com-petitive edge in foreign markets The North-to-South grain transfer northern dominance in exporting and southern dominance in importing and simulta-neous exporting from both the North and South are all just facets of Chinarsquos inter-regional grain circulation and international linkages following the early

9 Liangyou shichang bao《粮油市场报》 April 13 2002

QU AND SU312

ltUNgt

1990s they are all linked The coexistence of northern dominance in exports and southern dominance in imports of grain has now been replaced by a re-turn to the domestic North-to-South grain transfer on one hand and simul-taneous exports from both the North and South on the other Officials in the northeastern Corn Belt are now energetically promoting regionalization stan-dardization specialization and scale production in corn planting to further reduce corn production costs and to establish northeastern corn as an export brand Officials in the Yangtze River Delta have reduced the size of the area planted with early long-grain rice and have optimized the structure of early rice planting Now over fifty percent of total area planted with rice is planted with superior quality rice which will help meet the demand for high quality rice in southern China

There is one more question that of Chinarsquos food security Under the socialist market economy conditions of the new century food security has been defined as food self-sufficiency In some cases the demand for national self- sufficiency translated into provincial and regional self-sufficiency That however is in violation of the efficiency principles of the market economy In other words such demands lead to suboptimal allocation of resources and are therefore unreasonable Table 124 indicates that there were perfectly opposite trends for grain imports in the early 1990s and the mid to late 1990s Imports increased progressively in the first period and then decreased progressively in the sec-ond Exports increased progressively in the first period with exports greater than imports in some years Exports remained stable in the second period but grain exports were greater than imports in every year From 1997 to 1999 annu-al grain exports were nearly double annual grain imports which goes to show that China has greatly augmented its capacity to resolve food security issues If ever China faces an international embargo or a crop failure a redirection of grains reserved for export toward domestic markets will suffice to meet do-mestic demand At the same time since the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China we have assured growth in grain output through fiscal investments In particular the large-scale construction of farm field infrastructure since the 1960s and 1970s has kept Chinarsquos effective irrigation rates near the global fore-front The direct effects of this can be seen in the extremely low levels of fluc-tuation in grain output High irrigation rates are a fundamental condition of Chinarsquos resolution to address food security issues Furthermore the major na-tion effect of Chinarsquos vast territory and immense population coupled with the continued existence of a certain degree of the planned system (plans and the double-track system from before 1995 and the ldquorice sackrdquo system after 1995) are reliable inherent mechanisms for ensuring Chinarsquos stable sustained growth in


ltUNgt

grain output10 Under the rules of international markets all manner of rural citizen economic organizations are participating in exchange activities both domestic and international which has initiated us in the notion of risk on in-ternational markets and allowed us to accumulate experience in international markets and has helped to tighten the linkage between Chinarsquos domestic grain circulation and international trends We should make better use of spatial ex-changes of both domestic and international resources increase the competi-tiveness of Chinarsquos grain production and agriculture in general to respond to integrated international markets and try to benefit as much from domestic and international industry comparative advantages and geographical advan-tages as possible This is the only way in which we can link food security to economic factors and not political factors And this is the only way in which we can effectively arrive at the three great grain policy objectives of security efficiency and fairness

References

Long Guoqiang 隆国强 Daguo kaifang zhong de liangshi liutong 《大国开放中的粮

食流通》 [Grain Circulation ina Major Nation during Opening] (Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe 1999)

Song Hongyuan et al 宋洪远等 Gaige yilai zhongguo nongye he nongcun jingji zhengce de yanbian 《改革以来中国农业和农村经济政策的演变》 [The Evo-lution of Chinarsquos Agricultural and Rural Economic Policies since Reform and Opening] (Zhongguo jingji chubanshe 2000)

Li Yueyun et al 李岳云等 Zhongguo liangshi bodong lun 《中国粮食波动论》 [The Theory of Fluctuations to Chinarsquos Grain] (Zhongguo nongye chubanshe 2001)

Yan Ruizhen et al 严瑞珍等 Jingji quanqiuhua yu zhongguo liangshi wenti 《经济

全球化与中国粮食问题》 [Economic Globalization and Chinarsquos Grain Problem] (Beijing Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 2001)

Wu Shanlin 伍山林 ldquoZhongguo liangshi shengchan quyu tezheng yu chengyin fenxi ndash shichanghua gaige yilai de shizheng fenxi 中国粮食生产区域特征与成因分

析mdashmdash市场化改革以来的实证分析 [Analysis of Regional Characteristics and Contributing Factors Thereto of Chinese Grain outputmdashEmpirical Analysis of the Period since Marketization Reforms]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》 10 (2000)

10 Li Yueyun et al 李岳云等 Zhongguo liangshi bodong lun《中国粮食波动论》 [The Theory of Fluctuations to Chinarsquos Grain] (Zhongguo nongye chubanshe 2001) 79ndash85


ltUNgt

chapter 13

Rural Population Flows in the Era of CollectivizationmdashA Study of the Border Region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guangdong Provinces

You Haihua1

Abstract

Researchers generally hold that during the more than twenty years of the era of col-lectivization it was difficult for rural citizens to pick up and move and that there was very little population mobility in rural society at this time Analysis of population movements in rural areas of the border region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guang-dong shows that a trickle of rural population movement did occur during the era of collectivization There was some movement of urban population to the countryside as well as movement of rural laborers into cities There were also movements of popula-tion within the countryside During this era population movements were to a large extent organized and executed by the government In general members of Chinarsquos rural population who moved during this time moved mostly toward the countryside and mountainous regions

Keywords

era of collectivization ndash Gan-Min-Yue Border Region ndash population ndash movement

In this essay the border region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guangdong Prov-inces2 refers to the large area covering the Southeast of Jiangxi the West of Fujian and the Northeast of Guangdong3 encompassing the Wuyi Mountains

1 You Haihua (游海华 ) was born in 1972 and is a lecturer in the history department of Jiangxi Normal University

2 Translatorrsquos Note Hereafter referred to as the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region adopting the ab-breviated names for the three provinces

3 Here the ldquoSoutheast of Jiangxirdquo refers to the county and city level administrative districts of Xunwu Huichang Ruijin Shicheng Ningdu Xingguo Yudu Anyuan Gan County Ganzhou

315Rural Population Flows in the Era of Collectivization

ltUNgt

and spanning the Jiulian Mountains This essay will refer to this region as the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region [ldquoGanrdquo being short for Jiangxi ldquoMinrdquo being short for Fujian and ldquoYuerdquo being short for Guangdong] This is a mountainous area where road networks are not well developed and distances from political and economic centers are far These are impoverished regions of all three prov-inces In this essay I shall focus attention on these mountainous rural areas that are relatively isolated and socioeconomically underdeveloped to answer the following questions During the era of collectivization was there nearly no movement of the rural population If there were movements then how did the people move My goal is to focus on the microcosm of the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region in order to piece together the overall pattern of rural population move-ments4 across the country

i The Urban Movement of ldquoGoing to the Countrysiderdquo

During the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo a large number of rural laborers entered cit-ies causing a sudden inflation to urban populations and subsequent supply shortages helping to trigger the introduction of government policies that bi-furcated Chinarsquos population into urban and rural As urban centers became saturated and grew less able to absorb the annual increases to the number of unemployed governments adopted administrative measures to create a ldquogreen channelrdquo for siphoning excess urban population off to the countryside which led to a great countercurrent population flow in which people moved in large numbers from towns and cities to rural areas a phenomenon scarcely observed in all of Chinese history There were three groups of them

The first group consisted of surplus urban population that resulted from the downsizing of the urban workforce many of whom had originally come from the countryside As explained earlier too many had moved to towns and cities during the Great Leap Forward When this proved to overwhelm urban supplies the state adopted drastic measures to correct the situation Chen You-zhen 陈友桢 (fifty years old) who had lived on Beimiaoqian Street 北庙前街

Xinfeng Longnan Quannan Dingnan and other regions The ldquoWest of Fujianrdquo refers to the county and city level administrative districts of Changting Shanghang Wuping Yongding Longyan Liancheng Ninghua and other regions The ldquoNortheast of Guangdongrdquo refers to the county and city level administrative districts of Pingyuan Jiaoling Mei County Xingning Fengshun Dabu and other regions

4 In this essay ldquopopulation movmentrdquo generally refers to changes in area of household registra-tion changes in area of residence and changes in area of work (ie leaving the village)

YOU316

ltUNgt

in Xunwu County 寻乌县 Jiangxi Province recalled his familyrsquos experience as follows ldquoIn 1968 my entire family was ordered to move to Xikeng 茜坑 in Sanbiaofuzhai 三标富寨 Xikeng is in the mountains The place had a small population and plentiful farm land Only one household was living there at the time After we moved there my father herded cattle and I became a car-penter We had abundant grain at the time with plenty to eat At that time there were many other families like mine who were relocated to Sanbiaofurdquo5 Families with similar experiences could be found all over the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region

Table 131 shows the numbers of urban workers reduced from the workforce at this time in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region The size of the workforce in the towns and cities in nine counties in the region was reduced by a total of 36336 people from the late 1950s to the 1960s The vast majority of these laid-off workers ended up taking their families to live and work in the countryside Assuming that on average each household had four to five people in it this would mean that over 100000 people were relocated back to the heartland of these nine counties over this period Statistics for urban workforce downsiz-ings in the 1960s are based on incomplete data the actual number of people who returned to the countryside during this time is possibly over 200000 Over the years 1959 to 1962 40900 people were shed from the urban workforce in Mei County 梅县 located in northeastern Guangdong the vast majority of them returned to the countryside to become farmers6 From 1960 to 1962 even a tiny town such as Wuping County 武平县 in western Fujian province saw 11140 of its residents departed back to the countryside7 In Shanghang County 上杭县 the number was 60000 from 1959 to 19658 While the number was only 2334 for Xunwu County Jiangxi province for the early years of 1960s the overall historical total for this region was 87519 These four counties alone for which we have clear data saw 120000 people relocated to the countryside In

5 Based on a field study I performed in the capital of Xunwu County in 19996 Mei xian zhi 《梅县志》 [Records of Mei County] ed Mei County Records Compilation

Committee 梅县志编纂委员会 (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1994) 6087 Wuping xian zhi 《武平县志》 [Records of Wuping County] ed Wuping County Records

Compilation Committee 武平县志编纂委员会 (Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 1993) 46

8 Shanghang xian zhi 《上杭县志》 [Records of Shanghang County] ed Shanghang Coun-ty Records Compilation Committee 上杭县志编纂委员会 (Fujian renmin chubanshe 1993) 641

9 Xunwu xian zhi 《寻乌县志》 [Records of Xunwu County] ed Xunwu County Records Compilation Committee 寻乌县志编纂委员会 (Xinhua chubanshe 1996) 273


ltUNgt

percentage terms the reductions were fairly large Xunwu County shrankits state workforce by 137 percent in 1961 and then again by 226 percent in 1962 and its urban populations by 286 percent in 1961 and then by 271 percent in 196210

Downsizing of the urban workforce affected the following population seg-ments (1) workers recruited from the countryside after 1958 (2) households from the countryside containing laborers (3) older workers willing to retire (4) workers who chose of their own volition to quit their jobs and return to the

10 Zhongguo guoqing congshu ndash bai xianshi jingji shehui diaocha ndash xunwu juan 《中国国

情丛书mdashmdash百县市经济社会调查middot寻乌卷》 [China National Conditions Series ndash Socioeconomic Investigations in 100 Counties and Cities ndash Xunwu Edition] ed Ding Weizhi 丁伟志 (Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 1996) 58

Table 131 Reductions of urban workers in the Gan-Min-Yue border region from the late 1950s to 1960s

County Years Workers reduced


Xunwu 1961ndash1963 2334 Wuping 1961ndash1962 3291Huichang 1957ndash1968 1887 Mei 1966 1229Ruijin 1960ndash1962 6094 Jiaoling 1961ndash1965 2395Changting 1961ndash1963 6643 Pingyuan 1961ndash1965 5554Shanghang 1960 6909Total 36336

Data source Xunwu xian zhi 《寻乌县志》 [Records of Xunwu County] (Xinhua chubanshe 1996) 273 Huichang xian zhi 《会昌县志》 [Records of Huichang County] (Xinhua chubanshe 1993) 156 Ruijin xian zhi 《瑞金县志》 [Records of Ruijin County] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 65ndash66 Changting xian zhi 《长汀县

志》 [Records of Changting County] (Shenghuo-dushu-xinzhi sanlian shudian 1993) 643 Shanghang xian zhi 《上杭县志》 [Records of Shanghang County] (Fujian renmin chubanshe 1993) 40 Wuping xian zhi 《武平县志》 [Records of Wuping County] (Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 1993) 46 Mei xian zhi 《梅县志》 [Records of Mei County] (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1994) 608ndash609 Jiaoling xian zhi 《蕉

岭县志》 [Records of Jiaoling County] (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1992) 469 and Pingyuan xian zhi 《平远县志》 [Records of Pingyuan County] (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1993) 473ndash474Note The above figures were gleaned from county records and maybe incomplete

YOU318

ltUNgt

countryside and (5) urban residents who chose of their own volition to move to the countryside In fact all these people fell into one of two groups those who were ordered by the government to return to the countryside and those who chose of their own volition (largely in response to the increasingly acute supply shortages that were becoming common in overcrowded towns and cit-ies) to move to the countryside and become farmers The popular saying at the time ldquoa workerrsquos watch isnrsquot worth as much as a farmerrsquos bushel of lotus rootsrdquo goes to show that some people were indeed willing to go to the countryside voluntarily The downsizing trend for the urban workforce persisted for a long time from the late 1950s all the way to the 1970s in starts and fits

The second group of people who moved from towns and cities to the coun-tryside included educated youth (zhiqing) who had been sent en masse to the countryside to participate in agricultural production In the early 1960s with pressing supply shortages in many urban areas some urban youths were sent to rural farms or forestry centers of their home counties to take up labor In 1968 after Mao Zedong issued his ldquogo to the countrysiderdquo directive a large number of educated youths went ldquouprdquo to the mountains or ldquodownrdquo to the coun-tryside Placement of these young people followed four different principles The first was to return people to their place of origin to work in agriculture The second was to have people join a rural production team in some countymdashtheir own or notmdashand settle in that area allegedly so they could learn from the poor and middle peasants For example several dozen educated youths were sent to Rentian Town 壬田镇 Ruijin County 瑞金县 where they registered to become local residents during the ldquoCultural Revolutionrdquo11 The third was to establish a youth production brigade under the collective ownership system the members of which would collectively cultivate virgin land and plant the fields In one example in 1971 the number one production team of Tianbei Village 田背村 Shanghang County Fujian Province established an educated youth team that would work lands some distance from the village this team was dispatched to a large swath of uncultivated land ten huali [five kilometers] away (bordering the territory of Xiangdong Township 象洞乡 Wuping Coun-ty) where they camped and cultivated 91 mu of mountainous land Within two years this area originally an isolated mountain col at the border between two counties became a bustling village In 1973 the Zhongdu Commune 中都公社 of Shanghang County allocated funds toward the Zhongzhai Production Team 中寨队 for the construction of collective living quarters for educated youths in 1975 an educated youth mountain-planting brigade was dispatched to live

11 Based on a field study I performed in Rentian Town Ruijin City in 1998


ltUNgt

there and cultivate virgin land12 The fourth method was to dispatch educated youth to labor in state-run farms and forestry centers

Educated youth sent to the countryside in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Re-gion came not only from counties and towns within the region but also from regional metropolises like Ganzhou 赣州 Xiamen 厦门 Longyan 龙岩 Chaozhou 潮州 and Shantou 汕头 and also from provincial capitals like Nan-chang Fuzhou and Guangzhou Some even came from far away major cities like Shanghai Incomplete data indicate that in the 1960s a total of 45186 edu-cated youth were sent to the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region (see Table 132) an average of 5021 per county Shanghang County Fujian received the most edu-cated youth at 1014113 Five of Shanghang Countyrsquos twenty communersquos received over 1000 educated youth Zhongdu Xikou 溪口 Taiba 太拔 Jiaoyang 蛟洋 and Gutian 古田 Of those Zhongdu received the most at 1800 Even the Pan-jing Commune 泮镜公社 with a population of less than 5000 received over 500 educated youth who came to account for eleven percent of the local popu-lation14 The above figures show that a large number of educated youth were

12 Shanghang wenshi ziliao di 24 ji 《上杭文史资料》第24 辑 [Cultural and Historical Materials of Shanghang Vol 24] ed Chinese Peoplersquos Political Consultative Conference Shanghang County Cultural and Historical Materials Editing Committee 政协上杭县文

史资料编辑委员会13 Another account sets the total at over 14000 people See Shanghang wenshi ziliao di 24 ji 11114 Ibid

Table 132 Relocations of educated youth to the countryside in the Gan-Min-Yue border region

County Total relocated

County Total relocated County Total relocated

Xunwu 2432 Changting 长汀

4461 Mei 9750

Huichang 会昌

3927 Shanghang 10141 Jiaoling 蕉岭 1083

Ruijin 5241 Wuping 6308 Pingyuan 平远 1843

Total 45186

Data source Xunwu xian zhi 273 Huichang xian zhi 156 Ruijin xian zhi 279 Changting xian zhi 646 Shanghang xian zhi 640 Wuping xian zhi 576 Mei xian zhi 608 Jiaoling xian zhi 475 and Pingyuan xian zhi 473

YOU320

ltUNgt

sent down to the countryside During the ldquoreturn to the city movementrdquo of the 1970s and 1980s the vast majority of educated youth sent down to the country-side returned to their native cities with only a small portion of educated youth remaining in the countryside because of marriage or work Data compiled by officials in Xunwu County Jiangxi in 1985 indicated that less than one percent of educated youth had remained in the countryside there15

The third group consisted of officials that were ordered to go to the coun-tryside to participate in and supervise agricultural production Most of these officials had gone to the countryside driven by the ideology of ldquoindustry sup-ports agriculture and cities support the countrysiderdquo They went to the coun-tryside to strengthen leadership over rural grassroots work and help resolve agricultural and economic difficulties In 1959 for example the government of Shanghang County Fujian dispatched 333 officials to peoplersquos communes and brigades to take up posts with real power From 1960 to 1965 the coun-ty government thoroughly adjusted its guiding policy and sent another 134 officials to the countryside to work in agriculture16 In 1958 the government of Mei County Guangdong province sent 2017 officials 1560 of whom to be enrolled in education through labor and the remaining 457 to participate in grassroots work In 1958 the county government sent another 1342 officials to labor in farms forestry centers factories mines and agricultural coopera-tives In 1960 county government officials sent 2470 officials at the commune-level to strengthen the leadership of communes and brigades and 1332 more to production teams to participate in production and labor17 As you can see in Table 133 incomplete data indicate that from the late 1950s to the 1960s eight county governments in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region (Jiangling County was not included as we could not find relevant data) ordered a total of 12344 of-ficials to go to the countryside Some officials stayed in the countryside for sev-eral months and some for several years The majority returned to their original posts in cities once their term in the countryside had expired A small percent-age stayed for good

ii The Flow of Rural Population into Cities

Even amid the tumultuous movement of state-organized population reloca-tion to the countryside trickles of rural citizens from fringe areas continued to

15 Xunwu xian zhi 27316 Shanghang xian zhi 64917 Mei xian zhi 826


ltUNgt

move into cities The scale was miniscule compared to the torrent of human migration bound for the countryside Rural citizens entering cities at this time generally did so to pursue education to join the military or because they were recruited to work in cities or had been promoted in official careers For nearly one third of the era of collectivization which spanned over twenty years the work of recruiting students was halted For this reason technical and special-ized colleges recruited very few students during this period There was maybe one rural youth able to test into technical and specialized colleges per thou-sand square kilometers at this time and even fewer recommended into uni-versities Thus among the three groups of rural citizens entering cities at this time those doing so to pursue studies were the least numerous

More people moved to cities to join the military than to pursue studies during this period As shown in Table 134 a total of 34260 soldiers were re-cruited from the five counties of Ruijin Huichang Changting Shanghang and Wuping from the 1950s to the 1980s The difference between recruitment figures and dischargedemobilization figures for this period was 8904 people In other words nearly 10000 people permanently left the countryside of these five counties as a result of joining the military during this period Although the period of time covered in Table 134 went beyond the era of collectiviza-tion the figures given still give a more or less accurate picture of the number of people who left the countryside to join the military during the era of col-lectivization The majority of service-people demobilized or discharged from

Table 133 Officials sent down in the Gan-Min-Yue border region in the era of collectivization

County Years Total officials


Xunwu 1968 344 Mei 1958ndash1960 7151Huichang 1957ndash1968 2349 Shanghang 1959ndash1960 467Ruijin 1959 1961 125 127 Wuping 1958 1959ndash1963 312 196Pingyuan 1957

1962ndash1963380 332 Changting 1958 1961ndash1962 432 129

Total 12344

Data source Xunwu xian zhi 273 Huichang xian zhi 156 Ruijin xian zhi 64 and 283 Pingyuan xian zhi 479 Mei xian zhi 826 Shanghang xian zhi 649 Wuping xian zhi 577 and Changting xian zhi 648Note The above figures were gleaned from county records and may be incomplete

YOU322

ltUNgt

the militarymdashexcluding those sacrificedmdashreturned to their native regions to work following the governmentrsquos principle of ldquofrom whence you came thence you returnrdquo The vast majority of those returned to the villages where they were raised Nevertheless some military personnel went to cities upon decommissioning as a result of official promotions or changing professions Some others left the countryside to work in construction projects All military service-people who were decommissioned between 1967 and 1970 in Ruijin County were placed in jobs regardless of whether they held urban or rural household registrations18 In the years 1961 1970 and 1971 the government of Mei County sent 660 veterans as well as 308 accompanying family members to help in the construction of Hainan Island19 Although they account for but a small portion of the large number of those who joined the military young people from rural families and who ended up moving permanently to cities

18 Ruijin xian zhi 《瑞金县志》 [Records of Ruijin County] ed Ruijin County Records Compilation Committee 瑞金县志编纂委员会 (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chuban-she 1993) 254

19 Mei xian zhi 810

Table 134 Military conscriptions and demobilizations and discharges in the Gan-Min-Yue border region

County Years Conscriptions Demobilizations and discharges

Difference between conscriptions and demobiliza-tions + discharges

Ruijin 1950ndash1985 10686 9530 1156Huichang 1955ndash1985 5574 3472 2102Changting 1957ndash1978 5583 3720 1863Shanghang 1954ndash1978 6194 3524 2652Wuping 1955ndash1987 6223 5092 1131

Total 34260 25356 8904

Note Figures for demobilization and discharges in Wuping County run from 1949 to 1985 Incomplete data from other counties made it impossible to incorporate figures from the same time span for other counties in the tableData source Ruijin xian zhi 254 and 309 Huichang xian zhi 181 and 195 Changting xian zhi 671ndash672 Shanghang xian zhi 681ndash682 and Wuping xian zhi 529 and 558ndash559


ltUNgt

can count themselves among those who had left village and farming life behind them

Relatively speaking recruitment was the most important channel by which rural citizens moved to cities during the era of collectivization Recruitment was how a large number of them became ldquocity folkrdquo during this period The apex of recruitment of rural citizens to work in the cities occurred during the Great Leap Forward but the majority of these were returned to the countryside during the adjustments that followed in the early 1960s In the southeastern Jiangxi county of Huichang a slew of rural citizens became state workers dur-ing the Great Forging of Steel and Iron movement from 1958 to 195920 In 1959 the western Fujian county of Wuping recruited 4870 rural citizens to work in public institutions or enterprises of those 3291 were soon sent back to the countryside as the result of policy adjustments21 All of the 1892 rural citizens recruited from the countryside to work in Changting County in 1958 or after were sent back to the countryside in the adjustments of 1961 Soon thereafter all remaining rural workers remaining in urban centers there were also sent home22 Public institutions and enterprises generally recruited four kinds of people decommissioned and discharged service-people from the countryside educated youth sent to the country urban youth and children from rural fami-lies For example most workers recruited to work in Ruijin County from 1959 to 1966 were urban youths living on government grain rations but most recruits there from 1967 to 1974 were rural educated youth and urban educated youth who had already spent two years or more in the countryside A total of 13542 workers were recruited to work there from 1958 to 1978 of whom a portion were farmers for whom this would be a very good opportunity to leave their rural homeland23 In Mei County during the ldquoCultural Revolutionrdquo 8000 urban educated youths were sent to the countryside but 4666 rural residents (some of whom veterans) were recruited to work in urban public enterprises24 Al-though the majority of rural citizens who had moved to urban areas of Wuping County during the Great Leap Forward were shed from the urban workforce

20 Huichang xian zhi 《会昌县志》 [Records of Huichang County] ed Huichang County Records Compilation Committee 会昌县志编纂委员会 (Xinhua chubanshe 1993) 154

21 Wuping xian zhi 57322 Changting xian zhi 《长汀县志》 [Records of Changting County] ed Changting County

Records Compilation Committee 长汀县志编纂委员会 (Shenghuo-dushu-xinzhi san-lian shudian 1993) 643

23 Ruijin xian zhi 274ndash27524 Mei xian zhi 609

YOU324

ltUNgt

and sent home 1579 did retain their jobs in urban public enterprises Another 4890 rural residents were recruited from the countryside to work in urban jobs in Wuping County over the 27 years from 1960 to 1987 half or more of those movedto cities during the era of collectivization25

iii Population Movements within the Countryside

In addition to the flows of population between urban and rural areas described above there were also movements of population within the countryside in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region during this time Some moved to rural mountain-ous regions to work and others moved to areas where land was more plentiful others moved wherever their jobs took them Although there were fewer peo-ple moving within the countryside than between rural and urban areas such population movements comprised a major portion of population movements in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region in the era of collectivization

Rural laborers went to remote mountainous areas to take up two kinds of work The first was jobs in state-run or collective farms or forestry centers For example many residents of Xiewupai Village 谢屋排村 worked in the con-struction of the Longshan Reservoir 龙山水库 in Yeping 叶坪 Ruijin As to the remuneration for this work seventy percent went to the production team and thirty percent to the worker or twenty days for the production team and ten days for the workerin work-day terms the production team would also log workpoints for the workers for this labor26 Wang Gongming 王公明 Director of the Luokou Township 洛口乡 Neighborhood Committee in Ningdu County 宁都县 told us that he left his production team to work in the communersquos for-estry center in 1976 Wang paid 03 yuan from his daily earnings to the produc-tion team and kept the rest which he claimed was more than what was paid to the production team27 We discovered in interviews conducted in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region that commune members working in collective farms or forestry centers outside of their own production team were sometimes al-lowed to do jobs like collecting pine resin the earnings for which were split between the worker and the production team at differing ratios The only rea-son that production teams let their members work elsewhere was because of a win-win ldquogentlemenrsquos agreementrdquo (ie an unwritten agreement) that existed between the team and the individual workers

25 Wuping xian zhi 57326 Based on a field study I did in Yeping Township Ruijin City in 199827 Based on a field study I did in Luokou Township Ningdu County in 1998


ltUNgt

The second kind of work rural laborers were sent to remote mountainous areas to do was large-scale construction of farm fields or rural infrastructure or-ganized under ldquolarge formation warfarerdquo28 or other political movements It was common for large numbers of rural laborers to be swept up in these campaigns A total of 6896 rural laborers from Changting County were swept up in the construction of the Yingtan 鹰潭 to Xiamen Railway the Longyan to Zhang-zhou 漳州 Railway the Sibao Highway 四堡公路 in Liancheng 连城 and the Ting River Hydropower Plant 汀江沿河水电站 in 195829 From 1958 to 1967 officials in Shanghang County dispatched 12200 laborers to assist provincial-level and prefectural-level public enterprises in mining transportation and construction30

Rural citizens who moved to areas with more land came in two varieties as well The first was those who moved to mountainous regions This kind of reset-tlement had been going on since the dawn of history and had been particularly common in times of war or political upheavals The political situation began to stabilize in China in the 1950s at which point the population began to grow rapidly which became a problem in rural areas during the era of collectiviza-tion as the population grew but available land did not which meant reductions in per capita food rations In some places rural citizens never had enough to eat The mass movement of urban citizens toward the countryside doubtlessly exacerbated this situation Labor productivity in agriculture was low during the era of collectivization and this further reduced per capita food rations All the above factors pushed some rural citizens with means to move into moun-tainous regions that had more land in order to improve their chances of sur-vival Other important reasons for resettling in mountainous regions include the desire to escape tense political environments and to seek more autonomy in production In one example the residents of Jinhua Village 金华村 Rent-ian Town Ruijin are the ancestors of migrants from many different eras bear-ing many last names including Lin Zeng Zhong Qin Huang Yang and Deng The father of Jinhuarsquos Village Director Deng Dachun 邓大春 moved into the Puyuan Group 普圆小组 of Jinhua Village from Huangbai Township 黄柏乡

in the late 1950s Deng told us that his father moved to the village because his family was poor and he had too many brothers Although it was located far away in the mountains there was virgin land to cultivate and arable land to

28 Translatorrsquos note the so-called ldquoda bingtuan zuozhanrdquo refers to the military-style organi-zation of a mass movement

29 Changting xian zhi 64230 Shanghang xian zhi 641

YOU326

ltUNgt

plant on and his life was relatively free there31 Xie Yuanxin who lives about five kilometers from the capital of Ruijin County in Xiewupai Village Yeping Township moved to Dabaidi 大柏地 in the mountains with his family around the same time He did so because of a drought in Xiewupai which made life very difficult32 Similar stories of resettlement in the mountains in pursuit of survival or improvement to onersquos lot in life are commonthroughout the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region However these resettlements were relatively small in scale They happened against the backdrop of the great population congestion during the era of collectivization and represented a final episode in the wave of ldquomountain-bound migrationrdquo

Secondly people also moved from the densely populated areas of eastern Guangdong and western Fujian into the relatively more land-abundant and less densely populated area of southern Jiangxi province In an investigation conducted in Chengjiang Town 澄江镇 Xunwu County we ran across Deng Dingxiang 邓丁祥 a fifty-one-year-old resident of Guifeng Village 桂丰村 He had originally come from the Laowu Group 老屋组 of Songlin Village 松林村 Shishan Town 石扇镇 Mei County In 1971 he moved in with the fam-ily of his bride He told us ldquoWe had a lot of brothers in my family at the time (four) and we were extremely poor We didnrsquot even have enough to eat Here therersquos plenty of farmland and enough to eat so I came to Jiangxirdquo He said that many people came to Jiangxi for similar reasons33 A senior resident of Junmenling Town 筠门岭 Huichang County told us that a lot of girls married into the area from eastern Guangdong between the time of 1949 and the 1960s and 1970s One local cadre surnamed Ye (now nearly fifty years old) told us that all his five brothers had married girls from Guangdong34

A total of 3149 people moved to Xunwu County between 1959 and 1960 to flee disasters or economic difficulties at home Even after officials had sent many away 1461 refugees remained in the area and settled down35 The major-ity of refugees who have settled in southeastern Jiangximdashan area of bountiful grain harvests and surplusesmdashto escape famine throughout history have come from the border regions of Fujian and Guangdong Several thousand residents of Shanghang County fled famine during the three years of economic difficul-ties Manyof these fled to southern Jiangxi A significant drop in grain yields in

31 Based on an field study I performed in Rentian Town Ruijin City in 199832 Based on an field study I performed in Xiewupai Village Yeping Township Ruijin City in

199833 Based on an field study I performed in Chengjiang Town Xunwu County in 199834 Based on a field study I performed in Junmenling Town Huichang County in 199835 Xunwu xian zhi 294


ltUNgt

1960 led to the flight of 9070 people from Ninghua County 宁化县 Fujian in 1960 some of these settled in Shicheng Ningdu Guangchang 广昌 and oth-er counties of Jiangxi36 Of course there can be no comparison between the amount of people who settled in Jiangxi as a result of abnormal marriages or flight from famine and those who have fled from border regions of Fujian and Guangdong throughout history and founded villages there Nevertheless it is an undeniable fact that there was an upsurge in migration from the border re-gions of Fujian and Guangdong into Jiangxi at the time of collectivization We do not however have any accurate data to determine the scale of such migra-tion during this time A small number of people also moved in pursuit of job opportunities Working as porters or engaging in trade during the slack farm-ing season is the traditional means of earning secondary income for people in the border region These activities were strictly forbidden during the era of collectivization but some rural citizens did them anyway driven by necessity In the early 1960s one old resident from the Dongmen Brigade 东门大队of Chengyuan 城原 Changting County Fujian established a secret commercial relationship with another rural resident from Ningdu County Jiangxi The man in Changting stealthily delivered chili peppers to Ningdu and the man in Ningdu sent fire-cured tobacco back to Changting Once the shipments arrived at their destination the seller generally left them there to be sold on consign-ment Lai Huomu 赖火木 a resident of Shangjie Village 上街村 Hetian Town 河田镇 Changting also sold chili peppers to Ganzhou in stealth where they were purchased by a state-run store One such shipment of peppers earned him the equivalent of two to three months of pay for working in the production team He told us that at the time others in his area sold young bamboo to Ruijin but ldquothere werenrsquot many doing business like me then because I was braverdquo37

iv Conclusions

Theoretically speaking rural residents in the era of collectivization lost nearly all freedom of movement in stark contrast to their counterparts in the Ming and Qing Dynasties as a result of the state monopoly policy the collective ownership policy the urban-vs-rural dual household registration system and other policies The vast majority of rural residents at this time were chained

36 Ninghua xian zhi 《宁化县志》 [Records of Ninghua County] ed Ninghua County Records Compilation Committee 宁化县志编纂委员会 (Fujian renmin chubanshe 1992) 136

37 Based on a field study I performed in Changting County in 2000

YOU328

ltUNgt

to agriculture and confined to their villages During the era of collectivization rural China was a nearly ldquoimmobile societyrdquo However we have discovered through our research that in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region during the era of collectivization there were some flows of population from the city to the countryside (as a result of downsizing of urban workforces sending educated youth to the countryside and dispatching of urban officials) as well as flows of rural laborers into cities (such as those pursuing studies those recruited to work in cities and those who joined the military) There were even some population movements within the countryside (such as those who moved to remote mountainous regions to work those who resettled in areas with more land those who had been involved in unusual marriages those fleeing fam-ine and some who were engaged in illicit trading) During this time flows of population between urban and rural areas and within the countryside never ceased Of course compared to the ldquopeasant worker tiderdquo and frequent flows of population between urban and rural areas of today the aforementioned popu-lation movements were but a trickle Such a characterization does not mean however that we should overlook large-scale movements of laborers spurred by governmental actions or institutional planning (such as the ldquogo to the coun-trysiderdquo movement) or voluntary movement of rural populations on a smaller scale Rural society during the era of collectivization was not an ldquoimmobile societyrdquo To a large extent it was a society in which great swaths of population moved to the countryside or into mountainous regions and the era of collec-tivization was to a great extent an era of institutionally planned population movements

References

Changting xian zhi 《长汀县志》 [Records of Changting County] ed Changting County Records Compilation Committee 长汀县志编纂委员会 (Shenghuo- dushu-xinzhi sanlian shudian 1993)

Huichang xian zhi 《会昌县志》 [Records of Huichang County] ed Huichang Coun-ty Records Compilation Committee 会昌县志编纂委员会 (Xinhua chubanshe 1993)

Mei xian zhi 《梅县志》 [Records of Mei County] ed Mei County Records Compila-tion Committee 梅县志编纂委员会 (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1994)

Ninghua xian zhi 《宁化县志》 [Records of Ninghua County] ed Ninghua County Records Compilation Committee 宁化县志编纂委员会 (Fujian renmin chuban-she 1992)


ltUNgt

Ruijin xian zhi 《瑞金县志》 [Records of Ruijin County] ed Ruijin County Records Compilation Committee 瑞金县志编纂委员会 (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1993)

Shanghang wenshi ziliao di 24 ji 《上杭文史资料》第24 辑 [Cultural and Historical Materials of Shanghang Vol 24] ed Chinese Peoplersquos Political Consultative Confer-ence Shanghang County Cultural and Historical Materials Editing Committee 政协

上杭县文史资料编辑委员会 Shanghang xian zhi 《上杭县志》 [Records of Shanghang County] ed Shanghang

County Records Compilation Committee 上杭县志编纂委员会 (Fujian renmin chubanshe 1993)

Wuping xian zhi 《武平县志》 [Records of Wuping County] ed Wuping County Re-cords Compilation Committee 武平县志编纂委员会 (Zhongguo dabaike quans-hu chubanshe 1993)

Xunwu xian zhi 《寻乌县志》 [Records of Xunwu County] ed Xunwu County Re-cords Compilation Committee 寻乌县志编纂委员会 (Xinhua chubanshe 1996)

Zhongguo guoqing congshu ndash bai xianshi jingji shehui diaocha ndash xunwu juan 《中

国国情丛书mdashmdash百县市经济社会调查middot寻乌卷》 [China National Conditions SeriesmdashSocioeconomic Investigations in 100 Counties and Cities ndash Xunwu Edition] ed Ding Weizhi 丁伟志 (Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 1996)


ltUNgt

chapter 14

A Review of Research on the State Monopoly1

Wang Danli2

Keywords

state monopoly ndash industrialization ndash planned economy ndash coupon system ndash research review

The imposition of the state grain monopoly in 1953 is one of the most note-worthy events in the economic history of the Peoplersquos Republic of China The passage and continual development of this policy not only exerted a profound influence on the production and circulation systems for Chinarsquos agricultural products but also became an important symbol for the planned economy shortly after the founding of the nation closely linked with progress made in Chinarsquos march toward industrialization It is precisely for this reason that the state monopoly has long been of great interest to Chinese academics A review of this research is beneficial not only to furthering discussion in this topic at the academic level but also to the making of objective examinations and fair assessments of the course of Chinarsquos economic development shortly after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China

i The Establishment and Development of the State Monopoly

Officials in the early days of the Peoplersquos Republic of China established the ldquothree great battlesrdquo of the ldquofinancial battlefrontrdquo establishing national unifor-mity in financial work establishing the state monopoly and subjecting capital-ist industrial and commercial enterprises family-based agricultural operations and handicraft workshops to socialist reformation3 This placement among the

1 This essay was selected for the Seventh Annual Academic Forum on National History2 Wang Danli (王丹莉 ) is an assistant research fellow in the second research department of

the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies3 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu shang《若干重大决策与事

件的回顾》 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 1] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1991) 255

331A Review Of Research On The State Monopoly

ltUNgt

top three priorities illustrates the importance of the state monopoly policy In these early years the central government did not seal off free markets Rather it obtained grain by requisitioning of public grain and by making purchases from the open market As the economy gradually recovered and large-scale economic construction was launched an increasingly large gap began to emerge between state-controlled grain reserves and grain the state needed to provide to urban and rural areas To extricate itself from this predicament as quickly as possible the Communist Party of China (ccp) Central Committee after repeated inquiries and discussion issued the ldquoResolutions on Implement-ing Planned Purchases and Planned Supply of Grainrdquo 关于实行粮食的计划收

购与计划供应的决议 on October 16 19534 On November 19 of that year the State Administrative Council issued the ldquoOrders on Implementing Planned Purchases and Planned Supply of Grainrdquo 关于实行粮食的计划收购和计划供

应的命令 which included concrete measures for the state grain monopoly at which point the grain monopoly was officially implemented5

Generally speaking the core of the state monopolyon grain can be summed up by the following First officials implemented the policy of planned pur-chases from rural households that had surplus grain with purchase prices and grain varieties to be purchased dictated directly by the center Second offi-cials implemented the policy of planned grain supply for urban dwellers and rural residents who were not self-sufficient Third work responsibilities were divided between the central and local governments and under the uniform guidance of the center and all grain-related planning was done by the central government excluding grain allocated to regional governments but including grain flows between regions grain exports grain reserves emergency grain re-serves disaster relief grain and so on6

The scope of the state monopoly grew over the years In November 1953 the ccp Central Committee approved the resolutions of the Central Financial Committee regarding nationwide implementation of planned purchases of oil bearing materials In November the following year the State Administrative Council issued the ldquoOrders on Implementing Planned Purchases of Cottonrdquo 关于实行棉花计划收购的命令 In addition to grain cotton and edible oil the state also included fire-cured tobacco live pigs wool and leather as well as some ingredients for Traditional Chinese Medicine (tcm) aquatic prod-ucts scrap copper scrap tin scrap steel and several other important products

4 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 4 ce《建国以来重要文献选编》第4 册 [Se-lected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 4] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1993) 477

5 Ibid 5616 Ibid 478

Danli332

ltUNgt

within the scope of the monopoly Rural residents were unable to sell anything on markets even those things they had reserved for personal use All sales had to be made to state-commissioned stores It was permissible for citizens to sell some agricultural products such as chickens ducks geese fresh eggs spices aquatic products from scattered production areas dried fruits and nuts and fresh fruits on the markets but at time of necessity provincial-level peoplersquos committees were authorized to enforce the rules of the state monopoly on those products as well7 The enormous state monopoly system was thus gradu-ally taking shape

The state monopoly on agricultural productsmdashcentered primarily on grainmdashwas in place for a total of thirty-two years from its implementation in 1953 to its replacement by the contract purchasing system for grain and cot-ton in 1985 Its overall impact went far beyond its effects on the circulation of agricultural products

ii The Present State of Research and a Survey of Existing Literature

A great deal has been written by both Chinese and foreign researchers on the state monopoly The vast majority of this work is articles few books are de-voted to the topic Most past research has focused on issues such as the forma-tion and evolution of policies related to the state monopoly the impact of the monopoly on agricultural production and rural citizens its relationship with industry and with the grain circulation system In this essay I will review some themes within this body of research in order to arrive at a clearer understand-ing and firmer grasp of their findings so far The following areas have received the most attention

(A) Rationale for the State Monopoly Policy and the Process of its Formulation

The logical starting point for research into the state monopoly is the introduc-tion of the policy that created the state monopoly system so this issue has garnered a great deal of attention Many researchers have cited the grain crisis of 1953 in their discussions of the state monopoly as a major factor for the

7 Liang mian you tonggoutongxiao zhengce faling wenjian xuanbian 《粮棉油统购统

销政策法令文件选编》 [Selected Policies Decrees and Documents on the State Monop-oly on Grains and cereals Cotton and Oil] ed China Renmin University Economics Depart-ment Document Bureau 中国人民大学贸易经济系资料室 (1979) 232ndash234


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creation of the state monopoly8 According to Bo Yibo 薄一波 the state mo-nopoly was a product of the severe imbalance between supply and demand of grain between the summer and autumn of 1953 At the time increased scale of economic construction had led to the rapid growth in the countryrsquos overall demand for grain grain consumption among the rural population had mark-edly increased following land reform and the government was finding itself increasingly in competition with private grain traders for supply9 Xu Jianqing analyzed the economic reasons behind the statersquos introduction of the state mo-nopoly policy from the perspectives of the mechanism and costs of market op-erations On the basis of an analysis of grain and printed gauze she was able to showthat the costs of using the market pricing mechanism and government-set prices at the same time can be extremely high When severe inconsistency and disconnect between government-set prices and market prices make it difficult to contain the latter by means of the former and when serious imbalance exists between government purchases and sales of grain introducing government-planning in the purchases and sales of grain while admittedly less than ideal may have been the cheapest of options in terms of transaction costs for help-ing to ensure basic grain supply and the smooth implementation of the ldquoFirst Five-Year Planrdquo In this historical period finding the cheapest and fastest way to realize the countryrsquos objectives as they were laid out in its development plans was the basis of all state policy decisions at this time10 The Cambridge History of the Peoplersquos Republic of China (1949ndash1965) edited by Roderick MacFarquhar and John Fairbank gives a detailed description of the lackadaisical growth in agricultural production and the grain crisis around the year 1953 The authors

8 For example Liu Yang 刘洋 ldquoTonggoutongxiao ndash jianguo chuqi tongzhi jingji sixiang de tixian 统购统销mdashmdash 建国初期统制经济思想的体现 [The State Monopoly ndash the Appearance of Ideology of Ruling the Economy Soon after the Founding of the Na-tion]rdquo Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu 《中共党史研究》 6 (2004) Chen Guoqing 陈国庆 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de chansheng ji qi yingxiang 统购统销政策的产生及其

影响 [The Creation of the State Monopoly Policy and its Effects]rdquo Xuexi yu tansuo 《学

习与探索》2 (2006) and so on No academic studying the state monopoly has denied the direct relationship between the severity of the crisis in grains and cereals supply and demand and the issuance of the state monopoly policy and so I shall not give superfluous accounts here

9 Bo Yibo 255ndash25810 Xu Jianqing 徐建青 ldquoJianguo qianqi de shijia yu paijia ndash cong jiage jizhi dao tonggou-

tongxiao 建国前期的市价与牌价mdashmdash从价格机制到统购统销 [Market Prices and List Prices in the Early Days of the Nationmdashfrom Pricing Mechanisms to the State Monopoly]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研究》2 (2002)

Danli334

ltUNgt

pointed out that a close relationship exists between grain purchase prices fiscal revenue the scale of investments towards means of production and pro-duction sectors and other factors With industrialization as the highest policy priority at the time the government opted for monopolistic purchases of grain at fixed prices from the end of autumn 1953 in conjunction with measured expediting of cooperatization as the solution11

Two other books A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events by Bo Yibo and Grain Work in Contemporary China edited by Zhao Fasheng12 have given a detailed account of the workings behind the establishment of the state grain monopoly policy Justin Yifu Lin et al have also given an explanation for this process in their work on the topic13 Chen Yunrsquos 陈云 role in this process is also noteworthy A study of his writings and of articles written about him provide us with a great amount of information about the state monopoly In October 1953 Chen gave a speech entitled ldquoImplementing the State Grain Mo-nopolyrdquo 实行粮食统购统销 at the national grain conference In his speech Chen gave a detailed analysis of the severity of the nationwide grain problem different possible plans to solve the problem the limitations of each and the time required as well as quantities and measures to be employed in the state requisitioning of grain14 One could say that this speech was the earliest systematic description of the state grain monopoly policy of 1953 This docu-ment presents the reasons for its introduction and how the policy took shaped from the perspective of policymakers Yi Shui discusses the formulation of the state monopoly from the perspective of Chenrsquos work and decision-making ap-proaches15 Zhang Fengrsquoao places emphasis on Chenrsquos thinking on grain in his

11 Jianqiao zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (1949ndash1965) 《剑桥中华人民共和国史

(1949~1965)》 [Cambridge History of the Peoplersquos Republic of China (1949ndash1965)] ed Rod-erick MacFarquhar and Fei Zhengqing 费正清 translated from the English (Beijing Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1990) 166ndash181

12 Dangdai zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo 《当代中国的粮食工作》 [Grain Work in Contemporary China] ed Zhao Fasheng 赵发生 (Beijing Zhongguo shehui kexue chu-banshe 1988) 71ndash74

13 Lin Yifu Cai Fang and Li Zhou 林毅夫蔡昉李周 Zhongguo de qiji fazhan zhanluumle yu jingji gaige 《中国的奇迹发展战略与经济改革》 [The Chinese Miracle Devel-opment Strategy and Economic Reforms] (Shanghai Shanghai sanlian shudian and Shang-hai renmin chubanshe 1994) 40ndash41

14 Chen Yun wenxuan (yi jiu si jiu ndash yi jiu wu liu nian) 《陈云文选 (一九四九mdashmdash 一九

五六年 )》 [Selected Works of Chen Yun (1949ndash1956)] (Beijing renmin chubanshe 1984) 202ndash216

15 Yi Shui 亦水 ldquolsquoShi bu shi haiyou biede banfarsquo ndash cong quding tonggoutongxiao zhengce kan Chen Yun de gongzuo he jiejue fangfa lsquo是不是还有别的办法rsquomdashmdash从确定统


ltUNgt

essay ldquoA Brief Discussion of Chen Yunrsquos Idea that lsquoWithout Grain there is Anar-chyrsquordquo in which he provides a new perspective for understanding the state mo-nopoly16 These works focused mostly on the rationale for the state monopoly and how it came to be

(B) Research on the State Monopoly and IndustrializationAlthough significant shortages in grain supply in 1953 put the introduction of the state monopoly policy on the fast track another major reason for the rapid increase in the countryrsquos demands for grain was its commitment to industri-alization In other words there was a direct link between the introduction of the state monopoly policy and industrialization This link has been the focus of many writings on the subject

In the opinion of Liu Chuanjiang as the rapid development of heavy industry began to take precedence over other policy objectives in 1953 the government adopted the monopolistic grain circulation system in order to fulfill its grain purchase requirements and to ensure that needs for industrial-ization were met17 In his article Lu Ling contends that conflicts between the small peasant economy and industrialization helped trigger the grain crisis of 1953 Lu offers an analysis of the relationship between the grain crisis and the government policy commitment to industrialization and how this relationship was connected with of the introduction of the state monopoly policy18

Justin Yifu Lin et al go a step further in pointing out that having resolved to ldquocatch up to and overtake [more advanced economies] China nonethe-less faced a number of difficulties at the time including a low starting point shortages of capital and resources and low economic surpluses Under such

购统销政策看陈云的工作和决策方法 [lsquoIs There Another WayrsquomdashA Look at Chen Yunrsquos Work and Decision-making Approaches through the Establishment of the State Mo-nopoloy Policy]rdquo Dang de wenxian 《党的文献》3 (2005)

16 Zhang Fengrsquoao 张凤翱 ldquoJianlun Chen Yun de lsquowu liang ze luanrsquo sixiang 简论陈云的 rsquo无粮则乱 rsquo思想 [A Brief Discussion of Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of lsquoWithout Grains and cereals there is Anarchyrsquo]rdquo Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao 《湖南师范大学社会科

学学报》5 (2001)17 Liu Chuanjiang 刘传江 ldquoZhongguo liangshi liutong de zhidu anpai ji qi bianqian 中国

粮食流通的制度安排及其变迁 [Arrangements of Chinarsquos Grain Circulation System and Changes Thereto]rdquo Jingji pinglun 《经济评论》2 (2000)

18 Lu Ling 庐陵 ldquo1953 nian zhongguo de liangshi weiji yu tonggoutongxiao zhengce de qi-yuan 1953 年中国的粮食危机与统购统销政策的起源 [Chinarsquos Grain Crisis of 1953 and the Genesis of the State Monopoly Policy]rdquo Beijing daxue yanjiusheng xuekan 《北

京大学研究生学刊》 4 (1993)

Danli336

ltUNgt

circumstances setting up the necessary institutional arrangement for keeping the costs of developing heavy industry low offered an obvious way out of this predicamentrdquo In other words market resource allocation mechanisms alone would not have achieved this solution Therefore the government needed to establish a set of resource planning and allocation institutions suitable to the policy environment of the time in order to ensure adequate supply of scarce material resources and of resources to industries to which the government had given priority19 Logically speaking the state monopoly policy was the inevita-ble product of the statersquos strategy of prioritizing development of heavy industry over other industries and sectors In the essay ldquoCong tonggoutongxiao dao tudi shui 从统购统销到土地税 [From the State Monopoly to Land Taxes]rdquo Song Guoqing points out that the conflict between welfare provision and capital accumulation was the primary conflict in Chinarsquos early period of industrial-ization With the industrial monopoly unable to meet objectives for capital accumulation and conditions for the levying of a heavy land tax not yet ripe the state monopoly became the choice and development model most suitable to Chinarsquos national conditions According to Song it would be reasonable to think of the state monopoly as both a method of providing welfare and a mechanism for capital accumulation20 Li Feng holds that the implementation of the state monopoly reflected the conflict between rural consumption and industrializa-tion in the partitioning of national income The so-called ldquograin crisisrdquo was not actually an absolute lack of grain supply but was rather an inability of rural citizens to purchase sufficient quantities of grain through voluntary transac-tions as a result of government-set prices Thus the state monopoly endowed with the function of income redistribution was the result of the complex effects of industrialization and the specific economic environment shortly after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China21

Some works on the ldquoprice scissorsrdquo effect and industrial accumulations also touch on the state monopoly Wu Li holds that it was difficult for the Peoplersquos Republic of China established on a foundation of economic backwardness and

19 Lin Yifu et al 19 and 3620 Nongcun biange yu zhongguo fazhan 1978ndash1989 xia《农村变革与中国发展 1978~

1989》下 [Rural Revolution and Chinarsquos Development 1978ndash1989 Vol 2] ed Zhou Qiren 周其仁 (Hong Kong Oxford University Press China 1994) 362ndash413

21 Lu Feng 卢锋 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de shishi yu feishichang tizhi de jianli 统购

统销政策的实施与非市场体制的建立 [The Implementation of the State Monopoly Policy and the Erection of a Non-Market System]rdquo Jiaoxue yu yanjiu 《教学与研究》3 (1989)


ltUNgt

traditional agriculture to rely on external factors for achieving the ldquo primitive accumulation of capitalrdquo that was needed for industrialization making agri-cultural surpluses one of the most important sources of capital for industri-alization22 It is however a worthwhile endeavor to study exactly how much agricultural surplus the state attained through the state monopoly In another essay on the ldquoprice scissorsrdquo effect Wu gives a rough calculation of the ldquoprice scissorsrdquo difference by comparing government-set prices market prices and international prices of agricultural products and by-products and industrial products and then excluding agricultural products and by-products resold by the state in the countryside and industrial commodities sold to the country-side He concludes that the ldquoprice scissorsrdquo difference has been exaggerated by some scholars as has the amount of agricultural surplus exacted by the state23 Cui Xiaoli arrives at a similar conclusion Cui explores the issues of the state monopoly and industrial accumulation by looking at the structure of capital used for industrialization during the ldquoFirst Five-Year Planrdquo period the propor-tion of agricultural accumulation to overall capital accumulations for industri-alization the collection of the agricultural tax and other areas In the end Cui concludes that the state monopoly did not accomplish the objective of accu-mulating surplus capital for industrial accumulation at the most agricultural contributions to industrial capital accumulation held even with agricultural tax rates Another of Cuirsquos core arguments is that Chinarsquos state monopoly was different from the Soviet Unionrsquos ldquoSystem of Compulsory Sales to the Staterdquo and that although some of the impact of the state monopoly were negative its problem lay not in the sacrificing of agriculture but rather in its institutional rigidity24 Of course these discussions are made relative to the level of contri-butions made All researchers agree that the state monopoly system did indeed promote industrial accumulation and industrialization itself

22 Wu Li 武力 ldquoShilun jianguo yilai nongye shengyu ji qi fenpei zhidu de bianhua 试论

建国以来农业剩余及其分配制度的变化 [On the Subject of Changes to Agri-cultural Surpluses and Distribution Systems since the Founding of the Nation]rdquo Fujian shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 《福建师范大学学报 (哲学社会

科学版 )》3 (2004)23 Wu Li 武力 ldquo1949 ndash 1978 nian zhongguo ldquojiandaochardquo charsquoe bianzheng 1949~1978 年

中国lsquo剪刀差rsquo差额辨正 [Identification and Correction of Chinarsquos lsquoPrice Scissorsrsquo Discrepancy from 1949 to 1978]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研究》4 (2001)

24 Cui Xiaoli 崔晓黎 ldquoTonggoutongxiao yu gongye jilei 统购统销与工业积累 [The State Monopoly and Industrial Accumulation]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研

究》4 (1988)

Danli338

ltUNgt

(C) The Impact of the State Monopoly on Agricultural Production and Rural Citizens

In 1985 Central Document Number One upheld the positive role unified pur-chases of agricultural products played in guaranteeing supply and supporting construction At the same time however the document noted that as produc-tion had developed many of the adverse effects of the policy had become evi-dent which made it disadvantageous to the development of rural production of commercial products as well as to increases to economic efficiency25 This understanding would later lay the foundation for the introduction of a series of reform measures

In the early 1980s some researchers began a debate regarding the role played by the law of value during the era of the state monopoly in agricultural produc-tion and the management of agricultural products26 Bo Yibo has this to say on the subject ldquoThe primary malady of the state monopoly system was that it lim-ited the role of the law of value in agricultural production and the management of agricultural products So it inevitably had a negative impact on work incen-tives among rural citizens and the implementation of economic accounting in industrial and commercial enterprisesrdquo Excessive state requisitioning of grain was a universal phenomenon during this era which severely restricted work in-centives among rural citizens and so there was no great breakthrough in grain yields for a long time27 Zhang Xuebing holds that from 1953 to 1958 when the state monopoly was in place the system on the whole maintained prices and quantities in a relatively reasonable scope of adjustments benefiting both the government and the people That said there emerged many problems in the system including transgression of the law of value ldquoexcessive requisitioningrdquo forcible implementation of the system and so on The emergence of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo the peoplersquos commune movement and other factors such as ag-ricultural production after 1958 led to further imbalances between government planning and the peoplersquos livelihoods greatly discouraging rural citizens from working28 Lu Yunhang offersan econometric analysis of the issue Lu focuses

25 Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 《新时期农业和农

村工作重要文献选编》 [Selected Important Works on Agriculture and Rural Work in the New Era] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992) 326ndash327

26 Wu Shuo 吴硕 ldquoTongoutongxiao yu jiazhi guiluuml de yunyong 统购统销与价值规律的

运用 [The State Monopoly and Use of the Law of Value]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》 1 (1984)

27 Bo Yibo 280ndash28228 Zhang Xuebing 张学兵 ldquo1953 ndash 1958 nian tonggoutongxiao ji ge wenti kaoyi 1953~1958年

统购统销几个问题考议 [Discussion of Some Issues of the State Monopoly from 1953 to 1958]rdquo Changbai xuekan 《长白学刊》 4 (2006)


ltUNgt

his research on a production team in Xiangshan County Zhejiang Province on which he employed a method of calculating grain production functions and examiningintegration and causality to collect empirical evidence for the nega-tive effects of the state monopoly system on the work incentives among rural citizens Lu notes that the state monopoly was in fact a taxation system in-tended to provide capital accumulation for industrialization Once the govern-ment had requisitioned all surplus grain from collective agriculture it became extremely difficult for officials to be effective in attracting increased inputs of labor into collectivized agriculture When studying the operational efficiency of collectivized agriculture one should make note of the negative impact on the work incentives among rural citizens of the macroeconomic policy factors of the state monopoly29

According to Wu Li the state monopoly begun in the autumn of 1953 amounted to a kind of ldquoquota-based distribution schemerdquo On the basis of this scheme the governmentset consumption quotas for agricultural products for rural citizens and kept the rest Wu holds that this allowed the government to keep a maximum amount of agricultural surpluses However in order for this system to work as intended the government had to interfere in and control the production activities of rural citizens This level of control inevitably damp-ened the incentives of the rural population and led to low agricultural produc-tivity and made the state monopoly an undesirable system in the long term30 In his essay ldquoOn Reforms to the Purchase and Sale System of Grain Products in Chinardquo Ding Shengjun first notes the myriad demerits of the state monopoly and then advocates for reforms to the purchase and sale system for grain31 Gao Ying and Li Yueyun begin their analysis from the perspective of produc-tion and sale of grains The long-term imposition of the state monopoly they write distorted grain prices and caused imbalances in all the distribution of benefits and burdens relating to grain production and sales which in the end

29 Lu Yunhang 陆云航 ldquoDui jianqing nongmin fudan wenti de yi ge gongxian ndash tonggou-tongxiao dui liangshi shengchan yingxiang de shizheng yanjiu 1953ndash1982对减轻农

民负担问题的一个贡献mdashmdash 统购统销对粮食生产影响的实证研究 1953~1982 [A Contribution to the Issue of Reducing Rural Burdens ndash Empirical Research into the Influence of the State Monopoly on Grain Production]rdquo Nankai jingji yanjiu 《南开经

济研究》4 (2005)30 Wu Li ldquoShilun jianguo yilai nongye shengyu ji qi fenpei zhidu de bianhuardquo31 Ding Shengjun 丁声俊 ldquoGuanyu woguo liangshi shangpin gouxiao tizhi de gaige 关于我

国粮食商品购销体制的改革 [On Reforms to the Purchase and Sale System of Grain Products in China]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》8 (1984)

Danli340

ltUNgt

negatively affected the incentives among grain growers32 Many other articles have discussed or otherwise mentioned the negative impact the state monop-oly system had on the work incentives among grain growers For researchers in this field this is now one of the issues most worthy of deep reflection

(D) The Impact of the State Monopoly on the Grain Circulation SystemMany writings have touched on the changes to the grain circulation system that occurred under the state monopoly Many writers including Bo Yibo33 Zhao Fasheng34 Chen Jiyuan35 and others have reflected on the evolution of the circulation system under the monopoly Other articles cover changes to the grain circulation system to varying extents including Chen Tingxuanrsquos ldquoEvo-lution of the Grain Circulation System since the Founding of the Nationrdquo36 Zheng Youguirsquos ldquoReforms to the Grain Circulation System Analysis of Changes to Policies and their Effectsrdquo37 and Dai Daxinrsquos ldquoEvaluation and Analysis of the Policy of State Monopoly on Grain Cotton and Oil in the Early Period of the Nationrdquo38

Chen gives us a relatively thorough overview of the changes that took place in the state grain circulation system from 1949 through the 1980s He di-vides the changes into four phases The first ran from 1949 to 1952 when the

32 Gao Ying and Li Yueyun 高瑛李岳云 ldquoDui woguo liangshi chanxiao liyi shiheng wen-ti de fenxi 对我国粮食产销利益失衡问题的分析 [Analysis of the Issue of Imbal-ance of Interests between Production and Consumption of Grains and cereals in China]rdquo Jianghai xuekan 《江海学刊》6 (2006)

33 Bo Yibo 267ndash27934 Dangdai zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo 75ndash9635 Zhongguo nongcun shehui jingji bianqian (1949ndash1989) 《中国农村社会经济变迁

(1949~1989)》 [Rural Socioeconomic Changes in China (1949ndash1989)] ed Chen Jiyuan et al 陈吉元等 (Shanxi jingji chubanshe 1993) 177ndash185

36 Chen Tingxuan 陈廷煊 ldquoJianguo yilai liangshi liutong tizhi de yanbian 建国以来粮

食流通体制的演变 [Evolution of the Grain Circulation System since the Founding of the Nation]rdquo Gaige 《改革》 (1996) 6

37 Zheng Yougui 郑有贵 ldquoLiangshi liutong tizhi gaige zhengce yanbian ji qi jixiao fenxi 粮食流通体制改革政策演变及其绩效分析 [Reforms to the Grain Circulation Sys-tem Analysis of Changes to Policies and their Effects]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》4 (1998)

38 Dai Daxin 戴大新 ldquoJianguo chuqi liang mian you tonggoutongxiao zhengce pingxi 建国

初期粮棉油统购统销政策评析 [Evaluation and Analysis of the Policy of State Mo-nopoly on Grains and cereals Cotton and Oil in the Early Period of the Nation]rdquo Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao 《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2 (2001)


ltUNgt

state gradually established its overarching regulatory role in grain trade but purchases and sales remained outside the scope of government planning Grain output was unstable during this period and fluctuations began to appear in supply and demand opportunistic behavior jacked up grain prices The second period ran from 1953 to 1978 this being the era of the state grain monopoly The third period ran from 1979 to 1984 during which the state grain monopoly underwent partial reform and the marketrsquos role began to grow in grain produc-tion and pricing The final period from 1985 until present has been marked by a combination of the contract purchase system and the government fixed pur-chase system and by the increased importance of the market as allocation and distribution mechanism Chinarsquos state grain monopoly finally came to an end with its abolishment in 198539 Zhang Zhihua evaluates the evolution of the state grain monopoly from the perspective of grain prices40 Since the issuance of Document Number One in 1985 some researchers have begun to discuss the problems inherent to the original grain circulation system Such discussions can be found in among others Zhao Longyuersquos articleldquoScientifically-informed Choices for Grain Production and Consumption Policiesrdquo41 Yang Wenliangrsquos article ldquoPerspective on the Phenomenon of lsquoBoth Ends Making the Middle Laughrsquo in the Purchase and Sale of Grainrdquo42 Zhang Quanxinrsquos article ldquoResearch into Reforms to the Cotton Purchase and Sale Systemrdquo43 and Jin Su and Luo Yunrsquos article ldquoThe Evolution of Chinarsquos Grain Purchase and Sale System and Thoughts on Reformrdquo44

39 Chen Tingxuan40 Zhang Zhihua 张治华 ldquoJiage dui woguo liangshi shengchan yingxiang de shizheng fenxi

ji zhengce jianyi 价格对我国粮食生产影响的实证分析及政策建议 [Empirical Analysis of the Influence of Prices on Chinarsquos Grain Production and Policy Suggestions]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》9 (1997)

41 Zhao Longyue 赵龙跃 ldquoLiangshi chanxiao zhengce de kexue jueze 粮食产销政策的

科学抉择 [Scientific Choices for Grain Production and Consumption Policies]rdquo Jingji kexue《经济科学》6 (1994)

42 Yang Wenliang 杨文良 ldquoLiangshi gouxiao lsquoliang tou jiao zhongjian xiaorsquo xianxiang toushi 粮食购销 lsquo两头叫中间笑 rsquo 现象透视 [Unhappy Farmers and Consumers Happy Mid-dlemen An Analysis]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》 11 (1995)

43 Zhang Quanxin 张泉欣 ldquoMianhua gouxiao zhidu gaige yanjiu 棉花购销制度改革

研究 [Research into Reforms to the Cotton Purchase and Sale System]rdquo Nongye jingji wenti《农业经济问题》 5 (1996)

44 Jin Su and Luo Yun 金溯罗芸 ldquoWoguo liangshi gouxiao tizhi yanbian yu gaige de sisuo 我国粮食购销体制演变与改革的思索 [The Evolution of Chinarsquos Grain Pur-chase and Sale System and Thoughts on Reform]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村

经济》 4 (1998)

Danli342

ltUNgt

(E) The Relationship between the State Monopoly and Agricultural Cooperatives and Grassroots Organizations

At one level the state monopoly was the decisive factor in the establishment and evolution of the grain circulation system At another level it promoted ag-ricultural collectivization and the rise of cooperatives To a certain extent the state monopoly was a catalyst for both collectivization and the agricultural co-operative movement following the founding of the nation In his analysis of the ldquothree fixedsrdquo policy that went into effect in the mid-1950s Philip Huang notes that ldquothe three fixeds policy not only incorporated the entirety of the small peasant economy within state planning but also firmly pushed rural citizens onto the road of collectivizationrdquo45 Justin Yifu Lin et al give a logical analysis ofthe relationship between the state monopoly and agricultural collectiviza-tion ldquoIn order to ensure that rural citizens invest resources into production of agricultural products needed for industrialization under conditions of a low-price monopoly [officials] put in place institutional arrangements that gave the government direct control of agricultural production through administra-tive mandate According to this logic the agricultural collectivization move-ment began prior to the introduction of the state monopoly on agricultural products and then picked up its pace until 1958 when the peoplersquos commune system was establishedrdquo ldquoThe establishment of a purchase and sales system for agricultural products was merely the first step in the construction of the traditional rural economic system the peoplersquos commune movement was the true symbol that this system along with corresponding macroeconomic poli-cies for the rural economic system had fully formedrdquo46 This is what Lin et al refer toby ldquoa three-in-one traditional economic systemrdquo Specifically it means setting prioritized development of heavy industry as the logical starting point gradually forming a macroeconomic policy environment for distorted product and factor prices and the establishment of a highly-centralized resource plan-ning and allocation system and microeconomic management mechanisms that leave no space whatsoever for individual autonomy in decision-making These were used to ensure that rural surplus products flowed to urban and industrial sectors were available at relatively low prices

Xiao Donglian gives us an in-depth explanation of the reasons behind ag-ricultural collectivization To Xiao a key push for accelerating agricultural

45 Huang Zongzhi 黄宗智 Changjiang sanjiaozhou xiaonong jiating yu xiangcun fazhan 《长江三角洲小农家庭与乡村发展》 [The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta 1350ndash1988] (Zhonghua shuju 1992) 175

46 Lin Yifu et al 38 and 43


ltUNgt

collectivization stemmed from the desire to find a fundamental means of resolving the conflicts between prioritized development of heavy industry and backward agriculture47 First collectivization provided an effective organiza-tion model for ensuring state requisitioning and accumulation which reduced significantly the costs of the state monopoly Second the reason Xiao think agricultural collectivization offers a fundamental resolution to the conflicts between agriculture and industry is that at the time it was widely believed that agricultural collectivization could rapidly increase production output As early as July 1957 Chen Yun clearly noted his hope that agricultural coopera-tives and collectivization could achieve the dual goals of ensuring state requi-sitioning and increasing agricultural output in a speech titled ldquoPersist in and Develop the State Grain Monopolyrdquo 坚持和改进粮食的统购统销 ldquoWe rely primarily on agricultural cooperatives for agricultural development and great increases to grain output That is to say that we should actively steadily de-velop agricultural cooperatives and organize the hundreds of millions of farm-ing households into production cooperatives When that time arrives we will have achieved great increases in grain output at which time performing the work of a state monopoly in agricultural cooperatives will be much easier and much more reasonablerdquo48 Many researchers have performed in-depth studies of the mutual reinforcement between the state monopoly and the agricultural cooperative movement49 In the essay ldquoShanghai Alleys Grassroots Political

47 Xiao Donglian 肖冬连 ldquoJiasu nongye jitihua de yige zhongyao dongyin ndash lun youxian fazhan zhong gongye yu nongye de maodun 加速农业集体化的一个重要动因mdashmdash论优先发展重工业与农业的矛盾 [An Important Factor Behind Acceleration of Ag-ricultural Collectivization ndash On the Conflict between Prioritized Development of Heavy Industry and Agriculture]rdquo Zhonggong dang shi yanjiu 《中共党史研究》4 (1988)

48 Chen Yun wenxuan (yi jiu si jiu ndash yi jiu wu liu nian) 27649 See also Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoJiceng dang zheng jigou shehui zuzhi yu liangshi

tonggoutongxiao zhengce de tuixing 基层党政机构社会组织与粮食统购统销

政策的推行 [Grassroots Party and Government Organs Social Organizations and the Promotion of the State Grain Monopoly Policy]rdquo Shi lin《史林》 1 (2007) Xu Jingyong 许经勇 ldquoLun shehuizhuyi shichang jingji yu woguo nongye fazhan 论社会主义市场

经济与我国农业发展 [On the Socialist Market Economy and the Development of Agriculture in China]rdquo Jingji zongheng 《经济纵横》2 (1994) Zhang Ju and Shao Jin-dong 张举和邵近东 ldquoYi zhong nongcun chaoqiang kongzhi moshi一种农村超强控

制模式 [An Extremely Strong Model for Rural Control]rdquo Lilun xuekan 《理论学刊》7 (2005) as well as Zhang Xuebing 张学兵 ldquolsquoBoduorsquo yu lsquogaizaorsquo ndash tonggoutongxiao zhidu dui dangdai zhongguo nongcun de yingxiang (1953ndash1985) lsquo剥夺 rsquo与 rsquo改造 rsquomdashmdash 统购统

销制度对当代中国农村的影响 (1953~1985) [lsquoExpropriationrsquo and lsquoReformationrsquomdashThe Influence of the State Monopoly on Contemporary Rural China (1953ndash1985)]rdquo (masters

Danli344

ltUNgt

Mobilization and Trends of National Social Integration (1950ndash1955)rdquo Zhang Jishun analyzes the dual state and social role played by resident committees in Shanghai in the first half of the 1950s in political mobilization and system implementation of planned supply50 That dual role means that the supply sys-tem to which the state monopoly gave birth caused grassroots organizations to act as a part of the political mobilization of the planned system These orga-nizations became both drivers and organizers of the planned supply system which to a certain extent strengthened integration of the state and society

(F) The State Monopoly and the Construction of the Dural System of Urban vs Rural China

As Lu Feng points out the problems generated by the state monopoly were more profound and numerous than those it helped to resolved51 Some re-searchers hold that in addition to changing Chinarsquos grain circulation system the state monopoly had other consequences One rather serious repercussion was the formation and strengthening of Chinarsquos urban-rural duality

Xie Jing points out that with its enormous population and poor conditions at the beginning of industrialization China already faced a social system and social structure characterized by the urban-rural division and differenti-ated governance Once large-scale economic construction had been begun shortly after the founding of the nation the state monopoly and the rigorously enforced household registration system together played an important role in reinforcing and solidifying this social duality The state monopoly ensured supply of daily life products at low prices per household planning as well as price subsidies for urban areas The household registration system strictly controlled the growth of the urban population to mitigate pressure on the state caused by industrialization and overly-fast urbanization Under these conditions however systemic planning gave rise to a series of social prob-lems such as the widening urban-rural gap a narrowing of room for social mobility identity inequality sluggishness in the urbanization of Chinarsquos vast

thesis Capital Normal University department of contemporary history 2004) All aca-demic theses quoted in this essay come from the China Outstanding Scholars Theses Database

50 Zhang Jishun 张济顺 ldquoShanghai lilong jiceng zhengzhi dongyuan yu guojia shehui yitihua zouxiang (1950ndash1955) 上海里弄基层政治动员与国家社会一体化走向

(1950~1955) [Shanghai Alleys Grassroots Political Mobilization and Trends of National Social Integration (1950ndash1955)]rdquo Zhongguo shehui kexue 《中国社会科学》2 (2004)

51 Lu Feng


ltUNgt

countryside and so on52 Tang Shuiqing holds that the establishment of the planned supply of grain systemmdashpart of the state grain monopolymdashplayed a key role in the formation of Chinarsquos dual urbanndashrural social system The grain monopoly severed primary market connections between urban and rural ar-eas The system also distinguished between urban and rural identities for the first time by moving rural citizens en masse back to the countryside and re-stricting population movement from the countryside toward cities The system also imposed differentiated supply quota systems on different populations all depending on whether one had an urban household registration or not The system excluded the vast majority of the rural population from the scope of planned supply while at the same time also giving rise to a strictly enforced household registration system53

(G) Implementation of the State Monopoly in Different AreasThe different ways in which the state grain monopoly policy was implemented in different areas have garnered the attention of some researchers Represen-tative works in this field include Zhu Danrsquos ldquoThe Implementation and Effects of the State Monopoly Policy in Hubeirdquo54 Tang Wenqirsquos ldquoA Look Back on the Grain Situation in the Jiangsu Region Prior to the State Monopoly and Les-sons Learnedrdquo55 ldquoBrief Commentary on Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of the State Grain MonopolymdashBeginning with a Discussion of the Implementation of the State Grain Monopoly Policy in Jiangsurdquo56 and ldquoDisaster Relief Work in the

52 Xie Jing 谢敬 ldquoDui tonggoutongxiao zhengce yunxing sanshi yu nian de huigu yu Pingxi 对统购统销政策运行三十余年的回顾与评析 [A Look Back on Commentary on and Analysis of the Over Thirty Years of the State Monopoly Policy]rdquo Jiangxi shehui kexue 《江西社会科学》4 (2003)

53 Tang Shuiqing 汤水清 ldquoLun xin Zhongguo chengxiang eryuan shehui zhidu de xingcheng 论新中国城乡二元社会制度的形成 [On the Emergence of the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Dual Urban-rural Social System]rdquo Jiangxi shehui kexue 《江西社会科学》 8 (2006)

54 Zhu Dan 朱丹 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce zai Hubei de shishi ji yingxiang 统购统销

政策在湖北的实施及影响 [The Implementation and Effects of the State Monopoly Policy in Hubei]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》 1 (1995)

55 Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoTonggoutongxiao qian Jiangsu diqu liangshi xingshi de huigu ji qi qishi 统购统销前江苏地区粮食形势的回顾及其启示 [A Look Back on the Grain Situation in the Jiangsu Region Prior to the State Monopoly and Lessons Learned]rdquo Xian-dai jingji tantao 《现代经济探讨》6 (1994)

56 Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoJianlun Chen Yun lianshi tonggoutongxiao sixiang ndash cong liang-shi tonggoutongxiao zhengce zai Jiangsu Guanche shishi tanqi 简论陈云粮食统购统

销思想mdashmdash 从粮食统购统销政策在江苏贯彻实行谈起 [Brief Commentary on

Danli346

ltUNgt

Era of the State Grain MonopolymdashSelected Pieces from Records of Sichuan ProvincemiddotGrain Recordsrdquo57 Zeng Weirsquos ldquoThe Positive Effects and Negative Effects the State Grain Monopoly had in the History of Guangdongrdquo58 Zhou Zuyin and Jiang Shaoqingrsquos ldquoA Preliminary Exploration into Adjusting Base Numbers for Grain RequisitioningmdashA Look at Reforms to Grain Requisitioning Methods in the Commodity Grain Base of Tielingrdquo59 and others

These articles focus on the implementation and effects of the state mo-nopoly in Hubei Jiangsu Sichuan Guangdong and other places and offer discussions of grain supply and demand and general economic development conditions in these provinces prior to the introduction of the monopoly sys-tem Such analysis of the background of these areas prior to the era of monop-oly system more effectively demonstrate the policyrsquos necessity Zhu Zeng and Tang also analyze the negative and positive roles played by the state monopoly policy in different places Zhou and Jiang explore the maladies present in fixed state grain requisitioning quotas as well as possible solutions In the essay ldquoEs-tablishment of the Planned Grain Supply System in Shanghai (1953ndash1956)rdquo Tang Shuiqing offers a comprehensive analysis of the steps of and process by which the planned supply of grain system was implemented in Shanghai from 1953 to 1956 and the positive and negative impacts of this system60 In ldquoThe Formation of the State Grain Monopoly System and its Use in Tanghe

Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of the State Grain Monopoly ndash Beginning with a Discussion of the Implementation of the State Grain Monopoly Policy in Jiangsu]rdquo Xue hai 《学海》 6 (1995)

57 Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao shiqi de jiuzai gongzuo ndash Sichuan sheng zhimiddotLiangshi zhi xuandeng 粮食统购统销时期的救灾工作mdashmdash〈四川省志 middot粮

食志〉选登 [Disaster Relief Work in the Era of the State Grain Monopoly ndash Selected Pieces from Records of Sichuan ProvincemiddotGrain Records]rdquo Liangshi wenti yanjiu《粮

食问题研究》 1 (1996)58 Zeng Wei 曾伟 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao zai Guangdong lishi shang suo qi de jiji zuoy-

ong he xiaoji zuoyong 粮食统购统销在广东历史上所起的积极作用和消极作用 [The Positive Effects and Negative Effects the State Grain Monopoly Played in the History of Guangdong]rdquo Shangye jingji wenhui 《商业经济文荟》5 (1996)

59 Zhou Zuyin and Jiang Shaoqing 周祖尹姜绍卿 ldquoGuanyu tiaozheng liangshi zheng-gou jishu de chubu tantao ndash cong tieling diqu shangpinliang jidi kan liangshi zhenggou banfa de gaige 关于调整粮食征购基数的初步探讨mdashmdash 从铁岭地区商品粮基

地看粮食征购办法的改革 [An Initial Exploration into Adjusting Base Numbers for Government Purchase of GrainmdashA Look at Reforms to the Governmentrsquos Grain Purchas-ing Methods in the Commodity Grain Base of Tieling]rdquo Nongye jingji 《农业经济》 1 (1983)

60 Tang Shuiqing 汤水清 ldquoShanghai liangshi jihua gongying zhidu de jianli (1953ndash1956) 上海粮食计划供应制度的建立 (1953~1956) [Establishment of the Planned Grains


ltUNgt

Countyrdquo Tian Xiquan uses a large amount of case material and records in his analysis of how the state grain monopoly actually operated on the ground and its effects on the daily life of the ordinary people He focuses especially on Tanghe County Henan Province61 In addition local grain records compiled by various provincial (or direct-controlled city) prefectural and county grain departments62 provide records of the implementation of the state monopoly in these places These records provide a range of data such as those on grain requisitioning grain supply and sales the promotion of the coupon system and so on Abundant as these data are they are mere descriptions and lack analytical import

(H) The State Monopoly and the Coupon SystemThe creation of the coupon rationing system and the rolling out of the state monopoly are closely related On November 23 1953 the State Administrative Council resolved to implement a state monopoly on grain On August 23 1955 the State Administrative Council put into effect the system of supply quotas by which grains were available to urban residents for purchase only through grain coupons On September 15 1954 the State Administrative Council decided to include cottonmdashboth in the state of raw material and in the form of finished productsmdashwithin the state monopoly making coupons necessary for buying cotton wadding and cotton cloth At the same time local governments around the country instituted coupon rationing systems on pork eggs milk fish veg-etables sugar dietary alkali coal soap matches bicycles wristwatches and other commodities Local governments did not begin to abolish their coupon rationing systems until 1985 after the ccp Central Committee had resolved to abolish the state grain monopoly putting an end to the 30-year quota system

While acknowledging the benefits of the coupon rationing system such as price stability and guarantee of basic living standards Wan Dianwu also points out problems with the system such as its deviation from the law of value its

and cereals Supply System in Shanghai (1953ndash1956)]rdquo (2005 doctoral thesis in the Fudan University department of history)

61 Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao zhidu de xingcheng ji qi zai Tanghe xian de yunzuo (1953ndash1957) 粮食统购统销制度的形成及其在唐河县的运作

(1953~1957) [The Formation of the State Grain Monopoly System and its Use in Tanghe County]rdquo (2004 doctoral thesis in the Fudan Unviersity department of history)

62 Such as Jiangsu sheng liangshi zhi 《江苏省粮食志》 [Grain Records of Jiangsu Province] (Jiangsu renmin chubanshe 1993) Henan sheng liangshi zhi 《河南省粮食

志》 [Grain Records of Henan Province] (Zhongguo shangye chubanshe 2003) Hebei sheng zhi bull liangshi zhi《河北省志bull粮食志》 [Records of Hubei Province bull Grain Records] (Zhongguo chengshi chubanshe 1994) and so on

Danli348

ltUNgt

negative effect on the work incentives of farmers and workers the creation of highly-centralized monopolistic commercialized bloated management and administrative organs under it and its having apparently triggered the intro-duction of the coupon system for other goods63 Some other researchers have given a descriptive account of the impact of the coupon rationing system on peoplersquos lives in the era of material shortages64 Zhang Shuguang provides an analysis of the formation evolution and characteristics of the state grain mo-nopoly using from the point of view of institutional economics in his article ldquoOpening up Grain Prices and Abolishing Grain Couponsmdasha Study of Changes to Chinarsquos Grain Purchase and Sales System 放开粮价取消粮票mdash中国

粮食购销制度变迁研究 rdquo Zhang discusses the relationships between rights and obligations of government officials rural citizens urban citizens and oth-er social groups that formed in response to the introduction of the state grain monopoly and the impact these relationships had on institutional evolution In particular he offers an in-depth exploration of the functions and effects of grain coupons andprice changes65 In their book Grain Coupons Grain Prices Tang Zhong and Song Jiqing give a historical account and analysis of the grain coupon system in which they examine the ills of the use of the grain coupon system and the direction of grain reforms66

Many researchers present case studies in the implementation of the grain coupon rationing system Tian Xiquan for example shows how the use of various grain coupons provided an effective guarantee for the thorough implementation of the state grain monopoly policy through a study of the issuance and administration of different kinds of grain coupons in Henan Province from 1953 to 1957 The use of these coupons was both necessary and feasible under the conditions at the time and they had an important role to play As time passed however the downsides of the system (such as the pernicious tendency for grain coupons gradually to take on the function of

63 Wan Dianwu 万典武 ldquoCong liangshi mian bu deng piaozheng de xingfei kan gaige 从粮食棉布等票证的兴废看改革 [A Look at Reforms from the Rise and Fall of Coupon Systems for Grains and cerealss Cotton Cloth and So On]rdquo Shangye jingji yanjiu《商业经济研究》 12 (1998)

64 Lei Yi 雷颐 ldquolsquoRichang shenghuorsquo yu lishi yanjiu lsquo日常生活 rsquo与历史研究 [Research into lsquoDaily Lifersquo and History]rdquo Shixue lilun yanjiu 《史学理论研究》3 (2000)

65 Zhongguo zhidu bianqian de anli yanjiu di 1 ji 《中国制度变迁的案例研究》第 1 集 [Evolution of Chinarsquos Institutions and Case Studies Vol 1] ed Beijing Tianze Research Center 北京天则研究所 (Shanghai Renmin chubanshe 1996) 266ndash230

66 Tang Zhong and Song Jiqing 唐忠宋继青 Liangpiao Liangjia 《粮票粮价》 [Grain Coupons Grain Prices] (Beijing Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 1992)


ltUNgt

certificates that carried genuine valuemdashoften called ldquothe second currencyrdquomdash which attracted opportunists to misuse and abuse them) became more evi-dent and grain coupons became an important symbol of the urban-rural duality that had emerged in China in the era of the state monopoly67

(I) Foreign Research into the State MonopolyTian Xiquan has performed the most extensive survey of works by foreign researchers on Chinarsquos state monopoly to date My exposition here is more or less entirely based on Tianrsquos work68 Dwight Perkins notes quite early in his analysis of the state monopoly the pressure that emphasizing development of heavy industry shortly after the founding of the nation exerted on grain mar-kets and production He also analyzes the necessity of the implementation of the fixed supply system for grain cotton cloth edible oils and other com-modities owing to the premium placed on heavy industry the lack of invest-ments in agriculture prevailing ideologies and political controls69 Vivienne Shue holds that the introduction of the ldquothree fixedsrdquo policy in 1955 indicated a reduction in government demand for grain and did not represent an at-tempt by the government to become more austere on the basis of changes to state grain requisitioning quantities before and after the policyrsquos issuance70 Thomas Bernstein gives an in-depth discussion of the grain crisis of spring 1955 an analysis of the reasons behind it and an account of the mechanisms through which Chinarsquos rural mass movements were launched71

67 Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoTonggoutongxiao chuqi de liangshi piaozheng zhidu tanxi ndash yi 1953ndash1957 nian de Henan wei gersquoan 统购统销初期的粮食票证制度探析mdashmdash以

1953~1957 年的河南为个案 [Exploration of the Grain Coupon System in the Early State Monopoly Period ndash Using 1953ndash1957 Henan as a Case Study]rdquo Shixue yuekan 《史学月

刊》5 (2004)68 Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoLiangshi tongoutongxiao zhidu yanjiu de huigu he sikao 粮食

统购统销制度研究的回顾和思考 [A Look Back on and Thoughts on Research into the State Grain Monopoly System]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研

究》2 (2006) and Tian Xiquan 田锡全 Geming yu nongcun ndash guojia sheng xian yu liangshi tonggoutongxiao zhidu 1953ndash1957 《革命与乡村mdashmdash国家省县与粮食

统购统销制度 1953~1957》 [Revolution and the Countryside ndash the State the Province the County and the State Grain Monopoly System 1953ndash1957] (Shanghai Shehui kexue chubanshe 2006) 8ndash9

69 Dwight H Perkins Market Control and Planning in Communist China (Cambridge Harvard University Press 1968) 42 and 205ndash214

70 Vivenne Shue Peasant China in Transition The Dynamics of Development Toward Social-ism 1949ndash1956 (Berkely University of California Press 1980) 236

71 Thomas P Bernstein ldquoCadre and Peasant Behavior Under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955rdquo in Chinese Communist Politics

Danli350

ltUNgt

Foreign researchers have produced a great number of weighty works on the operations of the state grain monopoly on the ground level Shue describes the implementation of the state grain monopoly in Hubei and Hunan and the changes it engendered in the countryside72 In his book Food Grain Procure-ment and Consumption in China Kenneth Walker traces the development of the state grain monopoly over the period 1953 to 1962 and in the late 1970s Walker focuses primarily on evaluations of grain requisitioning and sales fig-ures within provinces between provinces and between urban and rural areas on the basis of which he attempts to determine the impact of the state mo-nopoly system on grain consumption73 In her book State and Peasant in Con-temporary China The Political Economy of Village Government Jean Oi makes an in-depth exploration of the Chinarsquos countryside in the period of collectiv-ization (1955 to 1984) particularly the course of grain requisitioning during the era of the peoplersquos commune and the various power relationships to which it gave rise74 Foreign research in the field of the Chinese state monopoly is well worth careful study

iii Comprehensive Evaluation and Overall Understanding of the State Monopoly Policy

Some research has attempted to provide comprehensive examination and evaluations of the state monopoly policy For example in ldquoMemorandum on Grain Issues 粮食问题备忘录 rdquo Gao Xiaomeng offers a systematic discus-sion of the characteristics functions and inherent problems of the state monopoly system Gao notes the three important functions of the system stabilizing general price levels contributing to state capital accumulation and ensuring urban supply to satisfy the demands for agricultural products of industrialization The author also explains that matching contributions and exchanges and matching subsidies and exchanges were the root of all the ills of the state monopoly75 Researchers have however generally acknowledged

in Action ed Doak Barnett (Seattle and London University of Washington Press 1970) 365ndash399

72 Zhou Zuyin and Jiang Shaoqing 214ndash24573 Kenneth R Walker Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge

Cambridge University Press 1984)74 Jean C Oi State and Peasant in Contemporary China The Political Economy of Village Gov-

ernment (Berkeley Los Angeles and Oxford University of California Press 1989)75 Nongcun biange yu zhongguo fazhan 1978ndash1989 xia 429ndash433


ltUNgt

the benefits of the state monopoly system holding almost unanimously that the state monopoly propelled industrialization in China Some researchers have noted that the general line for the transitionary period issued in 1953 gave top priority to industrialization but China did not use models for primi-tive accumulation of capital for industrialization that had historically been common elsewhere in the world such as the ldquoenclosurerdquo movement em-ployed in England Rather Chinese officials adopted the Soviet model of pri-oritizing heavy industry which demanded large-scale capital accumulation At the end of 1952 agriculture accounted for 569 percent of Chinarsquos com-bined agricultural and industrial output value and light industry accounted for 644 percent of total industrial output value Production of goods manu-factured from agricultural products then accounted for 875 percent of total light industry output value Faced with such a lopsided industry structure Chinese officials at the time could not depend on industry to provide capi-tal accumulation and national savings required for industrialization Such a situation meant that the primary sector of economic growth in China at the time namely agriculture was the only sector which could provide capital accumulation The state monopoly on grain and other major industrial crops provided light industry with a stable low-cost source of raw materials which in turn ensured growth The profits and taxes the state earned from light industry were then invested in heavy industry the development of which development followed76 One could say that the state monopoly played an extremely importantmdashin fact irreplaceablemdashrole in driving industrialization in China and that it played a positive role over this period in the history of contemporary China

Researchers have also made thorough evaluations of the central role the state monopoly system played in giving rise to the socialist planned econ-omy After the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China the state began the transition from a new democratic society toward a socialist society and gradually developed the planned economy As the planned economy was taking shape how to handle the rural population widely spread out and numerous as it was and agriculture backward as it was and threating to obstruct the advancement of industrialization became two major problems for the government The key lay in incorporating the ubiquitous small peasant economy within the scope of the planned economy In the opinion of Chen Guoqing the grain monopoly policy of 1953 brought the highly spread-out

76 Chen Guoqing 陈国庆 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de chansheng ji qi yingxiang 统购统

销政策的产生及其影响 [The Creation of the State Monopoly Policy and its Effects]rdquo Xuexi yu tansuo 《学习与探索》2 (2006)

Danli352

ltUNgt

rural population under state control and abolished the free market which had been established over a broad area The state then came to control grain and all other primary agricultural products its long arms even reaching into the realm of consumption laying the foundation for the establishment later of the planned economy77 Xie Jing also confirms the positive role the state monopoly played in accelerating the pace of socialist reformation The state monopoly and socialist reformation were interdependent Together they in-corporated the small peasant economy within the scope of the state planned economy giving rise to mutual aid and cooperation and bringing the rural economy onto the path of socialism78 Many researchers have acknowledged the role the state monopoly played in mitigating the grain crisis and stabi-lizing prices Others have reconsidered the problems and ills generated by the state monopoly policy as I already reviewed above One must point out however that any appraisal made of the state monopoly policy must not be made independent of consideration of the background and historical condi-tions of the times as only by considering the whole picture can one truly be objective and fair

iv Examining the State Monopoly under Its Particular Historical Circumstances

Du Runsheng once said ldquoThe issues of rural areas agriculture and rural citizens [ie the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo] are absolutely not simple nor are they isolated they are rather closely related to the overall national development strategy and domestic and foreign historical circumstances at the time There-fore in order to understand break down or analyze the experiences and lessons gained from Chinarsquos agricultural policies in the long term one must set them against these grand historical narratives before drawing conclusionsrdquo79 The state monopoly came about soon after the founding of the Peoplersquos Repub-lic of China Over its thirty years it evolved into an institutional system richly characteristic of the planned economy It had a deep impact on the formation and evolution of Chinarsquos planned economy it also had a profound impact on Chinarsquos socioeconomic development and social structure The state monopoly was in essence a grain circulation system established against the backdrop of

77 Ibid78 Xie Jing79 Du Runsheng 杜润生 Zhongguo nongcun tizhi biange zhongda juece jishi 《中国农村

体制变革重大决策纪实》 [Records of Major Decisions in Reforms to Chinarsquos Rural System] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 2005) 215ndash216


ltUNgt

grain shortages following the founding of the nation dramatic fluctuation to market prices for grain and rampant speculation Given those conditions the state monopoly played an enormous role in reigning in opportunistic behavior stabilizing market prices and mitigating the adverse effects of the grain crisis The state grain monopoly was a necessary choice under the economic condi-tions of the time The only way we can arrive at an objective fair understand-ing of the formation of the state monopoly system is to make a comprehensive survey of domestic and international economic and political conditions as well as historical circumstances of the time

We should likewise realize that the state monopoly system was not only a necessary product of history but that it had a profound and far-reaching impact on the formation of economic and social systems in China for over thirty years In fact its impact can still be felt even today At the economic level the state monopoly system was an integral part of Chinarsquos planned economy One could even call it one of the first attempts toward the planned economy The state monopolyrsquos solidification of production factor and market prices its microeconomic restrictions on the autonomy of market entities and its rigorous macroeconomic controls on the production and sale of grain laid the institutional and microeconomic foundations for the planned economy At the national strategy level the state monopoly was an integral part of Chinarsquos strategy of prioritizing development of heavy industry In fact it was the state monopoly that enabled the state to obtain large quantities of resources and agricultural surpluses from the agricultural sector to support rapid industrialization The state monopoly also provided enormous amounts of capital accumulation and low-cost materials for industrialization We could say that the state monopoly was an important undergrid for industrialization in China and that it played an important role in Chinarsquos economic develop-ment At the social level the state monopoly triggered great changes to Chinarsquos social structure and strengthened the urban-rural duality social barriers be-tween urban and rural areas were further solidified within the state monopoly system At the same time however the state monopoly also accelerated the course of both collectivization and the agricultural cooperative movement Agricultural collectivization and the cooperative movement in turn laid an organizational and institutional foundation for the formation of the state monopoly ultimately propelling the peoplersquos commune movement in China One cannot therefore evaluate or try to understand the state monopoly pol-icy through a narrow perspective The introduction of the state monopoly policy was logically consistent with other policies the Chinese government ad-opted under the prevailing conditions of the time On the whole all these poli-cies served to accelerate industrialization and help the country catch up with and overtake more economically developed countries elsewhere in the world

Danli354

ltUNgt

If one looks at the entire lifespan of the state monopoly from its inception to its end one must acknowledge that the system did indeed play its intended historical role shortly after it took shape and its contribution to early industri-alization efforts should not go unrecognized Of course we should also see the ills to which this system gave rise in its later years as economic development levels rose The state monopoly arbitrarily erected a barrier between rural citi-zens and the market The state replaced grain markets with a uniform grain pur-chase and sale system which violated the law of value in price regulation and resource allocation Rural citizens with no guidance from the market did not have the right to dispose of their own products as they saw fit This lack of rights served to hurt their incentives to work which then contributed towards chronic economic shortages The state also suffered enormous losses in several areas and was encumbered with a heavy burden giving rise to grievances on the part of the government the rural population and the urban population alike We should draw lessons from this history The reforms the government instituted to the grain circulation system following 1985rsquos abolition of the state monopoly es-sentially placed emphasis on the role of the market as well as on the normative function of the law of value Thereafter as the state began to exert a degree of macroeconomic controls to ensure state grain security officials brought about a new grain circulation system suitable to the market economy and guided by the market Following the end of the state monopoly system many negative aspects of the system under the auspices of the planned economy have gradually been contained These include the ever-widening urban-rural gap limited room for social mobility inequality among social identities sluggish urbanization imbalances in social and economic structure unreasonable mechanisms for resource and production factor allocations and so on These too were histori-cally inevitable We should come to understand the state monopoly systemrsquos formation and development as set against the backdrop of a particular set of historical conditions We must not however deny the enormous positive role it once played on account of some of the adverse effects it had in its later years

References

Bernstein Thomas P ldquoCadre and Peasant Behavior Under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955rdquo in Chinese Commu-nist Politics in Action ed Doak Barnett (Seattle and London University of Washing-ton Press 1970)


事件的回顾》 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 1] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1991)


ltUNgt

Chen Guoqing 陈国庆 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de chansheng ji qi yingxiang 统购

统销政策的产生及其影响 [The Creation of the State Monopoly Policy and its Effects]rdquo Xuexi yu tansuo 《学习与探索》 2 (2006)

Chen Tingxuan 陈廷煊 ldquoJianguo yilai liangshi liutong tizhi de yanbian 建国以来粮

食流通体制的演变 [Evolution of the Grain Circulation System since the Found-ing of the Nation]rdquo Gaige 《改革》 6 (1996)

Chen Yun wenxuan (yi jiu si jiu ndash yi jiu wu liu nian) 《陈云文选(一九四九mdashmdash 一

九五六年)》 [Selected Works of Chen Yun (1949ndash1956)] (Beijing renmin chuban-she 1984)

Cui Xiaoli 崔晓黎 ldquoTonggoutongxiao yu gongye jilei 统购统销与工业积累 [The State Monopoly and Industrial Accumulation]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国

经济史研究》 4 (1988)Dai Daxin 戴大新 ldquoJianguo chuqi liang mian you tonggoutongxiao zhengce Pingxi

建国初期粮棉油统购统销政策评析 [Evaluation and Analysis of the Policy of State Monopoly on Grain Cotton and Oil in the Early Period of the Country]rdquo Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2 (2001)

Dangdai zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo 《当代中国的粮食工作》 [Grain Work in Contemporary China] ed Zhao Fasheng 赵发生 (Beijing Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1988)

Ding Shengjun 丁声俊 ldquoGuanyu woguo liangshi shangpin gouxiao tizhi de gaige 关于

我国粮食商品购销体制的改革 [On Reforms to the Purchase and Sale System of Grain Products in China]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》 8 (1984)

Du Runsheng 杜润生 Zhongguo nongcun tizhi biange zhongda juece jishi 《中国农村

体制变革重大决策纪实》 [Records of Major Decisions in Reforms to Chinarsquos Rural System] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 2005)

Gao Ying and Li Yueyun 高瑛李岳云 ldquoDui woguo liangshi chanxiao liyi shiheng wenti de fenxi 对我国粮食产销利益失衡问题的分析 [Analysis of the Issue of Imbalance of Interests between Production and Consumption of Grain in China]rdquo Jianghai xuekan 《江海学刊》 6 (2006)

Huang Zongzhi 黄宗智 Changjiang sanjiaozhou xiaonong jiating yu xiangcun fazhan 《长江三角洲小农家庭与乡村发展》 [The Peasant Family and Rural Develop-ment in the Yangzi Delta 1350ndash1988] (Zhonghua shuju 1992)


4册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 4] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1993)

Jianqiao zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (1949ndash1965) 《剑桥中华人民共和国史

(1949~1965)》 [Cambridge History of the Peoplersquos Republic of China (1949ndash1965)] ed Roderick MacFarquhar and Fei Zhengqing 费正清 translated from the English (Beijing Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1990)

Jin Su and Luo Yun 金溯罗芸 ldquoWoguo liangshi gouxiao tizhi yanbian yu gaige de sisuo 我国粮食购销体制演变与改革的思索 [The Evolution of Chinarsquos Grain

Danli356

ltUNgt

Purchase and Sale System and Thoughts on Reform]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》 4 (1998)

Lei Yi 雷颐 ldquolsquoRichang shenghuorsquo yu lishi yanjiu lsquo日常生活 rsquo与历史研究 [Research into lsquoDaily Lifersquo and History]rdquo Shixue lilun yanjiu 《史学理论研究》 3 (2000)

Lin Yifu Cai Fang and Li Zhou 林毅夫蔡昉李周 Zhongguo de qiji fazhan zhan-luumle yu jingji gaige 《中国的奇迹发展战略与经济改革》 [The Chinese Miracle Development Strategy and Economic Reforms] (Shanghai Shanghai sanlian shudian and Shanghai renmin chubanshe 1994)

Liu Chuanjiang 刘传江 ldquoZhongguo liangshi liutong de zhidu anpai ji qi bianqian 中国粮食流通的制度安排及其变迁 [Arrangements of Chinarsquos Grain Circula-tion System and Changes Thereto]rdquo Jingji pinglun 《经济评论》 2 (2000)

Lu Feng 卢锋 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de shishi yu feishichang tizhi de jianli 统购

统销政策的实施与非市场体制的建立 [The Implementation of the State Mo-nopoly Policy and the Erection of a Non-Market System]rdquo Jiaoxue yu yanjiu 《教学

与研究》 3 (1989)Lu Ling 庐陵 ldquo1953 nian zhongguo de liangshi weiji yu tonggoutongxiao zhengce de

qiyuan 1953年中国的粮食危机与统购统销政策的起源 [Chinarsquos Grain Crisis of 1953 and the Genesis of the State Monopoly Policy]rdquo Beijing daxue yanjiusheng xuekan 《北京大学研究生学刊》 4 (1993)

Lu Yunhang 陆云航 ldquoDui jianqing nongmin fudan wenti de yi ge gongxian ndash tonggou-tongxiao dui liangshi shengchan yingxiang de shizheng yanjiu 1953ndash1982 对减

轻农民负担问题的一个贡献 mdashmdash统购统销对粮食生产影响的实证研究 1953~1982 [A Contribution to the Issue of Reducing Rural BurdensmdashEmpirical Research into the Influence of the State Monopoly on Grain Production]rdquo Nankai jingji yanjiu 《南开经济研究》 4 (2005)

Nongcun biange yu zhongguo fazhan 1978ndash1989 xia 《农村变革与中国发展 1978~1989》下 [Rural Revolution and Chinarsquos Development 1978ndash1989 Vol 2] ed Zhou Qiren 周其仁 (Hong Kong Oxford University Press China 1994)

Oi Jean C State and Peasant in Contemporary China The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley Los Angeles and Oxford University of California Press 1989)

Perkins Dwight H Market Control and Planning in Communist China (Cambridge Harvard University Press 1968)

Shue Vivenne Peasant China in Transition The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism 1949ndash1956 (Berkely University of California Press 1980)

Tang Shuiqing 汤水清 ldquoLun xin Zhongguo chengxiang eryuan shehui zhidu de xingcheng 论新中国城乡二元社会制度的形成 [On the Emergence of the Peo-plersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Dual Urbanndashrural Social System]rdquo Jiangxi shehui kexue 《江西社会科学》 8 (2006)

Tang Shuiqing 汤水清 ldquoShanghai liangshi jihua gongying zhidu de jianli (1953ndash1956) 上海粮食计划供应制度的建立(1953~1956)[Establishment of the Planned Grain


ltUNgt

Supply System in Shanghai (1953ndash1956)]rdquo (2005 doctoral thesis in the Fudan Univer-sity department of history)

Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoJianlun Chen Yun lianshi tonggoutongxiao sixiang ndash cong liangshi tonggoutongxiao zhengce zai Jiangsu Guanche shishi tanqi 简论陈

云粮食统购统销思想mdashmdash从粮食统购统销政策在江苏贯彻实行谈起 [Brief Commentary on Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of the State Grain Monopoly ndash Beginning with a Discussion of the Implementation of the State Grain Monopoly Policy in Jiangsu]rdquo Xue hai 《学海》 6 (1995)

Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoTonggoutongxiao qian Jiangsu diqu liangshi xingshi de huigu ji qi qishi 统购统销前江苏地区粮食形势的回顾及其启示 [A Look Back on the Grain Situation in the Jiangsu Region Prior to the State Monopoly and Lessons Learned]rdquo Xiandai jingji tantao 《现代经济探讨》 6 (1994)

Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao shiqi de jiuzai gongzuo ndash Sich-uan sheng zhimiddotLiangshi zhi xuandeng 粮食统购统销时期的救灾工作mdashmdash 〈四川省志粮食志〉选登 [Disaster Relief Work in the Era of the State Grain MonopolymdashSelected Pieces from Records of Sichuan ProvincemiddotGrain Records]rdquo Liangshi wenti yanjiu 《粮食问题研究》 1 (1996)

Tang Zhong and Song Jiqing 唐忠宋继青 Liangpiao Liangjia 《粮票粮价》 [Grain Coupons Grain Prices] (Beijing Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 1992)

Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoTonggoutongxiao chuqi de liangshi piaozheng zhidu tanxi ndash yi 1953ndash1957 nian de Henan wei gersquoan 统购统销初期的粮食票证制度探析mdashmdash以

1953~1957 年的河南为个案 [Exploration of the Grain Coupon System in the Early State Monopoly PeriodmdashUsing 1953ndash1957 Henan as a Case Study]rdquo Shixue yuekan 《史学月刊》 5 (2004)

Tian Xiquan 田锡全 Geming yu nongcun ndash guojia sheng xian yu liangshi tonggou-tongxiao zhidu 1953ndash1957 《革命与乡村mdashmdash国家省县与粮食统购统销

制度 1953~1957》 [Revolution and the Countrysidemdashthe State the Province the County and the State Grain Monopoly System 1953ndash1957] (Shanghai Shehui kexue chubanshe 2006)

Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao zhidu de xingcheng ji qi zai Tang-he xian de yunzuo (1953ndash1957) 粮食统购统销制度的形成及其在唐河县的运

作(1953~1957) [The Formation of the State Grain Monopoly System and its Use in Tanghe County]rdquo (2004 doctoral thesis in the Fudan Unviersity department of history)

Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoLiangshi tongoutongxiao zhidu yanjiu de huigu he sikao 粮食

统购统销制度研究的回顾和思考 [A Look Back on and Thoughts on Research into the State Grain Monopoly System]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史

研究》 2 (2006)Walker Kenneth R Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge

Cambridge University Press 1984)

Danli358

ltUNgt

Wan Dianwu 万典武 ldquoCong liangshi mian bu deng piaozheng de xingfei kan gaige从粮食棉布等票证的兴废看改革 [A Look at Reforms from the Rise and Fall of Coupon Systems for Grains Cotton Cloth and So On]rdquo Shangye jingji yanjiu 《商

业经济研究》 12 (1998)Wu Li 武力 ldquo1949ndash1978 nian zhongguo ldquojiandaochardquo charsquoe bianzheng 1949~1978年中

国 lsquo剪刀差 rsquo差额辨正 [Identification and Correction of Chinarsquos lsquoPrice Scissorsrsquo Dis-crepancy from 1949 to 1978]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研究》 4 (2001)

Wu Li 武力 ldquoShilun jianguo yilai nongye shengyu ji qi fenpei zhidu de bianhua 试论建

国以来农业剩余及其分配制度的变化 [On the Subject of Changes to Agricul-tural Surpluses and Distribution Systems since the Founding of the Nation]rdquo Fujian shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 《福建师范大学学报(哲学社会

科学版)》 3 (2004)Wu Shuo 吴硕 ldquoTongoutongxiao yu jiazhi guiluuml de yunyong 统购统销与价值规律

的运用 [The State Monopoly and Use of the Law of Value]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济

研究》 1 (1984)Xiao Donglian 肖冬连 ldquoJiasu nongye jitihua de yige zhongyao dongyin ndash lun youx-

ian fazhan zhong gongye yu nongye de maodun 加速农业集体化的一个重要

动因mdashmdash论优先发展重工业与农业的矛盾 [An Important Factor Behind Acceleration of Agricultural Collectivization ndash On the Conflict between Prioritized Development of Heavy Industry and Agriculture]rdquo Zhonggong dang shi yanjiu《中

共党史研究》 4 (1988)Xie Jing 谢敬 ldquoDui tonggoutongxiao zhengce yunxing sanshi yu nian de huigu yu

pingxi 对统购统销政策运行三十余年的回顾与评析 [A Look Back on Com-mentary on and Analysis of the Over Thirty Years of the State Monopoly Policy]rdquo Jiangxi shehui kexue 《江西社会科学》 4 (2003)

Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 《新时期农业

和农村工作重要文献选编》 [Selected Important Works on Agriculture and Rural Work in the New Era] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992)

Xu Jianqing 徐建青 ldquoJianguo qianqi de shijia yu paijia ndash cong jiage jizhi dao tonggou-tongxiao 建国前期的市价与牌价mdashmdash从价格机制到统购统销 [Market Prices and Government-set prices in the Early Days of the Nationmdashfrom Pricing Mechanisms to the State Monopoly]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研究》 2 (2002)

Yang Wenliang 杨文良 ldquoLiangshi gouxiao lsquoliang tou jiao zhongjian xiaorsquo xianxiang toushi 粮食购销 lsquo两头叫中间笑 rsquo现象透视 [Perspective on the Phenomenon of lsquoBoth Ends Making the Middle Laughrsquo in the Purchase and Sale of Grain]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》 11 (1995)

Yi Shui 亦水 ldquolsquoShi bu shi haiyou biede banfarsquo ndash cong quding tonggoutongxiao zhengce kan Chen Yun de gongzuo he jiejue fangfa lsquo是不是还有别的办法rsquomdashmdash从确定


ltUNgt

统购统销政策看陈云的工作和决策方法 [lsquoIs There Another WayrsquomdashA Look at Chen Yunrsquos Work and Methodological Approach through the Establishment of the State Monopoloy Policy]rdquo Dang de wenxian 《党的文献》 3 (2005)

Zeng Wei 曾伟 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao zai Guangdong lishi shang suo qi de jiji zuoyong he xiaoji zuoyong 粮食统购统销在广东历史上所起的积极作用和消

极作用 [The Positive Effects and Negative Effects the State Grain Monopoly Played in the History of Guangdong]rdquo Shangye jingji wenhui 《商业经济文荟》 5 (1996)

Zhang Fengrsquoao 张凤翱 ldquoJianlun Chen Yun de lsquowu liang ze luanrsquo sixiang 简论陈云

的 rsquo无粮则乱 rsquo思想 [A Brief Discussion of Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of lsquoWithout Grain there is Anarchyrsquo]rdquo Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao 《湖南师范大学社

会科学学报》 5 (2001)Zhang Jishun 张济顺 ldquoShanghai lilong jiceng zhengzhi dongyuan yu guojia shehui

yitihua zouxiang (1950ndash1955) 上海里弄基层政治动员与国家社会一体化走向

(1950~1955) [Shanghai Alleys Grassroots Political Mobilization and Trends of Na-tional Social Integration (1950ndash1955)]rdquo Zhongguo shehui kexue 《中国社会科学》 2 (2004)

Zhang Quanxin 张泉欣 ldquoMianhua gouxiao zhidu gaige yanjiu 棉花购销制度改革研

究 [Research into Reforms to the Cotton Purchase and Sale System]rdquo Nongye jingji wenti《农业经济问题》5 (1996)

Zhang Xuebing 张学兵 ldquo1953 ndash 1958 nian tonggoutongxiao ji ge wenti kaoyi 1953~1958 年统购统销几个问题考议 [Discussion of Some Issues of the State Monopoly from 1953 to 1958]rdquo Changbai xuekan 《长白学刊》 4 (2006)

Zhang Zhihua 张治华 ldquoJiage dui woguo liangshi shengchan yingxiang de shizheng fenxi ji zhengce jianyi 价格对我国粮食生产影响的实证分析及政策建议 [Em-pirical Analysis of the Influence of Prices on Chinarsquos Grain output and Policy Sug-gestions]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》 9 (1997)

Zhao Longyue 赵龙跃 ldquoLiangshi chanxiao zhengce de kexue jueze 粮食产销政策的

科学抉择 [Scientific Choices for Grain output and Consumption Policies]rdquo Jingji kexue 《经济科学》 6 (1994)

Zheng Yougui 郑有贵 ldquoLiangshi liutong tizhi gaige zhengce yanbian ji qi jixiao fenxi 粮食流通体制改革政策演变及其绩效分析 [Reforms to the Grain Circulation System Analysis of Changes to Policies and their Effects]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》 4 (1998)

Zhongguo nongcun shehui jingji bianqian (1949ndash1989) 《中国农村社会经济变迁

(1949~1989)》 [Rural Socioeconomic Changes in China (1949ndash1989)] ed Chen Jiyuan et al 陈吉元等 (Shanxi jingji chubanshe 1993)

Zhongguo zhidu bianqian de anli yanjiu di 1 ji 《中国制度变迁的案例研究》第 1 集 [Evolution of Chinarsquos Institutions and Case Studies Vol 1] ed Beijing Tianze Re-search Center 北京天则研究所 (Shanghai Renmin chubanshe 1996)

Danli360

ltUNgt

Zhou Zuyin and Jiang Shaoqing 周祖尹姜绍卿 ldquoGuanyu tiaozheng liangshi zhenggou jishu de chubu tantao ndash cong tieling diqu shangpinliang jidi kan liangshi zhenggou banfa de gaige 关于调整粮食征购基数的初步探讨mdashmdash从铁岭地区

商品粮基地看粮食征购办法的改革 [An Initial Exploration into Adjusting Base Numbers for Grain RequisitioningmdashA Look at Reforms to Grain Requisitioning Methods in the Commodity Grain Base of Tieling]rdquo Nongye jingji 《农业经济》 1 (1983)

Zhu Dan 朱丹 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce zai Hubei de shishi ji yingxiang 统购统销

政策在湖北的实施及影响 [The Implementation and Effects of the State Monop-oly Policy in Hubei]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》 1 (1995)

ltUNgt

Index

abnormal marriagesemsp327academicsemsp5 25n1 26ndash28 32 36 43

53 102ndash103n5 121 134 156 193 224 227 330 330n1 333n8 343ndash344n49

accumulationemsp7 26 45 69 169 171 206 208 235 246 257 304 336 337 337n24 339 343 350 351 353

accumulation of means of productionemsp257adjudicationemsp241adjustments to agricultureemsp307adventurismemsp145ndash146 151agricultural civilizationemsp287agricultural collectivizationemsp1 5ndash11 55

156n3 190ndash191n56 231 257 342 343 343n47 353

agricultural cooperative movementemsp69 70 109 288 342 343 353

agricultural cooperativesemsp53 62 75 82 102 102n4 104ndash106 116 133 135ndash139 136n7 136n10 141 150 164 232 246 257 320 342 343

agricultural cooperatizationemsp6n8 53 67 70 162n18

agricultural frontemsp106agricultural history researchemsp267n1 268agricultural household registrationsemsp45 217agricultural investmentsemsp220 221agricultural modernizationemsp28 41 213agricultural productionemsp3 6ndash8 15 26 30ndash32

41 48 106 116 123 136 161 176ndash178 246 252n36 272 283 288 291 297 318 320 332 333 338ndash340 342

agricultural production front lineemsp178agricultural production mutual aidemsp246agricultural productivityemsp1 4 26 79 109

282ndash284 292 339agricultural products and by-productsemsp119

158 171 194 337agricultural science and technologyemsp283agricultural surplusesemsp6 29 337 337n22

339 353agricultural taxesemsp16 53n2 165 166 337agricultural yieldsemsp26 75 78 79 96 103 106

107 109 113 127 127n31 174 176

allocationsemsp14 16 30 42 43 46 121 149 162 182 182n43 183 188 188n51 200 214 246 268 280 285 288 291 299ndash303 305 306 312 336 341 342 354

amenorrheaemsp157American cornemsp310 311Anhuiemsp15 31 60 62 63n14 64 65 68 82 89

182 268 271 273 275n4 278 281 282 298 304

animal products industriesemsp295anti-rightist movementemsp125 127appropriate rural landemsp47appropriationemsp39 47 49 159 161ndash174

172n27 176 178 179 186 188 189 215aquatic productsemsp331 332Asian Financial Crisisemsp43assemblies of geniuses and heroesemsp108austereemsp349auxiliary foods See non-staple foods

backwardnessemsp7 109 283 336backwardness of the rural economyemsp262backyard furnaceemsp118balancing of supply and demandemsp285ndash286bambooemsp110 118 166 171 181 182 182n43

188n52 220 327bankruptemsp159ndash160 174 189 206 207 255 256basic grain supplyemsp333beansemsp109 119 271 278 279 279n7 288 289

300 307 308Beidaiheemsp78 117 118Beijingemsp6n9 12n21 26n2 30 37 49 55n6

55n7 70n18 71n19 75n3 77n8 78n10 82 95n28 97n33 112n20 121n13 121n14 122n15 124n20 126n26 128n33 129 129n35 130n36 143n29 156n3 158n7 159n10 160n11 160n12 161n16 161n17 162n18 194n6 232n2 244n20 267n1 268 271 273 277 278 280 281 289 295n5 298 317 322n18 330n3 331n4 334n11 334n12 334n14 335n18 338n25 348n65 348n66 352n79

bicyclesemsp197 347big responsibility systememsp199ndash203 205Bixi Roademsp18 212ndash213 227

blind direction of productionemsp165 174 188 188n52

blockadesemsp293border regionemsp53 314ndash328Bo Yiboemsp71 71n19 77n8 128n33 143n29

161n17 330n3 333 333n9 334 338 338n27 340 340n33

burden on rural citizensemsp43 119 214 216 224 225

busy seasonemsp13 116 122 177 250busy-season childcare centersemsp133ndash152

capital accumulationemsp69 336 337 339 350 351 353

capital accumulation for industrializationemsp339

capitalist industrial and commercial enterprisesemsp330

capitalist roademsp244capitalistsemsp53 160 244 293 330capitalizationemsp259capital shortagesemsp262cash crop productionemsp278CAS Soil Instituteemsp92cattleemsp316CBEs See commune brigade enterprises

(CBEs)CCP See Communist Party of China (CCP)CCP Central Directives on Deep Plowing and

Soil Improvementemsp78CCP Central General Officeemsp109CCP Central Northeast Bureau Rural Work

Departmentemsp56CCP Central Politburoemsp78 117 121CCP Central South-Central Bureau Rural

Work Departmentemsp63CCP Fifth Central Committeeemsp108CCP Politburo Standing Committeeemsp267Central Committeeemsp12 30 34 54 55 74 97

108 116 117 120ndash122 125 126 128ndash130 158 161 163 174 194n6 244 283 331 347

Central Document Number Oneemsp299 338Central Financial Committeeemsp331central governmentemsp3 11 31 38 40 46 47

49 51 117 126 158 189 195 214 268 271ndash274 278 280ndash286 288 289 294 297 298ndash300 311 331

Central Secretariatemsp161Chaharemsp55

Changge Countyemsp75ndash77 76n4 76n5 79ndash81 80n12 83ndash88 92 93 93n24 96 97

Changshu Cityemsp18 212ndash227chemical fertilizersemsp2ndash4 15 16 168 283Chen Yunemsp29 30 174 334 335 343 345Chiang Kai-shekemsp267chickensemsp144 332Childcareemsp14 124 133ndash152 178childcare mutual aidemsp134 142n26chili peppersemsp327China Academy of Agricultural Sciencesemsp84

87 95 95n31 367n1China Academy of Agricultural Sciences

Mechanization Instituteemsp84China Academy of Sciences Biology

Divisionemsp94China Academy of Sciences (CAS)

Mechanical Instituteemsp90China Institute of Agricultural Sciencesemsp93China Institute of Water Resources and

Hydropower Researchemsp94 94n27Chinarsquos economyemsp3 288Chinese civilizationemsp287ndash288Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central

Committeeemsp54Chinese Peoplersquos Political Consultative

Conference (CPPCC)emsp144 319n12CIF See cost insurance and freight (CIF)circulation of agricultural productsemsp48circulation system for agricultural

productsemsp48citizen incomeemsp217 219 220 222ndash224class distributionemsp237 238class lineemsp261climatic and geographic conditionsemsp293coalemsp106 125 149 183 197 267 347collateralemsp251 252collective agricultureemsp1 10 15 339collective asset managementemsp226collective assetsemsp214ndash220 222ndash227collective contractingemsp200 205collective economic organizationsemsp41

212ndash227collective economyemsp18 181 203 213 224collective-owned assetsemsp219collective ownershipemsp160 318 327collective ownership systememsp318collective property rightsemsp225collective-run enterpriseemsp217 219 220

362 Index

ltUNgt

collective welfare enterprisesemsp118 124 147ndash152

collectivizationemsp1ndash11 14ndash18 29 41 53 55 70 101ndash114 149 156n3 201 231 257 314ndash328 342 343 350 353

collectivized productionemsp125commodity grainsemsp295 300 346 346n59commune and brigade industriesemsp194commune brigade enterprises (CBEs)emsp16ndash17

192ndash196 192ndash207 198ndash208communismemsp11 13 117 118 123 142 150 151

156 156n2 158 159 160 167communist base areasemsp134Communist Party of China (CCP)emsp10 12 28

54ndash59 63 74 76ndash78 81 108 109 116 117 120ndash122 125 126 128 129 133 158 161 174 176 179 194 213 219 232 244 267 283 331 347

Communist Party of China (CCP)rsquos Eighth National Congressemsp76

communist pilotsemsp117comparative advantagesemsp292 294 297ndash299

302ndash306 308 309 313compensation and promotions of local

officialsemsp215compulsory educationemsp41 46Compulsory Education Lawemsp46Conference of 7000 Cadresemsp174conservationemsp102ndash107 109ndash114 124 130conservation workemsp102 103 103n5 104

104n8 105 106 109 113constructionemsp3 5 7 10 11 13 14 16 18 19 26

27 31 33 34 38 40ndash42 75 76 101ndash114 116 117 119 120 134 142 143 146 148 149 151 160 162 163 164 165 168 170 177 181 182 188 196 197 212ndash227 257 259 283 285ndash286 300 310ndash312 318 322 324 325 331 333 338 342 344ndash345

consumer goodemsp2ndash3 11 288consumptionemsp10 33 120 122 149 166 255

273 277 279 280 284 288 295 296 303 304 306 307 310 311 333 336 339 340 341 350 352

consumption quotasemsp339contracting system for collective

enterprisesemsp219contracting systemsemsp102ndash107 109ndash114 124

130 206contract management systememsp215

contract purchase systememsp341contract purchasing and market purchasing

systemsemsp285controls on imports and exportsemsp286cooperative economic organizationsemsp

224ndash225 261cooperative economiesemsp224ndash225 261cooperative movementemsp6 63 69 70 109 116

134 136 185 288 342 343 353cooperativizationemsp45cooperatizationemsp6n8 53 67 69 70 105 108

109 134 141 144 162n18 334copperemsp166 331cornemsp19 31 76 77 80 106 151 272ndash284

289 291ndash293 295 296 300 302 304 306ndash312

Corn Beltemsp283 284 292 302 309ndash312corn processingemsp283corn surplusesemsp281corruptionemsp40cost insurance and freight (CIF)emsp311cottage industriesemsp193cottonemsp27ndash30 63 77 119 197 255 273 278

280 331 332 340 341 347ndash349coupon rationing systememsp347ndash348coupon systememsp31 347ndash349credit cooperativesemsp239 245 251 256

258ndash263creditworthinessemsp248 251ndash252crisis preparednessemsp253crop failuresemsp10 37n16 66 67n16 312crossover zonesemsp67 68Cultural Revolutionemsp4 11n18 82n15 318 323cultureemsp42 47 51 102n5 147 150 175cyanosisemsp157

damsemsp102 102n3 104 167Dazhaiemsp12 30 110 111n19 283debt burdensemsp43 232 255 256debt to agricultureemsp48decommissioned and discharged

service-peopleemsp323deep plowingemsp12 13 18 74ndash97demand for grainemsp31 32 273 277 289 295

301 306 333 349democratic governmentsemsp53 54democratic policiesemsp71democratic principlesemsp159Deng Xiaopingemsp1 31 129

363Index

ltUNgt

Deng Xiaopingrsquos ldquosouthern tourrdquoemsp31depositsemsp101 232 258 259 261development advantages of grain

productionemsp285dietary alkaliemsp347disaster reliefemsp31 331 345 346disaster relief grainemsp331disastersemsp10 11 31 33 127 173 235 286 326

331 345 346dischargedemobilizationemsp321ndash323distributionemsp6 10 15 30 46ndash47 51ndash71 93

117 118 120 122 126 127 161 166 168 197 200 203 204n32 220 222 223 225 237 238 278 286 297 302 336 337n22 339 341

Document Number Oneemsp299 338 341domestic and international marketsemsp302 310domestic industrial comparative

advantageemsp306domestic resources and marketsemsp299downsizing of urban workforcesemsp328draft animalsemsp5ndash6 79 80 81 84 91 92 95

256dried fruits and nutsemsp332droughtemsp10 307 326Dual-oversightemsp215ducksemsp332

East Chinaemsp31 60 64 88 213 288economic backwardnessemsp336economic competitionemsp68ndash70economic constructionemsp11 31 34 41 331

333 344economic developmentemsp1 2 53 54 65ndash67

69 120 193 210 213 223 234 256 267 277 297 299 306 307 309 330 346 352ndash354

economic globalizationemsp295n5 299 302 305ndash313

economic growthemsp3 11 14 43 55 69 212 216 223 225ndash227 292ndash296 299 301 309 351

economic reliefemsp262economic restructuringemsp294 299 300economic special zonesemsp294economic statusemsp49 238 254economyemsp1 2n1 4n4 9n15 13 26 33 42 44

53 62 70 91 112 118 156 182 201 208 213n2 216 217 223 224 239 285 294 295 299 304 308 309 331 333n8 350 350n74

edemaemsp157edible oilsemsp349educated youth (zhiqing)emsp318educationemsp42 46 47 51 92 140ndash142 145 147

150ndash152 175 190 190n56 197 320 321egalitarianismemsp54 118 129 156 159eggsemsp96 332 347Eight Character Guiding Policyemsp128elderlyemsp69 124 249 252 253embezzlementemsp188emergency grain reservesemsp331empty shell villagesemsp224Englandemsp351enterprise of communismemsp142 150era of collectivizationemsp1 101ndash114 201

314ndash328era of cooperatizationemsp141 144exchange of equivalentsemsp159ndash161exchanges of technologyemsp305exploitationemsp7 52 160 234 241 253exploiter classemsp240exploit the peasant massesemsp248export processingemsp196

factor and market pricesemsp353factor pricesemsp342family-based agricultural operationsemsp330family-based petty peasant economyemsp307family side businessesemsp123 176family side industriesemsp194famineemsp11n20 12n22 12n23 120 127 157 240

249 252 326ndash328 1012famous Chinese brandsemsp213 217farm field infrastructureemsp312farm implementsemsp6 76n5 84 84n18 88 89

90n20 96n32 162 164 168 169 171 185 189 196 235 256 259

farming implementsemsp76 81 246 251farming machineryemsp283feed productionemsp280 281 284ndash286female laboremsp134 136 137 139 142n28

146n39 150fertilizeremsp2ndash4 15 16 27 76 77 80 93 95 96

106 168 256 257 259 283feudal exploitationemsp241feudal landlord classemsp248financial battlefrontemsp330financial organizationsemsp261 263financial regulationemsp215fire-cured tobaccoemsp327 331

364 Index

ltUNgt

first big and second publicemsp146 148First Five-year Planemsp7 8 10 333 337First Ministry of Machine-Buildingemsp90 91

91n21fishemsp33 166 198 347fisheriesemsp32 198five constantsemsp215five things in vogueemsp156 156n2 159 161fixed quota systememsp284flood controlemsp102 102n3flow of rural populationemsp320ndash324food processingemsp196 285food securityemsp312 313food supplyemsp117 127 280food supply systememsp117 118forcible borrowingemsp241foreign exchangeemsp275 284foreign researchersemsp332 349 350foreign resourcesemsp306foreign trade systememsp305forestry centersemsp318ndash320 324four great freedomsemsp231freedom to lendemsp231 242free marketemsp331 352fresh fruitsemsp332Fujianemsp17 19n35 37 40 60 64 65 68 88

122n16 214 268 272 274 278 281 282 292 298 304 306 311 314ndash328 337n22

Gan-Min-Yue Border Regionemsp314n2 315ndash317 319ndash322 324 326 328

Gansuemsp37 53 60 64 65 68 82 268 271 284 298

geeseemsp332general line for the transitionary periodemsp63

244 246 351genetically modified (GMO)emsp309ndash310geographical advantagesemsp304 308 309 313global economyemsp294 299 309gluttonousemsp255GMO See genetically modified (GMO)ldquogoing to the countrysiderdquoemsp315ndash320government allocationsemsp268government-enterprise relationsemsp214government-enterprise separationemsp218government fixed purchase systememsp341government grain reservesemsp292government-set pricesemsp333 336 337grainemsp26 63 76 103n5 119 136 166 222 233

267ndash313 316 331

grain allocationemsp280 288 300 301 303 306

grain allocation and sales agreementsemsp306grain as the guiding principleemsp30 176grain circulationemsp45 286 292n3 293

299ndash301 311 313grain circulation systememsp281 301ndash303

332 335 337n17 340ndash342 344 352 354grain couponsemsp31 347ndash349 348n66

349n67grain crisis of 1953emsp7 332 335 335n18grain crisis of spring 1955emsp349grain growersemsp340grain industry structureemsp306 307grain outputemsp3 31 33 41 106 108 112

119 127ndash129 271 279 281ndash286 289 292 294 297 299 301 306 308 312ndash313 341 343

grain price fluctuationsemsp285grain pricesemsp19 30 33 41 45 285 295

297 300 304 339 341 348 348n66grain processing enterprisesemsp305grain processing industriesemsp280grain protectionemsp297 304grain rationsemsp128 222 323grain requisitioningemsp119 123 179 346

347 349 350grain reserve systememsp286grains and cereals flowsemsp267ndash286 332n7

333n8 335n16 340n32 340n38 348n63grain self-sufficiencyemsp272 273 281 291

292 295grain shortagesemsp10 289 292 293 296

301 304 306 310 311 352ndash353grain surplusesemsp30 288 289 293 300

304 307grain yieldsemsp82n13 105ndash107 111ndash113 119

271 288 291 293 326ndash327 338grand and spectacular movementemsp79Grand Canalemsp288grand tacticsemsp174 177grand tactics operationsemsp164grassroots laboremsp112grassroots organizationsemsp342ndash344Grassroots Political Mobilizationemsp343ndash344

344n50great enterprise of communismemsp142Great Forging of Steel and Ironemsp119 164 166

168 171 172 174 188ndash189

365Index

ltUNgt

Great Forging of Steel and Iron movementemsp156 323

Great Forging of Steel and Iron of the Entire Populaceemsp118

Great Leapemsp12n22 12n23 146Great Leap Forwardemsp1 2 4 9ndash14 74ndash97

106 115ndash118 116n2 123 125ndash127 126n26 155ndash158 167 174 178 188n52 271 289 315 323 338

green channelemsp315Guangdongemsp37 40 61 63ndash65 68 128 128n34

268 268n3 271 273 274 278 281 282 298 304 306 311 314ndash328 346 346n58

Guangxiemsp61 88 103 268 271 273 274 278 281 282 298 311

Guangzhou Central Working Conferenceemsp129

guarantoremsp251 252Guizhouemsp37 61 64 65 68 126 268 271 272

274 278 295 298 306

handicraft industriesemsp176handicraftsemsp14 145 151 194 196handicraft workshopsemsp330Han Dynastiesemsp103Hangzhou Grain Bureauemsp310healthcareemsp46 47 51 117n3 219 221 259health insuranceemsp216heavy industryemsp2 3 11 335 336 342 343

343n47 349 351 353heavy industry basesemsp273 278 280Hebeiemsp16 55 60 64 65 68 80 82 82n13

115ndash130 192ndash208 268 271 272 274 277n6 281 284 298 347n62

Hebei Provincial Committeeemsp117 119ndash122 124 129

Hebei Provincial Party Congressemsp120Heilongjiangemsp19 54n5 56ndash60 64 65 68

268 271 282 284 298 310 311Heilongjiang Farm and Land Reclamation

Bureauemsp310 311high-interest loansemsp259 260 262high yield agricultureemsp168high yieldsemsp92ndash96 107 109 110 112 166 168

304hired farmhand householdsemsp55 237 238

247 250 252 254 256 258hired farmhandsemsp55 234 237 238 242 253

262

hiring relationshipsemsp244history of contemporary Chinaemsp351ldquohope projectsrdquoemsp46 226n5household contract responsibility

systememsp30 33 36 41 198 202 205 220 emsp 222 223 299

household economiesemsp63 176 239 262household operationsemsp203 204household planningemsp344household registrationsemsp35 45 217 315n4

322 345household registration systememsp9 45 327

344 345household responsibility system (HRS)emsp1 15

26 199 202 203 206 222housingemsp117n3 140 163 164 165 169n26

169n27 170 174 181ndash185 181n38 183n46 186n50 188n51 218 219

HRS See Household responsibility system (HRS)

Huang-Huai-Hai Regionemsp273 277n6 278 280 281 302

Hubeiemsp8 42 61ndash65 62n11 68 82 231ndash263 268 273 274 275n4 278 281 282 287n1 298 304 345 345n54 346 347n62 350

human migrationemsp321hunanemsp61ndash66 62n12 66n15 68 128 129 244

268 271 273 274 275n4 278ndash282 298 304ndash305 335n16 340n38 350

husbandryemsp32 83 196 198 296husbandry industryemsp301

illicit tradingemsp328illiteracyemsp41ndash42imbalance between supply and demand of

grainemsp333imbalance in grains and cereals outputemsp277immature soilemsp76 78 79 92 105 106

108ndash109impoverished rural householdsemsp258 261 262improved varietiesemsp283 291 293incomeemsp4 6 9 26 27 35ndash37 43 50 52

56n8 61 63ndash67 67n16 70 70n18 123 137 139 169 176 181 194 197 198 202 214ndash227 235 240 247 249 253ndash255 261 262 285 304 308 327 336

distributionemsp9 46ndash47 51redistributionemsp336

incomes of northern rural citizensemsp308

366 Index

ltUNgt

increased yieldsemsp13 75 76n6 96 97individual economyemsp62 68 70 201ndash203indolenceemsp255industrial commoditiesemsp337industrializationemsp1ndash3 8 14ndash18 27 33 34 45

48 217 288 330 334ndash337 339 342 344 350 351 353 354

industrial monopolyemsp336industrial productsemsp28 337industryemsp7 10 26ndash28 33 35 42 54 91n21

127 140 175ndash178 193n4 195 197 203ndash205 207 213 217 220 223 279 281 282 285 295 299 301 302 306ndash309 313 320 332 343 351

comparative advantagesemsp299 302 309 313

restructuringemsp295structureemsp301 306 307 309 351

infirmemsp39 69 174 249 253information and transportation

technologyemsp302infrastructureemsp27 33 38 41 170 312 325infrastructure for grain circulationemsp286

297Inner Mongoliaemsp64 68 83 83n16 268 271

272 281 282 284inputs of laboremsp339Institute of Economics of the China Academy

of Sciencesemsp121 193n4institutional planningemsp328insuranceemsp216 219 222 311integrated nationwide grain

marketemsp285ndash286integration with the global economyemsp299

309intensive agricultureemsp96 176 293interestemsp4 8 33 34 40 45 46 53 54 121 140

164 190 214 232ndash234 238 240ndash244 248ndash253 255 257ndash259 262 294 300 304 309 340n32

interest-free loansemsp248 250 262interest ratesemsp164 243 244 249 250 251

253 258 262interlaced influence effectemsp207international comparative advantage in rice

productionemsp308international embargoemsp5 312international marketsemsp302ndash304 306 307

310 313

inter-provincial planned allocations of grainemsp299

inter-regional grain circulationemsp293 299 311inter-regional grain flowsemsp287ndash313intra-regional transfersemsp268irrigationemsp4 14 41 75 97 101n2 104 104n7

105n11 106n12 111 113 113n21 116 119 175 221 256 257 293 312

irrigation worksemsp27 33 75 102 116 119 164 167 168 170 174 181 185 283 300

Japanemsp28 48 53 54 54n3 310Jiangnanemsp103 155n1Jiangsuemsp17 37 40 60 64 65 68 82 155ndash190

212ndash213 217 222 225ndash227 268 273 275n4 278 281 282 298 310 345 345n55 345n56 346 346n56 347n62

Jiangsu Bosideng Corpemsp222Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltdemsp217

219ndash220Jiangsu Menglan Group Coemsp221Jiangxiemsp61ndash63 62n13 182 244 268 271 273

275n4 278 280ndash282 298 305 314ndash328Jiang Zeminemsp42Jilinemsp54n5 56 57 59 60 64 65 68 83n16

268 271 274 277n6 278 280ndash282 284 298

Jiulian Mountainsemsp315

kindergartenemsp14 124 133ndash152 164knitting industryemsp205Kunshanemsp157 157n5 184 185 187 188n51

laboremsp2ndash4 6 9 10 12ndash14 16 17 27 29 30 31 33 35 36 47 49 52 54 69 80 81ndash83 94 95 97 105 106 108ndash112 110 111 116 116n2 118 119 125 128 129 134ndash140 136 137 143n28 146n39 150 151 156 160 162 163 165 168ndash170 174 175ndash178ndash180 176ndash178 178n36 188n52 189 204 205 206 219 219n4 223 233 238 240 250 251 253 255 258 285 288 294 295 297 303 307 315 317 318ndash320 324 325 328 339

and land productivityemsp285cooperativesemsp177exchangeemsp138ndash140

laboring massesemsp93 232 238 239laid-off workersemsp316

367Index

ltUNgt

laissez-faireemsp122landemsp29 53 75 103 123 136 158 202 214

234 282 294 316 336appropriationsemsp49and labor costsemsp297ownershipemsp50ndash51 53pawningemsp255reformsemsp5 5n7 6 9 10 33 52ndash71 75

231ndash241 246ndash258 262 288 333rentingemsp244requisitioningemsp38 39 40 49 179 181resourceemsp38 40 168 178 294 307revolutionsemsp53salesemsp49 244 255taxesemsp336

landlord classemsp232 234 238 240 248landlordsemsp53 54 60 64 160 232 234 235

237 238 240 248 250 251 253laogaiemsp180large formation warfareemsp325large-scale campaignsemsp178 184large-scale construction of farm fieldsemsp312

325large-scale development of farm fieldsemsp283large-scale economic constructionemsp331 334large-scale establishment of collective

settlementsemsp172large-scale establishment of commune and

brigade public enterprisesemsp174large-scale establishment of public

canteensemsp121 123 156 164 166 167 172large-scale movementsemsp165 328law of valueemsp338 338n26 347 354leatheremsp197 200 331leftistemsp13 54 113 118 120 123ndash125 127 156

174 271 272ldquoleftistrdquo mistakesemsp118 120 125 156 174 271

272legislative protectionsemsp241Lehui Rice Companyemsp310liaoningemsp54n5 56 59 60 64 65 68 82

82n15 268 271 274 277n6 278 282 284 289 298

Liaoxiemsp56ndash59liberating female laborersemsp137 142n28liberationemsp26 53ndash54 54n4 116n2 125 134ndash

135 137 142n28 150ndash152 233 251n35liberation of womenemsp125Li Dequanemsp144light industryemsp2 351

Lijiazhaiemsp75 79 96Li Pengemsp18 212 213n2literacyemsp41ndash42 137Liu Shaoqiemsp129 161 161n16livestock feedemsp273 275 277ndash281 292 295

industryemsp273 275 280manufacturing industryemsp292 295processing industryemsp279

living needsemsp240 263living standardsemsp301 304 347Li Xiannianemsp29 30Liyuejuemsp75loansemsp3 7 18 159 232ndash235 238ndash263 300loan sharkingemsp232 245 248 254local processing of grainsemsp284loessemsp101Loess Plateauemsp101ndash104 102n2 102n5 103n5

103n6 106 107 109ndash113loomsemsp202 204ndash205 207lower-middle-income peasantemsp261low-interest loansemsp240 260low interest ratesemsp250 258 262Luuml Bingguangemsp76 76n7Luumlliang Mountain Rangeemsp101Lushan Conferenceemsp123ndash125 127 157

macroeconomic controlsemsp43 353 354macroeconomic policyemsp285 286 307 339

342main foods See staple foodsManchuriaemsp58manureemsp76 95 96 106 116 166manure fertilizeremsp95Mao Zedongemsp6n9 31 33 54 75 75n2 75n3

77 97n33 112 112n20 121 121n13 121n14 124n21 128n34 156 159n10 160n11 160n12 189 244n20 267 318

market economyemsp17 18 39 44ndash45 50 280 312 343n49 354

marketizationemsp281marketization reformsemsp268 281 294n4

299ndash301 303marketsemsp2 4 7 13 17 18 27 28 31ndash32 38

39 41 44ndash45 50 182 182n43 194 217 249 280 285ndash286 297 299 301ndash307 310ndash313 331ndash333 333n10 336 337 341 343n49 345 349 349n69 352ndash354

operationsemsp333pricing mechanismemsp333reformsemsp13 285

368 Index

ltUNgt

resource allocation mechanismsemsp336marriage and funeral expensesemsp259martyrsemsp69 108marxistemsp159 160mass lineemsp13 162 176matchesemsp117n3 347Ma Tongyiemsp75meal ticketemsp122 123 126 127means of productionemsp69 162 166 168 182

257 258 303 334meat productionemsp296mechanisms for resource and production

factor allocationsemsp354mechanizedemsp307mechanized agricultureemsp297microeconomic management

mechanismsemsp342microeconomic restrictionsemsp353middle-income-peasanthoodemsp254middle-income peasant householdsemsp240

247 254 255 261middle-peasant-izationemsp65 67 67n17 71middle peasantsemsp6 9 53 54 55 60 64 67

69 70 129 238 239 242 244 250 254 256 257 262 318

migrant laborersemsp31 35 36 47 49migrantsemsp1 17 39 49 151 325militaryemsp13 80 82 160 165 168 180ndash181 242

251 321 322 325n28 328milkemsp347milletemsp77minesemsp316 320Ming and Qing Dynastiesemsp288 327Ministry of Agricultureemsp40 43 49 77 78 84

84n18 90n20 91 125 212n1 267n1Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)emsp268 270

276 288 291Ministry of Financeemsp43 52 53n2Ministry of Land and Resourcesemsp38 49Ministry of Land Resourcesemsp40Ministry of Water Resourcesemsp39ndash40misappropriations of funds and

materialsemsp156model kindergartensemsp142ndash149modern corporate governance

structuresemsp226modern corporate systemsemsp218modern financial systememsp262MOFCOM See Ministry of Commerce

(MOFCOM)

money lendingemsp45mountain-bound migrationemsp326mountainousemsp103 108 109 113 315 318 324

325 328mountainous regionsemsp103 109 113 324 325

328movement of the populationemsp50multiple croppingemsp176 293mushroomsemsp198mutual aidemsp5 6 75 134 141 142n26 241 246

248 251 254 257 260ndash262mutual aid and cooperationemsp244 245 352

National Bureau of Statisticsemsp31 56 56n8 61 63 70n18 281n8

National Conference for Selection through Appraisal and Lectures Regarding Deep Plowing Implementsemsp91 91n22

National Conference on Deep Plowing Imple-ments and Soil Improvementemsp84 92

national economyemsp6 26 28ndash30 118 127 128 173 194 199n15 239 294 308

national grain conferenceemsp334National Peoplersquos Congressemsp46 213 221 222national savingsemsp351Nationwide Deep Plowing Implements and

Soil Improvementemsp77nationwide grain marketemsp285ndash286natural disastersemsp11ndash12 33 127 235 286net exportersemsp29 271 275 288 289 311new areasemsp54n4 62 67 68 232 243new democratic societyemsp351newly liberated areaemsp54n4 232new rich peasant economyemsp58 63new rich peasantsemsp52ndash71 247 254Ninth Plenum of the Eighth CCP

Congressemsp128 161 174no-interestemsp260non-agricultural industriesemsp217 294non-staple foodsemsp32North Chinaemsp55 60 64 288 295 302 303North China Bureauemsp55northeastemsp48 54n5 56ndash60 62ndash64 68 204

277 281 288 292 295 296 302 309 310 314 315

Northeast Bureauemsp54 56ndash59Northeastern Corn Beltemsp309ndash312northern plainsemsp297Northern Region Agricultural

Conferenceemsp272

369Index

ltUNgt

northern rice self-sufficiencyemsp275north-to-south grain transferemsp268 270

273ndash278 280 284 287ndash293 296 297 299 301 302 307 309ndash313

northwestemsp60 64 204 281 288n2 295 302Northwest Agriculture and Forestry

Universityemsp93Number One Cooperativeemsp75nursemaid groupemsp135 137

official promotionsemsp322officialsemsp5 8 14 17 18 31 37 38 40ndash42

48 51 63 80 83 105 108 109 112 113 117ndash121 125 127 135 140 142 144ndash148 150 152 156 159 173 176 188 189 215ndash217 219 223ndash226 231 241 242 244 246 254 258 261 270 272 283 284 288 300 312 320 321 325 328 330 331 339 342 348 351 354

oil bearing materialsemsp331old areasemsp54 54n4 55 56 64 67 68Old Chinaemsp237 244opening to the outsideemsp303open marketemsp331opportunistic behavioremsp341 353opportunity costs of agricultureemsp294 295

297 307organic fertilizersemsp96Outline Land Law of Chinaemsp54ownership by all the peopleemsp160

paddy fieldemsp84 91 95 108Panjing Communeemsp319partitioning of national incomeemsp336patriotic educationemsp142Pearl River Deltaemsp17 39 311Pearl River Valleysemsp287ndash288peasantryemsp45 160 162peasantsemsp6 7 8 9 12 13 15 18 26 33 45

52ndash71 151 159 160 161 169n24 178n36 232 233 234 235 238 239 240 242 243 244 247 253 261 262 318

peasant worker tideemsp328penalties for non-paymentemsp258Peng Dehuaiemsp11 13 123 124n19pensionemsp221 222pension insuranceemsp216Peoplersquos Bank of Chinaemsp244 245

peoplersquos commune movementemsp115 118 124 133 142 143 144 156 158 159 164 166 271 289 338 342 353

peoplersquos communesemsp1 10 12 29 41 82 83 102n4 117 118 120 121 122 126 128 129 130 146 151 158 159 162 168n21 232 320

peoplersquos livelihoodsemsp238peoplersquos militiasemsp177Peoplersquos Republic of Chinaemsp2 29 41 52ndash71

75 84n18 101n2 102 104 112 113 134 151 156n3 194 232n2 237 238 240 241 256 270 287ndash313 330 333 334n11 336 345n53 351 352

period of collectivizationemsp350pigsemsp135 144 178 235 331planned allocationsemsp299 303planned birthemsp42planned economyemsp26 37 39 40 44ndash47 49

50 268 280 299 351ndash354planned grain supplyemsp331 346planned purchases and planned supplyemsp331planned supplyemsp331 344 345 346planning and allocation institutionsemsp336

342plow oxenemsp171 257 259polarizationemsp7 53 71political upheavalsemsp325poor and middle peasantsemsp6 318poor peasantsemsp7 53 54 55 60 65 69 70

159 234 237 238 239 242 247 250 252 253 254 255 256 258 261 262

populationemsp1 4 10 12 15 16 27ndash29 31ndash35 45 46 50 56 59 65 70 71 77 116 157 172 174 176 189 214ndash216 218 260 289 291ndash293 297 307 312 314ndash328 333 339 344 345 351 352 354

population movementemsp16 315 324ndash328 345porkemsp347poultryemsp295 297povertyemsp1 4 35 37 50 55 69 71 106 107

109 204 232 245 254 257 258 262practical experienceemsp48 96 97pre-approved budget and accounting

systememsp215 216prefectural-level citiesemsp48preferential policiesemsp294preferential pricingemsp285pre-schoolemsp145 150 151

370 Index

ltUNgt

preschool educationemsp142 143 147 150price scissorsemsp38 48 336 337 337n23price subsidiesemsp344primary agricultural productsemsp288 352primitive accumulation of capitalemsp26 45

337 351private enterprisesemsp36 39 192ndash208 219private family side-businessesemsp123private grain tradersemsp333private lendingemsp8 231ndash263private ownershipemsp6 126private ownership systememsp176private property rightsemsp242 252productionemsp1 26 55 82 104 116 134 156 194

231 272 288 318 330production and circulation systemsemsp330production brigadeemsp13 41 102n4 104 116

125 128 143 159 165 174 318production mutual aid teamsemsp246 257professionalization of officialsemsp223ndash224profitsemsp38 49 200 201 206 218 221 222 253

261 303 305 351profit sharingemsp206promissory notesemsp173 185 186 187 188 189property rightsemsp17 218 225 242 252property rights reformsemsp218 220 226protectionismemsp305 308public accumulation fundsemsp246public enterprisesemsp159 165 167 168 174 177

179 323 324 325public granariesemsp233public institutions and enterprisesemsp323public welfare enterpriseemsp149 246purchase and sales system for agricultural

productsemsp342 348pursuit of profitemsp245 253

Qinemsp103 135 136 139 146 149 325Qing Dynastyemsp40 102n3Qinghaiemsp37 60 64 65 68 268 271 298quotaemsp111 126 127 166 178 179 198 200 201

284 308 311 339 345 346 347

rationsemsp118 121ndash123 126 128 129 143 149 166 176 222 323 325

raw material in feed productionemsp284reactionaryemsp125recruiting studentsemsp321recruitmentemsp174 321 323

refined goodsemsp249refined grainemsp149 249 295refined white riceemsp295reform and openingemsp26 27 28 30 33 35 44

47 113 192ndash208 232 279 292ndash295 297 300n6 301

regional balance of grains and cereals supply and demandemsp267 303

regional comparative advantageemsp297ndash299regional export price advantageemsp310regional grain production structuresemsp284regional supply of and demand for grains and

cerealsemsp277regulatoryemsp341Reheemsp56ndash59 61Renmin ribaoemsp76 76n7 78 78n9 79n11

82n13 82n14 82n15 83n16 93 93n23 93n25 94n26 95n30 96n31 118n4 123n17 143n28 233n5

Republican Eraemsp40 54n5requisitioningemsp38ndash40 49 119 120 123 179

181 331 334 338 343 346 347 349 350requisitioning of public grainemsp331researchemsp5 12 12n21 13 19 25n25 27 43

53 54n3 56n8 74n1 84 89 90 92 94 94n27 102n5 113 128 133 133n1 134 155 156 158n7 159n10 163n19 174 181 192 193 193n2 193n4 194n6 212 213 232 251n35 267n1 268 281n8 328 330ndash354

resident committeesemsp344resource planning and allocation

systememsp336 342restitutionemsp13 155ndash190

campaignemsp190committeesemsp162

restructuring of rural industryemsp274return to the city movementemsp320revolutionemsp1 4 4n5 5 7 8 9n16 11n18 13 33

53 54 69 76n5 81 82n15 84 90 93 110 134 176 193n4 304 318 323 336n20 349n68

riceemsp4 31 103 197 198 203 220 268 271ndash280 275n4 277n5 282 284 288 289 291ndash293 295 296 300ndash312

Rice Beltemsp302rice sackemsp300 301 303 312rich peasant(s)emsp7ndash9 18 52ndash71 232 234 237

238 240 242ndash245 247 250 253 254

371Index

ltUNgt

rich peasant economyemsp58 63 245rightist conservative thoughtemsp77rightist opportunismemsp157rightist opportunistsemsp124road networksemsp315rural areasemsp4 5 26ndash30 32 33 35 37

40ndash51 53ndash55 63n14 64 116 117 118 125 126n26 127 142 151 155 157ndash159 161 176 194 202 204 213 234 315 324 325 328 331 345 350 352 353

rural assistance loansemsp246rural capitalemsp245 262 263rural childcare organizationsemsp133ndash152rural Chinaemsp1 2 17 17n33 18 26 41 134 145

238 250n32 328 343n49 344ndash345rural citizen(s)emsp5 26ndash51 54 55 75 119 123

126 138 185 188 189 214 216 217 222 224 225 231 232 239 241 243 245 246 249ndash253 255ndash258 261 294 300 301 308 313 320 321 323 325 327 332 336 338ndash340 342 345 348 352 354

rural citizen economic organizationsemsp313rural class structureemsp70rural collectivesemsp63 119rural communesemsp67 144rural cooperative movementemsp116rural credit cooperativesemsp239 251 258ndash263rural debt(s)emsp18 232 241 242 243Rural Debt Disputesemsp232rural economic developmentemsp54 65 69 213rural economic policiesemsp34 69 300n6rural economyemsp5 34 41 50 52n2 54ndash59

62n12 63 65 66 68 69 212n1 213 215 233n4 234 236 237n8 239 242 258n49 262 352

rural financial regulation reformsemsp215rural financial servicesemsp263rural financial systememsp231 235 263rural grassroots workemsp320rural householdsemsp41 45 55 56n8 58 59 61

63 64 66ndash70 70n18 183 186 201 202 203 205 207 232 234 235 237 239 240 244 245 246 247 252 254 255 257 258 261 262 322 331

rural individual economyemsp62 68rural industrializationemsp1 2 14ndash18 192 217rural industryemsp193n4 207 255 257 274rural laborersemsp49 177 315 324 325 328rural land systememsp50

rural lending demandemsp261rural loansemsp252ndash256rural mass movementsemsp349rural modernizationemsp213 214 217rural peoplersquos commune movementsemsp271

289Rural Peoplersquos Communesemsp102n4 120 126

128 129 130 158Rural Peoplersquos Cooperativesemsp155ndash190rural populationemsp4 15 34 35 45 46 59 65

70 71 116 157 260 314ndash328 333 339 345 351 352 354

rural population flowsemsp314ndash328rural private enterprisesemsp192ndash208rural private lendingemsp231ndash263rural public canteensemsp115ndash130 151rural restitution workemsp186rural systememsp50 352n79rural taxationemsp215rural workemsp5 27 28 44 122 123n17 126

194n6 338n25Rural Work Departmentsemsp5 51 56ndash59 58n9

63 63n14 167 177 179n37 181n40 244 246 247 256 258 259 260

Russiaemsp310

salaries of professionalized officialsemsp223saline-alkaline soilemsp283sanctionsemsp293sanitationemsp140 142SARSemsp47Satellite Communeemsp117 118 145 149scientific experimentationemsp97seasonal productionemsp259secondary and tertiary industriesemsp39 43 49

220 223 294 295 297 299 307secondary enterprisesemsp137 177secondary incomeemsp327Second World Waremsp48self-reliantemsp293self-sufficiencyemsp168 272 273 275 281 283

284 291 292 306 312seniorsemsp137 141 157 219 221 222 253 326separation of government from

enterprisesemsp224sesameemsp77sesame oilemsp243Shaanxiemsp37 53 53n2 61 64 65 68 82 103

103n5 107 251n34 268 271 281 284 298

372 Index

ltUNgt

Shandongemsp40 60 64 65 68 74 75 82 83 89 268 271 272 277n6 281 288n2 298

Shanghaiemsp36 37 49 129 268 271 274 278 281 282 298 306 310 319 334n13 343 344 344n50 346 346n60 348n65 349n68

Shanghai-Nanjing Roademsp168Shanxiemsp12 60 62 62n10 64 65 68 82

101ndash114 133ndash152 268 271 284 298 340n35

shareholding corporationsemsp185 214 218 220 226

shareholding reformsemsp225sharesemsp15 18 188 204ndash205 207 218 219 224

226 247 258 259 279 285Sichuanemsp61 64 65 68 129 268 271 273 274

278 281 298 306 346 346n57sideline industryemsp194 201 202 204n31 219

255 257 259six in-the-fieldsemsp83Sixth Plenum of the Eighth CCP Central

Committeeemsp120 121Sixty-Article Regulations for

Agricultureemsp179 180slack farming seasonemsp177 250 327small peasant economyemsp335 342 351 352Smith Adamemsp251 252n34soapemsp117n3 347socialismemsp4n4 7 8n13 124ndash127 143n28 160

213n2 349n70 352socialist constructionemsp11 106 108n17 109n18

114 120 146n38 148 149socialist economyemsp11 112 245 245n22socialist education movementemsp190socialist market economyemsp190 190n56socialist modernizationemsp26 27 33 288socialist reformationemsp134 330 352socialist societyemsp351social mobilityemsp344 354social security systememsp235 262social structureemsp45ndash46 134 344 352 353socioeconomic developmentemsp223 267 352soil erosionemsp101 102 102n5 103 104 108

112 113soil improvementemsp77 78 78n9 79 84 89

90n19 92 103soil maturationemsp107solo practitionersemsp202

song-and-dance troupesemsp177Songjiangemsp56 57 59South-central regionemsp69 244n19 251n35Southern Jiangsu Modelemsp17 212ndash213

225ndash227South Koreaemsp48 310south-to-north grains and cereals

transferemsp267 270 273 277South-to-North grain transferemsp268 270 273

280 283 284 287ndash294Soviet Unionemsp3 7 9 11 29 45 142 337soybeansemsp271 278 279 279n7 288 289 300

307 308specialized and vocational schoolsemsp219 223spicesemsp332 354stabilizing market pricesemsp353standardized kindergartensemsp143staple foodsemsp32State Administrative Councilemsp52 232 331

347State Agricultural Loansemsp251 256ndash259state bank loansemsp259state banksemsp239 256 259 263State Bureau for Letters and Callsemsp40state corn reservesemsp282State Councilemsp31 109 116 174 179 194 194n6

195n7 243 272 282 283State Councilrsquos Development Instituteemsp46State Councilrsquos Research Development

Instituteemsp43state grain monopolyemsp8 30 41 248 249 262

285 330 331 334 341 343n49 345ndash348 346n56 346n57 346n58 347n61 349n68 350 353

state guiding policy for agricultureemsp272state macroeconomic policiesemsp286state-mandated protection priceemsp304state monopolyemsp248 249 288 327 330ndash354state monopoly on grainemsp63 248 299 332n7

339n29 340 340n38 347 351state planningemsp182 195 281n8 311 342state requisitioning of grainemsp334 338 343state-run agricultureemsp257state-run farmsemsp179 180 319state-run or collective farmsemsp324state-run storeemsp327steelemsp10 87 97 118 119 156 164 166 168 171

172 174 188 323 331stud farmsemsp172

373Index

ltUNgt

374 Index

ltUNgt

sugaremsp197supply and demandemsp239 285ndash286 300supply and demand for grainsemsp267 273

277 281 282 282n8 286 289 303 333 333n8 341 346

supply and demand imbalancesemsp285supply and demand of capitalemsp243 251 262supply quota systemsemsp345 347supply systememsp117 118 123 124 125 129 344

346 346n60 349surplusesemsp6 29 30 31 259 280 281 283 286

288 289 293 295 300 304 306 307 326 335 337 337n22 339 353

surplus grainemsp45 239 261 296 304 305 307 331 339

Suzhouemsp156 157n4 162 163 163n19 163n20 167ndash171 168n21 168n22 168n23 169n24 169n25 169n26 169n27 172n28 173n32 174 174n33 174n35 176 178 178n36 179 179n37 181 181n38 181n39 181n40 182 182n41 182n42 182n43 183n44 183n46 183n47 184ndash187 186n50 187 188n51 190n56

sweet potatoesemsp77 80 93

Taiwanemsp48taking grain as the key linkemsp103n5 272Tang and Song Dynastiesemsp287taxation systememsp339technical and specialized collegesemsp321technical schoolemsp216terraced fieldsemsp101ndash114 283terracesemsp12 102ndash113tertiary industryemsp39 43 49 220 223 294

295 297 299 305 307textilesemsp192 193n4 196 197 201ndash205 207Thai riceemsp308 311Third Plenum of the Eleventh Communist

Party of China (CCP) Congressemsp194Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee

of the Communist Party of Chinaemsp30 3414th National Conference of the Communist

Party of Chinaemsp4214th National Congress of the Communist


Party of Chinaemsp35 49ldquothree fixedsrdquo policyemsp342 349three great battlesemsp330

three-in-one traditional economic systememsp342

Three Norths Conferenceemsp128ldquothree rural issuesrdquoemsp5 25ndash51 113 352Three Souths Conferenceemsp128three-tiered economy of communesemsp194three years of economic difficultiesemsp326Tianjinemsp37 90 124 268 271 273 277 278

280 281 289 298Tibetemsp37 268 271 274 278 281 298tile kilnemsp196 197 203timberemsp166 181 182tinemsp166 331tobaccoemsp77 80 197 327 331topsoilemsp84 91 95 96 105ndash108town economic service centeremsp215town management of village

accountsemsp214ndash216town management of village financesemsp224township and village enterprises (TVEs)emsp1

17 33ndash34 42 44ndash45 206n37 207n39 213 217 220 292 294

tractorsemsp4 90 91 111trade systememsp304 305traditional agricultureemsp336ndash337Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM)emsp331traditional handicraftsemsp196traditional rural economic systememsp342traditional techniquesemsp293transaction costsemsp302 333transcontinental shipsemsp310transportationemsp2 16 42 48 160 168 175 177

197ndash198 302ndash304 310 311 325trends of pessimistic thoughtemsp124troubled householdsemsp69 248tubersemsp279TVEs See township and village enterprises

(TVEs)Twelve Instructionsemsp128 158two-track systememsp299 312

uncompensated appropriationsemsp161ndash174 178 179 186 188 189 215

uncultivated landemsp165 180 318United States (US)emsp11 309 310university studentsemsp47unusual marriagesemsp328upgradingemsp15 111 112 306 309upgrading Chinarsquos industry structureemsp309

375Index

ltUNgt

urbanizationemsp1 2 27 32 34 37ndash39 344 354urban or rural household registrationsemsp45

322 345urban public enterprisesemsp323 324urban-rural disparityemsp38 45ndash46 48ndash50urban-rural dualityemsp50 344 349 353urban-rural dual social structureemsp45ndash46urban-rural gapemsp26 27 36 46 48 51 344

354urban-rural integrationemsp27 50urban-rural relationshipemsp27urban-rural social dualityemsp49ndash50urban-vs-rural dual household registration

systememsp327urban workforce downsizingsemsp315ndash318 328urban youthsemsp318 323Urgent Instructions on Current Policy Issues

in Rural Peoplersquos Communes See Twelve Instructions

usurersemsp236 239 240 248ndash249usuriousemsp242 250 251 262usuryemsp231 245 246 251 253uterine prolapseemsp157

value-added processingemsp305vegetablesemsp32 33 144 149 150 166 179 180

347village assetsemsp215village-collective-run enterpriseemsp217 220village collectivesemsp51 206 207 212ndash227

215ndash219 222ndash227assetsemsp214ndash219 222economic organizationsemsp212ndash227economiesemsp213ndash216 226enterprisesemsp206 218 226sharesemsp218

village cooperative economic organizationsemsp212 224 225 261

virgin landemsp318ndash319 325vocational schoolsemsp216 219n4 223vogue of communismemsp13 118 151 156

158ndash160 167voluntary lendingemsp241 242

walking plowemsp80 83 84 88 92waremsp2 13 48 53 54n3 54n4 82 325war against Japanemsp53 54warehousing costsemsp310War of Liberationemsp53ndash54

wasting diseaseemsp157water and soil conservationemsp102ndash107

109ndash113water resourcesemsp39ndash40 94 94n27 221 293welfareemsp5 14 139n17 142 145 151 175 180

214 219ndash224 246 336enterprisesemsp118 124 134 147ndash152 178

221 246levelsemsp217 219 220 222 223 225 226

Wenzhou Modelemsp17 193 193n3wheatemsp94 95 95n30 95n31 151 243 255

268 271 272 279 281 283 284 289 291ndash293 295 300 306 308 309

wheat flouremsp295window on the Southemsp294womenemsp4 14 75n2 125 134ndash141 145ndash148

149n46 150ndash152 157 221Womenrsquos Federationemsp136 140 141n24

145n33 146 146n39 146n40 148 150 150n51

woolemsp207 331work incentivesemsp30 189 206 338ndash340

348workpointsemsp129 136 138 139 198 202 324World Trade Organization (WTO)emsp308 310wristwatchesemsp347Wuyi Mountainsemsp314

Xinjiangemsp61 64 65 68 268 271 272 281 298

Yangtze deltaemsp103 273Yangtze Riveremsp103 274 282 295 302 306Yangtze River Deltaemsp39 311 312yellow box policyemsp310Yellow Riveremsp102 102n5Yellow River Valleyemsp287youth league committeeemsp150youth production brigadeemsp318Yuan Dynastyemsp288Yunnanemsp37 61 103 268 273 274 295 298Yunnan-Guizhou plateauemsp306

Zhang Wentianemsp54 55n6 123 124n20Zhejiangemsp17 37 40 60 64 65 68 128 160

193n3 268 271 273 275n4 278 281 282 295 298 310 311 339

Zhou Enlaiemsp129 129n35 283Zhu Deemsp129


Copyright

Contents



Introduction Chinese Agriculture and Rural Development Reexamined Western and Chinese Perspectives

Part 1 Political Programs in Practice

1 The Origins and Development of Chinarsquos ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquo

2 The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants after the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Land Reforms

3 The Deep Plowing Movement of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo

4 A Study of the Construction of Terraced Fields in Liulin County Shanxi Province in the Era of Collectivization

5 Historical Observations Regarding the Large-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens in Hebei Province

6 From Busy-Season Childcare Centers to Full-scale KindergartensmdashRural Childcare Organizations in Shanxi Province in the 1950s

7 Restitution Paid by Rural Peoplersquos Cooperatives in the 1960smdashAn Inquiry Focused on Jiangsu Province

8 Transformations to Commune and Brigade Enterprises and the Rise of Rural Private Enterprises in Gaoyang County Hebei Province in the Early Days of Reform and Opening

9 Analysis of the Construction of Village Collective Economic Organizations and Related Issues in Changshu CitymdashFour Case Studies

Part 2 Flows of Goods Money and People

10 The History of Rural Private Lending in Hubei Province 1952ndash1954

11 The South-to-North and North-to-South Flows of Grains and CerealsmdashChanges to Directions and Quantities of Flows of Grains and Cereals between North and South in Contemporary China

12 Three Historic Changes to Inter-regional Grain Flows in the Peoplersquos Republic of China and Their Causes

13 Rural Population Flows in the Era of CollectivizationmdashA Study of the Border Region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guangdong Provinces

14 A Review of Research on the State Monopoly

Index

ltUNgt

Historical Studies of Contemporary China

Series Editor

Thomas DuBois (Australian National University)

Editorial Board

Joel Andreas ( Johns Hopkins University)Liping Bu (Alma College)

Brian Demare (Tulane University)Xiaoping Fang (Nanyang Technological University)

Xiaofei Kang (George Washington University)Huaiyin Li (The University of Texas at Austin)

Glenn Tiffert (University of Michigan)Luman Wang (Virginia Military Institute)

Michael Szonyi (Harvard University)

VOLUME 2

The titles published in this series are listed at brillcomhscc

ltUNgt

Agricultural Reform and Rural Transformation in China

since 1949

Edited by

Thomas DuBois Huaiyin Li

LEIDEN | BOSTON

ltUNgt

issn 2352-7919isbn 978-90-04-29018-1 (hardback)isbn 978-90-04-32249-3 (e-book)

Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill nv Leiden The NetherlandsKoninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill Brill Hes amp De Graaf Brill Nijhoff Brill Rodopi and Hotei PublishingAll rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced translated stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic mechanical photocopying recording or otherwise without prior written permission from the publisherAuthorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center 222 Rosewood Drive Suite 910 Danvers ma 01923 usaFees are subject to change

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner

The SSAP logo and the CASS logo should appear flush-left on the Copyright Page above the subvention text The logos should appear side-by-side with the SSAP logo appearing to the left of the CASS logo

This book is a result of the co-publication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill nv These articles were selected and translated into English from the Chinese journal Contemporary China History Studies (《当代中国史研究》 Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu) sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary China Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

The translation has received financial support from the Innovation Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names DuBois Thomas David 1969- | Li HuaiyinTitle Agricultural reform and rural transformation in China since 1949

edited by Thomas DuBois Huaiyin LiDescription Leiden Boston Brill [2016] | Series Historical studies of

contemporary China ISSN 2352-7919 volume 2 | Includes bibliographical references and indexIdentifiers LCCN 2016016317 (print) | LCCN 2016017693 (ebook) | ISBN

9789004290181 (hardback alk paper) | ISBN 9789004322493 (e-book) | ISBN 9789004322493 (E-book)

Subjects LCSH Agriculture and state--China--History--20th century | Social change--China--History--20th century | Social problems--China--History--20th century | China--Rural conditions | China--Social policy | China--Politics and government--1949-1976 | China--Politics and government--1976-2002

Classification LCC HD2098 A355 2016 (print) | LCC HD2098 (ebook) | DDC 3381851--dc23LC record available at httpslccnlocgov2016016317

ltUNgt

Contents

List of ContributorsemspviiTranslatorrsquos Noteemspix

Introduction Chinese Agriculture and Rural Development Reexamined Western and Chinese Perspectivesemsp1


Part 1Political Programs in Practice

1 The Origins and Development of Chinarsquos ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquoemsp25Lu Xueyi

2 The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants after the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Land Reformsemsp52

Su Shaozhi

3 The Deep Plowing Movement of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquoemsp74Zhu Xianling Ding Zhaojun and Hu Huakai

4 A Study of the Construction of Terraced Fields in Liulin County Shanxi Province in the Era of Collectivizationemsp101

Hao Ping

5 Historical Observations Regarding the Large-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens in Hebei Provinceemsp115

Li Chunfeng

6 From Busy-Season Childcare Centers to Full-scale KindergartensmdashRural Childcare Organizations in Shanxi Province in the 1950semsp133

Han Xiaoli

7 Restitution Paid by Rural Peoplersquos Cooperatives in the 1960smdashAn Inquiry Focused on Jiangsu Provinceemsp155

Wang Yugui

ltUNgt

vi Contents

8 Transformations to Commune and Brigade Enterprises and the Rise of Rural Private Enterprises in Gaoyang County Hebei Province in the Early Days of Reform and Openingemsp192

Feng Xiaohong

9 Analysis of the Construction of Village Collective Economic Organizations and Related Issues in Changshu CitymdashFour Case Studiesemsp212

Zheng Yougui

Part 2Flows of Goods Money and People

10 The History of Rural Private Lending in Hubei Province 1952ndash1954emsp231

Su Shaozhi and Chang Mingming

11 The South-to-North and North-to-South Flows of Grains and CerealsmdashChanges to Directions and Quantities of Flows of Grains and Cereals between North and South in Contemporary Chinaemsp267

Zheng Yougui Ou Weizhong Kuang Chanjuan and Jiao Hongpo

12 Three Historic Changes to Inter-regional Grain Flows in the Peoplersquos Republic of China and Their Causesemsp287

Qu Shang and Su Shaozhi

13 Rural Population Flows in the Era of CollectivizationmdashA Study of the Border Region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guangdong Provincesemsp314

You Haihua

14 A Review of Research on the State Monopolyemsp330Wang Danli

Indexemsp361

ltUNgt


Chang Mingming (常明明)PhD in economics is professor in the Institute of International Economics Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

Ding Zhaojun (丁兆君)is a lecturer in the university history museum University of Science and Tech-nology of China

Feng Xiaohong (冯小红)PhD in history is associate professor in the history department of Handan College

Han Xiaoli (韩晓莉)PhD in history is assistant professor in the history department of Capital Nor-mal University

Hao Ping (郝平)PhD in history is professor in the Institute of Social History of China and director of the Institute of History and Culture Shanxi University

Hu Huakai (胡化凯)PhD in history of science is a professor in the department of history of science and technological archaeology University of Science and Technology of China

Jiao Hongpo (焦红坡)is a researcher fellow in the department of contemporary agricultural history Institute of Rural Economics Ministry of Agriculture

Kuang Chanjuan (邝婵娟)is an associate research fellow Institute of Agricultural Resources and Regional Planning Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences

Li Chunfeng (李春峰)holds a Master of Laws and works in the Hebei Provincial Academy of Social Sciences History Center

ltUNgt

Lu Xueyi (陆学艺 1933ndash2013)was research fellow and doctoral thesis advisor Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (cass) President Chinese Sociological Association Director Insti-tute of Sociology cass President Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences Beijing University of Technology President Chinese Association for Rural Sociology

Ou Weizhong (欧维中)a noted agronomist and the former chairman of the Institute of Rural Econom-ics of the Ministry of Agriculture

Qu Shang (瞿商)PhD in economics is associate professor in Economics Institute Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

Su Shaozhi (苏少之)is professor in the School of Economics Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Director Institute of Economic History of China

Wang Danli (王丹莉)PhD in economics is assistant research fellow department of economic his-tory Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Wang Yugui (王玉贵)PhD in history is professor in the history department of Jiangsu University

You Haihua (游海华)PhD in history is professor in the School of Marxism Studies Zhejiang Gong-shang University

Zheng Yougui (郑有贵)is head of department of economic history Institute of Contemporary China Studies

Zhu Xianling (朱显灵)PhD is an associate research fellow in the department of history of science and technological archaeology University of Science and Technology of China

viii List of Contributors

ltUNgt


The Chinese word nongmin is typically translated into English as ldquopeasantrdquo Its constituent characters are nong which can mean ldquofarmingrdquo ldquoagriculturerdquo or ldquorural areasrdquo in general and min which means ldquopersonrdquo or ldquopeoplerdquo A nong-min is thus literally a ldquofarmerrdquo or a ldquorural personrdquo Prior to the recent era most nongmin in China were peasants in the traditional definition operating un-der a feudal system Shortly after the communist liberation of China nong-min became a political denomination of class at which point the status of nongmin became preferable to that of dizhu or ldquolandlordrdquo So in discussions of Chinarsquos official class system of that time it is appropriate to translate nong-min as ldquopeasant(s)rdquo However around the same time the Peoplersquos Republic of China instituted the hukou or household registration system based on Soviet precedent This system divided Chinarsquos population into two categories nongye ldquoagriculturalrdquo or in other words ldquoruralrdquo and feinong ldquonon-agriculturalrdquo or in other words ldquourbanrdquo Citizens registered ldquoagriculturalrdquo generally belong to a vil-lage collective which allots them parcels of land some designated for farm-ing and some for homesteading Urban citizens are not allocated any land but have other advantages in the cities where they are registered in ease of finding employment and access to public schools and other public services Chinese people with either kind of registration are citizens who can apply for passports or party membership or official service ie with ldquocitizensrsquo rightsrdquo but there are distinct differences in the rights of either group In one of many examples one often hears of the hundreds of millions of ldquorural migrantsrdquo in China citizens registered ldquoruralrdquo despite living and working in urban areas and their lack of access to full rights In modern China when one uses the term nongmin especially in official literaturemdashan example being the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo or sannong wentimdashit is almost certainly in reference to hukou status especially when statistics are being given So in this book I almost always render the term nongmin as ldquorural citizen(s)rdquo as I feel this term succinctly captures the nature of the population being described unless in a particular instance it is clear that the author was referring to political class status or the occupation of farming in particular

ltUNgt


ltUNgt

Introduction

Chinese Agriculture and Rural Development Reexamined Western and Chinese Perspectives


Since the dismantling of the Peoplersquos Communes and the gradual introduction of the Household Responsibility System (hrs) in the early 1980s rural China has witnessed tremendous economic and social changes Grain production has grown prodigiously township and village enterprises (tves) have flour-ished huge numbers of migrant workers have flowed into the cities and the rapid process of urbanization has reduced the number of rural dwellers to just over half of Chinarsquos total population Observers have tended to juxtapose these recent developments against the poor economic conditions in the countryside prior to 1978 emphasizing the low agricultural productivity and widespread rural poverty that was prevalent before and during the era of collective ag-riculture Political and scholarly perspectives have largely agreed that it was the failure of Maoist agricultural policies that drove the decollectivization and reforms of the Deng Xiaoping era even as these reforms created new problems of wealth disparity environmental degradation and food insecurity

Agriculture has always been at the heart of prc policy the government in-herited a country that was overwhelmingly rural and predicated its social and economic revolution heavily on rural transformation Despite the stunning in-dustrial growth of the past few decades China remains heavily invested in ag-riculture Since the 1980s Chinese historians have revisited and reassessed the history of agricultural development in the Peoplersquos Republic from the dawn of the collective movement to the new realities of the 1980s and beyond This vol-ume brings together fourteen articles from the journal Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu to introduce Chinese scholarly perspectives on many of the most impor-tant issues about agricultural development and institutional changes in rural China during and after the Maoist era Beginning with an overall assessment of the challenges and prospects of agricultural growth and social change in rural China this volume includes articles on the background and dynamics of agricultural collectivization in the early to mid-1950s the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath in the late 1950s and early 1960s and various facets of rural industrialization and economic development following decollectivization in the early 1980s

li and DuBois2

ltUNgt

This introduction frames the work of these scholars by presenting an overall historical context for the topics and issues addressed in this volume Beginning with a survey of the Chinese statersquos overall strategy for economic development and its subsequent agricultural policies it emphasizes the microeconomic in-stitutions that shaped collectivized agriculture as well as the motivations that subsequently drove the Great Leap Forward decollectivization and rural in-dustrialization In the process we will suggest some of the ways that the work presented in this volume engages some of the perspectives and concerns pre-sented in English language scholarship on post-1949 rural China

Overview Economic Strategy and Agricultural Growth

The dynamics and complexity of agricultural growth and agrarian changes in post-1949 China cannot be fully comprehended without placing them into the larger context of the Chinese statersquos overall development strategy it was after all these long-term macroeconomic goals that determined the statersquos priori-ties in investment the formulation of microeconomic policies and plans for the relationships among different economic sectors Like many other develop-ing countries in Asia during the decades following World War ii the newly established Peoplersquos Republic of China was confronted with the urgent task of economic development through industrialization and had to choose be-tween two alternative strategies The first was to encourage the improvement of family-based agriculture by means of modern inputs (chemical fertilizers pesticides machines improved seeds etc) provided by the industrial sector and by integrating family farming with regional national and global markets In turn improved productivity would enable rural ldquosurplus laborrdquo to flow from agriculture into the industrial sector thus propelling industrialization with the supply of cheap labor force and the subsequent process of urbanization This was the course of agricultural growth and rural development widely seen in other East Asian economies in the postwar decades1 The second was to priori-tize industrial growth especially investment in capital-intensive heavy indus-try (the manufacturing of machinery energy smelting and transportation) without significant investment in agriculture and light industry for consumer goods In the absence of external capital such as foreign loans or direct foreign

1 In these regimes as well the development of family farming often included the marginaliza-tion of existing agrarian elites see TJ Pempel ldquoThe Developmental Regime in a Changing Worlds Economyrdquo Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed) The Developmental State in Historical Per-spective (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1999) pp 164ndash165


ltUNgt

investment high-speed industrial growth relied on state extraction of eco-nomic resources from agriculture which in turn necessitated forced measures of agrarian collectivization and mobilization The Soviet Union had already pioneered just such an approach successfully achieving its goal of rapid indus-trialization but at the expense of a stagnant agriculture sector and the peren-nial shortage of consumer goods

Throughout the Mao era the Chinese leadership oscillated between the two strategies outlined above but generally it was the latter that prevailed The former which served initially only as a temporary and supplementary solution to the problems caused by overly aggressive agrarian extraction would eventu-ally come to dominate Chinarsquos development strategy in the post-Mao period The key factor behind the Maoist statersquos preference for the strategy of heavy industrial development was primarily geopolitical Mao was prompted by the success of the Stalinist model the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s the Westrsquos embargo of China and his own eagerness to narrow the gap between China and industrial nations to advocate the policy of ldquoleaning to one siderdquo (yi bian dao)mdashborrowing Soviet political and economic institutions while pioneering its own strategy of economic growth As Perkins and Yusuf pointed out from the 1950s through the 1970s the economic planners in the central government persistently prioritized the expansion of heavy industry which accounted for from 40 percent to over 50 percent of the statersquos capital construction invest-ment in most years2 The limited availability of capital for investment in agri-culture drove the state to aggressively mobilize the rural workforce as the pri-mary means to increase grain output Compared to the phenomenal increase in industrial output grain production increased by only 225 percent annually from 1955 to 1980 which was no better than that in many other developing countries The sluggish growth of agricultural output was a result not only of the statersquos lack of investment in and excessive extraction from agriculture but also of the mismanagement of local collective organizations and the ineffi-ciency in labor input Therefore since the mid-1960s modern capital input especially in the application of chemical fertilizers and the introduction of new strains of crops became increasingly important for agriculture and con-tributed to at least half of the increases in agricultural production which grew ldquoat a respectable 4 percent or more per yearrdquo3

Mark Selden offers a nuanced analysis of Chinarsquos economy under Mao by distinguishing between the two phases before and after the summer of 1955

2 Dwight Perkins and Shahid Yusuf Rural Development in China (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press 1984)

3 Ibid 198

li and DuBois4

ltUNgt

Selden suggests that in its earlier stage Chinarsquos economic plan was incremen-tal and innovative combining farmersrsquo voluntary participation in cooperatives and the use of market elements for the shared well-being of a coalition of so-cial forces Afterwards however the state turned to what he calls ldquomobiliza-tional collectivismrdquo in the form of compulsory procurement of crops at low state prices the forced transition to collectives and low investment in agri-culture Although Selden acknowledges the obvious achievements of Maoist rural development the overall direction of policy worked against rural inter-ests and accounted for the stagnation in agricultural productivity and peasant income from the collectives the continued poverty of the rural population and a widening gap in living conditions between urban and rural areas4 In a similar vein Andrew Walder questions the effectiveness of Chinarsquos develop-ment strategy after 1956 He emphasizes the facts that per capita gdp growth in China from 1950 to 1973 was only 29 percent largely on par with India but significantly lower than the level achieved by its East Asian neighbors As late as 1978 30 percent of the Chinese rural population remained below the pov-erty line not to mention the death of tens of millions during the Great Leap Forward and another 11 to 16 million during the Cultural Revolution5

To date Philip Huang has provided the most sophisticated explanation of the dynamics of agricultural growth in Maoist China Huang agrees that the rapid expansion of state power in the rural society through collectivization and party networks at the village level made possible local government pro-grams to construct water-control and irrigation projects increase the use of chemical fertilizers and tractors and promote the double-cropping of hybrid rice in the Yangzi delta in the 1960s and 1970s However the most important factor that contributed to agricultural growth Huang argues was the full mo-bilization of womenrsquos labor by the collectives The demands of the rapidly ex-panding population for more income to satisfy their subsistence needs efforts by collectives to maximize crop yields and the disappearance of off-farm em-ployment opportunities drove farmers to intensify labor input in production until the marginal return of their added labor input disappeared Labor in-tensification did increase output per unit area which reached its highest level in the late 1970s just before the abolition of the collective system However these gains were achieved at the cost of stagnation and even decline in labor productivity or output per workday as best measured by the cash value of the

4 Mark Selden The Political Economy of Chinese Socialism (Armonk ny ME Sharpe 1988) pp 3ndash23

5 Andrew Walder China under Mao A Revolution Derailed (Cambridge ma Harvard University Press 2015) pp 315ndash334


ltUNgt

farmersrsquo daily work points which remained largely unchanged throughout the Maoist era Huang refers to this process as agricultural involution which in his opinion had existed in Chinarsquos rural economy for centuries before the Com-munist revolution6

This volume begins with one similarly sweeping meta-analysis Lu Xueyirsquos still timely perspective on the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo (san nong wenti) Unlike the chapters that follow this piece was a speech rather than an academic research article and as such it offers an unusually frank assessment of the ways in which the past decades of rural reform have succeeded and those in which they have not The success story has been the development of agriculture (nongye) by which Lu refers to the aggregate level of production Simply put decades of successful investment in agriculture mean that depletion of the national grain supply is no longer a threat even (as one later chapter notes) in the case of an international embargo However this success has come at the expense of rural areas (nongcun) which are poorly managed and burdened by high levels of official debt and the welfare of rural citizens (nongmin) who have fallen behind their urban counterparts and are owed a debt for their contribution to national construction Worth particular notice are Lursquos recommendations which include abolishing the system of registering households as urban or ru-ral (with severely restricted options for the latter) as well as deep structural reforms of local government and the reinstatement of the Rural Work Depart-ment As Lursquos listeners and later readers would no doubt have understood each of these proposed reforms speaks to a specific moment of decision during Chinarsquos decades of agrarian transformation

Agricultural Collectivization in the 1950s

Commencing after the 1952 completion of land reform the process of collec-tivization continued for five years and proceeded in three stages7 The first stage was the organization of ldquomutual aid teamsrdquo (huzhuzu) each of which consisted of a few to more than a dozen households Participating house-holds joined the teams voluntarily and retained ownership of land and other

6 Philip CC Huang The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta 1350ndash1988 (Stanford Stanford University Press 1990) especially Chapter 11

7 Land reform itself was a multi-stage process which commenced on a small scale in the agrar-ian soviets of the 1920s and continued gradually in areas under communist control The date of 1952 refers to the point at which the reforms had been completed in newly acquired re-gions and the program officially declared complete

li and DuBois6

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property such as draft animals and farm implements Generally villagers wel-comed this form of cooperation because they still controlled all of the harvest from their private fields while the poor and middle peasants (labels which had been first applied during land reform) within the teams benefitted from the availability of shared use resources The second stage began in 1954 with the state-led transition from mutual aid teams to ldquoagricultural production cooperativesrdquo (nongye hezuoshe also known as primary cooperatives and more generally as apcs)8 These cooperatives each comprised an average of 30 households which as before continued to retain ownership of land draft animals and large farming tools but were required to allow their collective use by the coop In return households received payments of land dividends Because state policy limited such dividends to 45 percent of a cooprsquos total dis-tribution to member households (the remaining 55 percent was based on labor contribution to the collective) the apcs were considered to be ldquosemi-socialistrdquo in nature The third stage began in the summer of 1956 with the transition to ldquoadvanced cooperativesrdquo (gaoji nongye hezuoshe) This new generation of agrarian cooperatives was both larger with each coop having an average of 250 households and fully socialist in nature Member households were required to renounce private ownership of land and farming tools and their income from the collective was determined solely by their labor contribution The advanced cooperative movement proceeded quickly and involved coercion by local gov-ernments in merging the original (primary) apcs and the mobilization of in-dependent households By the end of 1956 nearly 90 percent of all households in the non-minority provinces were participating in the advanced collectives

The statersquos strategy for agricultural transformation therefore underwent a dramatic change from its original scheme of voluntary and gradual transi-tion to the radical plan of accelerated compulsory collectivization During the early 1950s the consensus among prc leaders and economic planners seems to have been that agricultural collectivization would be a lengthy process re-quiring at least fifteen years They believed further that agricultural collectives could be established widely and firmly only when Chinarsquos national economy was sufficiently industrialized as to provide agricultural machinery and other modern inputs9 At the same time planners recognized that industrial growth would rely on agricultural development Agricultural surpluses were necessary

8 It should be noted that different types of agricultural cooperatization remain in use outside of China and that terminology such as apcs is shared with a broader current literature on agrarian development

9 Pang Xianzhi and Jin Congji Mao Zedong zhuan [The biography of Mao Zedong] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 2011) pp 1307ndash1308


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not only to feed the urban centers where industry was to be concentrated but also to repay development loans from the Soviet Union and to fund the con-struction of industry in the absence of investment capital As Wang Danli dis-cusses in Chapter 14 of this volume the grain crisis of 1953 marked the moment of decision in this obvious conflict of priorities between agricultural develop-ment and surplus extraction It was at this point that state planners moved from simply regulating the grain market and instituted the grain monopoly that would remain in place until 1978

As is well known Mao personally championed the move to accelerate the transition to advanced cooperatives He did so for both productive and ideo-logical reasons Long before the Communist revolution observers had agreed that Chinarsquos independent family farming was in the words of one party reso-lution ldquoisolated scattered conservative and backwardrdquo and that the ineffi-ciency of household agriculture constrained the larger project of national de-velopment10 The other and as Mao increasingly emphasized more important reason was the struggle between the two roads of socialism and capitalism in the countryside For Mao the continuation of independent farming would inevitably lead to differentiation among peasant families and give rise to the resurgence of capitalism in agricultural production in which rich peasants predominated The transition to socialism in the countryside was the single solution to both the backwardness of agricultural production and the problem of endemic rural exploitation

In sharp contrast with Maorsquos ideological rhetoric Western scholars have generally emphasized the practical economic difficulties that challenged the leadership in the mid-1950s The greatest challenge according to Mark Selden lay in the crisis of the First Five-Year Plan which projected an annual growth of nine percent in grain production in 1953 and 1954 whereas the actual growth in both years was less than two percent ldquoAcceleration of cooperative forma-tion Mao now held could stimulate productive energies making possible fulfillment of the plan and opening new possibilities for accumulationrdquo11 On the other hand the problems of polarization and class differentiation Selden suggests were not as acute as Mao claimed by 1954 ldquothe already diminished rich-peasant advantage over poor peasants in per capita cultivated acreage

10 The negative assessment of household farming went back to the agrarian economists of the Rural Reconstruction movement See for example Martin C Yang A Chinese Village Taitou Shantung Province New York Columbia University Press 1945 Quote from Pang and Jin 2011 1325

11 Selden 1988 82

li and DuBois8

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had dropped from 134 to 1271rdquo12 In her classic work on rural transformation in the early 1950s Vivienne Shue emphasized the threat that sluggish growth in agricultural production posed to the fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan as the leading reason behind Maorsquos decision to accelerate collectivization How-ever she also takes into account the factor of ldquostubborn persistence of wide disparities in wealth between classesrdquo which explained why poor and lower-middle peasants who made up 70ndash80 percent of all peasants were ldquoready and eager to join in cooperative farming venturesrdquo13 According to Louis Putterman however collectivization was not merely a tool by which the state could more effectively extract agrarian surplus but was more important as a means of projecting power into the countryside and breaking any remaining resistance among the former rural elite14

Three chapters in this volume highlight specific challenges as they were seen at the time While he does not mention the debate over Party motiva-tions in such terms it is clear that Wang Danli sees in 1953 a moment where the needs of production took precedence over those of the social revolution He attributes the formation of the state grain monopolymdasha fundamental change that coincided with the beginning of collectivizationmdashalmost solely to the economic priorities of industrialization with no mention of political or class conflict In a similar way Su Shaozhi and Chang Mingmingrsquos Chapter 10 on private lending presents an image of early rural reform that is far less focused on class leveling than on increasing productivity Su and Chang show that planners sought primarily to free up productive capital much of which was being hoarded by rich peasants In the years before collectivization cadres in Hubei not only tolerated private lending among peasants they positively encouraged it This process included even recognizing the validity of some debts incurred before the revolution ones that many lenders and borrowers alike had assumed would have been wiped clean under the new regime Cen-tral and provincial directives to protect the interests of creditors grew out of the recognition that private lending was necessary to keep capital flowing into agrarian improvements To that end rural cadres were instructed to assure rich peasants that money lent under fair terms of interest would indeed be repaid and would not have adverse implications for the class status of the lender

In Chapter 2 Su Shaozhi recreates the view from 1955 when cadres sought to assess the reemergence of rural class statification three years after

12 Ibid 7913 Vivienne Shue Peasant China in Transition The Dynamics of Development Toward Social-

ism 1949ndash1956 (Berkeley University of California Press 1980) p 28414 Louis Putterman Continuity and Change in Chinarsquos Rural Development Collective and Re-

form Eras in Perspective (Oxford uk Oxford University Press 1993) p 26


ltUNgt

the official conclusion of land reform Taking a broad national perspective Su found that a small stratum of rich peasants had begun to emerge in areas where land reform had been conducted early particularly in rapidly developing provinces such as Liaoning but had not yet appeared in areas where the reforms had been instituted more recently The more significant change was the one suggested by Selden the striking transition of people from poor to the ranks of middle peasants This latter change suggests that land reform was successful overall and was quite likely the reason behind the fact that cadres collecting the data did not seem to regard the reemer-gence of a small number of rich peasants as a crisis Their rather calm assessment that a certain number of peasants would always succeed by virtue of either hard work or good luck is particularly striking given that it was made just before the onset of the politically charged panic over the perceived reemergence of rural exploitation that pushed the acceleration of Maoist collectivism

The Great Leap Forward

The process of collectivization was on the whole relatively smooth and suc-cessful There was no widespread resistance of the sort that had been seen in the Soviet Union and the large number of grassroots rural cadres gradually learned to deal with the movementrsquos numerous logistical difficulties how to award different numbers of work points to individual peasants calculate the different forms of income distributed to peasant households coordinate tasks and labor remuneration between different production teams and requisition privately owned land to construct public projects15 Complete collectivization under the advanced coops actually made these problems easier to handle Ad-vanced coop cadres enjoyed complete control in assigning tasks and distribut-ing income even if coop members became more vulnerable to abuse Scholars have expressed different opinions about whether the advanced coop changed cadre loyalties Helen Siu suggests that the larger coops were more beholden to the state while others believe that they tended to remain true to their grass-roots origins16 Philip Huang is probably the most accurate in suggesting that

15 Carl Riskin Chinarsquos Political Economy The Quest for Development Since 1949 (Oxford uk Oxford University Press 1987) 81ndash95 Shue 1980 300ndash308

16 Helen F Siu Agents and Victims in South China Accomplices in Rural Revolution (New Haven Yale University Press 1989) p 168 Shue 1980 56 66ndash67 William Parish and Martin King Whyte Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago The University of Chicago Press 1978) pp 106ndash144

li and DuBois10

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the advanced coops held ldquodouble loyaltiesrdquo to both state and local communi-ties17 In either case it is clear that from the dual perspectives of extraction and control the advanced cooperatives were a success

The movement towards larger and more socialist cooperatives culminated in the Great Leap Forward (glf) from 1958 to 1960 Unlike the largely success-ful phases of land reform and agricultural collectivization that had come be-fore it the glf ended in disaster which in turn produced a profound impact on the course of institutional changes in Chinarsquos economic and political de-velopment over the decades to come Among the many puzzles surrounding the history of the glf the most intriguing is why Mao launched the program when he did After all Maorsquos stated objective of establishing socialist collective agriculture had already been declared complete with the formation of the ad-vanced cooperatives in 1957 Yet even these cooperatives did not last long Just one year later the glf merged the advanced coops into the gigantic Peoplersquos Communes (renmin gongshe) which had an average of approximately 4500 households and a population of 23000 and became the basic unit of planning production and distribution The Peoplersquos Communes were beset with prob-lems commune leaders (who no longer had the close ties to the grassroots) exerted arbitrary command over the labor force enforced overly egalitarian systems of labor remuneration and diverted the most able villagers from farm-ing to tasks such as the construction of earthwork projects and the smelting of useless iron and steel These problems together with drought the statersquos excessive procurement of grain and (at the outset) the wasteful consumption of food at collective canteens exacerbated nationwide crop failures causing severe food shortages in 1959 and 1960 and a nationwide famine that claimed millions of lives

Past studies have emphasized two major factors behind Maorsquos decision to embark on the glf Domestically party leaders were growing dissatisfied with the results of the First Five-Year Plan In 1957 the last year of the First Five-Year Plan grain production grew by only 13 percent and the industrial growth rate was the second lowest since the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic At the same time population growth accelerated reaching 2 percent annually in the 1950s in contrast to 1 percent in the first half of the twentieth century Increases in both the consumption needs of the people and industryrsquos demands for raw materials from agriculture placed unprecedented stress on grain production and supply As Roderick MacFarquhar observed for ccp leaders ldquohellipthe grain shortages of the late summer of 1957 must have indicated clearly enough that

17 Siu 1990 321


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a fundamental reappraisal of their development strategy was essentialrdquo18 Agricultural collectivization alone could not solve the bottleneck in economic growth

Externally the gradual souring of Chinarsquos relations with the Soviet Union behind which China still lagged economically naturally prompted the former to imitate elements of its neighborrsquos economic strategies and institutionaliza-tion The 1959 announcement of the Seventh Economic Plan for the Soviet Union with its stated objective of catching up with the United States in fifteen years in per capita industrial output clearly inspired Mao to claim that the glf would allow China to overtake Britain in the exactly same time period An un-spoken motive behind Maorsquos initiation of the glf was his personal rivalry with Nikita Khrushchev the new leader of the Soviet Union for supremacy in the ideological realm of socialist economic construction Mao disagreed openly with Khrushchevrsquos reversal of Stalin-era policies and his own goals for the glf were precisely and overtly Stalinist in that they prioritized the development of heavy industry at the expense of agriculture and production of consumer goods19 Maorsquos ultimate goal for the glf was to show to Moscow and the rest of the communist world that China could eventually surpass the Soviet Union in socialist construction and the transition to communism

Reports of food shortages and inefficiencies in production served only to radicalize the program putting pressure on local cadres to outdo each other in demonstrating enthusiasm Recurrent political movements in particular the 1957 Anti-Rightist campaign and the 1959 attack on Peng Dehuai and his ldquoanti-Party cliquerdquo demonstrated the price of honest criticism and the danger of being identified with ldquorightist deviationrdquo People at all levels had little choice but to join the fanaticism for poorly-planned projects exhibit support for obvi-ously nonproductive tasks and willingly suspend belief in the face of clearly exaggerated production figures The central governmentrsquos 1959 decision to ex-port as many as 42 million tons of grain in order to support some Third World countries and pay off Chinarsquos debt to the Soviet Union exacerbated further a food shortage that had plainly reached disastrous proportions20

Recent studies have focused on determining and prioritizing the reasons behind the famine that accompanied the failure of the glf Justin Lin for instance rejects the role of natural disasters local mistakes in production

18 Roderick MacFarquhar The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Vol 2 The Great Leap For-ward 1958ndash1960 (New York Columbia University Press 1983) p 3

19 Walder 2015 32020 Frank Dikoumltter Maorsquos Great Famine The History of Chinarsquos Most Devastating Catastrophe

1958ndash1962 (New York Bloomsbury 2010) 83 104ndash107

li and DuBois12

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planning and the inefficiencies of the oversized communes Instead he em-phasizes the loss of incentive and the prevalence of free riding by peasants who were unable to exit the collective after the 1958 formation of Peoplersquos Communes21 Others highlight differences at the provincial levels Dali Yangrsquos research finds that the death toll during the famine was linked positively to the popularity of public canteens which were found more commonly in provinces that were poorer had fewer ccp party members and leaders who tended to be more supportive of the radical policies22 Others have echoed the importance of provincial leadership but reached different conclusions about the exact significance of political status and ambitions Kung and Chen assert that those who were within sight of elevation to the Partyrsquos Central Committee were more likely to implement radical policies such as the excessive procure-ment of grain23 Three years later Dali Yang et al published a rejoinder to this theory attributing the most radical tendencies to leaders whom Mao had per-sonally appointed to the Central Committee24 In addition local conditions including population density level of rural development and natural agrarian productivity all played an enormous role in the way in which different regions experienced the famine

This volume presents a different perspective on the GLF by focusing on the local development of some of its most characteristic institutions Rather than addressing the level of political ambition as such three chapters offer instead different examples of how the politicization of production during the glf distorted perceptions and priorities Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the dissemina-tion of two production techniques terracing and deep plowing and hint at the ways that even technological innovation could take on the characteristics of a political movement The practice of terracing sloping land to increase ag-ricultural area was itself nothing new but it was vastly expanded during the 1950s due both to the prevalent attitude that bigger is always better and to the communesrsquo ability to mobilize labor on an mass scale Terraces such as those constructed in the model farms of Dazhai Shanxi were indeed marvels of

21 Justin Y Lin ldquoTizhi gaige he Zhongguo nongye zengzhangrdquo Institutional reforms and agri-cultural growth in China China Center for Economic Research Beijing University 2008 1ndash17

22 Dali Yang Calamity and Reform in China State Rural Society and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine (Stanford Calif Stanford University Press 1996)

23 James Kung and Shuo Chen ldquoThe Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during Chinarsquos Great Leap Faminerdquo American Political Science Review (2011) 105 1 27ndash45

24 Dali Yang Huayu Xu and Ran Tao ldquoA Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career incentives political loyalty and political radicalism during Chinarsquos Great Leap Forwardrdquo Journal of Contemporary China (2014) 23 89 864ndash883


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agricultural construction but they came at a price Similar projects in nearby Yanggao did increase yields but at the cost of diverted labor and lost yields that could scarcely be mentioned at the time The deep plowing campaign shows how the idea of the ldquomass linerdquo wherein the Party adopts the revolu-tionary genius that originates with and arises from the masses was replicated even in the realm of technological innovation According to the stylized nar-rative the technique of deep plowing was pioneered by peasants of a produc-tion brigade perfected by rural cadres and research institutes and broadly dis-seminated back to the masses Like terracing the technique of deep plowing did produce some advantages and did increase yields in some areas However the politically charged atmosphere of the glf demanded that the practice be accepted universally and eventually came to demand extreme investments of human input tens of millions of peasants would turn their backs on existing techniques to ldquowage war on the landrdquo often unable to admit when the tech-nique did not work

In Chapter 5 of this volume Li Chunfeng illustrates a similar trajectory be-hind the acceptance and criticism of public canteens one of the signature social and economic policies of the glf Like terracing and deep plowing the story of the formation of public canteens was presented as having arisen from the spontaneous initiative of the masses who set up military style messes near the fields during the busy seasons The acceptance and development of canteens closely tracks the events of the glf as they began to reveal serious drawbacks as food waste canteens quietly began to fall into disfavor Ironi-cally the political reaction to Peng Dehuairsquos criticism of the glf saved the canteens as Mao championed the cause personally and cadres nationwide again competed to demonstrate their enthusiasm for a policy that was clearly flawed

In a way the most important legacy of the glf was its undeniable failure In the aftermath opposing factions were emboldened to dramatically shift poli-cy in the hope of rehabilitating the ruined economy Although some of these new policies such as the introduction of ldquohousehold responsibility for produc-tion under contractrdquo (baochan daohu) and introduction of household plots did anticipate the market reforms of the 1980s it is important to view the policies of the 1960s in their own right Wang Yugui presents one view of this period in Chapter 7 of this volume in which he examines the 1961 campaign to provide restitution for property that had been illegally seized or destroyed during the previous years Nominally instituted at the urging of Mao himself in reality this campaign aimed to underscore the political shift away from the leftist poli-cies now branded as the ldquovogue of communismrdquo and to restore the damaged image of the Party in the countryside But here again the central state was by no means omniscient Like the glf the process of making reparations was

li and DuBois14

ltUNgt

only as good as the local cadres who implemented them in particular because the vague instructions they received left significant room for interpretation as well as abuses such as paying with unenforceable ious

We also note that the glf did leave some legacies that turned out to be positive for Chinarsquos economic growth in the long run For all the blindness and irrationality that often accompanied their planning projects such as the con-struction of water-control and irrigation systems aided rural development con-siderably The three-tiered commune system Carl Riskin argues also ldquoturned out to be a flexible instrument for organizing farmland capital construction facilitating technical change introducing some social welfare protection to rural people and instituting rural industrialization Many of the small and medium-size industries that sprang up in the countryside after 1962 originated in the backyard factories of the Leaprdquo25

One of the positive legacies of collectivization if not of the glf specifically was the fuller incorporation of women into the workforce the change that Philip Huang posits as the greatest productive transformation of the twentieth century26 Although traditionally women had been involved in various aspects of rural production particularly in handicrafts such as weaving it was the la-bor policies of the collectives that both encouraged (through the allocation of work points) and allowed (by freeing them from other duties) women to commit fully In Chapter 6 of this volume Han Xiaoli discusses the introduc-tion and evolution of collective childcare a key component in the evolution of this change In some contrast to the triumphant tone of some of the other chapters this one presents in some detail the struggles cadres faced in gaining acceptance of the practicemdashwomen who did not want to care for other peo-plersquos children others who were happy to let their own children run free in the fields and so on It was only with the professionalization of childcare both the provision of work points to village carers and their eventual replacement by politically vetted outsiders that allowed the centers to take root and transform into a stable element of the local landscape as kindergartens

Decollectivization and Rural Industrialization

The dismantling of collectivized agriculture was not a single event but rather a process that continued for years after Maorsquos death The official account of this

25 Riskin 1987 p 13826 Huang 1990


ltUNgt

process emphasized the peasantsrsquo own initiative epitomized by the actions of eighteen villagers from Xiaogang in Fengyang County Anhui Province who in the winter of 1978 secretly divided the fields of their production team to households for independent farming Over subsequent years collectives across China imitated this audacious but illegal act leading ultimately to the imple-mentation in agriculture of the Household Responsibility System This basic narrative has been widely accepted by scholars who agreed that the introduc-tion of the hrs was indeed a spontaneous bottom-up process in which villag-ers participated voluntarily27 According to this view it was the common recog-nition of the inefficiencies of collective agriculture and the ultimate failure of the collectives to improve rural living conditions that prompted the rapid and smooth acceptance of the hrs

However in reality reactions to decollectivization were more complex es-pecially at the local level It is true that the vast majority of the rural popula-tion was still living at the subsistence level by the end of the collective era and that in many localities the villagers indeed took the first step in dismantling the communes However the situation was often quite different in areas where collectivization had significantly enhanced production This was particularly true when the increase was clearly attributable to the use of modern inputs (improved crop varieties chemical fertilizers and improved water control) and material incentives (such as the wide implementation of the piece rate work point system and the increase in the work point share in grain distribu-tion) In fact the growth of agricultural production accelerated prior to 1978 in the country as a whole reaching the highest level in the most prosperous areas such as the Yangzi delta in 1978 just before the collective system was disman-tled28 In areas that had benefitted from collective agriculture the emphasis was instead on reform for example by upgrading the basic accounting unit from the production team to the larger brigades29 Thus although the hrs did indeed benefit many peasants not every part of the country embraced it spon-taneously At the national level it was only possible to implement it through a coordinated top-down effort30

27 Eg Susan Shirk The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley ca Univer-sity of California Press 1993) pp 38ndash41 Kate Xiaohong Zhou How the Farmers Changed China Power of the People (Boulder Colorado Westview Press 1996)

28 Stone Bruce 1988 ldquoDevelopments in Agricultural Technologyrdquo China Quarterly 116 Dec 767ndash822 818 Putterman 1993 36 Huang 1990 242

29 Putterman 1993 31 David Zweig Agrarian Radicalism in China 1968ndash1981 (Cambridge ma Harvard University Press 1989) 39

30 Riskin 1987 pp 286ndash290

li and DuBois16

ltUNgt

The transition to the hrs had two major consequences First it greatly im-proved the incentive for farmers to increase production From 1980 to 1984 total agricultural output across the entire country expanded by 4223 percent an average of 77 percent per year which was significantly higher than the an-nual growth rate of 29 percent from 1952 to 1978 According to Justin Linrsquos esti-mate the introduction of the hrs and hence of farmersrsquo improved incentives accounted for 49 percent of this growth while the increased application of chemical fertilizers contributed 32 percent and the increase in the statersquos pro-curement price of major crops contributed another 16 percent31

Another unanticipated but profound consequence of the transition to the hrs was the flow of labor from agriculture into non-agricultural sectors This move was by no means unprecedentedmdashas You Haihua shows in this volume significant population movement was quite common even during the collec-tive era State or commune authorities arranged some of this migration most notably the transfer of labor to work on large projects and especially the re-location to the countryside of the generation of sent-down youth However much of it was voluntary as people moved where their labor was more valued while others escaped into sparsely settled mountains

This trickle of voluntary movement greatly expanded with the implementa-tion of the hrs Released from their obligations as members of agricultural collectives hundreds of millions of rural dwellers suddenly were free to leave the land and engage in whatever work they chose so long as they paid an ag-ricultural tax and various fees to local governments and sold the contracted amount of harvest to the state under the procurement program As a result a growing number of villagers sought work in construction transportation and commerce or established their own family businesses

The most conspicuous feature of the economic and social transformation following decollectivization was the development of rural enterprise The first stage of this process had emerged within the collectives themselves Already possessing both managerial expertise and a structure for the allocation and remuneration of labor existing collective bodies began as early as 1978 to make the transition into profit-making Commune Brigade Enterprises (cbes) Feng Xiaohongrsquos chapter in this volume traces the process by which cbes in Hebei were encouraged by national and provincial legislation to branch into small scale industries such as weaving and acrylic knitting gradually building exper-tise networks and economies into zones of regional specialization

31 Justin Lin ldquoRural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in Chinardquo The American Economic Review 821 (1992) 34ndash51


ltUNgt

The opening of the labor market spelled the decline of cbes but it also laid the foundation for the rise of a new generation of rural entrepreneurs and for larger and more market oriented township and village enterprises (tves) Over time three patterns of tves began to emerge each geographically associ-ated with a different part of the country The first was the so-called Wenzhou model Typical of the coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian in this model private investors (mostly villagers) started small-scale factories to manufacture labor-intensive goods which were then sold to domestic consumers through nationwide marketing networks In the second pattern prevalent in the Pearl River Delta factories received investment from Chinese in Hong Kong or over-seas and manufactured goods primarily for export The third was the Sunan (southern Jiangsu) model best exemplified by the factories in southern Jiangsu province but also seen widely throughout rural China In this model village or township governments took advantage of the public funds they had accumu-lated during and after the Mao era and established collectively owned (ie not state owned) factories to manufacture a wide array of industrial goods Where-as vast numbers of migrant workers came to power the factories and populate the unplanned urban sprawl (often called ldquourban villagesrdquo) of the Pearl River Delta employees of the Sunan firms were largely local villagers who would ldquoenter the factory but not the cityrdquo (jinchang bu jincheng) and ldquoleave the farm but not the countrysiderdquo (litu bu lixiang)32

Local government cadres vigorously encouraged and promoted the new col-lectively-owned factories These cadres were incentivized to start new factories in their home villages or townships to obtain the extra revenue available from local governments to fuel public projects as well as for their personal material gain as they completely controlled the firms they established33 The greatest problem of such industrial firms therefore was the ambiguity and complexity of their ownership and property rights which further entangled local govern-ment officials in the management of the factories making it difficult for the tves to run as efficient profit-making businesses sensitive to market condi-tions As a solution to the innate problems of the tves under the Sunan model most of those enterprises underwent a process of privatization in the 1990s which they became integrated more fully into the market economy During and since the 1990s most of these enterprises have either reorganized their ownership structure or been privatized outright

32 Samuel Ho ldquoRural Non-Agricultural Development in Post-Reform China Growth Devel-opment Patterns and Issuesrdquo Pacific Affairs 683 (1995) 360ndash391

33 Jean C Oi Rural China Takes Off Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley University of California Press 1999)

li and DuBois18

ltUNgt

In this volume Zheng Yougui presents a closeup view of the Sunan model focusing specifically on the ability of the Bixi Township of Changshu City to produce successful firms and famous brands Zheng discusses in detail how new enterprises in Bixi faced the challenge of dividing shares of the collective economy and emphasizes how the professionalization of village and town-ship government eased the transition into a market economy However while other firms in the Sunan model relied heavily on promotion by local officials Bixi was somewhat unique in that it enjoyed attention from the highest levels Already in the early 1980s Li Peng and other central leaders were promoting the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo initially as a pilot project and later as a replicable model of successful development What is not stated of course is the effect that such high level promotion had on the region particularly on its ability to attract loans and investment Without downplaying the success of the region it is also worth noting the similar role that the state had played in promoting earlier generations of model production areas

Unique Perspectives and Contributions

Although many of the chapters in this volume run parallel to or in some way engage the major themes in English language scholarship on post-1949 rural China there are tangible differences in their approach and perspec-tive One obvious difference derives from the nature of sources Most of the scholars featured in this volume enjoyed access to local archival mate-rials and many augmented this detailed view with more or less extensive oral histories This combination of sources allows them to present a finely grained view of local institutions such as rural canteens and daycare On the other hand they tend to be rather less critical of the perspectives con-tained in the sources themselves presenting without additional commen-tary the somewhat stylized view of construction and technology during the Maoist period or the unqualified success of the Bixi Road This observation itself is not necessarily a criticism It is perhaps a bit too simple to dismiss as ideological extremism historical concerns over the reemergence of rich peasants or movements such as the deep plowing campaign Scholarship that speaks as many of these chapters do in the voice of the original sources is particularly able to recapture the considerations that went into the formation of these iconic policies

In some cases the perspectives in this volume present entirely new directions of inquiry Issues such as informal rural debt have been studied extensively in


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the periods before 1949 and since the 1980s but not in between34 Revealing the importance of how and why rural cadres encouraged debt adds an important facet to our understanding of their plans for rural reconstruction The most striking departure is found in Chapters 11 and 12 on the flow of grain between provinces35 Together these two chapters outline dramatic changes the ability after 1986 of provincial governments to negotiate grain prices and especially the historic shift in the mid-1990s when the movement of grain from north to south first exceeded in caloric terms the traditional flow in the opposite direction Like the others these two chapters are valuable for their attention to detail in this case on the realities of the trade for example the fact that corn produced in the vast new farmlands of northern Heilongjiang works better as animal feed than the produce of the traditionally fertile south

Needless to say the fourteen articles included in this volume limited in number and scope of investigation do not do justice to the rich and multifac-eted scholarship that the Chinese researchers have developed in the past de-cades in understanding agriculture and social change in Maoist and post-Mao China Nevertheless we hope that readers will find the new evidence and per-spectives presented in these studies a useful resource for understanding some of the most drastic experiments pitfalls and breakthroughs that the hundreds of millions in rural China have experienced since 1949

References

Chan Anita Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger 1992 Chen Village Under Mao and Deng Berkeley University of California Press

Dikoumltter Frank 2010 Maorsquos Great Famine The History of Chinarsquos Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958ndash1962 New York Bloomsbury

Ho Samuel 1995 ldquoRural Non-Agricultural Development in Post-Reform China Growth Development Patterns and Issuesrdquo Pacific Affairs 683 360ndash391

Huang Philip CC 1990 The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta 1350ndash1988 Stanford Stanford University Press

34 Walter H Mallory ldquoRural Cooumlperative Credit in Chinardquo The Quarterly Journal of Econom-ics 45 3 (1931) pp 484ndash498 Li Zhou and Hiroki Takeuchi ldquoInformal Lenders and Rural Finance in China A Report from the Fieldrdquo Modern China 36 3 (2010) pp 302ndash328

35 On provincial trade see also Thomas Lyons ldquoGrain in Fujian Intraprovincial Patterns of Production and Traderdquo China Quarterly 129 (1992) pp 184ndash215

li and DuBois20

ltUNgt

Kung James and Shuo Chen 2011 ldquoThe Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career Incen-tives and Political Radicalism during Chinarsquos Great Leap Faminerdquo American Political Science Review 105 (1) 27ndash45

Lin Justin 1992 ldquoRural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in Chinardquo The American Eco-nomic Review 821 34ndash51

Lin Justin Y 1990 ldquoCollectivization and Chinarsquos Agricultural Crisis in 1959ndash1961rdquo Jour-nal of Political Economy 986 1228ndash1252

mdashmdashmdash 1998 ldquoTizhi gaige he Zhongguo nongye zengzhangrdquo (Institutional reforms and agricultural growth in China) China Center for Economic Research Beijing University

Lin Yifu 2008 Zhidu jishu yu Zhongguo nongye fazhan (Institution technology and agricultural development in China) Shanghai Gezhi chubanshe

Lyons Thomas 1992 ldquoGrain in Fujian Intraprovincial Patterns of Production and Traderdquo China Quarterly 129 184ndash215

MacFarquhar Roderick 1983 The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Vol 2 The Great Leap Forward 1958ndash1960 New York Columbia University Press

Mallory Walter H 1931 ldquoRural Cooumlperative Credit in Chinardquo The Quarterly Journal of Economics 45 (3) 484ndash498

Oi Jean C 1989 State and Peasant in Contemporary China The Political Economy of Village Government Berkeley University of California Press

mdashmdashmdash 1999 Rural China Takes Off Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform Berkeley University of California Press

Pang Xianzhi and Jin Congji 2011 Mao Zedong zhuan (The biography of Mao Zedong) Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe

Parish William and Martin King Whyte 1978 Village and Family in Contemporary China Chicago The University of Chicago Press

Pempel TJ 1999 ldquoThe Developmental Regime in a Changing Worlds Economyrdquo in Mer-edith Woo-Cumings (ed) The Developmental State in Historical Perspective (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1999) 137ndash181

Perkins Dwight and Shahid Yusuf 1984 Rural Development in China Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press

Putterman Louis 1987 ldquoThe Incentive Problem and the Demise of Team Farming in Chinardquo Journal of Development Economics 26 (1) 103ndash127

mdashmdashmdash 1993 Continuity and Change in Chinarsquos Rural Development Collective and Reform Eras in Perspective Oxford UK Oxford University Press

Riskin Carl 1987 Chinarsquos Political Economy The Quest for Development Since 1949 Oxford UK Oxford University Press

Selden Mark 1988 The Political Economy of Chinese Socialism Armonk NY ME Sharpe


ltUNgt

Shirk Susan 1993 The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China Berkeley University of California Press

Shue Vivienne 1980 Peasant China in Transition The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism 1949ndash1956 Berkeley University of California Press

Siu Helen F 1989 Agents and Victims in South China Accomplices in Rural Revolution New Haven Yale University Press

Stone Bruce 1988 ldquoDevelopments in Agricultural Technologyrdquo China Quarterly 116 767ndash822

Unger Jonathan 2002 The Transformation of Rural China Armonk NY ME SharpeWalder Andrew 2015 China under Mao A Revolution Derailed Cambridge MA Har-

vard University PressYang Dali 1996 Calamity and Reform in China State Rural Society and Institutional

Change Since the Great Leap Famine Stanford CA Stanford University PressYang Dali Huayu Xu and Ran Tao 2014 ldquoA Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career

incentives political loyalty and political radicalism during Chinarsquos Great Leap Forwardrdquo Journal of Contemporary China 23 (89) 864ndash883

Yang Martin C 1945 A Chinese Village Taitou Shantung Province New York Columbia University Press

Zhou Kate Xiaohong 1996 How the Farmers Changed China Power of the People Boulder Colorado Westview Press

Zhou Li and Hiroki Takeuchi 2010 ldquoInformal Lenders and Rural Finance in China A Report from the Fieldrdquo Modern China 36 (3) 302ndash328

Zweig David 1989 Agrarian Radicalism in China 1968ndash1981 Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

ltUNgtltUNgt

Part 1

Political Programs in Practice

∵


ltUNgt

chapter 1

The Origins and Development of Chinarsquos ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquo1

Lu Xueyi 2

Abstract

The unique urban-rural relationship and urban-rural development strategy that have emerged through Chinarsquos course of Reform and Opening have given rise to the theory of the ldquothree ruralrdquo issues which is unique to China The construction and use of this theory are highly significant for deepening understanding of Chinarsquos basic national conditions for guiding socialist modernized construction and for researching similar issues faced by other countries The overall status of Chinarsquos ldquothree ruralrdquo issues is Our agricultural issues have been fundamentally resolved but we still face serious rural citizen and rural area issues The root cause of this situation is that the rural and agri-cultural policies developed under the planned economy have yet to be fundamentally changed In order to resolve our rural citizen and rural area issues we must continue to deepen rural reforms resolve to reform the household registration system reform the current land contracting system reform the current income distribution system and reform the political authorities vested in town governments particularly in fiscal matters

Keywords

ldquothree ruralsrdquo theory ndash productivity factors ndash agriculture ndash rural areas ndash rural citizens

1 This essay was first presented as an academic report at the Institute of Contemporary China Studies Third Annual National History Academic Symposium on September 16 2003 This written format was compiled from an audio recording of that report which the author has edited and approved

2 Lu Xueyi (陆学艺) was a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Lu passed away in 2013 in Beijing at the age of 80

Lu26

ltUNgt

i Origins of the ldquoThree Ruralsrdquo Theory

It is widely known that reforms in China begin at the level of the rural village Rural areas were the first to implement the Household Responsibility System and the first to shake off the fetters of the planned economy These reformsled to a great liberation of agricultural productivity and great increases in agricul-tural yields for many years consecutively In 1984 grain production hit its peak of 800 billion jin (400 billion kilograms) which initially resolved the problems of insufficient food and physical security for the populace Peasants in those years became their own masters and received tangible benefits from the re-forms Their lives were improved to a great degree and the urban-rural gap was further closed At the time it was proposed that the second stage of rural reforms be implemented

Beginning in 1985 however there were changes to Chinarsquos urban-rural strat-egy Income in the national economy began flowing more toward cities the focus of work began shifting toward cities and the level of energy expended on rural reforms began to decline In 1985 agricultural production fell with grain production down seven percent From this point forward rural Chinarsquos development was at times bearish and at times bullish and rural development again took yet another turn In the late 1980s some Chinese academics who were summarizing the experiences and lessons of socialist modernization di-vided Chinarsquos rural issues (each beginning with the Character nong which is alternatively used to indicate agriculture or rural areas) into issues of agricul-ture [nongye] rural areas [nongcun] and rural citizens [nongmin ie peasants or farmers] on the basis of Chinarsquos unique national conditions They analyzed both the relationship between these three issues as well as the problems to be solved within each of the issues thereupon they proposed the analysis frame-work of the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo [san nong wenti] which they established as the theoretical framework for understanding Chinarsquos true conditions and the analysis of Chinarsquos practical issues After more than ten years of practical im-plementation and propagation this framework has now become a consensus within both political and academic spheres in China

The ldquothree rural issuesrdquo are unique to China they are the product of Chinarsquos Reform and Opening The development track of countries which have already successfully modernized indicates that when a country or region endeavors to modernize itself it generally must begin by accumulating capital through agri-culture in rural areas then move on to primitive accumulation of capital then to the production of agricultural products and rurally-produced industrial raw materials and finally move on to the large scale construction of factories and development of enterprises and industry During this time a great amount of


ltUNgt

rural labor will enter factories which are generally constructed on major traf-fic arteries Once there is an agglomeration of factories commerce and the service industry will begin to develop and cities will begin to rise At this point a large portion of the agricultural population will transform into city dwellers and so industrialization and urbanization go hand in hand with this process Once industrialization and urbanization reach a certain point they will begin to nurture agriculture they arm agriculture with modernized agricultural ma-terials (farm equipment fertilizers and pesticides) thereby bringing about the modernization of agriculture At this time rural citizens will become the mi-nority Under the effects of the market (and sometimes government interven-tion) the prices of agricultural products will rise and rural incomes gradually rise near to (and sometimes greater than) urban income levels Once urban industry is developed and the state treasury is amply stocked rural areas will be repaid this time with infrastructure such as roads irrigation works electric-ity telecommunications and so on This process leads to the modernization of rural areas which in turn causes urban-rural integration So other developed countries never linked together the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo during the course of their development Rather they considered only rural production rural area and rural citizen issues separately and conducted focused research in each area At the most some merged rural rural citizen or rural area and rural pro-duction issues together for joint research

Chinarsquos unique course of Reform and Opening gave rise to a unique urban-rural relationship and a unique urban-rural development path This path in turn led to Chinarsquos unique theory of the ldquothree ruralrdquo issues The construction and use of this theory is highly significant to understanding Chinarsquos fundamen-tal national conditions and to guiding the implementation of socialist mod-ernization For a relatively long time we have placed great emphasis on the resolution of Chinarsquos agricultural issues and have striven to solve production problems in both grain and major agricultural products in order to ensure effective supply However following the first bumper cropharvest of Reform and Opening in 1984 such problems as difficulty selling grain and cotton have emerged in rural areas Thereafter another series of problems presented them-selves such as the issuance of deferred payment slips (some of which were never repaid) by governments in lieu of cash for grain purchases heavy bur-dens on rural citizens increased number of clashes between rural cadres and rural citizens social instability in the countryside widening of the urban-rural gap and so on The emergence of these diverse problems led some academics and some people working in government departments performing real work to realize that rural work should not be centered on only agricultural issues but must also include resolution of rural citizen and rural area issues and that

Lu28

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agricultural rural area and rural citizen issues must be analyzed and studied together These academics and government workers then wrote a series of persuasive works on these issues Since the mid-1990s some academics and workers in government departments performing real work have composed treatises on agricultural rural citizen and rural area issues all three of which were studied and analyzed jointly The ldquothree ruralrdquo issues theory is now a con-sensus around China it has been widely cited in documents the media and all manner of written work In October 1998 the ldquoccp Central Resolutions on Several Major Issues in Agricultural and Rural Workrdquo 中共中央关于农业和

农村工作若干重大问题的决定 were issued reading ldquoThe issues of agricul-ture rural areas and rural citizens are major issues affecting the big picture of Reform and Opening as well as modernization Without stability in rural areas there can be no nationwide stability Without moderate prosperity for rural citizens there can be no agricultural modernization and thus there can be no modernization of the entire national economy If we can maintain stability in rural areas we will be able to take the initiative in controlling the big picturerdquo

The ldquothree rural issuesrdquo theory is also highly significant for studying the problems of other countries In 1998 I accepted an invitation from Waseda University to visit Japan At an academic conference there I conducted com-parative analysis on the countrysides of China and Japan on the basis of the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo theory this opportunity enabled me to elucidate a number of issues Japanrsquos path to modernization is fundamentally similar to that of de-veloped countries in North America and Europe However Japan is a country with a large population and small landmass Further since the 1960s the Japa-nese government has been importing agricultural products on a large scale in an effort to greatly increase exports of industrial products and develop markets for said products ignoring the costs to domestic agriculture Therefore since the 1970s most or all of the foodstuff cotton and other raw materials used in Japanese industry have been imported At present over 50 percent of Japanrsquos foodstuffs agricultural raw materials and industrial raw materials are import-ed thus Japanrsquos food prices are the highest in the entire world Importation of such a large quantity of foodstuffs has inevitably exerted a certain degree of influence on the quality of life for Japanese citizens It is thus evident that Japan a major economic powerhouse has problems in the area of agriculture If we analyze Japan on the basis of the ldquothree ruralsrdquo theory we see that Japan has solved its rural citizen issues and has fundamentally solved its rural area is-sues but its agricultural issues remain unsolved China is exactly the opposite Since the advent of Reform and Opening Chinarsquos agricultural policy has been ldquoDriven firstly by policy secondlyby sciencerdquo As a result of reforms and de-velopment we enjoyed several consecutive years of bumper crop harvests In


ltUNgt

1996 Chinese grain production exceeded 1 trillion jin (500 billion kilograms) and Chinese cotton production exceeded 84 million dan [Chinese unit of mea-sure equivalent to 50 kilograms] Since that time China has reversed its pre-vious long-standing shortages of grain and other major agricultural products and has now achieved year-to-year stability and agricultural surpluses China which contains nearly 10 percent of total arable land in the world feeds over 21 percent of the total global population Furthermore since 1997 Chinarsquos annual net exports of agricultural products have held steady at around usd $5 billion So if we use the ldquothree ruralsrdquo theory to analyze contemporary China we can see that agricultural issues have been fundamentally solved but rural citizen and rural area issues remain unsolved

ii The ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquo in Contemporary China

Why do I hold that China has already fundamentally solved its agricultural issues but has yet to solve its rural area and rural citizen issues I will discuss just this question in this section

(A) Agricultural IssuesFrom a historical perspective the issues of supply of grain and other agricul-tural products from the former Soviet Union and other socialist countries have never been well resolvedfollowing the implementation of traditional collec-tive economic systems in rural areas These issues have long been a thorn in the side of socialist countries

Before the Peoplersquos Republic of China implemented collectivization and indeed during the early years of Chinarsquos collectivization (prior to 1958) China was a net exporter of grains and agricultural products Beginning in 1961 how-ever Chinese citizens have been eating imported grains and China became a net importer of grain cotton and other major agricultural products

In 1959 the Chinese state put forward the notion that agriculture was the foundation of the national economy and that grain was the foundation of that foundation Thereafter the state consistently placed primary emphasis on the development of agriculture within national economic work casting enormous amounts of labor and financial resources into that field However shortages of grain and agricultural products were not thoroughly solved until the dissolution of peoplersquos communes Problems of insufficient food for the citizenry weighed heavily on the hearts of the first generation of leadership from Chairman Mao to the economic architects Chen Yun and Li Xiannian One could say that in his late years Chairman Mao was a physiocrat in economic matters He was the

Lu30

ltUNgt

first to propose such ideas as ldquothe Constitution of Eight Characters for Agricul-turerdquo ldquoagriculture is the foundation of the national economyrdquo ldquograin is the guid-ing principlerdquo ldquolearning agriculture from Dazhairdquo ldquoagricultural mechanization is imperativerdquo and so on Chen Yun even went on the record to say that ldquowith grain in your hand there can be no panic in your heartrdquo At one point Li Xian-nian personally oversaw the allocation and transport of grain convoys

Experience confirms that it was not that our party or government didnrsquot place emphasis on agriculture nor was it that our land was insufficient or that our rural citizens didnrsquot know how to plant crops Rather it was the peoplersquos commune system of collective labor unified management and equal distribu-tion that failed us

In the wake of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Com-munist Party of China rural areas took the lead in implementing reforms In ru-ral areas the household contract responsibility system was implemented and rural citizens obtained autonomy in their business operations Rural citizens benefited from this system which provided them with great work incentive in agricultural production There were bumper crop harvests in consecutive years and by the mid-1980s problems of insufficient supply of grain cotton and other major agricultural products had fundamentally been resolved Such fundamental resolution initially resolved problems of insufficient food and warmth Of course agricultural development hasnrsquot been an unbroken chain of good news over these past 20 years There have been some bumps on the road but the overall trend has been continuous progress and development As of 1996 Chinarsquos agricultural issues ie issues of guaranteeing effective agricul-tural supply have been fundamentally resolved

From the beginning of Reform and Opening to 1996 the general course of Chinarsquos agricultural development has been abumper crop harvest and major upgrade to agriculture about once every six years In 1978 total grain produc-tion was 6095 billion jin 317 kilograms per capita There were bumper crop harvests every year following the implementation of the household contract responsibility system in rural areas Total grain production in 1984 was 8146 billion jin this was the first year in which grain surpluses led to difficulty in selling grain In 1985 the state grain monopoly was abolished In its place the state implemented the contract system for grain purchasing This new policy suppressed grain prices and led to a decrease in grain production productivity among rural citizens grain production fell seven percent in this year leading to renewed vacillation on the grain issue Policies were adjusted again in 1986 and in 1990 there was a second bumper crop harvest total grain production hit 8925 billion jin just shy of 900 billion jin The bumper crop grain harvest in this year was widely unexpected Many in Beijing did not believe the numbers


ltUNgt

as a State Council spokesperson initially reported 840 billion jin then later 850 billion jin and the National Bureau of Statistics ultimately reported 8925 billion jin Relevant leadership fearing inflated reporting passed a Standing Committee resolution to report the yearrsquos grain production as 870 billion jin The National Bureau of Statistics disagreed with this resolution In the 1991 Tongji nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook] the Bureau reported 870 billion jin holding off on adding digits to the figure but at the same time did not report figures for such grain classes as rice and corn Following the major floods in An-hui and East China of 1991 the whole world joined together to provide disaster relief but in the end grain production on the year was reported at 8706 billion jin with no apparent year-on-year drop In 1992 the Bureau corrected the total figure reported for 1990

There was a drop in grain production in 1991 but slight increases in 1992 and 1993 However following Deng Xiaopingrsquos ldquosouthern tourrdquo in 1992 a surge of economic construction unfolded across the country A large number of devel-opment zones were established and peasant laborers flooded into cities There was a stark increase to urban populations as well as to demand for grain and agricultural products in the cities Beginning in autumn 1993 grain and agri-cultural product prices rose sharply some areas that had previously phased out the grain coupon system reinstated it The state had no choice but to re-new large-scale imports of grain in 1994 at the same time state officials greatly increased purchase prices for domestic grain In 1995 domestic grain produc-tion increased by 43 billion jin Even with agriculture on the rebound relevant leadership still feared instability and so again resolved to greatly increase grain purchase prices in 1996 reporting this to the masses ahead of time This resolu-tion provided rural citizens the incentives to plant grain Some migrant labor-ers even decided to return to the countryside to till grain fields With all those factors plus excellent weather 1996 saw the third bumper crop harvest with total annual grain production hitting 50454 million tonnes ie an excess of one trillion jin In the 1950s under the leadership of Mao Zedong the central government passed agricultural production plans that set the target for annual grain output at 400 then 500 and finally 800 jin per mu of land These targets were finally met in 1996

Chinarsquos history of agricultural development hit a milestone in 1996 the year that marked the end of the era of chronic food shortages and the beginning of that of supply-demand equilibrium accompanied by occasional surpluses China was no longer a buyer but a seller of major agricultural products China no longer pursued quantity exclusively in agricultural products rather equal emphasis was placed on quantity and quality and in some cases quality was given preference From this point forward Chinarsquos agricultural production

Lu32

ltUNgt

entered a phase of being restricted by not only resources but also by markets Thus one could say that following the bumper crop harvest of 1996 Chinarsquos agricultural development entered a new phase and at the same time Chinarsquos rural area development also entered a new phase

While Chinarsquos agriculture and rural areas had entered a new phase our understanding or policy approach to the new situation did not change cor-respondingly Such a lack of corresponding change caused the emergence of a new series of issues in agriculture and rural areas which we are currently experiencing One reason is that years of chronic food shortage seared the fear and anxiety about insufficient production into the collective memories of the Chinese people who are trying to stay in a state of perpetual preparedness

To this day academics and relevant departments have been unable to ex-plain why after 1996rsquos grain production figure in excess of one trillion jin the following six yearsmdashexcluding 1998 and 1999 in both of which years grain pro-duction exceeded one trillion jinmdashsaw grain production figures between 900 billion and 980 billion jin It is possible that grain production in 2003 will fall short of 900 billion jin These past seven years the population has increased by 730 million and urbanization has increased a full ten percentage points demand for grain agriculturally produced industrial raw materials and other agricultural products has clearly risen greatly That being the case why has supply exceeded demand in grain and other major agricultural products Why have grain reserves held steady at over 400 billion jin

One explanation for the grain situation is that the bounty of 1996rsquos harvest was not limited to just grain but was true also ofa range of other agricultural products There was a change to grain circumstances following 1997 but hus-bandry fisheries and aquaculture vegetables fruits and other agricultural sec-tors continued to grow by great margins In 2001 total grain production was 485 percent higher than in 1978 with a per capita increase of 123 percent over 1978 However in that same year total production of oil-bearing crops was 449 percent higher than in 1978 a per capita increase of 315 percent Over the same period meat output increased 640 percent from an annual per capitaoutput of 89 kilograms to 395 kilograms a 444-fold increase Output in fisheries and aquaculture increased 842 percent from an annual per capita output of 47 kilograms to 344 kilograms a 732-fold increase Fruit output increased 913 percent from an annual per capita output of 73 kilograms to 52 kilograms a 712-fold increase It is a tradition of the Chinese people to refer to grains as ldquomain foodsrdquo (ie staple foods) and to refer to all other foods as ldquoauxiliary foodsrdquo (ie non-staple foods) but it has been in these ldquoauxiliary foodsrdquo where China has experienced multiple-fold growth Now the majority of Chinese urban dwellers and more affluent rural citizens have reversed the old order


ltUNgt

consuming more ldquoauxiliaryrdquo than ldquomainrdquo foodstuffs Consumption of fowl fish other meat vegetables and fruits has greatly increased while consumption of grain has greatly decreased This structural shift indicates that there has been a fundamental change to the Chinese peoplersquos food consumption pattern particularly that of urban dwellers Thus despite decreases to overall grain output following 1996 grain sales have been sluggish and grain prices have remained low

To summarize after 1996 Chinarsquos agriculture entered a new phase a phase in which the major objective of guaranteeing effective supply had been achieved In other words Chinarsquos agricultural issues have been fundamentally resolved The reason we say that the issues have been fundamentally solved or that reso-lution had been fundamentally realized is that there is no one-time ultimate resolution to agricultural issues Just below the surface there are still factors of uncertainty such as land and water shortages worsening of agricultural and ecological environments less-than-ideal states of infrastructure such as irriga-tion works insufficient ability to resist natural disasters unsoundness of the agricultural technology propagation system and incomplete construction of pre-production and post-production agricultural service systems We now rely primarily on an economy composed of multitudes of small family farms for ag-ricultural output Both labor productivity and commodity rates of agricultural products are low We remain very far from achieving the objective of modern-izing agriculture and there is still much work for us to do in this field

(B) Rural Citizen IssuesIssues of rural citizens lie at the core of the ldquothree ruralrdquo issues Agriculture is the enterprise of rural citizens or in other words it is their profession Rural citizens are the laborers in the agricultural industry and rural areas are the communities in which rural citizens produce live and make their homes

Rural citizen issues are of particular importance in China traditionally a major agricultural country In 1950 Mao Zedong said ldquoPeasants [nongmin ie rural citizens] comprise the majority of Chinarsquos population The revolution was successful only because of support from the peasants The success of the statersquos industrialization will also be reliant upon support from the peasantsrdquo Experience has proven that this statement is entirely accurate Over these past 50 years our socialist modernization has been through many phases with both ups and downs One trend among these experiences has been particu-larly outstanding In all those phases in which party and state policies have adhered to the wishes and interests of the majority of rural citizens socialist enterprises have advanced smoothly and grown (such as Land Reform Reform and Opening the household contract responsibility system the development

Lu34

ltUNgt

of township and village enterprises and so on) In all those phases in which party and state policies have not adhered to reality or have even been det-rimental to the interests of the masses of rural citizens work has been diffi-cult the development of enterprises such as economic construction has been sluggish and social problems have multiplied The Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China summarized one very important basic experience that the only way to spur productivity among the masses of rural citizens is to ldquobe fully concerned with their material interests in economic matters and grant true protection to their democratic rights in mat-ters of governancerdquo The plenum went on to declare that this was the ldquoutmost starting point for determining agricultural policy and rural economic policiesrdquo

So in which areas do we face rural citizen issues now

1 The Rural Population Remains Enormous Now 900 Million StrongChina has always been a major agricultural country and so a preponderance of rural citizens is merely an objective reality What I mean here when I say that our rural population is large is that over the course of industrialization a countryrsquos rural population should naturally decrease but in China at the same time as we industrialize and urbanize our rural population continues to grow This pattern does not conform to the regular patterns of industrialized development and has given rise to a number of social issues

In 1949 the total population was 54167 million the agricultural popula-tion was 48402 million or 894 percent of the total In 1952 the total popu-lation was 57482 million the agricultural population was 50139 million or 872 percent of the total In 1958 the total population was 65994 million the agricultural population was 54704 million or 828 percent of the total In 1978 the total population was 96259 million the agricultural population was 79014 million or 8008 percent of the total Over the 20 years from 1958 to 1978 the rural population grew by 24310 million an average annual increase of 12155 million In 1998 the total population was 124810 billion the agricultural popula-tion was 86868 million or 696 percent of the total Over these 20 years the rural absolute population grew by 7854 million an average annual increase of 392 million In 1999 the total population was 25786 billion the agricultural popula-tion was 82038 million or 652 percent of the total In 2000 the total popu lation was 126743 billion the agricultural population was 80837 million or 638 per-cent of the total In 2001 the total population was 127627 billion the agricultural population was 79563 million or 623 percent of the total

Publicly available population figures indicate that the rural population de-creased rapidly after 1999 with a total population loss of 789 million over just three years an average annual decrease of 263 million These figures however


ltUNgt

are based on records of residency in either urban or rural areas If records of household registrations (either agricultural or non-agricultural) were used in-stead one would find that there were still over 900 million citizens holding agricultural registrations in 2001

Our rapidly industrializing country is both developing industry on a large scale and experiencing great increases to the rural population (500 million in 1952 up to 900 million in 2001 an increase of 400 million over fifty years) with only limited increases to such major production resources as arable land These two factors are the root cause of the severe rural citizen issues China is experiencing today It is not possible for a country to be industrialized and modernized with a 75 percent absolute majority of its population engaged in agriculture A major task we must accomplish in the coming years is to figure out how to reduce the rural population

2 Rural Citizensrsquo Lives Have Markedly Improved but Rural Citizens Remain Poor and Burdened

I have two things to say about the poverty and heavy burden borne by rural citizens First rural citizensrsquo lives have been greatly improved since the advent of Reform and Opening They have experienced great increases to income and the vast majority of them are no longer worried about not having enough to eat this is unprecedented Net per capita income for rural citizens was 134 yuan in 1978 and 2366 yuan in 2001 after adjustment for inflation that repre-sents an annual increase of 46 percent This increase is quite an accomplish-ment and a great step forward Second the poverty and heavy burden borne by rural citizens can be understood only through comparison to their urban coun-terparts and through comparison to our economic accomplishments The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has declared that we must build an overall moderately prosperous society that benefits over a billion peo-ple Chinarsquos gross domestic product (gdp) more than octupled over the span of 1978 to 2001 with average annual growth of 935 percent That said the ru-ral citizens who comprise seventy-five percent of Chinarsquos population did not benefit correspondingly Particularly after 1997 after agricultural development entered a new phase supply was greater than demand in agricultural prod-ucts which led to sluggish sales and low prices At the same time the degree of increase to rural citizensrsquo incomes fell relatively consistently nine percent in 1996 46 percent in 1997 43 percent in 1998 38 percent in 1999 21 percent in 2000 42 percent in 2001 and 46 percent in 2002 The slight increases in recent years is attributable to the income rural citizens earn from work they do as migrant laborers or non-agricultural activities The truth is that sixty-two percent of Chinese rural citizens count farming as their sole source of income

Lu36

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In recent years such income has suffered decreasesmdashfor the past seven years consecutively in fact That is to say that the majority of rural citizens are ex-periencing either stagnation or reductions in income In comparison urban citizensrsquo per capita disposable income grew by 3415 yuan over the years 1995 to 2002 an average annual increase of 487 yuan Over that same period rural citizensrsquo per capita net income grew from 1577 to 2476 yuan a net increase of only 899 yuan or an average annual increase of only 128 yuan This situation further exacerbated the urban-rural income gap which grew from 272 to one in 1995 to 292 to one in 2001 and further to 31 to one in 2002

We have been saying since the mid-1990s that we must increase rural in-comes reduce rural citizensrsquo burdens and maintain social stability by any means conceivable Then we started saying that we should ldquotake less give more and open furtherrdquo A number of years have passed and the government has come up with and implemented a number of plans However rural incomes remain low rural burdens remain high and the urban-rural gap continues to widen How can we expect to maintain social stability given such conditions In 2001 I participated in a small academic symposium in Shanghai At the sym-posium a county government committee leader from the Midwest said that the countryside had not been as well offmdashin terms of reforms and develop-mentmdashin the 1990s as they had been in the 1980s As of 1997 said the leader things in the Midwestern countryside were growing worse by the year People from Shanghai on the other hand said that Shanghai was doing much better in the 1990s than it had in the 1980s and that things in Shanghai were growing better by the year following 1995 My job is to study rural issues I previously worked in Shanghai and still often travel there I am familiar with the situations presented by both of these people and can affirm that both of their statements are true This is the problem that one is growing better by the year while the other is growing worse and that the gap between them continues to widen

3 Rural Citizens Have Grown Less HomogeneousInternal differentiation among rural citizens began in the 1980s with the im-plementation of the household contract responsibility system Occupation was the first in which this differentiation occurred as rural citizens were no longer only farmers In 1989 rural citizens I divided rural citizens into eight strata based on occupation agricultural laborer migrant laborer hired laborer individual industrial and commercial unit rural intellectual rural enterprise manager private enterprise owner and rural village manager This process of differentiation picked up pace in recent years

The second area in which internal differentiation among rural citizens oc-curred is income The rural income figures given above were averages and


ltUNgt

those averages actually conceal a great number of issues In 2001 for example per capita net income was 2366 yuan but 58 percent of citizens fell below that average In total 1322 percent of rural citizens earned less than 1000 yuan in that year which is to say that 1195 million of them were impoverished Another 2268 million rural citizens earned less than 500 yuan which means they were living in absolute poverty The current national poverty line has been estab-lished at 625 yuan per year in income Per this standard thirty million rural citizens are living in poverty with another ninety million hovering just above the poverty line

In recent years some regions have achieved affluence ahead of others and at the same time some people have become rich before others In 2001 only ten provinces or direct-controlled cities exceeded the national average in terms of per capita rural income They were in order Shanghai (5871 yuan) Beijing (5026 yuan) Zhejiang (4582 yuan) Tianjin (3947 yuan) Jiangsu (3784 yuan) Guangdong (3770 yuan) and Fujian (3381 yuan) Twenty-one provinces au-tonomous regions and direct-controlled cities fell below the average The low-est was Tibet (1404 yuan) followed by Guizhou (1412 yuan) Shaanxi (1491 yuan) Gansu (1509 yuan) Yunnan (1534 yuan) and Qinghai (1557 yuan) Av-erage income in Shanghai the highest was 418 times that of Tibet the lowest

There are even great discrepancies in rural citizensrsquo incomes within coun-ties towns and sometimes villages A minority of rural citizens particularly those in rural areas of Chinarsquos East or those near the edges of mid-sized and large cities have indeed become rich from businesses other than agriculture Some have even grown extremely rich in a short time Some households in those same areas nevertheless remain in poverty with the discrepancy be-tween rich and poor quite egregious in some cases A popular saying in the 1990s held that the richest people lived in rural villages and so did the poorest people This saying was rooted in fact

4 Rural Citizens are at a DisadvantageRural citizens are currently facing an extremely onerous problem Officials in many regions around the country are seizing and occupying rural citizensrsquo contracted land at an unprecedented scale rallying on such slogans as ldquoaccel-erate urbanizationrdquo ldquorun the city like a businessrdquo ldquogrow riches from the landrdquo and so on Rural citizens are being compensated for their land at extremely low rates which are still calculated based on standards established during the days of the planned economy Furthermore displaced rural citizens are not being properly relocated Such unequal transactions have resulted in tens of millions of rural citizens dispossessed of their land (some hold the total to be around forty million) At the same time some government officials and

Lu38

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unscrupulous real estate firms have profited immensely from the transactions which has objectively speaking given rise to a situation in which ldquothe more land is seized the more the government profits and the more government de-partments benefitrdquo Such government behavior is the fundamental reason that repeated efforts from the central government to enact protection of arable land as a fundamental national policy have continued to fall short of thorough implementation

An article written by Liu Tian appearing in the journal Zhongguo tudi (No 9 2001) the official magazine of the Ministry of Land and Resources reads ldquoOver the past 20 years the state has requisitioned about 100 million mu of land from rural citizenshellip The statehellip has used monopolistic tier-one market institutions and cut-rate price scissors (the difference between land prices on the market and actual compensations paid out for land requisitioning) to take from rural citizens a total amount of land resources valued at over two trillion yuan (this is clearly a conservative estimate)rdquo The over two trillion yuan Liu mentions has become a secondary treasury for many local governments in recent years These funds are used primarily in urban construction and urban expansion which in turn impose even greater losses on rural villages Some have estimat-ed that if a portion of these funds had been used for rural public products and infrastructure rural development would bear a much different face and the urban-rural disparity would be greatly diminished

It is particularly noteworthy that a new round of land requisitioning is cur-rently underway particularly in east and central China where the movement is proceeding at a spectacular pace in developed regions Per incomplete data from twenty-four provinces (and autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities) over 3500 new development areas have been opened on requisitioned land occupying a total area of 36000 square kilometers (fifty-four million mu) Everybody expects that land prices will skyrocket in the future and so some officials lacking a sense of responsibility and unscrupulous businessmen (in-cluding foreign businessmen) have colluded to seize rural citizensrsquo arable land under every guise conceivable Wherever this happens crops are destroyed old homes are torn down ancestral tombs are dug up and rural citizens are forced to relocate This process is dressed up under such names and excuses as ldquobroad swath developmentrdquo ldquostate constructionrdquo and ldquonecessary for urban-izationrdquo Rural citizens are at present a vulnerable group They have no rights no power and no organization All they can do is watch as their homes are stripped from them Nobody in local governments listens to their pleas and so all they can do is file reports with either provincial governments or the central government In recent years the majority of audiences sought with high-level authorities have been related to land requisitioning


ltUNgt

The land that rural citizens contract serves three functions provides re-sources for production retains household financial resources and serves as a means of subsistence So requisitioning a rural citizenrsquos land is tantamount to taking the source of that citizenrsquos livelihood from him On top of that there is a lack of proper relocation performed for these citizens So how can these tens of millions of people survive and how can we continue to develop One in-vestigation indicates that the majority of the fifty-four million mu of land req-uisitioned in the recent round of land-grabs is concentrated in economically developed regions in the Southeast particularly in the Yangtze River Delta the Pearl River Delta and in the outskirts of mid and large cities Most is extremely productive agricultural land In these places there are multitudes of people but only scarce land and so the number of people affected is in excess of fifty million Most of these rural citizens were relatively affluent to begin with ow-ing to their proximity to cities The loss of their land means that a considerable portion of these rural citizens will go from riches to rags in some cases becom-ing unpropertied migrants Such an enormous group is bound to give rise to a multitude of social issues Can the state sit back and watch this happen In the recent era it has been imperative for any country or region which desires to modernize industrialize and urbanize to first expand the size of its cities In all such cases the land used to that end has been agricultural land However in other countries the government or private enterprises must conduct fair transactions to purchase the land The land purchasing party must pay market prices and rural citizens are compensated fairly Rural citizens then use their funds to invest in secondary or tertiary industries or go buy land elsewhere All parties are thus satisfied and disputes after the fact are rare

At present we have brought about a socialist market economy but in the appropriation of rural citizensrsquo land we continue to use methods leftover from the planned economy (despite some small changes they remain on the whole unchanged) We seize rural citizensrsquo lands with inadequate compensation us-ing unequal powers and often relying upon administrative orders In the short term such measures simplify matters (no need for equal consultations) save money (low compensation levels) and speed things along (one administra-tive order and the deal is closed) However whatrsquos to be done about the rural citizen who loses his land Without a means to make a living hersquos going to come looking for you When it becomes difficult to make ends meet hersquos going to come looking for you When hersquos old and infirmed hersquos going to come look-ing for you When his progeny encounter trouble hersquos going to come looking for you Since land is the very lifeblood of a rural citizen if you take away the source of his livelihood with no or very little compensation of course hersquos go-ing to come looking for you (the Ministry of Water Resources is still receiving

Lu40

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petitions from rural citizens displaced with no or low compensations during the construction of large reservoirs in the 1950s) Real estate firms and foreign bosses pocket the money and walk away but we are the peoplersquos government Can we just shirk responsibility and let the chips fall where they may There is no end to the troubles for tomorrow wersquore sowing today by using land req-uisitioning methods leftover from the planned economic system Itrsquos bad for rural citizens bad for rural development and bad for the statersquos plans for urban development Because it does not conform to economic laws it is also detri-mental to the interests of the vast majority of rural citizens On the one hand some local cadres have come up with a plan summed up as ldquogrow riches from land build the city with those riches attract merchants with the city grow rich from the merchants and get promoted as a result of those richesrdquo But if we take a look at officials who have fallen from grace as a result of corruption such as Cheng Kejie 成克杰 Hu Changqing 胡长清 Mu Suixin 慕绥新 Ma Xiangdong 马向东 Yu Fei 于飞 (Guangdong) and Li Jiating 李嘉廷 can you tell me which one didnrsquot get his start by growing riches from the land

The number of civil law suits filed against officials is growing daily The num-ber of rural citizen petitions exceeded the number of those coming from urban areas for the first time in 2000 A total of seventy-three percent of petitions made to the Ministry of Land Resources in the first half of the year pertained to disputes over land requisitioning Of those forty percent of petitioners com-plained of disputes arising over land requisitioning Eighty-seven percent of these petitioners claimed insufficient compensation or inadequate relocation accommodations In 2002 the State Bureau for Letters and Calls received a to-tal of 4116 initial petitions concerning land requisitions in all these petitions rural citizens complained about problems caused by the loss of land and occu-pation The provinces of Zhejiang Jiangsu Fujian Shandong and Guangdong accounted for forty-one percent of these petitions Over fifty percent of all let-ters and visits received by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2001 and 2002 were related to land requisitions and rural relocation plans

(C) Issues of Rural AreasIn the Qing Dynasty and before Chinarsquos central government interceded no low-er than the county level dispatching officials to administer counties No cen-tral officials were dispatched to the level of towns or lower Those areas were all administered by country gentlemen or bodies similar to our modern autono-mous organizations Even in the Republican Era when the central government called for autonomy of towns and villages some provinces still installed re-gional or town administrative offices in towns and villages run by officials appointed from the county government Immediately after the founding of


ltUNgt

the Peoplersquos Republic of China we continued the old tradition establishing regional and town governments below the county level After the passage of the constitution in 1954 towns became tier-one government organizations and town peoplersquos government committees were founded After collectivization in 1958 governments and communes were unified with administrative powers granted to commune committees Peoplersquos communes then implemented a system of ldquothree-tier ownership with the production brigade as the founda-tionrdquo Production brigades were established under peoplersquos communes and under those were established production teams Officials thus unified the gov-ernment and communes as they were both collective economic organizations as well as administrative organizations Peoplersquos communes were abolished in 1983 at which point governance was separated from communes Communes were then reorganized into town peoplersquos governments production brigades into village committees and production teams into village small groups Over these past twenty years some towns and villages have been merged and some have otherwise been restructure In 2001 there were 40161 towns and 709257 villages across the country 365 million village small groups or natural villages 24432 million rural households and 90398 rural citizens (citizens holding agricultural registration) The administrative framework at use now is still the one previously employed during the era of the peoplersquos commune

The question we should study now is as follows Is this base-level adminis-trative framework suitable for modern rural China in which the norm is small-scale agricultural production divided into households not brigades That is to say is the higher level of construction suitable to the economic infrastructure and is it suitable for future agricultural modernization

Immediately after the household contract responsibility system went into practice there was a tranquil period during which neither cadres nor the masses found fault with each other ldquoWith land in your hand what of a cadre could you demandrdquo the saying went After the bumper crop harvest of 1984 it became difficult for rural citizens to sell their grain In 1985 the state grain monopoly system was nixed in favor of the purchase by contract system There was a drop in grain output in that year and grain prices on the market esca-lated much higher than the price levels stipulated in the purchase by contract system A common task of grassroots government organizations at this time was forcing rural citizens to hand over their grain stocks Town and village cad-res saw great increases to both their workloads and their levels of authority Beginning in the mid-1980s many construction projects and government-run enterprises were developed in rural areas on the tails of the development of urban-rural economic construction Such projects included roads irrigation projects compulsory education eradication of illiteracy greening village and

Lu42

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town construction and so on With such a slew of tasks being handed down cadres found themselves quite busy In eastern coastal regions and on the out-skirts of mid to large cities Township Village Enterprises (tves) rose up around the country the majority being collective economic bodies founded from with-in towns or villages As the tves grew considerable income began flowing into towns and villages With economic backing behind them local cadres could employ more people to work in town and village governments Such backing gave rise to a multitude of economic committees industry and communica-tions offices transportation management stations power plants and other autonomously founded governmental bodies The functions which had origi-nally been handled by assistants such as planned birth assistants civil affairs assistants culture and education assistants forestry assistants land manage-ment assistants and so on now were assumed by a great number of dedicated offices and stations As long as this continued the number of local officials continued to rise in some cases village governments previously staffing only thirty employees ended up with a hundred or even hundreds of cadres In the late 1980s some town governments built themselves eight-story office build-ings and some even had dozens of stores News of such happenings drifted to Chinarsquos central and western regions where the economy had not grown in any significant way yet local officials added superfluous government organs and increased their employee rosters dozens at a time all the same Town and village governments in these regions had neither local economic backing nor fiscal allocations from higher levels of government Their only choice was to apportion the increased financial burden to local rural citizens whose burdens grew heavier by the year

By 1992 central authorities had become aware of increasing rural citizen burdens heightening tensions between rural cadres and the rural masses and escalating conflicts Fresh from the closing of 14th National Conference of the Communist Party of China Jiang Zemin 江泽民 personally visited Hubei to convene a conference of cadres aimed at resolving the increasing burdens on rural citizens and social instability in the countryside A series of policies call-ing for the income and personnel attrition in the countryside was thereafter issued alleviating a portion of such rural issues

In 1993 the state began macroeconomic adjustments implementing major reforms to state finances taxation foreign reserves foreign trade and other areas These adjustments were enacted to increase the proportion of tax rev-enues within gdp as well as to increase the proportion of central-level funds to overall central and local fiscal incomes Experience has proven that this reform was both necessary and correct This reform led to great increases to state in-come State fiscal incomes greatly increased as did central-level fiscal incomes


ltUNgt

and such increases played an active role in augmenting the centerrsquos power to exert macroeconomic controls in ensuring healthy economic growth and in withstanding the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis The problem with this reform was that although it alleviated problems of fiscal allocations between the central and provincial levels it did not fully solve the problems of fiscal allocations and authorities between provincial governments and prefectural-level governments between prefectural-level governments and county gov-ernments and between county governments and town governments What happened in the end was that all stable fiscal and tax income was sent up the chain while all the difficulties and burdens were sent down

The town is the most basic level of government authority If you establish a state taxation bureau a local taxation bureau and a finance bureau in towns in the central or western regions where most lack tax revenue from secondary and tertiary industries then where are the funds going to come from to pay the several hundred new salaries One way is to extract it from local rural citizens and another is to borrow the money In both cases the burden on rural citi-zens grows heavier At present there are still many town governments in China unable to pay salaries on time and most town governments are saddled with debt The results of an investigation performed by the Ministry of Agriculture and five other departments in 1998 indicate that the average town government debt in the central and western regions is four million yuan and 200000 yuan for the average village in those regions Data released by the Ministry of Finance indicate that in 2000 the total debt burden borne by town and village governments is 320 billion yuan but some academics now estimate the figure to be in excess of 500 billion

Without reforms to the current fiscal system we will not only not be able to repay old debts but in fact may be unable to ensure financial resources to maintain normal operations of town governments That is because town cad-res have to go out on their own to find the money to pay their peoplersquos salaries The daily routine of many town chiefs and party secretaries contains a great deal of borrowing repaying and dodging debt collectors They are however nothing more than mice caught in the bellows stuck between fire on the one side and a hammer on the other When some town governments run out of money rendering them incapable of continuing normal operations their only choice is to declare a long holiday as a last resort but the truth is that when this happens the government is effectively paralyzed Some members of the State Councilrsquos Research Development Institute conducted research on a re-mote town in Ningxia The first three times they visited the town government hall was locked The fourth time seeing the door still locked they asked an old man tending to his sheep not far from the government hall ldquoWhere did all the

Lu44

ltUNgt

town leaders gordquo they asked ldquoI havenrsquot seen them for a long timerdquo responded the old man

iii Analysis

I have two things to say about the rural work thatrsquos been performed in the over 50 years since the founding of the country particularly in the twenty-plus years since Reform and Opening First we have accomplished an enormous amount in rural work it is fair to say that wersquove made historical progress Chinarsquos ag-ricultural issues have been fundamentally resolved Whatrsquos more we solved those problems on a foundation of a small agricultural economy centered on individual household units There have been earthshaking changes across all of Chinarsquos countryside and the lives of rural citizens have universally improved Some rural citizens have even grown rich No amount of praise for this accom-plishment could be excessive and the successful experience we attained in this area should be fully and deeply summarized However the other side of the coin is that now that we are faced with the objective of building a mod-erately developed socialist modernized country by the middle of this century and the demand to build a moderately prosperous society that benefits over a billion people in the coming twenty years our rural citizen and rural area is-sues remain quite serious We need to deeply consider these issues and find the reasons behind these issues and ultimately we need to establish correspond-ing guiding principles and policies

In order to solve rural citizen and rural area issues we must first analyze the reasons that these issues emerged in the first place Said reasons can be divided by and large into the following categories

(A) China Remains in a Transitory Phase in Which the Former Planned Economic System is Still Transitioning into a Socialist Market Economy

All the rural citizen and rural area issues we are currently facing are the result of the former planned economy They are all remnants of an era gone by

It has been clearly proposed since the 14th National Congress of the Com-munist Party of China that we must build a socialist market economy Howev-er such institutional reforms have been unable to permeate to the countryside since 1985 In that year rural areas entered the second phase of reforms but the truth is that the second round of reforms was unsuccessful in rural areas What was the second round of rural reforms intended to change To this day it remains unclear whether they were intended to promote development of


ltUNgt

tves to bring about industrialization or to develop small urban centers It would be fair to say that the second round of rural reforms reformed nothing That is because nothing was changed in the rural household registration sys-tem in the circulation system or in the land system Problems leftover from the planned economy such as population problems land problems grain circulation problems rural money lending systems and so on have lingered to this day The planned economy was inherently detrimental to the interests of rural citizens Under the planned economy rural citizens were defined by Stalin as a part of the populace intended to make special contributions to the state In other words their purpose was nothing more than primitive accu-mulation of capital for the state on its way to industrialization Immediately following its inception the former Soviet Union instituted the Prodrazvyorstka policy under which peasants were forced to hand over surplus grain to the state Even though a fixed contract purchasing system for grain later took the place of Prodrazvyorstka grain prices remained extremely low making life ex-tremely difficult for the Soviet peasantry We began learning from the Soviets at the time of our own countryrsquos inception implementing the planned economy and cooperativization Such systems stripped rural citizens of the power to sell their own produce The task given to agriculturalists was to guarantee supply in order to meet state demands for agricultural products The state fixed the prices at which rural citizens sold grain and other agricultural products to the state When rural citizens sold grain to the state it was called ldquomaking a con-tribution to the staterdquo or ldquoselling patriotic grainrdquo Such sales were in no way an equal value exchange So the rural citizen and rural area issues we are dealing with today are rooted in the rural area and agricultural policies established under the planned economy To this day we have yet to solve these issues At their root the rural citizen and rural area issues we face today are problems that require further deepening of reforms

(B) Under the Planned Economy We Governed Urban and Rural Citizens Differently Based on Their Household Registrations Which Gave Rise to Chinarsquos Urban-Rural Dual Social Structure This Structure Remains Unchanged to This Day and it is an Important Reason for the Ever-widening Urban-Rural Disparity

Under Chinarsquos long-standing household registration system the agricultural population is concentrated in rural areas and the non-agricultural population in urban areas It is for this reason that we say ldquodifferent governance for ur-ban and rural one country with two policiesrdquo This arrangement is beneficial to urban populations but detrimental to rural populations In economic terms citizens with agricultural household registrations receive different treatment

Lu46

ltUNgt

from their urban counterparts in taxation property ownership employment and other areas Whatrsquos more the degree of disparity in treatment is striking As for democracy one delegate to the National Peoplersquos Congress is elected per 240000 citizens in urban areas but 960000 in rural areas The difference is a factor of four In social terms rural citizens receive different treatment from their urban counterparts in education healthcare social security and other areas One statistician claimed that there are fourteen differences in treatment between urban and rural populations The result of this policyrsquos long-term im-plementation has been our countryrsquos urban-rural dual social structure with the urban-rural gap growing ever wider

(C) The Current State of Income Distribution is Detrimental to Both Rural Areas and Rural Citizens

Why have we long been unable to solve the issues of rural compulsory edu-cation Who is to blame The root cause is that current funding allocations for compulsory education are egregiously skewed against the interests of rural citizens and rural areas The Compulsory Education Law 义务教育法 stipu-lates that rural compulsory education be guided by central leadership but that local leadership be responsible for its implementation however the law does not clearly stipulate exactly which level of local leadership be responsible The results of an investigation conducted by the State Councilrsquos Development In-stitute indicate that the central government contributes only two percent of total funding to rural compulsory education Another eleven percent comes from the provincial and city levels nine percent from the county level and the remaining seventy-eight percent from the township level Some communi-ties have recently begun establishing ldquohope projectsrdquo which are in themselves good things deserving of praise but we cannot establish compulsory education in this way Some have even said that the ldquohope projectrdquo method is inherently ldquohopelessrdquo and they are not wrong The issue is that since wersquore mandating compulsory education across the country we ought to integrate urban and ru-ral education systems funding for all of which should be provided by the state or at the very lowest at the provincial level How can we hope to fundamentally solve compulsory education problems on the strength of well-intended ldquohoperdquo contributions of thirty and forty yuan at a time

The following is how the current funding allocation system operates in com-pulsory education as well as in the state healthcare funding system Annual state healthcare expenditures total in the hundreds of billions of yuan but of that total eighty-five percent goes to urban areas and only fifteen percent to rural areas At present the rural cooperative healthcare preventative sys-tem has more or less collapsed many rural areas lack doctors and drugs and


ltUNgt

some town governments have even been forced to sell their hospitals It was an extremely wise decision on the central governmentrsquos part to forbid university students and migrant laborers to return home during the outbreak of sars Had the epidemic spread to the countryside with the rural healthcare system in such shambles the results would have been unthinkable We often say that many areas have been improved following the advent of Reform and Opening in 1978 but the reality is that some areas have in fact worsened since 1978 One example is the rural healthcare system At least there were still cooperative healthcare and healthcare stations during the era of the peoplersquos commune Now even these are gone

(D) Reforms to Chinarsquos Economic Foundation and Superstructure in Recent Years Have Been Successful in Many Areas but Unsuccessful in Others

In recent years rural areas have entered a second round of reforms but it remains unclear exactly what is to be reformed Nobody is sure about what township governments are supposed to change where township-level finan-cial resources are supposed to come from and exactly what township govern-ments are supposed to be controlling Many reforms enacted in recent years have been successful but some have not In fact some have only reinforced those aspects leftover from the planned economy that are particularly detri-mental to rural development

A few years ago there was a trend in China for reorganizing counties and lower-level administrative areas into cities and districts For example Chang-ping County 昌平县 became Changping District 昌平区 and Jiangyin Coun-ty 江阴县 became Jiangyin City 江阴市 This reorganization gave rise to a unique situation in which ldquomayorsrdquo could be at one of five levels of authority the provincial level the deputy provincial level the prefectural level the depu-ty prefectural level or the county level Such different layers of authority exist-ing in one person had two results First it raised the level of the cadres involved and increased the total number of cadres Second it became easier to appro-priate rural land in regions once they had been elevated to the level of city or district The ease of appropriation was beneficial to cities but detrimental to rural citizens Even worse for rural citizens was the reorganization of lower-level regions into cities Before they had been converted into cities regions had jurisdiction over their counties and had to ensure a certain amount of govern-ment funding for each of these counties Once they were cities all funds al-located for them by the central government for culture education healthcare and so on got held up at the city government level no longer did these regions have to allocate portion of funding to their counties Itrsquos plain to all that nearly

Lu48

ltUNgt

all prefectural-level cities are well-constructed look respectable and contain modern facilities and a number of high-end hotels Almost nobody has ever heard of a cadre or a teacher working in a prefectural-level city not receiving wages on time This is why The result of this methodology has been to further exacerbate the urban-rural disparity

(E) Inadequate Understanding of the SituationAfter 1996 Chinarsquos agriculture left the phase of simply increasing output and ensuring supply and entered a new phase Some of our cadres however have been unable to adjust to this change their understanding of the situation is severely lagging In 1999 I met an official responsible for the agriculture of a Northeastern province at an agricultural conference I asked him how the har-vest had been that year Can you guess what he answered ldquo[Unfortunately] we just might see increasedoutput figures again this yearrdquo Evidently his un-derstanding hadnrsquot caught up with new conditions His job was to oversee agricultural production he should have been happy about increased output figures The times now however are different Increased agricultural output means added pressure as it costs the government money to buy agricultural products from the farmers not to mention the costs of transportation storage and operating the pricing mechanismfor agricultural products He was wor-ried because he hadnrsquot had access to the practical experience of processing agricultural products for added value and establishing a circulation system for agricultural products He was the very face of officialsrsquo being behind the times

Another question is whether it is now time for China to repay its debt to agriculture Fifty years have passed from the founding of the country to pres-ent Over this span of time we have consistently turned to agriculture to pro-vide the capital and raw materials necessary for industrialization Over these fifty years wersquove made ten five-year plans and wersquove basically achieved our goals of industrializing the country Is it not now time for the country to repay its debt to agriculture by boosting investment in it Industrialized countries and regions that developed following the Second World War generally began to increase investment in agriculture about twenty years after the beginning of industrialization Such was the case for Japan South Korea and Taiwan as well Taiwan began to boost investment in agriculture in 1973 and 1974 On the mainland itrsquos been over fifty years but wersquore still mostly taking from the ru-ral citizenry Not only has Chinarsquos urban-rural gap not been reduced in recent years but it has in fact continued to widen in two ways Such widening has caused the price scissors existing between urban and rural areas to cut broader and broader swaths


ltUNgt

One way is through migrant laborers Ministry of Agriculture statistics indicate that in 2002 there were 946 million migrant rural laborers employed in secondary and tertiary industries in Chinese cities Although they are also technically considered part of the laboring class their political and economic status is far different from that of their urban counterparts Even when work-ing identical jobs rural and urban citizens are paidunequally In 2001 the body of migrant rural laborers over 90 million strong created over 23 trillion yuan in gdp for Chinese cities an average of 25000 yuan in value created per mi-grant laborer yet the average migrant laborer earned only 8000 yuan on the year meaning that the remaining 17 trillion yuan was their contribution to the cities where they toiled It has been shown that the more migrant laborers employed in a city the faster that city develops Such was the case in Shenzhen and in Shanghai and Beijing as well The city of Shenzhen itself was built by several million migrant laborers

The second way is through land appropriations Ministry of Land and Re-sources data indicate that a total of 295 million mu of land was requisitioned under different programs around the country in 2002 The real figure is in fact much greater than that All that land was requisitioned at low prices using the methodology of the planned economy era and then flipped at high prices On average a single mu of land can be sold for between tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of yuan That means several hundreds of billions of yuan for all land requisitioned around the country Of course a portion of those funds are handed up the chain to the central government but in the end the lower-level governments transacting land sales come away with enormous profits Hence the saying ldquoGrow money from the landrdquo The more land a re-gion requisitions the faster it becomes wealthy and the greater the benefits re-ceived by local cadres Such requisitioning has further exacerbated the already yawning gap between Chinarsquos rural and urban areas

iv Recommendations

The overall status of Chinarsquos ldquothree rural issuesrdquo is as follows Our agricultural issues have been fundamentally solved but we remain far from resolving our rural citizen and rural area issues as we have yet to solve issues of institutional restrictions The summary report of the 16th National Congress of the Commu-nist Party of China puts forward that there have been no fundamental changes to Chinarsquos urban-rural social duality that the urban-rural disparity and inter-regional disparities continue to grow and that there are still a great deal of

Lu50

ltUNgt

people living in poverty in the countryside For these reasons the tasks of increasing rural incomes by any means conceivable reducing rural citizensrsquo burdens by any means conceivable and maintaining rural stability by any means conceivable remain extremely arduous

The following are a few recommendations for how we can solve rural citizen issues and rural area issues given todayrsquos circumstances

(A) We Must Continue Deepening Reforms to the Rural SystemThe second round of rural reforms should continue We must continue to deepen reforms to the rural system in order to drag the rural economy and social system from the era of the planned economy into the new era of the socialist market economy and to further liberate our rural citizens from the fet-ters of the planned economy The aforementioned is the only way to overcome the urban-rural economic duality and bring about urban-rural integration We cannot sacrifice our rural citizens in order to bring about modernization in our cities If we implement the market economy in cities alone while leaving rural areas in the planned economic system our cities will flourish while our rural areas descend into poverty In other words the prosperity of our cities will be built on the poverty of our rural areas If that is the case we will be unable to build socialist market economy Even if we were able to build it it would be less than perfect

(B) We Must Reform the Household Registration SystemOur current household registration system is a product of the planned econ-omy It artificially divides our population into two sectorsmdashagricultural and non-agriculturalmdashand it restricts the free movement of the population This situation is the primary reason for the urban-rural duality and this situation is no longer suitable for our present conditions It is also a major obstacle to achieving urban-rural integration We must commit to thoroughly reforming the current household registration system

(C) We Must Reform the Current Land Contracting SystemLand issues lie at the core of our rural citizen and rural area issues As the saying goes ldquoif land is stable all under heaven will be stablerdquo The state gov-ernment has repeatedly gone on the record to say that the current land con-tracting system will continue unchanged In 1998 the government announced that the system will remain intact for the coming thirty years However ex-perience has proven that Chinarsquos rural land system has undergone constant changes The reason is that the current land contracting system has not funda-mentally solved issues of land ownership and land usage rights I suggest that


ltUNgt

we implement state ownership of all land that all land ownership rights be restored to the state with usage rights given to rural citizens This system should then be maintained in perpetuity Such a system would allow rural citizens to transfer usage rights of their land to other people who desire to produce on that land effectively ensuring reasonable fluidity of rural land I further suggest that homestead plots be returned to rural citizens At present rural citizensrsquo homestead plots belong to village collectives which leaves the citizens themselves unable to sell or mortgage the property This should be changed

(D) We Must Reform the Current Income Distribution SystemChinarsquos current income distribution system is skewed in favor of cities and is detrimental to both rural citizens and rural areas This system should be re-formed In order to shrink the urban-rural gap and fundamentally solve rural citizen and rural area issues we must skew the income distribution system in favor of rural areas and rural citizens particularly in such areas as education healthcare culture and other public services

(E) We Must Reform the Political Powers Vested in Town Governments Particularly Their Fiscal Powers I Also Recommend We Restore the Rural Work Department

At present town governments are saddled with debt and there is no end to conflicts between town officials and citizens This is not a problem caused by any given official but rather is the result of the town-level political system particularly in fiscal affairs We must commit to undertaking reforms in this area Furthermore if we want to fundamentally solve the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo of such a large country as China merely issuing documents will not suffice The central government should establish a dedicated body tasked with guiding the process Thus I recommend that the Rural Work Department be restored


ltUNgt

12

1 Su Shaozhi （苏少之） is a professor in the Economics School of the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law 430060

2 Nongcun jingji yu nongmin fudan diaocha ziliao《农村经济与农民负担调查资料》

Materials Regarding Investigations into Rural Economies and the Burden on Peasants] volume

chapter 2

The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants after the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Land Reforms

Su Shaozhi1

Abstract

Between the conclusion of Land Reform and the eve of the agricultural cooperative movement few new rich peasants were created around the country and those who did were created slowly There was only a real correlative relationship between the degree of rural affluence and the proportion of new rich peasant households to total rural households across all provinces however there was a positive correlation be-tween these two factors within individual provinces The proportion of new rich peas-ant households to the total number of rural households in areas with relatively high degrees of rural cooperatization and restrictive policies on new rich peasants was not necessarily lower thanmdashand in some cases was higher thanmdashother areas These data indicate that many factors influenced the creation and development of new rich peas-ants and that analysis of a single factor would be insufficient to explain the complex socioeconomic issue of new rich peasants

Keywords

new rich peasant ndash scale ndash distribution

A rural investigation report issued by the Ministry of Finance in 1952 defines ldquonew rich peasantsrdquo as follows ldquoThey are rich peasants produced following land reforms New rich peasants are delineated on the basis of the stipula-tions regarding rural class differentiation issued by the State Administrative Council All those whose total of exploitation (including hiring laborers and issuing debt) exceed twenty-five percent of their total income shall be known as rich peasantsrdquo2 In 1955 the leadership of the Peoplersquos Republic of China


ltUNgt

made the following judgment new rich peasants were emerging everywhere following land reforms polarization grew more severe daily and capitalist forces spread unchecked This appraisal of rural conditions at the time was an important reason behind the acceleration of both agricultural cooperatization and collectivization In recent years many academics studying the issues of agricultural cooperatives have noted that under historical conditions of the time appraisals of polarization were frequently made too harshly However there has been no dedicated research performed on the key reason behind said polarization the concrete conditions for the creation of new rich peasants On the basis of data I have been able to collect on the issue I have performed research into the scale and distribution of new rich peasants created in the Chinese countryside between the end of land reforms and the eve of collectiv-ization Owing to the scattered nature of historical materials in this area and my own limited abilities as a researcher this essay should be considered no more than an initial foray into this field I hope that any academic colleague interested in this issue will send me valuable opinions

i The General Trend for the Creation of New Rich Peasants

Back during the War of Resistance against Japan peoplersquos democratic regimes were established in resistance bases These regimes either reduced rents and interests or outright launched land revolutions (for example in some border regions of Shaanxi Gansu and Ningxia) Feudal land ownership systems were either abolished or greatly weakened At the same time with the encourage-ment and support of democratic governments the proactivity of peasants (nongmin) to produce was increased and economic development caused im-portant changes to the class structure of rural areas Specifically those chang-es were a weakening of the old economy run by landlords and rich peasants a reduction in the number of poor peasants and an increase of middle peas-ants Among those ranks a minority of formerly poor peasants experienced rapid economic development and were elevated to the ranks of rich peasants A classic example of a new rich peasant from this era was Wu Manyou 吴满有

from the border region around Shaanxi Gansu and Ningxia During the war against Japan the democratic regimes adopted policies to encourage new rich peasants honoring those who remembered their roots after becoming rich ac-tively developed the economy and supported the democratic governments In the land reforms that followed the War of Liberation new rich peasants were

2 ed Central Peoplersquos Government Ministry of Finance Bureau of Agricultural Taxation （中央人民政府财政部农业税司） Shaanxi Provincial Archives D9-8-23 68

SU54

ltUNgt

345

3 For more information on the new rich peasant issue during the War of Resistance Against Japan see my article ldquoGenjudi xinfunong wenti yanjiu 根据地新富农问题研究 [Research Into the Issue of New Rich Peasants in Base Areas]rdquo Jindai shi yanjiu 《近代史研究》 1 (2004)

4 The demarcation line between ldquoold areasrdquo (ie old liberated areas) and ldquonew areasrdquo (ie newly liberated areas) changed constantly during the War of Liberation ldquoOld areasrdquo as referred to in this essay refer to those areas which completed land reforms prior to June 1950 ldquoNew areasrdquo as referred to here are those in which land reforms were implemented after the winter of 1950

5 Liaodong was one of nine provinces in Republican-era Northeast Many of the smaller prov-inces were disbanded between 1949 and 1954 leaving the current three provinces of Liaon-ing Jilin and Heilongjiang

again attacked particularly during the fervor for land reforms incited in winter of 1947 by the issuance of the Outline Land Law of China 中国土地法大纲 as egalitarianist ldquoleftistrdquo erroneous tendencies began emerging and even middle peasants and those working in industry and commerce saw their interests in-fringed This situation was initially remedied following an enlarged meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) Central Committee in December 1947 which called for appropriate care to be accorded to new rich peasants who had become rich through their own labor and that they should be treated politi-cally as wealthy middle peasants The meeting also emphasized that new rich peasants should be continued to exist in new democratic rural areas following the success of the revolution Some regions even wrote into policy that new rich peasants whose interests had been egregiously infringed should be com-pensated Nevertheless these policies were never thoroughly implemented So during this great movement to evenly divide the land those new rich peasants who had been created with the encouragement and support of democratic governments in resistance bases during the war against Japan were mostly re-duced to the status of middle peasants and in some cases beaten down to the level of poor peasants although in general they fared better than landlords and old rich peasants Also the economic model which new rich peasants had brought to the countryside was fundamentally abolished3

Immediately before and after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of Chi-na old areas4 gained peaceful stable social environments as they were the first to implement land reforms Rural economies in those areas were restored and began developing anew relatively early and so this is where new rich peas-ants first appeared A telegram sent on May 17 1949 by the ccp Provincial Party Secretary of Liaodong Province5 Zhang Wentian 张闻天 to the Northeast Bu-reau 东北局 and Mao Zedong 毛泽东 indicates that the lives of the major-ity of rural citizens (ie peasants) had improved as a result of rural economic development and that class division had already begun The majority of poor


ltUNgt

67

6 Zhang Wentian xuanji 《张闻天选集》[Selected Works of Zhang Wentian] (Beijing Ren-min chubanshe 1985) 447ndash448

7 Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 《中国土地改革史料选编》[Selected Historical Materials from Chinarsquos Land Reforms] ed China Land Reforms Editing Department and the Modern Economic History Department of the China Academy of Social Sciences Economic Institute (Beijing Guofang daxue chubanshe 1988) 690

peasant and hired farmhand households had been elevated to the status of middle peasant households which now comprised the majority in rural ar-eas Some poor peasant and hired farmhand households which had been al-located land and livestock still faced difficulties A minority of those originally deemed to be middle peasants had quickly become new rich peasants6 Per a report the North China Bureau dispatched to the ccp Central Committee in May 1950 following the production movement of 1948 and 1949 the majority of poor peasants hired farmhands and middle peasants inhabiting the coun-tryside in ldquoold areasrdquo of North China which had completed land reforms in 1947 had shirked off poverty and had seen their status rise in those areas middle peasants now comprised the absolute majority A survey conducted in 3097 households in twenty-three villages of the provinces of Hebei and Chahar in-dicates that the proportion of poor peasant and hired farmhand households to total rural households fell from fifty-one percent prior to land reforms down to fifteen percent while the proportion of middle peasant households grew from 376 percent to seventy-seven percent only one formerly affluent middle peas-ant household had elevated his status to that of new rich peasant7 These data regarding new rich peasants publicized long ago indicate that the new rich peasants of the Peoplersquos Republic of China were created against a socioeco-nomic background of recovering rural economic growth universal economic improvement for rural citizens and the fact that middle peasant households came to comprise the majority in rural areas

A large amount of materials regarding new rich peasants was later pub-lished but the movement for agricultural collectivization that followed land reforms overshadowed the issue and the Chinese countryside did not again engage in universal open class division The records that do exist pertain-ing to new rich peasants are scattered across a variety of rural investigative reports Many of these investigations were conducted on small scales offer piecemeal explanations are scattered or are incomplete It is not possible to shed light on the broader picture of new rich peasants across China from only these few fragmentary documents To write this essay I compiled and organized all the materials I could collect pertaining to this issue selecting for use those written by authoritative investigative bodies those covering a wide

SU56

ltUNgt

8

8 The materials I used to write this essay can be divided into two groups The first consists of rural investigation materials conducted by provincial regional city-level and county-level organizations The second consists of investigations conducted into rural household expenditures and incomes for 1954 by the National Bureau of Statistics in spring 1955 All of these investigations were one-off and so none is exactly the same in the body conducting the investigations the scope or targets of the investigations investigative methodology or statistical bore Thus none of the reports are strictly suitable for conducting vertical or hori-zontal comparisons It is now impossible to remedy shortages of research materials caused by historical reasons These materials can however give us a general impression of the basic conditions of new rich peasants at the time

scale those which collected a large quantity of samples and those which employed relatively scientific methodologies Such sampling enabled me to paint a comprehensive picture of the creation of new rich peasants in the Peoplersquos Republic of China8

Letrsquos first look at old areas in the Northeast Of four reports written by the ccp Central Northeast Bureau Rural Work Department regarding surveys con-ducted in 5510 households in seventeen typical villages of four counties in the three provinces of Heilongjiang Jilin and Liaodong some reports did not even touch on the issue of new rich peasants Some reported not having discovered any new rich peasants and some reported that there were ldquovery fewrdquo new rich peasants without providing any concrete data Only one of the reports makes mention of the example of one single new rich peasant household Of course this may just be a reflection of the fact that rural economic investigations con-ducted at the time did not place emphasis on rural class division

The conditions of new rich peasants in northeastern regions in 1951 and 1952 are indicated in Tables 21 and 22

Tables 21 and 22 indicate that there was relatively rapid growth in the num-ber of new rich peasants in the Northeast during the years 1951 and 1952 as compared to the years prior to 1950 The total proportion in 1951 was less than one percent but exceeded one percent in 1952

Lastly letrsquos take a look at the situation in the Northeast in 1953 and 1954 The results of an survey conducted in 8930 households in thirty-three typical villages of six provinces of the NortheastmdashHeilongjiang Songjiang Jilin Lia-oning Liaoxi and Rehemdashindicate that new rich peasants accounted for 142 percent of the total population surveyed (see Table 23)

The results of an investigation conducted in 1954 by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1735 households in the three Northeastern provinces of Heilongji-ang Jilin and Liaoning indicate that new rich peasants accounted for 133 per-cent of the total population surveyed (see Table 24)


ltUNgt

Table 21 The conditions of new rich peasants as reflected by a rural economic survey into the six provinces of the northeast in 1951

Province Typical villages surveyed

Total households



Heilongjiang Yongrsquoan and Xirsquoan Villages in 16th Dist Hailun County

394 3 067

Xiangyang Village Nehe County

470 5 106

Songjiang Mengjing Village Hulan County

234 2 086

Gonghe Changsheng and Haihong Villages Acheng County

366 None found

Liaoxi Cuijiatun Village 2nd Dist Heishan County

260 None found

Liaodong 4 villages in Tonghua Region

421 4 095

Guanfansi Village Hai-cheng County Nuanquan Village Gaiping county

988 15 152

Rehe 9 villages in Beipiao Ningcheng and Longhua Counties

1938 None found

Total of above

23 villages in 5 provinces 5071 29 057

Jilin Province-wide comprehensive rural economic data

Total 1

Data source compiled from ten rural economic investigative reports from 1951 contained within the 1950ndash1952 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji 《 1 9 5 0 ~ 1 9 5 2 年东北农村调查汇集》 [Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations Years 1950ndash1952] edited by the ccp Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department

SU58

ltUNgt

9

9 ldquoZhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu ge sheng 26 ge cun diaocha de huibao jiyao (1953 nian 12 yue)《中共中央东北局农村工作部关于各省2 6个村调

查的汇报纪要（ 19 5 3年 1 2月）》[Summary of Reports Conducted by the cpc Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department into 26 Villages in Every Province (December 1953)]rdquo in 1953 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji 《 19 5 3年东北农村调查汇集》

[Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations 1953] vol 2 ed cpc Central Northeast Bureau Rural Work Department 3

Table 22 The Conditions of new rich peasants in fourteen typical villages of three provinces of the northeast in 1952

Total rural households



5 villages in Keshan Hailun and Zhaoyuan Counties Heilongjiang Province

1055 32 303

6 typical villages of Rehe Province 1488 18 123 villages of Liaoxi Province 1132 1 0114-village totals 3675 51 139

Data source compiled from four rural economic investigative reports from 1952 contained within the 1950ndash1952 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji《 1 9 5 0 ~ 1 9 5 2 年东北农村调查汇集》 [Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations Years 1950ndash1952] edited by the ccp Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department

The above data indicate that in the Northeast from the end of land reforms in 1948 until 1950 very few new rich peasants were created as the rural economy recovered From 1951 to 1952 the new rich peasant economy began to grow as economic rejeuvenation trended toward growth From 1953 to 1954 there was a slowing to the creation of new rich peasants Of course even within the Northeast conditions from province to province varied widely The summary of a survey report issued by the ccp Northeast Bureau Rural Work Department in December 1953 indicates conditions in 1953 ldquoThere are slightly fewer new rich peasants in Northern Manchuria than in 1952 but slightly more in the Southern Manchuria Special Production Zonerdquo9


ltUNgt

Table 23 The proportion of new rich peasants to total rural populations as indicated by rural economic investigations conducted in six provinces of the northeast in 1953

Province Region county village Total rural households



Heilongjiang 9 villages in Baicheng Keshan Hailun and Zhaoyuan Counties

1776 21 118

Songjiang Nongfeng Tianmao and Jinbu Villages in 7th Dist Shuangcheng County

1074 4 037

Jilin Xinyu Xinrsquoan and Xinzao Villages in 10th Dist Yongji County

1256 25 199

Jiefang and Guangming Villages in 13th Dist Yushu County

696 18 267

Liaoning Sitaizi Dongguantun and Beilitun Villages in 2nd Dist Gaiping County

552 7 17

Liaoxi 6 villages in Lishu and Yi Counties

1855 46 25

Rehe 7 villages in Chengde Chifeng and Zhaoyang Counties

1721 6 035

Totals 33 villages in 6 provinces 8930 127 142

Data source Compiled from six investigative reports and two summary reports contained in issues 1 and 2 of 1953 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji《 1 9 5 3年东北农村调查汇集》 [Compilation of Rural Investigations in the Northeast in 1953] edited by the ccp Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department

SU60

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 2

4 Ne

w ri

ch p

easa

nts i

n tw

enty

-one

pro

vinc

es a

roun

d th

e cou

ntry

in 19

54

Regi

onPr

ovin

ceH

ouse

hold

s su

rvey

edN

ew ri

ch p

easa

nt c

ondi

tions

No

of n

ew

rich

pea

sant

ho

useh

olds

Clas

s sta

tuse

s at t

he e

nd o

f lan

d re

form

sPe

rcen

tage

of

new

rich

pe

asan

t ho

useh

olds

to

prov

inci

al to

tal

()

No

of n

ew

rich

pea

sant

ho

useh

olds

in

regi

on

Perc

enta

ge o

f ne

w ri

ch p

eas-

ant h

ouse

hold

s to

regi

onal

tota

l (

)

Poor

pea

sant

s (h

ouse

hold

s)M

iddl

e pe

asan

ts

(hou

seho

lds)

Land

lord

s (h

ouse

hold

s)

Nor

thea

stLi

aoni

ng50

09

27

ndash1

823

133

Jilin

537

92

7ndash

168

Hei

long

jiang

698

52

3ndash

072

Nor

th C

hina

Heb

ei1

019

5ndash

41

049

100

47Sh

anxi

893

4ndash

4ndash

048

Inne

r Mon

g27

81

ndash1

ndash0

36Ea

st C

hina

Jiang

su50

02

ndash2

ndash0

421

057

Anhu

i98

47

25

ndash0

71Zh

ejia

ng46

01

1ndash

ndash0

16Sh

ando

ng1

054

102

8ndash

095

Fujia

n49

91

ndash1

ndash0

2N

orth

wes

tG

ansu

600

2ndash

2ndash

033

120

62Q

ingh

ai20

01

ndash1

ndash0

5


ltUNgt

Dat

a so

urce

Com

pile

d fro

m Y

ijiuw

usi n

ian

quan

guo

nong

jia sh

ouzh

i dia

ocha

zilia

o《一

九五

四年

全国

农家

收支

调查

资料

》[I

nves

tigat

ive

Mat

eria

ls Re

gard

ing

Nat

ionw

ide

Rura

l Hou

seho

ld E

xpen

ditu

res a

nd In

com

es in

1954

] ed

ited

by th

e Pe

ople

rsquos Re

publ

ic o

f Chi

na N

atio

nal B

urea

u of

Sta

tistic

s (M

ay

1956

) Am

ong

the

twen

ty-fi

ve p

rovi

nces

and

regi

ons o

f the

cou

ntry

at t

he ti

me

Reh

e Ji

angx

i an

d G

uang

xi d

id n

ot re

port

rele

vant

figu

res

and

the

figur

es

repo

rted

by

Yunn

an d

id n

ot a

dher

e to

nat

iona

l uni

fied

stan

dard

s Th

us I

have

incl

uded

dat

a on

143

34 h

ouse

hold

s fro

m th

e re

mai

ning

twen

ty-o

ne p

rovi

nces

G

uang

dong

Pro

vinc

ial A

rchi

ves W

A07-

61middot2

22

Shaa

nxi

100

08

ndash8

ndash0

8Xi

njia

ng14

01

ndash1

ndash0

71So

uth-

cent

ral a

nd

Sout

h Ch

ina

Hen

an99

33

ndash3

ndash0

315

047

Hub

ei70

01

ndash1

ndash0

14H

unan

697

1ndash

1ndash

014

Gua

ngdo

ng81

610

37

ndash1

23So

uthw

est

Gui

zhou

500

ndashndash

ndashndash

ndashndash

Sich

uan

1140

ndashndash

ndashndash

Tota

l14

344

8114

661

057

81

SU62

ltUNgt

The overall situation of the Northeast shows us the general trends of new rich peasant creation in old and new areas However widely varying socio-economic conditions across different regions meant great disparities in the degree of new rich peasant creation A survey conducted into 6023 households in twenty typical townships of Shanxi Province indicates that new rich peas-ant households accounted for only 008 percent of total households surveyed in 1952 That figure was down to 006 percent in 195410 That is to say that the development trend of new rich peasants here was roughly similar to that of the Northeast but the proportion of new rich peasant households here was significantly lower than in the Northeast

Land reforms in new areas began in the autumn and winter of 1950 with most complete by 1951 or 1952 That left only two or three years of time for the rural individual economy to grow before the advent of agricultural coop-eratives After 1952 there were great changes to the rural policy environment Therefore there was little time for new rich peasants to be created in new ar-eas and those who were created mostly did not fall into standard patterns A survey conducted into 3754 households in twelve townships of Hubei prov-ince discovered no new rich peasant households in 1952 and only twelve in 1954 accounting for 032 percent of total households surveyed11 A survey con-ducted into 3575 households in nine townships of Hunan province indicates the proportion of new rich peasant households to total households to be 017 percent in 1952 025 percent in 1953 and 011 percent in 195412 A survey con-ducted by the Jiangxi Provincial Committee in 3638 households in nine typi-cal townships of Jiangxi indicates that no new rich peasant households were created in 1952 but four emerged in 1954 accounting for 011 percent of total households surveyed13 A survey conducted in 2893 households of ten town-ships of Anhui province indicates that 072 percent of households surveyed 10111213

10 Shanxi sheng 20 ge dianxing xiang diaocha ziliaothinspmiddotthinsptudi gaige jieshu shiqi (1952ndash1954) 《山

西省2 0个典型乡调查资料 middot 土地改革结束时期(1952~1954 年)》[Investigation Materials Regarding 20 Typical Townships of Shanxi Provincethinspmiddotthinspthe End of Land Reforms (1952ndash1954)] May 1956 Shanxi Provincial Archives 6805

11 Hubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongji biao (1955 nian) 《湖北省十二个典

型乡调查统计表（ 19 5 5年)》[Statistical Tables from Investigations into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province (1955)] Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-154

12 See Note on Hunan rural economic investigations in References13 Guanyu quansheng (9 ge dianxing xiang) jingji diaocha zonghebiao 《关于全省（9个

典型乡)经济调查综合表》[Comprehensive Tables Regarding Economic Investigations into 9 Typical Townships Across the Province] ed Jiangxi Provincial Committee Investiga-tive Group 1956 Jiangxi Provincial Archives X006-2-13


ltUNgt

were new rich peasant households down to 045 percent in 195414 Hunan Hubei and Jiangxi completed land reforms well after the provinces of the Northeast generally finishing in 1952 The ccp Central South-Central Bureau Rural Work Department launched an investigation into twelve typical town-ships of Guangdong at the end of 1953 Surveyors there reported an even lower proportion of new rich peasant households than in Hunan Hubei and Jiangxi A nationwide survey into rural household expenditures and incomes in 1954 revealed that the proportion of new rich peasant households in Guangzhou was 123 percent (see Table 24) That gave Guangdong a relatively high propor-tion of new rich peasant households as compared to the rest of the country

In summary after land reforms new rich peasant creation hit its peak more or less between 1953 and 1954 Beginning in the second half of 1955 China ex-perienced a fervor for establishing rural collectives at which point the new rich peasant and rural individual household economies abruptly died out In the spring of 1955 the National Bureau of Statistics and rural work departments of all provinces conducted a concentrated investigation into rural economic conditions over 1954 in order to aid the development of rural cooperatives Their work provided us with relatively systematized data for the study of the new rich peasant issue Thus in the following section we shall use 1954 as our focus year for the study of the scale distribution and economic characteristics of the creation of new rich peasants prior to the cooperative movement Of course we must also incorporate analysis of conditions prior to 1954 as the general line for the transitionary period was established in 1953 at which time central officials instituted the state monopoly for grains cotton oil and other important agricultural products exerting a great influence on the develop-ment of the new rich peasant economy

ii The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants in 1954

Prior to the spring planting of 1955 the National Bureau of Statistics conducted an investigation into the 1954 expenditures and incomes of rural households in twenty-five provinces and autonomous regions For this investigation the Bu-reau designed a unified methodology for sample collection The investigation sent 5000 active cadres into 16468 rural households in 824 villages around the 14

14 Anhui sheng nongcun dianxing diaocha (tudi gaige jieshu zhi 1954 nian) 《安徽省农村典

型调查（土地改革结束至 19 5 4年)》[Typical Investigations into Rural Areas of Anhui Province ( from the End of Land Reforms to 1954)] ed cpc Anhui Provincial Committee Rural Work Department 中共安徽省委农村工作部办公室

SU64

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country Once complete the Bureau compiled data from 15432 households from twenty-three provinces After the data were collected the entire inves-tigation was examined and studied before being made public For this reason this document is an important piece of evidence for understanding the chang-es and trends in class changes taking place in rural areas across the country up to 1954 The conditions of new rich peasants from most of the countryrsquos prov-inces regions and autonomous regions are indicated in Table 24

Table 44 indicates that new rich peasant households accounted for 057 percent of all surveyed rural households included in the tablersquos datamdash14344 households across twenty-one provinces At the time land reforms ended 815 percent of these new rich peasant households had been middle peasant households 173 percent had been poor peasant households and 12 percent had been landlord households Although most had been deemed middle peas-ant households a substantial amount had also been classified poor peasant households

If we break the data down by province or autonomous region we can see that Liaoning had the highest proportion of new rich peasant households at 18 percent Other provinces or autonomous regions exceeding the national aver-age were in order Jilin Guangdong Shandong Shaanxi Heilongjiang Anhui and Xinjiang all exceeding 07 percent The provinces with the fewest new rich peasant families were in order Sichuan Guizhou Hubei Hunan Zhejiang and Fujian all coming in below 03 percent The remaining provinces and au-tonomous regions of Qinghai Hebei Shanxi Jiangsu Inner Mongolia Gansu and Henan all registered between 03 and 05 percent

If we break it down by larger administrative divisions the Northeast had the highest proportion of new rich peasant households followed by the North-west East Chinarsquos proportion was even with the national average North China and central China both fell below the national average and two provinces of the Southwest did not report discovering any new rich peasants

iii Analysis of the Factors Determining the Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants

In order to study the patterns behind the creation of new rich peasants we broke the data into units of provinces (or autonomous regions) and selected such indicators as rural per capita income levels the proportion of commune-member rural households to total rural households and the proportion of middle peasant households to total rural households as well as such factors as differentiation between new and old areas We used these criteria to ana-lyze the factors behind the scale and distribution of the creation of new rich


ltUNgt

peasants We also examined the influence on the creation and development of new rich peasants of the time at which land reforms were completed the level of rural economic development the level of middle-peasant-ization the degree of severity of rural policies and the political climate in a given area

The correlation coefficient between the proportion of new rich peasant households to total households and the level of rural per capita income is 0266 calculated based on the data in Table 25 That is to say that there is a

Table 25 Comparisons of per capita (total) incomes and proportions to total rural population of new rich peasant households commune member households and poor peasant households in twenty provinces and regions in 1954

Province Total households surveyed

Per capita income (yuan)


Percentage of middle peasant + commune member households ()

Percentage of commune member households ()

Hebei 1019 14957 049 8116 815Shanxi 839 16715 048 8641 2062Shaanxi 1000 19712 08 643 05Shandong 1054 13218 095 6831 398Henan 993 13365 03 6294 111Liaoning 500 18215 18 718 9Jilin 537 16486 168 6536 95Heilongjiang 698 19189 072 5602 831Inner Mong 278 21615 036 6007 791Gansu 600 19011 033 6533 133Qinghai 200 26550 05 69 05Jiangsu 500 15517 04 65 12Anhui 984 12893 071 5132 274Zhejiang 640 16359 016 6688 078Hubei 700 13787 014 7229 186Hunan 697 14904 014 6901 029Sichuan 1140 14383 0 6202 053Guangdong 816 17367 123 5453 208Guizhou 500 9454 0 682 2Fujian 499 19495 02 6814 441

Data source Same as Table 24 The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was omitted from this list as data on its class structure at the time are incomplete

SU66

ltUNgt

15

15 See Note on Hunan rural economic investigations in References

positive correlation between these two factors but the correlation is weak In other words the correlation between the number of new rich peasants and the degree of economic development is not strong

However if we look at different periods of time within a single province we discover a different situation Letrsquos take Hunan as an example The harvests of nine typical Hunan towns surveyed in 1952 and 1953 were relatively good The per capita annual grain income of households in the survey increased from 14267 jin to 1572 jin an increase of 102 percent Of these same households the proportion of new rich peasant households increased from 017 percent to 025 percent In 1954 widespread crop failures due to waterlogging caused decreases in agricultural output Rural household per capita grain income fell to 12277 jin a drop of 219 percent from the previous year there was a corresponding reduction of the proportion of new rich peasant households of 011 percent (see Table 26) These data reported by the Hunan government indicate that as the rural economy developed and rural incomes increased the number of new rich peasants also increased at the same time the income disparity be-tween new rich peasants and other classes of peasant households shrank The data also indicate that as agricultural output fell so did rural income levels and the overall proportion of new rich peasant households at the same time the income disparity between new rich peasants and other classes of peasant

Table 26 Per capita rural incomes and the proportion of new rich peasant households to total rural households in nine townships of hunan province 1952ndash195415

Total house holds surveyed


Non-new-rich-peasants New rich peasants

Year Number of households


Number of households

Percentage of total households ()


1952 3488 14267 3482 14251 6 017 211151953 3284 1572 3276 15715 8 025 1998841954 3575 12277 3571 12262 4 011 20061


ltUNgt

1617

16 I must clarify here that the reason behind the reduction of new rich peasant per capita income in 1953 might be that newly created new rich peasant households lagged eco-nomically behind existing new rich peasant households This may have resulted in the per capita income drop When there was a reduction to the total of new rich peasant households in 1954 economically weak new rich peasants fell from the stratum of new rich peasants as a result of the crop failures This may have caused the rebound to per capita income levels in this year

17 These data reflect the degree of middle-peasant-ization This is because most peasant households joining communes at this time had originally been middle peasants and be-cause commune-member households were on nearly identical economic footing with middle peasant households

households grew16 Such disparities indicate that in the nine Hunan towns of the survey reduction to the income of other classes of peasant households was not a prerequisite for the creation of new rich peasants Rather the creation of new rich peasants was attributable to economic development and universal increases to rural incomes

Using data contained in Table 25 we calculated a coefficient of correlation of minus0144 between the proportion of middle peasant households+commune-member households and new rich peasant households across the provinces and autonomous regions17 That is to say that there is a negative correlation between the two but the correlation is relatively weak In other words there was a weak relationship between the number of new rich peasants and the degree of middle-peasant-ization

Also using data contained in Table 25 we calculated a coefficient of correla-tion of 0347 between the proportion of rural commune-member households to total rural households (which reflects the level of agricultural cooperatiza-tion) and the proportion of new rich peasant households to total rural house-holds This coefficient indicates a positive correlation but a weak one It is generally held that the higher the level of agricultural cooperatization in an area the more rigorous that arearsquos policies were toward new rich peasants the higher the political pressure on them and thus the more restrictions were im-posed on the creation of new rich peasants If this were the case there should have been a negative correlation between the two variables but we found the case to be the opposite This conclusion indicates that many factors influenced the creation and development of new rich peasants Analysis of a single factor would be insufficient to explain the complex socioeconomic factors influenc-ing the creation of new rich peasants

Letrsquos break down the 21 provinces and provincial-level areas into three groups old areas new areas and crossover zones between old and new ar-eas As shown in Table 27 there was a higher proportion of new rich peasant

SU68

ltUNgt

households in old areas than in crossover zones and the proportion was high-er in crossover zones than in new areas That said proportions varied widely from province to province even within similar areas Table 24 shows us that the highest proportions of new rich peasant households were concentrated in the three northeastern provinces and Shandong Provincemdashin old areasmdashand provinces like Shaanxi in the crossover zone but also in areas such as Guang-dong Anhui Xinjiang and so on All provinces containing proportions of new rich peasant households less than 03 percent were in the new areas However such provinces as Hebei and Shanxi in the old areas and Henan in the cross-over zone exhibited proportions of new rich peasant households lower than the national average

The above analysis leads us to the following conclusionsFirst generally speaking old areas were the first to complete land reforms

and experience rejuvenation in rural economies Thus relatively higher pro-portions of affluent peasant households appeared in the old areas It would have been impossible for all peasants to have identical experiences amid rural individual economic competition across the country therefore it was inevi-table that new differences in economic conditions would arise

Second there was not a clear relationship between the degree of rural af-fluence and the proportion of new rich peasant households to total peasant households from province to province However the situation is different if one looks within similar areas For example rural conditions in Hunan from

Table 27 The proportion of new rich peasant households to total rural households in old areas new areas and the crossover zone between old and new areas in 1954

Total households surveyed



Old areas total 4674 42 09Crossover zone total 1993 11 055New areas total 7694 28 036

Data source Same as Table 24 Here the old areas include such provinces as Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Hebei Shanxi and Shandong The crossover zones include the provinces of Shaanxi and Henan New areas include such provincial-level regions as Inner Mongolia Xinjiang Qinghai Gansu Hubei Hunan Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Guangdong Sichuan and Guizhou This is very rough division


ltUNgt

1952 to 1954 indicate that the situation was not as some have surmised it to be that a small number of people swallowed up the resources of others in order to engage in capital accumulation thus causing the majority to fall into poverty Rather the situation was that most peasants were hardworking strove for busi-ness success and saw their economic stars rise Some made economic gains faster than others which caused them to become new rich peasants Of course some peasants made economic gains slowly or struggled to make any gains at all There is not however a definite direct correlation between this phenom-enon and the emergence of new rich peasants this was rather a reflection of individual natures These peasants and their families had little resources to begin with and did not benefit amply from land reforms Some had little or in some cases no capacity for labor Some were not gifted in business and some suffered natural or man-made calamities Some were just lazy An investiga-tion into thirty-five townships in the South-central region in 1953 indicates that of two thirds of poor peasant households which comprised about thirty percent of total rural households had experienced economic growth following land reforms as a result of government assistance and were near to the level of middle peasant households The remaining third (about ten percent of total rural households) had not experienced any economic improvement and had in fact suffered economic losses Some of these troubled households possessed insufficient means of production and some had suffered natural or man-made calamities The primary reason for their condition however was insufficient capacity for labor The majority of such households consisted of widowers widows orphans the childless the elderly and the infirmed and the families of martyrs of the revolution they were in need of assistance and support from the government

Third before the agricultural cooperative movement hit its crescendo the proportion of new rich peasant households to total households in areas with relatively high degrees of rural cooperatization and restrictive policies on new rich peasants was not necessarily lower thanmdashand in some cases was higher thanmdashother areas This proportion reflects the contradictory nature of rural economic policies in the period before the agricultural cooperative movement peaked In other words the only way to promote rural economic development following land reforms was to give policy support to individual peasant house-holds striving to increase output and run their businesses At the same time the government was encouraging the masses of peasants to strive to increase output and expand accumulation it was also restricting the emergence of eco-nomic disparities amid economic competition of individual rural families as well as the creation of new rich peasant households These two policy direc-tions were in direct conflict with one another It was precisely this conflict that

SU70

ltUNgt

18

18 National Bureau of Statistics 1954 nian woguo nongjia shouzhi diaocha baogao 《 19 5 4

年我国农家收支调查报告》[Investigative Reports into the Expenditures and Incomes of Chinese Rural Households in 1954] (Beijing Tongji chubanshe 1957) 13ndash14

caused the government to later accelerate the pace of agricultural cooperatiza-tion and collectivization thereby rooting out the driver of the creation of new rich peasants by eliminating the individual economy

In the above sections we have analyzed the scale and geographic distribu-tion of the creation of new rich peasants around the country in the period of time following land reforms but before the crescendo of the agricultural cooperative movement So what influence did the creation of new rich peas-ants exert on the changes taking place to rural class structure Per an inves-tigation into rural household expenditures and incomes conducted in 1954 poor peasant households accounted for 571 percent of total rural households at the time land reforms ended By the end of 1954 469 percent of poor peas-ant households (ie 268 percent of total rural households) had been elevated to the status of middle peasants This status elevation caused an important change to the rural class structure That is to say that the proportion of poor peasant households to total rural households fell to 29 percent while the pro-portion of middle peasants to the total rose from 358 percent at the end of land reforms to 622 percentmdashnearly two thirds of total householdsmdashby the end of 1954 causing them to comprise the bulk of the rural population At the same time old rich peasant households accounted for 36 percent of total rural households at the end of land reforms By the end of 1954 565 percent (21 percent of the total rural population) of old rich peasant households had fallen to the level of either middle or poor peasants At this time scarcely any new rich peasants were created and those who did get created were created slowly such households came to comprise only 06 percent of total rural households Thus the proportion of both old and new rich peasant households combined by the end of 1954 to total rural households was only 21 percent a reduction of 15 percent from the end of land reforms18 On the basis of the above analysis we can conclude that the trend of changes to rural class structure in the period of time between the end of land reforms to the crescendo of the agricultural cooperative movement was reduction at both extremes and concentration in the middle Of course it was not possible for all peasants to take identi-cal paths toward affluence following land reforms Very few new rich peasants were created as a result of economic competition in small-scale commerce among peasants Some peasant households made economic gains slowly or struggled to make any gains at all This phenomenon was inevitable during the


ltUNgt

19

19 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu shang 若干重大决策与事

件的回顾 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 1] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1991) 208

course of middle-peasant-ization This process did not in any way conform to what is generally referred to as ldquopolarizationrdquo As the government enacted a series of new democratic policies following land reforms to actively aid and support peasants in poverty this process of differentiation was limited to a cer-tain scope I agree with Bo Yiborsquos 薄一波 assessment in his book A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events In Borsquos view although there was a nega-tive side to the differentiation occurring in rural populations under historical conditions of the times this differentiation was beneficial to promoting gains in productivity So long as we perform our work well the negative side wonrsquot result in any destructive consequences19

References

1950ndash1952 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji《 1950~ 1952年东北农村调查汇集》

[Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations Years 1950ndash1952] ed CPC Cen-tral Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department

Anhui sheng nongcun dianxing diaocha (tudi gaige jieshu zhi 1954 nian)《安徽省农村

典型调查(土地改革结束至 1954年)》[Typical Investigations into Rural Areas of Anhui Province ( from the End of Land Reforms to 1954)] ed CPC Anhui Provincial Committee Rural Work Department 中共安徽省委农村工作部办公室


事件的回顾》上[A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 1] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1991)

Guanyu quansheng (9 ge dianxing xiang) jingji diaocha zonghebiao《关于全省(9个

典型乡)经济调查综合表》[Comprehensive Tables Regarding Economic Investiga-tions into 9 Typical Townships Across the Province] ed Jiangxi Provincial Committee Investigative Group 1956 Jiangxi Provincial Archives X006-2-13

Hubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongji biao (1955 nian)《湖北省十二个

典型乡调查统计表( 1955年)》[Statistical Tables from Investigations into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province (1955)] Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-154

National Bureau of Statistics 1954 nian woguo nongjia shouzhi diaocha baogao 《 1954 年我国农家收支调查报告》[Investigative Reports into the Expenditures and In-comes of Chinese Rural Households in 1954] (Beijing Tongji chubanshe 1957)

Nongcun jingji yu nongmin fudan diaocha ziliao 《农村经济与农民负担调查资

料》[Materials Regarding Investigations into Rural Economies and the Burden on

SU72

ltUNgt

Peasants] volume 2 ed Central Peoplersquos Government Ministry of Finance Bureau of Agricultural Taxation （中央人民政府财政部农业税司） Shaanxi Provin-cial Archives D9-8-23

Shanxi sheng 20 ge dianxing xiang diaocha ziliaomiddottudi gaige jieshu shiqi (1952ndash1954) 《山西省 20个典型乡调查资料 middot 土地改革结束时期 (1952~1954年 )》 [Investi-gation Materials Regarding 20 Typical Townships of Shanxi Provincemiddotthe End of Land Reforms (1952ndash1954)] May 1956 Shanxi Provincial Archives 6805

Zhang Wentian xuanji 《张闻天选集》[Selected Works of Zhang Wentian] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1985)

ldquoZhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu ge sheng 26 ge cun diaocha de huibao jiyao (1953 nian 12 yue) 中共中央东北局农村工作部关于

各省26个村调查的汇报纪要（ 1953年 12月） [Summary of Reports Conducted by the CPC Central Northeast Bureaursquos Rural Work Department into 26 Villages in Every Province (December 1953)]rdquo in 1953 nian dongbei nongcun diaocha huiji 《 1953年东北农村调查汇集》[Compilation of Northeastern Rural Investigations 1953] vol 2 ed CPC Central Northeast Bureau Rural Work Department 中共中央

东北局农村工作部 Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 《中国土地改革史料选编》[Selected

Historical Materials from Chinarsquos Land Reforms] ed China Land Reforms Editing Department and the Modern Economic History Department of the China Academy of Social Sciences Economic Institute (Beijing Guofang daxue chubanshe 1988)

Note on Hunan rural economic investigations Data compiled from investigations conducted into nine townships from 1952 to 1953 and eight townships in 1953 as follows

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Xiangtan xian Qingxi xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于湘潭县清溪

乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from In-vestigations into the Economy of Qingxi Township Xiangtan County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Pro-vincial Archives 146-1-176

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Xiangtan xian Changle xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于湘潭县

长乐乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Changle Township Xiangtan County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-197

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Anxiang xian Zhulinyuan xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于安乡

县竹林垸乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables


ltUNgt

from Investigations into the Economy of Zhulinyuan Township Anxiang County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-205

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Anxiang xian Jianjiadu xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于安乡

县蹇家渡乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Jianjiadu Township Anxiang County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-204

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Yuanling xian Xiaojiaqiao xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于沅陵

县肖家桥乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Xiaojiaqiao Township Yuanling County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-246

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Yuanling xian Mengfu xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于沅陵县

蒙福乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Mengfu Township Yuanling County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Pro-vincial Archives 146-1-272

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Yuanling xian Mumaxi xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于沅陵县牧

马溪乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Mumaxi Township Yuanling County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-260

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Changsha xian Juantang xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于长沙县

卷塘乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Juantang Township Changsha County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-153

Shengwei nongcun gongzuo bu guanyu Changsha xian Caotang xiang 1952ndash1954 nian jingji qingkuang diaocha fenxi biao (1955 nian) 《省委农村工作部关于长

沙县草塘乡 1952~ 1954年经济情况调查分析表（ 1955年）》[Analytical Tables from Investigations into the Economy of Caotang Township Changsha County from 1952ndash1954 Performed by the Provincial Committee Rural Work Department (1955)] Hunan Provincial Archives 146-1-265


ltUNgt

chapter 3

The Deep Plowing Movement of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo

Zhu Xianling Ding Zhaojun and Hu Huakai1

Abstract

From 1957 to 1958 Mao Zedong upheld the experience of Lijiazhai Village 厉家寨

村 in Shandong Province and Changge County in Henan Province in increasing crop yields through deep plowing He called for the entire country to learn from their ex-ample and meet objectives for increased yields through deep plowing In August 1958 the ccp Central Committee issued directives calling for all arable land in the country capable of being plowed to a depth of one chi or more to be so plowed within two to three years A spectacular nationwide frenzy for deep plowing erupted In the ensu-ing movement officials from around the country actively organized teams to learn from Changge Countyrsquos experience and methodologies in deep plowing dispatching the masses to the fields to launch a ldquodecisive military campaignrdquo against the earth Re-searchers developed or revised farm implements specifically for deep plowing and sci-entists summarized and argued for the effectiveness of deep plowing measures Some also conducted experiments for increasing yields through deep plowing Although it was scientifically possible to increase yields to a certain extent through deep plowing many problems arose around the country in 1958 as deep plowing was taken too far done on too much land or performed improperly in some cases decreasing soil fertil-ity The movementrsquos anticipated objectives were never met

Keywords

ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo ndash deep plowing ndash deep plowing implements

1 Zhu Xianling (朱显灵 ) is a doctorate in Confucian idealist philosophy and an associate research fellow in the department of science and technology history and archaeology at the University of Science and Technology of China Ding Zhaojun (丁兆君 ) is a lecturer in the museum of history at the University of Science and Technology of China Hu Huakai (胡化凯 ) is a professor in the department of science and technology history and archaeol-ogy at the University of Science and Technology of China


ltUNgt

i Genesis of the Deep Plowing Movement

Land reforms were completed swiftly following the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China many rural citizens founded mutual aid teams and cooper-atives Some cooperatives made efforts in irrigation projects and land reclama-tion both of which markedly increased agricultural yields In 1951 the Liyueju 厉月举 team of Lijiazhai Village 厉家寨村 Yingnan County 莒南县 Shan-dong Province began experimenting with deep plowing They experienced in-creased yields in their very first year In 1953 the Liyueju teamrsquos average yield per mu of land was 228 kilograms an increase of 1255 kilograms per mu over the previous year In 1954 the Liyueju deep plowing system sparked a mass fervor for deep plowing In December 1955 the Lijiazhai Village advanced ag-ricultural producersrsquo collective began a program of large-scale irrigation works construction The slogan used for this program was ldquocleave ridges and fill in ravines change the courses of rivers turn over the land and advance into the mountainsrdquo Through hard work the collective changed the courses of five riv-ers flattened eleven mountains filled in twenty-one large ponds and over 300 ravines merged over 1000 scattered pieces of farmland into 118 large fields and increased arable land by an area of 192 mu Leadership at all levels took notice and lauded them for their fighting spirit2 On October 9 1957 Mao Zedong wrote the following memo upon reading the ldquoReport On the Repeated Bumper crop Harvests Achieved by Any Means Conceivable Realized by the Dashan Ag-ricultural Cooperative of Lijiazhai Township Yingnan County Shandong Prov-incerdquothinsp山东省莒南县厉家寨乡大山农业社千方百计争取丰收再丰收

的报告 ldquoLijiazhai is a good example for reforming China with the spirit of yu gong yi shan [a Chinese saying that can be interpreted as lsquowhere therersquos a will therersquos a wayrsquo or more literally as lsquothe foolish old man who moves an entire mountain through sheer determinationrsquo]rdquo3 From this point forward Lijiazhai was extolled as the supreme example for agricultural and irrigation construc-tion around the country and deep plowing became an important experience for increasing agricultural yields

Around the same time in 1954 Director Ma Tongyi 马同义 of the Shengli 胜利 Number One Cooperative of Mengpai Village 孟排村 Changge County

2 Wang Ribin and Su Qinshu 王日彬孙钦书 ldquoMao Zedong san ge dianxing jingyan pishi gei women de qishi 毛泽东三个典型经验批示给我们的启示 [Inspirations that Three of Mao Zedongrsquos Classic Experiences and Memos Give to Us]rdquo Lingdao ganbu wang 领导干

部网 accessed from httpwww1dgbcomcnE_ReadNewsaspNewsID=815913 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 6 ce 《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第6 册 [Mao Zedong

Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 6] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chu-banshe 1992) 599

ZHU DING AND HU76

ltUNgt

Henan Province summarized his deep plowing methodology He first applied sixty percent of his base fertilizer to the surface of mature soil then dug up that fertilized soil into piles He then applied the remaining 40 percent of his base fertilizer to the immature soil below and mixed up that soil layer with the fertilizer Then he pushed the previously fertilized mature soil back on top of the now fertilized immature soil Once an entire field had been so fertilized he moistened it with water and plowed the soil level in preparation for plant-ing Marsquos method called for plowing approximately thirty centimeters deep His reported yield of early corn was 5365 kilograms per mu4 The government of Changge County promoted Marsquos deep plowing method across the county in the winter of 1955 and spring of 1956 with a total of 29426 mu thus treated In the winter of 1957 the county government promoted the slogan ldquoturn up thousand-year-old soil and strive for output of 1500 jin per murdquo This slogan too set off a frenzy for deep plowing5

In May 1958 the first party secretary of the Changge County Committee Luuml Bingguang 吕炳光 made a report on deep plowing at the second meeting of the Communist Party of China (ccp)rsquos Eighth National Congress Luuml claimed that there were ten great advantages to deep plowing and went on to give a de-tailed explanation of his countyrsquos deep plowing methods and changes needed in farming implements to make the methods work Luuml said that 330000 mu of land in his county had been deep plowed to a depth of about 15 chi [unit of measure equal to one third of a meter] as of the end of April 1958 He also reported that the county committee had planned to have all 112 million mu of land in the county deep plowed and hoped to yield 800 jin of grain per mu He also gave several examples to show that deep plowing was an important mea-sure in the process of increasing yields He shared the following slogans ldquoplow deeper by one cun [unit of measure equal to one third of a decimeter] and cap it with manurerdquo and ldquowater is blood manure is grain and deep plowing is constructing granariesrdquo6 Luumlrsquos speech appeared in Renmin ribao 人民日报 the Peoplersquos Daily on May 137

4 Changge xian zhi 《长葛县志》 [Records of Changge County] (Shenghuomiddotdushumiddotxinzhi sanlian shudian 1992) 648

5 cpc Changge County Committee 中共长葛县委会 ldquoNongju da gexin tudi da fanshen 农具大革新土地大翻身 [Great Revolution in Farm Implements Great Turning of the Earth]rdquo Zhongguo nongbao 《中国农报》 3 (1958)

6 Although Luumlrsquos speech was based in fact the figures he presented regarding deep plowing methods and increased yields were exaggerated

7 Luuml Bingguang 吕炳光 ldquoTudi da fanshen zhengqu muchan babai jin 土地大翻身争取

亩产八百斤 [Great Turning of the Earth Strive for 800 Jin of Production per Mu]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 May 13 1958 fourth edition


ltUNgt

In a speech to the second meeting of the Eighth ccp Congress Mao Zedong called for the entire country to promulgate Changge Countyrsquos experience He said ldquoDeep plowing of one chi and five cun is a great invention Changgersquos ex-perience poses a question to all other counties if Changge can deeply plow all of its 112 million mu can other counties not do the same If one year isnrsquot enough then take two years If two years isnrsquot enough then take three If three years isnrsquot enough then take four If four years isnrsquot enough surely five years can do the trickrdquo8 Maorsquos high appraisal of deep plowing touched off a wave of enthusiasm for the method among cadres at all levels After the meeting the entire country mobilized from the upper echelons down to the grassroots levels formally kicking off the deep plowing movement of the entire people

ii Apex of the Deep Plowing Movement

On July 11 1958 the Ministry of Agriculture convened the ldquoNationwide Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Improvementrdquo 全国深耕农具和改良土壤 on-the-spot meeting in Changge County With over 200 party leaders agriculture specialists and farm machinery technologists from around the country in at-tendance the Ministry promoted Changgersquos experiences in deep plowing and soil improvement The countyrsquos delegate to the meeting announced that the county had run a control with corn millet cotton sweet potatoes sesame and tobacco on soil that had not been deeply plowed The root systems of all crops planted in soil plowed between one and two chi deep had grown strong and ldquoyields were at least double those of fields not deeply plowed and in some cases multiple times higherrdquo At the meeting it was decided that the following principles were essential to deep plowing and soil improvement living soil on top donrsquot disrupt soil layers administer water and fertilizer together improve soil from the bottom up and strengthen the earthrsquos productivity Also impor-tant were making proper adjustments based on location and season and not blindly copying Changgersquos precedent word-by-word It was further decided that political leadership take control of the movement at all levels The entire party and entire population were mobilized under the mass debate of deep plowing and soil improvement unifying understanding and overcoming rightist con-servative thought Leadership demanded that every level of the state estab-lish plans clarify tasks involved grasp the key time period organize dedicated

8 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与事件

的回顾》下 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 2] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1997) 708

ZHU DING AND HU78

ltUNgt

teams and launch an all-out assault Leaders at the meeting demanded that the country strive to deeply plow and improve the soil of all of the over 16 bil-lion mu of arable land in the country before spring of 1959 The stated goal was to plow fields to a depth of about 15 chi two to three or more chi in particularly productive soil fertilize multiple layers of soil and convert all poor soil in the country into good soil9 This meeting abundantly confirmed the effects of deep plowing it turned out to be the pivotal moment when leading cadres from the Ministry of Agriculture mobilized the country to bring about Maorsquos vision of deep plowing

An enlarged meeting of the ccp Central Politburo was convened from August 17 to 30 1958 in Beidaihe On August 29 the meeting passed the ldquoccp Central Directives on Deep Plowing and Soil Improvementrdquo 中共中央关于

深耕和改良土壤的指示 which stressed that deep plowing was the core technical measure to be used to bring about increased agricultural yields The Directives noted that during the spring and summer plantings of 1958 only 120 million mu of landmdashless than one tenth of total arable land in the countrymdashhad been deeply plowed and that it would not be possible to deeply plow all land in the country even given ten years So the Directives demand-ed that all land which could be deeply plowed in the following two to three years be deeply plowed and that the deep plowing process be repeated on all previously deeply plowed land once every three years The standard for deep plowing established by the Directives was a depth of over one chi and over two chi in particularly productive land The Directives also made the following demands of all governments around the country ldquoguidance by political lead-ership mobilization of the entire party and action by the entire populacerdquo ldquoincite a frenzy for the deep plowing and soil improvement movementrdquo and ldquomake the high tide of output centered on deep plowing and soil improvement even higher in 1958 than in 1957 and ensure that an even greater leap is made in agricultural output in 1958 than was made in 1957rdquo10 On September 2 of that year Renmin ribao published an editorial extolling the advantages of deep plowing claiming that immature soil could be converted into mature soil and

9 Qu Mingzhen 曲明振 ldquoShengeng shenfan daliang zengchan quanguo jiang xianqi shen-fan he gailiang turang yundong 深耕深翻大量增产全国将掀起深翻和改良土壤

运动 [Deep Plowing Greatly Increases Yields The Entire Nation Will Launch a Move-ment for Deep Plowing and Soil Improvement]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 July 27 1958 fifth edition

10 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 11 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》

第 11 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 11] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1995) 459ndash462


ltUNgt

mature soil into particularly fertile soil thereby greatly increasing overall soil fertility and allowing a single mu of land to produce as much as it had taken several mu to produce in the past The article claimed that deep plowing gener-ally increased agricultural yields by between fifty and 100 percent and in some cases as much as much as 300 to 500 percent or higher The editorial includ-edcomparison of Changge Countyrsquos agricultural productivity before and after deep plowing to illustrate the effectiveness of the method The author called for leadership around the country to be sufficiently decisive and for the entire party to mobilize the masses into a grand and spectacular movement11 Agri-cultural departments increased propagation and guided work per the Direc-tives and leadership from every region in the country dispatched delegates to Changge for observations A nationwide frenzy for the deep plowing and soil improvement was then swiftly launched

iii Methods and Measures of Deep Plowing

Once the movement had been launched the Peoplersquos Daily Zhongguo nongbao 中国农报 Nongye gongzuo tongxun 农业工作通讯 and other periodicals frequently published articles discussing new deep plowing methods that had been developed around the country The two most representative cases were those of Lijiazhai Village and Changge County Lijiazhai adopted two deep plowing methods ldquosparrow somersaultrdquo and ldquotwo immature soil layers around one mature soil layerrdquo Changge adopted over ten methods including ldquotwo-layer deep plowing and widespread turning of earthrdquo ldquoman-power widespread deep turningrdquo ldquoman-power ditch turningrdquo ldquocombined man-and-beast plowingrdquo ldquofirst shallow single plowing then double deep plowingrdquo ldquoplowingfollowed by pick-ingrdquo ldquotriple plowings to build a ridgerdquo ldquoplowing high and planting low methodrdquo ldquosingle-layer deep plowing and turningrdquo ldquosparrow big somersaultrdquo ldquodeep plow-ing in the middle shallow plowing on both sidesrdquo ldquoleaving immature soil intact while moving mature soilrdquo and others The ldquotwo-layer deep plowing and wide-spread turning of earthrdquo method consisted of one person driving two draft ani-mals to plow andturn the earth to a net depth of 12 chi driving the plowhead to a depth of 15 chi and turning three mu of earth per day The ldquoman-power widespread deep turningrdquo and ldquoman-power ditch turningrdquo methods were both man-powered the former used progressive deep soil turning and the latter used interlaced deep soil turning In the ldquocombined man-and-beast plowing

11 ldquoRang tudi lai ge da fanshen 让土地来个大翻身 [Let there Be a Great Turning of the Earth]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 2 1958 fourth edition

ZHU DING AND HU80

ltUNgt

methodrdquo a team of people drove draft animals to pull a seven cun walking plow to turn the surface soil followed by a team of people using hand-held plows to dig up the earth while applying fertilizer at the same time In the ldquofirst shal-low single plowing then double deep plowingrdquo method first a shallow walking plow is used followed by a deep double plow to dig up lower soil layers In the ldquodeep plowing in the middle shallow plowing on both sidesrdquo method first a double-layer double-furrow plow is used to turn the earth after which the soil is fertilized and then a seven cun shallow walking plow is used to plow shal-lowly piling the mature soil from either side into the middle to form ridges This last method calls for four people and four draft animals and can be used to plow five to six mu per day The depth in the middle is 12 chi and seven cun on either side This method is suitable for planting corn tobacco sweet potatoes and other wide-ridged crops12 Table 31 lists the depths and work efficiencies of the primary deep plowing methods used in Changge County

Table 31 shows that ldquoman-power widespread deeprdquo turning was the deepest of all the primary methods in Changgersquos deep plowing arsenal hitting depths of between two and three chi as compared to the other methods which came in at just over one chi in plowing depth Nevertheless the work efficiency of most deep plowing methods was low The ldquoman-power widespread deep turningrdquo method required twelve workers to turn a single mu of land The ldquoman-power ditch turningrdquo method required seven workers and the ldquocombined man-and-beast plowingrdquo method required three The above indicate that deeper plowing required more workers The use of improved deep-plowing implements (ie plows) markedly increased work efficiency but they reached no deeper than 15 chi In order to reach plowing depth of 15 chimdashand in some cases over a metermdashgovernments around the country drastically increased the number of workers deployed to perform this work

The Henan provincial government mobilized an army of millions of laborers organized into several specialized brigades They lived and ate in the fields where they worked spending day and night deep plowing the earth The government of Xiayi County 夏邑县 placed a high premium on deep plowing Officials there organized a troupe of laborers 200000 strong com-manded in military style organized into regiments battalions and companies This force was divided across over sixty ldquobattlefieldsrdquo where they launched an all-out assault on the land night and day The different tiers of government in Hebei Province also generally took deep plowing very seriously There party

12 Zhang Junchang and Niu Pu 张君常钮溥 ldquoChangge xian shenfandi de fangfa he kexue genju 长葛县深翻地的方法和科学根据 [The Methods and Scientific Basis of Changge Countyrsquos Deep Plowing]rdquo Nongye kexue tongxun 《农业科学通讯》 9 (1958)


ltUNgt

Tabl

e 3

1 M

etho

ds d

epth

s an

d wo

rk ef

ficie

ncy o

f dee

p pl

owin

g co

nduc

ted

in C

hang

ge C

ount

y H

enan

Pro

vinc

e

Met

hod

Two-

laye

r dee

p pl

owin

g an

d w

ides

prea

d tu

rnin

g of

ear

th

Man

-pow

er

wid

espr

ead

deep

turn

ing

Man

-pow

er

ditc

h tu

rnin

gCo

mbi

ned

man

-and

-be

ast

plow

ing

Plow

ing

follo

wed

by

pick

ing

Trip

le p

low

ings

to

bui

ld a

ridg

ePl

ow h

igh

and

plan

t low

Sing

le-la

yer

deep

plo

win

g an

d tu

rnin

g m

etho

d

Plow

ing

dept

h (c

hi)

15

2ndash3

15

15

12

12

Dra

ft an

imal

s re

quire

d

23

32

Labo

r (p

eopl

e x

days

mu)

029

127

03

02

00

331

00

30

Data

sour

ce c

cp C

hang

ge C

ount

y Co

mm

itte

e ldquoN

ongj

u da

gex

in t

udi d

a fa

nshe

n《农

具大

革新

土地

大翻

身》

[Gre

at R

evol

utio

n in

Farm

ing

Impl

emen

ts G

reat

Tur

ning

of

the

Eart

h]rdquo

Zhon

gguo

non

gbao

中国

农报

3 (19

58)

ZHU DING AND HU82

ltUNgt

secretaries were put in charge of the program and the entire party and entire populace were mobilized deep plowing command headquarters were estab-lished at every level of government from the county down to the commune The majority of agricultural cooperatives and peoplersquos communes organized deep plowing brigades and groups Those peoplersquos communes and peoplersquos mi-litia production and fighting brigades which had already completed labor-mil-itary integration comprised the bulk of the ldquofighting forcerdquo13 Statistics indicate that at this time Henan Hebei Shandong Shanxi Beijing Shaanxi Gansu Anhui Jiangsu and Hubei had already collectively deeply plowed a total of over 129 million mu Of those 10 provinces and cities the movement was par-ticularly vast in Henan Shandong Hebei and Beijing where a force over 32 million strong was waged war on the land night and day14

In early October 1958 the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee convened telephone conferences on deep plowing for party secretaries at the provincial city and county levels successively followed by a conference broadcast on mass media regarding a mass pledge to go all out in deeply plowing thereby completing concrete deployments and deep mobilization Provincial leaders called for party committees at every level to arouse the masses to take action of their own accord in the deep plowing movement In early October over 42 million people around the province participated in the war of deep plowing Over 877 million mu of land was deeply plowed five times the area that the mass pledge conference had called for15 The movement was taken seriously in

13 ldquoShenfan yi chi tu duo chan wan jin liang Henan Hebei qianbaiwan laodong dajun riye tuji fandi 深翻一尺土多产万斤粮河南河北千百万劳动大军日夜突击翻

地 [Deeply Plow and Increase Grain Yields by 10000 Jin Armies Millions Strong Staging an Earth-Turning Assault Day and Night in Hebei and Henan]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日

报》 September 12 1958 sixth edition14 ldquoXunsu tuiguang xianjin jingyan he shengsuo qianyin li ba shenfan tudi yundong

tuixiang gaochao 迅速推广先进经验和绳索牵引犁把深翻土地运动推向高潮 [Swiftly Promulgate Advanced Experience and Rope-Pulled Plows Push the Deep Plow-ing Movement to Crescendo]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 29 1958 third edition

15 ldquoMingnian nongye dafanshen xian yao jinnian tudi dafanshen Liaoning xingqi ri fan bai-wan mu yundong sibaiwan dajun jizhan yi zhou shenfandi babaiqishi duo wan mu 明年农业大翻身先要今年土地大翻身辽宁兴起日翻百万亩运动四百万大军激

战一周深翻地八百七十多万亩 [We Must Bring About a Soil Revolution This Year in Order to Realize an Agricultural Revolution Next Year a Movement to Plow a Million Mu per Day Rising in Liaoning an Army Four Million Strong can Deeply Plow Over 8700000 Mu in a Week of Fierce Fighting]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 19 1958 first edition


ltUNgt

both the agricultural and semi-agriculturalsemi-husbandry regions of Inner Mongolia There many peoplersquos communes promoted the ldquosix in-the-fieldsrdquo (ie command in the fields eating in the fields living in the fields holding meetings and debates in the fields learning in the fields and entertainment in the fields) and the method of rotating people and oxen but never stopping the plowing process deep plowing proceeded night and day in this province as well16 In the ldquosatelliterdquo fields of Shouzhang County Shandong Province lead-ership demanded that deep plowing go 12 zhang [a unit of measure equal to three and one third meters] deep In this county youth platoons waged the ldquonight battlerdquo Teams were frequently composed of three people top middle and bottom The soil dug up by the bottom person was lifted to the middle per-son who then hauled it to the top person who then hauled it to fill a ditch17

iv Development of Implements for Deep Plowing

Human-powered deep plowing not only called for an immense amount of labor but it also consumed great amounts of time It became imperative to develop new implements specialized in deep plowing to complete the task Officials from Changge County unveiled the plowing implements they had developed for deep plowing at the same time they shared their experience with the country The most famous of said implements was the double-layer double-furrow plow invented by farmer Wang Yushun 王玉顺 This plow is fitted with a guiding wheel on the front and regulators for both depth and width of plowing It is fitted in the middle with two plow columns The front plowshare was an eight cun walking plow and the back was composed of a plow furrow and a plow frog The plowshare was an eight cun walking plow and plow frogs were also installed on the plow columns There were four holes on the top to adjust the plow headrsquos depth of entry into the soil The plow was 220 centimeters long twenty-five centimeters wide and 118 centimeters tall When in use this implement could plow a width of twenty centimeters

16 ldquoZhuajin nongshi jiasu qiugeng Neimenggu Jilin fandi yundong jinru gaochao 抓紧农

时加速秋耕内蒙古吉林翻地运动进入高潮 [Firmly Grasp the Farming Season and Accelerate Autumn Plowing The Plowing Movement Hitting Crescendo in Inner Mongolia and Jilin]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 24 1958 fourth edition

17 Tong Pingya 佟屏亚 ldquoNongye lsquoda yuejinrsquo kaoliang nongye kexuejiamdashxie zai 1958 nian nongye lsquoda yuejinrsquo 50 zhou nian 农业ldquo大跃进rdquo考量农业科学家mdash mdash 写在 1958 年农业ldquo大跃进rdquo50 周年 [Agricultural Scientists Consider the Agricultural lsquoGreat Leap Forwardrsquo ndash Written on the 50th Anniversary of the Agricultural lsquoGreat Leap Forwardrsquo]rdquo Nongye kaogu 《农业考古》 4 (2008)

ZHU DING AND HU84

ltUNgt

turning all soil to the right side The back plow didnrsquot turn the earth but loos-ened it in a swath twenty centimeters wide It required one person and three draft animals and could plow 35 mu of earth per day to a depth of forty centi-meters deeper than the average walking plow by twenty centimeters18 Wangrsquos plow was held up as a great invention The plow itself became the prototype of the farm implement revolution and Wang himself was hired as a special research fellow in the China Academy of Agricultural Sciences Mechanization Institute

On July 11 1958 the Ministry of Agriculture convened the National Confer-ence on Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Improvement 全国深耕农具和

改良土壤会议 in Changge County The primary goals of the conference were to promulgate Changge Countyrsquos experience with deep plowing and appraise various experiments which had been conducted in deep plowing implements A total of fifty-seven newly invented implements were displayed at the confer-ence (of which twenty-onemdash368 percent of the totalmdashcame from Changge itself) Of those thirty-six were chosen for field testing They were appraised based on their plowing depth pulling capacity and efficiency as well as on their ability to turn earth loosen earth and flatten ditch bottoms During the testing some plows were unable to function properly due to poor design Some were equipped with weak parts which warped during testing render-ing them likewise unable to function properly The malfunctioning models excluded only twenty-six plows ended up being appraised (see Table 32) These twenty-six could be divided into three groups based on their working conditions and basic design dry farming deep plows paddy field deep plows and double-wheel double-furrow deep plows They were basically all com-plex plows meaning that their tops turned the topsoil while their rear ends loosened the earth below the plow

On-the-spot testing showed that all the double-wheel double-furrow com-plex deep plows met the demands of deep plowing but they required a great deal of pulling capacity Some even required the capacity needed to pull over 700 kilograms of weight which even three draft animals working in concert would be hard pressed to provide rendering them impractical The paddy field plows were tested in dry sandy soil and so testing results were less than ideal The fore-plows and subsoil shovels among the dry farming deep plows reached a depth of 33 centimeters with a minimum capactiyto pulla weight of 250 kilograms which made them practical for teams of three draft ani-mals working in light soil however the subsoil shovel was often incapable of

18 Nongju tupu di yi juan 《农具图谱》第 1 卷 [Illustrated Farm Implements Vol 1] ed Peoplersquos Republic of China Ministry of Agriculture (Tongsu duwu chubanshe 1958) 34


ltUNgt

Tabl

e 3

2 Te

chni

cal a

ppra

isals

for n

ewly

inve

nted

dee

p pl

owin

g im

plem

ents

Nam

eSp

onso

rD

esig

nPl

owin

g de

pth

(cm

)Pu

lling

cap

acity

Mai

n pl

owSu

bsoi

l sho

vel

Tota

l dep

thK

g

8 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le c

urve

d rid

ge d

oubl

e-la

yer p

low

Wan

g Yu

shun

of

Chan

gge

Coun

tyM

ain

plow

8 cu

n

furr

ow-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

2210

532

525

97

Dee

ply

curv

ed h

oe-s

tyle

do

uble

-laye

r plo

wW

ang

Yush

unM

ain

plow

8 cu

n h

oe-

styl

e su

bsoi

l sho

vel

216

1738

546

7

7 cu

n fu

rrow

-col

umn-

styl

e do

uble

-laye

r plo

wW

ang

Yush

unM

ain

plow

8 cu

n

furr

ow-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

99

1827

926

37

7 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le d

oubl

e-la

yer p

low

Wan

g Yu

shun

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

fu

rrow

-sty

le su

bsoi

l sh

ovel

2312

135

127

66

Dou

ble-

furr

ow d

oubl

e-la

yer

plow

Wan

g Yu

shun

Mai

n pl

ow se

lf-m

ade

fu

rrow

-sty

le su

bsoi

l sh

ovel

1418

3227

4

7 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le fo

ur-la

yer

plow

Wan

g Yu

shun

Mai

n pl

ow 7

cun

fu

rrow

-sty

le su

bsoi

l sh

ovel

735

2532

449

5

ZHU DING AND HU86

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 3

2 M

etho

ds d

epth

s an

d wo

rk ef

ficie

ncy o

f dee

p pl

owin

g co

nduc

ted

in C

hang

ge C

ount

y H

enan

Pro

vinc

e (co

nt)

Nam

eSp

onso

rD

esig

nPl

owin

g de

pth

(cm

)Pu

lling

cap

acity

Mai

n pl

owSu

bsoi

l sho

vel

Tota

l dep

thK

g

8 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le d

eepl

y cu

rved

dou

ble-

laye

r plo

wCh

angg

e Co

unty

Fa

rmM

ain

plow

8 cu

n

furr

ow-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

222

64

286

272

5

8 cu

n fu

rrow

-sty

le d

eepl

y cu

rved

dou

ble-

laye

r plo

wSo

ngzh

ai V

illag

e 宋

砦村

Cha

ngge

Co

unty

Hen

an

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

fu

rrow

-sty

le su

bsoi

l sh

ovel

209

1232

927

1

Dee

ply

curv

ed h

oe-s

tyle

do

uble

-laye

r plo

wH

enan

Pro

vin-

cial

Agr

icul

tura

l Bu

reau

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

hoe

-st

yle

subs

oil s

hove

l21

49

430

825

63

8 cu

n ho

e-st

yle

extr

a de

ep

plow

Shua

ngm

iao

Tow

nshi

p 双

庙乡

Cha

ngge

Co

unty

Hen

an

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

hoe

-st

yle

subs

oil s

hove

l20

23

723

919

44

8 cu

n do

uble

-laye

r col

umn-

styl

e pl

owLi

anfe

ng 连

丰

Coop

erat

ive

Ch

angg

e Co

unty

H

enan

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

old

fu

rrow

subs

oil s

hove

l18

88

727

529

51


ltUNgt

8 cu

n do

uble

-hoo

k-st

yle

extr

a de

ep p

low

Zhen

ping

Cou

nty

镇平

县 H

enan

Mai

n pl

ow 8

cun

ho

ok-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

204

34

238

186

5

7 cu

n ho

e-st

yle

extr

a de

ep

plow

Tong

xu C

ount

y 通

许县

Hen

anM

ain

plow

7 cu

n h

oe-

styl

e su

bsoi

l sho

vel

2514

3940

0

7 cu

n do

uble

-laye

r hoe

-sty

le

deep

plo

wH

ejia

n Co

unty

河间

县 H

enan

Mai

n pl

ow 7

cun

hoe

-st

yle

subs

oil s

hove

l20

1636

516

Old

plo

w p

lus s

ubso

il sh

ovel

Chan

gge

Coun

ty

Hen

an6

0815

211

188

7 cu

n th

ree-

laye

r dee

p pl

owSo

ngzh

uang

To

wns

hip

宋

庄乡

Lus

han

Coun

ty 鲁

山县

H

enan

Old

7 cu

n m

ain

plow

ho

ok-s

tyle

subs

oil

shov

el

201

67

268

257

5

Old

styl

e do

uble

-laye

r plo

wN

anya

ng S

teel

-w

orks

Hen

anIm

prov

ed m

ain

plow

ho

e-st

yle

subs

oil

shov

el

235

65

3031

25

7 cu

n ho

e-st

yle

3-la

yer p

low

Chin

a Ac

adem

y of

Ag

ricul

tura

l Sci

-en

ces A

gric

ultu

ral

Mec

hani

zatio

n In

stitu

te

One

shov

el h

ole

in

mid

dle

254

1439

444

8

Two

shov

els

hole

in

mid

dle

174

1431

629

5

One

shov

el h

ole

on

top

2516

441

451

0

Two

shov

els

hole

on

top

185

1836

533

2

ZHU DING AND HU88

ltUNgt

Com

poun

d de

ep p

low

Fujia

n Fa

rm

Impl

emen

t Tes

t-in

g Ce

nter

Mai

n pl

ow a

pad

dy

plow

hoe

-sty

le su

b-so

il sh

ovel

213

37

2526

35

7 cu

n sh

ould

er-c

arrie

d ho

e-st

yle

deep

plo

wG

uang

xi Z

huan

g M

inor

ity A

ut-

nom

ous R

egio

n Ba

ise

Farm

Ma-

chin

ery

Fact

ory

Mai

n pl

ow a

pad

dy

plow

hoe

-sty

le su

b-so

il sh

ovel

196

41

237

201

7 cu

n do

uble

-toot

h-st

yle

deep

pl

owG

uang

xi A

uton

o-m

ous R

egio

nM

ain

plow

a li

ght

wal

king

plo

w h

ook-

styl

e su

bsoi

l sho

vel

217

21

238

192

5

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

plu

s su

bsoi

l sho

vel

East

Chi

na A

gri-

cultu

ral S

cien

ces

Inst

itute

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

fro

nt p

low

repl

aced

w

ith su

bsoi

l sho

vel

204

88

292

323

Nam

eSp

onso

rD

esig

nPl

owin

g de

pth

(cm

)Pu

lling

cap

acity

Mai

n pl

owSu

bsoi

l sho

vel

Tota

l dep

thK

g

Tabl

e 3

2 M

etho

ds d

epth

s an

d wo

rk ef

ficie

ncy o

f dee

p pl

owin

g co

nduc

ted

in C

hang

ge C

ount

y H

enan

Pro

vinc

e (co

nt)


ltUNgt

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

plu

s su

bsoi

l sho

vel

Shan

dong

Pro

vin-

cial

Far

m Im

ple-

men

t Ref

orm

O

ffice

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

fro

nt p

low

repl

aced

w

ith su

bsoi

l sho

vel

186

89

275

236

Dou

ble-

whe

el p

low

plu

s su

bsoi

l sho

vel

Shan

dong

Pr

ovin

ceD

oubl

e-fu

rrow

plo

w

on a

turn

ing

rack

for

plow

ing

in fr

ont a

nd

loos

enin

g in

bac

k

284

1038

468

6

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

plu

s su

bsoi

l sho

vel

Anhu

i Pro

vinc

ial

Farm

Impl

emen

t Re

sear

ch In

stitu

te

Dou

ble-

furr

ow p

low

fro

nt p

low

repl

aced

w

ith su

bsoi

l sho

vel

185

127

312

365

Dou

ble-

furr

ow d

oubl

e-la

yer

deep

plo

wD

ahui

大会

Tech

ni-

cal G

roup

Dou

ble-

furr

ow a

nd

doub

le-s

hove

l22

610

326

740

Data

sour

ce T

echn

ical

Gro

up o

f th

e Na

tion

al C

onfe

renc

e fo

r De

ep P

low

ing

Impl

emen

ts a

nd So

il Im

prov

emen

t ldquoS

heng

eng

nong

ju sh

iyan

jia

ndin

g zo

ngjie

深耕

农具

试验

鉴定

总结

[Sum

mar

y of

Tes

ts a

nd A

ppra

isal

s on

Deep

Plo

win

g Im

plem

ents

]rdquo N

ongy

e jix

ie 《

农业

机械

》3

(195

8)

ZHU DING AND HU90

ltUNgt

effectively loosening soil This problem indicates that some of the deep plow-ing implements of the time required such great pulling capacity as to be im-practical while others were practical only in a minority of soil conditions Oth-erwise they were limited in depth and efficiency The conference demanded that further research and development be performed with the focus of future efforts on improving the design and manufacture of subsoil shovels so as to reduce required pulling capacity and increase efficiency19

The deep plowing implement revolution hit its apex after this conference with all manner of vibrating rotating single-layer double-layer combined-man-and-beast-powered and machine-powered deep plowing implements emerging from every corner of the country For example the China Academy of Sciences (cas) Mechanical Institute conducted tests on a vibrating deep plow (referred to as Machine Development No 1) in September 1958 The device was intended for dry farming designed to plow to a depth of fifty-three centime-ters turn a swath of earth fifteen centimeters wide and loosen another thirty-eight centimeters of soil with a vibrating shovel It required very little pulling capacity it could be pulled by a thirty-five-horsepower tractor burning little gas half of what machine-pulled plows at the time required Another bene-fit of the machine was that its high-frequency vibrations killed pest insects collapsed soil capillaries and reduced losses of water through evaporation20 Although it did not perform well in field tests its innovative design was met with approbation After this a number of work units around the country began designing their own innovative deep plowing implements In late September the Tianjin Tractor Factory collaborated with the Institute to convert a four-furrow plow into a three-furrow vibrating plow The Sixth Division of the First Ministry of Machine-Building 一机部六局农机所 borrowed that idea and converted a three-furrow plow into a two-furrow vibrating plow In December the cas Mechanical Institute collaborated with the Farm Machine Institute of the First Ministry of Machine-Building to test a four-furrow vibrating plow Nevertheless all these vibrating plows indicated a number of problems in field testing The vibrating engines of some were improperly sized while others had problems in vibration frequency or amplitude Some were improperly

19 Technical Group of the National Conference for Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Im-provement ldquoShengeng nongju shiyan jianding zongjie 深耕农具试验鉴定总结 [Sum-mary of Tests and Appraisals on Deep Plowing Implements]rdquo Nongye jixie 《农业机

械》3 (1958)20 Nongye jixiehua dianqihua de jiejing 《农业机械化电气化的捷径》 [Shortcuts to Ag-

ricultural Mechanization and Electrification] ed Ministry of Agriculture Office of Farm Implement Reform 农业部农具改革办公室 (Nongye chubanshe 1958) 189


ltUNgt

curved or had subsoil shovels of inappropriate size The transmission belts of some fell off easily The list went on and on21

In March 1959 the Ministry of Agriculture and the First Ministry of Machine-Building together convened the National Conference for Selection through Ap-praisal and Lectures Regarding Deep Plowing Implements A total of 144 deep plowing implements were submitted from around the country Experts chose twenty-four out of these for assessment eleven animal-powered plows eight plow slings three rope-pulled plows and two machine-driven plows However the fields used for testing were small and the time allotted tight On top of that nonstop rain made tests difficult to manage and testing results far from ideal The implements failed to meet requirements for depth (one chi in paddy fields and 15 to two chi in dry fields) quality (at turning soil and not disturbing soil layers) speed (low required pulling capacity and high efficiency) stability (solid stable reliable and long-lasting) economy (simple manufacture low costs) convenience (ease of use and simple technology) and so on22 In sum-mary although the objectives of the deep plowing implement were straightfor-ward and requirements clear no great achievements were made This lack of achievements was attributable not only to technological handicaps but also to misguided thinking on behalf of leadership

There was a positive correlation between plowing depth and required pull-ing capacity ie the deeper a plow was to go the more pulling capacity it re-quired At the time there were no high-powered tractors in China and draft animals were generally able to plow no deeper than one chi The central prob-lem in the design of new deep plowing implements was to achieve plowing depths of between one and 15 chi while at the same time reducing pulling capacity required of draft animals and small to mid-sized tractors Inventors working on this problem took one of two paths The first was to design a dou-ble-level plow that turned topsoil with a furrow and loosened subsoil with a shovel The second was to design a rotating deep plow that cut horizontally while lifting soil vertically thus achieving the objective of loosening the soil

21 Da yuejin zhong nongjiju de chuangzao faming 《大跃进中农机具的创造发明》 [Creation and Invention of Farm Machines and Implements during the Great Leap For-ward] ed First Ministry of Machine Building Sixth Administrative Bureau of Machinery Industry 第一机械工业部第六机器工业管理局 (Jixie gongye chubanshe 1959) 40ndash47

22 ldquoQuanguo shengeng nongju pingxuan jiangxihui zongjie (zhaiyao) 全国深耕农具评

选讲习会总结 (摘要 ) [Summary of the National Conference for Selection through Appraisal and Lectures Regarding Deep Plowing Implements (Abstract)]rdquo Nongye jixie 《农业机械》 6 (1959)

ZHU DING AND HU92

ltUNgt

Most double-layer deep plows were redesigned based on existing walking plows although there were differences between old and new in design of plow furrows and subsoil shovels shape size and working efficiency Some double-layer plows required a relatively small pulling capacity and in light soil could achieve a plowing depth of over one chi pulled by a draft animal These plows were not however able to meet the demands for deep plowing of the time First they could not achieve a plowing depth of 15 chi or more Second they frequently ended up mixing immature soil with subsoil which is bad for farm-ing Third it was not possible to achieve fertilization of different layers with these plows Fourth the pulling capacity required to operate these plows in heavy clay soil made them unusable

Although the theory behind rotating deep plows was scientific and their design reasonable they encountered many problems in field testing Not only were they difficult to manufacture but they required many diverse parts and their structures were complex They were designed to rotate move forward and elevate soil all at the same time It was difficult to coordinate the various necessary movements and their parts wore out quickly The reason for this is that soil environments are highly complex Different areas vary in soil quality and structure and vary widely in soil composition and hardness Even in a sin-gle patch of land a rotating deep plow could encounter rapidly changing levels of obstacles which could overload the engine and break the machine down

There were too many demands on deep plowing implements as well as too many different categories So despite the greatest efforts on the part of techni-cians limitations on engine power for farm machines at the time made it pos-sible for only a very small number of new deep plowing implements to meet demands

v Evidentiary Support for Deep Plowing and Experimentation in High Yields

Once the nationwide deep plowing movement had been launched a number of agricultural education and scientific research organs actively began research-ing the issue They wrote reports and articles expounded on the theoretical basis of deep plowing and proved the effectiveness of deep plowing In July 1958 the cas Soil Institute 中国科学院土壤研究所 dispatched a team to Changge County to make observations Team leader Xiong Yi 熊毅 read a report titled ldquoUsing Soil Science to Study the Question of Deep Plowingrdquo 从土壤科学

来研究深翻问题 at the National Conference on Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Improvement In his report he claimed that deep plowing was a great


ltUNgt

revolution of the soil and that we would no longer be able to make judgements of soil distribution and changes from solely the perspective of the natural en-vironment It was more important Xiong said to study soil changes caused by the power of the great laboring masses Therefore he said we must use not only natural dialectics but also historical materialist dialectics to study the soilHis conclusion based in argumentation was this ldquoDeep plowing is a method that can be employed in all ordinary soil Except in a very few extreme cases it generally is only beneficial and not harmfulrdquo Deep plowing could cause ldquotheo-retical changes to the soilrdquo said Xiong who continued ldquoWe must scientifically summarize the experience of the agricultural masses seek patterns and cause the soil to develop in the direction of our demandsrdquo23 A researcher from the Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University wrote an essay titled ldquoThe Sci-entific Basis behind Changge Countyrsquos Deep Plowing Methodsrdquo 长葛县深翻

地的方法和科学根据 after having concluded investigations in Changge In the essay he divides the countyrsquos deep plowing practices into ten methods and explains the effectiveness of deep plowing on increasing yields He discusses the scientific basis behind the deep plowing methods and points out the five great advantages of deep plowing He notes that in Changge it was absolutely possible to produce 200000 jin of sweet potatoes per mu after plowing to a depth of one to 15 chi24

On September 11 1958 Renmin ribao convened a symposium of agricultural scientists and workers to discuss the meaning of the deep plowing movement Deputy Secretary of the China Institute of Agricultural Sciences 中国农业

科学院 Liu Chunrsquoan 刘春安 addressed the assembly saying that fertiliza-tion as performed in deep plowing had destroyed the ldquolawsrdquo of soil and fer-tilizer science and that this experience had been created by farmers during the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo25 In an article that appeared in the Peoplersquos Daily

23 Xiong Yi 熊毅 ldquoCong turang kexue lai yanjiu shenfan wenti 从土壤科学来研究深翻

问题 [Using Soil Science to Study the Question of Deep Plowing]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民

日报》 September 12 1958 sixth edition24 Zhang Junchang and Niu Pu 张君常钮溥 ldquoChangge xian shenfandi de fangfa

he kexue genju 长葛县深翻地的方法和科学根据 [The Methods and Scientific Basis of Changge Countyrsquos Deep Plowing]rdquo Nongye kexue tongxun 《农业科学通讯》 9 (1958)

25 Liu Chunrsquoan 刘春安 ldquoXuexi nongmin weida de chuangzao jingshen tamen de shijian dapo le nongye kexue shang hen duo chenfu de guiluuml 学习农民伟大的创造精神他们

的实践打破了农业科学上很多陈腐的规律 [Learning from the Great Innovative Spirit of Farmers Their Experience Has Broken Many Old Decayed Laws of Science]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 8 1958 seventh edition

ZHU DING AND HU94

ltUNgt

in October that same year Gao Shiqi 高士其 wrote that this had proven that deep plowing could transform dead soil into living soil and that multi-level fertilization could effectively turn living soil into particularly fertile soil Deep plowing wrote Gao could change the appearance and characteristics of soil and made crops grow better in the soil26 Clearly scientists and researchers at the time had been affected by the prevailing political and social atmosphere of the time Their arguments were not based on strict experimentation and this led them to slant their views Their writings attached the word ldquosciencerdquo to the deep plowing movement thus giving the foolhardy behaviors of the movement a ldquoscientificrdquo basis

In addition to making theoretical arguments for the scientific nature and necessity of deep plowing many scientific institutes dispatched researchers to the countryside to participate in deep plowing labor and run experiments to prove that yields were indeed higher The China Institute of Water Resourc-es and Hydropower Research 中国水利科学院 conducted experiments on three mu of land within the Institutersquos grounds plowing the earth to a depth of six chi (a feat performed by Institute employees using spades and shovels) In the experiment one chi of soil was considered a layer and every layer was dug up and moved to a pre-selected location Once the lowest layer of soil had been dug up every layer was replaced in its original order The experiment was con-ducted on the basis of ldquobeing in accordance with the precise demands of and rigorously masteringrdquo the ldquoEight Character Constitutionrdquo 八字宪法 One thou-sand jin of wheat was planted on each mu with dedicated personnel in charge of fertilizing irrigating and weeding Fans were used at regular intervals to promote air circulation and music was played to facilitate the happy growth of wheat seedlings Electric lights were used to increase photosynthesis and trestles were erected to support the wheat stalksThe wheat yield per mu ended up at over 1500 jin as a result of great efforts on the part of the Insti-tutersquos entire staff27 This was an extremely high yield for the time but it still fell far short of the target yield of 300000 jin The China Academy of Sciences Biology Division likewise established a deep plowing high-yield field testing

26 Gao Shiqi 高士其 ldquoBa situ biancheng huotu ndash cong shenfandi tan dao turang de gaizao 把死土变成活土mdashmdash 从深翻地谈到土壤的改造 [Transform Dead Soil into Living Soil ndash a Discussion of Deep Plowing to Soil Reformation]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日

报》 October 17 1958 eighth edition27 Zhou Sun 周孙 ldquoShuikeyuan yijiuwuba nian gaochan shiyan tian jishi 水科院一九五



ltUNgt

committee The committee planted wheat on six mu which staff plowed to a depth of 10 chi Committee employees planted between 260 to 400 jin of seeds and used between 400000 to 600000 jin of manure fertilizer per mu During the day the team used fans to increase carbon dioxide and at night used electric lights to increase photosynthesis In the end the most produc-tive mu of their experiment yielded only 900 jin of wheat28 Their experiments proved that deep plowing combined with other technical measures did indeed increase yields but within certain limitations and that it would certainly be impossible to bring about yields of over 10000 jin per mu In fact in many places deep plowing was taken too far ldquodead soilrdquo from deep in the earth got mixed with fertile topsoil which not only didnrsquot increase yields but in some cases reduced them29

The Peoplersquos Daily published an article written by the Meng County 孟县 Committee of Henan Province on July 7 1959 The committee wrote ldquoOur experience from the first year of deep plowing indicates that there is no clear difference in results between plowing to a depth of over two chi and plowing to a depth of only one chihellip Three to five times the amount of labor required to plow to a depth of one chi are required to plow to a depth of two chi Thus as both human labor and draft animals are in short supply we have found it appropriate to plow to a depth of one chirdquo30 On September 5 1959 the Peoplersquos Daily published an article by a researcher at the China Academy of Agricul-tural Sciences which read ldquoOwing to limited supply of human labor draft animals and machine power a plowing depth of between six to eight cun is appropriate for most dry land both in the South and the North a depth of approximately six cun is appropriate for paddy fieldsrdquo31 This logic indicates

28 Luo Pinghan 罗平汉 1958ndash1962 nian zhongguo de zhishijie 《 1958 ~1962 年中国的知识

界》 [Chinarsquos Intelligentsia from 1958 to 1962] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 2008) 115

29 Qi Zhengxin 戚正欣 ldquoJiaoguan yu shenfan 绞关与深翻 [The Plow Sling and Deep Plowing]rdquo Qinzhou xinwen wang 秦州新闻网 accessed from httpwwwtznewscnArticlelvyouducj20081130921html

30 ldquoYunyong lsquoba zi xianfarsquo yingde xiaomai gaochan Henan Meng xian xiaomai da mianji fengchan fang jishu jingyan zongjie 运用ldquo八字宪法rdquo赢得小麦高产河南孟县

小麦大面积丰产方技术经验总结 [Use of the lsquoEight Character Constitutionrsquo Brings about Big Wheat Yields Summary of the Technological Experience of Meng County Henan Province in Big Wheat Yields over a Large Area]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 July 7 1959 third edition

31 China Academy of Agricultural Sciences Institute of Crop Breeding and Cultivation 中国农业科学院作物育种栽培研究所 ldquoGuanyu jinnian qiubo xiaomai jishu cuoshi de ji dian yijian 关于今年秋播小麦技术措施的几点意见 [Some Opinions

ZHU DING AND HU96

ltUNgt

that those people who held to practical experience and sober thought arrived at a logical understanding of the effects of deep plowing and made more reasonable demands

vi Commentary on the Deep Plowing Movement

Experience shows that reasonable deep plowing is useful for increasing agri-cultural yields First deep plowing improves the physical and chemical proper-ties of the soil A plow layer 10 centimeters deep may form in fields in which farm machines have long exerted pressure An over-shallow plow layer can se-verely affect the growth of crop root systems Deep plowing breaks up the plow layer thickens the living soil layer increases soil porosity reduces soil density increases soil breathability and water retention and increases soil capacity for holding water and fertilizer If one combines deep plowing with multi-layer fertilizing especially with organic fertilizers such as farmyard manure or green manure one may accelerate the maturation of lower layers of soil and improve the soilrsquos aggregate structure Second deep plowing promotes the growth of crop root systems down into deep soil layers allowing them to absorb more nutrition from the soil Third deep plowing enables one to turn insect eggs and larva and pathogenic bacteria to the surface which helps reduce the effects of pests on crops32 The experiences of Lijiazhai Village and Changge County in increasing yields through deep plowing and intensive agriculture constitute effective evidence in support of the positive effects of deep plowing

That said one must use reasonable plowing depths and appropriate plow-ing methods in order to increase yields deeper is not always better Excessive deep plowing can ruin the structure of good topsoil making said soil extreme-ly vulnerable to erosion which not only does not lead to increased yields but may also incite other side effects During the deep plowing movement some locations dug to a depth of three chimdashand in some cases three metersmdash turning ldquodead soilrdquo and sand up into the topsoil layer Such methods not only destroyed the topsoil structure but also sapped away the soilrsquos existing fertility rendering it incapable of fostering crop growth Such ldquodeep plowingrdquo was never going to bring about increased yields

Regarding Technical Measures Used in This Yearrsquos Autumn Wheat Planting]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 5 1959 seventh edition

32 Liu Jiansheng et al 刘健生等 Woguo nongju de chuangzao gailiang ji qi zonghe liyong 《我国农具的创造改良及其综合利用》 [The Creation Improvement and Comprehensive Use of Chinarsquos Farm Implements] (Nongye chubanshe 1959) 7


ltUNgt

This means of increasing crop yields invented by farmers working on their own was first promoted into a nationwide movement and then completely petered out The reasons are that the methods employed in Changge County were never seriously studied or converted into effective science for the rest of the country Changge County arrived at its deep plowing methods only after years of experimentation People there employed different implements and methodologies in different soil and for different crops along the way improv-ing a few basic plows to increase the effectiveness of their deep plowing They never plowed deeper than one chi and they never deeply plowed more than 30000 mu even over the course of several years Their increased yields were experienced over a small area and the increases were confined to hard limita-tions Changge Countyrsquos party secretary clearly overstated the results of the countyrsquos experiments in deep plowing when delivering his report to the Cen-tral Committee boasting about deep plowing objectives he had only imagined The Central Committee not knowing this called on the entire country to emu-late Changge County in the hope that such increased yields could be extended everywhere This call was made to bring about the agricultural ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo which in the end caused deep plowing to become a political move-ment The concurrent backyard steel furnace movement and large-scale irriga-tion movement had led to shortages in labor and machinery in the countryside at the time and so the high targets imposed on deep plowing were entirely infeasible Although governments in some places employed the human wave strategy or organized veritable armies of plowhands the only results garnered were the widespread waste of labor and material resources The ultimate goals of deep plowing were unattainable

The lesson that the deep plowing movement can give us today is that in promoting technical measures we absolutely cannot contradict the laws of science In Chairman Maorsquos words ldquoWe must begin from the true conditions of our own country and abroad from within and without provinces from within and without counties and from within and without onersquos own area We must draw from these conditions intrinsic facts not those which have been fabricat-ed In other words we must find the internal connections between incidents and allow them to guide us in our actionsrdquo33 In such actions we should move forward positively and steadily on the basis of scientific experimentation and large quantities of practical experience Things will only go against our wishes if we violate the rules of science and act rashly

33 Mao Zedong xuanbian di 3 juan 《毛泽东选集》第3 卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 3] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1991) 801

ZHU DING AND HU98

ltUNgt

References

Changge xian zhi 《长葛县志》 [Records of Changge County] (Shenghuomiddotdushumiddotxinzhi sanlian shudian 1992)

China Academy of Agricultural Sciences Institute of Crop Breeding and Cultivation 中国农业科学院作物育种栽培研究所 ldquoGuanyu jinnian qiubo xiaomai jishu cuoshi de ji dian yijian 关于今年秋播小麦技术措施的几点意见 [Some Opin-ions on Technical Measures Used in This Yearrsquos Autumn Wheat Planting]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 5 1959 seventh edition

CPC Changge County Committee 中共长葛县委会 ldquoNongju da gexin tudi da fan-shen 农具大革新土地大翻身 [Great Revolution in Farm Implements Great Turning of the Earth]rdquo Zhongguo nongbao 《中国农报》 3 (1958)

Da yuejin zhong nongjiju de chuangzao faming《大跃进中农机具的创造发明》

[Creation and Invention of Farm Machines and Implements during the Great Leap Forward] ed First Ministry of Machine Building Sixth Administrative Bureau of Machinery Industry 第一机械工业部第六机器工业管理局 (Jixie gongye chubanshe 1959)

Gao Shiqi 高士其 ldquoBa situ biancheng huotu ndash cong shenfandi tan dao turang de gaizao 把死土变成活土mdashmdash 从深翻地谈到土壤的改造 [Transform Dead Soil into Living Soil ndash a Discussion of Deep Plowing to Soil Reformation]rdquo Renmin ribao《人

民日报》 October 17 1958 eighth editionJianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 6 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第6 册 [Mao Ze-

dong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 6] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992)


Liu Chunrsquoan 刘春安 ldquoXuexi nongmin weida de chuangzao jingshen tamen de shijian dapo le nongye kexue shang hen duo chenfu de guiluuml 学习农民伟大的创造精

神他们的实践打破了农业科学上很多陈腐的规律 [Learning from the Great Innovative Spirit of Farmers Their Experience Has Broken Many Old Decayed Laws of Science]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 October 8 1958 seventh edition

Liu Jiansheng et al 刘健生等 Woguo nongju de chuangzao gailiang ji qi zonghe liyong 《我国农具的创造改良及其综合利用》[The Creation Improvement and Comprehensive Use of Chinarsquos Farm Implements] (Nongye chubanshe 1959)

Luuml Bingguang 吕炳光 ldquoTudi da fanshen zhengqu muchan babai jin 土地大翻身争

取亩产八百斤 [Great Turning of the Earth Strive for 800 Jin of Output per Mu]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 May 13 1958 fourth edition

Luo Pinghan 罗平汉 1958ndash1962 nian zhongguo de zhishijie《 1958~1962 年中国的知

识界》[Chinarsquos Intelligentsia from 1958 to 1962] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 2008)


ltUNgt

Mao Zedong xuanbian di 3 juan《毛泽东选集》第3 卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 3] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1991)

ldquoMingnian nongye dafanshen xian yao jinnian tudi dafanshen Liaoning xingqi ri fan baiwan mu yundong sibaiwan dajun jizhan yi zhou shenfandi babaiqishi duo wan mu 明年农业大翻身先要今年土地大翻身辽宁兴起日翻百万亩运动

四百万大军激战一周深翻地八百七十多万亩 [We Must Bring About a Soil Revolution This Year in Order to Realize an Agricultural Revolution Next Year a Movement to Plow a Million Mu per Day Rising in Liaoning an Army Four Million Strong can Deeply Plow Over 8700000 Mu in a Week of Fierce Fighting]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 October 19 1958 first edition

Nongju tupu di 1 juan《农具图谱》第 1 卷 [Illustrated Farm Implements Vol 1] ed the Peoplersquos Republic of China Ministry of Agriculture (Tongsu duwu chubanshe 1958)

Nongye jixiehua dianqihua de jiejing《农业机械化电气化的捷径》[Shortcuts to Agricultural Mechanization and Electrification] ed Ministry of Agriculture Office of Farm Implement Reform 农业部农具改革办公室 (Nongye chubanshe 1958)

Qi Zhengxin 戚正欣 ldquoJiaoguan yu shenfan 绞关与深翻 [The Plow Sling and Deep Plowing]rdquo Qinzhou xinwen wang 秦州新闻网 accessed from httpwwwtznews cnArticlelvyouducj20081130921html

Qu Mingzhen 曲明振 ldquoShengeng shenfan daliang zengchan quanguo jiang xianqi shenfan he gailiang turang yundong 深耕深翻大量增产全国将掀起深翻和

改良土壤运动 [Deep Plowing Greatly Increases Yields The Entire Country Will Launch a Movement for Deep Plowing and Soil Improvement]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 July 27 1958 fifth edition

ldquoQuanguo shengeng nongju pingxuan jiangxihui zongjie (zhaiyao) 全国深耕农具评

选讲习会总结(摘要) [Summary of the National Conference for Selection through Appraisal and Lectures Regarding Deep Plowing Implements (Abstract)]rdquo Nongye jixie《农业机械》 6 (1959)

ldquoRang tudi lai ge da fanshen 让土地来个大翻身 [Let there Be a Great Turning of the Earth]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 September 2 1958 fourth edition

ldquoShenfan yi chi tu duo chan wan jin liang Henan Hebei qianbaiwan laodong dajun riye tuji fandi 深翻一尺土多产万斤粮河南河北千百万劳动大军日夜突击翻

地 [Deeply Plow and Increase Grain Yields by 10000 Jin Armies Millions Strong Staging an Earth-Turning Assault Day and Night in Hebei and Henan]rdquoRenmin ribao《人民日报》 September 12 1958 sixth edition

Technical Group of the National Conference for Deep Plowing Implements and Soil Improvement ldquoShengeng nongju shiyan jianding zongjie 深耕农具试验鉴定总

结 [Summary of Tests and Appraisals on Deep Plowing Implements]rdquo Nongye jixie 《农业机械》 3 (1958)

Tong Pingya 佟屏亚 ldquoNongye lsquoda yuejinrsquo kaoliang nongye kexuejia ndash xie zai 1958 nian nongye lsquoda yuejinrsquo 50 zhou nian 农业ldquo大跃进rdquo考量农业科学家mdashmdash 写在

ZHU DING AND HU100

ltUNgt

1958 年农业ldquo大跃进rdquo50 周年[Agricultural Scientists Consider the Agricultural lsquoGreat Leap Forwardrsquo ndash Written on the 50th Anniversary of the Agricultural lsquoGreat Leap Forwardrsquo]rdquo Nongye kaogu《农业考古》 4 (2008)

Wang Ribin and Sun Qinshu 王日彬孙钦书 ldquoMao Zedong san ge dianxing jingyan pishi gei women de qishi 毛泽东三个典型经验批示给我们的启示

[Lessons from Mao Zedongrsquos Commentaries on Three Classic Cases]rdquo Lingdao ganbu wang 领导干部网 accessed from httpwww1dgbco mcnE_ReadNewsaspNewsID=81591

Xiong Yi 熊毅 ldquoCong turang kexue lai yanjiu shenfan wenti 从土壤科学来研究深

翻问题 [Using Soil Science to Study the Question of Deep Plowing]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 September 12 1958 sixth edition

ldquoXunsu tuiguang xianjin jingyan he shengsuo qianyin li ba shenfan tudi yundong tuixiang gaochao 迅速推广先进经验和绳索牵引犁把深翻土地运动推向高

潮 [Swiftly Promulgate Advanced Experience and Rope-Pulled Plows Push the Deep Plowing Movement to Crescendo]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 September 29 1958 third edition

ldquoYunyong lsquoba zi xianfarsquo yingde xiaomai gaochan Henan Meng xian xiaomai da mianji fengchan fang jishu jingyan zongjie 运用ldquo八字宪法rdquo赢得小麦高产河南孟

县小麦大面积丰产方技术经验总结 [Use of the lsquoEight Character Constitutionrsquo Brings about Big Wheat Yields Summary of the Technological Experience of Meng County Henan Province in Big Wheat Yields over a Large Area]rdquo Renmin ribao《人

民日报》 July 7 1959 third editionZhang Junchang and Niu Pu 张君常钮溥 ldquoChangge xian shenfandi de fangfa he

kexue genju 长葛县深翻地的方法和科学根据 [The Methods and Scientific Bas-es of Changge Countyrsquos Deep Plowing]rdquo Nongye kexue tongxun《农业科学通讯》 9 (1958)

Zhou Sun 周孙 ldquoShuikeyuan yijiuwuba nian gaochan shiyan tian jishi 水科院一九五


ldquoZhuajin nongshi jiasu qiugeng Neimenggu Jilin fandi yundong jinru gaochao 抓紧农

时加速秋耕内蒙古吉林翻地运动进入高潮 [Firmly Grasp the Farming Sea-son and Accelerate Autumn Plowing The Plowing Movement Hitting Crescendo in Inner Mongolia and Jilin]rdquoRenmin ribao《人民日报》 October 24 1958 fourth edition


ltUNgt

chapter 4

A Study of the Construction of Terraced Fields in Liulin County Shanxi Province in the Era of Collectivization

Hao Ping1

Abstract

The construction of terraced fields is an important measure in water and soil conser-vation work During the era of collectivization in Liulin County Shanxi Province the movement to construct terraces grew from nothing into a major agricultural move-ment The Hechang Agricultural Cooperative and the Hanjiayu Brigade spurred tech-nological upgrading of terrace construction on the Loess Plateau where locals were first apprehensive toward the idea but later embraced and promulgated it The major reason for that was the increased agricultural yields made possible by terrace construc-tion on sloped farm fields Increased yields were the greatest value the construction of terraces brought to the ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess plateau in the battle against erosion during the era of collectivization

Keywords

Terraced fields ndash terraces ndash collectivization ndash water and soil conservation ndash Shanxi Province ndash Liulin County

Chinarsquos Loess Plateau the worldrsquos largest deposit of loess is currently facing a series of environmental problems the most prominent of which is soil ero-sion Liulin County 柳林县2 is located in the heartland of the Loess Plateau and the Luumlliang Mountain Range 吕梁山 Its territory is full of interlacing

1 Hao Ping (郝平 ) is an associate professor in the Chinese Social History Institute of Shanxi University

2 After the founding of Peoplersquos Republic of China Liulin County was under the administration of Lishi County but was reorganized as an independent county in 1971 The areas I discuss in this essay lie within the jurisdiction of Liulin County During the era of collectivization

HAO102

ltUNgt

round-topped mountains and its topography of ridges and ravines is typical of the Loess Plateau It has also been hard hit by soil erosion It was precisely for that reason that the party and government established soil and water con-servation as a strategic task in remedying Yellow River floods and developing agriculture in impoverished areas during the era of collectivization launching large-scale programs to control and preserve water and recreate nature Liulin has been the forerunner in soil and water conservation on the Loess Plateau when it was the Liulin Commune 柳林公社 under jurisdiction of Lishi Coun-ty 离石县 and remained so after it became a county in its own right The most prominent feature of Liulinrsquos efforts in this area is terraced field construction Compared with the construction of alluvial flood control damsmdashparticularly the Jiajiayuan Dam3mdashthat took place hundreds of years earlier development of terraced fields proceeded rapidly in Liulin In only thirty years beginning shortly after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China Liulinrsquos terracing technology evolved from slope-style terraces to level terraces to broad terraces During this time the county also saw the rise of advanced typical models like the Hechang Agricultural Cooperative 贺昌农业社and the Hanjiayu Brigade 韩家峪大队 4 How were the terraces understood and spread by the common people What was the process of terrace replacement What were the effects of terraces on water and soil conservation work performed on the Loess Plateau during the era of collectivization In this essay I shall attempt to answer these questions with the aim of providing insights and valuable lessons to those working in water and soil conservation and irrigation works construction today5

Liulin County was the typical model for construction of terraced fields on the Loess Plateau The rest of the country looked to this area for guidance in sustainable irrigation projects

3 The Jiajiayuan Dam is located in Jiajiayuan Village Liulin County It was first built in the 12th year of the reign of the Jiaqing Emperor of the Qing Dynasty (1807) It is Shanxi Provincersquos oldest and largest alluvial flood control dam

4 Prior to 1958 in the Chinese countryside first came the founding of primary agricultural co-operatives followed by the founding of advanced agricultural cooperatives In this essay I re-fer to both by the single term ldquoagricultural cooperativesrdquo After the founding of rural peoplersquos communes in August 1958 rural grassroots administrative units turned into production bri-gades I refer to both collectively as ldquobrigadesrdquo

5 Academic research into Chinese society during the era of collectivization has been in the ascendant in recent years Many great achievements have been made in the research of policy changes rural life rural culture and other areas Likewise much good work has been done in the study of soil erosion and erosion prevention on the Loess Plateau Cheng Fulong (成甫隆) made an inital foray into the subject in his book Huanghe zhiben lun《黄河治

本论》 [On Treating the Root Cause of the Yellow Riverrsquos Problems] (Pingmin ribaoshe 1947)


ltUNgt

i The Construction and Promotion of Terraced Fields

Terraced fields are constructed primarily to aid in water and soil conservation and to increase agricultural yields They first appeared as early as the Qin and Han Dynasties primarily in the mountainous regions of Jiangnanmdasha geo-graphic area comprising lands immediately to the south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River including the southern part of the Yangtze Deltamdashwith the majority now found in Guangxi and Yunnan These areas are rich in mountains but poor in plains and so local farmers build terraced fields to suit a maximum area of their mountainous terrain to rice planting Terraced field construction began considerably later in Northern Shaanxi and Western Shanxi the practice in these regions was widely popularized only in the 1950s The Loess Plateau is typified by low Guangxi and poor soil fertility The construction of terraced fields here not only helps mitigate soil erosion on sloped fields but also helps to increase yields through increased water retention and soil improvement It has been shown that terraced fields achieve an average water retention rate of 832 percent and a soil retention rate of 839 percent in Lishi County Shanxi Yanrsquoan City 延安市 Shaanxi and Suide County 绥德县 Shaanxi all three of which are located in mountainous regions of the Loess Plateau6 Terraced fields are an extraordinarily effective means of conservation in sloped farm fields and so have developed rapidly in Western Shanxi and Northern Shaanxi Liulin alone built terraces on a total area of 114338 mu of arable landmdashtwenty percent of the countyrsquos 577880 mu of total arable landmdashover the thirty-plus

Shi Nianhairsquos (史念海 ) Huangtu gaoyuan lishi dili yanjiu 《黄土高原历史地理研究》 [A Study of the History and Geography of the Loess Plateau] (Huanghe shuili chubanshe 2001) was the culmination of all work done so far in the field There are however few works on the subject of soil and water conservation work performed during the era of collectiviza-tion Other than a few essays published in small local publications there are very few aca-demic treatises on this subject the major exception being Gao Yunrsquos (高芸 ) ldquolsquoYi liang wei gangrsquo zhengce de shishi dui shaanbei huangtu qiuling gouhe qu shuitu baochi gongzuo de yingxiangmdashyi Suide xian weili ldquo以粮为纲 rdquo 政策的实施对陕北黄土丘陵沟壑区水土

保持工作的影响mdashmdashmdash以绥德县为例 [The Effects on Soil and Water Conservation Work in the Loess Plateau Hills and Ravines of Northern Shaanxi of the Implementation of the lsquoTaking Grain as the Key Linkrsquo Policymdashusing Suide County as an Example]rdquo (masters thesis Shaanxi Normal University 2007)

6 Wu Faqi and Zhang Yubin 吴发启张玉斌 ldquoHuangtu gaoyuan shuiping titian de xush-uibaotu xiaoyi fenxi 黄土高原水平梯田的蓄水保土效益分析 [Analysis of the Effec-tiveness at Water and Soil Conservation of Level Terraces on the Loess Plateau]rdquo Zhongguo shuitu baochi kexue 《中国水土保持科学》 1 (2004)

HAO104

ltUNgt

years from the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China to 19807 Terraces are now an important component of the countyrsquos arable land

Liulinrsquos terraces were not however built overnight At first locals were op-posed to the idea of terraces but eventually their understanding changed and they came to accept them

Residents of Liulin had abundant experience in digging ditches and build-ing dams but terraced fields were a completely alien concept to them at first In August 1954 the first Peoplersquos Congress of Shanxi Province passed the ldquoRes-olutions on the Planned Performance of Water and Soil Conservation Work throughout the Provincerdquo 关于在全省范围内有计划地开展水土保持工

作的决议 They read ldquoImportant measures in properly performing water and soil conservation work include changing unreasonable land usage customs promoting the widespread construction of terraced fields on sloped arable land and changing the extensive farming method of lsquoplanting widely but reap-ing littlersquordquo8 In the ldquoShanxi Province fifteen-year Long Range Plan for Water and Soil Conservationrdquo 山西省水土保持十五年远景规划 that followed the government turned its attention to the ridge-and-ravine areas of the Loess Pla-teau where soil erosion was the most severe The Plan read ldquoWe must imple-ment a widespread program of water and soil conservation In other words we must flatten stretches of earth at fixed intervals on sloped arable land building earthen ridges at their outskirts Water should then be irrigated into the newly flattened land making it suitable for planting Every year the ridges should be rebuilt and reinforced and the earth should be plowed more deeply every year In this way terraced fields will eventually be formedrdquo9 At this time the Lishan County government assembled a total of 381 agricultural cooperative directors production brigade chiefs and technicians from 379 cooperatives around the county and dispatched them to study the construction of terraced fields at Daquan Mountain 大泉山 Yanggao County 阳高县 the provincial

7 Liulin xian shuili zhi 《柳林县水利志》 [Irrigation Records of Liulin County] ed Chen Baohua 陈保华 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 2006) 93 Liulin xian zhi 《柳林县志》 [Re-cords of Liulin County] ed Li Jiulin 李九林 (Zhongguo haichao chubanshe 1995) 114

8 ldquoGuanyu zai quan sheng fanwei you jihua di kaizhan shuitu baochi gongzuo de jueyi 关于

在全省范围有计划地开展水土保持工作的决议 [Resolution Regarding Promoting Planned Water and Soil Conservation Work throughout the Province]rdquo Shanxi ribao 《山西

日报》 August 12 1954 second edition9 Shanxi shuitu baochi zhi 《山西水土保持志》 [Records of Water and Soil Conservation in

Shanxi] (Huanghe shuili chubanshe 1998) 93


ltUNgt

model for water and soil conservation works10 Officials in Liulin still under the jurisdiction of Lishan County 离山县 made the earliest forays into terrace construction One of their pilot programs was established at the Wangjiagou water and soil conservation station 王家沟水土保持站 One of two methods was employed in tests at Wangjiagou depending on the degree of slope and general topography of an area The first was to build the terraces all in one go The second was to build terraces gradually over the course of several years Ag-ricultural cooperatives at the time generally employed the all-at-once method on land with a slope of six degrees or lower as a relatively small amount of la-bor was required On land with slopes between six and twenty-fivedegrees co-operatives would use a combination of cultivation techniques and engineering measures digging level ditches across the slope along predetermined horizon-tal lines set at fixed distance from one another Above the ditches they built ridges and then they flattened the earth behind those ridges Over the years a combination of working the earth and natural rainfall established the terraces more firmly and built the ridges higher In the end slope-style terraces with a slope between three and five degrees resulted

The construction of slope-style terraces required only a small amount of changes to a hillside which made the process relatively simple However the process was slow particularly the gradual building up and adding of ridges and this slow pace did not conform to the rapid pace at which cooperatization was sweeping the country It took two years to complete terrace construction in the Wanjiagou basin coming to total an area of less than 100 mu of terraced fields11 Construction methods were not very scientific and so the process of gradual leveling of the terraced fields ended up ruining fertile topsoil render-ing those fields incapable of increasing grain yields One person with inside knowledge had this to say ldquoIn the early 1950s owing to our lack of experience we had an insufficient understanding of topsoil issues while constructing the terraced fields The result was that the majority of soil contained in the ter-raced fields was immature soil with the cultivatable soil buried deep below

10 Lishi xian zhi 《离石县志》 [Records of Lishi County] ed Li Wenfan 李文凡 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1996) 746

11 Shanxi sheng Lishan shuitu baochi shiyan zhan ( jingliu guance ziliao zhengli) 《山西省

离山水土保持试验站 (径流观测资料整理 )》 [LishanWater and Soil Conservation Testing Station of Shanxi Province Compiled from Runoff Observation Materials] ed Shanxi Provincial Agricultural Construction Bureau Department of Farm Fields and Irrigation and the Lishan Water and Soil Conservation Testing Station 山西省农业建设厅农田

水利局离山水土保持试验站 (1959) 5

HAO106

ltUNgt

The immature soil was not only insufficiently loose but even worse it lacked the organic matter necessary for agricultural production The result of these construction methods was that grain output did not increase but rather de-clined Locals referred to this method of terrace construction as lsquothree years of povertyrsquordquo12 For these reasons locals did not truly accept terraced fields at this time and the method was not promulgated

Beginning in 1958 the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo was launched on the agricul-tural front Although this movement resulted in great losses to socialist con-struction to a certain extent it did spur construction of terraced fields on the Loess Plateau Lishan County began attempts at one-off construction of level terraces in order to accelerate the pace of water and soil conservation work A much larger amount of labor was required in this method than in the slope-style method but it did result in the replacement of high-degree slopes with terraces This method also eliminated erosion due to gravity and stabilized soil water content by thickening the soil and increasing the soil layerrsquos adsorption capacity Thus from this point forward terraced fields were highly effective in both water and soil conservation and in increasing grain yields

The Hechang Agricultural Cooperative of Liulin Township was the first group to attempt ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo The cooperative built an area of 230 mu at the Sanlangbao 三郎堡 site in the Tianjiagou 田家沟 basin using this method Throughout the process cooperative members worked as a team and pooled wisdom to arrive at common goals They employed a method of matur-ing immature soil in which they combined soaked soil stove ashes mule and horse manure bituminous coal corn stalks and other fertilizers in trenches for a period of time before returning the mixture to the terraced fields and plowing deeply This method enabled them to overcome the various shortcom-ings of previous terrace construction they both avoided destroying the topsoil level and increased agricultural yields at the same time In 1958 alone yields per mu in terraced fields rose to 363 jin eighty-three percent higher than in slope-style terraces13 One Soviet water and soil conservation expert lauded the terraces as ldquoa pioneering undertaking in water and soil conservationrdquo14 At this time began the great ldquoone-time level terracerdquo movement that subsequently swept across Liulin not to mention the rest of the ridge-and-ravine areas of the Loess Plateau Thereafter such areas as Jinluo Village 金罗村 Zhongyang County 中阳县 and Anye Village 安业村 Lin County 临县 in Shanxi and

12 From an interview with a cadre surnamed Dong (78 years old) from the Liulin County Water Conservation and Irrigation Department conducted on April 20 2010

13 Lishi xian zhi 20214 Liulin xian shuili zhi 519


ltUNgt

Suide County in Shaanxi also began promoting ldquoone-time level terracerdquo con-struction More importantly locals began to approve of the method as the soil maturation process ensured that topsoil was not damaged and increased grain yields Once this improved method had been invented terraces were built with even greater speed By the end of 1959 5799 mu of terraced fields had been built in Liulin County alone15

In the 1960s and 1970s Liulin County adopted the ldquoconcentrate topsoil in the middlerdquo method the ldquoinvert layersrdquo method and other methods on the basis of Dazhairsquos ldquotriple retention fieldsrdquo All these merged into a top-to-bottom theory of slope management which was used to guide the large-scale construction of terraces in the area Of all groups working in this field the Hanjiayu Bri-gade made the greatest strides at increasing yields with their ldquobroad terracerdquo method From this point forward terraced fields were elevated to the status of ldquohigh yield fieldsrdquo and the total area of land converted to terraced fields grew many times over up to 54638 mu in 1970 and again to 114338 mu in 198016 No longer lamented as ldquothree years of povertyrdquo terraced fields came to be known among locals as ldquoriches this yearrdquo on the strength of their stable high yields Terraces in Liulin were first lamented and then widely accepted In that era in which grains were scarce and indeed having enough to eat was one of the greatest issues of the times terraces came to be supported and welcomed by the masses The effectiveness of the terraces at water and soil conservation was thus considered less important at that time than their effectiveness at increas-ing agricultural yields

ii The Establishment of Typical Models and the Replacement of Terraced Fields

The Hechang Cooperative and Hanjiayu Brigade were the forerunners of ter-race construction of Liulin County changing the reputation of terraces from ldquothree years of povertyrdquo to ldquoriches this yearrdquo Their work also served as a model in water and soil conservation across the ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess Plateau in both Western Shanxi and Northern Shaanxi

(A) The Hechang Cooperativersquos ldquoOne-time Level TerracerdquoThe Hechang Cooperative was not the first group to build ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo Back in early 1957 the Shanxi Provincial Water and Soil

15 Ibid 9316 Ibid

HAO108

ltUNgt

Conservation Station had tried this method in the Wangjiagou basin but with limited success There was great dissent regarding how ldquoone-time level ter-racesrdquo should be tested owing to the nascent nature of the technology Many officials and members of the public were strongly opposed to the method as it required a great deal of labor to build andnecessitated sacrificing ten to fifteen percent of slope land to ridge-building and because the plowing up of im-mature soil affected yields One reason that testing in ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo was conducted by the Hechang Cooperative was that Hechang had been the home of the Hechang martyrs of the ccp Fifth Central Committee Another reason was a brave quote attributed to the leader of the Hechang Cooperativersquos seventh production team Yang Tingrsquoan 杨庭安 ldquoThere are always losses and gains to any story Itrsquos not so bad that our yields dropped this year When yoursquore hit with one year of losses replace it with gains year after yearrdquo17 For these reasons the Lishan County Party Committee chose the Hechang Cooperative to conduct the testing

The Hechang Cooperative was located in the Tianjiagou basin in the lower reaches of the Sanchuan River 三川河 It was by no means an advanced unit in water and soil preservation at the time The cooperative managed 600 mu of paddy fields and 4400 mu of mountainous terrain but over the three years of cooperatization the area suffering from soil erosion in the Cooperative ac-counted for only six percent of the total size of the area suffering from soil ero-sion in this area Once tests had begun in ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo secretary of the Lishan County Committee and secretary of the Liulin Township 柳林乡 Party Committee Wang Jian 王健 was dispatched to the Hechang Coopera-tive to oversee work Although Wang was a native of the area just like the co-operativersquos members he wasnrsquot very sure about whether terraces could actu-ally increase grain output His strategy then was ldquocrossing the river by feeling the stonesrdquo Wang ventured deeply into the countryside paying visits to many old farmers with experience in this area in order to make breakthroughs with ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo In addition he convened ldquoassemblies of geniuses and heroesrdquo to hear a broad array of suggestions With all members working togeth-er as a team the Hechang Cooperative conducted multiple tests ultimately arriving at their method of erecting level terraces without ruining the topsoil The method was described thusby one official at the time ldquoShovel the top-soil to the side and dig up the immature soil from the bottom After building

17 ldquoLishan xian chuxi nongcun shehuizhuyi jianshe xianjin danwei daibiao dianxing cailiao (1958 nian 10 yue) 离石县出席农村社会主义建设先进单位代表典型材料 (1958 年 10月 ) [Representative Typical Materials from Liulin Countyrsquos Participation in a Rural Socialist Construction Advanced Unit]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ 1-9-48-54


ltUNgt

ridges with the immature soil press the rest down to the bottom and cover with mature soil Next deeply plow and fertilize At the same time to economize labor on land sloping more than fifteen degrees make the terraces slightly nar-rower and intertill on land sloping less than fifteen degrees Then use an ox to deeply plow once or twice and then flatten In addition Chinese yams barley beans and other high-yield crops can be planted in immature soilrdquo18 Local of-ficials then mobilized all 300 members of the cooperative in the construction of ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo The guiding policy was ldquoSpecialized teams work during the busy farming season and the entire populace launches an all-out assault during the slow seasonrdquo The overall situation at the time was summed up as ldquoEvery village is taming its slopes and building terracesrdquo Over the course of one year the total area of terraced land increased drastically and agricultur-al yields increased by 83 percent from when farming was done on sloped fields This change in methodology from treating symptoms to treating the root cause of the problem laid a good foundation for later construction of basic farmland Commendations and encouragement from the State Councilrsquos Water and Soil Conservation Committee 水土保持委员会 established the Hechang Cooper-ativersquos status as a typical model in water and soil conservation What followed was a mass movement for the construction of ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo across all ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess Plateau

In the 1950s the ccp promoted development of agricultural productivity and initiated the agricultural cooperative movement in order to rapidly lift the countryside out of poverty and backwardness At the end of 1955 the ccp Central General Office published a three-volume series called The Socialist Up-surge in Chinarsquos Countryside 中国农村的社会主义高潮 which introduced the various typical models of the cooperative movement being conducted throughout the country Interim secretary of the Lishan County Committee Liu Yaorsquos 刘耀 essay ldquoIt is Entirely Feasible to Launch Large-scale Water and Soil Conservation Work on the Strength of Cooperatizationrdquo 依靠合作化开

展大规模的水土保持工作是完全可能的 and Yanggao County Commit-tee Secretary Wang Jinrsquos 王进 ldquoLook Daquan Mountain Has Changedrdquo 看大泉山变了样子 were two of a very small number of works on typical models of water and soil conservation in mountainous regions accepted for this rea-son they became prototypes for mountain management and water conserva-tion Another model for water and soil conservation at the time was the highly

18 ldquoLishan xian chuxi nongcun shehuizhuyi jianshe xianjin danwei daibiao dianxing cailiao (1958 nian 10 yue) 离石县出席农村社会主义建设先进单位代表典型材料 (1958年 10月 ) [Representative Typical Materials from Liulin Countyrsquos Participation in a Rural Socialist Construction Advanced Unit]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ 1-9-48-54

HAO110

ltUNgt

celebrated Daquan Mountain Lishan County was formally made a national model in water and soil conservation for its planning but the ldquofairytalerdquo story of Gao Jincai 高进才 and Zhang Fenglinrsquos 张凤林 Daquan Mountain was altogether different The success of ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo ended the Loess Plateaursquos reliance on traditional methods of mountain management and wa-ter conservation It was a one-off exploration and revolution in water and soil conservation aided by collectivization It also overcame the myriad apprehen-sions and misgivings people had toward terraced fields at the time At the time the basic farmland system was established the status of ldquohigh-yield farmlandrdquo accorded to terraces made them an important practical measure for water and soil conservation in the ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess Plateau

Wang Jian the actual executor of national policy during the era of collec-tivization truly made deep incursions with laborers He excavated the diverse scattered experiences and wisdom of the masses exceeding what was pos-sible with labor alone and bringing about a sublimation of the wisdom of the masses

(B) The Hanjiayu Brigadersquos ldquoBroad TerracesrdquoldquoBroad terracesrdquo were another form of level terraces The ldquobroadrdquo in their name refers to the width of the area of arable land within individual terraces The standards for this width varied from region to region and from one period of time to another In the 1970s six meters was the dividing line with terraces be-tween three to five meters wide referred to as ldquonarrow terracesrdquo and anything over six meters referred to as ldquobroad terracesrdquo One difference between these and ldquoone-time level terracesrdquo was the equipment necessary to build them All level terraces built in the 1950s and 1960s were ldquonarrow terracesrdquo because the most common equipment for terrace-building at the time was limited to spades shovels hoes and bamboo baskets As a result the work efficiency of terrace construction was low Further compounded by the nascent nature of the technology terrace construction was generally limited to a width of be-tween three and five meters The spread of mechanization was a turning point in the construction of ldquobroad terracesrdquo which are intrinsically more effective at water and soil conservation The Hanjiayu Brigade was the first group in all of Liulin County to attempt trials with broad terraces Their success at moving away from narrow terraces led to an updating of terrace construction technology

The Hanjiayu Brigade was one of the most successful models for water and soil conservation during the ldquolearn from Dazhai in agriculturerdquo movement The Brigade administered a total of 1268 mu of farm land the vast majority of which was located on slopes in the region of Liuliangjiugou which means ldquosix


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ridges and nine ravinesrdquo This region had long been mocked as ldquonine apologies every ten yearsrdquo owing to severe erosion and poor land management In 1970 the Brigade launched a mass water and soil conservation movement based on Dazhairsquos experience with ldquosponge fieldsrdquo ie fields of soil with loose soft tex-ture Specialized conservation teams were at the core of the movement with the participation of all other laborers ensured via labor competitions quota management and other means The focus of their work was the construction of terraced fields Over the course of three years the Brigade built a total area of 812 mu of terraces which together with their pre-existing 300 mu of terraces meant that terraces comprised ninety-two percent of the Brigadersquos land That was quite an impressive accomplishment Terraces improved soil conditions and the Brigade experienced bumper crop grain harvests for several years running Their total grain yield in 1970 was 200000 jin In 1972 the figure was 300000 meaning a per capita grain yield of 400 jin19 The most striking differ-ence between Hanjiayu and other model areas in water and soil conservation was that all of the over 800 mu of terraces built by the Brigade were ldquobroad terracesrdquo over six meters wide Before this time terrace construction had been carried out using an array of basic tools wooden rafters wooden tamps and hoes The Hanjiayu Brigade had at its disposal certain amounts of push carts flatbed carts walking tractors and other more advanced implements These possessions represented a technological upgrade in the construction of ter-races Seeing that narrow terraces made tractor plowing and irrigation diffi-cult the Hanjiayu Brigade boldly broke through the previous width limitations of three to five meters making tractor plowing and irrigation possible It was for this reason that at the Province-wide Shanxi Region ldquoLearn from Dazhairsquos Experiencerdquo Exchange Conference convened by Liulin County in 1972 the Hanjiayu Brigade was confirmed as an advanced model in building terraces on sloped fields and in ldquogoing from rags to richesrdquo More important were the advantages of ldquobroad terracesrdquo in bringing about increased grain yields and the guiding effect of this model The Hanjiayu Brigade played an important role in pushing the change from ldquonarrow terracesrdquo to ldquobroad terracesrdquo on the Loess Plateau in the 1970s This change in turn played an innovative and leading role in the widening and general upgrading of level terraces in the region

19 ldquoShanxi sheng xishan diqu nongye xue dazhai jingyan jiaoliuhuiyi cailiao (1972 nian 10 yue) 山西省西山地区农业学大寨经验交流会议材料 (1972年 10月 ) [Materials from the Exchange Conference for Learning from Dazhairsquos Agricultural Experience in the Western Mountain Regions of Shanxi Province]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ1-4-12-14

HAO112

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iii Conclusions

China has been a major agricultural country since antiquity Between the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China and the end of the 1970s grain was constantly a major problem in the development of Chinarsquos socialist economy Mao Zedong addressed the conference of the secretaries of provincial and municipal party committees convened in 1957 saying the following ldquoYou must be aware that not paying special attention to grain is very dangerous If you donrsquot pay attention to grain sooner or later there will be great upheavals under the heavensrdquo20 The greatest threat to grain in Liulin County inhabiting the ridge-and-ravine topography of the Loess Plateau was soil erosion That is why from the very outset of the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China officials here launched a long-lasting movement of water and soil conservation One of the most important measures of that movement was the construction of terraced fields Over time local attitudes toward terraces changed from op-position to acceptance A major reason for that change was increased grain yields brought about by terraced fields Officials established both the ldquoone-time level terracerdquo and ldquobroad terracerdquo as official models specifically because of increased grain yields The mobilization of grassroots labor during the era of collectivization made the wide scale construction of terraces possible A virtuous cycle emerged between the struggle to control soil erosion and the realization of higher grain yields in terraced fields which had been officially deemed ldquohigh-yield farmlandrdquo This cycle made them an important practical measure in water and soil conservation in the ridge-and-ravine regions of the Loess Plateau At the same time an important characteristic of the era of col-lectivization was the excavation concentration refinement and sublimation of the experience of the people especially as manifested during the upgrading of terracing technology

Thirty years of unflagging efforts to control erosion spurred vigorous de-velopment to Liulinrsquos terraced fields and brought about mature theories and technological achievements during the era of collectivization One must also remember however that there are also lessons to be learned from the ter-race building of this period For example some poorly designed terraces went barren after only a few years of use meaning that a great deal of labor and material resources had been squandered for nothing In another example pressure to increase grain output and the success of the ldquoone-time level ter-racerdquo prompted the people to pursue higher yields of grain per mu but in the

20 Mao Zedong wenji di 7 juan 《毛泽东文集》第7 卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 7] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1999) 199


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end many terraces were built on land too narrow or too steep to be suitable for terrace construction leading to increased soil erosion in those areas21

In summary the major reasons behind the deficiencies of water and soil conservation work of this era lay in restrictions of leftist wrong though and in technological limitations In the pursuit of speed and quantity many areas overlooked efficiency and quality in their conservation work More important-ly water and soil management wasmdashjust like the construction and explora-tions of the Peoplersquos Republic of China at the timemdashin an exploratory period There was little experience to draw from during this time of performing prac-tical work without having first completed research Those factors in addition to scarcity of resources and capital and low levels of technology caused some endeavors to end unsuccessfully Historical researchers should however view the past with a dialectical attitude One could even say that it was the unbro-ken chain of attempts and failures of those explorers on the front line that propelled the great advances made in terrace construction in Liulin County Those successes and failures have now become valuable treasures for further water and soil conservation work on the Loess Plateau

The appeals of the masses and the creation of official models forged the glowing glamor of terraces in the era of collectivization After the start of Reform and Opening there was a new surge in rural irrigation construction as the countryrsquos overall national prowess steadily increased Recent achieve-ments have been made in water and soil conservation on the Loess Plateau on the strength of abundant capital and advanced technology that overshadow any achievements made in times gone by The dense network of terraces are a major component in the engineering system currently used to administer the regionrsquos mountainous regions Whereas in the past increased grain yields were the major driver of water and soil conservation at present the foremost objective in this field is environmental improvement Improved agricultural yields are now a secondary concern such a status conforms to our current social environment of increased attention to environmental issues One can-not however overlook the fact that explorations made in terraced field con-struction during the era of collectivization not only laid a solid theoretical and practical foundation for the achievements of today but the experiences and lessons gained from that time still exert a strong impact on the water and soil conservation work being performed today Now as farming irrigation projects have become the focus of the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo the abundant resources and

21 From an interview with a cadre surnamed Lei (55 years old) from the Liulin County Water Conservation and Irrigation Department conducted on April 21 2010

HAO114

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experiences accumulated during the era of collectivization are still extremely valuable to our socialist construction today

References

ldquoGuanyu zai quan sheng fanwei you jihua di kaizhan shuitu baochi gongzuo de jueyi 关于在全省范围有计划地开展水土保持工作的决议 [Resolution on Promot-ing Planned Water and Soil Conservation Work throughout the Province]rdquo Shanxi ribao 《山西日报》 August 12 1954 second edition

ldquoLishan xian chuxi nongcun shehuizhuyi jianshe xianjin danwei daibiao dianxing cailiao (1958 nian 10 yue) 离石县出席农村社会主义建设先进单位代表典型材

料(1958年 10月) [Representative Typical Materials from Liulin Countyrsquos Participa-tion in a Rural Socialist Construction Advanced Unit]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ 1-9-48-54

Lishi xian zhi《离石县志》 [Records of Lishi County] ed Li Wenfan 李文凡 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1996)

Liulin xian shuili zhi 《柳林县水利志》 [Irrigation Records of Liulin County] ed Chen Baohua 陈保华 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 2006) 93

Liulin xian zhi 《柳林县志》 [Records of Liulin County] ed Li Jiulin 李九林 (Zhong-guo haichao chubanshe 1995)


ldquoShanxi sheng xishan diqu nongye xue dazhai jingyan jiaoliuhuiyi cailiao (1972 nian 10 yue) 山西省西山地区农业学大寨经验交流会议材料(1972 年 10 月) [Materials from the Exchange Conference For Learning from Dazhairsquos Agricultural Experience in the Western Mountain Regions of Shanxi Province]rdquo Liulin County Archives SJ1-4-12-14

Shanxi shuitu baochi zhi 《山西水土保持志》 [Records of Water and Soil Conserva-tion in Shanxi] (Huanghe shuili chubanshe 1998)

Wu Faqi and Zhang Yubin 吴发启张玉斌 ldquoHuangtu gaoyuan shuiping titian de xushuibaotu xiaoyi fenxi 黄土高原水平梯田的蓄水保土效益分析 [Analysis of the Effectiveness at Water and Soil Conservation of Level Terraces on the Loess Pla-teau]rdquo Zhongguo shuitu baochi kexue 《中国水土保持科学》 1 (2004)


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chapter 5

Historical Observations Regarding the Large-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens in Hebei Province

Li Chunfeng1

Abstract

Between the first half of 1958 and June 1961 rural public canteens in Hebei Province first exploded in number then became difficult to sustain then were forcibly rein-stated and finally were completely abolished The fate of rural canteens in Hebei was closely related to the rise and fall of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and the peoplersquos com-mune movement Rural public canteens in Hebei grew prodigiously as the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and peoplersquos commune movement were in the ascendant but the rural can-teen movement ended in failure just as the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo came to its close

Keywords

Hebei Province ndash rural public canteens ndash the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo movement ndash the peoplersquos commune movement

Between the first half of 1958 and June 1961 rural public canteens in Hebei Province first exploded in number then became difficult to sustain then were forcibly reinstated and finally were completely abolished The fate of rural canteens in Hebei was closely related to the rise and fall of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and the peoplersquos commune movement Rural public canteens in He-bei grew prodigiously as the Great Leap Forward and peoplersquos commune move-ment were in the ascendant but the rural canteen movement ended in failure just as the Great Leap Forward came to its close In this essay I shall attempt to present a thorough review and some observations of the historical processes by which rural public canteens were widely established in Hebei Province dur-ing the Great Leap Forward era

1 Li Chunfeng (李春峰 ) is a master of laws in the Hebei Provincial Academy of Social Sciences History Center

LI116

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i Headlong Rush to Action

The genesis of the rural public canteen movement in Hebei Province lay in the rural cooperative movement During this time farmers voluntarily and spon-taneously established simple or mobile canteens on a temporary or seasonal basis amid the fields to increase the work efficiency of farming As the busy seasons wound down these simple canteens were temporarily closed These temporary canteens were similar in style and substance to the public canteens that followed One might say they were the embryonic form of the public can-teens they laid the foundation for the widespread establishment of public canteens during the Great Leap Forward

On September 24 1957 the ccp Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued the ldquoResolutions Regarding the Large-scale Launch of the Farm-land Irrigation and Manure Collection Movement in Winter of this Year and Spring of Next Yearrdquo 关于今冬明春大规模地开展兴修农田水利和积肥

运动的决定 which called for governments around the country to launch a ldquoleapingrdquo upsurge in output centered on construction of irrigation works in rural areas In order to thoroughly implement the spirit of the Central Com-mittee directives and comprehensively promote the construction of rural irrigation works the Hebei Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Peoplersquos Committee between October 14 and 20 of that year jointly convened a congress of irrigation and manure collection activists at which it was demanded that the entire rural population of the province initiate an upsurge in the move-ment for irrigation works construction and manure collection and promote the Great Leap Forward in agricultural production The Xushui County 徐水县 government implemented a large-scale collective irrigation works labor strat-egy of ldquomilitarized organization battle-style action and collectivized livingrdquo which brought about unified control of labor over a wide area In response all manner of busy season canteens and ldquoon-work-premise canteensrdquo were es-tablished to increase labor productivity and to integrate modes of living and modes of production By July 1958 every commune and production brigade of Xushui County had established public canteens which made Xushui the first county in Hebei to bring about county-wide ldquocanteen-izationrdquo It was reported that ldquoall the 247 agricultural cooperatives of Xushui County have established a total of 1771 rural canteens serving a total of 275000 people more than 80 percent of the total population of the countyrdquo2

2 ldquoLaoli da jiefang shengchan da yuejin Xushui xian sheshe ban qi gonggong shitang 劳力大

解放生产大跃进徐水县社社办起公共食堂 [Great Liberation of Labor Great Leap


ltUNgt

In the first half of 1958 the Great Leap Forward was launched in every corner of the country On August 17 officials at a meeting of the ccp Central Politburo in Beidaihe 北戴河 attended by non-members passed the ldquoccp Central Resolutions Regarding Issues of Establishing Peoplersquos Communes in Rural Areasrdquo 中共中央关于在农村建立人民公社问题的决议 The Resolutions mandated that communes implement a distribution system combining a supply system (ie rationing system) and a wage system and that communes erect public canteens From August 13 to 15 the Hebei Provincial Committee convened on-the-spot conferences on canteens in Anci and Wuqing to promulgate canteen experience On August 29 the Hebei Provin-cial Committee issued the ldquoDirectives Regarding Construction of Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于建立人民公社的指示 which demanded that the govern-ments of all provincial and city-level regions establish peoplersquos communes and establish public canteens Xushui County was ahead of nationwide trends at the time Under the guidance of ccp Central Xushui officials began to estab-lish ldquocommunist pilotsrdquo and implemented the ldquosupply system of the entire peoplerdquo which was also known as the ldquofifteen includedsrdquo3 With the central government vigorously promoting ldquofactors of communismrdquo this ldquopioneering workrdquo of Xushui County caught the attention of the Central Committee who lent the region their enthusiastic support This official support led to the rapid spread of public canteens throughout the province

On September 1 Hong qi Magazine published an editorial titled ldquoWelcom-ing the Climax of Peoplersquos Commune Transformationrdquo 迎接人民公社化高潮 as well as the general regulations of the Cuoyashan Satellite Commune 嵖岈

山卫星公社 of Suiping County 遂平县 Henan Province The regulations stipulated a distribution system that combined a wage system and a food sup-ply system State regulations of the time established the standard for food supply as the establishment of public canteens within production units On September 4 the Peoplersquos Daily 人民日报 published an editorial lavishing praise on the Cuoyashan Satellite Communersquos food supply system and its pub-lic canteens The Cuoyashan Satellite Communersquos provisions regarding public canteens stipulated that the communersquos public canteens be a model for the

Forward in Production All Communes of Xushui County Establishing Public Canteens on a Wide Scale]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 July 12 1958

3 On September 23 1958 Xushui County First Party Secretary Zhang Guozhong further ex-plained the concept of ldquofifteen includedsrdquo to a meeting convened by the county committee The full list of ldquoincludedsrdquo was food clothing housing shoes socks towels soap lamp oil matches heating subsidies showers haircuts watching movies healthcare subsidies and burial

LI118

ltUNgt

promulgation of such canteens throughout the country Once word got out officials in every corner of the country began emulating the communersquos food supply system The most common method of establishing food supply systems at the time was as follows a portion of food rations pre-established for dis-tribution to individual commune members was retained per state regulations and appropriated to public canteens where commune members could eat for free If one holds that the 1958 Beidaihe conference was the precursor to the public canteen movement then one must agree that the publication of the Cuoyashan Satellite Communersquos general regulations lit the fuse that spread the movement to every peoplersquos commune in the country The regulations also provided the model for the rapid rise of public canteens in neighboring Hebei On October 25 the Peoplersquos Daily published an editorial titled ldquoProper Opera-tion and Management of Public Canteensrdquo 办好公共食堂 which read ldquoThe collective welfare enterprise of properly establishing communes particularly the establishment of public canteens has become an extremely important component of the work involved in the peoplersquos commune movement It is the crux behind solidifying peoplersquos communesrdquo4 As the peoplersquos commune move-ment of the Great Leap Forward and the ldquoGreat Forging of Steel and Iron of the Entire Populacerdquo [aka ldquobackyard furnacerdquo] movement swept the country rural public canteens sprouted in every corner of Hebei as vigorously as bamboo shoots after a spring rain ldquoBy November 1958 over 230000 public canteens were established in all rural areas of the province with ninety-four percent of commune members participatingrdquo5

ii Difficulties in Sustaining

The Great Leap Forward movement was plagued with problems including the ldquovogue of communismrdquo (a trend by which egalitarianism was held supreme and labor and material resources were transferred arbitrarily regardless of which commune they belonged to) the tendency of officials to exaggerate yield figures special treatment of cadres the trend of excessively forceful or-ders and other ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes These severely impacted the national econo-my and plunked the economy of Hebei into a mire of difficulties

4 ldquoBan hao gonggong shitang 办好公共食堂 [Proper Operation and Management of Public Canteens]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 25 1958

5 Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 《河北省志 middot政府志》 [Records of Hebei ProvincemiddotGovernment Records] (Renmin chubanshe 2000) 522


ltUNgt

At the end of 1958 there were severe food shortages in Hebei where it became difficult to sustain the multitudes of public canteens that had been recently set up The first reason was that the policy of providing food free of charge in public canteens led to enormous wastes Two official policies of public canteens in Hebei instituted from the outset were ldquoeat for freerdquo and ldquoall you can eatrdquo One estimate based on incomplete statistics was that ldquoover 3 bil-lion kilograms of food were thrown away or left to rot across the provincerdquo6 A second reason was that the ldquoGreat Forging of Steel and Ironrdquo large-scale con-struction of irrigation works and other ldquolarge-scalerdquo rural collective initiatives siphoned off an enormous quantity of fit young laborers This loss of laborers led to a severely insufficient labor pool dedicated to agriculture and in many cases there was nobody available to harvest fields full of ripe grain which in turn led to a condition known as ldquopoor yields despite healthy cropsrdquo One farmer in Qingyuan County Baoding District said this of the situation ldquoFields of ripe beans rotting on the ground and to pick the cotton therersquos no one aroundrdquo7 The third reason was ldquoexcessive grain requisitioningrdquo caused by over- ambitious estimates of grain yields The Hebei Provincial Committee convened a province-wide financial and economic work conference at the end of August 1958 at which provincial officials apportioned the work of ldquogreat purchasing and great sellingrdquo of agricultural products and by-products At the conference grain output for the entire province was estimated at the enormous figure of 225 billion jin but the actual yield from 1958 was only 837 billion jin Of that total 2641 billion jin of grain was requisitioned 3155 percent of total grain output In February 1959 the Hebei provincial government convened a con-ference for the purchase and sale of agricultural products At this conference the province-wide grain yield was estimated at 30 billion kilograms officials demanded requisitioning of 435 billion jin to be realized by force if neces-sary The requisitioning figure was reduced to 335 billion kilograms in October The true grain yield in 1959 was 739 billion kilograms a drop of 980 million kilograms from 1958rsquos total but a total of 3323 billion kilogramsmdash4496 per-cent of the totalmdashwas requisitioned by the government After requisitioning rural citizens were left with 1235 kilograms of grain per capita a reduction of ten kilograms from the previous year Inflated estimates and increased requi-sitioning intensified the burden on rural citizens and severely dampened their

6 Hebei sheng zhimiddotliangshi zhi 《河北省志 middot粮食志》 [Records of Hebei ProvincemiddotGrain Records] (Zhongguo chengshi chubanshe 1994) 3

7 Ibid 45

LI120

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incentive It was reported that by 1958 ldquoover forty counties across the province were in famine with over 40000 people having fled from hungerrdquo8

By the end of 1958 the Hebei government ordered that grains and pota-toes be allotted together in public canteens and demanded that all local gov-ernments enforce planned eating and reasonable distribution of grain On December 30 Hebei ribao 河北日报 published an article reading ldquoPeoplersquos communes must enforce planned consumption of grains with the prerequi-site that commune members eat well and eat enough All food that is retained within peoplersquos communes after state requisitioning tasks are fulfilled must be reasonably distributedrdquo9 In May of the following year there were 255 se-vere incidents of canteens running out of food in fifty-five natural villages of the province10 These incidents indicate that Hebei did indeed face a dire food shortage many public canteens were forced to stop operating once food stocks had been exhausted

The ccp Central Committee convened a series of meetings from late 1958 to early 1958 to mitigate the negative influence of ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes on economic development and rectify peoplersquos communes On January 14 1959 the Hebei provincial government convened an assembly of delegates from advanced work units in rural socialist construction At the assembly provincial officials demanded that delegates thoroughly implement the ldquoResolutions Regard-ing Several Issues of Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于人民公社若干问题的决议 passed by the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Central Committee and the ldquoResolutions Regarding Rectifying and Solidifying Rural Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于整顿巩固农村人民公社的决议 passed at the second meeting of the Hebei Provincial Party Congress Officials further demanded that delegates grasp the opportunities of winter that year and spring the following year and over the course of about four months mobilize the entire party and entire pop-ulace to perform one-time deep rectification and solidification work within all peoplersquos communes11 With public canteens facing severe food shortages the Hebei Provincial Committee began taking proactive measures to mitigate the pressure that the food situation was exerting On April 21 the Hebei Provincial

8 Ibid9 ldquoGonggong shitang yong liang hai yao bu yao jihua 公共食堂用粮还要不要计划

[Should We Make Further Plans for Grain Demand in Public Canteens]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 December 30 1958

10 Liang Shuzhen 梁淑珍 ldquoDa ban nongcun gonggong shitang de lishi jiaoxun 大办农村

公共食堂的历史教训 [Historical Lessons from the Wide-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens]rdquo Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu 《中共党史研究》 3 (2000)

11 ldquoXie Xuegong tongzhi de kaimuci 解学恭同志的开幕词 [The Opening Address of Comrade Xie Xuegong]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 January 15 1959


ltUNgt

Committee held a telephone conference on resolution of food shortages Officials demanded that grain sale figures be reduced that a system of fixed per capita rations be instituted in rural canteens that emphasis be placed on food allocations and that more grain be purchased12 On April 23 the Hebei Provincial Committee transmitted to subordinate government bodies the ccp Central Committeersquos directives on feasibly reducing grain sales figures which demanded a reduction of urban grain sales by about one tenth The Central Committee had not however fully understood the level of danger posed by maladies plaguing rural public canteens this is reflected by the continued em-phasis on properly establishing public canteens contained in the ldquoResolutions Regarding Several Issues of Peoplersquos Communesrdquo In addition Mao Zedong had during the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Congress written the follow-ing memo regarding the publication of the Biography of Zhang Lu 张鲁传 ldquoIt is most interesting that those who eat in roadside eateries did not need to pay This was a harbinger of the public canteens in our peoplersquos communesrdquo13

As the various ills of public canteens gradually came to light the ccp Central Committee and Mao Zedong also gradually became aware of the severity of the issue In April 1959 some experts and academics from the Institute of Econom-ics of the China Academy of Sciences 中国科学院经济研究所 conducted an investigation into the problems caused by the large-scale establishment of public canteens in rural Changli County 昌黎县 Hebei Province Their inves-tigations yielded two reports ldquoDo Rural Canteens have any Advantages at Allrdquo 农村食堂究竟有无优越性 and ldquoRecent Working Conditions and Problems in Communes of Changli County Hebei Provincerdquo 河北省昌黎县最近公

社的工作情况和问题 In these reports researchers point out seven abuses that were taking place in rural public canteens in Changli County as well as across the country Mao approved the latter report and on May 2 wrote the following memo ldquoThe situation in Changli County Hebei Province and the opinions they raise are universal in nature Party committees in every location and at every tier should lay emphasis on the resolution of these problems the faster the betterrdquo14 That same month an enlarged meeting of the ccp Central Politburo in Shanghai issued a meeting summary titled ldquoRegarding Eighteen

12 Hebei sheng zhimiddotliangshi zhi 36213 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 7 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第7 册 [Mao

Zedong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 7] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992) 627

14 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 8 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第8 册 [Mao Zedong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 8] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1993) 241

LI122

ltUNgt

Issues of Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于人民公社的十八个问题 In it officials noted the following ldquo Communes may institute a meal ticket system in their canteens on the basis of per capita food rationing Once per month commune members who do not use all their tickets may exchange them for grain or cash to be considered their private propertyrdquo15 On May 26 the ccp Central Commit-tee issued the ldquoDirectives Regarding the Distribution of Summer Harvests in Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于人民公社夏收分配的指示 which stipulated the following

We must earnestly reform public canteens through the distribution of the summer harvest Public canteens must be founded properly and positively and participation therein is to be voluntary We must ensure that participa-tion in public canteens by commune members be truly voluntary but at the same time we cannot adopt a laissez-faire attitude and allow the canteens to disappear like the windhellip We may establish canteens in which all commune members participate or we may also establish canteens in which only a por-tion of commune members participate Canteens may be run all year long or they may be run only during busy farm work seasons They may also be flexibly operated with more running in busy seasons and fewer in slack seasons Those canteens which are too big may be appropriately scaled down Food supplies should be distributed directly to households and commune members on the basis of per capita rationing The rations of those people who eat in canteens should be distributed to canteens with less going to individuals The entirety of rations should be distributed to those people who do not eat in canteens for their own safekeeping and consumption16

In order to practically implement the spirit of the ccp Central Committeersquos ldquoDirectives Regarding the Distribution of Summer Harvests in Peoplersquos Com-munesrdquo on May 30 the Hebei Provincial Committee and Provincial Peoplersquos Committee jointly issued the ldquoDirectives Regarding the Solid Performance of Summertime Rural Work including Harvest Retention Government Pur-chases Utilization and Plantingrdquo 关于切实做好夏季农村工作实现收

好留好征购好用好种好的指示 The Directives made the follow-ing demands ldquoCanteen work must be improved and integrated with summer harvest distributionhellip They should be proactively rectified in accordance with the principles of proactivity voluntary participation by the masses diversity of methodology and being advantageous to production Various manners of



16 Luo Pinghan 罗平汉 Nongcun renmin gongshe shi 《农村人民公社史》 [The History of Rural Peoplersquos Collectives] (Fujian renmin chubanshe 2003) 141


ltUNgt

canteens should be established based on different seasons different condi-tions and different demands of the masses Canteens should continue to be run using methods of per capita rationing meal ticket systems and limited quantities of food being allotted to individualsrdquo17 On June 20 the Hebei Pro-vincial Peoplersquos Committee issued a statement demanding the reinstatement of the system of retaining private plots of land by individual households and the allowance of commune members to feed their own livestock and fowl and to operate private family side-businesses All income from these enterprises was to belong to commune members and no grain requisitioning was to be imposed on these incomes As to the issues of public canteens the statement stipulated the following ldquoFood rations are to be distributed to individual households on the basis of per capita rationing standards Those commune members who voluntarily choose to eat in canteens should have a portion of their rations distributed to canteensrdquo18 This relaxation of rural policy enabled rural citizens to engage in a certain extent of individual production and played an important role in the restoration and development of agricultural produc-tion Once rural citizens had been allowed to engage in individual production many local governments abolished their supply systems and dissolved a por-tion of public canteens This abolishment did not however fundamentally treat the chronic illness plaguing public canteens a fact which was to come to light after the forcible reinstatement of the public canteen policy

The reform of public canteens from early policies of ldquoeat for freerdquo and ldquofill up your bellyrdquo into a system of distributing rations directly to households served to mitigate the anarchy that had beset public canteens This reform was the result of adjustments made to the public canteen system caused by food short-ages These adjustments however did not change the overarching central push for the large-scale establishment of public canteens which continued to be considered part of the countryrsquos ldquobudding communismrdquo

iii Forcible Reinstatement

The Lushan Conference intended to correct ldquoleftistrdquo tendencies was con-vened in July and August of 1959 At the conference Peng Dehuai 彭德怀

17 ldquoQieshi zuo hao xiaji nongcun gongzuo zhong zhonggong Hebei shengwei sheng renmin weiyuanhui fachu zhishi 切实做好夏季农村工作中共河北省委省人民委员会

发出指示 [Solidly Carry Out the Instructions Issued by the Hebei cpc Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Peoplersquos Committee in Summertime Rural Work]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 June 12 1959

18 Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 254

LI124

ltUNgt

Zhang Wentian 张闻天 and other leaders raised criticisms of the Great Leap Forward and the peoplersquos commune movement including criticisms of public canteens Peng denounced the supply system and public canteens claiming that ldquoallowing the people to eat for free too soonrdquo and ldquoencouraging people to fill their belliesrdquo were ldquoboth lsquoleftistrsquo tendenciesrdquo19 Zhang proclaimed that ldquoso-cialism does not necessarily require such methods as the supply system and public canteensrdquo20 The conference denounced the views of Peng Zhang and others as ldquotrends of pessimistic thoughtrdquo Peng and others were condemned as rightist opportunists and members of anti-party cliques Maorsquos view was that disbanding public canteens was ldquoan extremely bad thought trend that will cor-rode the party and corrode the people It is in opposition to the will of the proletariat and mass of poor farmers and it is in opposition to Marxism and Leninismrdquo21 The atmosphere of the Lushan Conference quickly deteriorated into an ldquoanti-rightistrdquo movement

The attitude of the Hebei Government toward public canteens merged with the prevailing trend of attacking rightists and the policy for proactively estab-lishing public canteens was restored On September 12 the Hebei Provincial Committee issued the ldquoDirectives Regarding Proactively Establishing Rural Public Canteensrdquo 关于积极办好农村公共食堂的指示 which called for putting a stop to the growth of rightist thought and the negative emotions of letting things fall by the wayside They also called for the rapid restoration of public canteens22 From August 24 to September 16 an enlarged meeting of the eighth plenum of the First Hebei Provincial Committee was convened in Tianjin This meeting passed the ldquoResolutionon Opposing Right-leaning Ten-dencies Boosting Incentives and Launching a Movement to Increase Output and Promote Conservationrdquo 关于反右倾鼓干劲深入开展增产节约

运动的决议 The Resolution further criticized rightist thought The meet-ing made the following demands of all local governments in the province ldquo Actively engage in such collective welfare enterprises as establishing can-teens kindergartens childcare centers homes for the elderly and so on As for public canteens leading organizations and leading cadres at all levels should feasibly implement the centerrsquos guiding policy of lsquoproactive establishment and voluntary participationrsquo and enthusiastically support them lead them

19 Peng Dehuai zhuan 《彭德怀传》 [Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe 1993) 600

20 Zhang Wentian xuanji 《张闻天选集》 [Selected Works of Zhang Wentian] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1985) 497

21 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 8 ce 41022 Liang Shuzhen


ltUNgt

and cause them to grow better day by dayrdquo23 On September 25 and 26 the Hebei provincial government convened an enlarged meeting of the Provincial Peoplersquos Committee at which officials transmitted the resolutions issued by the eighth plenum of the Eighth ccp Central Committee and the spirit of the resolutions issued by the eighth plenum of the First Provincial Committee On October 15 the ccp Central Committee approved and issued the Ministry of Agriculture party organizationrsquos ldquoReport on the State of Rural Areas since the Lushan Conferencerdquo 关于庐山会议以来农村形势的报告 which claimed that ldquoeliminating a portion of the supply system closing down public can-teens and other measures run defiantly against the spirit of socialismrdquo The report further called for ldquoexposing such reactionary repulsive things as much as possiblerdquo and ldquocriticizing them and holding them to accountrdquo24

At this point the issue of public canteens became organically mixed to-gether with the anti-rightist movement as a negative attitude toward public canteens was taken as one of the marks of a rightist The Hebei provincial government ceased to give due consideration to objective reality and began fiercely attacking any ldquorightist speech and thoughtrdquo that was allegedly criti-cal of the supply system and public canteens Provincial officials then forcibly reinstated public canteens On October 14 Hebei ribao summarized the experi-ence of the Dongziyan Production Brigade 东紫烟生产队 of the Chengguan Commune 城关公社 of Xinle County 新乐县 extolling the 10 great advan-tages of public canteens suitability to collectivized production liberation of women convenience to the masses economization of labor efficient use of food and coal improvements to commune membersrsquo lives the fostering of the spirit of collectivism strengthening unity of the masses bringing harmony to families and driving the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo in production25 These moves strongly repoliticized the issue of public canteens and exacerbated the spread of ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes Even with food supplies still extremely tight public can-teens many of which had been forced to close due to exhausted supplies

23 ldquoGuanyu fanyouqing gu ganjin shenru kaizhan zengchan jieyue yundong de jueyi 关于

反右倾鼓干劲深入开展增产节约运动的决议 [Directives Regarding Opposing Rightists Encouraging Enthusiasm and Launching a Movement to Increase Production and Increase Savings]rdquo Hebei Ribao 《河北日报》 September 22 1959

24 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 12 ce 62125 ldquoDongziyan sheyuan zhengkua shitang hao zongjie jingyan ba shitang ban de geng hao

东紫烟社员争夸食堂好总结经验把食堂办得更好 [Members of Dongziyan Commune Sing Praises of Canteens Summarizing Experience Makes Canteens Better]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 October 14 1959

LI126

ltUNgt

were resuscitated It was reported that ldquo100000 canteens have been rectified or developed amid the movement of the Great Leap Forward in productionrdquo26

In late February 1960 the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee issued the ldquoReport on the Current Conditions of Rural Public Canteensrdquo 关于目前农村

公共食堂情况的报告 which read ldquoCanteens are also a battlefield position of socialism which we defend tenaciously If we lose this position it will be impossible for peoplersquos communes to maintain their strength and there will be no guarantee for the Great Leap Forwardrdquo27 This report caught the attention of the ccp Central Committee and Mao In a memo regarding this report the Central Committee reversed the position on the distribution of food rations to households which it had taken in 1959rsquos ldquoDirectives Regarding the Distribution of Summer Harvests in Peoplersquos Communesrdquo The memo read ldquoThe principles of food distribution are send quotas to householdssend physical materials to canteens eat on the basis of meal tickets and reduce the amount that goes to individuals These are prerequisites for properly establishing canteensrdquo ldquoThis practice should be emulated across the country with no exceptionsrdquo28 The forcible reinstatement of public canteens and reversals on policies for distrib-uting food directly to households further stripped rural citizens of their rights to private ownership and demand for food Without a doubt this reinstate-ment added to their already heavy burden

On March 18 the ccp Central Committee issued the ldquoMemo on Strengthen-ing Leadership of Public Canteensrdquo 关于加强公共食堂领导的批示 which Mao had drafted himself The Memo demanded that all local governments across the country continue to reinstate and promulgate public canteens As early as February 17 at the second meeting of the Second Hebei Provincial Peoplersquos Congress public canteens were established as a focus of rural work The congress demanded that ldquoin the countryside we must place central em-phasis on grain make canteens the focus and feasibly plan the lives of the massesrdquo29 In November the central government issued the ldquoUrgent Instruc-tions on Current Policy Issues in Rural Peoplersquos Communesrdquo 关于农村人民

公社当前政策问题的紧急指示信 (more commonly known as the ldquoTwelve

26 ldquoWosheng nongcun da yuejin gaochao xiongyong pengpai 我省农村大跃进高潮汹涌

澎湃 [The Surging Tide of the Great Leap Forward in the Rural Areas of this Province]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 October 21 1959


13 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 13] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 47

28 Ibid 43ndash4429 Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 517ndash518


ltUNgt

Instructionsrdquo) intended to reverse severe economic hardship in the country-side The Instructions ended the ldquoanti-rightistrdquo movement begun at the Lushan Conference and took initial steps toward reversing ldquoleftistrdquo practices However the Instructions continued to refer to public canteens as battlefield positions of socialism which must be stalwartly defended The Instructions read as fol-lows ldquoPublic canteens must be properly established The key to properly es-tablishing canteens is for lsquopolitics to enter the canteen and cadres to enter the kitchenrsquohellip Resolutely implement per capita rationing sending quotas to households sending food to canteens enforcing the meal ticket institution and reducing distribution to individualshellip The institution of public canteens must be persisted inrdquo30 In 1960 Hebei suffered a severe natural disaster that greatly stressed food supply yet the official line still held that public canteens must be persisted in On December 31 Hebei ribao reprinted an editorial that had appeared in Dong feng Magazine titled ldquoStriving to Increase Agricultural Yields in 1961rdquo 为争取 1961年的农业丰收而奋斗 The editorial read that ldquoagriculture has suffered from two consecutive years of natural disasters par-ticularly in 1960 when the scale of the disaster was unprecedentedrdquo but ldquothe proper establishment of public canteens enables the masses to participate in the production movement with healthy bodies and abundant spirit This is an extremely important condition for ensuring bumper crop agricultural yields This is an extremely important task that we should fully implement through-out the entire yearrdquo31

iv Complete Abolition

The Great Leap Forward threw the national economy into a quagmire As a result of the movement the national economy became severely imbalanced and total output values of both industry and agriculture fell several years con-secutively During this period there were great losses to productivity in the cities and rural areas of Hebei Province particularly in grain production These losses led to famine and the abnormal deaths of humans and livestock in some regions of the province Grain output in Hebei during the Great Leap For-ward fell to the level of 1953 ldquoAfter 1960 when grain purchase and sale figures were reduced overall grain conditions worsened to an unusual extent In 1961

30 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 13 ce 67131 ldquoWei zhengqu 1961 nian de nongye fengshou er fendou 为争取 1961年的农业丰收而


LI128

ltUNgt

province-wide per capita grain output was 1561 kilograms and oil crop output was 305 kilograms the rural per capita grain ration fell to 134 kilograms from 184 kilograms in 1957 a reduction of fifty kilogramsrdquo32

The ccp Central Committee took a series of measures to mitigate the dam-age done to the national economy In January 1961 the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Congress formally passed the Eight Character Guiding Policy 八字方针 intended to ldquoadjust solidify replenish and increaserdquo the national economy and also commit to implementingthoroughly the ldquoTwelve Instruc-tionsrdquo in the countryside At the plenum Mao emphasized the ideological line and working method of seeking truth from facts calling for the entire party to incite a trend of investigation and research Faced with a strong public out-cry against public canteens Mao dispatched teams to conduct rural investiga-tions in Zhejiang led by Tian Jiaying 田家英 to Hunan led by Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木 and to Guangdong led by Chen Boda 陈伯达 The ccp Central Com-mittee convened the ldquoThree Souths Conferencerdquo 三南会议 and ldquoThree Norths Conferencerdquo 三北会议 in February and March collectively as a central work conference in Guangzhou To address the various abuses which had appeared in the peoplersquos communes the conference passed the ldquoWorking Regulations for Rural Peoplersquos Communes (Draft)rdquo 农村人民公社工作条例(草案) This draft did not however change the stipulations of the ldquoTwelve Instructionsrdquo regarding public canteens Rather this document held that ldquoproduction teams should actively establish public canteens in all places that meet conditionsrdquo33 The masses however had by this time long been dissatisfied with public can-teens At the ldquoThree Souths Conferencerdquo somebody transmitted the four great disadvantages of public canteens as had been reported by the branch secre-tary of a production brigade in Guangdong they destroy the mountains and forests they waste labor they have no meat and theyrsquore disadvantageous to production34 Itrsquos plain to see that public canteens had become an onerous problem that desperately needed to be solved On March 7 the Hebei Provin-cial Peoplersquos Committee convened an enlarged meeting to analyze the reasons

32 Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 52733 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与


34 Liang Yaoji 梁耀基 ldquoYi wei yinqi Mao Zedong guanzhu de nongcun dang zhibu shuji -- -- Liang Jinan fanying gongshe gonggong shitang wenti de guocheng 一位引起毛泽东

关注的农村党支部书记mdashmdash梁纪南反映公社公共食堂问题的过程 [One Rural Branch Secretary Who Caught Mao Zedongrsquos Attention mdash Liang Jinanrsquos reporting of the Problems of Public Canteens in Communes]rdquo Guangdong dangshi 《广东党史》 5 (2002)


ltUNgt

behind economic hardships in the province The committee also proposed concrete measures to overcome hardship and demanded that all provincial and city-level regions concentrate efforts in agriculture and grain output In the first half of that year Hebei Provincial Committee Secretary Liu Zihou 刘子厚 led an investigation in the Rencheng Commune 任城公社 of Julu County 巨鹿县 after which he wrote the ldquoReport on the Issues of Canteensrdquo 关于食堂问题的报告 to Mao In the report he noted the problem of egali-tarianism that had emerged in public canteens primarily in excessive use of labor excessive expenditures and a reduction of the value of workpoints

After the Guangzhou Central Working Conference 广州中央工作会议 leaders at every level from the center to the village left their offices and vis-ited public canteens to study their problems At the end of April Zhou Enlai 周恩来 travelled to Handan 邯郸 Hebei to receive reports from provincial cadres From May 3 to 7 Zhou personally visited several impoverished mid-dle peasant households in the Boting Commune 伯延公社 of Wursquoan County 武安县 Hebei where he made inspections of collectivized canteens This visit gave Zhou first-hand experience of a number of the problems taking place in public canteens He discovered that the central directives on developing can-teens and maintaining a portion of the supply system did not conform to the real conditions of the countryside These were in fact two issues about which both cadres and the masses had the most vehement complaints Zhou report-ed his findings to Mao who was in Shanghai at the time35 Further investiga-tions were then conducted by Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 in Hunan Zhu De 朱德 in Sichuan and Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 and Peng Zhen 彭真 in the outskirts of Beijing They all reported the various severe problems of public canteens to Mao and the fact that the masses were unanimous in their desire to abolish the institution Their reports ended up compelling the ccp Central Commit-tee and Mao to change the policies calling for persistence in public canteens

From the end of May to the beginning of June The ccp Central Committee convened a working conference in Beijing at which the ldquoWorking Regulations for Rural Peoplersquos Communesrdquo were debated and revised The revised draft stipulated the following ldquoThe decision whether or not a production team establishes a canteen is to be decided entirely by debate among commune membershellip All commune membersrsquo rations should be distributed to house-holds regardless of whether the production team has established a public canteen these rations are to be used at the discretion of individual commune

35 Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949ndash1976) zhong juan 《周恩来年谱 (1949~1976)》中卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1949ndash1976) Vol 2] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1997) 409

LI130

ltUNgt

membersrdquo36 In order to thoroughly implement the spirit of the Central Committeersquos instructions on public canteens on May 25 the Hebei provincial government drafted the ldquoSupplemental Working Regulations for Rural Peoplersquos Communes (Revised Draft)rdquo 农村人民公社工作补充条例(草案修改稿) this document adopted a policy of ldquogenerally not establishingrdquo public canteens By the end of May all public canteens in Hebei province were disbanded ush-ering the public canteen off the stage of history

References

ldquoBan hao gonggong shitang 办好公共食堂 [Proper Operation and Management of Public Canteens]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 October 25 1958



ldquoDongziyan sheyuan zhengkua shitang hao zongjie jingyan ba shitang ban de geng hao 东紫烟社员争夸食堂好总结经验把食堂办得更好 [Members of Dongzi-yan Commune Sing Praises of Canteens Summarizing Experience Makes Canteens Better]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 October 14 1959

ldquoGonggong shitang yong liang hai yao bu yao jihua 公共食堂用粮还要不要计划 [Should We Make Further Plans for Grain Demand in Public Canteens]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 December 30 1958

ldquoGuanyu fanyouqing gu ganjin shenru kaizhan zengchan jieyue yundong de jueyi 关于反右倾鼓干劲深入开展增产节约运动的决议 [Directives Regarding Opposing Right-Leaning Tendencies Boosting Incentives and Launching a Move-ment to Increase Output and Promote Conservation]rdquo Hebei Ribao 《河北日报》 September 22 1959

Hebei sheng zhimiddotliangshi zhi 《河北省志 middot粮食志》 [Records of Hebei ProvincemiddotGrain Records] (Zhongguo chengshi chubanshe 1994)

Hebei sheng zhimiddotzhengfu zhi 《河北省志 middot政府志》 [Records of Hebei ProvincemiddotGovernshyment Records] (Renmin chubanshe 2000)





ltUNgt



12 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 12] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996)


Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 14 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》

第 14 册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 14] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1997)

ldquoLaoli da jiefang shengchan da yuejin Xushui xian sheshe ban qi gonggong shitang 劳力大解放生产大跃进徐水县社社办起公共食堂 [Great Liberation of Labor Great Leap Forward in Production All Communes of Xushui County Establishing Public Canteens on a Wide Scale]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 July 12 1958

Liang Shuzhen 梁淑珍 ldquoDa ban nongcun gonggong shitang de lishi jiaoxun 大办农村

公共食堂的历史教训 [Historical Lessons from the Large-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens]rdquo Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu 《中共党史研究》 3 (2000)

Liang Yaoji 梁耀基 ldquoYi wei yinqi Mao Zedong guanzhu de nongcun dang zhibu shuji -- -- Liang Jinan fanying gongshe gonggong shitang wenti de guocheng 一位引起

毛泽东关注的农村党支部书记 mdashmdash梁纪南反映公社公共食堂问题的过程 [One Rural Branch Secretary Who Caught Mao Zedongrsquos Attention mdash Liang Jinanrsquos reporting of the Problems of Public Canteens in Communes]rdquo Guangdong dangshi 《广东党史》 5 (2002)

Luo Pinghan 罗平汉 Nongcun renmin gongshe shi 《农村人民公社史》 [The Hisshytory of Rural Peoplersquos Collectives] (Fujian renmin chubanshe 2003)

Peng Dehuai zhuan 《彭德怀传》 [Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe 1993)

ldquoQieshi zuo hao xiaji nongcun gongzuo zhong zhonggong Hebei shengwei sheng renmin weiyuanhui fachu zhishi 切实做好夏季农村工作中共河北省委省

人民委员会发出指示 [Feasibly Carry Out the Instructions Issued by the Hebei CCP Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Peoplersquos Committee in Summer Rural Work]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 June 12 1959

ldquoWei zhengqu 1961 nian de nongye fengshou er fendou 为争取 1961年的农业丰收而


ldquoWosheng nongcun da yuejin gaochao xiongyong pengpai 我省农村大跃进高潮汹

涌澎湃 [The Surging Tide of the Great Leap Forward in the Rural Areas of this Province]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 October 21 1959

LI132

ltUNgt

ldquoXie Xuegong tongzhi de kaimuci 解学恭同志的开幕词 [The Opening Address of Comrade Xie Xuegong]rdquo Hebei ribao 《河北日报》 January 15 1959

Zhang Wentian xuanji 《张闻天选集》 [Selected Works of Zhang Wentian] (Bei-jing Renmin chubanshe 1985)

Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949ndash1976) zhong juan 《周恩来年谱(1949~1976)》中卷 [Chronshyicles of Zhou Enlai (1949ndash1976) Vol 2] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1997)


ltUNgt

chapter 6

From Busy-Season Childcare Centers to Full-scale KindergartensmdashRural Childcare Organizations in Shanxi Province in the 1950s

Han Xiaoli 1

Abstract

In the 1950rsquos rural childcare in Shanxi Province evolved from seasonal childcare cen-ters into model kindergartens and from voluntary mutually beneficial arrangements between cooperative members into full-fledged public welfare enterprises Theregion-ally diverse seasonal childcare organizations became standard model kindergartens with standards of education and enrollment as their objectives evolved from the liberation of women to the education of children Changes that took place in rural childcare organizations reflected the statersquos efforts to develop rural public welfare en-terprises amid social transformations of the time Throughout this process there were both popular innovations that met the true needs of rural areas as well as the problem of exaggerated figures and adventurism A look back on the lessons of history is help-ful not only for more deeply understanding changes that took place to Chinese rural society in that particular era and comprehending efforts and explorations on the part of the government and the masses to build an ideal society but also in resolving to-dayrsquos rural social issues particularly as related to the issue of migrants leaving children behind in their villages an now issue widely discussed in China

Keywords

busy-season childcare centers ndash model kindergartens ndash social reformation

In recent years there has been a great deal of attention paid to research of Chinese rural society during the era of the agricultural cooperative How did the ccp promote the agricultural cooperative and peoplersquos commune movements

1 Han Xiaoli (韩晓莉 ) holds a PhD in history and was conducting postdoctorate research in the history department of Capital Normal University at the time this essay was written

HAN 134

ltUNgt

under new social structures and social relations How were the masses mobi-lized and organized in such an enormous social revolution These have been the foci of academic research in this field In the 1950s many different forms of childcare organizations emerged in rural China They were popularized and touted as safeguards for the cooperative movement and components of rural welfare enterprises In this essay I shall focus on Shanxi Province and make use of local records field surveys2 and materials published in newspapers to conduct a deep investigation into rural childcare organizations from the time of cooperatization to the advent of the peoplersquos commune I hope this will pro-vide valuable lessons for the resolution of modern rural social issues

i Pilots in Busy-Season Childcare Centers

The emergence of rural childcare organizations is closely related to the entry of women into the workforce The liberation and mobilization of women was an important social policy of governments in communist base areas since the beginning of the revolution After the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China the guiding ideology concerning women in the workforce was to en-able women to leave the house and become involved in socialist reformation and construction On October 20 1949 the Shanxi provincial government con-vened a womenrsquos congress at which it was proposed that as part of the great production movement of 1950 seventy percent of women would participate in agricultural work3 The first step to meeting this objective was to liberate women from the burden of caring for children

Shortly after the beginning of the cooperative movement some rural gov-ernments of Shanxi began pilots in childcare mutual aid teams and childcare centers that opened during busy farm work seasons in order to free up more of the female labor pool In spring 1951 Xigu Village 西故村 Tunliu County 屯留

县 established a busy-season childcare team one of the first childcare teams in Shanxi As the initial childcare team was highly effective at liberating female

2 Some records and materials used to write this essay came from field surveys conducted by professors and students of the Chinese History Institute of Shanxi University They are stored in the archives of that Institute

3 ldquoQuan sheng funuuml daibiao huiyi jueding funuuml ying zuo de shiqing 全省妇女代表会议决定

妇女应做的事情 [Province-wide Womenrsquos Congress Determines Things Women Should Do]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 November 10 1949 second edition


ltUNgt

labor the number of such groups quickly grew from one to six4 The provincial government lauded Xigursquos experience and quickly introduced the model of childcare teams and busy-season childcare centers to the rest of the province

Although government officials believed that the establishment of busy- season childcare centers helped reduce womenrsquos burdens in the home the public was highly apprehensive of the practice at first Some even displayed doubts or feelings of revulsion In 1952 a womenrsquos symposium was convened by the government of Xinhe Village 新河村 Wutai County 五台县 in prepa-ration for the establishment of a nursemaid group ldquoAt the symposium some older women expressed fear that the children would cry that there would be much urine and feces and that there would be disharmony among the adults if children were not cared for properly Young women who took the podium said they were not willing to allow others to take their children away from them and that if it was tiresome for them to care for the children it would be even more so for older peoplerdquo5 After the agricultural cooperative of Hongjing Village 洪井村 Licheng County 黎城县 had established a busy-season child-care center only two women sent their children there The rest of the women preferred letting their children run wild in the fields to sending them to the cen-ter When the female deputy commune director visited individual households one mother asked her ldquoHow could somebody see a child as kin if they didnrsquot bear the child or rear himrdquo Another mother said ldquoMy child is still small hersquoll be bullied by the older children if I send him to the centerrdquo The nurses and maids had their own concerns One said ldquoItrsquod be fine if you asked us to raise pigs but we donrsquot dare to take the responsibility of watching childrenrdquo6 When the Nanyujiao Cooperative 南余交农业生产合作社 of Qin County 沁县 opened a pilot busy-season childcare centers nursemaids there raised four things that gave them fear ldquoFirst we fear gossip Second we fear that the mothers wonrsquot trust us Third we fear the children will fall ill Fourth we fear that watching children is exhaustingrdquo Mothers were either afraid that their children would

4 ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao le 屯留县西故村农忙托儿

所办得更好了 [Childcare Centers in Xigu Village Tunliu County Now Better Run]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 April 21 1952 second edition

5 ldquoXinhe cun chengli le baomu xiaozu dai haizi de funuuml shang le minxiao 新河村成立了

保姆小组带孩子的妇女上了民校 [Xinhe Village Has Established a Guardian Group Women with Children Now in Peoplersquos School]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 December 14 1952 fourth edition

6 ldquoBa haizi song dao nongmang tuorsquoersuo qu 把孩子送到农忙托儿所去 [Send Children to Busy-Season Childcare Centers]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 June 1 1955 third edition

HAN 136

ltUNgt

not be well looked after in the childcare center or were resentful of the work-points that would be allocated to the nursemaids7

The awkwardness that plagued busy-season childcare centers was mitigat-ed as the cooperative movement deepened One reason for this mitigation of awkwardness was that the various cooperatives improved the organization and administration of childcare centers on the basis of real circumstances elimi-nating the concerns of mothers and nursemaids alike Another reason was the policy for paying women and men equally for equal work which greatly in-creased womenrsquos incentives for participation in labor By the spring of 1952 there were ten childcare centers in Xigu Village with twenty-five nursemaids caring for 125 children making ninety-eight female laborers available for work outside the home8 The Womenrsquos Federation of Sigouhui Village 寺沟会村 Kelan County 岢岚县 founded three childcare teams in the village with three nursemaids supervising all the children in the village9 The Baiyangyu Agricul-tural Cooperative 白羊峪农业生产合作社 of Xiyang County 昔阳县 solved the childcare problems for twenty-four women through the establishment of various forms of childcare teams allowing them to participate in production10

The establishment of busy-season childcare centers played an active role in spurring women to participate in work outside the home the centers them-selves gradually came to be accepted by the public In early 1952 the women of Xigu Village worked alongside with male workers to dig twenty-five wells and four cisterns They also dug one cistern and one well and weeded 973 mu of grain fields on their own Ninety-eight women with children enrolled in child-care centers sun-dried the grain harvest from twenty-six mu of land11 The fifth production team of the Nanyujiao Agricultural Cooperative of Qin County was

7 ldquoNanyujiao nongyeshe zuzhi nongmang tuorsquoersuo tengchu you xiaohai funuuml canjia tian-jian shengchan 南余交农业社组织农忙托儿所腾出有小孩妇女参加田间生产 [Nanyujiao Agricultural Cooperative Organizes Busy Season Childcare Centers Frees Women with Children to Participate in Agricultural Production]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山

西农民》 July 7 1954 second edition8 ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao lerdquo9 ldquoSigouhui cun de funuuml bianyang la 寺沟会村的妇女变样啦 [The Women of Sigouhui

Village Have Changed]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 August 14 1952 second edition

10 ldquoBaiyangyu nongye shengchan hezuoshe shixing nannuuml tong gong tong chou funuuml can-jia shengchan de jijixing gengjia tigao 白羊峪农业生产合作社实行男女同工同酬妇女参加生产的积极性更加提高 [Baiyangyu Agricultural Cooperative Implements Equal Pay for Equal Work for Men and Women Womenrsquos Proactivity in Participating in Production Further Increased]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 September 5 1953 second edition



ltUNgt

the first there to run a pilot childcare center which allowed four women with children to participate in production work outside the home Female coopera-tive member Wang Ehai 王娥孩 had this to say ldquoBefore I was so tired because of the child(ren) that I couldnrsquot even go into the fields and I was often very angry Now that the child(ren) is (are) looked after I can get in more days of laborrdquo12 As a result cooperative members began actively demanding the rees-tablishment of busy-season childcare centers

Some cooperatives when liberating female laborers from childcare to par-ticipate in production outside the home also used the same childcare model to enable women to study In 1952 Dongcheng Village 东城村 Quwo County 曲沃县 established an ldquointensive literacy classrdquo for women Most students brought their children however who turned the classroom into a playground greatly compromising the efficiency of the class The village government then established a childcare center to look after all the children in one place One villager had this to say ldquoIt has become convenient for women to participate in production outside the home and to engage in studies since the founding of the childcare center This has made them more at ease during their studies The women in the intensive literacy class are making progress quite quicklyrdquo13 The womenrsquos school of Xinhe Village District One Wutai County adopted a similar method There twenty-two senior villagers were organized into a child nursemaid group to watch forty-two children Every day after lunch the female students of the school sent their children to the nursemaid group before head-ing off to classes atthe school14

The establishment of busy-season childcare centers not only liberated wom-en laborers from childcare but also brought about a certain degree of change to the social atmosphere Once women worked outside the home their incomes in-creased and relations among family members became increasingly harmonious In the Gucheng Zhang Bingyi Agricultural Cooperative 故城张炳义农业生

产合作社 of Wuxiang County 武乡县 ldquoold women were organized to watch after the children giving them something to do and a sense of satisfaction With women joining the labor force fifteen men were freed up to engage in secondary enterprises Some of these men packaged grain in the granary and

12 ldquoNanyujiao nongyeshe zuzhi nongmang tuorsquoersuo tengchu you xiaohai funuuml canjia tian-jian shengchanrdquo

13 ldquoQuwo Dongcheng cun chengli le tuorsquoersuo jiejue le dai haizi funuuml de xuexi kunnan 曲沃东城村成立了托儿所解决了带孩子妇女的学习困难 [Dongcheng Village of Quwo Founds Childcare Center Resolves Difficulties Experienced by Women with Chil-dren in Attending School]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 December 1 1952 fourth edition

14 ldquoXinhe cun chengli le baomu xiaozu dai haizi de funuuml shang le minxiaordquo

HAN 138

ltUNgt

some became carpenters These men earned a considerable amount of money and so they too were happy The women were able to earn more workpoints from their work outside the home now that their children were in childcare centers and so they were also satisfied Economic production was going well and we had achieved satisfaction by three different groupsrsquordquo15

ii Organization and Administration of Busy-Season Childcare Centers

Although at first rural citizens founded busy childcare centers on their own later agricultural cooperatives began to play an important role in their intro-duction in other areas At this time childcare centers were administered in ac-cordance with the principle of voluntary mutual benefit between cooperative members Administratorsrsquo greatest functions were coordination and oversight

(A) The First Problems to Solve were Reasonable Labor Exchange Arrangements Addressing Womenrsquos Concerns and Compensation for the Nursemaids

When childcare centers first appeared the greatest concern of mothers and nursemaids alike was how the workpoints they would earn (or lose) would be calculated Rural mothers were concerned that too many workpoints would be allocated to the nursemaids which would make it not worth their while to work outside the home The nursemaids by contrast felt that caring for chil-dren was dirty tiring work and if too few workpoints were allocated for this work they might as well be toiling in the fields instead Cooperatives had to find a way to keep everybody satisfied and so they established measures in-formed with input from both sides

Cooperatives first helped their female members figure out the economics Letrsquos examine the example of Gu Jinzhi 顾金枝 mother of two and member of the Nanguan Village Agricultural Cooperative 南关村农业合作社 of Tiejiahui Township 铁家会乡 Fanzhi County 繁峙县 When the cooperative founded its childcare center a total of ten workpoints were assigned for one day of work outside the home Gu could earn seven or more points every day they worked and she could work about eighty days out of the year Sending her children to a childcare center for those eighty days would earn a nursemaid a

15 Wuxiang funuuml yundong shiliao xuanbian di 2 ji《武乡妇女运动史料选编》第2 集 [Selected Historical Materials from the Womenrsquos Movement in Wuxiang Vol 2] ed Wux-iang County Womenrsquos Movement History Office 武乡县妇运史办公室 (1985) 40


ltUNgt

total of twenty-nine workpoints which left her a total of 771 paid days of work and an income of 8481 yuan If she had opted to stay at home with her children and forego working outside the home she would have earned no income This calculation eliminated the worries of mothers who collectively declared their position ldquoWe are willing to send our children thererdquo16 Gong Yumei 弓玉梅 member of the Donghongyi Agricultural Cooperative 东洪驿农业生产合作

社 of Anze County 安泽县 had this to say ldquoAfter they showed us the compari-son I came to truly understand that participating in cooperative production was much better than spinning thread at home I can earn at least six points a day of which I give two and a half to the nursemaid That leaves me with a net earning of three and a half points Who would give me even one point for staying at homerdquo Having been persuaded the mothers of the village sent their thirty-nine children into the care of seven nursemaids greatly freeing up female labor for participation in production outside the home17

The various cooperatives generally made compensation for the nursemaids flexible depending on local conditions The Nanyujiao Agricultural Coop-erative of Qin County made the following stipulation ldquoOne and half points shall be awarded per child per day for small children unable to walk For older children able to walk 08 points shall be awarded per child per dayrdquo18 The Xigu Village Agricultural Cooperative of Tunliu County made this stipula-tion ldquoWorkpoints shall be awarded based on the age of children supervised Two and a half points shall be awarded for watching small children two years of age and under Two points shall be awarded for caring children four years and under One point shall be awarded for caring for children six years and under Ten workpoints are equivalent to one day of a womanrsquos laborrdquo19 The government of Quwo County made the following stipulation ldquoAll nursemaid compensations shall be borne by the mothers These compensation should be

16 Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇女联合会 ldquoTiejiahui xiang Nanguan cun gongnong lianmengshe shi zenyang ban qi tuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan de (1956 nian 7 yue 3 ri) 铁家会乡南关村工农联盟社是怎样办起托儿所幼儿园的 (1956年7月3 日 ) [How the Worker-Peasant Alliance of Nanguan Village Tiejiahui Township Established Childcare Centers and Kindergartens (July 3 1956)]rdquo Xinzhou City Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 6ndash2

17 Shanxi Provincial Democratic Womenrsquos Federation 山西省民主妇女联合会 ldquoFunuuml ertong fuli gongzuo jingyan jieshao (1956 nian 3 yue) 妇女儿童福利工作经验介绍

(1956年3月 ) [Introduction to the Experience of Womenrsquos and Childrenrsquos Welfare Work (March 1956)]rdquo 8

18 ldquoNanyujiao nongyeshe zuzhi nongmang tuorsquoersuo tengchu you xiaohai funuuml canjia tianjian shengchanrdquo


HAN 140

ltUNgt

according to seasonal fluctuations to the age of the children being watched and the quality of the care The ultimate principle to be observed is voluntary mutual interest between mothers and nursemaidsrdquo20

(B) Second Systems were to be Tailored to Local Conditions and a Variety of Models of Childcare Service were to be Adopted

Local governments encouraged officials in all localities to establish childcare centers that suit local conditions to operate cooperatives in accordance with the principles of thrift and industry and to offer flexibility in childcare ser-vices In 1956 the government of Quwo County issued the ldquoUrgent Notice on the Large-scale Establishment of Busy-Season Childcare Centersrdquo 关于大力

举办农忙托儿所的紧急通知 which read as follows ldquoEarnestly and thor-oughly implement the principle of thrift and hard work in operating coopera-tives set your goals according to a realistic understanding of your means and capabilities The best method to adopt at present is unified leadership over a number of child supervision centers It is appropriate for onenursemaid to watchtwo to three children This makes it easy to solve the housing problem and to meet hygiene and sanitation standards and helps prevent the spread of communicativediseasesrdquo21 The Womenrsquos Federation of Qi County 祁县 is-sued this statement ldquoActively build all manner of childcare organizations on the basis of the principle of running cooperatives by abiding by the princi-ples of thrift and hard work the needs of production and the demands of the peoplerdquo22

By 1956 there were 104 childcare groups and centers in Wuxiang County where childcare services were divided into three categories The first category featuredmultiple childcare facilities under unified leadership In such child-care facilities each nursemaid was charged with watching three to six chil-dren with a total of over 100 children among all the facilities Childcare centers in the second category putall the nursemaids and all the children in their care together for centralized education there were over fifty children cared for in

20 ldquoQuwo xian renmin weiyuanhui guanyu dali juban nongmang tuorsquoersuo de jinji tongzhi (1956 nian 5 yue 28 ri) 曲沃县人民委员会关于大力举办农忙托儿所的紧急通知

(1956年5月28日 ) [Urgent Notice of the Quwo County Peoplersquos Committee on Striving to Establish Busy Season Childcare Centers]rdquo Houma City Shangpingwang Village Archives 131ndash5

21 Ibid22 Qi County Democratic Womenrsquos Federation 祁县民主妇女联合会 ldquoQiuji funuuml gong-

zuo anpai de chubu yijian (1956 nian 10 yue 3 ri) 秋季妇女工作安排的初步意见 (1956年 10月3日 ) [Initial Opinions on Womenrsquos Autumn Work Plans (December 3 1956)]rdquo Qi County Li Village Archives 42ndash63


ltUNgt

centers in this category The third category involved mutual aid among fami-lies and neighbors in this category nursemaids and children were assembled together twice a month forclasses23 The childcare center of the Nanguan Co-operative 南关社 of Tiejiahui Township Fanzhi County adopted the model of multiple facilities under unified leadership on the basis of how far one lived from thesefacilities Nursemaids there care for children by themselves at home or together with two or three other Nursemaids24 During my investigation in Nanyukou Village 南峪口村 Dongshan Township 东山乡 Fanzhi County I discovered that mutual aid between neighbors and family members had been particularly widespread during the era of cooperatization One senior still living there Mrs Zhao Xiuying 赵秀英 recalled that when the village cooperative was formed because of her poor healthshe stayed at home watching her three children and two neighborsrsquo children ldquoBack then we had no childcare centers to speak of It was just people in the village helping each other out It was enough for people to express their gratitude by sharing some grain after the autumn harvest This was very common in the villagerdquo25

(C) Oversight was Strengthened Nursemaid Duties Clarified and the Level of Care Increased

Agricultural cooperatives all imposed concrete requirements on nursemaids to ensure that busy season childcare centers continue to function over the long term Some cooperatives improved nursemaidsrsquo abilities through fixed-interval education Most nursemaids were older women from villages no longer able to participate in work outside the home and so their generally low levels of edu-cational attainment determined that the primary means of supervision imple-mented in childcare facilities was household education At this time the funda-mental requirement to which cooperatives subjectednursemaidswas to ensure the health of children under their care The Tinghebao Village 停河堡村 Busy-Season Childcare Center of Licheng County 黎城县 was a model childcare center in the area The extent to which nursemaids there took care of children in their care was described thus ldquoThey fed the children mixed soup when it was time to eat Once they had gotten full the older children were made to

23 Wuxiang funuuml yundong shiliao xuanbian di 3 ji《武乡妇女运动史料选编》第3集 [Selected Historical Materials from the Womenrsquos Movement in Wuxiang Vol 3] ed Wuxiang County Womenrsquos Movement History Office 武乡县妇运史办公室 (1985) 4ndash5

24 Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇女联合会 ldquoTiejiahui xiang Nanguan cun gongnong lianmengshe shi zenyang ban qi tuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan de (1956 nian 7 yue 3 ri)rdquo

25 From an interview I conducted with the 89-year old Zhao Xiuying in Nanyukou Village Dongshan Township Fanzhi County on February 21 2013

HAN 142

ltUNgt

lead the younger children in games The younger children were both comfort-able and happyrdquo26 In addition to imposing basic requirements for maintaining childrenrsquos health some cooperatives with the means to do so opted to increase nursemaid standards by establishing childcare center committees convening meetings at fixed intervals offering nursemaid education and implementing other methods as well In March 1952 the government of Xigu Village Tunliu County convened a meeting composed of delegates from the village childcare center nursemaids and mothers Delegates summarized a year of achieve-ments and shortcomings and established institutions to address issues of sani-tation and nursemaid shift changes The cooperative ldquoimplemented nursemaid education that was good for oneself good for others and good for the state [Officials] described the conditions of childcare centers in the Soviet Union and recounted to them some common sense knowledge about sanitation The patriotic convention of childcare centers requires that nursemaids not only take good care of children and see to their health but also that they tend to the childrenrsquos patriotic education and internationalist educationrdquo27

Local governments and cooperatives operating on the principle of volun-tary mutual benefit between cooperative members played an important role in the organization and administration of busy season childcare centers they established objectives that satisfied both mothers and nursemaids Although preschool education practices taken in busy-season childcare centers at the time pales in comparison with modern practices the basic demands of flexibly customizing service according to the specific conditions in different places and prioritizing childrenrsquos health fit the true social needs of rural areas at the time

iii Establishing Model Kindergartens

In 1958 changes began taking place in the nature of rural childcare organiza-tions as the peoplersquos commune movement began taking off At this time child-care centers and kindergartens both important components of rural public welfare system were accorded special significance Lenin once called the con-struction of public canteens childcare centers and kindergartens the begin-nings of the great enterprise of communism28 In August local governments

26 ldquoNongmang tuorsquoer huzhuzu 农忙托儿互助组 [Busy-Season Childcare Mutual Aid Groups]rdquo Shanxi nongmin《山西农民》 May 17 1952 third edition

27 ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao lerdquo28 Cao Guanqun 曹冠群 ldquoJinyibu jiefang funuuml laodongli wei duokuai haosheng di jianshe

shehui zhuyi fuwu 进一步解放妇女劳动力为多快好省地建设社会主义服务


ltUNgt

across the country accelerated the pace of the construction of public canteens and kindergartens with communist characteristics in response to the upsurge of the peoplersquos commune movement Incomplete data indicate that by the end of October 475 million childcare centers and kindergartens had been built across the country29 The quantity of rural childcare centers and kindergartens at this time was unprecedented Moreover many communes began working to standardize preschool education in order to demonstrate their advanced nature From this point many standardized kindergartens began to emerge

In 1959 the Yingzhao Peoplersquos Commune 应朝人民公社 of Yangcheng County established a model kindergarten with five rooms one hall one kitch-en and a playground The slogan for this operation was ldquoattempt to establish a model create experience and propel the entire countryrdquo The five rooms in-cluded a classroom a sleeping room a washroom a teachersrsquo room and an of-fice The hall was a meal hall equipped with tables and chairs The kitchen was a childrenrsquos kitchen with food rations allocated under the unified guidance of the production brigade The playground was a facility for sports and activi-ties equipped with rocking horses see-saws swiveling chairs and a basketball goal One report described the facility this way ldquoThe interior and exterior of the kindergarten are as beautiful as a park It is truly a rural nursery that mothers have been expecting that everybody can love that is not tiring to the eyes that is grand and awesome that is fresh and beautiful and that can accommodate 180 childrenrdquo30 Although that description was slightly exagger-ated the construction of the Nanguan Village 南关村 Kindergarten did indeed conform to standards of the time this was proven through a field investigation The Nanguan Village Kindergarten is still operating today currently under its fourth principal It has one of the best reputations of private kindergartens in the area Former principal Cui Xuetao 崔雪桃 told me that the kindergarten was originally established in the Bai Family Courtyard 白家四合院 a very large

[ Further Liberating Female Labor Serves the Faster More Economical Construction of Socialism]rdquo Renmin ribao《人民日报》 June 2 1958 second edition

29 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与


30 ldquoYangcheng xian yingzhao renmin gongshe fejin dadui bu hu yi fen qian you ban tuoyoursquoeryuan ban cheng quan tuo baoyuyuan de zhuanti cailiao (1959 nian) 阳城县应

朝人民公社飞进大队不花一分钱由半托幼儿园办成全托保育园的专题材料

(1959年 ) [Dedicated Materials on How the Feijin Brigade of the Yingzhao Commune of Yangcheng County Converted Half-care Kindergartens into Full-care Nurseries Without Spending a Penny]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 18ndash11

HAN 144

ltUNgt

space Children were sent to the kindergarten to eat and rest during the day and were sent home at night The installation of see-saws and spinning chairs might seem like nothing compared to modern kindergartens but it was quite advanced for the time The Nanguan Village Kindergarten was commended as a model kindergarten in the county immediately upon its founding Observers from other parts of the country were often given tours of the facility Li Dequan 李德全 at the time serving as deputy chairman of the Chinese Peoplersquos Politi-cal Consultative Conference (cppcc) National Committee lauded the kinder-garten after making an inspection

Another school to be held up as a county-level model was the Yongquan Kindergarten 涌泉幼儿园 of Wuxiang County A busy-season childcare cen-ter founded in 1951 was its predecessor which was founded after the peoplersquos commune movement of 1958 The school was enlarged to include a nursing room (breastfeeding room) a childcare center and a kindergarten all in one full-time (ie boarding) facility that provided care for 134 children ldquoThe entire facility included three halls (dining hall lecture hall and shower hall) and six rooms (washroom exhibition room isolation room receiving room health room and infant room) In order to improve the childrenrsquos lives the school included a vegetable garden and fruit orchard as well as facilities for raising sheep pigs and chickens The childrenrsquos meals were improved slightly every five days and greatly every half month to ensure their nutritional needs were metrdquo In 1959 the kindergarten was again enlarged this time adding over thirty teachers and over thirty rooms The children were given cookies and candies at fixed intervals and all children had to wear identical uniforms31 The Yongquan Kindergarten is also a privately run school still operating today According to local accounts the village kindergarten was founded at the same time as pub-lic canteens The commune allocated the school a courtyard and appointed female activists as teachers As the school was well run county officials often sent groups to make observations there32

Busy-season childcare centers opened during the era of cooperatization made use of traditional household child-rearing techniques Sending children to kindergartens for centralizedcare however was something quite new for rural society Rural communes were able to provide facilities and equipment that met the standards of the time but a lack of experience on the part of the staff thrust many rural kindergartens into a mire of difficulties from their very first day of operation The kindergarten of the Daoping Production Team

31 Wuxiang funuuml yundong shiliao xuanbian di 3 ji 127 and 14232 I interviewed the 76-year old Wang Guifen in Yongquan Village Wuxiang County on

February 17 2013 Two of Mrs Wangrsquos children had attended the Yangquan Kindergarten


ltUNgt

道坪生产队 of the Yuci County Satellite Commune 榆次县卫星公社 had two teachers and thirty students when it first opened To prevent the chil-dren from running away the teachers locked the doors causing the children to cry for an entire day One parent said ldquoI canrsquot trust these people who lock my children in the kindergarten to cry all dayrdquo All kids were gone from the kindergarten within a matter of days33 In another example shortly after the opening of the Dajia Production Team 大甲队 Kindergarten of the Hongx-ing Peoplesrsquo Commune 红星公社 Wanrong County 万荣县 the two teachers on staff were completely unable to control the crying screaming and fighting of the several dozen students Parents were dissatisfied and soon thereafter the school was closed34 Faced with these problems in newly established kin-dergartens local governments sought to find women with more child-rearing experience to serve as teachers asked parents to donate toys and ordered teachers to make toys to attract students Local officials also demanded that teachers pay attention to education as well as supervision and proposed the introduction of pre-school lessons Teachers in the Daoping Production Team Kindergarten divided class levels based on the studentsrsquo situations and de-veloped curricula for music handicrafts drawing arithmetic environmental understanding and other areas Both students and parents were happy and the kindergarten was saved from the brink of collapse35 Teachers at the Da-jia Kindergarten created all manner of toys for the kids and taught them to sing dance and play games Such toy creation greatly enriched the childrenrsquos lives The experience of the Dajia Kindergarten was held up and introduced by county and township government officials who in 1959 sent a total of 200 people over six observation tours to inspect the facility36

Shortly after the advent of the peoplersquos commune the government began placing great emphasis on kindergartens at this point a large number of model kindergartens were established in response While one must com-mend attempts and explorations made in childcare at this time for the sake of improving welfare in rural China one must also note that many mistakes were

33 Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyangmdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi《幼儿园

的教养工作mdashmdash 托儿所幼儿园工作经验选辑之一》[The Education Work of KindergartensmdashVolume One of Selected Works on the Work Experience of Childcare Centers and Kindergartens] ed Shanxi Provincial Department of Civil Affairs and Shanxi Pro-vincial Womenrsquos Federation 山西省民政厅山西省妇女联合会 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1959) 25

34 Ibid 2035 Ibid 2736 Ibid 21ndash24

HAN 146

ltUNgt

made at this time as a result of adventurism and exaggerated reporting The political environment at the time was of course one of the pursuits of ldquofirst big and second publicrdquo37 in peoplersquos communes and of making a ldquoGreat Leaprdquo in all areas For example in October 1958 the Fenghuo Peoplersquos Commune 烽火人

民公社 Qin County announced that over the course of only seven days it had realized full-time childcare via the construction of fifty-three kindergartens to which 1480 children were sent38 The Xiangyuan County 襄垣县 Womenrsquos Federation announced that over twenty days of bitter battle a total of 1414 childcare centers and kindergartens had been founded across the county and that 964 percent of all children were receiving collective education39 The Chengguan Peoplersquos Commune 城关人民公社 Fanzhi County announced that it had built fifty-seven kindergartens by the end of 1959 with fourteen youth canteens serving them County officials further announced that 100 per-cent of children in the county were attending the kindergartens and that this was done to meet the especially large ldquoGreat Leaprdquo of 196040 Many of these fig-ures were exaggerated of course Through interviews I conducted with women over the age of seventy-five in the capital of Fanzhi County I discovered that none of them had formed a particularly deep impression of the establishment of the kindergartens They did recall that kindergartens had been founded in the county capital at the same time as public canteens but they attracted few children and were soon disbanded Per their recollections most children in the villages were looked after by older family members at home some older children watched over the play of younger children out on the land Li Baoting 李宝廷 formerly the chief accountant for the Dongshandi Commune Brigade 东山底公社大队 told me that at the time a sign reading ldquokindergartenrdquo was

37 Translatorrsquos note This is a popular slogan of the time meaning that communes are better the bigger and the more non-private they are

38 ldquoShanxi sheng funuuml shehui zhuyi jianshe jiji fenzi daibiao huiyi fayan gao 山西省妇女

社会主义建设积极分子代表会议发言稿 [Manuscript of Speeches Delivered at the Shanxi Provincial Congress of Women Socialist Construction Activists]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 156ndash136

39 Shixian wu hua jiefang le funuuml laodongli 《实现五化解放了妇女劳动力》 [Bringing About the Five Changes Liberated Female Labor] ed Shanxi Provincial Womenrsquos Federa-tion 山西省妇联 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1958) 23

40 Fanzhi County Chengguan Commune Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县城关公社妇联会 ldquoChengguan gongshe guanyu samba jie qian funuuml gongzuo renwu ji yaoqiu (1960 nian 2 yue 7 ri) 城关公社关于三八节前妇女工作任务及要求 (1960年2月7日 ) [Cheng-guan Communersquos Work Tasks and Requirements of Womenrsquos Work Prior to the March 8 Womenrsquos Day Holiday]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 32ndash19


ltUNgt

hung outside somebodyrsquos house just to maintain the appearance of there being a kindergarten in case higher-ranking officials came to inspect41

iv Collective Welfare Enterprises under the Governmentrsquos Guidance

Over less than ten years rural childcare services evolved from busy-season childcare centers to model kindergartens There were also great changes to the nature methods and significance of childcare services These changes re-flected explorations and attempts made by local governments and the public to build an ideal society

(A) From Nursemaids to Kindergarten TeachersWith the movement to establish kindergartens begun in 1958 nursemaids were replaced by childcare workers nursery teachers and kindergarten teachers No longer were the positions filled by older local women who lacked the ability to work outside the home They were instead filled by women of outstand-ing political character chosen by commune leadership and now they received regular training from higher-level departments

In 1958 the Jishan County 稷山县 government began pushing for the large-scaleestablishment of kindergartens The County Bureau of Culture and Edu-cation selected nearly 700 teachers from all the cooperatives of the county for training centered in political education Culture and education officials also increased childcare professionalsrsquo skills levels through observation studies the convening of on-the-spot meetings lectures and other methods To further guide the work being done in kindergartens the Bureau of Culture and Educa-tion issued several pamphlets including ldquoA Primer on Kindergartens and Pre-school Educationrdquo 幼儿园和幼儿教育的基础知识 and ldquoRural Kindergarten Workrdquo 农村幼儿园工作 These pamphlets provided work and rest schedules and curriculum schedules for all kindergartens in the county42 The Nanguan Village Yingzhao Peoplersquos Commune Yangcheng County made these demands for selecting kindergarten workers ldquoThey must be politically reliable hold prestige among commune members have amiable attitudes and love chil-drenrdquo The commune organized professional education activities for teachers every seven days convened meetings on residential issues at the kindergarten

41 From interviews I conducted with Jia Zhenghua (78 years old) Du Qiaoyun (89 years old) Li Yingying (82 years old) Li Xianying (78 years old) Li Baoting (78 years old) and others in Fanzhi County Shanxi Province on February 20 2013

42 Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyangmdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi 5ndash7

HAN 148

ltUNgt

every ten days and convened meetings with mothers twice a month43 In September 1959 the government of Chengguan Town Fanzhi County and the local Womenrsquos Federation jointly issued a notice on group training for all kindergarten teachers in the townrsquos jurisdiction The notice demanded that all areas dispatch ldquopeople who are politically clear and ardently love womenrsquos and childrenrsquos workrdquo and added that ldquoit is absolutely forbidden to not send enough peoplerdquo44 The quality of rural kindergarten teachers was improved through the governmentrsquos selection and training programs these programs formed the foundationfor the establishment of model kindergartens At the same time changes to the identities of youth educators reflected the change that had taken place in rural childcare from popular organizations formed voluntarily for mutual benefit into collective social enterprises under the direct guidance of the government

(B) From Decentralized Childcare to Concentrated CareDuring the era of the peoplersquos commune local governments began promoting the ldquobigrdquo and the ldquopublicrdquo in their construction of kindergartens in response to the ideology of ldquofirst big and second publicrdquo which prevailed at the time Such an ideology was a radical departure from the traditional household childcare methods previously employed

In May 1958 the Beiliu Qingfeng Brigade 北留庆丰大队 of Yangcheng Coun-ty founded a kindergarten In April officials announced that the kindergarten was now providing full-time care and had been selected as an advanced work unit in socialist construction by the county government45 In 1958 the Xiawudu Farm 下五渡农场 of the Kuangqu Commune 矿区公社 of Yangquan City 阳泉市 founded a kindergarten Attendance at this school escalated from 22 to 116 ie attendance by 100 percent of children living in the schoolrsquos jurisdiction This facility was selected as an advanced work unit in agricultural socialist

43 ldquoYangcheng xian yingzhao renmin gongshe fejin dadui bu hu yi fen qian you ban tuoyoursquoeryuan ban cheng quan tuo baoyuyuan de zhuanti cailiao (1959 nian)rdquo

44 Fanzhi County Chengguan Town Peoplersquos Committee 繁峙县城关镇人民委员会 ldquoGuanyu 1960 nian lsquosan barsquo jie qian xunlian yi pi baoyuyuan baojianyuan jieshengyuan de tongzhi (1960 nian 2 yue 22 ri) 关于 1960年 ldquo三八 rdquo 节前训练一批保育员保健员

接生员的通知 (1960年2月22日 ) [Notice on Training a Slew of Nursemaids Health Workers and Midwives Before the ldquoMarch Eighthrdquo Holiday of 1960 (February 22 1960)]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 32ndash27

45 ldquoBeiliu qingfeng dadui yoursquoeryuan shi zenme ban qilai de (1958 nian 11 yue) 北留庆丰

大队幼儿园是怎么办起来的 (1958年 11月 ) [How the Kindergarten of the Beiliu Qingfeng Brigade was Established (November 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 157ndash50


ltUNgt

construction46 The Hongqi Peoplersquos Commune 红旗人民公社 Xiabai Town-ship 下柏乡 Jiang County 绛县 instituted the ldquocommunal living institution for childrenrdquo soon after founding a kindergarten All forty-one students boarded there eating and sleeping in the school47 Children at the boarding kindergar-ten of the Fenghuo Commune Qin County were each given monthly allocations of twenty jin of refined grains and half a jin of starch noodles in addition to daily allocations of half a jin of vegetables All other food consumed was reim-bursed on the basis of actual consumption with the commune settling monthly accounts for the school Individual production teams were tasked with deliver-ing coal to the school and it was mandated that the children not eat the same meal twice in a week The commune further planned to provide two coats to the children every year48 In 1959 The Yuci Satellite Commune Daoping Kin-dergarten announced that 100 percent of children in the jurisdiction were in attendance that a youth canteen had been established and that each child was guaranteed a daily ration of 12 liang [a unit of measure equal to 50 grams] of processed grains The children were given physical inspections by the school and the local health center once a week Their hair was cut once a month and their clothes washed once every seven days All children were given masks49

If one puts aside the possible exaggerations in the above figures and looks only at the governmentrsquos approbation of these model kindergartens one can see that concentrated care conducted in the form of a public welfare enter-prise was the direction and objective of rural kindergarten construction in the era of the peoplersquos commune However such kindergartens that exemplified the positive nature of collectivization were not suitable to rural social condi-tions at the time On the one hand it was very difficult for local governments which were under tight economic constraints to guarantee the meeting of standards for the supply of material resources to these kindergartens in the long term On the other hand full-time ldquocollective youth living institutionsrdquo ran counter to traditional rural concepts of child-rearing In the materials I reviewed I found many instances of parents unwilling to send their children to these kindergartens

46 Shi Yuying 师玉英 ldquoWomen de yoursquoeryuan shi ruhe ban hao de (1958 nian 12 yue) 我们的幼儿园是如何办好的 (1958年 12月 ) [How Our Kindergarten Was Founded ( December 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 163ndash8

47 Chen Yanjiao 陈燕皎 ldquoQuanxin quanyi peiyu zuguo de huaduo (1958 nian 11 yue) 全心全意培育祖国的花朵 (1958年 11月 ) [Cultivating the Flowers of our Ancestral Homeland With All Our Hearts (November 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 156ndash85

48 ldquoShanxi sheng funuuml shehui zhuyi jianshe jiji fenzi daibiao huiyi fayan gaordquo49 Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyangmdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi 16ndash18

HAN 150

ltUNgt

(C) Transitioning from a Focus on Womenrsquos Liberation to a Focus on Childrenrsquos Education

The primary objectives for the founding of childcare centers in the era of the agricultural cooperative were liberating women and enlarging the labor pool By the era of the peoplersquos commune changes had taken place in the objects of this service following changes to the nature of childcare By this time pre-school education had come to the forefront and the core objective of this edu-cation had become the fostering of successors to the enterprise of communism

In 1958 the Jishan County Bureau of Culture and Education noted that the objective behind founding kindergartens was to liberate female labor and educate the younger generation in the spirit of communism ldquoThe concrete task in kindergarten education is to develop children into a new generation of communism endowed with culture the love of labor and healthy bodiesrdquo50 The Womenrsquos Federation of Fanzhi County demanded that ldquochildren entering kindergartens receive pre-school education and become good children who are polite understand reason are brave are vivacious and have worry-free demeanorsrdquo51 Some kindergarten teachers who had received training began to attempt new methods per government demands on kindergarten education Chen Yanjiao 陈燕皎 a teacher in the kindergarten of the Hongqi Peoplersquos Commune of Xiabai Township Jiang County was also the deputy secretary of the communersquos youth league committee and director of the communersquos womenrsquos federation She proposed moral character education that taught chil-dren to love labor love studying and love their motherland She developed vegetable gardens in the kindergarten which the children watered weeded and fertilized She taught her students stories of the martyrdom of Huang Ji-guang 黄继光 and Liu Hulan 刘胡兰 as well as reading and singing52 The kindergarten of the Xiawudu Farm of the Yangquan Mining District Commune divided children into different grades according to their age and organized a health group and singing team to take to the streets and spread official politi-cal teachings of the time Teachers there also taught morning exercises games and dance in addition to formal classes to all able students They also brought the children out into the fields to observe planting to work sites to observe the construction of buildings and to wild areas surrounding the village to observe

50 Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyangmdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi 251 Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇联会 ldquoGao hao yoursquoeryuan ji dian jianyi

(1958 nian 8 yue) 搞好幼儿园几点意见 (1958年8月 ) [Some Opinions on Founding Kindergartens (August 1958)]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 25ndash40

52 Chen Yanjiao


ltUNgt

nature thus enriching the childrenrsquos lives53 The Guanjiabao 贯家堡 Kinder-garten of Taigu County 太谷县 established a curriculum that included classes in languages arithmetic handicrafts music and sports Teachers there ldquooften tookthe children outdoors where they learned the difference between wheat and chives and between corn and sorghum The children heard the whirring of electrical waterwheels and the rumbling of boilers they saw the deep green of grain seedlings and lush orchards full of fruithellip This fostered in the children a sense of respect for workers and peasants ardent love of work and labor and an attitude of stewardship toward public propertyrdquo54

As peoplersquos communes were integrated with local governments at the time kindergartens a collective welfare enterprise were constructed on a large scale over a very short period of time Rural kindergartens were the continuation and development of busy-season childcare centers but they were also suscep-tible to the influence of the vogue of communism and fantastical notions well ahead of their time To a certain extent this trend led to rural kindergartensrsquo being out of touch with rural realities at the time With the onset of the three years of hardship most rural kindergartens were closed at the same time as rural public canteens and childcare reverted to previous models of neighbors helping each other or care by grandparents Nevertheless rural kindergartens of this era left behind experiences in increasing professionalism among teach-ers and developing pre-school education that deserve to be commended today

Rural childcare service providers in the Peoplersquos Republic of China evolved from busy-season childcare centers to public welfare kindergartens Through-out that process there were popular innovations made in pre-school education on the basis of the real needs of rural areas but there were also problems asso-ciated with exaggerated reporting and adventurism A look back on the history and summarizing the lessons learned helps us achieve a deeper understanding of the changes that took place to Chinese rural society in that particular era and of the efforts and explorations by the government and the public to build an ideal society Moreover such a reflection can also be valuable towards ef-forts to resolve some of todayrsquos rural social issues particularly those related to children left behind in the villages by their migrant parents For example we must build a rural pre-school education and supervision system based on the true needs of rural society In this we must avoid vanity projects and projects meant to advance officialsrsquo political careers The government can try to

53 Shi Yuying54 Luuml Fenghua 吕凤花 ldquoDang hao peiyu zuguo huaduo de yuanyishi (1958 nian 12 yue)

当好培育祖国花朵的园艺师 (1958年 12月 ) [How to Be Good Gardeners Cultivating the Flowers of our Ancestral Homeland (December 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 155ndash32

HAN 152

ltUNgt

encourage private capital and civic organizations to establish different forms of childcare service organizations which would with policy guidance develop into mutually beneficial sustainable enterprises While supervising rural childcare organizations the government should also make use of resource advantages to improve childcare conditions and play a greater role in improving the quality of childcare workers So doing would allow rural children to be both cared for and educated in a way that would satisfy parents children and the government

References

ldquoBa haizi song dao nongmang tuorsquoersuo qu 把孩子送到农忙托儿所去 [Send Children to Busy-Season Childcare Centers]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 June 1 1955 No 3

ldquoBaiyangyu nongye shengchan hezuoshe shixing nannuuml tong gong tong chou funuuml canjia shengchan de jijixing gengjia tigao 白羊峪农业生产合作社实行男女同

工同酬妇女参加生产的积极性更加提高 [Baiyangyu Agricultural Cooperative Implements Equal Pay for Equal Work for Men and Women Womenrsquos Proactivity in Participating in Production Further Increased]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 September 5 1953 No 2

ldquoBeiliu qingfeng dadui yoursquoeryuan shi zenme ban qilai de (1958 nian 11 yue) 北留庆丰

大队幼儿园是怎么办起来的(1958年 11月) [How the Kindergarten of the Beiliu Qingfeng Brigade was Established (November 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 157ndash50



Cao Guanqun 曹冠群 ldquoJinyibu jiefang funuuml laodongli wei duokuai haosheng di jianshe shehui zhuyi fuwu 进一步解放妇女劳动力为多快好省地建设社会

主义服务 [Further Liberating Female Labor Serves the Faster More Economical Construction of Socialism]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 June 2 1958 No 2

Chen Yanjiao 陈燕皎 ldquoQuanxin quanyi peiyu zuguo de huaduo (1958 nian 11 yue) 全心全意培育祖国的花朵(1958年 11月) [Cultivating the Flowers of our Ancestral Homeland with All Our Hearts (November 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 156ndash85

Fanzhi County Chengguan Commune Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县城关公社妇联会 ldquoChengguan gongshe guanyu samba jie qian funuuml gongzuo renwu ji yaoqiu (1960 nian 2 yue 7 ri) 城关公社关于三八节前妇女工作任务及要求(1960年2月7日) [Chengguan Communersquos Work Tasks and Requirements of Womenrsquos Work Prior to the March 8 Womenrsquos Day Holiday]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 32ndash19


ltUNgt

Fanzhi County Chengguan Town Peoplersquos Committee 繁峙县城关镇人民委员会 ldquoGuanyu 1960 nian lsquosan barsquo jie qian xunlian yi pi baoyuyuan baojianyuan jiesh-engyuan de tongzhi (1960 nian 2 yue 22 ri) 关于 1960年ldquo三八rdquo节前训练一批保

育员保健员接生员的通知(1960年2月22日) [Notice on Training a Slew of Nursemaids Health Workers and Midwives Before the ldquoThree Eightrdquo Holiday of 1960 (February 22 1960)]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 32ndash27

Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇联会 ldquoGao hao yoursquoeryuan ji dian jianyi (1958 nian 8 yue) 搞好幼儿园几点意见(1958年8月) [Some Opinions on Found-ing Kindergartens (August 1958)]rdquo Xinzhou Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 25ndash40

Fanzhi County Womenrsquos Federation 繁峙县妇女联合会 ldquoTiejiahui xiang Nanguan cun gongnong lianmengshe shi zenyang ban qi tuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan de (1956 nian 7 yue 3 ri) 铁家会乡南关村工农联盟社是怎样办起托儿所幼儿园

的(1956年7月3日) [How the Worker-Peasant Alliance of Nanguan Village Tiejia-hui Township Established Childcare Centers and Kindergartens (July 3 1956)]rdquo Xinzhou City Xiaruyue Commune Dagou Brigade Archives 6ndash2

Luuml Fenghua 吕凤花 ldquoDang hao peiyu zuguo huaduo de yuanyishi (1958 nian 12 yue) 当好培育祖国花朵的园艺师(1958年 12月) [How to Be Good Gardeners Cultivat-ing the Flowers of our Ancestral Homeland (December 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 155ndash32

ldquoNanyujiao nongyeshe zuzhi nongmang tuorsquoersuo tengchu you xiaohai funuuml canjia tianjian shengchan 南余交农业社组织农忙托儿所腾出有小孩妇女参加

田间生产 [Nanyujiao Agricultural Cooperative Organizes Busy Season Childcare Centers Frees Women with Children to Participate in Agricultural Production]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 July 7 1954 No 2

ldquoNongmang tuorsquoer huzhuzu 农忙托儿互助组 [Busy-Season Childcare Mutual Aid Groups]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 May 17 1952 No 3

Qi County Democratic Womenrsquos Federation 祁县民主妇女联合会 ldquoQiuji funuuml gong-zuo anpai de chubu yijian (1956 nian 10 yue 3 ri) 秋季妇女工作安排的初步意见

(1956年 10月3日) [Initial Opinions on Womenrsquos Autumn Work Plans (December 3 1956)]rdquo Qi County Li Village Archives 42ndash63

ldquoQuan sheng funuuml daibiao huiyi jueding funuuml ying zuo de shiqing 全省妇女代表会

议决定妇女应做的事情 [Province-wide Womenrsquos Congress Determines Things Women Should Do]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 November 10 1949 No 2

ldquoQuwo Dongcheng cun chengli le tuorsquoersuo jiejue le dai haizi funuuml de xuexi kunnan 曲沃东城村成立了托儿所解决了带孩子妇女的学习困难 [Dongcheng Vil-lage of Quwo Founds Childcare Center Solves Difficulties Experienced by Women with Children in Attending School]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 December 1 1952 No 4

ldquoQuwo xian renmin weiyuanhui guanyu dali juban nongmang tuorsquoersuo de jinji tong-zhi (1956 nian 5 yue 28 ri) 曲沃县人民委员会关于大力举办农忙托儿所的紧急

HAN 154

ltUNgt

通知(1956年5月28日) [Urgent Notice of the Quwo County Peoplersquos Committee on Striving to Establish Busy Season Childcare Centers]rdquo Houma City Shangpingwang Village Archives 131ndash5

ldquoShanxi sheng funuuml shehui zhuyi jianshe jiji fenzi daibiao huiyi fayan gao 山西省妇

女社会主义建设积极分子代表会议发言稿 [Manuscript of Speeches Delivered at the Shanxi Provincial Congress of Women Socialist Construction Activists]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 156ndash136

Shi Yuying 师玉英 ldquoWomen de yoursquoeryuan shi ruhe ban hao de (1958 nian 12 yue) 我们的幼儿园是如何办好的(1958年 12月) [How Our Kindergarten Was Founded (December 1958)]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 163ndash8

Shixian wu hua jiefang le funuuml laodongli 《实现五化解放了妇女劳动力》 [Bring-ing About the Five Changes Liberated Female Labor] ed Shanxi Provincial Womenrsquos Federation 山西省妇联 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1958)

ldquoSigouhui cun de funuuml bianyang la 寺沟会村的妇女变样啦 [The Women of Sigouhui Village Have Changed]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 August 14 1952 No 2

ldquoTunliu xian Xigu cun nongmang tuorsquoersuo ban de geng hao le 屯留县西故村农忙

托儿所办得更好了 [Childcare Centers in Xigu Village Tunliu County Now Better Run]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山西农民》 April 21 1952 No 2

Wuxiang funuuml yundong shiliao xuanbian di 2 ji《武乡妇女运动史料选编》第2 集 [ Selected Historical Materials from the Womenrsquos Movement in Wuxiang Vol 2] ed Wuxiang County Womenrsquos Movement History Office 武乡县妇运史办公室 (1985)

ldquoXinhe cun chengli le baomu xiaozu dai haizi de funuuml shang le minxiao 新河村成

立了保姆小组带孩子的妇女上了民校 [Xinhe Village Has Established a Nurse-maid Group Women with Children Now in Peoplersquos School]rdquo Shanxi nongmin 《山

西农民》 December 14 1952 No 4ldquoYangcheng xian yingzhao renmin gongshe fejin dadui bu hu yi fen qian you ban

tuoyoursquoeryuan ban cheng quan tuo baoyuyuan de zhuanti cailiao (1959 nian) 阳城

县应朝人民公社飞进大队不花一分钱由半托幼儿园办成全托保育园的专

题材料(1959年) [Dedicated Materials on How the Feijin Brigade of the Yingzhao Commune of Yangcheng County Converted Half-care Kindergartens into Full-care Nurseries Without Spending a Penny]rdquo Yangcheng County Nanguan Village Archives 18ndash11

Yoursquoeryuan de jiaoyang gongzuomdashtuorsquoersuo yoursquoeryuan gongzuo jingyan xuanji zhi yi 《幼儿园的教养工作mdashmdash 托儿所幼儿园工作经验选辑之一》 [The Edu-cation Work of KindergartensmdashVolume One of Selected Works on the Work Experi-ence of Childcare Centers and Kindergartens] ed Shanxi Provincial Department of Civil Affairs and Shanxi Provincial Womenrsquos Federation 山西省民政厅山

西省妇女联合会 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe 1959)


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chapter 7

Restitution Paid by Rural Peoplersquos Cooperatives in the 1960smdashAn Inquiry Focused on Jiangsu Province

Wang Yugui1

Abstract

Just as in the rest of China the effects of the ldquofive things in voguerdquomdashmost notably the ldquovogue of communismrdquomdashwere extremely severe in rural Suzhou during the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and peoplersquos commune movements As the entire Party was commit-ted to redressing ldquoleftistrdquo errors in the early 1960s the local governments of rural Su-zhou began the task of cataloguing funds and materials that had been appropriated from production brigades communes and individuals during the Great Leap Forward movement with the aim of making restitution or reparation Reviewing the experi-ence and lessons of this work in rural Suzhou is of particular significance to our further understanding and evaluations of the peoplersquos commune movement as well as further-ing research in the history of peoplersquos communes

Keywords

peoplersquos communes ndash reparation and restitution work ndash rural Suzhou

In the 1960s the entire Party and governments across the country began to redress egregious errors made during the Great Leap Forward movement At the same time the national government began making comprehensive

This essay was one of the results of the research performed by the author during his project ldquoStructural Transformations to the Ownership System and Socioeconomic Changes to Rural Areas of Contemporary Jiangnanrdquo《所有制的结构性变革与当代江南农村社会经济

的变迁》 (Project Serial No Su Guihua 苏规划[09ndash3001]) subsidized by the Jiangsu pro-vincial governmentrsquos ldquoNinth Five-Year Planrdquo social sciences fund

1 Wang Yugui (王玉贵 ) was born in 1965 and is a doctorate of history and lecturer in the his-tory department of Jiangsu University

WANG156

ltUNgt

adjustments to the economy and severe hardship was soon mitigated One important measure taken to redress previous ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes and correct the economy was to settle accounts and make restitution for errors stemming from poor leadership the negative effects of the vogue of communism and ldquomis-appropriation of resources and personnelrdquo which had taken place during the peoplersquos commune movement Until now no academic research has been pub-lished on this topic Having made a deep reading of a large volume of materials to serve as the basis of this essay which focuses specifically on Jiangsu Province I hope to make a contribution in the further study of the issue of restitution

i

Amid the Great Leap Forward and the peoplersquos commune movements launched in 1958 poor leadership led to many egregious errors including ldquorunning into communismrdquo the large-scale establishment of public canteens The enthusi-asm of the timeled to the widespread emergence of the ldquofive things in voguerdquo2 most particularly the ldquovogue of communismrdquo (a trend by which egalitarian-ism was held supreme and labor and material resources were transferred ar-bitrarily regardless of which commune they belonged to) In November 1958 Mao Zedong 毛泽东 commenced an initiative to redress some of these errors demanding that ldquoold accounts must be settledrdquo and held that ldquosettling accounts is the only way to realize the objective value of thingsrdquo3 Thereafter govern-ments across the country began making initial settlements and restitution and reparation for ldquomisappropriations of funds and materialsrdquo The Suzhou govern-ment in April 1959 began launching pilots in settlement and restitution work in some communes and production teams in Changshu County 常熟县 Wu County 吴县 and other areas officials also made reparation to people in some areas for what had been appropriated from them during the ldquoGreat Forging of Steel and Ironrdquo movement4 However this work came to a grinding halt when

2 Translatorrsquos note In addition to the ldquovogue of communismrdquo the ldquofive things in voguerdquo also included boastful aggrandizement arbitrary commands cadre exceptionalism and counter-productive direction of production

3 Peoplersquos Republic of China State Agriculture Commission General Office 中华人民共和国

国家农业委员会办公厅 Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian (1958ndash1981) xia 《农

业集体化重要文件汇编 (1958~1981)》下 [Selected Important Documents on Agricultural Collectivization (1958ndash1981) Vol 2] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1981) 163

4 ldquoChangshu xian diyi er pi gongshe suanzhang dahui de zongjie (chugao) 常熟县第一

二批公社算账大会的总结 (初稿 ) [Summary of the Changshu County Conference


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at the Lushan Conference the decision was made to launch party-wide criti-cism and clampdown of the so-called ldquorightist opportunismrdquo

As the consequences of the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward further intensified large numbers of abnormal deaths occurred in many rural areas across the country Even southern Jiangsu a region long known to be prosper-ous was no exception The Bacheng Commune 巴城公社 of Kunshan Coun-ty 昆山县 was worst affected with 558 deaths between November 1959 and February 1960 a loss of 38 percent of the total rural population Among the dead were 180 people of working age and 168 children or seniors 178 were ab-normal deaths ie thirty-two percent of the total One hundred and thirty-one of those who died had a pre-existing disease which were exacerbated by food shortages they accounted for twenty-three percent of total deaths A total of 1263 members of the commune or 78 percent of the total population had contracted edema cyanosis wasting disease gynecological diseases or other diseases Most brigades in the region saw their food supplies exhausted some for thirty days but most for around forty days The most severely affected bri-gades were without food supplies for over sixty days In these instances great numbers of people fled the famine At the apex of the flight 1312 peoplemdash92 percent of the total rural population in the areamdashwere on the move looking for food The most severely affected brigade was the Yangmu Brigade 杨木大队 where thirty-nine percent of commune members took to flight5 In 1959 594 members of the Zhouzhuang Commune 周庄公社 were diagnosed with ede-ma that number rose to 1394 in 1960 Over two years 500 members of that commune died from starvation Of those 482 were members of the Panlong Brigade 蟠龙大队 There 115 people contracted edema fifty-two women contracted amenorrhea and four women suffered uterine prolapse Fourteen

on Settlements in the First and Second Batches of Communes (Draft)]rdquo June 3 1959 H5-1-1959-34 Peasant and Worker Department of the Suzhou Prefectural Committee of the Communist Party of China 中国共产党苏州地委农工部 ldquoWu xian puzhuang gongshe de liang bi zhang 吴县浦庄公社的两笔账 [Two Accounts of the Puzhuang Commune of Wu County]rdquo April 3 1959 ldquoChangshu xian dirsquoer pi suanzhang dahui youguan shuzi tongji 常熟县第二批算账大会有关数字统计 [Relevant Figures and Statistics from the Changshu County Conference on the Second Batch of Settlements]rdquo May 1959 ldquoChangshu xushi pian suanzhang dahui de zongjie baogao 常熟徐市片算账大会的总结报告 [Sum-mary Report on the Settlement Conference for the Xuzhou Region of Changshu]rdquo (original report untitled this title was formulated by the author) June 3 1959 H5-2-1959-59

5 Kunshan County Committee of the Communist Party of China 中共昆山县委员会 ldquoGuanyu bacheng gongshe zaocheng duanliang siwang shijian de diaocha baogao 关于巴城公社造成断粮死亡事件的调查报告 [Investigative Report Regarding In-cidents of Running out of Food and Deaths in the Bacheng Commune]rdquo June 20 1960 H1-2-1960-209

WANG158

ltUNgt

members of the brigade starved to death6 The emergence of the above situ-ations caused central policy-making departments to become more deeply aware of the severity of rural circumstances as a result restitution work found its way back onto the agenda In November 1960 the ccp Central Committee issued the ldquoUrgent Directives on Current Policy Issues in Rural Peoplersquos Com-munesrdquo 关于农村人民公社当前政策问题的紧急指示信 The directives called for earnest accounting and decisiverestitution to be made for any hous-es furniture land vehicles livestock agricultural products and by-products building materials or any other property seized without compensation as a result of the vogue of communism which had swept through the Great Leap Forward and peoplersquos commune movements In cases where the seized objects were still available they must be returned In all other cases reparation must be made after the fair value of the misappropriated objects had been deter-mined7 Not long thereafter the ccp Central Committee issued the ldquoInstruc-tions on the Thorough Implementation (of the Urgent Directives)rdquo 关于贯彻

执行〈紧急指示信〉的指示 which read as follows ldquoThorough accounting of and decisiverestitution for all misappropriated funds and materials are im-perative This is the only way to further improve the incentives of the masses to work In some cases some communes and brigades will be unable to afford restitution and may not be able to guarantee full settlement prior to the spring plowing of next year In these cases provincial prefectural sub-provincial and county governments should prepare funds to assist these communes and bri-gades In cases where provincial sub-provincial and county governments fall short financially the central government will provide necessary assistancerdquo8 In December that year the ccp Central Committee convened a working meet-ing to discuss further cleaning things in up in rural areas and in the communes and issues related to the thorough implementation of the urgent directives of the ldquoTwelve Instructionsrdquo After the meeting the Central Committee issued the ldquoccp Central Committee Summary of Minutes of the Discussions of Cleaning

6 Martial Protection Division of the Zhouzhuang Commune 周庄公社武保科 ldquoDui panlong dadui gaizao fucha qingkuang de zongjie 对蟠龙大队改造复查情况的总结 [Summary of Circumstances Discovered During a Reinvestigation of Reforms Implemented in the Pan-long Brigade]rdquo September 1 1961 Zhouzhuang County Committee of the Communist Party of China 中共周庄公社党委 ldquoSan nian lai gongzuo de jiancha baogao 三年来工作的检

查报告 [Report on Investigations into Work Done These Past Three Years]rdquo September 15 1961 Zhouzhuang Town Archives

7 cpc Central Literary Research Department 中共中央文献研究室 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 13 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 13 册 [Selected Important Doc-uments Since the Founding of the Nation Vol 13] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 662

8 Ibid 679


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Things up in Rural Areas and Communes and Several Policy Issuesrdquo 中央工作会

议关于农村整风整社和若干政策问题的讨论纪要 which made clearer and more concrete stipulations regarding restitution and reparation work9 This document mandated that officials act decisively in making restitution for all misappropriated funds and materials made since the beginning of the peoplersquos commune movement and that they proceed in accordance with the principle of ldquoleaving nothing that had been misappropriated unaccounted or uncompensated forrdquo Officials were to use the restitution process to solidify the three-tier ownership system of peoplersquos communes the foundation of which was the production team Restitution was to be made to educate both cadres and the masses and to help everybody better understand the Marxist prin-ciple of not exploiting peasants and the principles of exchange of equivalents and ldquoto each according to his contributionsrdquo Restitution work the document declared must walk the road of the masses must adhere to democratic prin-ciples and must advocate the partyrsquos policies to the masses All matters related to restitution work were to be fully discussed in poor peasant committees or commune member congresses Restitution was to be made in all instances in which the majority of masses present found them necessary The document declared that reparation is to be resorted to only whenrestitution was not fea-sible In cases where reparation is made the money comes from three sources namely in descending order are cash resources of the commune or brigade then small public cash reserves of county governments or public enterprise work units and finally extra budgetary funds and state-allocated stipends of provincial prefectural or autonomous region governments It was forbidden for departments at all levels to take out bank loans to pay for reparations or to use the moneyfor any other purpose Settlements were to be made in full for all cases in which cadres had embezzled funds or overdrawn from public accounts

Mao placed great emphasis on restitution work often stressing that efforts tocorrect the ldquofive things in voguerdquo ought to focus on the ldquovogue of commu-nismrdquo according to whose core principles there would be egalitarianism in materials supply and food provision and production resources of production brigades are subject to indiscriminate appropriation by the commune10 He further noted that ldquothe question of restitutionis very important we must car-ry out this work inearnestrdquo ldquoCounty and commune governments must make

9 Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian (1958ndash1981) xia 435ndash43610 cpc Central Literary Research Department 中共中央文献研究室 Jianguo yilai Mao

Zedong wengao di 9 ce 《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第9 册 [Mao Zedong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 9] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 352

WANG160

ltUNgt

restitutioneven if they have to sacrifice family enterprises and go bankrupt That is because we have exploited the peasantry which is absolutely not al-lowed by Marxism Our misappropriation of the fruits of peasant labor are more egregious than the exploitation by landlords and capitalists At least capitalists have to pay something for what they take albeit less than the equiv-alent value but we give nothing at all in our misappropriation We must per-sist in making restitution all departments all industries and all enterprises must persist in making restitution for all items misappropriated It would even be acceptable for commune resources to be exhausted by saidrestitution to have only a few people and a few grass huts leftrdquo ldquoCounty governments and communes as well as all relevant departments must make restitution those with material resources should compensate with material resources and those with money must compensate with moneyrdquo ldquoAny government body school factory or military unit that misappropriated must make restitutionrdquo ldquoTo cor-rect the lsquovogue of communismrsquo we must truly make good on our pledge to make restitution We would learn nothing if we did not experience some pain and suffering in this process The only way to understand the Marxist principle of exchange of equivalents is through experiencing some pain and sufferingrdquo He further noted that ldquothere must be boundaries set in restitution and repara-tion The state will pay a portion of restitution in relation tothe large-scale con-struction of hydraulic projects transportation projects and processed foods production hubs Counties and communes cannot be made to make those portions of restitution or reparation which the state should make Cadres at the county and commune levels must be convinced of the justification forres-titution their errors cannot be corrected if they are notrdquo11 On January 8 1961 Mao made the following comments upon hearing the report of leading cad-re of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee ldquoIt is not enough for only the central and provincial governments to have resolve We will fail if prefectural and county governments lack resolve If prefectural and county governments have resolve then even if some communes or production teams fail it will be only a question of time We must make them truly understand the difference between communism and socialism and the difference between ownership by all the people and collective ownership We cannot exploit the peasantry exchanges must be made among equals We can exploit landlords exploiting peasants is unheard of Such an ideadoes not buildsocialism but destroys itrdquo12

11 Mao Zedong wenji di 7 juan 《毛泽东文集》第7 卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 7] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1999) 227ndash228

12 Gu Longsheng 顾龙生 Mao Zedong jingji nianpu 《毛泽东经济年谱》 [Economic Chronicles of Mao Zedong] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1993) 528ndash529


ltUNgt

On January 9 after hearing reports at a central working conference he said that he had written a draft for the ldquoThree Great Disciplinary Laws and Eight Matters of Attentionrdquo 三大纪律八项注意 Part of this document read ldquoAr-ticle Five Those things which are borrowed must be repaid Article Six Res-titution must be made for those things that are destroyed Here we primarily mean that one may not engage in appropriating from othersrdquo13 On January 18 he made the following comment at the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Na-tional Congress ldquoWe must resolutely implement central control over account-ing exchange of equivalents distribution according to contribution and the principle of the more one works the more one getsrsquo Leaders in rural areas must resolutely rectify the lsquoFive Things in Voguersquo should makerestitution or repara-tion in all instances where they are warranted and may not choose not tordquo14 It was Maorsquos belief that ldquoresolutely correcting errors of uncompensated appro-priations making full restitution or reparationrdquo was ldquothe only way to promote the development of agricultural production the only way to create beneficial conditions for industrial development and the only way to further solidify the alliance of workers and peasantsrdquo15 In May of that year Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 returned to his home to conduct an investigation In a discussion with resi-dents of his native Tanzichong Village 炭子冲村 he said that restitutionwork ldquomust not be left half-finished or disposed of perfunctorily We must make firm settlements of every account and be prepared to experience some pain in this processrdquo ldquoOnce accounts are settled in full you should mark this by erecting a stele or hanging a framed catalogue [of what has been done] in the communerdquo ldquoWe must pass the lesson not to commit this error again down through the generationsrdquo16 Around this same time the Central Secretariat convened several meetings at which it was ordered to conduct concrete investigations and make arrangements for restitution work in rural areas17

It was on this basis that in June 1961 the ccp Central Committee issued the ldquoRegulations on Persisting in Correcting the Errors of Uncompensated Appropriations and Making Thorough Restitution and Reparationrdquo 关于坚决

13 Ibid 530ndash53114 Ibid 53515 Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian (1958ndash1981) xia 44716 Liu Shaoqi xuanji xia juan 《刘少奇选集》下卷 [Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi Vol 2]

(Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1985) 33117 Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆 Yang Shangkun riji xia 《杨尚昆日记》下 [Diary of Yang

Shangkun Vol 2] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 2001) 28ndash30 34 35 and 38 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu xia 《若干重大决策与


WANG162

ltUNgt

纠正平调错误彻底退赔的规定 18 which further clarified and solidified regulations regarding the scope of restitution concrete principles work plans leadership organization the raising of materials and money and other areas The Regulations stipulated that the time period to be covered in the restitu-tion of uncompensated appropriations would begin primarily from the time of the founding of peoplersquos communes Although restitution should be made in full for any appropriation from commune members that took place before the establishment of communes said accounts were not to be considered ldquoun-compensated appropriationrdquo Restitution was to be made primarily in kind and reparation wasresorted to only if needed The principle of compensating all whose property was lost due to uncompensated appropriations was to be persisted in In cases in which means of production means of making a living or labor had been thus appropriated those materials urgently necessary for production or making a living by the peasantry were to be repaid first Restitu-tion work was to be conducted in installments over time in a planned and orderly manner All restitution workwas to be finished in five years The task of ensuring supply of all construction materials farm implements and oth-er tools required to make restitution was enjoined to relevant departments which were to adopt feasible effective measures and organize production Res-titution committees or restitution groups were to be established at every level of government from the center down to the production team which were also to establish task forcesto oversee all aspects of restitution work These task forces were to oversee allocations and manufacture of all materials required in restitutionwork and investigate and resolve all disputes arising from restitu-tion work Restitution work the Regulations demanded was to fully walk the ldquomass linerdquo

ii

The Regulations were made in response to the situation across the entire coun-try and to a certain extent were meant to confer guiding principles Beginning in late 1960 the Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee first selected regions heavily affected by uncompensated appropriations launching the first pilot in restitutionwork in the Mocheng Commune 莫城公社 of Changshu County

18 Huang Daoxia et al 黄道霞等 Jianguo yilai nongye hezuohua shiliao huibian 《建国以

来农业合作化史料汇编》 [Compiled Historical Materials on Agricultural Cooperati-zation Since the Founding of the Nation] (Beijing Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe 1992) 688ndash690


ltUNgt

in accordance with the unified deployments of both the Central Committee and Jiangsu Provincial Committee in order to provide a true basis for restitu-tion work to be performed in the Suzhou region19 Upon the basis of initial experience gained in cleaning up the communes the Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee issued several documents including the ldquoOpinions on Handling the Several Concrete Issues of Correcting the Errors of Uncompensated Appro-priations and Making Thorough Restitution (Draft)rdquo 关于纠正平调错误彻

底退赔中若干具体问题的处理意见（初稿） the ldquoOpinions on Handling the Several Concrete Policy Issues of Restitution Workrdquo 关于退赔工作中若

干具体政策问题的处理意见 the ldquoOpinions on Handling the Several Con-crete Issues of Restitution Work in the Mocheng Commune (Discussion Draft)rdquo 莫城公社关于退赔中若干具体问题的处理意见（讨论稿） and oth-ers20 These documents provided detailed concrete stipulations for policies and work deployments taking place in restitution in the Suzhou region

The above documents raised the following opinions regarding housing is-sues (1) Cases in which commune membersrsquo houses had been destroyed were to be handled in one of the two following methods In the first full restitution was to be made to those who had lost everything due to the taking of all or some of the materials of their houses In the second in cases in which part or most of the materials of a house were taken restitution was to be made for all materials taken as well as all labor and construction fees (2) In cases in which commune members were rallied to pull down a house restitution was to be made on the basis of actual damage done as well as for costs due to material losses excepting in those cases in which people were paid fees for having their houses pulled down in accordance with regulations (3) Full restitution was to be made for all building materials subject to uncompensated appropriations (4) In all cases in which commune membersrsquo houses had been occupied the original inhabitants were to be restored and rent to be paid for the duration of the occupation All damage done to such housing was to be fully repaired Any costs incurred from any repair or additions work done to such housing

19 cpc Suzhou City Committee Party History Research Department 中共苏州市委党史研

究室 Zhongguo gongchandang Suzhou dashiji 《中国共产党苏州大事记》[Record of Major Communist Party of China Events in Suzhou] (Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe 2000) 90

20 These documents can be found in the Suzhou City Archives Suzhou Prefectural cpc Com-mittee Peasant and Worker Division under Nos 56 and 57 in the permament category and No 86 in the long-term category See also ldquoXiong Renmin tongzhi zai suanzhang tuipei huiyi shang de fayan (jilu gao) 熊人民同志在算账退赔会议上的发言（记录稿） [The Speech of Comrade Xiong Renmin at the Conference on Settling Accounts and Mak-ing Restitutions (Transcription)]rdquo January 20 1961 H5-1-1961-56

WANG164

ltUNgt

during the period of occupation was to be deducted from rents Rent was to be exempted in cases when housing was occupied for grand tactics operations the construction of irrigation works or temporary support provided by visiting members of other communes however the sponsor of such activities was to be liable for making full restitution for any damage done to such housing (5) In cases in which the pulling down or occupation of a house caused its occupants to incur moving costs or renovations costs or in which furniture household implements or other property were damaged or lost as a result of the pulling down or occupation and in which the masses could testify to the veracity of the situation restitution was to be made on the basis of these losses in addi-tion to the loss of the house itself (6) Restitution was not to be made in the fol-lowing cases in which authorities did not deem losses to fall within the scope of uncompensated appropriations those commune members whose houses had been pulled down or occupied but who had been given new houses which were lost due to fire and those commune members who had sold their hous-es to other commune members or to the production team on the basis of an agreement but who were in disputes regarding the sale of their house owing to incomplete payments made (7) The county government was to be respon-sible for making restitution for all damages and construction costs incurred as a result of the tearing down of houses done for the Great Forging of Steel and Iron the large-scale construction of ponds and dykes the large-scale construc-tion of pig farms the construction of concentrated settlements the large-scale establishment of public canteens and assembly halls the construction of kin-dergartens or the celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the founding of the country excepting all materials to be compensated by the work unit respon-sible for the uncompensated appropriation

The documents made the following stipulations regarding farm imple-ments (1) All large and mid-sized farm implements paid for and introduced into common ownership at the time of the advanced agricultural cooperative were to be settled as old accounts In cases in which full payment had not been made interest should be made on the remaining sum calculated based on bank interest rates over the period of time over which local authorities had ex-ceeded the originally determined date of payment (2) All large and mid-sized farm implements which had not been formally appropriated by cooperatives but which had been collectively used following the peoplersquos commune move-ment could either be paid for by the commune or returned to their original owners with a reasonable compensation for time used (3) All privately owned small farm implements were to be handled on the basis of the individual com-mune memberrsquos circumstances Commune members who had experienced normal damages to implements which they had used themselves were to be


ltUNgt

solely responsible for such damages Restitution was to be made for damages incurred as a result of military units waging battle No restitution was to be made for those implements which had been returned to original owners after uncompensated appropriations but rent was to be paid for the duration of the uncompensated transfer The production brigade was to be responsible for making restitution for damages incurred to small implements seized and dam-aged due to collective usage as a result of blind direction of production caused by the merger of multiple teams Production teams were to conduct invento-ries and proactively return all implements which had been circulated to them from other teams All implements which went unclaimed were to become common property of the production team The production team was to make restitutionfor all damages incurred as a result of usage by the production team

The documents made the following stipulations regarding land (1) For all land which had been occupied by county governments communes or any public enterprise work unit restitutionwould be made by the unit responsible for the uncompensated appropriationfor both land usage and crops destroyed All land which had been seized but not used was to be returned in full to the production brigade and rent and agricultural taxes were to be paid for the du-ration of the land seizure (2) In cases in which land had been dug up packed down or rendered useless either the county government or the host unit was to be responsible for restitution depending on circumstances (3) All cultivat-ed and uncultivated land planted by public enterprise work units was to be returned unconditionally to the production team of original ownership (4) In cases in which buildings on homestead plots had been razed but new housing had been allocated to original occupants the homestead plot in question was to be returned to the production team In such cases in which new housing had not been allocated to original occupants the plot was to be restored to the original occupants

The documents made the following stipulations regarding labor (1) The county government or commune was to be responsible for paying labor com-pensations in cases in which either the county government or communersquos name had been invoked in making an uncompensated appropriation of labor (2) Mandatory labor performed in any of the ldquolarge-scalerdquo projects was allowed to be exempt from compensation (3) Labor settlements were to be made ac-cording to average unit prices effective in the years 1958 and 1959

The documents made the following stipulations regarding uncompensated appropriations of furniture utensils and construction materials (1) Restitu-tion was to be made for materials costs and labor costs for constructing kitch-en stoves in all cases in which commune membersrsquo kitchen stoves had been removed during any of the ldquolarge-scalerdquo movements regardless of whether the

WANG166

ltUNgt

original materials had been removed The county government was to make restitution in all cases of destruction of kitchen stoves performed during the Great Forging of Steel and Iron The commune was to be responsible in all cases of destruction of kitchen stoves performed during the manure collection movement The production team was to be responsible in all cases in which kitchen stoves were destroyed for the large-scale establishment of public can-teens (2) The production team was to be responsible for making restitution for damages incurred to utensils borrowed from commune members for the large-scale establishment of public canteens but it was not necessary to return those utensils which commune members had been encouraged to donate for collective use in public canteens (3) The work unit in charge of any ldquolarge-scalerdquo movement which had borrowed and damaged utensils of commune members was to be responsible for making restitution (4) It was not necessary to compensate commune members for any vegetables provided for common consumption in public canteens

The documents made the following stipulations regarding waters and fish ponds (1) All occupied rivers on which taxes were paid were to be returned to their original work units with rent and agricultural taxes paid for the duration of the occupation (2) Reimbursements were to be paid for all unreasonable prices paid for fish ponds used collectively by communes

The documents also made the following concrete stipulations regarding uncompensated appropriations of agricultural products and processed food products and fields used for high-yield experiments as well as pricing stan-dards for restitution (1) For all cases of unreasonable prices given for copper iron tin timber bamboo fishing nets and other materials seized for the ldquosev-en contributionsrdquo of the peoplersquos commune movement restitution was to be made to make up deficiencies in prices paid (2) Commune members who sold large quantities of means of production or living to meet distribution require-ments during the time of large-scale investments were to be compensated (3) Many commune membersdonated their own grain to public canteens and some exhausted their own grain quota through consuming meals at the pub-lic canteens There are three types of settlement for such a situation First no refund was necessary in cases where canteens had issued the member meal coupons in equivalent value For those whose ration of food had been fully used by the public canteens compensation in kind would be made to them when and if a bumper harvest made a surplus available For those who had consumed above and beyond what their quota allowed they would have to pay back the extra-quota portion provided this did not cut into their current rations (4) For those cases in which households had been raided for grain the following stipulations were made For those households which had been


ltUNgt

raided in 1958 but which belonged to communes that passed ldquoeat all you canrdquo policies in canteens reimbursement was to be paid for all grain seized but no in-kind compensation would be given All grain seized from households dur-ing home raids as part of the ldquostamping out underreporting of yields and keep-ing the unreported portion to oneselfrdquo campaign of 1959 was to be restored to original owners These policies were a synthesis of relevant central policies and concrete stipulations made in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region 苏州专

区 They were highly feasible and targeted and so I have given a detailed de-scription of them here

In order to strengthen integrated leadership and comprehensive planning of restitution work the Suzhou sub-provincial regional government and all party committees and organizations of the region established restitution offic-es or restitution task forces under the guidance and organization of rural work departments and financial departments per the instructions of superiors party committees of work units at the county level and below were given pri-mary responsibility over this work Archival records indicate that once restitu-tion work formally began restitution organs at every level convened meetings with financial planning commercial and other departments to discuss and address relevant issues The Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee convened several standing committee meetings and standing committee meetings with wider attendance then committee members to establish restitution work plans make decisions solve problems and provide guidance for the continu-ation of the work That is how restitution work in the Suzhou area was begun

The first order of business in making accurate restitution was to make a close accounting of all uncompensated appropriations Just as in the rest of the country various forms of uncompensated appropriations in Suzhou most notably those which took place as a result of the ldquovogue of communismrdquo were particularly egregious during the Great Leap Forward movement There were however some notable differences between uncompensated appropriations in Suzhou and those elsewhere in China In most of the country the ldquovogue of communismrdquo mostly affected the large-scale establishment of public canteens and in the founding of public enterprises by communes Uncompensated ap-propriations took place in even more projects in the Suzhou area the dredg-ing of the Taipu River 太浦河 the Liu River 浏河 the Wangyu River 望虞河 and Zhangjia Harbor 张家港 other irrigation works projects which took place at the same time as the Four Major Projects 四大工程 including Yanglint-ang 杨林塘 in Taicang 太仓 the Dongheng River 东横河 in Jiangyin 江阴 Xuputang 许浦塘 in Changshu the Western Tai Lake Dam 西太湖大堤 in Wu County the destruction of land crops and objects on the land such as houses and so on as a result of said dredging costs for the promulgation of

WANG168

ltUNgt

advanced tools and small tools land resources given by the collective and individual commune members for the Great Forging of Steel and Iron labor and materials appropriated without compensation for transportation projects as well as houses demolished land occupied crops destroyed and other rel-evant objects such means of production as new farm implements machinery chemical fertilizers and pesticides promulgated or provided by industrial and commercial public enterprises for which prices were set very low or not set at all funds allocated by the state for construction such as funds intended to compensate for the restoration of the Shanghai-Nanjing Road or for pro-vincial irrigation works projects which were misappropriated land laborers and capital seized or appropriated without compensation by government organs military units public enterprises and other such units in the develop-ment of departmental business activities such as labor used for technologi-cal innovation houses dismantled and trees chopped peasant land occupied for production self-sufficiency means of production and labor used without compensation for experiments in high yield agriculture and land occupied by government organs or public enterprises for blind construction or expansion21 It is easy to see that the scope of uncompensated appropriations was wider and their consequences more severe in the Suzhou area

Just as in the rest of the country steady progress was made in giving full accounting for uncompensated appropriations in Suzhou Statistics from spring of 1961 indicate that the total value of uncompensated appropriations from the entire region was 5115 million yuan of which 27588599 yuan were from the county level or higher22 Statistics recalculated in June 1961 indicate that the regional total was in fact 534005 million yuan of that total 271183 million yuan was owed to individual commune members 169428 million yuan to collectives and 93394 million yuan to distributions Of the total sum 2165 million was the responsibility of county-level and higher governments 1621 million of communes and higher and 1554 million of production teams and brigades23 Further rough calculations made in February 1962 indicated that

21 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu xian yishang jiguan dui renmin gongshe suanzhang tuipei de chubu fangrsquoan (chugao) 苏州专区县以上机关对人民公社算账退赔的初步方案（初

稿） [Initial Plan for Settlements and Restitutions to be Made in Peoplersquos Communes by Organs at the County Level and Higher in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region (Draft)]rdquo January 7 1961 H5-1-1961-56

22 See cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公

室 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangrsquoan 苏州专区退赔方案 [Suzhou Sub-provincial Re-gion Restitutions Plan]rdquo January 12 1962 H5-1-1962-63

23 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Settlement Fulfillment Leading Group （中共苏

州）地委算账兑现领导小组 ldquoGuanyu dangqian suanzhang tuipei qingkuang de


ltUNgt

the regional total of uncompensated appropriations was 11810 million yuan of that total eighty million yuan (sixty-eight percent) was owed to commune members and 3810 million (the remaining 32 percent) was owed to collec-tives24 A further rough calculation performed not long thereafter again raised the figure to 15174 million yuan with 10174 million yuan (sixty-seven percent) owed to commune members 2700 million (178 percent) to be distributed into collective incomes and 2300 million (152 percent) belonging to collective ac-cumulations This round of uncompensated transfer calculation set the state restitution burden at 8481 million yuan (558 percent) the county burden at 2716 million yuan (eighteen percent) and the peoplersquos commune burden at 2417 million yuan (sixteen percent) The final assessments of objects subject to uncompensated appropriations were as follows 154487 houses razed 145697 mu of land destroyed 506955 million working days of labor 765899 woks and 49863 million farm implements25 Final tallies are shown in Table 71

An examination of uncompensated appropriations of houses further in-dicates the severity of the problem in Suzhou Incomplete statistics indicate that a total of 62044 households and 154487 total structures were destroyed in the region (statistics released in late October 1962 set the total of structures at over 17780026 but the figure was later revised to 154270)27 Of structures destroyed 84584 or 548 percent were tile-roof houses and the remaining

baogao 关于当前算账退赔情况的报告 [Report on Current Conditions of Settle-ments and Restitutions]rdquo June 9 1961 and ldquoGuanyu dangqian suanzhang duipei de qin-gkuang he yijian 关于当前算账退赔的情况和意见 [Opinions on and the Current Situation of Settlements and Restitutions]rdquo June 24 1961 H5-1-1961-56


农村工作部 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangrsquoan de kuangji shuoming 苏州专区退赔方

案的匡计说明 [Explanation of Rough Estimates of the Restitutions Plan in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo February 2 1962 H5-1-1962-63

25 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公室 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangrsquoan 苏州专区退赔方案 [Restitutions Plan of the Suzhou Sub-Provincial Region]rdquo February 12 1962 H5-1-1962-63

26 Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee Settlement Fulfillment Leading Group Office 中共

苏州地委退赔领导小组办公室 ldquoGuanyu tuipei fangwu gongzuo huiyi qingkuang he jindong mingchun yijian de baogao 关于退赔房屋工作会议情况和今冬明春意

见的报告 [Report on Conditions of the Working Meeting of Housing Restitutions and Opinions for Winter this Year and Spring Next Year]rdquo October 30 1962 H5-1-1962-63

27 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangwu anzhi chaiqian hu gongzuo qingkuang he yijian (chuxi sheng tuipei huiyi ziliao) 苏州专区退赔房屋安置拆迁户工作情况和意见（出席

省退赔会议资料） [Conditions of and Opinions on Restitutions to Households Re-located after Forcible Demolition of their Homes in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region (Materials from the Provincial Restitutions Conference)]rdquo March 7 1964 H5-1-1964-74

WANG170

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 7

1 Ac

coun

ting

for u

ncom

pens

ated

app

ropr

iatio

ns in

the S

uzho

u re

gion

by c

ateg

ory

Obj

ect o

f unc

ompe

nsat

ed

tran

sfer

Uni

tQ

uant

ityCa

sh e

quiv

alen

t (y

uan)

Not

es

1La

ndRe

stitu

tion

on c

olle

ctiv

e la

nd su

bjec

t to

unco

m-

pens

ated

app

ropr

iatio

ns w

as g

ener

ally

cal

cula

ted

for a

ppro

pria

tions

occ

urrin

g up

to sp

ring

1961

Fo

r exa

mpl

e o

rigin

ally

land

des

troy

ed b

y

irrig

atio

n w

orks

con

stru

ctio

n w

as c

ompe

nsat

ed

at a

rate

of t

wo

year

s of n

orm

al p

rodu

ctio

n

ie 1

45 y

uan

per m

u b

ut n

ow o

nly

62 is

giv

en

No

com

pens

atio

ns w

ere

give

n fo

r lan

d de

stro

yed

by ir

rigat

ion

wor

ks c

onst

ruct

ed b

y co

mm

unes

Land

des

troy

ed b

y irr

igat

ions

w

ork

cons

truc

tion

Mu

585

263

636

mn

Land

affe

cted

but

not

des

troy

ed

by ir

rigat

ions

wor

k co

nstr

uctio

nM

u40

145

512

000

Requ

isiti

oned

for i

nfra

stru

ctur

eM

u19

790

237

48 m

nO

ccup

ied

Mu

253

1063

270

0Cr

ops d

estr

oyed

Mu

273

2621

780

0

2H

ousi

ngH

ouse

s dem

olis

hed

with

out r

eloc

atio

n w

ere

com

pens

ated

at a

rate

of 2

60 y

uan

per s

truc

ture

H

ouse

s raz

ed w

ere

com

pens

ated

at a

rate

of 1

25

yuan

per

stru

ctur

e fo

r rel

ocat

ed h

ouse

hold

s H

ouse

s occ

upie

d w

ere

com

pens

ated

by

the

pay-

men

t of t

hree

yea

rs o

f ren

t and

the

cost

s of r

e-pa

irs n

eces

sary

afte

r sev

eral

yea

rs o

f occ

upat

ion

Des

troy

edSt

ruct

ures

134

838

471

93 m

nRe

loca

ted

Stru

ctur

es19

649

153

1 m

nO

ccup

ied

Stru

ctur

es17

983

04

316

mn

3La

bor

Labo

r req

uisi

tione

d by

the

coun

ty g

over

nmen

t fo

r the

con

stru

ctio

n of

irrig

atio

n w

orks

was

co

mpe

nsat

ed a

t sev

en ji

ao p

er d

ay N

o co

mpe

n-sa

tions

wer

e pa

id fo

r any

labo

r on

cons

truc

tion

of ir

rigat

ion

wor

ks b

y co

mm

unes

Irrig

atio

n w

orks

100

00

labo

r day

s4

608

2510

60

mn

Infra

stru

ctur

e an

d ot

her

100

00

labo

r day

s46

13

369

04 m

n


ltUNgt

Data

sou

rce

Suz

hou

Pre

fect

ural

Par

ty C

omm

itte

e Re

stit

utio

n Of

fice

中共

苏州

地委

退赔

办公

室 ldquo

Suzh

ou z

hua

nqu

tuip

ei f

angrsquo

an

苏州

专区

退赔

方案

[Su

zhou

Sub

-pro

vinc

ial

Regi

on R

esti

tuti

on P

lan]

rdquo Fe

brua

ry 12

196

2 H

5-1-

1962

-63

4M

ater

ial g

oods

and

oth

erFa

rm m

achi

nery

and

impl

emen

ts in

clud

e sm

all

impl

emen

ts o

f com

mun

e m

embe

rs su

bjec

t to

unco

mpe

nsat

ed a

ppro

pria

tions

The

re a

re a

to

tal o

f 997

259

hou

seho

lds i

n th

e en

tire

regi

on

the

num

ber o

f suc

h im

plem

ents

was

roug

hly

cal-

cula

ted

at fi

ve p

er h

ouse

hold

Far

m im

plem

ents

al

so in

clud

e w

oks a

nd so

up p

ots t

aken

for t

he

Gre

at F

orgi

ng o

f Ste

el a

nd Ir

on t

he n

umbe

r of

such

impl

emen

ts w

as ro

ughl

y ca

lcul

ated

at s

ix

per h

ouse

hold

The

num

ber o

f bric

ks a

nd ti

les

was

roug

hly

calc

ulat

ed to

be

740

00 p

er b

rigad

e

ther

e w

ere

3627

brig

ades

in th

e re

gion

The

qu

antit

y of

woo

d an

d ba

mbo

o w

as ro

ughl

y es

ti-m

ated

to b

e 12

50 d

an p

er b

rigad

e T

he a

mou

nt

of a

gric

ultu

ral p

rodu

cts a

nd b

y-pr

oduc

ts w

as

roug

hly

estim

ated

to b

e 80

0 da

n pe

r brig

ade

Ca

pita

l doe

s not

incl

ude

the

usin

g of

brig

ade

ac-

cum

ulat

ions

by

com

mun

es T

he o

ther

cat

egor

y in

clud

es o

bjec

ts o

n la

nd d

estr

oyed

in W

ujia

ng

Coun

ty b

y th

e dr

edgi

ng o

f the

Tai

pu R

iver

whi

ch

acco

unte

d fo

r 391

000

yua

n in

loss

es

Farm

mac

hine

ry a

nd

impl

emen

tsPi

eces

498

63 m

n17

452

mn

Boat

sEa

ch1

202

841

400

mn

Plow

oxe

nH

ead

417

417

1 m

nFu

rnitu

rePi

eces

598

35 m

n17

95

mn

Live

stoc

kH

ead

862

501

725

mn

Fow

lEa

ch23

542

589

00Br

ick

and

tile

Piec

es25

389

mn

380

8 m

nW

ood

and

bam

boo

Dan

440

7 m

n22

035

mn

Agric

ultu

ral p

rodu

cts a

nd

by-p

rodu

cts

Dan

246

2 m

n7

4047

mn

Capi

tal

Yuan

345

000

WANG172

ltUNgt

699903 or 452 percent were thatched cottages Razings of entire areas destroyed 196 natural villages six small towns 217 homestead plots 6810 households and 22103 structures About 20000 households and 45000 structures were destroyed as a result of piecemeal demolitions28 The Xieqiao Commune 谢桥公社 of Changshu County was the most severely affected in the region There a total of 1632 households were razed or 2087 percent of total households affecting 6998 people or 2571 percent of the population A total of 5520 structures were razed including 40575 thatched cottages and 14625 tile-roof buildings29 Large numbers of structures in the Jinxing 金星 Mingxing 明星 and Chenqiao 陈桥 Brigades of the Xieqiao Commune were razed as a result of the rerouting of the Wangyu River the Great Forging of Steel and Iron the large-scale establishment of collective settlements and stud farms and the large-scale establishment of public canteens Statistics indicate that in these three brigades 244 householdsmdash4326 percent of the totalmdash and 830 structuresmdash3679 percent of the totalmdashwere razed affecting 1047 people 4345 percent of the total population The campaign to reorganize production teams and villages alone led to the destruction of eleven villages and ten production teams as well as 171 householdsmdash70 percent of total households razed in the three brigadesmdashand 583 structuresmdashlikewise seventy percent of total structures razed The Jinxing Brigade saw the destruc-tion of five villages three production teams and fifty-nine households or seventy percent of total households The Mingxing Brigade saw the destruc-tion of three villages two production teams and forty-five households or sev-enty percent of total households The Chenqiao Brigade saw the destruction of three villages five production teams and sixty-seven households also

Explanation One reason for the discrepancies between earlier and later figures of demol-ished housing lay in the fact that some cases of house demolition were only later included in the scope of restitutions as policies were adjusted and the degree of restitution work escalated further clarifying the situation of uncompensated transfers Another reason is that some demolished houses which were initially included in the scope of uncom-pensated appropriationsrestitutions were later removed from that scope as conditions became clearer


29 ldquoGuanyu Changshu xian Xieqiao gongshe chaiqian minfang anzhi qingkuang de diaocha 关于常熟县谢桥公社拆迁民房安置情况的调查 [Investigation into Conditions of Forced Demolition and Relocation of Members of the Xieqiao Commune of Changshu County]rdquo October 6 1962 H1-2-1962-270


ltUNgt

seventy percent of total households30 These three brigades were a heavily-hit disaster area of the Xieqiao Commune

Progress was slow in restitution work at the outset One reason for the de-lay lay in the major adjustments being made to the national economy in the 1960s which intertwined many areas of work together and made the overall situation highly complex Another reason was an insufficient understanding of the importance of restitution work on the part of leaders in some areas which slowed the pace of their work and slowed overall progress of the entire enterprise31 On top of that the work itself was quite intricate and difficult Most officials lacked experience at the beginning and were unclear on which losses of property should be considered uncompensated appropriations how to calculate figures for those losses which were thus deemed and finally how to go about paying restitution Such lack of experience too affected the pace of work By the end of 1961 a total of 46927 million yuan in restitution had been paid in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region That figure consisted of 1455 million yuan in material goods 23247 million yuan in cash 4254 million yuan of debt repaid with objects of similar value and 4871 million yuan of bank promissory notes32 Progress in the various localities of the region was poorly balanced Progress was relatively fast in Suzhou City (and suburbs) where work entered its final stages after March 1961 A total of over 459000 yuan was disbursed around the city (and suburbs) accounting for 779 percent of total restitution

30 ldquoGuanyu (Changshu xian) Xieqiao gongshe jinxing mingxing chenqiao 3 dadui chaiq-ian hu anzhi qingkuang de chubu diaocha baogao 关于 (常熟县 )谢桥公社金星

明星陈桥3个大队拆迁户安置情况的初步调查报告 [Investigative Report on the Conditions of Households Who Were Relocated after Forced Demolition of their Houses in the Jinxing Mingxing and Chenqiao Brigades of the Xieqiao Commune of Changshu County]rdquo (the authorship and time of publication of this document are un-clear) H1-2-1962-270

31 See ldquoXiong Renmin tongzhi zai suanzhang tuipei huiyi shang de fayan (jilu gao)rdquo ldquoMocheng gongshe guanyu jianjue jiuzheng pingdiao cuowu chedi tuipei gongzuo de chubu fangrsquoan 莫城公社关于坚决纠正平调错误彻底退赔工作的初步方案 [Mocheng Communersquos Initial Plan for Resolutely Redressing the Errors of Uncompen-sated Transfers and the Work of Full Restitutions]rdquo 1961 H5-1-1961-57 and ldquoGuanyu Wu xian Xietang gongshe shenxu dadui jiehe tiaozheng hesuan danwei zuohao suanzhuang tuipei gongzuo de qingkuang 关于吴县斜塘公社沈许大队结合调整核算单位做

好算账退赔工作的情况 [Conditions of Combining Adjusted Accounting Units in Or-der to Properly Perform Restitution Work in the Shenxu Brigade of the Xietang Commune of Wu County]rdquo March 1 1962 H5-1-1962-64

32 Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee Restitutions Office ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangrsquoanrdquo

WANG174

ltUNgt

for uncompensated appropriations A total of over 152000 yuan was paid out in material goods 331 percent of total compensations paid out at the time33

In mid-June 1961 Chen Yun 陈云 at the time deputy chairman of the ccp Central Committee and deputy premier of the State Council traveled to Su-zhou to convalesce and conduct research He convened symposiums of both county committee secretaries and production brigade branch secretaries He was highly concerned with restitution work and gave concrete instructions in this area34 After the ldquoConference of 7000 Cadresrdquo of 1962 the understanding of the entire party of the severity and danger of ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes was further deepened and more emphasis was placed on restitution work As a result restitution work in Suzhoumdashas in the rest of the countrymdashwas ramped up the emphasis now being on persistently implementing the ldquorepay debts to the point of bankruptcyrdquo spirit of the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth ccp Congress35

Restitution work in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region consisted primarily of settlements and restitution made for housing land instruments (including those used for production and living) labor and other areas Letrsquos first take a look at how restitution was handled for labor At the height of the Great Leap Forward movement mistakenly high estimates of agricultural yields led to the assumption that agricultural issues had been solved As a result large numbers of young capable laborers were removed from the front lines of agriculture and sent to work on the Great Forging of Steel and Iron the large-scale es-tablishment of commune and brigade public enterprises and all manner of irrigation works projects On top of all that were blind direction of production large-scale recruitment for grand tactics campaigns and so on uncompensat-ed appropriations were particularly severe in the area of labor For an example letrsquos take a look at the Baowei Production Brigade 保圩大队 of the Weitang Commune 渭塘公社 in Wu County There labor provisions for agriculture decreased yearly beginning in 1957 while at the same time the proportions of old weak infirmed handicapped and female increased Table 72 shows these trends

Although Southern Jiangsu Province has long been plagued by a dearth of land for its abundant population the area has long been home to agricultural

33 Zhongguo gongchandang Suzhou dashiji 9334 Ibid 9435 Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee Settlement Fulfillment Leading Group Office

ldquoGuanyu tuipei fangwu gongzuo huiyi qingkuang he jindong mingchun yijian de baogaordquo ldquoSong Lianfang buzhang zay sheng tuipei hui shang fayan gao 宋连芳部长在省退赔会

上发言稿 [Speech of Minister Song Lianfang at the Provincial Conference on Restitu-tions]rdquo 1962 (no exact date specified) H5-1-1962-63


ltUNgt

Tabl

e 7

2 La

bor p

lann

ing

cond

ition

s in

the B

aowe

i brig

ade o

f the

Wei

tang

com

mun

e of W

u co

unty

Indu

stry

1957

1958

1959

1960

Peop

le

empl

oyed

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal (

)

Peop

le

empl

oyed

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal (

)

Peop

le

empl

oyed

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal (

)

Peop

le

empl

oyed

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal (

)

Agric

ultu

re72

396

91

640

879

156

877

852

575

21

Side

line

indu

strie

s7

094

152

0644

603

547

74

Wel

fare

60

818

247

354

843

616

Com

mun

e-ru

n in

dust

ry1

014

243

330

411

375

3

Irrig

atio

n1

014

50

6914

192

10

14Tr

ansp

orta

tion

and

ship

ping

91

236

081

30

42

Cultu

re a

nd

educ

atio

n2

027

101

3818

247

223

15

Data

sou

rce

ldquoW

eita

ng g

ongs

he

baow

ei d

adui

lao

li d

iaoc

ha

qing

kuan

g 渭

塘公

社保

圩大

队劳

力调

查情

况 [

Find

ings

of

a La

bor

Inve

stig

atio

n in

th

e Ba

owei

Bri

gad

e of

th

e W

eita

ng C

omm

une]

rdquo Ju

ly 15

196

0 H

5-1-

1960

-48

WANG176

ltUNgt

production and operations methods suitable to local conditions and a high population density ie intensive agriculture maintained by a vast labor pool With a large number of laborersin small areas multiple cropping allowed farmers to achieve higher labor productivity Surplus labor was funneled into family side businesses and handicraft industries which were highly developed Shortly after the advent of the peoplersquos commune movement there were no substantive changes to methods of agricultural production and operations ie levels of production but there were great changes to the organizational methods employed in production and operations Household economies were abolished as vestiges of the private ownership system at this point the sole income of all households came from collective production units When young able-bodied laborers were taken out of agricultural production the repercus-sions weregrave Moreover agricultural production is highly seasonal early or late planting or harvesting bears an extremely negative impact on overall agricultural yields Low agricultural yieldsled to insufficiencies in basic rural rations which in turn adversely affected the physical health of agricultural laborers Declines in the health of laborers then gave rise to a vicious cycle In response to this situation governments at every level in Suzhou began conduct-ing sweeping investigations of labor infringements and labor appropriations Officials then began taking measures to rectify the situation adopting such methods as planning squeezing protecting reforming managing regulating and others in order to solve labor insufficiencies in the agricultural sector Squeezing and protecting helped solve current issues Planning and manag-ing were used for the long term Reforming and regulating were used as assur-ances that the problem be fundamentally solved Here ldquoplanningrdquo refers to the guiding policy of ldquocomprehensive planning with agriculture as the foundation and grain as the guiding principlerdquo which demanded a plan considering all fac-tors comprehensive planning and reasonable arrangements of proportions of labor sent to every battle front in rural areas ldquoSqueezingrdquo refers to squeezing all possible labor out of every single industry by every means conceivable in order to support agricultural production ldquoProtectingrdquo refers to cherishing and protecting labor and ensuring that all available labor be able to participate in the production battle front full of vigor ldquoReformingrdquo refers to persisting in the mass line large-scale reforms to tools large-scale technological innovations in agriculture and the technical revolution ldquoManagingrdquo refers to strengthening of the management of operations in communes and brigades ldquoRegulatingrdquo re-fers to the establishment of institutions and regulations on the administration and demand for labor Relevant documents made concrete stipulations regard-ing the above in order to cause labor management to be truly standardized and achieve results in the real world The ccp Suzhou Prefectural Committee


ltUNgt

Rural Work Department issued fifteen regulations regarding labor administra-tion summarized as follows (1) From now onward integrated administration must be implemented over rural labor No one may wantonly transfer laborers much less organize labor cooperatives or use grand tactics at will which thwart the labor usage plans of contracting units The organization of labor coopera-tives must be conducted voluntarily by parties involved and approved by the party committee one level above (2) All personnel hired privately or recklessly by any commune system or work unit since 1960 must be identified and sent back to their original production units (3) All communes and brigades which use labor to go through back doors or engage in cooperatives must be identi-fied and sent back (4) No government or department at any level is permitted to seize laborers at will If indeed labor is required permission must be granted by the county committee Earnest investigations must be conducted for all la-borers already thus seized all those who should not have been appropriated must be sent back to the countryside (5) No commune is permitted to estab-lish its own full-time construction team (6) Industrial enterprises founded by communes are in no case allowed to siphon off rural laborers within the next two years Such enterprises should be conducted in accordance with the spirit of small-scale production during the busy farming season and large-scale pro-duction during the slack farming season Some personnel may be transferred to assist during the busy season and all laborers may be transferred during the slack season This will lead to gains in both industry and agriculture with-out the need to bring on additional laborers (7) Brigades may not establish dedicated transportation teams All boats and laborers already appropriated from production teams must be returned to their original production teams for participation in agricultural production (8) All agricultural schools red and expert schools and agricultural middle schools founded in communes must go on holiday during the busy farming season All staff of these schools ex-cepting those required for production within the school must be returned to their original brigades to participate in production during these holidays (9) Government organs schools and public enterprises may not seize agricultural labor in the development of production in secondary enterprises All laborers already thus seized must be returned to the countryside (10) All song-and-dance troupes must conduct activities in their spare time none may be released from their duties (11) Earnest efforts should be made to persuade commune mem-bers who have absconded to return home and to participate in production They should be given necessary help in the resolution of difficulties in produc-tion and in their lives and should not be discriminated against or attacked (12) The training of peoplersquos militias must be conducted during the slack farm-ing season (13) All communes and directly subordinate public enterprises

WANG178

ltUNgt

must comprehensively list out projects in order of priority and down-size all non-production work forces Brigades may not hire dedicated correspondents purchasing agents or accountants (14) The following stipulations are hereby made regarding determining staff numbers and quotas in welfare enterprises secondary industry production enterprises and so on one cook is to bear the meal burden of at least 50 people one gardener is to bear the meal burden of at least 50 people one childcare worker is to supervise at least 10 children and one pig keeper is to tend to at least 30 pigs (15) There must be a universal tidy-ing up of all rural labor Labor levels are to be reappraised in order to provide good conditions for planned production and labor arrangements36 Per these regulations all county governments made efforts to rectify labor which had been appropriated without compensation and shore up the agriculture On the whole there were no great variations to this work and the work was mostly completed by the second half of 1961 after all large-scale campaigns concluded in particular commune-founded enterprises Laborers who had been appropri-ated without compensation were not only returned to the agricultural produc-tion front line but also received corresponding compensations

Next came land settlements and land restitution During the Great Leap Forward a great quantity of precious land resources was squandered due to infringements and appropriations made during the various large-scale cam-paigns These appropriations were particularly injurious to Jiangsu a province in which land resources were tight to begin with As such in accordance with demands from the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee the Suzhou regional government began processing initial settlements and restitution for all agricul-tural land that had been requisitioned but not used requisitioned but not en-tirely used and appropriated without compensation At the outset however many work units that had engaged in uncompensated appropriations pos-sessed an insufficient understanding of the importance of the work Some gave back much less than they had taken Some made airs of returning land but in truth retained control Some gave back land while taking more at the same time Some gave back public land but not private land Some production teams feared that a return of land which had been subject to uncompensated appro-priations would increase the teamrsquos requirements for grain production which would in turn further strain commune members these teams were not terribly eager to reclaim taken lands an attitude that further slowed work progress By


农村工作部 rdquo Guanyu zhengdun nongcun laodongli wenti zuotan huiyi de qingkuang 关于整顿农村劳动力问题座谈会议的情况 [Conditions of the Symposium on Rectifying Rural Labor Issues]rdquo August 3 1960 H5-1-1960-48


ltUNgt

June 1962 settlements had been made on only 261279 mu of agricultural land in the region Of that total 690045 mu were deemed land leftover from exces-sive requisitioning Another 934627 mu had been subject to uncompensated appropriations and another 509518 mu of land was compensated as a result of destruction by the leveling or digging up of fields Another 4786 mu fell into the category of ldquovegetables replaced with grainrdquo Another 4164 mu fell into the category of fixed quotas or fixed obligations as a result of continued cultivation by state-run farms and public enterprises37 In March 1963 to respond to this situation and in accordance with the spirit of State Council instructions the ldquoSixty-Article Regulations for Agriculturerdquo 农业六十条 and other relevant documents the ccp Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitution Work Leading Group made the following concrete regulations (1) Regarding the issues of re-turning ownership of land to production teams The ldquoRegulationsrdquo stipulate that all land requisitioned but not used be unconditionally returned to produc-tion teams that no requisitioning fees be levied and that ownership of the land go to the state In cases of need arising hereafter the land will be returned for usage at no cost after approvals procedures are completed All production team land requisitioned without compensation must be unconditionally re-turned with ownership going to the production team In addition compensa-tions must be paid for all losses incurred during the time of occupation (2) The spirit of State Council regulations is to be abided in the question of handling crops The principle of ldquohe who planted shall reaprdquo shall be observed for crops already mature or nearing maturation For crops still far from maturation seedlings shall be handed over and the production team shall pay compensa-tions for seeds and labor at its discretion (3) Production teams are responsible for the protection of buildings and other fixture and may not destroy them If a production team wishes to borrow one it must obtain permission from the original work unit All small attachments related to production teams which are not needed by original work units may be given to that production team for use after a price is reached through negotiations (4) All mature land received by production teams shall be included within planning area and state requisi-tioning requirements will be levied thereupon All land which was only mildly damaged and can be restored to full arability through minor efforts shall be included within planning area in the first year such land will be appropriately cared for so as to establish a quota for grain production and in the second year state grain requisitioning requirements will be levied thereupon All land

37 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Rural Work Department 中共苏州地委农村工作

部 ldquoGuanyu qingli tudi de qingkuang baogao 关于清理土地的情况报告 [Report on Conditions of Land Settlements]rdquo June 19 1962 H5-1-1962-65

WANG180

ltUNgt

which was heavily damaged and thus requires the expenditure of a great deal of production team labor to return to arability shall be considered uncultivat-ed land and measures for handling the cultivation of uncultivated land shall be observed (5) All land belonging to private citizens of cities or towns and any other private land not part of collectives shall be directly handed over to production teams by the work unit which has occupied it No private citizen may receive land If any person desires to plant land he may join a local com-mune and transfer into an agricultural registration he shall then be allocated a plot of land for personal needs as a member of a commune (6) Some work units which make seasonal use of large swaths of farmland may adopt one of the following measures according to their own conditions The first is that the unit may use a production team for planting with duties regularly rotated but this may not affect usage on the part of the work unit The second is that the unit may plant the land itself and establish its own tasks of turning production over to higher authorities The third is that the unit may reduce its scope re-serving a portion and withdrawing from a portion per the principle of econo-mizing land use (7) The following measures may be employed for large swaths of arable land surrounded by containing walls or fences per concrete condi-tions The first is to reduce the size of the wall and free up some land The sec-ond is for commune members to enter the walled-in area to plant The third is for a work unit to plant the land and establish tasks of turning production over to higher authorities (8) All land occupied by schools except areas necessary for exercise and approved agricultural middle schools or other production land belonging to specialized schools must be returned in entirety to produc-tion teams No excuses of necessity for labor training or living welfare will be accepted for the continued occupation of such land If the return of such land leads to difficulties in procuring ample vegetables to eat local commercial de-partments and production teams shall be responsible for supplying such In individual cases in which a school is located in a remote area or is responsible for a large number of people and local commercial departments and produc-tion teams are unable to meet their vegetable needs a certain amount of vegetable-planting land may be reserved with permission from the local coun-ty committee (9) Per the central tenet of the ldquoSixty-Article Regulations for Agriculturerdquo land planted by communes and brigades must generally be va-cated and returned to production teams In some cases in which there is a con-crete value to retaining said land with permission from the county committee it shall be acceptable to vacate a portion and retain a portion or to retain the land in entirety (10) A great number of issues are involved in land belonging to state-run farms vegetable bases belonging to cities and towns land belonging to laogai [reform through labor] units land belonging to military departments


ltUNgt

and other land occupied under special circumstances Preliminary opinions should be established through consultations with relevant units and control-ling departments and reported in a dedicated report to the research depart-ments of all party committees for handling38 Although some areas continued to handle things in their own fashions39 after the issuance of these highly oper-able ldquoregulationsrdquo the majority of local governments rapidly came in line with the work of land settlements and restitution After further comprehensive ear-nest land settlements a total of 13857421 mu of land occupied but not used or occupied without compensation had been returned across the Suzhou region by September 1963 That total added to all the land returned in the years prior accounted for over ninety percent of the 45103 mu in the region that had been requisitioned or occupied since 1958 (not including land destroyed for the con-struction of irrigation works) At this point basically all land that could be returned had been returned40 This process spurred the development of pro-duction increased incomes of production teams and commune members and solidified the collective economy Its effects were particularly striking for com-munes and teams in the outskirts of towns and cities which had always been heavily populated but poorly endowed in land and in which land requisition-ing had been heavy-handed

Restitution work related to housing was the most difficult of all restitution tasks its progress also the slowest One reason for such difficulty is that of all the things that were appropriated without compensation housing accounted for the largest proportion Another reason was that housing was most closely related to the daily lives of commune members moreover there is no substi-tute for housing which made this issue closest to the hearts of commune mem-bers At the time fund raising for house building materials such as timber and bamboo was the most difficult By March 1962 restitution had been made for only 46450 structures only thirty percent of the total for which restitution was due Of that total an equivalent of 22075 structures (fourteen percent) were

38 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Leading Group 中共苏州地委退赔领

导小组 ldquoGuanyu tuipei fangwu qingli tudi huiyi de qingkuang baogao 关于退赔房屋

清理土地会议的情况报告 [Report on the Conference on Restitutions Housing and Land Settlements]rdquo March 24 1963 H1-2-1963-306

39 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公室 ldquoGuanyu Wu xian jinshan gongshe qingli tuipei tudi qingkuang de baogao 关于吴县金

山公社清理退还土地情况的报告 [Report on Land Settlements and Restitutions in the Jinshan Commune of Wu County]rdquo June 6 1963 H5-2-1963-111

40 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Rural Work Department ldquoGuanyu qingli tudi gongzuo zongjie 关于清理土地工作总结 [Summary of Land Settlement Work]rdquo H5-1-1963-70

WANG182

ltUNgt

compensated in the form of state-owned housing Another 16393 structures (eleven percent) were compensated through the tearing down of state-owned housing to construct new buildings or the reconstruction of old buildings The funding for 7962 structures (five percent) was raised independently by the public and the remaining percentage of restitution was paid out in cash41 Support for restitution work picked up and the pace of said work accelerated beginning in the second half of 1963 as the economy further recovered The Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee reported to the Jiangsu Provincial Com-mittee that a total of restitution for 94900 structuresmdashmade either through compensations or the construction of new housingmdashhad been made in the re-gion as of the end of August accounting for 599 percent of the 158500 private structures destroyed in the region42 In October of that year the Suzhou Pre-fectural Commissionerrsquos office arranged for 20000 stalks of bamboo outside of state planning figures to be brought in from Jiangxi province Thereafter the Jiangsu provincial government appropriated 60000 yuan and 200 cubic meters of timber to the Suzhou region for house restitution In November the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region Supply and Marketing Cooperative Means of Production Station arranged for 15000 stalks of bamboo outside of state planning to be brought in from Anhui province43 By Spring Festival of 1964


42 Zhongguo gongchandang Suzhou dashiji 10543 The above materials came from the following sources in this order cpc Suzhou Prefec-

tural Committee Restitutions office and Suzhou Provincial Supply and Marketing Coop-erative Suzhou Sub-provincial Region Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公室江苏省供

销合作社苏州专区办事处 ldquoGuanyu fenpei yipi jihua wai maozhu yong yu shenghuo he tuipei jianwu de tongzhi 关于分配一批计划外毛竹用于生活和退赔建屋的通

知 [Notice on Unplanned Allocation of Bamboo to be Used for Living and Restitutions to Reconstruct Houses]rdquo October 21 1963 Jiangsu Provincial Dedicated Bureau of Finance for Suzhou and cpc Suzhou Prefectural Restitutions Office 江苏省苏州专员公署财政

局中共苏州地委退赔办公室 ldquoGuanyu fenpei yi pi tuipei jingfei de tongzhi 关于

分配一批退赔经费的通知 [Notice on Allocating Funding for Restitutions]rdquo October 21 1963 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office and Jiangsu Provincial Dedicated Planning Committee for Suzhou 中共苏州地委退赔办公室江苏省苏

州专员公署计划委员会 ldquoGuanyu fenpei yi pi tuipei zhuanyong mucai de tongzhi 关于分配一批退赔专用木材的通知 [Notice on Allocation of Wood to be Used for Res-titutions]rdquo October 21 1963 cpc Suzhou Prefectural Committee Restitutions Office and Jiangsu Provincial Supply and Marketing Cooperative Sub-provincial Region Office 中共

苏州地委退赔办公室江苏省供销合作社苏州专区办事处 ldquoGuanyu fenpei yi pi anpai shenghuo zhuanyong maozhu de tongzhi 关于分配一批安排生活专用毛竹


ltUNgt

a total of 92499 structures had been built as restitution accounting for 5997 percent of all private structures that had been razed Initial plans indicated that 111 communes (fifty-one percent of the total) and 1872 brigades (sixty-eight percent of the total) had resolved or basically resolved the housing prob-lems for households in urgent need44 By March the number of structures built as restitution rose to 93999 accounting for over 60 percent of razed private housing structures accounting for about ninety percent of all rural households45 Statistics indicate the following allocations from the provincial and sub- provincial regional governments used for housing restitution from 1962 to spring of 1965 6375 cubic meters of wood 93600 stalks of bamboo 2975 tonnes of coal 299 million bricks and 1059 million tiles46 A total of 101377 structures were constructed for restitution in the region accounting for 657 percent of total razed structures See Table 73 for details

Statistics from June 1964 indicate that by the time restitution work ended in the region about 9000 housing structures which should have been compen-sated had not been The most seriously affected region was Changshu County with over 5000 structures for which restitution had not been made The least affected region was Wujiang County 吴江县 with only over 200 such struc-tures47 See Table 74 for detailed figures

的通知 [Notice on the Allocation of Bamboo to be Used for Living]rdquo November 23 1963 H5-2-1963-110

44 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu tuipei fangwu anzhi chaiqian hu gongzuo qingkuang he yijian (chuxi sheng tuipei huiyi ziliao) 苏州专区迟赔房屋安置拆迁户工作情况和意见（出

席省退赔会议资料） [Conditions of and Opinions on the Work of Restitutions and Relocations for Razed Households in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 7 1964 H5-1-1964-74 Figures given in some documents may be erroneous For example statis-tics issued in October 1963 indicate that a total of 94092 structures for restitutions had been constructed this figure is only 593 percent of the total number of houses razed See ldquoTuipei huiyi qingkuang de baogao 退赔会议情况报告 [Report on Conditions at the Restitutions Conference]rdquo October 25 1963 H5-1-1963-69

45 ldquoGuanyu jieshu tuipei fangwu anzhi chaiqian hu gongzuo de chubu fangrsquoan 关于结束退

赔房屋安置拆迁户工作的初步方案 [Initial Plan for Ending the Work of Relocating Families of Razed Homes]rdquo April 1964 H5-1-1964-74

46 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu 1961 nian dao 1964 nian fenpei tuipei jianwu wuzi huizongbiao 苏州

专区 1961年到 1964年分配退赔建屋物资汇总表 [Summary Table of Resources Allo-cated to the Construction of Restitutions Housing in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region from 1961 to 1964]rdquo July 12 1965 H5-1-1965-77

47 Suzhou Prefectural Party Committee Restitutions Office 中共苏州地委退赔办公室 ldquoDangqian tuipei anzhi gongzuo qingkuang 当前退赔安置工作情况 [Current Condi-tions of the Work of Restitutions and Relocation]rdquo June 13 1964 H5-1-1964-74

WANG184

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 7

3 Re

stitu

tion

and

relo

catio

n (f

or ra

zed

hous

es) i

n th

e Suz

hou

regi

on

Uni

t St

ruct

ures

Regi

onFo

rcib

le re

loca

tions

Relo

catio

ns a

nd re

stitu

tion

Hou

seho

lds

Stru

ctur

es

raze

dTo

tal

stru

ctur

esPe

rcen

tage

of

tota

l str

uctu

res

raze

d (

)

By y

ear

Prio

r to

1962

Spri

ng 19

62 to

w

inte

r 196

3Sp

ring

1963

to

win

ter

1964

Spri

ng 19

64 to

w

inte

r 196

5

Tota

l59

904

154

269

101

377

657

719

1715

987

724

36

230

Wux

i4

994

117

756

063

515

4387

51

313

341

521

Jiang

yin

476

411

702

636

054

546

351

011

420

294

Shaz

hou

166

2933

259

262

3779

184

552

951

52

397

52

433

Chan

gshu

186

1955

842

344

235

617

222

695

627

02

764

312

0Ta

ican

g1

950

628

84

489

714

3758

611

120

Kuns

han

511

114

201

128

995

908

103

995

163

258

628

2W

u Co

unty

383

08

717

427

149

3184

785

530

15

Wuj

iang

400

712

485

663

453

248

285

141

331

25

80

Data

sou

rce

Suz

hou

Pre

fect

ural

Par

ty C

omm

itte

e Re

stit

utio

n Of

fice

ldquoSu

zhou

zh

uanq

u tu

ipei

anz

hi f

angw

u qi

ngku

ang

苏州

专区

退赔

安置

房屋

情况

[Co

ndit

ions

of

Hou

sing

Res

titu

tion

and

Rel

ocat

ions

in t

he

Suzh

ou S

ub-p

rovi

ncia

l Re

gion

]rdquo Ju

ly 8

196

5

H5-

1-19

65-7

7


ltUNgt

Policies regarding restitution to be made for implements for production or liv-ing consistently emphasized that material goods should be used for restitution in a maximum of cases but in most actual cases damage to small farm imple-ments was officially deemed to have fallen within the scope of ldquonormal wear and tearrdquo and thus no restitution was made (generally all implements thus af-fected were small farm implements belonging to rural citizens the majority of large farm implements had been bought with cash or collective sharehold-ing into collectives at the time of the cooperative movement) As there were a great quantity of classifications for ldquoliving implementsrdquo it was difficult to make objective verifications of circumstances on the basis of which to make resti-tution The more feasible option was to appraise their value and compensate with promissory notes

Beginning in the second half of 1963 some local governments of the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region began preparing to wrap up restitution work

Table 74 Plans for final tasks in housing restitution and relocations in the Suzhou sub- provincial region

Unit Structures

Region Number of restitution structures still required

Structures razed for mid to large sized irrigation works

Structures razed for small irriga-tion works

Structures razed for oth-er large-scale campaigns

Total 5094 3048 846 1200Changshu 2500 1784 416 300Shazhou 1591 856 250 485Wujiang 301 258 10 33Wuxi 332 100 232Jiangyin 250 150 50 50Kunshan 120 20 100

Explanation (solution) Materials on hand in each county sufficient to construct 700 to 800 structures provincially-allocated materials and funding sufficient to construct around 1500 structures local government resources plus mass-raised funds sufficient to construct 1000 to 1300 struc-tures 1400 to 1800 structures still lackingData source ldquoQuan zhuanqu tuipei anzhi saowei renwu guihua 全专区退赔

安置扫尾任务规划 [Plans for Final Tasks in Housing Restitution and Reloca-tions across the Sub-Provincial Region]rdquo July 16 1965 H5-1-1965-77

WANG186

ltUNgt

in accordance with the unified deployments of superior governments48 After April 1964 the entire region had entered the final stages of restitution work49 All restitution work was completed by the second half of 1965 with relevant organs withdrawing from the process and handing down the small quantity of remaining issues to civil affairs departments for integrated processing A total value of over 23 million yuan in material goods and cash had been distrib-uted in the region all allocated from the provincial and sub-provincial govern-ments50 A large quantity of promissory notes was also issued as restitution in the region See Table 75 for details

iii

One can arrive at the following conclusions after an objective consideration of the above historical processes First rural restitution work in Suzhou was conducted and completed within the scope stipulated by central policy frame-works just like all other work Also like all other work rural restitution work went through repetitions as a result of changes to central policies The overall trend however was one toward continual deepening and thoroughness which not only redeemed the image of the party and government which had been adversely affected for a time but also played an important positive role in the rapid restoration of agriculture and alleviation of difficulties across the vast countryside Second insufficient understanding of the importance of restitu-tion work and insufficiently thorough comprehension of policies on the part of some cadre in addition to the problems caused by the various ldquothings in voguerdquo gave rise to the following malpractices in restitution work (1) The on-slaught of uncompensated appropriations hit as fiercely and as quickly as a lightning strike but restitution work proceeded slowly incomprehensively and in some cases not at all owing to a number of factors Some rural households did not receive restitution of material goods of guaranteed quality sufficient

48 ldquoTuipei anzhi gongzuo qingkuang yu yijian (taolun gao) 退赔安置工作情况与意见

（讨论稿） [Conditions of and Opinions on the Work of Restitutions Relocations (Dis-cucssion Draft)]rdquo December 7 1963 H5-2-1963-109

49 ldquoGuanyu jieshu tuipei fangwu anzhi chaiqian hu gongzuo de chubu fangrsquoanrdquo50 ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu peitui anzhi gongzuo qingkuang he quanmian jieshu de yijian 苏州专

区退赔安置工作情况和全面结束的意见 [Conditions of Restitution Work of Hous-ing Relocation in the Suzhou Sub-provincial Region and on Bringing Said Work to a Com-plete Close]rdquo (date and authorship unclear) H5-1-1965-77 The actual figure was likely 2331972 yuan See ldquoSuzhou zhuanqu 1961 nian dao 1964 nian fenpei tuipei jianwu wuzi huizongbiaordquo


ltUNgt

Tabl

e 7

5 Pr

omiss

ory n

otes

issu

ed a

s res

titut

ion

in th

e Suz

hou

regi

on

Uni

t Yu

an

Coun

tyQ

uant

ity is

sued

Qua

ntity

re

calle

d by

ba

nks

Qua

ntity

unr

ecal

led

Tota

lBr

igad

es a

nd

prod

uctio

n te

ams

Com

mun

e m

embe

rsO

ther

Tota

lBr

igad

es a

nd

prod

uctio

n te

ams

Com

mun

e m

embe

rsO

ther

Tota

l5

785

102

333

952

02

350

561

769

3915

413

54

172

260

240

693

91

762

025

762

54W

uxi

134

090

858

628

675

414

022

543

71

053

984

463

885

652

099

Jiang

yin

948

040

651

004

267

064

299

7241

665

453

138

643

550

410

540

9Sh

azho

u53

935

314

498

738

433

662

946

466

407

831

3137

926

413

011

Chan

gshu

708

642

284

507

377

168

469

6723

639

547

224

716

429

526

173

746

217

Taic

ang

765

898

351

975

413

923

238

472

527

426

277

960

246

950

251

6Ku

nsha

n30

568

628

903

016

656

711

2523

456

120

379

016

261

145

10W

u Co

unty

865

7536

470

425

3518

060

685

1518

700

422

45W

ujia

ng10

900

099

526

194

739

272

266

817

734

759

674

580

60

Data

sou

rce

Suz

hou

Pre

fect

ural

Par

ty C

omm

itte

e Re

stit

utio

n Of

fice

ldquoSu

zhou

zh

uanq

u tu

ipei

qip

iao

qing

kuan

g 苏

州专

区退

赔

期票

情况

[Co

ndit

ions

of

Prom

isso

ry N

otes

for

Res

titu

tion

in t

he

Suzh

ou S

ub-p

rovi

ncia

l Re

gion

]rdquo O

ctob

er 15

196

4 H

5-1-

1965

-77

WANG188

ltUNgt

quantity or fair pricing by the conclusion of reparations work but instead received promissory notes that could not be redeemed in the short term this led to further intangible losses (2) Many material goods that had been subject to uncompensated appropriations had been depreciated but restitution work was conducted in accordance with careful calculations and strict budgets Offi-cials in many areas feared ldquoexcessiverdquo restitution would burst budgetary limits and chose not to make restitution in many cases Some opportunistic cadre members profited from the campaign through embezzlement Others took more than their fair share misappropriated funds made unjust allocations or redeemed promissory notes ahead of time These behaviors exacerbated the already poor situations of those whose property had been subject to un-compensated appropriations making both living and production more diffi-cult for rural citizens When making restitution for appropriated houses some substituted shoddy materials for good ones cut corners in craftsmanship or sold inferior goods at high prices All the above compounded the dissatisfac-tion of rural citizens at the time and detracted from the image and prestige of the party and government51 (3) Some official documents of the time clearly stipulated that losses attributable to blind direction of production should be accounted for politically and not economically52 As the Great Forging of Steel

51 ldquoGuanyu tongrsquoan gongshe suanzhang tuipei gongzuo de jiancha baogao 关于通安公社

算账退赔工作的检查报告 [Investigative Report on the Settlement and Restitution Work of the Tongrsquoan Commune]rdquo H5-2-1961-86 See also Suzhou Prefectural Party Com-mittee Restitutions Office （中共苏州）地委退赔办公室 ldquoGuanyu Kunshan xian tuipei minfang zhuanyong qicai de shengchan diaobo shiyong qingkuang xiang diwei de baogao 关于昆山县退赔民房专用器材的生产调拨使用情况向地委的报

告 [Report to Prefectural Party Committee on the Production Allocation and Utilization of Materials for Construction of Restitutions Housing in Kunshan County]rdquo April 16 1962 ldquoChangshu xian zai tuipei jianhuan fangwu zhong cailiao bei tanwu nuoyong he ganbu duo zhan de qingkuang 常熟县在退赔建还房屋中材料被贪污挪用和干部多占

的情况 [Building Materials Meant for Restitutions Housing Embezzled or Excessively Appropriated by Cadres in Changshu County]rdquo H5-2-1962-97

52 Losses attributable to blind direction of production during the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo were enormous A rough accounting conducted by the Jiangyin County Party Committee Res-titutions Office regarding the Beiguo Commune of that county indicated that during the three years of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo the commune lost 313 million jin of grain over 15 million cubic meters of lumber over 2500 dan of tree wood over 1500 dan of bamboo over 9500 dan of firewood and about 150000 days of labor totaling about 670000 yuan 40 yuan per capita or 130 yuan per household See ldquoGuanyu shengchan xia zhihui feng suo zaocheng de jingji sunshi de diaocha 关于生产瞎指挥风所造成的经济损失的

调查 [Investigation into Economic Losses Caused by the Wind of Blind Direction of Pro-duction]rdquo September 16 1961 H5-2-1961-86


ltUNgt

and Iron had been a mass movement of the entire party and entire popula-tion no compensations were to be made for labor contributed thereto Many reparation for objects damaged as a result of uncompensated appropriations was calculated according to the prices of these objects at the time of the ap-propriation and not at the time of reparation53 There had been a great in-crease to prices of the vast majority of commercial goods between the time of uncompensated appropriations and the time of restitution work Such price increases were yet another great intangible loss suffered by rural citizens at the time In addition officials in many places unable to make a clear accounting of values or losses of instruments or farm implements either opted to make no restitution or handled the matter with a symbolic promissory note (4) In the end central authorities stepped in to prevent grassroots cadres from trying to get out of returning objects which should be returned and from stubbornly holding their hands out for more government money as well as to make sure that restitution work wouldteach people a profound lesson As such the cen-tral government made the following clear regulation in the question of resti-tution the principle of ldquohe who decides shall be responsible for restitutionrdquo shall beadhered to and grassroots cadre shall be the first ones forced to make thorough restitution ldquolest they learn nothingrdquo54 Mao Zedong had this to say ldquoWhen it comes to restitution do not first look for money from the state but counties and communes should try to make restitution using their own funds even if risking bankruptcy In the end it will suffice for the state to provide a slight degree of subsidies otherwise counties and communes will become dependent on the staterdquo55 This regulation played a positive role in increasing work incentives among grassroots cadre and gave them the resolve to persist in restitution work and helped them gain the trust of the people improve rela-tions between officials and the public further development of work that fol-lowed and so on There were however some problems Those grassroots work units (and cadres) which had benefited from uncompensated appropriations were also themselves victims there were often great limitations to the mate-rial goods and money in their possession to be used for restitution Thus the continual emphasis on making grassroots units (and cadres) responsible for

53 ldquoXiong Renmin tongzhi zai suanzhang tuipei huiyi shang de fayan (jilu gao)rdquo ldquoGuanyu jiuzheng pingdiao cuowu chedi tuipei zhong ruogan juti wenti de chuli yijian (chugao) 关于纠正平调错误彻底退赔中若干具体问题的处理意见（初稿） [Opinions on Handling Several Concrete Problems of Restitutions and Thoroughly Redressing the Errors of Uncompensated Transfers]rdquo August 31 1961 H5-1-1961-56

54 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 13 ce 67955 Gu Longsheng 539

WANG190

ltUNgt

restitution put them in an awkward predicament If they didnrsquot make restitu-tion they would face censure from superiors and dissatisfaction from citizens but if they wanted to make restitution they were faced with insufficient re-serves of material goods and cash Grassroots cadres often went to great lengths to perform this thankless duty but seldom were met with satisfaction from ei-ther above or below In many cases they either made restitution at qualities or quantities less than demanded or had to resort to substituting shoddy ma-terials or falsifying reports No matter which route they chose relations with superior policy-making bodies and the masses were doomed to deteriorate These doomed relationships were one of the major reasons for the launching of the socialist education movement targeting grassroots cadres that followed soon thereafter56 Third the myriad problems that emerged amid the restitu-tion campaign should lead us to a deeper understanding of this principle any major policy that closely affects the personal interests of the masses should be subject to repeatedtestingon the basis of scientific evidence until proven sound before it is issued

References



CCP Central Party Document Research Department 中共中央文献研究室 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao di 9 ce 《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第9 册 [Mao Zedong Manuscripts from After the Founding of the Nation Vol 9] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996)

CCP Central Party Document Research Department 中共中央文献研究室 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 13 ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 13 册 [Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Nation Vol 13] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 662

The Peoplersquos Republic of China State Agriculture Commission General Office 中华

人民共和国国家农业委员会办公厅 Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian

56 See ldquoHengtang gongshe shuangqiao dadui zai qing jingji dingrsquoan tuipei gongzuo zhong cunzai de jige wentirdquo 横塘公社双桥大队在清经济定案退赔工作中存在的几个

问题 [Some Problems Existing in the Restitution Work of the Plan to Clean up Finances in the Shuangqiao Brigade of the Hengtang Commune] in Shejiao qingkuang jianbao (wu) 《社教情况简报》（五） [Brief Report on Conditions of the Socialist Education Movement (Five)] October 28 1965 Suzhou City Archives


ltUNgt

(1958ndash1981) xia 《农业集体化重要文件汇编(1958~1981)》下 [Selected Impor-tant Documents on Agricultural Collectivization (1958ndash1981) Vol 2] (Beijing Zhong-gong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1981)

Suzhou City Party Committee Party History Research Department 中共苏州市委

党史研究室 Zhongguo gongchandang Suzhou dashiji 《中国共产党苏州大事

记》 [Record of Major Communist Party of China Events in Suzhou] (Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe 2000)

Gu Longsheng 顾龙生 Mao Zedong jingji nianpu 《毛泽东经济年谱》 [Economic Chronicles of Mao Zedong] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1993)

Huang Daoxia et al 黄道霞等 Jianguo yilai nongye hezuohua shiliao huibian 《建国

以来农业合作化史料汇编》 [Compiled Historical Materials on Agricultural Cooperatization Since the Founding of the Nation] (Beijing Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe 1992)

Liu Shaoqi xuanji xia juan 《刘少奇选集》下卷 [Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi Vol 2] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1985)


Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆 Yang Shangkun riji xia 《杨尚昆日记》下 [Diary of Yang Shangkun Vol 2] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 2001)


ltUNgt

chapter 8

Transformations to Commune and Brigade Enterprises and the Rise of Rural Private Enterprises in Gaoyang County Hebei Province in the Early Days of Reform and Opening

Feng Xiaohong1

Abstract

In the late 1970s and early 1980s Commune Brigade Enterprises (cbes) grew rapidly under the collective ownership system with support from state policies After the im-plementation of the household contract responsibility system cbes changed rapidly some spun directly into individually-owned business or private enterprises and some contracted out under different variations of the responsibility system There is a close connection between the transformation of cbes and the rise of rural private enterpris-es with the former being the starting point for the latter The transformation of cbes into rural private enterprises led to accumulations of valuable experience and lessons for later reforms to small and mid-sized urban enterprises

Keywords

Commune and Brigade Enterprises ndash transformation ndash private enterprises

A great deal of economic research has been done on Commune Brigade Enterprises (cbes) which were most common in the late 1970s and early 1980s particularly in the development circumstances existential issues and reform

This essay was one of the initial products of the Hebei Provincial Social Sciences Fund project ldquoTypical Cases of Chinarsquos Rural Industrializationmdasha Study of the Hundred Year History of the Textile Industry in Gaoyang Hebei as well as the Laws that Governed its Developmentrdquo《中国乡村工业化的典型个案mdashmdash 河北高阳织布业百年历程及发

展规律研究》 (HB07LS002) 1 Feng Xiaohong (冯小红 ) holds a doctorate in history and is an associate professor in the

history department of Handan College


ltUNgt

directions for such enterprises at the time As cbes gradually faded from existence research in this field also declined with only a few doctoral and masterrsquos theses published on the subject Most of these theses however focused on the period of time ending in the mid-1980s very few drew connections be-tween cbes and the development of rural private enterprises that followed2 After the mid-1980s a large number of academics in economics and the other social sciences conducted research on rural private enterprises focusing pri-marily on their present conditions prospects for future development and theories for understanding them Very little of this research however drew connections between rural private enterprises and cbes For example Zhang Renshou 张仁寿 et al noted in their research of the ldquo Wenzhou Modelrdquo that the splitting up of cbes had been one of the channels by which Wenzhoursquos cottage industries had arisen but they did not perform detailed analysis on the exact process by which cbes had developed into cottage industries Shi Jinchuan 史晋川 et al on the other hand concluded that cbes had not at all been the logical starting point for the development of private enterprises in Wenzhou3 To this end I have made an initial study into the development and transformation of cbes and the rise of rural private enterprises in the early years of Reform and Openingmdashfocusing specifically on Gaoyang County 高阳县 Hebei Province4mdashin order to show the historical relationship between the two

2 For a more comprehensive list of research performed into Commune and Brigade Enterprises see the references section of Liu Yantaorsquos (刘燕桃 ) ldquoHebei sheng shedui qiye yanjiu河北省社队企业研究 [Research into Enterprises Managed by Communes and Pro-duction Teams in Hebei Province]rdquo (2008 masterrsquos thesis Hebei Normal University)

3 Zhang Renshou and Li Hong 张仁寿李红 Wenzhou moshi yanjiu《温州模式研

究》[A Study of the Wenzhou Model] (Zhongguo Shehui kexue chubanshe 1990) 47 Shi Jinchuan Jin Xiangrong and Zhao Wei 史晋川金祥荣赵伟 Zhidu bianqian yu jingji fazhan Wenzhou moshi yanjiu《制度变迁与经济发展温州模式研究》[Institu-tional Changes and Economic Development Study of the Wenzhou Model] (Zhejiang daxue chubanshe 2002) 64

4 The primary reason that this essay focuses on Gaoyang County Hebei Province is that the textile industry there has developed for 100 years making it a typical case in the field of eco-nomic history For more research into the Textile Industry of Gaoyang County see also Gu Lin 顾琳 Zhongguo de jingji geming ershi shiji de xiangcun gongye 《中国的经济革命二

十世纪的乡村工业》 [Chinarsquos Economic Revolution Rural Industry in the 20th Century] translated from the Japanese by Wang Yuru et al 王玉茹等 (Jiangsu renmin chubanshe 2009) Zhao Zhilong 赵志龙 ldquoGaoyang fangzhiye de bianqian (1880ndash2005) 高阳纺织业

的变迁 (1880~2005) [Changes in the Gaoyang Textile Industry (1880ndash2005)]rdquo (2005 doctoral thesis Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and Feng Xiao-hong 冯小红 ldquoGaoyang zhibuye de jindaihua Jincheng 高阳织布业的近代化进程 [The

FENG 194

ltUNgt

i Outline of the Development of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s

cbes gradually grew out of traditional rural handicrafts and family side indus-tries as well as from commune and brigade industries and sideline industries cbes came into existence shortly after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China and later evolved through the adjustments and cutbacks of the 1960s and the winding development path of the 1970s The Third Plenum of the Elev-enth Communist Party of China (ccp) Congress issued the ldquoResolutions on Several Issues of Accelerating the Development of Agriculturerdquo 关于加快农

业发展的若干问题的决定 which proposed the following

There must be great development of Commune and Brigade Enterprises and we must gradually increase the proportion of income from cbes to total income of the three-tiered economy of communes5 Agricultural products and by-products should gradually transition to being processed by cbes in all cases when doing so is economically reasonable Urban fac-tories must allocate a portion of their production capacity for products or parts which are suitable forbeing processedin rural areas to cbes in a planned manner they should also give equipment and technical support The production supply and marketing of cbes should come in different forms and should link up with every level of national economic planning in order to ensure unobstructed supply and marketing channels The state government shall grant tax breaks or tax exemptions to cbes on the basis of their differing situations6

Shortly thereafter the State Council issued the ldquoRegulations on Several Issues of the Development of Commune and Brigade Enterprisesrdquo 关于发展社

队企业若干问题的规定 which established the guiding policy for the de-velopment of cbes established the business scopes funding sources and ownership structures of cbes and called for all industries to actively support

Gaoyang Textile Textile Industryrsquos Course of Modernization]rdquo (2002 masterrsquos thesis Hebei University)

5 Translatorrsquos note The three tiers are communes brigades and production teams6 Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 《新时期农业和农

村工作重要文献选编》 [Selected Important Works on Agriculture and Rural Work in the New Era] ed cpc Central Committee Literary Research Department and State Council Development Research Center 中共中央文献研究室国务院发展研究中心 (Bei-jing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992) 39


ltUNgt

the development of cbes7 Having been thus commanded by the central government local governments around the country responded by issuing concrete measures supporting the development of cbes The Gaoyang County government issued six measures in 1979 the primary contents of which were as follows incorporate cbes into state planning and industry in the county capital shall support cbes8

With the support of party committees and governments at every level cbes developed rapidly from 1978 to 1980 which turned out to be a short period of prosperity Per statistics released by the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises by April 1978 110 brigades in the county (fifty-nine per-cent) had established enterprises of one kind or another and 580 production teams (thirty percent) had begun industrial or sideline enterprise production9 By July 1978 the number of brigades running enterprises rose to 175 (ninety-seven percent) and the number of production teams running enterprises rose to 710 (forty-six percent)10 Over the short span of a few months the number of county brigades operating cbes grew fifty-nine percent and the number of pro-duction teams operating cbes grew twenty-two percent extremely fast growth

See Table 81 for the basic conditions of commune and brigade enterprises in Gaoyang County between 1978 and 1980

Table 81 shows that over the three-year period from 1978 to 1980 Gaoyang County experienced growth in both the number of cbes and the number of people employed in cbes The countyrsquos gross domestic product (gdp) grew

7 ldquoGuowuyuan banfa lsquoguanyu shedui qiye ruogan wenti de guiding (shixing caorsquoan) de tong-zhi (1979 nian 7 yue 3 ri) 国务院颁发〈关于社队企业若干问题的规定(试行草

案)〉的通知 (1979 年7月3日 ) [Notice Regarding the State Councilrsquos lsquoRegulations on Several Issues of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (Trial Draft) (July 3 1979)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 10-276-3

8 ldquoGaoyang xian yi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye fazhan guihua (1978 nian 12 yue) 高阳县一

九七九年社队企业发展规划 (1978年 12月 ) [Gaoyang County Development Plan for Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1979 (December 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-557-4

9 ldquoKaizhan duozhong jingying dali fazhan shedui qiye wei nongye dagan kauishang jilei daliang zijin (1978 nian 4 yue 14 ri) 开展多种经营大力发展社队企业为农业

大干快上积累大量资金 (1978年4月 14日 ) [Develop Multiple Forms of Operations Strive to Develop Commune and Brigade Enterprises Go All Out and Go Fast to Accu-mulate Large Quantities of Capital for Agriculture (April 14 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-1

10 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju yi jiu qi ba nian shang ban nian gongzuo zongjie (1978 nian 7 yue 24 ri) 高阳县社队企业局一九七八年上半年工作总结 (1978年7月24日 ) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Work Summary for the First Half of 1978 (July 24 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-2

FENG 196

ltUNgt

342 percent from 1978 to 1979 We are unable to compare 1980rsquos figures with those from the two previous years as the Bureau of cbes began reporting total revenues instead of gdp for that year nevertheless growth to the number of people employed by cbes in 1980 would seem to indicate a continued growth to gdp in that year

cbes in Gaoyang County were distributed over a wide range of industries County cbe Bureau data indicate that county cbes were involved in over sixty fields and manufactured over 400 varieties of products County cbes were pri-marily involved in textiles export processing the repair and manufacture of small and mid-sized farm implements planting and husbandry construction tile kiln operation and food processing11 See Table 82 for details

Table 82 shows the industries over which cbes were distributed in Gaoyang County Some industries were omitted from the table as their output values were small or their business activities hard to categorize including brigade-run commercial enterprises (commission stores) traditional handicrafts (straw-weaving wooden forks brooms whips shoe soles and reed mats)

11 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu shedui qiye ziyuan he jingji qingkuang de huibao (1980 nian 8 yue 13 ri 高阳县社队企业局关于社队企业资源和经济情况的汇报

(1980年8月 13日 ) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Re-port on the Resources and Economic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (August 13 1980)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-6-1

Data source ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu yi jiu qi ba nian gongzuo zongjie baogao 高阳县社队企业局关于一九七八年工作总结报告 [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Work Summary Report for 1978]rdquo ldquoYi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye jiben qingkuang dengjibiao 一九七九年社队企业基本情况登记表

[Registration Form of Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1979]rdquo and ldquoYi jiu ba ling nian shedui qiye jiben qingkuang dengjibiao 一九八年社队企业

基本情况登记表 [Registration Form of Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1980]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-4 26-4-1 and 26-5-1Note Figures from 1979 and 1980 were calculated based on 1978 constant prices figures for 1980 are total revenues

Table 81 Basic conditions of commune and brigade enterprises in Gaoyang County 1978ndash1980

Year Number of cbes Number of people employed by cbes gdp (yuan)

1978 1051 9650 1448 million1979 1171 15148 19438 million1980 1238 16723 1593 million


ltUNgt

Table 82 Primary industry distribution of commune and brigade enterprises in Gaoyang County 1980

Industry Fields Product varieties

Annual income (yuan)

Machinery Farm machinery repair and manufacture industrial equipment (electrical materials) metals for production metals for daily use

66 6846292

Smelting Small castings factories 4 207000

Chemicals Plastic processing rubber processing manufacture of daily use chemical products (glasses)

13 52534

Forestry Wood processing 5 43300Construction materials

Construction teams brick factories tile kilns treated felt asbestos tile processing

23 1930250

Textile sewing and leather

Textile acrylic fiber processing sewing leather goods dye houses cotton processing synthetic fibers

60 2858292

Paper-making and culturaleducation goods

Embroidery arts and crafts (enamel balls cloisonneacute wickerwork) pa-permaking printing carpets

44 955785

Food Rice and noodle processers vinegar factories canteens oil mills tofu factories sugar refineries popsicle producers

63 346359

Other Mops pharmaceuticals tobacco factories inns for carters chaste tree weaving bicycle repairs and parts carpet factories tarpaulin painting coal briquettes

13 673300

Agriculture Orchards breeding stations 21 71114Total All 45 fields 312 13984226

Data source ldquoQuan xian gongshe dadui qiye jiben qingkuang huiji (1980 nian 6 yue 26 ri) 全县公社大队企业基本情况汇集 (1980年6月26日 ) [Compilation of Materials on Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Across the County (June 26 1980)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-7-1

FENG 198

ltUNgt

transportation industries (the Jiucheng Brigade transportation team and the Nanjie transportation team) small-animal husbandry and fisheries (fish bees and rabbits) plant-product industries (mushrooms) and so on12

Before 1979 cbes were run the same way agricultural enterprises had been using the ldquobig pot of ricerdquo method13 (ie recording workpoints) From 1979 to 1980 as the household contract responsibility system was introduced some cbes began to adopt the system of contracting out an entire task with a quota and the system of giving rewards for exceeding said quota In one example the Tuanding Brigade 团丁大队 electrical materials factory was permitted to hire a total of nine people Its quota for annual net income was 10000 yuan for which each employee would be rewarded eight workpoints per day and given an eight percent bonus If the factory earned 15000 yuan an additional twelve percent bonus would be paid on the extra 5000 yuan on top of the original eight percent bonus and daily workpoints would be increased to nine If another 5000 yuan was earned the staff would be given a fifteen percent bonus on that 5000 yuan and daily workpoints would be increased to ten If the factory failed to meet the quota however one workpoint per day per worker would be deducted for every 1000 yuan by which the factoryrsquos earnings fell short The Yangjiawu Brigade implemented a system in which three things were fixed fixed size of the staff fixed tasks and fixed rewards and punish-ments The number of workers was set at thirty-two and the quota for monthly net income was set at 2000 yuan which if accomplished would mean the staff would receive a seven percent bonus The staff would be given a fifteen percent bonus on any revenue earned on top of the quota of 2000 yuan in addition to eight workpoints If the quota was not met no rewards would be given and the staff rsquos salaries would be docked by the percentage of the amount by which they fell short14

12 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye fenlei dengjibiao (1981 nian 8 yue) 高阳县社队企业分类

登记表 (1981年8月 ) [Registrations of Commune and Brigade Enterprises by Category in Gaoyang County (August 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-571-19

13 Under this kind of management enterprises were fully financially supported by the gov-ernment so it mattered little how well or poorly they performed similarly salary was guaranteed and was not linked with job performance

14 ldquoShedui qiye kai xin hua tong xin tong de gao sihua ndash xiyan gongshe yi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye gongzuo zongjie (1979 nian 12 yue 20 ri) 社队企业开新花同心同德搞

四化mdashmdash 西演公社一九七九年社队企业工作总结 (1979年 12月20日 ) [New Blos-soms on Commune and Brigade Enterprises Bringing About the Four Changes with One Heart and One Mind ndash Work Summary of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in Xiyan Commune 1979 (December 20 1979)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-4-2


ltUNgt

ii Changes to cbes after the Implementation of the ldquoBig Responsibility Systemrdquo in Agriculture

In 1979 the Gaoyang County government began to implement the household responsibility system in agriculture By the end of 1982 1646 of the countyrsquos total 1652 production teams had implemented its main form the Household Responsibility System15 which fomented major changes to cbes

(A) The Quantity of cbes Decreased DramaticallyThe implementation of the Household Responsibility System also known as the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo exerted an enormous effect on cbes most no-tably in a rapid decline to their number At the end of 1980 there were 1238 cbes in Gaoyang County thirty-five run at the commune level 424 at the bri-gade elevel and 779 at the production team level16 By the end of 1981 there were only 580 cbes in the county forty at the commune level 246 at the bri-gade level and 294 at the production team level17 By the end of 1982 there were only 248 cbes remaining in the county thirty-five at the commune level 210 at the brigade level and a paltry three at the production team level18 On the whole after the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo was put in place the reduction to the number of cbes at the commune level was minimal brigade-run cbes were reduced by half and nearly all production-team-run cbes vanished

(B) New Trends Emerged in Management MethodsThree different trends emerged in management methods of cbes after the implementation of the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo

15 ldquoGaoyang xian jiben qingkuang (fu yi jiu ba san nian guomin jingji zhongyao zhibiao shexiang) (1982 nian 12 yue) 高阳县基本情况(附一九八三年国民经济重要指标

设想 )(1982年 12月 ) [Basic Conditions in Gaoyang County (Including Tentative Impor-tant Indicators for the National Economy in 1983) (December 1982)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-584-6

16 ldquoYi jiu ba ling nian shedui qiye jiben qingkuang 一九八年社队企业基本情况 [Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1980]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-5-1

17 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju yi jiu ba yi nian gongzuo jianjie he yi jiu bae r nian jianyao anpai 高阳县社队企业局一九八一年工作简结和一九八二年简要安排 [Brief Work Summary of the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises for 1981 and Brief Plans for 1982]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-1

18 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo jianjie (1882 nian 12 yue 23 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于一九八二年工作简结 (1982年 12月23日 ) [Brief Work Summary of the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises for 1982 (December 23 1982)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-3

FENG 200

ltUNgt

1 Some cbes were forced to shut down The primary reasons were as follows (1) Machinery manufacturers such as the Gaozhuang Communersquos 高庄公社 repair and manufacturing plant were forced to close due to long-term substandard technology and balance sheet losses (2) Some enterprises such as the Taokou Brigadersquos 陶口大队 asbestos plant and the Zhaobu Brigadersquos 赵布大队 pearlite factory were forced to close due to lack of reliable materials sources or regular sales channels (3) Some enterprises such as small castings factories and hardware manufacturers were forced to close due to poor management and sustained unprofit-ablity or losses19

2 Some cbes attempted to emulate the responsibility system which had been implemented in agriculture This trend took place in most commune-run enterprises and a portion of brigade-run enterprises This trend came in one of two forms either contracting by the factory direc-tor personally or contracting by the collective Collective contracting was more common happening in sixty-five percent of cases20 In most cases where the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo was adopted meaning that the commune or the brigade relinquished direct management of the enterprise and allowed the contracting party to take full control All tools and equipment were handed over to the factory director or collective who was in turn responsible for autonomous direction of the factory Profit distributions were handled via various methods They include the following (1) ldquoContracts based on fixed output quotas in which factories retain all output in excess of quotas and exercise full control over how extra profitsaredistributedrdquo In this method the commune or brigade established a fixed sum to be paid at a regular interval by the contracting party All profits earned in excess of that sum went to the contracting party the commune or brigade did not interfere in allocations of profits earned in excess of the pre-established sum One example was the leath-er factory of the Bianjiawu Brigade 边家务大队 Biandukou Commune

19 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu shedui qiye qingkuang de diaocha baogao (1981 nian 8 yue 25 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于社队企业情况的调查报告 (1981年8月25日 ) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Investigative Report on the Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (August 25 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-9-18

20 ldquoDangqian shedui qiye ji ge qingkuang de huibao (1983 nian 11 yue 13 ri) 当前社队企业

几个情况的汇报 (1983年 11月 13日 ) [Report on Some Present Situations of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (November 13 1983)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-15-5


ltUNgt

边渡口公社 21 (2) ldquoContracts based on fixed output requirement extra profits to be divided and piece-rate wagesrdquo In this method the commune or brigade seta fixed output sum for the contractor All profits earned in excess of that amount were to be divided between the contractor and the commune or brigade at a pre-determined ratio The commune or brigade also paid a piece-rate wage to the contractor One example was the Gaozhuang Communersquos machine kiln22 (3) ldquoContracts based on fixed output requirements bonuses to be paid for extra profits and fixed wag-esrdquo In this method the commune or brigade established a fixed amount of output to be produced by the contractor at a regular interval The con-tractor was paid a bonus at a fixed rate for any profits earned in excess of the output quota The commune or brigade also paid the contracting party a fixed wage One example was the Pukou Communersquos 浦口公社

repair and manufacturing plant23 (4) ldquoContracts based on fixed output requirement and floating wagesrdquo In this method the commune or bri-gadeset a fixed output requirement to be fulfilled by the contractor at a regular interval The amount of basic wage is set which would increase or decrease as a percentage of the amount of money earned above or below the output requirement24 (5) ldquoFixed output requirment bonuses paid for extra profits and profit splittingrdquo In this method the commune or brigade set a fixed output requirement The contractor would receive fixed bonuses for exceeding that quota and all profits were split between the contractor and the commune or brigade at a pre-determined ratio One example was the Bianjiawu Brigadersquos textile plant25

3 Some cbes handed their operations over to rural households to be directly run as part of the individual economy This trend was most prominent in production-team-run enterprises and a portion of brigade-run enterprises The production team was the basic unit for agriculture and industrial and sideline industry production During the era of col-lectivization production teams containing industrial or sideline industry enterprises generally divided their members into two groups agricultural

21 ldquoBianjiawu dadui shixing baogandaohu de zuofa (1981 nian 4 yue 29 ri) 边家务大

队实行包干到户的做法 (1981年4月29日 ) [Bianjiawu Brigade Adopts Methods of Responsibility System (April 29 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 10-168-10

22 ldquoDangqian shedui qiye ji ge qingkuang de huibao (1983 nian 11 yue 13 ri)rdquo23 Ibid24 Ibid25 ldquoBianjiawu dadui shixing baogandaohu de zuofa (1981 nian 4 yue 29 ri)rdquo

FENG 202

ltUNgt

and sideline industries with the workpoint system used to govern both After the implementation of the household contract responsibility sys-tem those production team members who had originally been assigned to sideline industries were also allocated land At this time the level of agricultural mechanization was extremely low nearly all planting was done by hand This low level of mechanization required these production team members to expend a great deal of time and energy in the fields for which they were responsible which made concentrated production in industrial and sideline industry enterprises unsustainable Given these conditions the most common and most practical option of production teams was to sell equipment to people in rural areas at cut-rate prices or in some cases to just give them out for free Some brigades opted for similar measures as well The Liguozhuang Brigade 李果庄大队 of the Xiaowang Guozhuang Commune 小王果庄公社 for example directly allocated the looms from its textile factory to individual housholds who then operated the business in their own homes with all income going to said households and the collective taking only commissions26 Several production teams of Jilang Village 季郎村 Xingnan Commune 邢南公

社 sold their acrylic fiber plants to rural individuals at low prices after the household contract responsibility system had been put in place The production teams of the Nanyuba Brigade 南于八大队 Yuba Commune 于八公社 which had either individually or jointly established eight acrylic fibers plants maintained ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo operations for nearly a year after the implementation of the Household Responsibil-ity System thereafter all the production teams sold the plants to those people who had been operating them Some places implemented the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo in name but in truth allowed the individual econ-omy to take charge The textile factory of the Luotun Brigade 骆屯大队

of the Beisha Commune 北沙公社 for example contracted its looms out to individual households at the fixed price of five yuan per year per loom At that time five yuan was approximately equivalent to the annual depreciation cost of a loom and so this method was tantamount to handing looms to rural households free of charge In other areas poor management led to instances of ldquosolo practitionersrdquo Managing cadres taking special privileges in the textile factory of the Liuhetun Brigade

26 ldquoFahui youshi yang chang bi duan geti jingji xunmeng fazhan ndash liguozhuang dadui jingyan (1982 11 yue 20 ri) 发挥优势扬长避短个体经营迅猛发展mdashmdash李果庄大队经验 (1982年 11月20日 ) [Taking Advantage of Strengths Downplaying Weaknesses Rapid Growth of Small Privately-owned Enterprises ndash the Experience of the Liguozhuang Brigade]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-45


ltUNgt

六合屯大队 of the Xingnan Commune caused a mass uproar which led to the closing of the factory and distribution of its machinesamong local residents27

(C) Industries Suitable to Rural Household Operations Began Trending Toward the Individual Economy

The majority of enterprises in industries suitable for operation by rural house-holds such as textiles garments embroidery straw and wicker weaving parts repairs and so on gave their equipment directly to rural households who then became part of the individual economy Such methods brought about the transformation of the collective economy into the individual economy cbes not suitable to household operation or those in suitable industries but of large scale such as some textile plants electrical materials plants plastic compres-sion plants rice and flour processors brick and tile kilns orchards restaurants hotels and so on opted instead to implement the Household Responsibility System

iii The Rise of Rural Private Enterprises

In the mid-1980s rural private enterprises in Gaoyang County experienced explosive growth and became the primary means by which riches were made in the countryside By the end of 1982 there were a total of 5753 households who either specialized in a single type of production activities in an agriculture-related industry or made notable contribution to the local tax revenue and 885 partnership enterprises in the county28 By the end of 1983 the numbers were 8791 and 1257 respectively By the end of 1984 the numbers were 13466 and 1760 respectively29

Rural private enterprises rose primarily by the following three methods

27 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu dangqian shedui qiye qingkuang he anpai yijian de baogao (1981 nian 5 yue 10 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于当前社队企业情况和安

排意见的报告 (1981年5月 10日 ) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Report on Current Circumstances of Gaoyang Commune and Brigade Enter-prises and Opinions on Planning (May 10 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-9-10

28 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo qingkuang de baogao (1983 nian 2 yue 26 ri) 中共高阳县委关于一九八二年工作情况的报告 (1983年2 月26日 ) [cpc Gaoyang County Committee Report on Work Conditions of 1982 (February 26 1983)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-584-1

29 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei yi jiu ba si nian gongzuo zongjie (1985 nian 1 yue 2 ri) 中共

高阳县委一九八四年工作总结 (1985年 1月2日 ) [cpc Gaoyang County Committtee Work Summary for 1984 (January 2 1985)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-598-1

FENG 204

ltUNgt

(A) Privately or Individually Owned Businesses That Had Evolved Directly from cbes Grew Rapidly Accounting for the Largest Share in Private Enterprises

The textile industry which was suitable to household operation was the most typical example At the end of 1981 cbes around the county owned a total of over 2000 looms By the end of 1982 that figure had grown to 3001 with 804 collectively owned and 2197 individually owned30 By January 1984 there were 4790 looms in the county all owned by either individuals or partner-ships Of that total 4207 belonged to individually-owned businesses of which there were 4512 in the county the remaining 583 belonged to partnerships of which there were over 100 in the county31 By the end of 1984 there were over 6000 looms in the county with fifteen villages dedicated to the textile industry A total of over 20000 laborers manned those looms but the total of industry workers topped 40000 if one counts pre-production and post-production ser-vice workers The Gaoyang textile industry turned out sixty million meters of fabric of all varieties sold in fifteen provinces direct-controlled cities and au-tonomous regions in the South Southwest Northeast North and Northwest making the textile industry the predominant industry of Gaoyang Countyrsquos rural areas32 The brigade-run textile factory of Liguozhuang a village special-izing in textiles claimed only seventy manually powered looms and annual per capita revenue of only twenty-nine yuan in 1979 After the looms had been distributed to local households the majority used the manual looms for only four or five months before using accumulated capital to buy electric looms By 1982 not a single manual loom remained in the village which now claimed 470 electric looms and annual per capita revenue of 1564 yuan The twelve-person household headed by Han Pingrsquoan 韩平安 which had hitherto lived in abject poverty bought two electric looms a few months after the brigade-run factory had folded Thereafter the household needed to weave only one roll of fabric to achieve an average daily revenue of ten yuan and an average annual revenue

30 ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo jianjie (1882 nian 12 yue 23 ri)rdquo

31 ldquoGaoyang xian nongcun gongfuye fuwu gongsi guanyu dangqian nongcun gongfuye qing-kuang de diaocha baogao (1984 nian 1 yue 25 ri) 高阳县农村工副业服务公司关于当

前农村工副业情况的调查报告 (1984年 1月25日 ) [Gaoyang County Rural Industrial and Sideline Industry Service Company Investigative Report on Current Rural Industrial and Sideline Industry Conditions (January 25 1984)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-16-1

32 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu da bu shengchan de diaocha baogao (1985 nian 7 yue 18 ri) 中共高阳县委关于大布生产的调查报告 (1985年7月 18日 ) [cpc Gaoyang County Committee Investigative Report on Widespread Distribution of Production (July 18 1985)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-599-24


ltUNgt

of over 3600 yuan33 By 1985 there were 615 electric looms in the village and annual textile revenue totaled 515 million yuan or 1327 yuan per capita34

The acrylic knitting industry was another typical example Gaoyangrsquos knit-ting industry was concentrated in Nanyuba Village of the Yuba Commune Nanjianwo Village 南尖窝村 of the Jianwo Commune 尖窝公社 and Jilang Vil-lage of the Xingnan Commune all located to the west of the county capital All knitting in these villages had previously been controlled by production-team-run enterprises which owned over 200 looms collectively The knitting industry grew rapidly after the machines had been distributed to individual households By January 1984 there were over 1000 looms in the three villages which were posting annual revenues of over five million yuan primarily from the sale of scarves35

(B) A Large Portion of Private Enterprises Rose by Copying cbre Products

After the implementation of the ldquobig responsibility systemrdquo some people for-merly employed in cbes on the strength of the technical and management skills they had acquired as well as the network of relationships they had built during their stints in cbes established individually-owned kiosks or partner-ship enterprises which copied the products made in cbes For example prior to 1980 there had been four production-team-run felt factories in Taokoudian Village 陶口店村 Pukou Township 蒲口乡 After the household contract responsibility system had gone into place former felt factory workers got to-gether to raise the funds to build thirteen felt factories on the strength of the technical and management expertise they had acquired in the cbe Another example centers on the brigade-run glasses factory of Xiwangcaozhuang Vil-lage 西王草庄村 Jianwo Township 尖窝乡 With the new responsibility sys-tem in place thirty-two rural households emulated the former cbe and col-lectively founded nine small glasses factories The compression molding plant of Sanfangzi Village 三坊子村 Longhua Township 龙化乡originally imple-mented collective contracting unified direction of labor by the production

33 ldquoFahui youshi yang chang bi duan geti jingji xunmeng fazhan ndash liguozhuang dadui jing-yan (1982 11 yue 20 ri)rdquo

34 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei bangongshi guanyu liguozhuang cun gongtong zhifu de diaocha baogao 中共高阳县委办公室关于李果庄村共同致富的调查报告 [cpc Gaoyang Committee General Office Investigative Report on Liguozhuang Villagersquos Collective Wealth Creation]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-609-14

35 ldquoGaoyang xian nongcun gongfuye fuwu gongsi guanyu dangqian nongcun gongfuye qingkuang de diaocha baogao (1984 nian 1 yue 25 ri)rdquo

FENG 206

ltUNgt

team led to over-involved management and low production proactivity on the part of laborers After 1983 some local households left the plant this led to the founding of twenty partnership enterprises and the establishment of sixteen specialized households36

(C) Some Private Enterprises Arose from the Contracting Out of cbesBeginning in 1981 the cbes of Gaoyang County all began to implement con-tracting systems mostly modeled on the Household Responsibility System nearly all brigade-run enterprises that had not been dissolved opted to use this method This method was effective at boosting work incentives but many contractors neglected maintenance and repair of equipment and facilities in their pursuit of ever higher profits This method gave rise to the phenomena of ldquomaking exhaustive useof equipmentrdquo and ldquopillaging-style productionrdquo There were abuses of profit sharing systems and a lack of awareness of public accu-mulations negatively influenced and limited the expansion and reproduction of enterprises Many such enterprises had no choice but declare bankruptcy after only a few years cbes that implemented the contract responsibility sys-tem provided good conditions for the rise of private enterprises in one of two ways The first was it allowed the contractor to accumulate capital technology and management experience which laid the foundations for the later estab-lishment of a private enterprise The Gaoyang County cbe Bureau came to the following conclusion when summarizing the issues inherent to cbe contract-ing ldquoAll those people whose had had their lsquotuitionrsquo paid by town or village col-lective enterprises in either business or production technology all took off on their own to start their own businesses once they had gained enough business or production technology knowledge and accumulated enough capitalrdquo37 The

36 ldquoGaoyang xian fazhan nongcun shangpin shengchan dianxing cailiao xuanbian (xubian yi) (1984 nian 10 yue) 高阳县发展农村商品生产典型材料选编 (续编一 )(1984年

10月 ) [Selected Materials on Typical Cases of the Development of Rural Commercial Products in Gaoyang County (Continuation One) (October 1984)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 32-3-7

37 ldquoXiang (zhen) cun ban jiti qiye ruhe shixian zheng qi fenkai zizhu jingying ndash Gaoyang xian xiangzhen qiye guanli xianzhuang ji jinhou yijian de diaocha (1986 nian 9 yue 5 ri) 乡(镇)村

办集体企业如何实现政企分开自主经营 mdashmdash高阳县乡镇企业管理现

状及今后意见的调查 (1986年9月5日 ) [How the Government was Separated from Enterprises and Autonomous Operations Were Brought About in Township (Town) and Village-run Collective Enterprises ndash Current Conditions in Management of Town and Vil-lage Enterprises in Gaoyang County and Opinions for the Future (September 5 1986)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-21-10


ltUNgt

second way was for private enterprises to use factories or equipment which had been left idle after the bankruptcy of a cbe In one example a newly es-tablished partnership enterprise made use of the factory and machinery of the village-run textile factory of Zhaoguanzuo Village 赵官佐村 Xingnan Town-ship by buying shares of the village collective to found a wool factory (which produced carpets)38

I summarized the above three methods from the overall course of develop-ment of private enterprises in Gaoyang County In many cases a combination of these methods was used in individual industries or villages in which cases the rise of private industries could be attributed to the ldquointerlaced influence ef-fectrdquo The development of private industries under the influence of the ldquocopy-ing effectrdquo could be characterized as coming in waves or growing progressively After the first individually-owned business and partnership enterprises spun out of former cbes had begun to achieve economic success other rural house-holds were quick to emulate their models Thus came the second and third waves in the development of rural private enterprises Once a particular indus-try had grown in a given village surrounding villages were sure to quickly copy expanding the scale of that industry For this reason the countryside played host to specialized production zones characterized by ldquosmall scales and large communitiesrdquo By 1987 Gaoyang County had become host to six specialized production zones ldquoone big and five smallrdquo The ldquoone bigrdquo was the textile indus-try which covered fifteen towns 149 villages over 3900 individually-owned or partnership enterprises 6500 looms over 23000 specialty workers and an-nual revenues of over twenty million yuan The ldquofive smallrdquo were the electronic materials plastics garments felt and cloisonneacute industries These industries collectively covered one or two towns over a dozen villages production zones encompassing over 10000 people and annual output values of over ten million yuan39

In conclusion the course of development of rural industries in Gaoyang County indicates that there was a close historical connection between the

38 ldquoZhaoguanzuo cun hu lianban qiye shi yi tiao hao luzi (1986 nian 10 yue 15 ri) 赵官佐

村户联办企业是一条好路子 (1986年 10月 15日 ) [The Joint Founding of Enterprises by Households in Zhaoguanzuo Village is a Good Road (October 15 1986)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-608-22

39 ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu xiangzhen qiye da diaocha de baogao (1987 nian 6 yue 7 ri) 中共高阳县委关于乡镇企业大调查的报告 (1987年6月7日 ) [cpc Gaoyang County Committee Report on the Great Investigation into Town and Village Enterprises (June 7 1987)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-620-19

FENG 208

ltUNgt

transformation of cbes and the rise of rural private enterprises Some cbes evolved directly into private enterprises Others provided production samples capital technology management experience and sales channels for the rise of private enterprises Viewed from this perspective the transformation of cbes was the starting point for the development of the rural private economy fol-lowing Reform and Opening The transformation of cbes into rural private en-terprises led to the accumulation of valuable experience and lessons for later reforms targeting small and mid-sized urban enterprises

References

ldquoBianjiawu dadui shixing baogandaohu de zuofa (1981 nian 4 yue 29 ri) 边家务大队实

行包干到户的做法(1981年4月29日) [Bianjiawu Brigade Adopts Methods of Re-sponsibility System (April 29 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 10-168-10

ldquoDangqian shedui qiye ji ge qingkuang de huibao (1983 nian 11 yue 13 ri) 当前社队企

业几个情况的汇报(1983年 11月 13日) [Report on Some Present Situations of Com-mune and Brigade Enterprises (November 13 1983)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-15-5

ldquoFahui youshi yang chang bi duan geti jingji xunmeng fazhan ndash liguozhuang dadui jingyan (1982 11 yue 20 ri) 发挥优势扬长避短个体经营迅猛发展mdashmdash李果庄

大队经验(1982年 11月20日) [Taking Advantage of Strengths Downplaying Weak-nesses RapidGrowth of Small Privately-owned Enterprises ndash the Experience of the Liguozhuang Brigade]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-45

ldquoGaoyang xian fazhan nongcun shangpin shengchan dianxing cailiao xuanbian (xu-bian yi) (1984 nian 10 yue) 高阳县发展农村商品生产典型材料选编(续编一)(1984年 10月) [Selected Materials on Typical Cases of the Development of Rural Commercial Products in Gaoyang County (Continuation One) (October 1984)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 32-3-7

ldquoGaoyang xian jiben qingkuang (fu yi jiu ba san nian guomin jingji zhongyao zhibiao shexiang) (1982 nian 12 yue) 高阳县基本情况(附一九八三年国民经济重要指

标设想)(1982年 12月) [Basic Conditions in Gaoyang County (Including Tentative Important Indicators for the National Economy in 1983) (December 1982)]rdquo Gaoy-ang County Archives 1-584-6

ldquoGaoyang xian nongcun gongfuye fuwu gongsi guanyu dangqian nongcun gongfuye qingkuang de diaocha baogao (1984 nian 1 yue 25 ri) 高阳县农村工副业服务公

司关于当前农村工副业情况的调查报告(1984年 1月25日) [Gaoyang County Rural Industrial and Sideline Industry Service Company Investigative Report on Current Rural Industrial and Sideline Industry Conditions (January 25 1984)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-16-1


ltUNgt

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye fenlei dengjibiao (1981 nian 8 yue) 高阳县社队企业分类

登记表(1981年8月) [Registrations of Commune and Brigade Enterprises by Cat-egory in Gaoyang County (August 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-571-19

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu dangqian shedui qiye qingkuang he anpai yijian de baogao (1981 nian 5 yue 10 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于当前社队企业情况

和安排意见的报告(1981年5月 10日) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Report on Current Circumstances of Gaoyang Commune and Brigade Enterprises and Opinions on Planning (May 10 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-9-10

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu shedui qiye qingkuang de diaocha baogao (1981 nian 8 yue 25 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于社队企业情况的调查报告(1981年8月

25日) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Investigative Report on the Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (August 25 1981)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-9-18

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu shedui qiye ziyuan he jingji qingkuang de huibao (1980 nian 8 yue 13 ri 高阳县社队企业局关于社队企业资源和经济情况的汇

报(1980年8月 13日) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterpris-es Report on the Resources and Economic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (August 13 1980)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-6-1

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo jianjie (1882 nian 12 yue 23 ri) 高阳县社队企业局关于一九八二年工作简结(1982年 12月23日) [Brief Work Summary of the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enter-prises for 1982 (December 23 1982)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-3

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju yi jiu ba yi nian gongzuo jianjie he yi jiu bae r nian jian-yao anpai 高阳县社队企业局一九八一年工作简结和一九八二年简要安排 [Brief Work Summary of the Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises for 1981 and Brief Plans for 1982]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-11-1

ldquoGaoyang xian shedui qiye ju yi jiu qi ba nian shang ban nian gongzuo zongjie (1978 nian 7 yue 24 ri) 高阳县社队企业局一九七八年上半年工作总结(1978年7月24日) [Gaoyang County Bureau of Commune and Brigade Enterprises Work Summary for the First Half of 1978 (July 24 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-2

ldquoGaoyang xian yi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye fazhan guihua (1978 nian 12 yue) 高阳县一

九七九年社队企业发展规划(1978年 12月) [Gaoyang County Development Plan for Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1979 (December 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-557-4

ldquoGuowuyuan banfa lsquoguanyu shedui qiye ruogan wenti de guiding (shixing caorsquoan) de tongzhi (1979 nian 7 yue 3 ri) 国务院颁发〈关于社队企业若干问题的规定(试行草案)〉的通知(1979年7月3日) [Notice Regarding the State Councilrsquos lsquoRegula-tions on Several Issues of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (Trial Draft) (July 3 1979)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 10-276-3

FENG 210

ltUNgt

ldquoKaizhan duozhong jingying dali fazhan shedui qiye wei nongye dagan kauishang jilei daliang zijin (1978 nian 4 yue 14 ri) 开展多种经营大力发展社队企业为农业大

干快上积累大量资金(1978年4月 14日) [Develop Multiple Forms of Operations Strive to Develop Commune and Brigade Enterprises Go All Out and Go Fast to Accumulate Large Quantities of Capital for Agriculture (April 14 1978)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-1-1

ldquoShedui qiye kai xin hua tong xin tong de gao sihua ndash xiyan gongshe yi jiu qi jiu nian shedui qiye gongzuo zongjie (1979 nian 12 yue 20 ri) 社队企业开新花同心同

德搞四化 mdashmdash西演公社一九七九年社队企业工作总结 (1979年 12月 20日 ) [New Blossoms on Commune and Brigade Enterprises Bringing About the Four Changes with One Heart and One Mind ndash Work Summary of Commune and Bri-gade Enterprises in Xiyan Commune 1979 (December 20 1979)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-4-2

Shi Jinchuan Jin Xiangrong and Zhao Wei 史晋川金祥荣赵伟 Zhidu bianq-ian yu jingji fazhan Wenzhou moshi yanjiu 《制度变迁与经济发展温州模式

研究》 [Institutional Changes and Economic Development Study of the Wenzhou Model] (Zhejiang daxue chubanshe 2002)

ldquoXiang (zhen) cun ban jiti qiye ruhe shixian zheng qi fenkai zizhu jingying ndash Gaoyang xian xiangzhen qiye guanli xianzhuang ji jinhou yijian de diaocha (1986 nian 9 yue 5 ri) 乡(镇)村办集体企业如何实现政企分开自主经营mdashmdash高阳县乡镇

企业管理现状及今后意见的调查(1986年9月5日) [How the Government was Separated from Enterprises and Autonomous Operations Were Brought About in Township (Town) and Village-run Collective Enterprises ndash Current Conditions in Management of Town and Village Enterprises in Gaoyang County and Opinions for the Future (September 5 1986)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-21-10

Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 《新时期农业和

农村工作重要文献选编》 [Selected Important Works on Agriculture and Rural Work in the New Era] ed CCP Central Committee Literary Research Department and State Council Development Research Center 中共中央文献研究室国务院

发展研究中心 (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992)ldquoYi jiu ba ling nian shedui qiye jiben qingkuang 一九八年社队企业基本情况

[ Basic Conditions of Commune and Brigade Enterprises in 1980]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 26-5-1

Zhang Renshou and Li Hong 张仁寿李红 Wenzhou moshi yanjiu 《温州模式研

究》 [A Study of the Wenzhou Model] (Zhongguo Shehui kexue chubanshe 1990)ldquoZhaoguanzuo cun hu lianban qiye shi yi tiao hao luzi (1986 nian 10 yue 15 ri) 赵官佐村

户联办企业是一条好路子(1986年 10月 15日) [The Joint Founding of Enterprises by Households in Zhaoguanzuo Village is a Good Road (October 15 1986)]rdquo Gaoy-ang County Archives 1-608-22


ltUNgt

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei bangongshi guanyu liguozhuang cun gongtong zhifu de diaocha baogao 中共高阳县委办公室关于李果庄村共同致富的调查报

告 [CCP Gaoyang Committee General Office Investigative Report on Liguozhuang Villagersquos Collective Wealth Creation]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-609-14

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu da bu shengchan de diaocha baogao (1985 nian 7 yue 18 ri) 中共高阳县委关于大布生产的调查报告(1985年7月 18日) [CCP Gaoyang County Committee Investigative Report on Widespread Distribution of Production (July 18 1985)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-599-24

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu xiangzhen qiye da diaocha de baogao (1987 nian 6 yue 7 ri) 中共高阳县委关于乡镇企业大调查的报告(1987年6月7日) [CCP Gaoyang County Committee Report on the Great Investigation into Town and Village Enterprises (June 7 1987)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-620-19

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei guanyu yi jiu ba er nian gongzuo qingkuang de baogao (1983 nian 2 yue 26 ri) 中共高阳县委关于一九八二年工作情况的报告(1983年

2月26日) [CCP Gaoyang County Committee Report on Work Conditions of 1982 (February 26 1983)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-584-1

ldquoZhonggong Gaoyang xianwei yi jiu ba si nian gongzuo zongjie (1985 nian 1 yue 2 ri) 中共高阳县委一九八四年工作总结(1985年 1月2日) [CCP Gaoyang County Committtee Work Summary for 1984 (January 2 1985)]rdquo Gaoyang County Archives 1-598-1


ltUNgt

chapter 9

Analysis of the Construction of Village Collective Economic Organizations and Related Issues in Changshu CitymdashFour Case Studies

Zheng Yougui1

Abstract

In the 1980s Changshu City was designated a pilot area for agricultural moderniza-tion reforms Over the years a number of features and trends in village cooperative economic organizations in Changshu City as a whole and the four model villages forrural modernization became increasingly evident They include a simplified orga-nizational structure a new kind of relationships with the government town manage-ment of village accounts and professionalization of village officials These measures have had many positive effects including rapid economic growth for Changshu City and increases in thevalue of village collective assets revenue for village governments employment participation in non-agricultural industries among rural population and village resident incomes The entry of rural Changshu City into this state ofsound de-velopment wasan inevitable consequence of the evolution on the Southern Jiangsu Model

Keywords

Changshu City ndash village collective economy ndash Bixi Road ndash Southern Jiangsu Model

i Success of the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo and the ldquoSouthern Jiangsu Modelrdquo

Changshu City 常熟市 is located in southern Jiangsu Province In the early 1980s the successful experience of Bixi Township 碧溪乡 Changshu City which came to be known as the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo was affirmed by Li Peng 李鹏 and

1 Zheng Yougui (郑有贵 ) is an associate research fellow in the Contemporary Agricultural History Department of the Ministry of Agriculturersquos Institute of Rural Economics


ltUNgt

other central leaders2 and caught the attention of the entire country The ldquoBixi Roadrdquo means simultaneous development of industrial and agricultural Town-ship Village Enterprises (tves) with the bulk of said tves operating within the collective economy In other words the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo was what would later give rise to the ldquoSouthern Jiangsu Modelrdquo The primary characteristics of ru-ral Southern Jiangsu were a strong collective economy and coordinated de-velopment between agriculture and industry In the 1980s Changshu City was designated a pilot area for agricultural modernization reforms and at present the rural areas of Changshu are considered to be at the forefront of rural ar-eas in East China To research this topic we selected the four Changshu vil-lages of Jiangxiang 蒋巷 Menglan 梦兰 Kangbo 康博 and Changnan 常南 which are outstanding among the total of 410 villages located in Changshu and all of which are key model villages for rural modernization in the city (only ten villages were thus designated in all of Changshu) Three of these villages were responsible for the creation of three ldquofamous Chinese brandsrdquo Bosideng Menglan and Longliqi The other one was responsible for the creation of a provincial ldquofamous brandrdquo The Party secretary of each of these villages was ei-ther a delegate to the Sixteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) or a delegate to the National Peoplersquos Congress They were given esteemed titles such as outstanding ccp member national model workers Chinese rural celebrities and so on It would seem likely that some common factors were behind the success of so many famous villages and enterprises within a single county-level city I studied these four villages of Changshu City and their unusually high level of development in an attempt to discover those common factors and trends that may suit the needsof future rural economic development

ii Organization and Construction of Changshursquos Village Collective Economies and Their Operation

There are four characteristics of the organization and construction of village collective economies in Changshu in recent years as well as their operation

2 On an observations tour on January 8 1986 Li Peng noted the following of Bixi Township it was centered on the collective economy with a focus on the industrial economy it walked a road of common prosperity and it persisted in the direction of socialism He also had this to say ldquoShirk off commonness without leaving the township enter the factory without entering the city both industrial and agricultural collectively grow rich the town is small but well informed build two civilizationsrdquo

ZHENG214

ltUNgt

1 Simplification of Village Political OrgansThere were originally three government organs presiding over village gover-nance in Changshu City the village party branch committee the village peo-plersquos committee and village economic cooperative Now only the village party branch committee and village peoplersquos committee remain There is no longer an independent body controlling village collective economic organization village collective assets are now controlled by the village peoplersquos committee

2 Emergence of New Government-Enterprise RelationsIn traditional government-enterprise relations the village government controls local enterprises However new government-enterprise relations emerged in Jiangxiang Menglan Kangbo and Changnan In these four villages while it is the same person who serves as both village Party secretary and as the president of the dominant local enterprise this does not mean that there is no separa-tion between government and business or that the village government controls theenterprise The actual nature of government-enterprise relations in these four villages is that as the pillar company grows the government becomes in-creasingly extricated from it The village governmentthen implements either a shareholding or contracting system on the enterprise and the enterprise be-gins to exert influence on local governance Such exertion of influence can be seen primarily in two phenomena The first is that in Changnan Kangbo and Menglan the village Party secretary took up that position only after having become president of the local pillar company The second is that once those company heads had become local Party secretaries they worked to help in-crease the income and improve welfare for the entire village population3 while at the same time promoting further development in rural modernization and establishing allocations of resources such as village land that served the inter-est of their companies

3 ldquoTown Management of Village AccountsrdquoThe central government has demanded implementation of openness in village government affairs and finances in order to reduce the burden on rural citi-zens this means allowing rural citizens oversight of village affairs and finances Local governments across the country made explorations in this area While investigating the countryside of Xianyou County 仙游县 Fujian Province in May 2002 I observed that villages there had established sound institutions for

3 The presidents of Bosideng Longliqi and Menglan do not receive salaries from their villages but their companies provide such resources as employment opportunities capital for mod-ernist construction and so on to the villages


ltUNgt

village finance regulation as well as dual-oversight thereover ldquoDual-oversightrdquo means openness of village affairs and finances to enable oversight by the local population as well as oversight by superior tiers of government Town govern-ments there have implemented a system of monthly concentrated accounting of village finances officials in town government oversight stations perform a concentrated auditing of income and expenditures from the previous month and fix any problems as soon as they emerge In late June 2002 the Changshu City government instituted the ldquotown management of village accountsrdquo policy to further computerize the work of regulating village collective finances and assets In concrete terms this policy dictates that each town government estab-lish village-level financial regulation service centers where officials are com-missioned by village leadership to make an accounting of the books prepared by village governments under the unified leadership of the town economic service center This policy operates under the principle of the ldquofive constantsrdquo They are Work units at the village level that keep independent accounts re-main constant ownership of usage rights to and beneficiaries of village assets (capital) remain constant the bodies authorized to manage village finances village debtsmdashboth what it owes and what is owed to the villagemdashremain constant approval procedures for expenditures and income on village capital remain constant and the final constant is that village accountants must be officials within the system The policy further stipulates that no work unit or individual has the right to make uncompensated appropriations divert funds or violate any legal rights of the village collective economic organization The policy also laid out a set of corresponding regulation institutions including primarily a system for village financial regulation pre-approved budgets and financial accounting for villages openness of village affairs and finances a contract management system for village economies assessments based on maintaining or increasing the value of village collective assets (to determine the compensation and promotions of local officials) a system for managing records a system of job responsibility for financial and accounting personnel a system for assessing bonuses and punishments and so on The directorship of town government village-level financial regulation service centers is held by the leading cadre for rural economics in the town economic service center The centers are staffed by one chief accountant (usually one chief accountant per four to six villages) a certain number of bookkeepers and only one village accountant per village The Changshu government sees the ldquotown manage-ment of village accountsrdquo policy as an important attempt in rural financial regulation reforms officials are promoting it as an important corresponding measure in reforms to rural taxation The thorough implementation of this measure in Changshu is advantageous to strengthening oversight over the use

ZHENG216

ltUNgt

of village collective assets and the imposition of regulation measures over collective assets It is also beneficial to standardizing the work order of ac-countants and financial management behaviors as well as to improving the pre-approved budget and accounting system for village-level finances It is beneficial to reducing the number of village-level officials by choosing for the best to decreasing non-production expenditures to increasing and stabiliz-ing village collective revenues and to feasibly reducing the burden on rural citizens

4 Increased Professionalism among Village OfficialsIncreased professionalism among village officials can be seen primarily in the following two areas (1) Open hiring ensures that outstanding talent from technical and vocational schools are attracted to village governments The Changshu City government has executed a policy of open hiring of village officials which has been met with a positive response over 100 graduates of technical and vocational schools have been appointed as ldquovillage officialsrdquo In one example from Jiangxiang Village one three-year technical school graduate was first employed as an assistant in the village government but later came to be appointed deputy director of the village peoplersquos committee owing to excel-lent work performed (2) The government has eliminated worries about the future on the part of officials through basic compensations institutions as well as granting them pension insurance and health insurance this enables them to cast themselves into their work mind and body ldquoBasic compensationsrdquo for village officials (in reality their wages) and bonuses are based on such stan-dards as increases to the value of village collective assets economic growth population figures and so on Village officialsrsquo basic compensations and in-surance fees come ldquoprimarily from the village with planning from the town and subsidies from the cityrdquo On the whole village officials earn more than the average rural per capita income In 2001 basic compensations for village officials in Changshu fell generally in the range of 15000 to 20000 yuan but many also earned bonuses (in some cases bonuses far exceeded yearly basic compensations)

iii The Effectiveness of Economic Models in the Four Villages

The operations of village collective economic organizations in Changshu are effective primarily in the following areas First the economy of Changshu City is growing rapidly In 2001 the cityrsquos gross domestic product (gdp) was 303 bil-lion yuan a year-on-year growth of 176 percent and its fiscal revenues totaled


ltUNgt

3046 billion yuan a year-on-year increase of twenty-five percent Also in 2001 the per capita savings rate was 19000 yuan Second village collective assets are gaining value In 2000 for example the total value of all village collective assets in the city grew by over 100 million yuan over the previous year which breaks down to an average increase of over 200000 yuan per village Of all vil-lages in the city over seventy percent realized increases to village collective net assets the average net increase to village collective assets in those villages was over 600000 yuan Less than thirty percent of villages experienced net losses to village collective assets Third village governments had large quantities of financial resources available for spending In 2001 the average quantity of fi-nancial resources available for the year at the village level in Changshu was 101 million yuan In 2002 those villages with financial resources available for the year totaling 300000 yuan or less were deemed financially troubled villages and financial subsidies were allotted to them Fourth the ratio of rural citizens (those with agricultural household registrations) employed in non-agricultural industries was high with over two thirds of rural citizens employed in non-agricultural industries Fifth rural per capita net incomes were high in 2001 the average rural per capita income in the city was 5853 yuan 25 times the national average

Next we shall evaluate the effectiveness of the village collective econom-ic organizations in Jiangxiang Menglan Kangbo and Changnan based on their economies collective assets and citizen income and welfare levels (see Table 91 for an outline)

First letrsquos look at the village economies The overall economies of all four villages were large and have already entered the track of rapid development Industry provided the largest contribution to economy in each village as each village is home to one large-scale pillar enterprise that accounts for a large proportion of total village gdp The village-collective-run enterprise in Jiangx-iang Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltd accounts for 897 percent of total vil-lage gdp which is low compared to the other villages but still a generally high figure all other industrial agricultural and service companies in the village account for minuscule proportions of total village gdp These four pillar en-terprises cannot be considered tves in the traditional sense of that term They are modern corporations with human resources and branding strategies that have achieved success through product quality The ldquofamous Chinese brandsrdquo Bosideng Menglan and Longliqi as well as Jiangsu provincial ldquofamous brandsrdquo are their important intangible assets as well as the basis for their strength in market competition Officials in all four villages have enacted policies of ldquousing industry to build the countrysiderdquo thus simultaneously promoting rural indus-trialization and agricultural and rural modernization

ZHENG218

ltUNgt

Second total asset values of village collectives were either maintained or increased Government-enterprise separation has been implemented in all four villages No matter whether a given village government has enacted reforms to property rights institutions the pillar enterprises in all four villages have grad-ually established modern corporate systems and have either maintained or in-creased total collective asset values through system protections The methods through which village collective asset values are increased can be divided into two types The first is used in Jiangxiang Village where there have been no property rights reforms enacted in village collective enterprises but the pillar enterprise has still grown quickly bringing the total value of village collective assets up with it Village government revenues there are high coming from en-terprise contracting revenue operations revenue and housing rental revenue The second method is employed in Menglan Kangbo and Changnan Villages where the pillar enterprises are shareholding corporations There are great in-centives under such conditions for enterprise operators to earn profits and so the enterprises have a strong capacity for sustained growth As the enterprises grow so do dividends paid on village collective shares Village government

Table 91 Conditions in the Four Villages in 2001

Jiangxiang Menglan Kangbo Changnan

Total population 739 812 1672 2680Total households 187 197 430 900Total arable land (million mu) 1049 1045 2525 2577gdp (million yuan) 5800 8133 83093 25438Industrial sales revenue (million yuan)

25018 46188 258036 83552

Industrial profits and taxes (million yuan)

2416 5290 44386 13138

Village collective assets (million yuan)

10465 1336 3885 728

Available resources for year (million yuan)

606 308 1243 960000

Per capita income (yuan) 9500 9021 6419 5550New village construction (structures)

86 39 210 Preparing

Old village restoration (structures)

197


ltUNgt

revenues in those three villages come primarily from corporate dividends collective-held shares contracting fees paid for small enterprises that the village founds with earnings from the sale of its shares real estate and rent paid for housing and other collective-owned assets The governments of these villages have a great deal of financial resources available every year

Third citizen incomes and collective welfare levels are relatively high The pillar enterprises of the four villages have solved the employment issues for village labor4 and have made enormous contributions to increasing local in-comes Economic strength of the village collectives has provided conditions for the improvement of welfare for all village citizens and has solved such problems as enterprise labor senior care healthcare employment insurance and so on The villages are also mostly newly constructed Jiangxiang Meng-lan and Kangbo have already completed construction of new villages or reno-vations of existing villages and Changnan is currently in the planning phase for new village construction which will take place soon

In summary the villages of Changshu City particularly the four on which we are focusing are in a good state with rapidly growing economies village collective asset values increasing and citizen income and welfare levels on the rise Next letrsquos take a look at the conditions of each of the four villages individually

1 Jiangxiang VillageLeader Chang Desheng 常德盛 the village Party secretary has been a ccp member for over 30 years was a delegate to the 16th ccp National Congress has been named outstanding Party member and also serves as chairman and presi-dent of the Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltd 江苏常盛集团有限公司

Economic conditions Under the leadership of Chang Desheng the village has provided an excellent development environment for locals to become wealthy The government has enacted policies of people should do what they are best suitable for whether it be agricultural sideline industries or business and the most suitable model should be adopted whether it is as part of a col-lective or privately operated The village government operates a contracting system for collective enterprises It encourages the development of individual and private enterprises for which officials have opened a dedicated industrial zone and issued a policy whereby enterprises pay no fees to the village col-lective for their first sixteen years of operation Village gdp was 27890 billion yuan in 2001 to which the collective-run enterprise Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltd contributed 897 percent Total economic output of individual and

4 These enterprises also attract a great deal of laborers from outside their villages as well as a great deal of graduates from specialized and vocational schools

ZHENG220

ltUNgt

private industrial enterprises was 2232 million yuan contributing eight per-cent of village gdp The agricultural economic output of the village was 360 million yuan contributing 13 percent to village gdp and economic output of tertiary industries was 280 million yuan contributing one percent to village gdp

Pillar enterprise The village-collective-run enterprise Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltd is the dominant company in the village In 2001 the companyrsquos industrial sales revenue totaled 25018 billion yuan in addition to profit and tax revenue of 2416 million yuan Even after the two rounds of property rights reforms to tves in Changshu City Changsheng has remained a collective-run enterprise as compared to the other three villages all of which have enacted shareholding systems

Collective assets As the pillar enterprise remains village-owned the value of collective assets in this village is high 10465 billion yuan In 2001 the vil-lage government had a large amount of disposable financial resources for the year 606 million yuan most of which came from Changsheng which paid 588 million yuan to the collective for the year accounting for 932 percent of all disposable government income Table 92 shows collective revenues and ex-penditures in Jiangxiang

The greatest portion of collective expenditures went to welfare and ben-efits which accounted for 571 percent of total expenditures The second great-est portion went to agricultural investments (mostly ecological construction including bamboo forests and orchards) accounting for 326 percent of the total this is attributable to the villagersquos policy of ldquousing industry to build the countrysiderdquo Operating expenditures were low leaving a total of 147400 in surplus funds Management fees made up the smallest portion of all expen-ditures coming in at only 39 percent This trend is in stark contrast to most villages in the country where management fees represent a large proportion of total expenditures

Agriculture Rights to land in the village are auctioned by the collective on the basis of the household contract responsibility system (the village govern-ment provides 600 jin of rice per mu free of charge) to fifteen major plant-ing households Newly-constructed ecological gardens (bamboo gardens orchards and so on) are run directly by the village government as agricultur-al factories the government hires a small number of old farmers to cultivate these areas at their leisure for which hourly wages are paid

Citizen income and welfare levels The villagersquos per capita income is high reaching 9500 yuan in 2001 Welfare distributions are also high in the village (see Table 92) Now sixty-eight local households reside in small villas con-structed by the village government


ltUNgt

2 Menglan VillageLeader Qian Yuebao 钱月宝 serves as village Party secretary was a delegate to the Ninth and 10th National Peoplersquos Congresses was named one of the ten most distinguished women in the country and is chairman and president of the Jiangsu Menglan Group Co 江苏梦兰集团公司

Pillar enterprise Jiangsu Menglan Group Co is the dominant company in the village Its primary constituent enterprises hold assets valued at 450 mil-lion yuan In 2001 the company earned sales revenues of 460 million yuan and additional profits and taxes of fifty-three million yuan

Unit Yuan

Table 92 Village-level collective revenues and expenditures in Jiangxiang Village 2001

Revenue Expenditures Notes

Item Sum Item Sum

Total revenues 64826 mn Total expenditures

62526 mn Agricultural investments include 164000 yuan in field and irrigation con-struction 823600 yuan for rural road and bridge construction and 10513 mn yuan in orchard cultivationManagement fees include cadre compen-sations entertainment fees and office feesWelfarebenefits expen-ditures include special care for servicemen sup-ply stipends cooperative healthcare payment of senior pensions greening fees and social welfare enterprises

Operating revenues

544200 Operating expenditures

396800

Fees for contracting out water resources

13900 Agricultural investments

20389 mn

Rent income 2000 Management fees

244900

Money paid up by collective enterprises

588 mn Welfarebenefits expenditures

3572 mn

Additional revenue from two taxes

12500 Enterprise investments

Other revenues

30000 Other expenditures

Previous yearrsquos balance

172000 Balance on year

230000

ZHENG222

ltUNgt

Collective assets A total net asset is value at 1366 million yuan and dispos-able government financial resources in 2001 totaled 308 million yuan The vil-lage collective owns fifteen percent of Jiangsu Menglan Group

Agriculture Rights to the over 1200 mu of farmland in the village are auc-tioned out on the basis of the Household Responsibility System (grain rations and a certain quantity of liquid petroleum gas are provided free of charge) for scale operation to two major planting households and three village-run con-tracted farms

Citizen income and welfare levels The villagersquos per capita income is high reaching 9021 yuan in 2001 Welfare distributions are also high in the village Enterprises in the village have to provide pension workersrsquo injury unemploy-ment health and maternity insurance to all employees and are responsible for paying pensions to the over 170 seniors residing in the village Some citizens reside in small villas constructed by the village government which has also built a rehabilitation and activities center a tennis facility a rural citizen park a supermarket and other corresponding facilities

3 Kangbo VillageLeader Gao Dekang 高德康 serves as the village Party secretary was a delegate to the Tenth National Peoplersquos Congress is a rural celebrity in Chi-na and is the chairman and president of the Jiangsu Bosideng Corp Ltd 江苏波司登股份有限公司

Pillar enterprise Jiangsu Bosideng Corp Ltd is the dominant company of the village This is the most economically viable of all four of the village pillar companies in this study Its assets were valued at 2284 billion yuan and its net assets at 580 million yuan at the end of 2001 The companyrsquos operating assets totaled 236 billion yuan on the year

Collective assets Village collective assets total 3885 million yuan and dis-posable government financial resources in 2001 totaled 1243 million yuan


Citizen income and welfare levels In 2001 per capita net income was 6419 yuan and some citizens now reside in the Kangbo Gardens (a villa complex) constructed by the village government

4 Changnan VillageLeader Xu Zhiwei 徐之伟 serves as the village Party secretary and as chairman and president of the Jiangsu Longliqi Group 江苏隆力奇集团

Pillar enterprise Jiangsu Longliqi Group is the dominant company of the vil-lage In 2001 its industrial sales revenues totaled 830 million yuan in addition to 130 million yuan in profits and taxes


ltUNgt

Collective assets Collective net assets are valued at 728 million yuan and disposable government financial resources in 2001 totaled 960000 yuan


Citizen income and welfare levels There are 457 agricultural laborers 1024 construction and industrial laborers and 519 tertiary industry laborers in the village Per capita net income was 5550 yuan in 2001 A high-standard villa area is currently being planned

A look at the effectiveness of operations of the collective economic or-ganizations of these four villages leads us to the following conclusions The economic models of Changshu City and these four village collectives are all beneficial to economic growth increases to collective asset values gains to per capita income levels and improvement of welfare distributions

iv Lessons and Further Discussion

There are lessons to be learned from the economic models being practiced by these four successful village collectives in Changshu but there are also some issues which merit further exploration

1 Is the Professionalization of Officials Something That Necessarily Occurs When the Economic Development Reaches a Certain Level

As the countryside develops socially and economically so does the demand for high quality talent there Officials in economically developed Changshu City put this in practice by hiring graduates from specialized and vocational schools The professionalization of officials means viewing village government positions as job positions and several conditions must be met for this to be accomplished First graduates of specialized and vocational schools need to be able to earn a relatively ideal salary in rural government positions Second these graduates need to have a purpose in their jobs so as to have some value to their lives Third there must be an economic foundation in the village town or county in which they work sufficient to pay the salaries of professionalized officials These conditions have been met in fiscal affairs of Changshu at the village town and county levels as well as in the state of socioeconomic de-velopment of some villages So now there are many graduates of specialty and vocational schools employed as ldquovillage officialsrdquo in Changshu In other words it is the strong economy and developed society of Changshu that have made the professionalization of officials possible which presents us with a ques-tion is the professionalization of officials an inevitable trend once a place reaches a certain degree of economic strength Also would we thwart the

ZHENG224

ltUNgt

professionalization of officials by demarcating village community economies as cooperative economies These are practical questions but also questions that must be answered through theoretical inquiries

2 Should We Classify Village Community Economic Organizations as Collective Economic Organizations or as Cooperative Economic Organizations

In political terms the model of economic organization at the village level in Changshu can be summarized as follows the only controlling political bodies are the village Party committee and the village peoplersquos committee village economic cooperatives have been abolished and village officials are becoming increasingly professionalized In terms of management there has been a separation of government from enterprises and two groups oversee collective assets (primarily land real estate enterprises or shares in corpora-tions) and operations thereof this ensures either maintenance of or gains to total asset values The ldquotown management of village financesrdquo policy is advan-tageous to reducing the burden on rural citizens as it reduces the number of village officials Under this model enterprises grow rapidly and rural citizens experience increased incomes The value of collective assets is secure and col-lective income can grow stably primarily from business revenues contracting fees of collective assets dividends from collective-held corporate shares and so on All of this goes to ensure continued improvement to villagersrsquo well-being and welfare In other words this system has propelled rural Changshu into a positive development state in which the economy grows fast collective assets maintain or increase in value and citizen incomes and welfare continue to grow This model which has been highly efficient in economically developed regions is worthy of our attention No political bodies are established to guide the collective economy in regions where village collectives are of strong eco-nomic viability (nearly 10 years of successful operations demonstrate the ef-ficiency of this mode of administration) that ought to tell us something about the necessity of such bodies in ldquoempty shell villagesrdquo This fact also presents us with a question should we define village community economic organiza-tions as collective economic organizations or as cooperative economic orga-nizations There is great dissent regarding this question in academic circles as different methods are employed in different areas In some places village community economic organizations are called cooperatives but this is a fact in name only as they are not operated on the principles of the cooperative system This trend can be seen in the following areas First the directors of cooperatives are appointed the position usually filled by the Party secretary or director of the village peoplersquos committee but appointment of a leader does


ltUNgt

not conform to the principles of cooperatives If we persist in calling village community economic organizations cooperative economic organizations it will be very difficult for the leader of a cooperative to also be the leader of a village peoplersquos committee selected under the system of autonomy of village residents If it does end up being the same person then wersquoll have double the democracy and double the costs (the costs of elections committee meetings and so on) and that is not beneficial to reducing the burden on rural citizens Second the objective behind merging administrative villages is to reduce the number of village officials and thus reduce the burden on rural citizens Such a merging is extremely necessary but it is a government action If the assets of village collectives were merged in the same way (which would be in real-ity tantamount to a redistribution of the collective property rights of village residents) it would not be a voluntary union asked for by villagers That is to say that if collectives were made into cooperatives the various property rights of the members of those cooperatives would not be truly protected Third the law stipulates that land belongs to village collectives village residents who leave community economic organizations cannot take the land with them Thus if village community economic organizations are run under a system of autonomy by village residents and all land belongs to the collective we should clarify that village community economic organizations are in fact col-lective economic organizations under the direct control of the village peoplersquos committee (in theory it should be a relationship of agency by commission ie village residents entrust the peoplersquos committee with the power to regulate) and we should not insist on calling them cooperative economic organizations Such a move would be beneficial both to reducing the number of village-level officials and to shrinking the burden on rural citizens Of course if a commu-nity economic organization just so happens to operate on the principles of a cooperative then it should be called a cooperative economic organization

3 Is the Entry of Rural Changshu into a Positive Development State of Rapid Economic Growth Sustained or Increased Values of Collective Assets and Rising Village Resident Income and Welfare Levels the Inevitable Result of the Southern Jiangsu Model

This model which establishes mechanisms for rapid economic growth ensures value retention or value growth of collective assets and brings about increases to village resident incomes and welfare levels has long been a major topic of discussion All four of our focus villages entered a positive develop-ment state of rapid economic growth sustained or increased values of collec-tive assets and rising village resident income and welfare levels regardless of whether the pillar enterprise had been subject to shareholding reforms There

ZHENG226

ltUNgt

are two primary reasons for this phenomenon First each village has a good leader Jiangxiang has been under the control of public servant Chang Desheng who disregards personal gains and losses and gives his absolute all for the de-velopment of the collective enterprise The governments of Menglan Kangbo and Changnan have all implemented shareholding systems in their pillar en-terprises but resident incomes and welfare levels have risen in those three vil-lages as well That is because the chiefs of theirpillar enterprises also serve as local Party secretaries who solve the employment issues for their villages and bring about general prosperity through growing the pillar enterprise and driv-ing development of related industries They also give back to the community5 Second each village has delinked government from business and enacted both systems for collective asset management and modern corporate governance structures To improve collective asset management the Changshu City gov-ernment has enacted assessment protocols by which the salaries and bonuses of village officials are linked to the maintenance and growth of collective asset values This linking ensures maintenance or growth of collective asset values and encourages officials to make active use of said assets which in turn leads to stable income for the village collective and ensures increases to income and welfare levels for citizens All four of the villages delinked government from business and established modern corporate governance structures regardless of whether they enacted shareholding systems and the contracting system was implemented in those enterprises not subject to property rights reforms Village collective enterprises now employing the shareholding system have ex-perienced rapid growth as a result of ample incentives on the part of operators The reason that these villages have entered a positive development state of rapid economic growth sustained or increased values of collective assets and rising village resident income and welfare levels is therefore the competence of village leaders and the effectiveness of village political institutions

Further analysis indicates that the entry of rural Changshu into this posi-tive state is indeed the inevitable consequence of the Southern Jiangsu Model There are two reasons I came to this conclusion The first is that the Southern Jiangsu Model laid a solid foundation for village collective economies Even if the village collective sells its shares in the mainstay foundation it is rewarded with a sizeable amount of capital which can be used to invigorate collective assets and spur value increases thereto The second is that changes to politi-cal institutions have been reliant upon government ways and means Some

5 They also engage in a number of activities to give back to society outside of their villages Examples include the founding of the ldquoBosideng Ten Million Yuan Green Hope Project Fund to Protect Our Mother Riverrdquo and the adoption of a great number of orphans


ltUNgt

village collectives have not sold out and still retain a few points or in some cases over ten percent of the ownership of pillar enterprises the dividends from which represent an important contribution to collective income If we defined the Southern Jiangsu Model on the basis of ownership alone then aca-demics would conclude that the Southern Jiangsu Model has already run its course If however we see the Southern Jiangsu Model as an extension and a development of the ldquoBixi Roadrdquo then the Southern Jiangsu Model should still have more to offer

ltUNgt

Part 2

Flows of Goods Money and People

∵


ltUNgt

chapter 10

The History of Rural Private Lending in Hubei Province 1952ndash1954

Su Shaozhi and Chang Mingming1

Abstract

Private lending had long been an important component of the rural financial system before the liberation of China Surveys conducted in rural Hubei Province from 1952 to 1954 indicated that owing to economic backwardness the weakness of household economies lack of a sound social security system and non-existence of a modern fi-nancial system private lending after 1949 was subject to some suppression Neverthe-less lending also saw some development and was characterized by relative procedural simplicity and lower interest rates Most private lending after 1949 was done to provide mutual aid The expansion of state banking services into the countryside as well as the rise of such modern financial organizations as rural credit cooperatives shrank the space for private lending but they were in no way able to completely replace the role played by private lending

Keywords

borrowing rates ndash lending forms ndash loan uses ndash influencing factors

From the end of Land Reform to the peak of the agricultural collectivization movement private lending remained a major component of Chinarsquos rural fi-nancial system Chinese government policies first encouraged freedom and then came to chastise the ldquofour great freedomsrdquo one of which was the free-dom to lend money privately At the same time officials attempted to bring about collectivization quickly to solve the production and living difficulties of rural citizens and to excoriate the exploitative practice of usury However

1 Su Shaozhi (苏少之 ) is a professor in the Institute of Chinese Economic History of Zhong-nan University of Economics and Law Chang Mingming (常明明 ) holds a PhD from Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

SU AND CHANG232

ltUNgt

some materials indicate that even during the eras of agricultural cooperatives and peoplersquos communes rural private lending including loan sharking had not been eradicated Following Reform and Opening rural private lending has reemerged and many are placing a great deal of attention on this issue this is what piqued our interest in rural private lending in the 1950s It is unfortu-nate that little research has been done on this topic to date In this essay we attempt to provide further insight into the issue of private lending in Chinarsquos countryside from the years from 1952 to 1954 with a particular focus on Hubei Province

i The Development of Rural Private Lending in Hubei from 1952 to 1954

(A) Rural Private Lending in Hubei a Year or Two after Land Reforms1 Private Lending Following Land ReformsDebt burdens on poverty-stricken peasants in China before 1949 were partic-ularly heavy Studies have shown that between fifty to sixty percent of rural households in Hubei were in debt in the 1930s and 1940s2 Land reforms led by the ccp abolished the debts owed by the laboring masses to the landlord class

After 1949 Hubei a newly liberated area launched a movement to de-crease rents decrease interest and in some cases return deposits made prior to land reforms In the land reforms that began there in autumn of 1950 all debts owed by rural citizens (nongmin alternatively referred to as peasants) to landlords were forgiven as ordered by the Central Peoplersquos Government State Administrative Council in the ldquoMeasures for Handling Rural Debt Disputes in the Countryside of New Areasrdquo 新区农村债务纠纷处理办法 The measures ordained thatall other debtsbe handled based on their specific circumstances For disputes in which laboring peasants owed debts to rich peasants and the interest owed was equal to the principal interest was eliminated and only the principal would need to be repaid In cases in which interest was twice the principal or more both interest and principal were forgiven In cases in which interest was less than the principal the creditorrsquos rights of the rich peasant remained in force In cases in which interest was greater than the principal but less than twice the principal the debt agreement was cancelled once twice the interest was paid The measures for handling debts owed to rich peasants

2 Li Jinzheng 李金铮 Minrsquoguo xiangcun jiedai guanxi yanjiu《民国乡村借贷关系研究》 [A Study of Rural Lending Relationships in the Republic of China] (Beijing Renmin chuban-she 2003) 25


ltUNgt

were also observed in cases in which peasants and other laborers had incurred interest-bearing debt prior to liberation to those who made a living from interest on loans or to schools Debts owed to ancestral temples religious tem-ples or other social organizations were generally cancelled Both interest and principal were required to be repaid in all debts owed to public granaries per original agreements regardless of who the borrower was All debts owed in the transaction of material goods or other commerce were also to be resolved on the basis of original agreements signed by both parties All ordinary debts incurred by peasants to other peasants prior to 1949 also remained in effect3 Thus even after land reforms some old debts lingered in the countryside

A survey conducted in Yangbu Township 杨步乡 Mianyang County 沔阳县 indicated that by the end of 1952 there were still debts between twenty householdsmdash543 percent of the total of 368 households in the areamdashleftover from before land reforms4 Another survey conducted in Xishui County 浠水

县 indicated that in early 1953 there were still debts leftover from before 1949 affecting seventy householdsmdash3153 percent of the 222 households investi-gated in six selected areas of Nanyue Township 南岳乡 5 These two surveys were conducted in small areas with few samples taken and there was a great disparity in the situations they reported Another survey conducted in seven Hubei townships in early 1953 indicated debts from before land reforms still af-fected 780 households 2281 percent of the total 3419 households in the survey Of those 548 householdsmdash1602 percent of total householdsmdashwere borrow-ers borrowing on average 1043 jin of grain (investigators denominated debt of both material goods and money in grain at the time) per household Another 232mdash679 percent of total householdsmdashwere lenders lending on average 943 jin of grain (calculated in the same way as for borrowers) per household6 This

3 Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 《中国土地改革史料选编》 [Selected Historical Materials from Chinarsquos Land Reforms] (Guofang daxue chubanshe 1988) 677ndash678

4 ldquoMianyang xian yangbu xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha 沔阳县杨

步乡土改后农村经济基本情况调查 [An Investigation into Basic Rural Economic Con-ditions in Yangbu Township Mianyang County after Land Reforms]rdquo April 1953 Hubei Pro-vincial Archives SZ18-1-42

5 Wang Xuezhe 王学者 ldquoXishui xian nanyue xiang nongcun siren jiedai guanxi diaocha 浠水

县南岳乡农村私人借贷关系调查 [An Investigation into Rural Lending Relationships in Nanyue Township Xishui County]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 August 8 1953

6 Original data came from ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuang 荆州专区

农村私人借贷情况 [Private Lending in the Countryside of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42 ldquoDangyang xian guanling xiang jingji diaocha 当阳县关陵乡经济调查 [Economic Investigation of Guanling Township Dangyang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives and ldquoGuanghua xian bailiansi

SU AND CHANG234

ltUNgt

investigation took a large quantity of samples and so was more indicative of the general situation of old debt in rural Hubei at the time Although the find-ings of the above surveys were not entirely similar on the whole they all indi-cate that even after the elimination of debt owed by peasants to the landlord class carried out during land reforms some degree of debt between peasant households incurred prior to land reforms lingered

Most debt incurred before 1949 that remained unpaid in the Nanyue Town-ship survey existed between peasants but some was owed to rich peasants those who made a living from interest on loans and business people Most borrowers were poor peasants and vagrants accounting for 8677 percent of all borrowers Peasants by and large believed that the capital issued as debt by rich peasants those who made a living from interest on loans and busi-nesspeople (282 percent of lenders) had been accumulated through exploita-tion and thus they were generally unwilling to repay said debts Of all debt between peasants incurred prior to 1949 385 percent of borrowers had paid a total of interest less than the amount of principal and 118 percent had paid one to two times the principal in interest Only 47 percent had paid over two times the principal in interest and 45 percent had paid neither interest nor the principal Borrowers who had borrowed little and had the ability to repay had all repaid their debts Some poor peasants and hired farmhands in difficult situations took the initiative in negotiating with creditors and arrived at agree-ments to repay the debt in installments or to postpone debt repayment Some non-repayment of debt on the part of peasants was attributable to economic hardship Some others however thoughtthey might put it off indefinitely since they were not going to be able to repay fully anyway some tried torepudiate their debt altogether Most of those who had paid two times their principal in interest either negotiated to have the debt cancelled or simply desisted from repaying

2 Development of Borrowing and Lending One or Two Years after Land Reforms

The feudal land system was abolished after land reforms and peasants were given new life both politically and economically Nevertheless sluggishness of economic development in rural areas kept the majority of rural families at a very low economic level A sampling survey conducted at the time indicated that at the completion of land reforms the average rural household in Hubei

xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji dioacha baogao 光化县白莲寺乡土改后农村经济调查

报告 [Investigative Report into the Rural Economy of Bailiansi Township Guanghua County After Land Reforms]rdquo January 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47


ltUNgt

was in possession of 1209 mu of arable land 052 cows 001 horses 002 donkeys 072 pigs and 41 structures their farm implements were crude and untidy and average income was low Peasant households operated small-scale economies had low capacity for both production and withstanding natural disasters earned low incomes and lacked accumulation These facts meant that they would experience difficulties in both production and daily life when-ever a natural or man-made disaster hit At the time there was neither a sound social security system nor a modern rural financial system So when peasants landed on hard times their best option was often to borrow money from pri-vate citizens to tide them over

We shall first examine borrowing and lending that occurred after land reforms and then come back to make comparisons with old debts remaining from before land reforms The findings of asurvey conducted in early 1953 of 3419 households in five townships of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region 荆州专区 one township of Dangyang County 当阳县 and one township of Guanghua County 光化县 concerning borrowing and lending that oc-curred after rural land reforms and comparisons to old debts are contained in Table 101

Data in the table indicate that 781 of the 3419 householdsmdash2284 percentmdashin the survey either borrowed or lent after land reforms Of those 484 householdsmdash146 percent of total households surveyedmdashwere borrowers with average household borrowing at 540 jin The other 297 householdsmdash869 percent of total households surveyedmdashwere lenders The proportion of house-holds in a debt relationship to total households held roughly steady before and after land reforms but the proportion of borrowers was slightly lower and the proportion of lenders slightly higher There was a great change however in amounts borrowed Old debts accounted for 6861 percent of the total of 833277 jin of grain borrowed both before and after land reforms with new debts accounting for only 319 percent New debt borrower households were in debt for an average of 540 jin of grain only 5177 percent of the average debt of 1043 jin borrowed by old debt households The number of households that neither borrowed nor lent was approximately the same before and after land reforms but quantities borrowed after land reforms were much smaller than before

Another survey conducted in eleven townships of rural Hubei indicated that excluding landlord households about ten percent of rural households had been lenders prior to 1949 with an average of 80000 jin of grain lent per township After land reforms the percentage of lending households held relatively steady coming in at 98 percent but the volume of the loans had dropped dramatically down to an average of 25000 jin of grain per township

SU AND CHANG236

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 10

1 Ne

w a

nd o

ld p

rivat

e len

ding

rela

tions

hips

in se

ven

tow

nshi

ps o

f rur

al H

ubei

pro

vinc

e in

1952

Num

ber o

f bo

rrow

er

hous

ehol

ds

Perc

enta

ge

of to

tal

hous

ehol

ds

Tota

l gra

in

borr

owed

(jin

)Av

erag

e gr

ain

borr

owed

per

ho

useh

old

(jin)

Num

ber

of le

nder

ho

useh

olds

Perc

enta

ge o

f ho

useh

olds

su

rvey

ed

Tota

l gra

in

lent

(jin

)Av

erag

e gr

ain

lent

(jin

)

Old

deb

t54

816

03

571

716

1043

232

697

218

755

943

New

deb

t48

414

16

261

561

540

297

869

415

262

140

Data

sour

ce ldquo

Jingz

hou

zhua

nqu

nong

cun

sire

n jie

dai q

ingk

uang

荆州

专区

农村

私人

借贷

情况

[Pri

vate

Len

ding

in t

he C

ount

rysi

de o

f th

e Jin

gzho

u Su

b-pr

ovin

cial

Reg

ion]

rdquo M

arch

1953

Hub

ei P

rovi

ncia

l Ar

chiv

es S

Z18-

1-42

ldquoDan

gyan

g xi

an g

uanl

ing

xian

g jin

gji d

iaoc

ha 当

阳县

关陵

乡

经济

调查

[Eco

nom

ic In

vest

igat

ion

of G

uanl

ing

Tow

nshi

p Da

ngya

ng C

ount

y]rdquo

Mar

ch 19

53 H

ubei

Pro

vinc

ial

Arch

ives

SZ18

-1-47

and

ldquoGua

nghu

a xi

an b

aili

ansi

xia

ng t

ugai

hou

non

gcun

jing

ji di

oach

a ba

ogao

光化

县白

莲寺

乡土

改后

农村

经济

调查

报告

[Inv

esti

gati

ve R

epor

t in

to t

he

Rura

l Ec

onom

y of

Bai

lian

si T

owns

hip

Guan

ghua

Cou

nty

Afte

r La

nd R

efor

ms]

rdquo Ja

nuar

y 19

53 H

ubei

Pro

vinc

ial

Arch

ives

SZ1

8-1-4

7Exp

lana

tion

Bo

rrow

ing

figu

res i

n th

e ab

ove

tabl

e ar

e m

uch

grea

ter

than

len

ding

fig

ures

Thi

s phe

nom

enon

is p

rim

aril

y be

caus

e le

nder

s wer

e un

wil

ling

to

exp

ose

thei

r w

ealt

h fo

r fe

ar t

heyrsquo

d be

dep

icte

d as

hig

h-in

tere

st u

sure

rs L

ow r

epor

ting

of

quan

titi

es l

ent

mad

e it

dif

ficu

lt t

o as

cert

ain

the

trut

h of

the

situ

atio

n A

s bor

row

ers h

ad l

ess t

o fe

ar f

rom

bei

ng t

ruth

ful

it is

lik

ely

that

the

fig

ures

the

y re

port

ed w

ere

clos

er t

o th

e tr

uth

Rep

orti

ng t

rend

s wer

e si

mil

ar in

inve

stig

atio

ns c

ited

bel

ow


ltUNgt

Of that total forty percent had been borrowed forcibly with less than 15000 jin of grain per township loaned voluntarily7 So if one excludes lending done by landlords and rich peasant households there was a great reduction to the scale of lending between peasant households

Next we shall take a look at the class distribution of rural private lending after land reforms A survey conducted of 3165 rural households8 indicated that 701 rural households (2215 percent) had engaged in either entered new borrowing or lending between the end of land reforms and the end of 1952 Of those 426 (1346 percent of total households surveyed) were borrower house-holds borrowing on average 403 jin of grain per household There were 275 lender households (896 percent of total households) lending an average of 3853 jin per household

The majority of new borrower households were poor peasant and hired farmhand households accounting for 632 percent of total borrower house-holds and borrowing 629 percent of total grain lent However only 171 per-cent of households in the poor peasant and hired farmhand class were bor-rowers slightly higher than the average percentage of borrowers per class but they borrowed slightly less on average than other classes averaging only 389 jin per household One major change in the class distribution of borrowing and lending from Old China to the Peoplersquos Republic of China was that poor peas-ant and hired farmhand households came to account for a large proportion of lender households in the Peoplersquos Republic of China accounting for 5564 percent of total lender households and lending 5381 percent of total grain lent Of course such a fact does not indicate that poor peasant and hired farm-hand households had more surplus capital than households in other classes it is rather representative of the fact that over fifty percent of all rural house-holds at this time fell into this class A total of 965 percent of all households in the poor peasant and hired farmhand class were borrowers slightly higher than the average for all classes but their average total lent was 373 jin slightly

7 ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan) 农村借贷情况与活

跃农村借贷问题（草案） [Rural Lending Conditions and the Issue of Invigorating Rural Lending (Draft)]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-18-1-40

8 ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuang 荆州专区农村私人借贷情况 [Pri-vate Lending in the Countryside of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42 ldquoDangyang xian guanling xiang jingji diaocha 当阳县关陵乡

经济调查 [Economic Investigation of Guanling Township Dangyang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47 and ldquoGuanghua xian bailiansi xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji dioacha baogao 光化县白莲寺乡土改后农村经济调查报告 [Investigative Re-port into the Rural Economy of Bailiansi Township Guanghua County After Land Reforms]rdquo January 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

SU AND CHANG238

ltUNgt

less than the average for all classes In terms of both lending and borrowing poor peasant and hired farmhand households had experienced a boost to their economic status after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China If we combined figures for the poor peasant and hired farmhand class the middle peasant class and other laboring classes we would see that they accounted for 939 percent of all borrowing households 9745 percent of all grain bor-rowed 9419 percent of all lending households and 9427 percent of all grain lent These figures indicate that most borrowing and lendingthat took place in the countryside since the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China occurred among the laboring masses

Lastly letrsquos take a look at the overall situation of borrowing and lending in rural China at the time both old and new A survey conducted of 6795 house-holds in four townships of the Xiangyang region 襄阳地区 five townships of the Xiaogan region 孝感地区 and five townships of the Jingzhou region from late 1952 to early 1953 indicated that 1760 households (259 percent) were in lending relationships Of those 1171 households (1723 percent of total house-holds surveyed) were borrower households and 589 (867 percent of total households surveyed) were lender households Of the households covered in this survey a higher proportion were either borrowers or lenders than had been in the one represented in Table 101 as this survey included old debt but the total of old and new debt in this survey was much lower than in the previ-ous survey That is because old and new debts were listed in the previous sur-vey but in reality many households with new debt also had old debt making it difficult to list out the ratios of old and new independently In class distribu-tion of debt 952 percent of all borrower households and 928 percent of total grain borrowed in both old and new debts came from the classes of poor peas-ants hired farmhands middle peasants and laborers These classes accounted for 8811 percent of all lender households and 8432 percent of all grain lent in-dicating that on the whole most lending was taking place between households of the laboring masses and most of it was done toward objectives of mutual aid or mutual succor

On the whole there was new development in rural private lending in Hubei over the one to two years following land reforms but said development was not vigorous In other words rural private lending had fallen into stagnation That does not mean that all old debts remaining after the cancellation of all debts to the landlord class had fallen into a state of near-death but rather that there were relatively few new debts The survey depicted in Table 101 indicates that the quantity of lending occurring in new debt was only thirty-one percent that of old debt (all debts owed to the landlord class were cancelled as were most debts owed to rich peasants or those who made a living from interest on loans


ltUNgt

most borrowingand lending existed between households of the laboring mass-es) Of course such a comparison is of only relative significance To determine whether rural private lending relationships had fallen into stagnation we must perform analysis of actual supply and demand for private lending existing in rural economic life at the time The rural household economy was weak follow-ing land reforms Over half of rural households were still poor peasants From the perspective of the difficulties they faced in both production and living ru-ral demand for private lending was quite strong With the national economy still in tatters state banks were eeking together capital to give loans to rural citi-zens and the government was still actively advocating for and organizing rural credit cooperatives indicating both the demand for capital in the countryside and the lack thereof There were countless instances of rural citizens on hard times ldquoforcibly borrowingrdquo from their more affluent neighbors indicating that capital issued by state banks and credit cooperatives as loans as well as capital freely lent between rural households was insufficient to meet rural demand Thus private lending needed to be further developed to meet demand

Now letrsquos look at the supply of private capital Although wealth was redis-tributed following land reforms there was still some idle capital in the coun-tryside available for private lending Surveys indicated that the average middle peasant household in the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region had lent out 1000 jin of grain prior to 1949 but the lending figure had dropped to 450 jin after land reforms9 The reason for this drop was that middle peasant households were unwilling to lend even if they had excess grain for fear of ldquoexposing wealthrdquo or ldquostanding outrdquo or ldquoelevating statusrdquo or being labeled ldquousurersrdquo A survey con-ducted of 275 rural households of Yutai Township 雨台乡 in Jiangling 江陵 Zhonghe Township 中和乡 in Gongrsquoan 公安 Dengping Township 邓平乡 in Echeng 鄂城 and other townships of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region indi-cated that these households collectively possessed 265000 jin of surplus grain an average of 964 jin per household and the average townshiprsquos middle peas-ant households sat on a total of between five to ten thousand yuan in surplus capital Very little however was lent out A survey conducted in four town-ships of the Xiangyang Sub-provincial Region indicated that only 64 percent of surplus social capital was used in lending and lending was well developed in fewer than ten percent of townships10

9 ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuang 荆州专区农村私人借贷情况 [Private Lending in the Countryside of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42


SU AND CHANG240

ltUNgt

Most rural borrowing at the time was done just to meet living needs to tide a household over for a year or a season of famine or other unexpected hard-ships Stagnation in rural private lending made it difficult for rural households to make it through hard times An oft-heard phrase at the time was ldquoall four doors are closed tight and we cannot borrow moneyrdquo

(B) Reasons for Stagnation in Private Lending Measures Taken to Resolve the Issue and Their Results

1 Reasons for the Stagnation of Rural Private Lending after Land Reforms

Land reforms cancelled all debts owed to the landlord class This was a severe blow to the creation of debt as the landlord class owned the most private prop-erty The primary causes of stagnation in rural private lending following land reforms were egalitarian ideology and policies skewed against private lending This stagnation was manifested in the following areas

(a) Deviations in the implementation of land reform policies between different areas A distinction was made in land reform policies of the Peoplersquos Republic of China regarding ldquothose who made a living from interest on loansrdquomdashzhaili shenghuozhemdash(the term ldquousurerrdquo gaolidaizhe was generally avoided to reduce contention over whetherone gavehigh or low interest loans) and ldquothe landlord classrdquo The law read as follows ldquoThose who have issued a large amount of debt over a long period of time and rely solely or primarily on income from this debt for a living shall be accorded the status of lsquothose who make a living from interest on loansrsquo The property of people in this class is not to be touched during land reforms but all debts incurred by peasants and laborers to such persons prior to 1949 shall be handled in accordance with measures for han-dling debt incurred before 1949 owed by peasants to rich peasants In other words interest shall be forgiven and only principal repaid for debts in which accumulated interest is twice the principal and payments shall be altogether halted on repayment of debts for which accumulated interest is twice the prin-cipal or even morerdquo11 In the actual implementation of land reform policies however many of those who made a living from interest on loans rich peas-ants and affluent middle-income peasants were mistakenly labeled as mem-bers of the ldquoexploiter classrdquo for having engaged in lending at interest and were thus mistakenly accorded the status of landlords or other classes and conse-quently subject to persecution For example twelve households who made a living from interest on loans in Yihe Township 义和乡 Yingcheng County 应城县 were struggled against had all debts owed to them cancelled and had

11 Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 725


ltUNgt

all their property confiscated12 The result of these actions was that rural citi-zens came to believe that lending was the primary form of feudal exploitation that lending was ldquoillegalrdquo and ldquounreasonablerdquo and that it was not an error to renege on debts

(b) There were no legislative protections for rural private lending after land reforms After the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China no system of civil laws was established Rural private lending relationships were adjusted primarily through policies Policies of land reforms differentiated between dif-ferent kinds of old debt and officials announced that ldquoyou shall henceforth be free to lend and interest shall be determined by negotiations between both partiesrdquo They further decreed that disputes arising from rural debts should generally be resolved through the peoplersquos government or peasant association with jurisdiction those disputes which local governments could not resolve were to be passed up to county-level justice administration organs for adjudi-cation There was not however a clear basis for said adjudication The primary method actually used to resolvedebt matters was consultation or mediation held by rural government authorities or peasant associations In the materials wersquove been able to find all instances of forcible borrowing were either tac-itly allowed or in some cases directly organized by grassroots authorities We found no instances of authorities forcing debtors to repay their private debts

(c) Old debts that remained after land reforms were not well handled Re-payment on most of these debts were postponed for a long time Creditors did not dare to put pressure on debtors for to collect repayment both debtors and creditors decided to wait and see what was coming Some townships badly mangled the handling of old rural debts The method employed by officials in Guandu Township Songzi was to cancel interest and order repayment of only principal for debts in which the debtor had the ability to pay immediately debts which could not be immediately repaid were classified as new debts at two percent interest Officials in Yannian Township 延年乡 Zhongxiang 钟祥 outright abolished all old debts existing between peasant households13

(d) The principle of voluntary lending was violated in new lending Offi-cials in some townships stressed ldquounity and fraternal loverdquo or ldquomutual aid and mutual lendingrdquo This principle encouraged some peoplemdashincluding both offi-cials and members of the publicmdashwho were too lazy to work for themselves to coerce households with excess grain to put it up for loans For example

12 ldquoXiaogan zhuanqu wu ge xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 孝感专区五个乡农村经济

调查 [A Rural Economic Investigation into Five Townships of Xiaogan Sub-provincial Region]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-14

13 ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuangrdquo

SU AND CHANG242

ltUNgt

three rich peasant households of Gaoqiao Township Enshi were coerced into putting 610 jin of grain up for loan by a mob shouting ldquovoluntary lendingrdquo14

(e) Interest was not clearly stipulatedon new debts and high-interest lend-ing was not clearly differentiated from ordinary lending The bulk of the masses had only one all-inclusive concept ldquolending money at interest is illegalrdquo Some people knew the policy of ldquoallowing free lending and interest to be negotiated by both partiesrdquo but did not know exactly how much interest was legal For ex-ample one middle peasant in Zhouyan Township 周严乡 Xianning 咸宁 had this to say ldquoIn lending if the interest is too low then itrsquos not worth it If itrsquos too high yoursquoll try to get interest from him but hersquoll come after your principalrdquo15 This statement is highly representative of general thinking on the part of the erarsquos middle peasants who dared not to lend

2 Policies to Invigorate Rural Private Lending and Their EffectsTo promote rural private lending and invigorate the rural economy the South-central Military Administrative Commission 中南军政委员会 issued ten pol-icies regarding spring plowing and production at the opportune moment of spring plowing in both 1950 and 1951 calling for free lending in the countryside On March 6 1953 the Commission issued a decree this time clearly calling for ldquoprotection of the freedom to lendrdquo Governments at all levels around Hubei began enacting clear measures to resolve the situation Those measures called for actions in the following areas

(a) The proper handling of old debt As detailed above old debt accounted for 8405 percent of all rural debt at this time Most creditors belonged to the poor peasant hired farmhand middle peasant or other laboring classes Thus even though their private property rights were upheld some old debts were labeled high-interest or usurious as interest in these debts was several times or in some cases dozens of times the principal Officials made the following regulations to protect creditorsrsquo rights as well as to ensure the ability of debtors to repay First creditorsrsquo rights in debts between peasants and other laboring classes incurred before 1949 were upheld but interest was cancelled in all debts in which interest was twice the principal or more For debts in which interest was between one and two times the principal the debt was restructured and interest determined by negotiation Interest was to be renegotiated in debts in which interest owed was less than the principal to be calculated based on the time of non-payment Second officials reaffirmed debts incurred by peasants

14 ldquoEnshi gaoqiao xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 恩施高桥乡农村经济调查 [Rural Eco-nomic Investigation of Gaoqiao Township Enshi]rdquo Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47



ltUNgt

or other laboring classes before 1949 owed to rich peasants or households who made livings from interest on loans which were to be handled in accordance with the second article of the ldquoMeasures for Handling Disputes in Rural Debts in New Areasrdquo 新区农村债务纠纷处理办法 issued by the State Council in October 1950 Third all debts incurred after 1949 were fully upheld

(b) All lending from this point forward was to rigorously abide the May 6 1953 proclamation of the South-central Military Administrative Commission ldquoEnsure lending freedom with the amount of interest determined by negotia-tions between both parties no government or peasant association at any level may interfererdquo16

(c) Interest rate standards for private lending were established Reason-able interest rate standards were established to alleviate the concerns of ru-ral citizens including ldquospring debts are to be repaid in autumnrdquo and monthly interest between three and five percent There were three reasons for such standardization of rates First there was generally a five to eight percent regional price deviation and a twelve to fifty percent seasonal price deviation in rural commercial crops For example a survey conducted in the Xiangyang Sub- provincial Region indicated that in 1952 wheat sold for 162 yuan per dan at the time of the harvest but 216 yuan per dan at the time of planting and so interest on wheat was set at 33 percent In the same survey sesame oil sold for 04 yuan per jin in October but 06 yuan per jin in March and so interest on sesame oil was set at five percent17 There was a twenty-five per-cent price deviation between newly harvested grain sold in autumn and old grain sold in spring in the Xiaogan Sub-provincial Region18 There was a great deal of idle grain in the countryside but it was dispersed widely over countless households who were completely free to either hoard it or lend it out If they couldnrsquot get an interest rate on lending out their grain better than the seasonal price deviation then they would hoard it to sell it at speculative prices later in the year this directly obstructed the development of private lending Sec-ond interest rates were generally determined by the supply and demand of capital available for lending With rural private lending mired in stagnation those households wishing to lend often complained that ldquothere is no point to lendingrdquo as interest rates were too low Third the tradition handed down from

16 ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan)rdquo17 ldquoXiangyang zhuanqu si ge xiang jiedai zudian diandang maimai guanxi de diaocha 襄

阳专区四个乡借贷租佃典当买卖关系的调查 [An Investigation into the Relation-ships of Lending Tenancy Pawning and Commerce in Four Townships of Xiangyang Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-14

18 ldquoXiaogan zhuanqu wu ge xiang nongcun jingji diaochardquo

SU AND CHANG244

ltUNgt

Old China regarding interest was ldquofive points on grain three points on cashrdquo It was reversed in economically developed areas along waterways ldquothree points on grain five points on cashrdquo Interest rates had soared as a result of runaway inflation during the Republic of Chinarsquos rule Multiple surveys indicated that interest rates began to return to normal as prices stabilized following 1949

(d) Officials advocated for loans issued in currency with monthly interest rates Loans denominated in cash instead of material goods at monthly inter-est rates facilitated rapid capital turnover and helped to resolve seasonal dif-ficulties of farmers without resulting in excessive indebtedness

The above policies were made from considerations of both reinvigoration of rural private lending and of the ability to repay debt of some heavily indebted rural households They enabled creditors to profit from lending without forc-ing debtors into long-term excessive indebtedness These policies spurred development in rural private lending for a time The ccp Central Committee South-central Bureaursquos Rural Work Department conducted a survey into ten townships of Hubei Hunan and Jiangxi (of which five were in Hubei) that indicated that 2889 percent of rural households had engaged in private lend-ing or borrowing in 1953 a 555 percent increase over the 2334 percent ratio of 1952 A total of 252528 jin of grain was lent out in these townships in 1953 a 4496 percent increase over the 174211 jin lent out in 195219

(C) Development of Rural Private Lending from 1953 to 19541 Important Factors Influencing the Development of Rural Private

LendingAfter the general line for the transitionary period had been proposed in the second half of 1953 rural private lending hiring relationships land sales and land renting were denounced as the opposite of mutual aid and cooperation It was held that they were ldquoall advantageous to rich peasants and affluent middle peasantsrdquo and that their ldquoresults would be the development of a minority of rich peasants and taking the capitalist roadrdquo20 Thereafter there were chang-es to the governmentrsquos understanding of rural private lending In May 1951 Peoplersquos Bank of China President Nan Hanchen 南汉宸 made this statement at the First Nationwide Rural Financial Conference ldquoPrivate lending is done freely So long as debts are repaid and interest is negotiated between the two

19 ldquoZhongnan qu 1953 nian nongcun jingji diaocha tongji ziliao 中南区 1953年农村经济

调查统计资料 [Statistical Data from a Rural Economic Investigation of South-central Regions in 1953]rdquo July 1954 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-J-40 73ndash74

20 Mao Zedong xuanji di 5 juan 《毛泽东选集》第5 卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 5] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1977) 117 and 123


ltUNgt

parties we do not interfere So will this practice grow into loan sharking No it wonrsquot That is because we have more than one kind of credit cooperative and bank organizations are being promoted in the countryside so loan sharking will not developrdquo21

While conducting a study of ldquoSoviet Socialist Economic Issuesrdquo in late 1953 deputy director of the Peoplersquos Bank of China Rural Financial Administration Bureau 中国人民银行总行农村金融管理局 Wang Peilin 王沛霖 made this comment

The existence and development for a certain period of time of free lend-ing is not only inevitable but also plays to a certain extent a positive role in enlivening rural capital and resolving a portion temporary difficulties in production or living experienced by poverty-stricken rural households So we should permit the existence and development of free lending for a certain period of timehellip However free lending is established on a founda-tion of individual self-initiated development of rural citizens Its primary objective is the pursuit of profit and so it is a kind of lending relationship beneficial to development of the rich peasant economy If we allow it to develop freely it shall lead to exploitative usury and class differentia-tion Furthermore once mutual aid and cooperation are universally de-veloped and the demand for capital loans needed to expand production and buy new equipment for cooperative organizations grows larger and more concentrated free lending will no longer be suitable to such devel-opment needs as the capital used in such lending is extremely dispersed Therefore the future development direction of rural lending should be the active and stable development of credit cooperatives and the gradual reformation of free lending At the same time we should economically struggle against loan sharking22

21 ldquoNan hangzhang zai diyi jie quanguo nongcun jinrong huiyi de zongjie baogao 南行长

在第一届全国农村金融会议的总结报告 [The Summary Report of Bank Presdient Nan at the First Nationwide Rural Financial Conference]rdquo Zhongguo jinrong 《中国金

融》 7 (1951) Vol 1 1722 Wang Peilin 王沛霖 ldquoJiaqiang dui zhengzhi jingjixue faze de yanjiu zuo hao nongcun

jinrong gongzuomdashlsquosulian shehui zhuyi jingji wentirsquo xuexi xinde 加强对政治经济学

法则的研究作好农村金融工作 mdashmdash〈苏联社会主义经济问题〉学习心得

[Strengthening Study of Political and economic Laws Performing Rural Economic Work WellmdashLessons Learned from lsquoSoviet Socialist Economic Issuesrsquo]rdquo Zhongguo jinrong 《中

国金融》20 (1953) 3

SU AND CHANG246

ltUNgt

While affirming that rural private lending had played a positive role in the past Wang laid particular emphasis on the negative role it was playing under the conditions of the time his final conclusion was that rural private lending was more negative than positive The ideology at the time held that rural private lending would inevitably evolve into usury and so officials took actions to re-strict and attack it The political atmosphere that resulted from the issuance of the general line for the transitionary period doubtlessly had a major impact on the development of rural private lending

Another survey conducted of 3754 rural households of twelve Hubei town-ships in 1955 by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department indicated that after land reforms there was growth in agricultural production mutual aid teams in rural Hubei A total of 3712 percent of households surveyed par-ticipated in such teams in 1952 reaching 7110 percent in 1954 A total of 614 householdsmdash1636 percent of total households surveyedmdashwere members of cooperatives accounting for twenty-three percent of all households partici-pating in teams23 In agricultural teams rural citizens were able to overcome the difficulties of solo household production through alliances of man-power beast-power and farming implements Such alliances were particularly typical of agricultural cooperatives which coordinated unified allocations of produc-tion capital and were key targets of focus rural assistance loans from the state As production cooperatives developed so did their public accumulation funds and public welfare funds Public accumulation funds were used to drive agri-cultural development and public welfare funds were used to develop public welfare enterprises within the cooperative Cooperative members could draw a portion of cash or material goods in advance based on their actual needs In one example total revenues for 1954 of the Raoxingli Agricultural Coop-erative 饶兴礼农业生产合作社 of Xishui County Hubei Province came to 19176 yuan of which over 15000 was distributed as advanced pay to coopera-tive members24 Thus the development of agricultural cooperatives and teams reduced rural demand for loans to a certain extent

23 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiao 湖北省十二个典型乡调查

统计表 [Statistical Tables from Investigations into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province]rdquo 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-1-154

24 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dangrsquoan ziliao xuanbian (1953ndash1957) 《中华人民共

和国经济档案资料选编 (1953~1957)》 [Selected Economic Records and Materials from the Peoplersquos Rebpulic of China (1953ndash1957)] ed Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and China Central Archives 中国社会科学院中央档案馆 (Zhongguo wujia chuban-she 2000) 427


ltUNgt

2 Development of Rural Private Lending from the End of 1953 to 1954The same private lending survey conducted of 3754 rural households in twelve Hubei townships by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department in 1955 in-dicated the following differences in rural private lending in 1954 as compared to 195225

First the percentage of households that engaged in either borrowing or lending was lower In the twelve townships in 1954 it was 2589 percent a 08 percent decrease from 2669 percent in 1952 The share of borrowing house-holds of total households fell 263 percent from 2226 percent in 1952 to 1963 percent in 1954 The share of lending households oftotal households was 626 percent in 1954 an increase of 183 percent over 1952 At the same time the total amount borrowed decreased The average size of the loan per household fell by 21 yuan from 1626 yuan in 1952 to 1416 yuan in 1954 The average loan per household fell 1049 yuan from 2923 yuan in 1952 to 1874 yuan in 1954 indicating a reduction to the scale of rural private lending

Second most households that became engaged in borrowing and lending at this time were middle-income peasant households accounting for 5509 per-cent of total number of borrowing households and 6142 percent of the total loan amount Middle-income peasant households accounted for 7106 percent of total lending households and 6210 percent of the total loan amount Such was the case because in the two to three years following land reforms about half of former poor peasant and hired farmhand households were elevated to the status of middle-income peasants The total proportion of middle-income peasant households in the survey grew from 2979 percent in 1952 to 6401 per-cent in 1954 Of course this did not affect the fact that most rural private lend-ing at the time happened between peasant and laboring classes

Third in the 1955 survey there emerged a new class one which garnered a great deal of attention at the time new rich peasants One of the 12 new rich peasant households discovered in the survey lent out a total of 2643 yuan indicating a relationship between the ascendance of new rich peasants and their ability to lend money or rather that their new wealth afforded them abundant capital to be used in lending activities That said only one of the 12 householdsmdash833 percent of total new rich peasant householdsmdashhad made loans at all not very far from the overall ratio of lender households to total households indicating that there was not an inevitable or universal connection between the creation of new rich peasants and the development of rural lending

25 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiaordquo

SU AND CHANG248

ltUNgt

ii The Forms of Loans Made Interest on Those Loans and Creditworthiness in Rural Hubei after Land Reforms

(A) Forms of Loans Made and Interest on Those Loans in Rural Hubei after Land Reforms

Rural private lending in Hubei was complex prior to 1949 and loan sharking had been one of the most important means the feudal landlord class used to exploit the peasant masses Surveys conducted after 1949 indicated that in the period between land reforms and the imposition of the state grain monopoly most rural private loans were in grain that even those made in cash were de-nominated in terms of grain and that forms of loans were simpler than they had been prior to 1949 Once the state monopoly had been instituted most loans were made in the form of cash A survey conducted of five townships of Hubei indicated that loans made in currency accounted for only 263 percent of total loans made before the state monopoly on grain and 7525 percent af-terward26 Loans and interest thereof generally came in the following forms

1 Interest-free loans Most of these were made between members of mu-tual aid teams family members friends and neighbors to facilitate short-term capital turnover needs The amount of grain lent was often small These loans were popular virtually everywhere For example 586 percent of all loans in Zhonghe Township Gongrsquoan were interest-free27 as were 2128 percent of all loans in Yannian Township Zhongxiang28 Of all loans in Longxing Township 龙兴乡 Yicheng 宜城 22 were interest-free loans with three- to five-month terms between family and friends and another 1781 percent were interest-free loans made to troubled households29 Such was the case primarily because

26 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha baogao 湖北省十二个典型乡调查报


27 ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuangrdquo ldquoDangyang xian guanling xiang jingji diaochardquo and ldquoGuanghua xian bailiansi xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji dioacha baogaordquo

28 ldquoJingzhou zhongxiang xian di shiyi qu yannian xiang tugai fucha hou nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha 荆州钟祥县第十一区延年乡土改复查后农村经济基本

情况调查 [An Investigation into Basic Rural Economic Conditions after Land Reforms in Yannian Township Eleventh District of Zhongxiang County Jingzhou]rdquo December 1952 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-7

29 ldquoYicheng xian longxing xiang nongcun jingji diaocha ji ge cailiao de zhengli 宜城县龙兴

乡农村经济调查几个材料的整理 [Some Arranged Materials from a Rural Economic Investigation into Longxing Township Yicheng County]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-5


ltUNgt

creditors at the time were afraid of being labeled usurers and so they did not discuss interest at the time of making the loan However debtors often repaid loans at two to three points interest regardless or otherwise repaid the favor through invitations gifts helping with work or through other means

2 Loans made at two three four or five percent annual interest (includ-ing loans made in spring and returned in autumn) In Zhonghe Township Gongrsquoan 266 percent of loans were made at two to three percent annual inter-est and 146 percent were made at four to five percent annual interest In Yan-nian Township Zhongxiang 5319 percent of loans were made at two percent annual interest 213 percent at three percent annual interest 638 percent at four percent annual interest and 426 percent at five percent annual interest In Xinglong Township Yicheng 5839 percent of loans were made at five per-cent annual interest and fifteen-percent made at three to four percent annual interest

3 Loans made at over five percent annual interest These comprised a minority of loans Only 016 percent of loans in Zhonghe Township fell into this category In Xinglong Township 552 percent of loans were made between six and eight percent annual interest rate and 166 percent of loans required interest equal to principal Most of these were given to the elderly the infirm and others who could not work who required this income to cover basic living expenses

4 Loans made in times of temporary shortages These loans were made in grain but denominated in currency to be repaid at the same or higher rates in grain at the time of the autumn harvest

5 ldquoNewly harvested grain moneyrdquo and ldquonewly spent moneyrdquo (known col-loquially as ldquowangqirdquo or ldquogreen sproutsrdquo debt) In Zhonghe Township in times of temporary shortages loans were made denominated in grain generally fifty percent lower than market rates repaid in grain after the autumn harvest at interest of sixty-six to seventy percent or more

6 Loans of grain repaid in grain Rural citizens generally lacked grain to eat during spring and summer famines At these times they would take out loans of coarse grain to be repaid in refined grain or other refined goods Interest rates were concealed in the changes that took place to objects borrowed with minimum monthly interest rates of 125 percent and maximum monthly rates of 333 percent This method was highly popular before the state grain monop-oly One survey into five Hubei townships revealed that the practice fell 8928 percent after the state monopoly had been put in place30

30 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha baogaordquo

SU AND CHANG250

ltUNgt

7 Loans of cash repaid with labor These accounted for a small percentage of total loans In these loans rural citizens would borrow money paid at work rates for the slack farming season to be repaid in labor once the busy season arrived

These surveys indicate that rural citizens were universally willing to accept loans at monthly interest rates between three and five percent One rural citi-zen had this to say ldquoInterest rates of five percent or higher are too high peo-ple canrsquot afford to borrow at that rate Three percent is too low though as itrsquos not worth it for the lenderrdquo31 Interest-free loans were beneficial to some poor peasant and hired farmhand households for a period of time but they did not remain popular for long as most lenders who gave these loans did not do so voluntarily Thus excessive emphasis on or forcible imposition of interest-free loans had adverse impact on rural private lending

After land reforms the Chinese government imposed maximum interest rate standards for rural private lending The maximum standard for cash loans was three percent monthly interest For material goods the standard was to return 13 to 15 dou in autumn for one dou borrowed in spring32 This was also the standard used to determine if a given loan was usurious The truth is that the vast majority of private loans made in rural Hubei after land reforms were made at low interest rates A survey conducted by the Hubei Provincial Bureau of Statistics into rural private lending in 35 townships revealed the following (1) Poor peasant households borrowed 4396 jin of grain only 13 percent of these loans bore interest Middle peasant households borrowed 894 jin of grain and only twenty-five percent of these loans bore interest Landlord households borrowed 331 jin of grain and only 465 percent of these loans bore interest (2) Cash loans totaled 4251 yuan Commune members borrowed a total of sixty-nine yuan only thirty-nine percent of these loans bore interest Poor peasant households borrowed a total of 866 yuan only 154 percent of these loans bore interest Middle peasant households borrowed a total of 3002 yuan only 122 percent of these loans bore interest Landlord households borrowed a total of 163 yuan and rich peasant households borrowed a total of 151 yuan eitherwith or without interest Interest rates were generally around two percent with the highest being no higher than three to four percent33

31 ldquoXiangyang zhuanqu si ge xiang jiedai zudian diandang maimai guanxi de diaochardquo32 Zhongguo nongcun jinrong lishi ziliao (1949ndash1985) 《中国农村金融历史资料( 1949~

1985)》 [Historical Materials of Financing in Rural China (1949ndash1985)] ed Lu Hanchuan 卢汉川 (Hubei sheng chuban shiye guanliju 1986) 188

33 ldquo1954 nian nongcun jingji diaochao baogao 1954年农村经济调查报告 [1954 Rural Eco-nomic Investigative Report]rdquo December 5 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ44-2-118


ltUNgt

These rate levels indicate that the vast majority of rural private lending in Hubei was done without interest toward the objective of mutual aid Even those loans that bore interest were made at interest rates below the government-mandated maximum Usurious loans were in the minority A por-tion of both production and living difficulties of rural citizens were resolved through private lending At the same time as rural credit cooperatives spread interest rates employed in rural private lending decreased Thus it is clear that we cannot simply assume that allowing rural private lending inevitably leads to usury and thus must be restricted Interest rates in rural private lending are determined primarily by the supply and demand of capital and the degree of risk involved With state agricultural loans and rural credit cooperatives un-able to meet all rural demand for capital the imposition of restrictions on nor-mal lending not only does not prevent usury but in fact leads to the creation of hidden usury Adam Smith gives us another historical example ldquoIn the reign of Edward vi religious zeal prohibited all interest This prohibition however like all others of the same kind is said to have produced no effect and probably rather increased than diminished the evil of usuryrdquo34

(B) Creditworthiness in Rural Private Lending after Land ReformsPrior to 1949 rural private lending generally required consent from both parties and the drafting and signing of a written agreement or in some cases a third party to act as guarantor These agreements generally required collateral usually in the form of farmland houses livestock large farming implements or other goods If an agreement required no collateral it would generally re-quire a third party as guarantor and a written loan receipt For example pre-1949 landlords in Sanhe Township 三合乡 Jiangling County used the ldquothree dependsrdquo when making loans first it depends on if the borrowing family can afford to repay and has goods to serve as collateral second it depends on how the borrower is as a laborer (so he can serve as a long-term laborer to work off his debt in the case he is unable to repay) and third it depends on if the guar-antor is solid or not The only way to borrow from a landlord was to meet these three criteria otherwise the landlord would not even open his door to you35

34 Adam Smith Guofu lun 《国富论》 [The Wealth of Nations] translated from the English by Yang Jingnian 杨敬年 (Shaanxi renmin chubanshe 2001) 115

35 ldquoZhongnan qu yibai ge xiang diaocha ziliao xuanbian (jiefang qian bufen) 中南区一百

个乡调查资料选集 (解放前部分 ) [Selected Materials from an Investigation into 100 Townships in the South-central Region (Portion from Before Liberation)]rdquo ed South-central Military Administration Commission Land Reform Committee Investigation and Research Department 中南军政委员会土地改革委员会调查研究处 29

SU AND CHANG252

ltUNgt

After land reforms rural private lending usually proceeded in one of the three following fashions The first was surreptitious borrowing and lending This type of loan was most common between friends and family members ldquoMost lending households and borrowing households were either members of the same family or had previously had deep-seated personal affectionrdquo ldquoBoth borrowers and lenders were deeply afraid of having the loan be found out by third partiesrdquo36 Lenders preferred to make loans far away and in remote town-ships rather than nearby Loans made between friends and family members were made entirely on trust there were no guarantors or collateral Rather lender households frequently made these loans through agents in different townships The second was loans made during times of shortage or famine as a result of political coaxing from rural leadership Such lending was generally coerced Most rural citizens saw this as a form of relief Borrowers did not plan on repaying the loan and lenders dared not make demands The third were open loans made by rural activists poor peasant and hired farmhand house-holds and the elderly without support These loans were generally made on trust alone without the need for collateral on the basis of either an oral or written agreement indicating that there were changes to the forms taken by rural private lending in Hubei after land reforms as compared to the time be-fore 1949 Specifically much fewer loans required collateral and most loans were made either on faith or with a third party serving as guarantor Those debtor families who were not deeply in debt and capable of repaying did so quickly Those rural households on hard times and without the means to repay generally came to an agreement with their creditors to repay in installments or postpone repayment An extremely small portion of rural citizens opted to mortgage their land to repay debt this was entirely the result of credit On the whole the ability of rural citizens to come to loan agreements depended en-tirely on the respect debtors and creditors had for each otherrsquos private property rights as well as the amount of faith they had in one another

iii Reasons behind and Uses for Rural Loans after Land Reforms

(A) The Reasons behind Rural Loans Issued after Land ReformsA survey conducted of twenty rural Hubei townships indicated that prior to 1949 2425 percent of all lender households belonged to the rural exploitative

36 ldquoNanzhang xian di er qu xiaoxi xiang nongye shengchan dianxing diaocha zongjie 南漳县第二区消溪乡农业生产典型调查总结 [Summary of an Investigation into Typical Cases of Agricultural Production in Xiaoxi Township Second District Nanzhang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47


ltUNgt

class ie landlords rich peasants and those who made a living from interest on loans this class also accounted for 501 percent of the total value of loans The interest rates on their loans were high and the goal of these loans was ex-ploitation by usury After land reforms as new production relationships were established there were changes to the reasons that rural citizens made loans In concrete terms rural citizens began to issue loans for the following reasons

1 Crisis preparedness and preparation for old age These lenders were gen-erally seniors who were infirmed or lived on their own Unable to labor some relied on interest from loans for their livings Others used income from interest to bolster their agricultural livelihoods A survey conducted of four villages of two Zhouyan 周严 and Huangpi 黄陂 Townships Xianning 咸宁 indicated that nine householdsmdash3212 percent of the total of twenty-eight lender house-holds in the surveymdashfell into this category lending a total of 3955 jin of grain 2803 percent of all 14111 jin of grain lent37 There were eight such householdsmdash exactly half of the sixteen lender householdsmdashdiscovered in a survey in Yihe Township Yingcheng lending out a 3635 jin of grain 4138 percent of the 8775 jin lent in total38 The elderly hired farmhand Chen Tianru of Xiaoxi Township Nanzhang lived alone with his senior wife In 1952 they had an income of 154 dan which meant they had a surplus of grain in addition to their 05 cows and a plow thus they had a low level of difficulties in production There were seven such lender households in the township accounting for twenty-eight percent of the total twenty-five lender households in the township39

2 Surplus capital and the pursuit of profit Most such lendinghouseholds were poor peasants hired farmhands or the elderly the infirm and those without family members They had few concerns besides profits whenmaking loans One hired farmhand in Gaoqiao Township 高桥乡 Enshi 恩施 said ldquoI earned this money by being a long-term laborer so itrsquos only right to want interest on itrdquo40 There were thirteen such households discovered in a survey of four villages of Zhouyan and Huangpi Townships accounting for 463 percent of all lending households in the survey lending 6611 jin of grain 4685 percent of total loans in the survey A survey identified five such households in Yihe Township Yingcheng accounting for 3125 percent of total lender households and lending 3005 jin of grain 3421 percent of total grain lent in the survey Six households were identified as belong to this category in Xiaoxi

37 ldquoXiaogan zhuanqu wu ge xiang nongcun jingji diaochardquo38 ldquoYingcheng xian yihe xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 应城县义和乡农村经济调查

[ Rural Economic Investigation into Yihe Township Yingcheng County]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-45

39 ldquoNanzhang xian di er qu xiaoxi xiang nongye shengchan dianxing diaocha zongjierdquo40 ldquoEnshi gaoqiao xiang nongcun jingji diaochardquo

SU AND CHANG254

ltUNgt

Township 消溪乡 Nanzhang 南漳 accounting for twenty-four percent of lender households there These surveys also indicated that only an extremely small minority of rural households improved their economic status via lending Of the four affluent middle-income peasant and new rich peasant households in Zhouyan Township only two had reached that status from middle-income-peasanthood through loan sharking41

3 Mutual aid between family members and neighbors A survey identified five such households in four villages in Zhouyan and Huangpi Townships ac-counting for 1786 percent of lending households in that survey lending 2015 jin of grain accounting for 1428 percent of total grain lent Only two such households were identified in the Yihe Township survey accounting for 125 percent of lender households and lending 615 jin of grain or seven percent of total grain lent

4 Coercive loans spurred by local officials Only one such household was discovered in the Zhouyan and Huangpi Townships survey accounting for 357 percent of total lender households lending 1530 jin of grain 1084 percent of total grain lent Again only one such household was discovered in the Yihe Township survey accounting for 625 percent of total lender households and lending 1530 jin of grain or 1742 percent of total grain lent Another survey conducted in eleven townships of rural Hubei found that forty percent of grain lending following land reforms had been coerced42

(B) Uses of Rural LoansA survey conducted of 4971 households in ten rural Hubei townships indicat-ed the loaning out of 35268275 jin of grain to 663 borrower households The primary reason for borrowing in these townships was the resolution of living difficulties with 4249 percent of total borrower households borrowing for this reason Of those 4480 percent were middle peasant poor peasant or hired farmhand households with middle peasant households alone accounting for 3319 percent To a certain extent this reflects the poverty experienced at the time by a portion of rural households who had no choice but to rely on loans A total of 1808 percent of borrower households in the survey had borrowed to invest in production of those 1610 percent were poor peasant or hired farmhand households and 2529 percent were middle peasant households43

41 ldquoXianning xian di yi qu zhouyan xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 咸宁县第一区周严乡

农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation into Zhouyan Township First District Xianning County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

42 ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan)rdquo43 Ibid


ltUNgt

A total of 2004 percent of borrower households had borrowed money to use for weddings or funerals making this the second largest borrowing category among rural private borrowing in the survey indicating that a large portion of rural private borrowing after land reforms was used for reasons other than survival Spending was exaggerated in this category of consumption as a result of bad customs which further exacerbated total debt burdens

In three of the ten surveyed townships thirty-eight percent of loans were used for production and another twelve percent were used for basic means of living The proportion of those using loans for production was twenty-six percentage points higher than of those using loans for living The reason here is that these townships were all near to cities where rural industry commerce and sideline industries were highly developed and most rural households were engaged in production in sideline industries44 In relatively affluent areas where production and business were relatively accessible the proportion of loans taken for production was high This trend was widespread

The paying of interest on loans by rural citizens after land reforms inevitably added to their economic burdens So did some rural households go bankrupt from repaying their debts An investigation into land pawning and sales after land reforms in Tanzhuang Township 谭庄乡 of Xiangyang Bailiansi Town-ship 白莲寺乡 of Guanghua and Longxing Township of Yicheng indicated that a total of 2313 mu of land had been pawned by all rural households in the survey accounting for only 017 percent of total arable land in the townships Of households who pawned land forty percent of cases were for weddings funerals or illnesses thirty percent for living difficulties owing to decreased labor abilities ten percent for concerns arising from inability to plant the fields pawned ten percent for repayment of old debts and ten percent because of gluttony and indolence Very little land was sold after land reforms Of all households in Bailiansi and Longxing Townships only three had sold land and the total sold was only 376 mu The reasons for land sales there were as follows The middle-income peasant household of Li Renfu 李仁富 in Bailiansi Town-ship owed twenty-eight jin of ginned cotton to the poor peasant household of Li Chengyin 李成银 this debt necessitated the sale of 105 mu Another household was poor to begin with was inefficient at production and was also gluttonous and lazy and subsequently ran out of food shortly after the autumn harvest this household sold 31 fen of land to people outside the township for three dou of wheat without letting local officials know The last household sold

44 ldquoHanyang meifu xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 汉阳梅福乡农村经济调查 [Rural Eco-nomic Investigation into Meifu Township Hanyang]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-45

SU AND CHANG256

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24 mu of land because they lived in a different township and could not plant the land45 Some households in the survey sold land to repay debt but they didnrsquot sell all their land nor did they go bankrupt Some households in the above surveys took loans to ldquocatch their breathrdquo and make it through a hard time Some households increased their difficulties by piling on debt burden However very few households went bankrupt as a result of repayment of debt after land reforms

iv The Effects of State Agricultural Loans and the Development of Credit Cooperatives on Private Lending

(A) The Effects of the Development of State Agricultural Loans on Rural Private Lending after Land Reforms

After the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China state banks began developing rural loan work in the countryside according to the economic development needs of the countryside and potential financial resources there In this they helped rural citizens resolve production problems such as lacks of seeds fertilizer farm implements and draft animals They also laid emphasis on loans for small irrigation projects to be used for the digging of ponds and trenches A survey conducted of 3754 households in twelve townships by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department in 1955 indicated that most rural pri-vate loans issued by state banks at the time were made to assist poor peasant and hired farmhand households middle peasant households were in second place In 1952 4149 percent of poor peasant and hired farmhand households received state bank agricultural loans the average loan issued per borrowing household was 744 yuan and the average of loans to total households in this class was 309 yuan Of middle peasant households 2495 percent received state agricultural loans an average of 75 yuan per borrowing household and an average of 187 yuan per total households in the class These two classes accounted for 9863 percent of total agricultural loans issued borrowing 994 percent of total agricultural loan capital In 1954 3422 percent of poor peasant and hired farmhand households received state bank agricultural loans the av-erage loan issued per borrowing household was 1120 yuan and the average of loans to total households in this class was 883 yuan Of middle peasant house-holds 1950 percent received state agricultural loans an average of 94 yuan per borrowing household and an average of 277 yuan per total households in the class In both 1952 and 1954 poor peasant and hired farmhand households

45 ldquoXiangyang zhuanqu si ge xiang jiedai zudian diandang maimai guanxi de diaochardquo


ltUNgt

took out the most loans and were the focus of poverty assistance A great increase to the number of households in the middle peasant class meant a great increase to the proportion of total quantity of loans and total loan capital taken out by middle peasant households

After the blueprint for the countryrsquos overallpath for the transitionary period was introduced the state strengthened loans issued for state-run agriculture agricultural cooperatives and production mutual aid teams in order to spur the development and solidification of agricultural collectivization In Hubei growth in loans to individual rural households slowed Rural households were recipients of only 2941 percent of state agricultural loans in 1954 a 32 percent drop from 1952 but the average household received 277 yuan in loans a 035 yuan increase over 195246 There was a slight increase to total lending in state agricultural loans from 1952 to 1954 but the number of recipients of said loans decreased

State agricultural loans were used primarily to resolve production difficul-ties of rural citizens A survey conducted in Zengji Township 曾集乡 Jingmen County 荆门县 indicated that all state loans issued in the township in 1952 to-taled 16824 yuan Of that total 316 yuan was used to buy plow oxen 9074 yuan for sideline industries 145 yuan for rural industry and commerce 735 yuan for purchasing seeds and fertilizer thirty-six yuan for irrigation thirty-three yuan for construction and 1715 yuan for other uses47 State agricultural loans gen-erally bore monthly interest of around one percent lower than private loans therefore rural citizens were willing to develop production with these loans State agricultural loans played an extremely important role in supporting the development of production of rural citizens To a certain extent they replaced rural private lending in the accumulation of means of production However the impact of state agricultural loans on private lending was highly limited The first reason for that is that agricultural loans were rigorously administered and terms on agricultural loansmdashexcluding those for irrigationmdashwere gener-ally very short Loans issued for sideline industries for example carried terms of only three months One local said ldquoYou have to return the money as soon as you borrow itrdquo At the same time banks strictly enforced repayment of loans Some rural citizens complained that government loans were inflexible Pay-ments could not be delayed even by a single day Loan payments were general-ly due after grain and cereal harvests when prices of grainswere low It was not

46 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiaordquo47 ldquoJingmen xian di ba qu zengji xiang nongcun jingji diaocha ziliao 荆门县第八区曾集乡

农村经济调查资料 [Data from a Rural Economic Investigation into Zengji Township Eighth District Jingmen County]rdquo December 1952 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-6

SU AND CHANG258

ltUNgt

economically prudent for rural citzens to sell grains to repay their loans but despite the low interest rates on their loans penalties for non-payment were severe Rural households of Dunzitang Township 墩子唐乡 Yingshan County 应山县 for example did not dare take a loan for their spring digging of ponds Local Cai Yuanlin 蔡远林 had this to say ldquoIf I borrow it will be difficult if I canrsquot repay when the loan comes due so itrsquos best not to borrowrdquo48 Even though the state placed emphasis on the issuance of agricultural loans to poor peas-ant and hired farmhand households loan officials sought out only households with the capacity to work to do business or to use capital in the short term ef-fectively downplayinga given householdrsquos general poverty or lack of means of production It was difficult for impoverished rural households lacking means of production labor and business ability to receive these loans some didnrsquot dare ask The second reason was that agricultural loans were meant to be used for specific production purposes but the needs of rural citizens were diverse Some rural citizens used loan funds to buy food for marriages and funerals for sickness to build houses and to do business Limited state finances at the time made agricultural loans incapable of satisfying the diverse lending demands of rural citizens

(B) The Effects of the Development of Rural Credit Cooperatives on Rural Private Lending

In July 1951 the Hubei provincial government began launching pilots in new credit cooperatives in the countryside By the end of 1953 344 such coopera-tives had been established around the province with a membership of 257000 people capital shares of 390000 yuan and 177000 yuan in deposits By the end of 1954 there were 10674 new credit cooperatives around the province accounting for 891 percent of all credit cooperatives Their membership had grown to 58 million with capital shares of 876 million yuan and deposits of 658 million yuan49

A survey conducted by the Hubei Rural Work Department into nine credit cooperatives of nine townships (with 1801 member households 6617 percent of the total of 2787 households in the area surveyed) in July 1955 indicated that the cooperatives had actively developed business activities based on the

48 ldquoYingshan xian dunzitang xiang nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha baogao 应山县墩子唐乡农村经济基本情况调查报告 [Investigative Report on Basic Rural Economic Conditions in Dunzitang Township Yingshan County]rdquo Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-44

49 Hubei nongcun jingji (1949ndash1985) 《湖北农村经济 (1949~1985)》 [Rural Economy in Hubei (1949ndash1985)] (Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 1990) 91


ltUNgt

needs of members and on the characteristics of seasonal production Deposits in the nine cooperatives totaled 6707 yuan with a remaining balance of 2306 yuan and a total of 9321 yuan was out on loan with a remaining loan balance of 5319 yuan The cooperatives supported production of their members and helped members overcome living difficulties through loans50 Incomplete sta-tistics from five townships including Jiangtai and Fuwan indicated that 1505 households had taken out loans accounting for a total of 83 percent of coop-erative membership in those five townships Those loans totaled 24222 yuan of which 7149 yuanmdash2952 percent of the totalmdashwas issued as agricultural loans These loans were used to purchase 86393 jin of fertilizer (in cake form) fifty-seven plow oxen 15197 jin of seeds and 217 farm implements A total of 955 yuan in loans were issued to eighty-nine households for healthcare needs Another 924 yuan in loans were issued to thirty-one households for marriage and funeral expenses Another 573 yuan in loans were issued to sixteen mem-ber households for house construction and 1385 yuanmdash572 percent of total loansmdashin loans were issued for sideline industries51

Capital for credit cooperatives came from three places shares purchased by members member deposits and state bank loans The first two accounted for the bulk of capitalization Deposits and loans of credit cooperatives could be viewed as an organized means for invigorating rural private capital surpluses The surveys indicated that cooperative loans were not as strictly limited to a single purpose as state agricultural loans and so the development of credit cooperatives inevitably influenced the development of rural private lending A survey conducted of 541 households of three townships in three counties by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department in July 1955 indicated that 164 of those householdsmdash3031 percent of the totalmdashhad been in rural pri-vate borrowing and lending prior to the coming of credit cooperatives but that figure dropped to 148 householdsmdash2736 of the totalmdashafter the coming of credit cooperatives Thatrsquos a reduction of 295 percent The total value of rural private lending before cooperatives was 231423 yuan down to 96592 yuan after cooperatives a decrease of 5826 percent A total of 106 households had been engaged in high-interest loans prior to the coming of credit coopera-tives Thirty-seven of those were lenders accounting for 6727 percent of total

50 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiaordquo51 ldquoXiaogan xishui jiangling dangyang he gucheng deng xian xinyong hezuoshe qing-

kuang diaocha biao 孝感浠水江陵当阳和谷城等县信用合作社情况调查

表 [Tables from an Investigation into Conditions of Credit Cooperatives in Xiaogan Xi-shui Jiangling Dangyang and Gucheng Counties]rdquo July 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-161

SU AND CHANG260

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lender households lending out 182421 yuan 7883 percent of total funds lent After the coming of credit cooperatives only twenty-one households were in-volved in high-interest loans Of those eight were lenders accounting for 1379 percent of private lender households lending out 20250 yuan 2096 percent of total funds lent52 A survey conducted by the Hubei Provincial Rural Work Department in July 1955 into 817 households of five townships including Fu-wan 付湾 in Gucheng County 谷城县 and Jiangtai 将台 in Jiangling County indicated that there had been a great reduction to private high-interest loans after the coming of cooperatives In such loans there was a reduction of 741 percent to lender households and 8005 percent to total funds lent there was also a reduction of 639 percent of borrower households and 697 percent to total funds borrowed Conditions in the townships indicated that decreases to the extent of high-interest lending varied with the timing of the arrival of credit cooperatives and how well they developed business activities For ex-ample there was a 9798 percent decrease in borrowers of high-interest loans after the founding of the credit cooperative (old cooperative) in Jiantai Town-ship Jiangling County Only one of the 217 households of Dishui Township 滴水乡 Enshi had taken out any such loans and for a total of only nineteen yuan There was a reduction of only forty-four percent in the number of households taking out high-interest loans and a reduction of only forty-two percent to the amount of such loans after the founding of the credit cooperative in Huchang Township 胡场乡 Dangyang (new cooperative) The number of high-interest lender households was four a drop of only 333 percent lending out a total of 250 yuan a decrease of only 1455 percent53 In summary credit cooperatives replaced a portion of rural private lending and caused changes to the forms taken by rural private loans In other words there was a reduction to the issu-ance of high-interest loans and an increase to the percentage of low-interest loans mutual aidmdashie no-interestmdashloans

Of course the above surveys indicated a reduction to the scale of rural pri-vate lending in Hubei by 1954 but not a complete disappearance thereof for the following reasons

First credit cooperatives had not been around for long rendering them incapable of covering the entire countryside In addition they lacked man-agement experience and there were problems in the development of their business activities At this time credit cooperatives had not gained the trust of the entire rural population and they did not develop well at first A sur-vey conducted of the fourth and fifth districts of Jiangtai Township Jiangling County in 1955 indicated that over the four years since the establishment of

52 Ibid53 Ibid


ltUNgt

a local credit cooperative only fifty-one householdsmdash147 percent of the total 347 households surveyedmdashhad made deposits there deposits totaled 1816 yuan a per household average of 356 yuan A total of 866000 jin of surplus grains had been sold there in 1954 totaling 45900 yuan in sales but deposits of only 1486 yuanmdashonly 324 percent of total grains sale dividendsmdashhad been made in the cooperative between autumn 1954 and July 195554 For the above reasons the ability of credit cooperatives to satisfy rural lending demand remained highly limited

Second credit cooperatives were mutual aidcooperative economic organi-zations used by the masses of rural citizens for the circulation of credit In or-der to maintain long-term healthy growth they needed to both attain sources of capital and ensure normal turnover of that capital to make slight profits through development of credit loans Thus it was often difficult for impover-ished rural households lacking credit to take out loans from credit coopera-tives Some were so poor they couldnrsquot afford to buy into the cooperative at all A survey conducted in 1955 into Wangcheng Jiangtai Taizi 太子 and Fuwan Townships indicated that 126 poor peasant households had not joined credit cooperatives Of those seventy-eight (6191 percent of the total) had declined to join due to inability to buy in Some credit cooperatives feared that poor peasant households would not be able to repay loans and so excluded such households A survey conducted of 833 households of Wangcheng Township Xishui and Taizi Township Xiaogan indicated that poor peasant households and both new and old lower-middle-income peasant households had taken out loans totaling 3973 yuan a per household average of 155 yuan Of that total new and old lower-middle peasant households took out a total of 684 yuan in loans a per-household average of 129 yuan Only 89 percent of upper- middle-income peasant households had taken out loans for a per household loan average of 1715 yuan About forty percent of poor peasant households and new and old lower-middle peasant households had received no support what-soever from credit cooperatives as cooperative officials felt that issuing loans to poor peasants was akin to tossing money into a ldquopool of stagnant waterrdquo55 Under the political circumstances of the times the above methods were criti-cized as coming from a purely business perspective and not thoroughly imple-menting a correct class line The truth however was that credit cooperatives were financial organizations and as such they had to establish ldquothresholdsrdquo for entry it would have been impossible for them not to consider the ability of borrowers to repay As compared to private lending loans made by coopera-tives lacked the touch of human sentiment and so there was no way for such

54 Ibid55 ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha baogaordquo

SU AND CHANG262

ltUNgt

loans to replace private lending completely Of course some credit coopera-tives forced affluent peasant households to buy in while placing the focus of lending work on assistance to the impoverished in order to fully execute the governmentrsquos policies regarding class and class division This behavior irked some affluent peasants while failing to solve fully the problems of impover-ished rural households It also led to a great deal of bad debt which in the end the state treasury had to buy up at which point these loans became pure economic relief

Based on all the above we can come to the following conclusionsFirst the primary reasons behind rural private lending after land reforms

were the backwardness of the rural economy weakness of household econo-mies the lack of a social security system and non-existence of a modern fi-nancial system Most private lending took place between poor peasant hired farmhand and middle peasant households Most rural private loans were taken out to resolve living difficulties but some were used to develop pro-duction Rural private lending played a positive role in resolving some rural capital shortages and restoring growth to the rural economy A minority of rural households were mired further into poverty as a result of inability to repay loans Another small percentage of rural households elevated their sta-tus through income earned from interest on loans So long as there is lending at all such phenomena are inevitable but that does not negate the positive effects of private lending

Second forms taken by rural private loans in this period were much simpler than prior to 1949 Most rural private loans were denominated in grains before the imposition of the state grain monopoly and in cash afterwards Interest rates for most private loans were between three to five percent but some low-interest or interest-free mutual aid loans were also made as were a small quan-tity of high-interest loans Interest rates in rural private loans were determined by many factors including supply and demand of capital and the degree of risk involved Excessive promotion of interest-free loans or the forcible imposi-tion of low interest rates not only hampers the normal development of private lending but also leads to an increase in the incidence of ldquohiddenrdquo usurious loans

Third private lending in rural Hubei over the 1952ndash1954 period was lack lus-ter For a period of time after land reforms the government encouraged lend-ing freedom during which time rural private lending grew After the blueprint for the countryrsquos general path for the transition period the number of rural private borrowing and lending and the total value of rural private loans both decreased as lending freedom came under attack and was restricted Private lending was restricted by both the political and social atmospheres of the time


ltUNgt

Fourth the extension of state banking services to the countryside and the development of modern financial organizations like rural credit cooperatives replaced private lending remedied shortages in rural capital and caused a re-duction to rural private lendingmdashall to a certain extent State banks and rural credit cooperatives were however formal financial institutions Their controls were strict and their procedures complicated and they emphasized that loans were to be used for a single purpose Private loans on the other hand were much more flexible often with no restrictions on the use of funds borrowed making them more practical for their immediate usage in production or to meet living needs Thus no one financial organization or financial tool could completely satisfy all demand for rural financial services Private lending was an irreplaceable component of the rural financial system at the time and con-tinues to exist to this day (although administration and guidance are needed) Private lending still exists in many forms today even in developed countries with highly effective financial institutions that just goes to prove this point

References

ldquo1954 nian nongcun jingji diaochao baogao 1954年农村经济调查报告 [1954 Rural Economic Investigative Report]rdquo December 5 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ44-2-118

ldquo1954 nian quanguo nongjia shouzhi diaocha ziliao 1954年全国农家收支调查资料 [Data from an Investigation into Nationwide Rural Household Income and Expen-ditures in 1954]rdquo Guangdong Provincial Archives MA07-61-222

ldquoDangyang xian guanling xiang jingji diaocha 当阳县关陵乡经济调查 [Economic Investigation of Guanling Township Dangyang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Pro-vincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoEnshi gaoqiao xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 恩施高桥乡农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation of Gaoqiao Township Enshi]rdquo Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoGuanghua xian bailiansi xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji dioacha baogao 光化县白莲

寺乡土改后农村经济调查报告 [Investigative Report into the Rural Economy of Bailiansi Township Guanghua County After Land Reforms]rdquo January 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoHanyang meifu xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 汉阳梅福乡农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation into Meifu Township Hanyang]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-45

Hubei nongcun jingji (1949ndash1985) 《湖北农村经济(1949~1985)》 [Rural Economy in Hubei (1949ndash1985)] (Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 1990)

SU AND CHANG264

ltUNgt

ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha baogao 湖北省十二个典型乡调查报


ldquoHubei sheng shirsquoer ge dianxing xiang diaocha tongjibiao 湖北省十二个典型乡调

查统计表 [Statistical Tables from Investigations into Twelve Typical Townships of Hubei Province]rdquo 1955 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-1-154

ldquoJingmen xian di ba qu zengji xiang nongcun jingji diaocha ziliao 荆门县第八区曾

集乡农村经济调查资料 [Data from a Rural Economic Investigation into Zengji Township Eighth District Jingmen County]rdquo December 1952 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-6

ldquoJingzhou zhongxiang xian di shiyi qu yannian xiang tugai fucha hou nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha 荆州钟祥县第十一区延年乡土改复查后农村经济基

本情况调查 [An Investigation into Basic Rural Economic Conditions after Land Reforms in Yannian Township Eleventh District of Zhongxiang County Jingzhou]rdquo December 1952 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-7

ldquoJingzhou zhuanqu nongcun siren jiedai qingkuang 荆州专区农村私人借贷情况 [Private Lending in the Countryside of the Jingzhou Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42

Li Jinzheng 李金铮 Minrsquoguo xiangcun jiedai guanxi yanjiu 《民国乡村借贷关系

研究》 [A Study of Rural Lending Relationships in the Republic of China] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 2003)

Mao Zedong xuanji di 5 juan《毛泽东选集》第5 卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol 5] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 1977)

ldquoMianyang xian yangbu xiang tugai hou nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha 沔阳县杨步乡土改后农村经济基本情况调查 [An Investigation into Basic Rural Economic Conditions in Yangbu Township Mianyang County after Land Reforms]rdquo April 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-42

ldquoNan hangzhang zai diyi jie quanguo nongcun jinrong huiyi de zongjie baogao 南行长

在第一届全国农村金融会议的总结报告 [The Summary Report of Bank Pres-dient Nan at the First Nationwide Rural Financial Conference]rdquo Zhongguo jinrong 《中国金融》 7 (1951) Vol 1

ldquoNanzhang xian di er qu xiaoxi xiang nongye shengchan dianxing diaocha zongjie 南漳县第二区消溪乡农业生产典型调查总结 [Summary of an Investigation into Typical Cases of Agricultural Production in Xiaoxi Township Second District Nan-zhang County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoNongcun jiedai qingkuang yu huoyue nongcun jiedai wenti (caorsquoan) 农村借贷情况

与活跃农村借贷问题(草案) [Rural Lending Conditions and the Issue of Invigo-rating Rural Lending (Draft)]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-18-1-40

Smith Adam Guofu lun《国富论》[The Wealth of Nations] translated from the Eng-lish by Yang Jingnian 杨敬年 (Shaanxi renmin chubanshe 2001)


ltUNgt

Wang Peilin 王沛霖 ldquoJiaqiang dui zhengzhi jingjixue faze de yanjiu zuo hao nong-cun jinrong gongzuomdashlsquosulian shehui zhuyi jingji wentirsquo xuexi xinde 加强对政治

经济学法则的研究作好农村金融工作 mdashmdash〈苏联社会主义经济问题〉学

习心得 [Strengthening Study of Political and economic Laws Performing Rural Economic Work WellmdashLessons Learned from lsquoSoviet Socialist Economic Issuesrsquo]rdquo Zhongguo jinrong 《中国金融》 20 (1953a)

Wang Xuezhe 王学者 ldquoXishui xian nanyue xiang nongcun siren jiedai guanxi diaocha 浠水县南岳乡农村私人借贷关系调查 [An Investigation into Rural Lending Relationships in Nanyue Township Xishui County]rdquo Renmin ribao 《人民日报》 August 8 1953b

ldquoXiangyang zhuanqu si ge xiang jiedai zudian diandang maimai guanxi de diaocha 襄阳专区四个乡借贷租佃典当买卖关系的调查 [An Investigation into the Relationships of Lending Tenancy Pawning and Commerce in Four Townships of Xiangyang Sub-provincial Region]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-14

ldquoXiaogan zhuanqu wu ge xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 孝感专区五个乡农村经济调

查 [A Rural Economic Investigation into Five Townships of Xiaogan Sub-provincial Region]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-14

ldquoXiaogan xishui jiangling dangyang he gucheng deng xian xinyong hezuoshe qing-kuang diaocha biao 孝感浠水江陵当阳和谷城等县信用合作社情况调

查表 [Tables from an Investigation into Conditions of Credit Cooperatives in Xiao-gan Xishui Jiangling Dangyang and Gucheng Counties]rdquo July 1955 Hubei Provin-cial Archives SZ18-1-161

ldquoXianning xian di yi qu zhouyan xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 咸宁县第一区周严乡

农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation into Zhouyan Township First Dis-trict Xianning County]rdquo March 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-47

ldquoYicheng xian longxing xiang nongcun jingji diaocha ji ge cailiao de zhengli 宜城县

龙兴乡农村经济调查几个材料的整理 [Some Arranged Materials from a Rural Economic Investigation into Longxing Township Yicheng County]rdquo 1953 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-5

ldquoYingcheng xian yihe xiang nongcun jingji diaocha 应城县义和乡农村经济调查 [Rural Economic Investigation into Yihe Township Yingcheng County]rdquo 1953 Hu-bei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-45

ldquoYingshan xian dunzitang xiang nongcun jingji jiben qingkuang diaocha baogao 应山

县墩子唐乡农村经济基本情况调查报告 [Investigative Report on Basic Rural Economic Conditions in Dunzitang Township Yingshan County]rdquo Hubei Provincial Archives SZ18-1-44

Zhongguo nongcun jinrong lishi ziliao (1949ndash1985) 《中国农村金融历史资料

( 1949~ 1985)》 [Historical Materials of Financing in Rural China (1949ndash1985)] ed Lu Hanchuan 卢汉川 (Hubei sheng chuban shiye guanliju 1986)

SU AND CHANG266

ltUNgt

Zhongguo tudi gaige shiliao xuanbian 《中国土地改革史料选编》 [Selected His-torical Materials from Chinarsquos Land Reforms] (Guofang daxue chubanshe 1988)

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dangrsquoan ziliao xuanbian (1953ndash1957) 《中华人民共

和国经济档案资料选编(1953~1957)》 [Selected Economic Records and Materials from the Peoplersquos Rebublic of China (1953ndash1957)] ed China Academy of Social Sci-ences and China Central Archives 中国社会科学院中央档案馆 (Zhongguo wujia chubanshe 2000)

ldquoZhongnan qu 1953 nian nongcun jingji diaocha tongji ziliao 中南区 1953年农村经

济调查统计资料 [Statistical Data from a Rural Economic Investigation of South-central Regions in 1953]rdquo July 1954 Hubei Provincial Archives SZ-J-40

ldquoZhongnan qu yibai ge xiang diaocha ziliao xuanbian (jiefang qian bufen) 中南区一百

个乡调查资料选集(解放前部分) [Selected Materials from an Investigation into 100 Townships in the South-central Region (Portion from Before 1949)]rdquo ed South-central Military Administration Commission Land Reform Committee Investiga-tion and Research Department 中南军政委员会土地改革委员会调查研究处


ltUNgt

chapter 11

The South-to-North and North-to-South Flows of Grains and CerealsmdashChanges to Directions and Quantities of Flows of Grains and Cereals between North and South in Contemporary China

Zheng Yougui Ou Weizhong Kuang Chanjuan and Jiao Hongpo1

Over the more than forty years since 1949 there have been major historical changes to the directions and quantities of grains and cereals flows between Chinarsquos North and South The most important of these changes was a funda-mentalshift from the dominance of southern grains and cereals support for the North to that ofnorthern support for the South Flows of grains and cereals between northern and southern China has had a major impact on both intra-regional and inter-regional socioeconomic development that is why regional balance of grains and cereals supply and demand has become a major topic of discussion On August 22 1970 Mao Zedong 毛泽东 made this comment at a meeting of the ccp Politburo Standing Committee ldquoAfter 1949 we unified the country but issues of south-to-north grains and cereals transfer and north-to-south coal transfer emerged These issues existed before 1949 but we didnrsquot know about them I donrsquot know if northern coal was shipped southward under Chiang Kai-shekrsquos reign And grains and cereals did he send southern grains and cereals northward It would seem that we need to find a progressive solu-tion to this questionrdquo2 The historical trajectorythrough which the dominance

1 Zheng Yougui (郑有贵 ) is an assistant research fellow and deputy director of the Contem-porary Agricultural History Research Department of the Institute of Rural Economics of the Ministry of Agriculture he resides in Beijing Ou Weizhong (欧维中 ) is a high-level agrono-mist and the former chairman of the Institute of Rural Economics of the Ministry of Agricul-ture he resides in Beijing Kuang Chanjuan (邝婵娟 ) is an associate research fellow in the China Academy of Agricultural Sciences Bureau of District-Dividing she resides in Beijing Jiao Hongpo (焦红坡 ) is an intern researcher in the Contemporary Agricultural History Re-search Department of the Institute of Rural Economics of the Ministry of Agriculture and resides in Beijing

2 Wang Dongxing 汪东兴 ldquoYi Lushan jiu jie er zhongquanhui 忆庐山九届二中全会 [Re-calling the Second Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress at Lushan]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》 3 (1994) 11

ZHENG et al268

ltUNgt

of southern support for the north in terms of grains and cereals supply transi-tioned into the dominance of northern support for the south is an important topic for contemporary agricultural history research This topic is of profound historical and practical importance

By ldquonorthern Chinardquo we refer to an area that consists of the fifteen prov-inces autonomous regions and cities under the directcontrol of the central government including Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Liaon-ing Jilin Heilongjiang Shandong Henan Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia and Xinjiang ldquoSouthern Chinardquo consists of the fifteen provinces autonomous regions and cities under the directcontrol of the central government includ-ing Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Hubei Hunan Guang-dong Hainan Guangxi Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan and Tibet3

This essay covers the period from 1949 to 1994

i Stages of Changes to Direction and Quantities of Flow of Grains and Cereals between Northern and Southern China Since 1949

To determine the stages of change to the direction and quantities of flow of grains and cereals betweennorthern and southern China we must first dif-ferentiate between the quantity of grains and cereals flowing from the South to the North and the quantity flowing between northern and southern China During the period in which more grains and cereals flowed from southern to northern China grains and cereals transfers were primarily the result of gov-ernment allocations under the planned economy we will refer to this period as the ldquoSouth-to-North grain transferrdquo period The period in which more grain was shipped from north to south was primarily the result of marketization reforms we will refer to this period as the ldquoNorth-to-South grain transferrdquo period

Statistics compiled by the Ministry of Commerce (mofcom) for total quan-tities of grain transfers per annum include intra-regional transfers (such as the flow of rice from Hunan to Guangdong in the South and the flow of wheat from Henan to Shanxi in the North) as well as inter-regional transfers Statistics were not compiled purely on the basis of transfers of grains and cereals from north to south or south to north Owing to a shortage of historical data for this essay we have compiled statistics for total transfers in and out of northern and south-ern China based on statistics for annual grains and cereals transfers per prov-ince compiled by mofcom (see Table 111) To these we have added nationwide

3 Hainan was delinked from Guangdong and made an independent province in 1988 Before this there were 14 provinces autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities in the South


ltUNgt

Table 111 Net inbound or outbound shipments of grains and cereals in China by region and net international exports and imports 1953ndash1992

Unit million tonnes


1953 2573 0432 1953 25731954 1659 1065 1954 16591955 2653 0547 1955 26531956 3451 minus0870 1956 34511957 4264 minus1611 1957 42641958 4325 minus0121 1958 43251959 4383 1515 1959 43831960 3083 minus1388 1960 30831961 0191 minus4285 1961 01911962 0262 minus3594 1962 02621963 1303 minus4281 1963 13031964 2308 minus3515 1964 23081965 2631 minus4461 1965 26311966 201 minus1796 1966 2011967 1646 0117 1967 16461968 1975 minus1735 1968 19751969 187 minus2563 1969 1871970 1917 minus1987 1970 19171971 239 minus150 1971 2391972 1815 minus392 1972 18151973 1594 minus3901 1973 15941974 2275 minus2815 1974 22751975 1451 0547 1975 14511976 0708 minus1255 1976 07081977 0115 minus406 1977 01151978 minus1052 minus5749 1978 minus10521979 minus0870 minus5075 1979 minus08701980 minus266 minus7867 1980 minus2661981 minus3017 minus7932 1981 minus30171982 minus2214 minus10192 1982 minus22141983 minus3024 minus8074 1983 minus30241984 minus2261 minus7287 1984 minus22611985 3825 2777 1985 3825

ZHENG et al270

ltUNgt

grains and cereals import and export figures as well as comprehensive analysis of empirical judgments We have divided the history of changes to grains and cereals transfers between northern and southern China since 1949 into three stages the ldquosouth-to-north grain transferrdquo period the transitional period be-tween ldquosouth-to-north grain transferrdquo and ldquonorth-to-south grain transferrdquo and the ldquonorth-to-south grain transferrdquo period The following is a brief history of these three periods

(A) The ldquoSouthndashNorth Grain Transferrdquo PeriodThis period ran roughly from the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China to the mid-1970s The transfer of grains and cereals from south to north was small at first in the 1950s but then grew larger in the 1960s

On the whole in the 1950s there were net transfers of grains and cereals out of both the North and the South There was very little circulation of grains and cereals between the North and South but some southern grains and ce-realswas shipped to the North Officials began recording statistics for annual grains and cerealsflows between North and South in 1953 Over the 1953ndash1955


1986 minus1825 minus5727 1986 minus18251987 minus6067 minus8979 1987 minus60671988 minus9415 minus3792 1988 minus94151989 minus5827 minus9863 1989 minus58271990 minus3303 minus503 1990 minus33031991 minus0128 0161 1991 minus01281992 minus0577 0098 1992 minus0577

Notes (1) Data sources Calculation of net change to grain supply in the North and South is based on materials compiled by the Ministry of Commerce international grains and cereals inbound orout-boundshipment figures were compiled from several years of the Zhongguo tongji nianjian 中国统计年鉴 [China Statistical Yearbook] (2) Negative numbers indicate netgain in grain supply positive numbers indicate net loss in grain supply (3) Grain shipment figures from 1981 to 1990 were calculated based on both fixed and negotiated prices Figures from 1991 to 1992 were calculated on the basis of fixed prices only and do not include inbound orout-boundshipments made at negotiated prices

Table 111 Net inbound or outbound shipments of grains and cereals in China by region and net international exports and imports 1953ndash1992 (cont)


ltUNgt

periods as well as in the single year of 1959 northern China was a net exporter of grains and cereals but a net importer over the three years from 1956 to 1958 Over the years from 1953 to 1959 northern Chinarsquos tally of inbound shipment of grains and cereals to the South totaled 174 million tonnes an annual average of 249000 tonnes of out-bound shipment The tally of southern exports of grains and cereals from 1953 to 1959 totaled 23308 million tonnes an annual average of 333 million tonnes During this period China was a net out-bound shipment of grains and cereals internationally with national net out-bound shipments growing from 116 million tonnes in 1950 to 416 million tonnes in 1959 Chinarsquos most inbound and out-bound shipment in terms of agricultural productsat this time were rice and soybeans and its most impor-tant inbound shipment in terms of agricultural product was wheat although quantities of wheat imports were low at between 20000 and 220000 tonnes per year The following were the conditions of domestic inbound and out-bound shipment of gains and cereals involving all the northern and southern provinces (and autonomous regions and central government-controlled cit-ies) Of the fourteen southern provinces twelve were net grain out-bound shipment of grains and cereals Shanghai was a net inbound shipment region and there were no data for Tibet Sichuan Hunan and Jiangxi were the largest out-bound shipment provinces but Zhejiang Anhui Guizhou Guangdong and Guangxi also posted significant out-bound shipment figures Of the fif-teen northern provinces ten were net grain out-bound shipment provinces Shanxi Inner Mongolia Jilin Heilongjiang Shandong Henan Shaanxi Gan-su Ningxia and Xinjiang The largest northern grain out-bound shipment provinces were in order Heilongjiang Jilin and Inner Mongolia Five north-ern provinces and cities tallied net imports of grains and cereals in order Liaoning Beijing Hebei Tianjin and Qinghai with a small quantity

Grain output in China began to fall in 1959 owing to the influence of the ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and the rural peoplersquos commune movement Grain output figures were restored to 1958 levels only in 1966 Reductions in grain yields greatly strained grain supply and demand relation-ships and in 1961 China ceased to be a net exporter and became a net im-porter of grains and cereals From 1960 to 1969 there were no longer five but ten net inbound shipment of grains and cereals provinces in the North with Shandong Henan Gansu Shanxi and Shaanxi joining the ranks At this time in the North only Heilongjiang Jilin Inner Mongolia Ningxia and Xinjiang were net out-bound shipment provinces but during this period there was a reduction to total grain shipped out of Heilongjiang Jilin and Inner Mongolia as compared to the 1950s Over these ten years the North ceased to be a net out-bound shipper of grains and cereals and became a net inbound shipment region importing a net total of 2750 million tonnes an annual average import

ZHENG et al272

ltUNgt

quantity of 275 million tonnes In the 1960s the formerly twelve southern net out-bound shipment of grain provinces fell to eleven with Fujian becoming a net inbound shipment province Over these ten years the South remained a net out-bound shipment region making out-bound shipments of a net total of 17279 million tonnes an annual average of 1728 million tonnes a 616 percent reduction from the annual average for the 1953ndash1955 periods We can also see that net southern out-bound shipments of grain totaled 1728 million tonnes 1022 million tonnes less than the Northrsquos net inbound shipment of 275 mil-lion tonnes This was the case because the South shipped not only grain but also rice to the North That is to say that at this time people in the North ate not only grains and cereals grown in the South but also a sizeable amount of grains and cereals imported internationally During this period the quantity of northern inbound shipments of grain was large and the imbalance in south-north grain flow had already emerged

In 1970 the State Council convened the Northern Region Agricultural Con-ference at which officials redressed some ldquoleftistrdquo mistakes and proposed the strategic objective of reversing the south-north grain transfer as quickly as possible demanding acceleration to agricultural production in northern re-gions lacking grain Officials also placed particular emphasis on ldquomaking grain prominentrdquo in the state guiding policy for agriculture which called for ldquotak-ing grain as the key link and promoting comprehensive developmentrdquo These central policies in addition to improvements to northern agricultural condi-tions and advances in technology at this time caused great increases to pro-duction of wheat and corn There was a marked increase in overall agricultural production capacity which spurred gains to the Northrsquos grain self-sufficiency From 1970 to 1975 there were still five net out-bound shipment provinces and ten net inbound shipment provinces of grain in the North The three major agricultural provinces of Hebei Shandong and Henan switched from being net inbound shipment to being net out-bound shipment while Inner Mongo-lia Ningxia and Xinjiang became net importers Changes during this period caused a reduction in total grains and cereals imports by the North to drop to 13576 million tonnes an average annual net import of 2253 million tonnes a 177 percent reduction over the average annual import quantity of the 1960s At this time the number of net grain bound shipment provinces in the South fell to ten with Guizhou becoming a net inbound shipment province Over this period the southern grain out-bound shipment total was 11442 million tonnes an net annual average of 1907 million tonnes a 103 percent increase over the annual average in the 1960s Southern net out-bound shipments of grains and cereals remained smaller than northern net inbound shipments as all shortfall was made up of through inbound shipments


ltUNgt

In simple terms the North went from being a net out-bound shipment region for grains and cereals in the early 1950s to being a net inbound shipment region in the mid to late 1950s Net northern grain inbound shipment was larg-est during the 1960s falling somewhat in the 1970s as the North grew in grain self-sufficiency Over this period the South was consistently a net grain out-bound shipment region Southern grain out-bound shipment quantities were high in the 1950s fell somewhat in the 1960s but rose again in the early 1970s though not back to the level of the 1950s Between 1960 and 1975 southern grain out-bound shipments were insufficient for meeting northern demands shortfall was mitigated by supplies from central government granaries and through international imports Southern grain ships to the North went mostly to large and mid-sized cities like Beijing and Tianjin heavy industry bases some areas of concentrated production of cash crops (mostly cotton-grow-ing areas of the Huang-Huai-Hai Region) and some areas lacking conditions for grain production they were mainly used for direct human consumption Although corn production in the South at this time accounted for a small pro-portion of total nationwide corn output the modern livestock feed industry had not developed at this time most livestock feed was made locally in both the North and South at this time

(B) Transitional PeriodThe mid-1970s to mid-1980s was a transitional period between ldquosouth-to-north grain transferrdquo and ldquonorth-to-south grain transferrdquo During this period there was a great adjustment to the varieties of grains and cereals transferred be-tween the North and the South A great deal of southern rice was transferred northward and a great deal of northern corn flowed southward

There were great changes to supply and demand for grains and cereals in the South in the mid to late 1970s Grain out-bound shipment quantities from the South were small in 1976 and 1977 and in 1978 the South became a net grain inbound shipment region shipping a total of 1052 million tonnes of grain The South has been a net grain inbound shipment region ever since From 1976 to 1984 the only net out-bound shipment provinces in the South were Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Jiangxi Hubei Hunan and Guangxi all in the middle to lower reaches of the Yangtze delta but total out-bound shipment quantities in all of these provinces fell from previous years The quantities of grains and cereals shipped out of Jiangsu Hunan and Jiangxi originally the three largest out-bound shipment provinces fell greatly and Sichuan Guang-dong and Yunnan all switched from being net out-bound shipment to net in-bound shipment provinces Most striking is Sichuan which had been a major net grain out-bound shipment province in the 1950s and 1960s this change had

ZHENG et al274

ltUNgt

enormous impact on the quantities and directions of grain flows between the North and the South During this time seven southern provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities became net grain in-bound shipment provinces They are Shanghai Fujian Guangdong Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan and Tibet Over the period from 1978 to 1984 southern in-bound shipments of grain exceeded out-bound shipments making the region a net grain inbound shipment province A total of 15098 million tonnes of grain were shipped to the South over these seven years for an annual average of 2157 million tonnes

Over the nine years from 1976 to 1984 the North remained a net grain inbound shipment region and in fact northern grain inbound shipment sincreased in scale reaching 57491 million tonnes over the period an annual average of 6388 million tonnes 132 times the annual average net inbound shipment for the decade of the 1960s and 182 times the annual average net inbound ship-ment for the period from 1970 to 1975 During this period the North received some shipments of southern rice and some northern corn was shipped to the South From 1976 to 1983 the annual average of northern corn shipped to the South was less than one million tonnes In 1983 major northern corn-producing provinces including Liaoning Jilin Hebei Henan and others shipped a total of 685600 tonnes of corn to the South Of those Jilin shipped out the most corn followed by Henan Corn from Jilin was shipped to coastal regions stretching from Shanghai to Guangxi inland provinces including Yunnan Guizhou and Sichuan and Hubei and Hunan in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River a total of eleven provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities Corn from Henan was shipped to thirteen provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities of the South all except Tibet

During this period the state drafted and implemented many policies for international inbound shipment of grains and cereals in order to reduce pres-sure on domestic production and provide necessary conditions for restructur-ing of rural industry From 1976 to 1984 the quantity of net grains and cereals inbound shipments was large an annual average of 9353 million tonnes

(C) The ldquoNorth-to-South Grain Transferrdquo PeriodThe mid- to late 1980s marked a historic turning point for grain flows between the North and South as shipments of northern grain to the South gradually exceeded those of southern grains and cereals to the North This was the begin-ning of the ldquonorth-to-south grain transferrdquo period

So why did this historic turning point arrive in the mid-1980s We shall first analyze the directions and quantities of rice and corn being transferred be-tween the North and South and then offer some judgments


ltUNgt

As rice cultivation grew in the North there was an increase to northern rice self-sufficiency and in fact some high-quality northern rice was even shipped to the South Fluctuations in southern rice output during this period led to reduced shipments of southern rice to the North and by the mid-1990s net out-bound shipment of rice fromthe South to the North was no longer fea-sible Corn production in the North however developed rapidly The South on the other hand accounts for less than twenty percent of nationwide corn output and so major development in the southern livestock feed industry also prompted a great deal of shipment of northern corn to the South We shall now perform objective analysis of transfers of southern rice to the North and of northern corn to the South Table 112 indicates total inbound and out-bound shipments of corn and rice in both the North and the South This table gives us an idea of the quantities of southern rice being shipped to the North and northern corn being transferred to the South

1 Quantity of southern rice shipped to the North Rice is one of Chinarsquos traditional export products and even during the 1960s and 1970s when China was a net grain importer the country still exported rice Most rice exported by China comes from the South Out-boundshipments of southern rice include both exports to foreign countries to earn foreign ex-change and domestic shipment to the North Most rice consumed in the North comes from the South It is thus fair to surmise that the quantity of northern inbound shipments of rice should be roughly equivalent to that of southern out-bound shipments of rice Net transfers of southern rice to the North totaled 734000 tonnes in 1975 806000 tonnes in 1980 1354 million tonnes in 19854 and 125 million tonnes in 1990

2 Quantity of northern corn shipped to the South In the years prior to 1984 China alternated from being a net exporter and a net importer of corn but overall import and export quantities were never large China was a net international exporter of corn from 1984 to 1994 and thus it is fair to surmise that the quantity of southern inbound shipments of corn should be roughly equivalent to that of northern out-bound shipments of corn Net shipment of northern corn to the South totaled 485000 tonnes in

4 Per statistics issued by the grain bureaus of Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Jiangxi Hubei and Hunan the nationrsquos major suppliers of rice the following are yearly outflows of unprocessed rice from these six provinces to the north 2933 million tonnes in 1983 2585 million tonnes in 1984 and 215 million tonnes in 1985 Once these figures are converted to processed rice they match up with our estimate of total rice outflow from the South to the North in 1985 These figures also demonstrate a gradual falling off of transfers of rice from the South to the North

ZHENG et al276

ltUNgt

Tabl

e 11

2

Chan

ges t

o ne

t out

-bou

nd sh

ipm

ents

of r

ice a

nd co

rn in

the n

orth

and

sout

h

Uni

t to

nnes

Year

Rice

Corn

Net

am

ount

of s

outh

ern

ship

men

t of r

ice

to th

e no

rth

min

us n

orth

ern

out-b

ound

ship

men

ts o

f co

rn to

the

sout

h co

rn

tran

sfer

Net

am

ount

ex

port

ed

from

the

sout

h

Net

am

ount

of

nort

hern

ex

port

Net

am

ount

of

sout

h-to

-nor

th

tran

sfer

Net

am

ount

ex

port

ed to

th

e so

uth

Net

am

ount

of

nort

hern

ex

port

Net

am

ount

of

nort

h-to

-sou

th

tran

sfer

1975

224

mn

734

000

734

000

485

000

969

000

485

000

249

000

1980

938

000

806

000

806

000

154

3 m

n26

500

026

500

0 5

410

0019

852

085

mn

135

4 m

n1

354

mn

187

8 m

n5

832

mn

187

8 m

nminus5

240

0019

902

005

mn

125

mn

125

mn

271

4 m

n3

195

mn

271

4 m

nminus1

464

mn

Not

es (

1) D

ata

sour

ce c

ompi

led

from

mof

com

dat

a (2

) Fig

ures

for f

low

of r

ice

and

corn

in 19

75 c

alcu

late

d on

stab

ilize

d pr

ices

Fig

ures

from

1980

to 19

90 w

ere

calc

ulat

ed b

ased

on

stab

ilize

d an

d ne

gotia

ted

pric

es (

3) W

e es

timat

ed th

e am

ount

of r

ice

ship

men

t fro

m S

outh

to N

orth

the

am

ount

of c

orn

ship

men

t fro

m

Nor

th to

Sou

th a

nd th

e fig

ures

for n

et a

mou

nt o

f Sou

th-to

-Nor

th ri

ce o

ut-b

ound

ship

men

t min

us N

orth

-to-S

outh

cor

n ou

t-bou

ndsh

ipm

ent


ltUNgt

1975 265000 tonnes in 19805 1878 million tonnes in 19856 and 2714 mil-lion tonnes in 1990 Of course there were flows of other kinds of grain between the North and the South during this period as well but their quantities paled in comparison to those of rice and corn

This data shows us that beginning in the mid-1980s the quantity of corn shipped from North to South was much greater than the quantity of rice trans-ferred from south to north By 1990 the disparity had grown to nearly 15 million tonnes Thus we can say that we entered the ldquoNorth-to-South grain transferrdquo period in the mid- to late 1980s By the 1990s the quantity of North-to-South grain transfer had grown much higher than in the 1980s making this the great imbalance in grains and cereals output between the North and the South This imbalance had an increasingly large impact on economic development in all the regions of across both the North and the South and has become a major topic for discussion in the field of balancing regional supply of and demand for grains and cereals

ii Analysis of the Characteristics of Flows of Grains and Cereals between the North and South

We can conclude therefore that grains and cereals transfers between the North and South in the over forty years since 1949 have had the following characteristics

Firstly rice has comprised the bulk of southern grain out-bound shipment to the North where it has served mostly as food for direct human consump-tion Corn has comprised the bulk of northern grain shipment to the South where it has mostly been used to manufacture livestock feed

Northern grain inbound shipment figures indicate that inbound shipment for the two cities of Beijing and Tianjin were greater than some other north-ern provinces and autonomous regions in the period from 1953 to 1960 as well as in the years 1967 1968 1971 1975 1976 1985 1986 1988 and 1990 a total of

5 This is because southern rice imports were greater than northern corn exports in this year Thus we used the figure for northern corn exports in this year

6 Per statistics issued by the grain bureaus of Jilin and Liaoning in the Northeast and Hebei Shandong and Henan in the Huang-Huai-Hai Rivers Region the nationrsquos major suppliers of corn the following are yearly outflows of corn from these six provinces to the south 685600 tonnes in 1983 14221 tonnes in 1984 and 13381 tonnes in 1985 These figures match up with our estimate of total corn outflow from the North to the South of 1878 million tonnes in 1985

ZHENG et al278

ltUNgt

seventeen years Excluding those years during the other twenty-one years over the period 1961 to 1990 grain inbound shipmentfor other northern provinces and autonomous regions were all greater than those for Beijing and Tianjin Jilin Province long a heavy industry base was the large net grain inbound shipment province in the North in the 1950s and 1960s This fact indicates that Beijing Tianjin and Liaoning have been the major destination of grain inbound shipments to the North Some other provinces and autonomous regions also subsisted on shipped grains and cereals from other provinces but at smaller amount than these two cities and one province and most inbound shipments in those areas went to concentrated cash crop production areas (mostly cotton-growing areas of the Huang-Huai-Hai Region) and some ar-eas lacking conditions for production Letrsquos look at out-bound shipment of southern rice to the North in 1975 as an example In 1975 net Southern rice out-bound shipment totaled 224 million tonnes The nine southern provinces and autonomous regions including Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Hubei Hunan Guangdong and Guangxi were net out-bound shipment prov-inces Hunan led the pack followed by Jiangxi with Fujian coming in last Shanghai was the largest net rice inbound shipment province in the South Sichuan Guizhou and Tibet were all also net rice inbound shipment prov-inces but at much smaller amount In 1975 Liaoning was the only northern province to be a net out-bound shipment of rice but at a small quantity Excluding Liaoning and Ningxia the other thirteen provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities of the North were all net inbound shipment provinces of rice for a total of 734000 tonnes In summary most southern grain import to the Northwent to large and mid-sized cities such as Beijing and Tianjin heavy industry bases concentrated cash crop production areas and some areas that cannot produce for itself

In North-to-South grain transfers the South received shipments of a total of 2714 million tonnes of corn in 1990 with thirteen provinces autonomous regions and central government directly controlled cities making net inbound shipments Shanghai Sichuan Guangxi and Zhejiang led the rest and only Anhui was a net out-bound shipment province of corn but in small amounts Corn comprises the bulk of northern grain shipped to the south although a small amount of northern soybeans are also shipped southward One could call the true nature of this transfer ldquoshipping of northern livestock feed to the Southrdquo

The most important types of grains and cereals shipped between the North and South are rice and corn although small amounts of other types of grains and cereals were also shipped between the regions This grain shipment structure is the result of the distribution of grain varieties in China and the


ltUNgt

structure of production areas Major grains and cereals7 in China include rice wheat corn soybeans tubers and other assorted grains and cereals Rice wheat and corn make up the bulk of grain varieties in China The share of combined output of rice wheat and corn in total grain output in the country rose from 632 percent in 1952 to 841 percent in 1994 Rice dominates grain out-put in the South with fourteen of the fifteen southern provinces producing rice as the major grain crop Dry farming dominates the North where wheat corn and soybeans are the major crop varieties and rice production is minimal Although rice cultivation is growing rapidly in the North the South remains the major rice producing region consistently accounting for over ninety per-cent of national rice output The South accounted for 959 percent of national rice output in 1952 947 percent in 1965 933 percent in 1975 93 percent in 1984 and 903 percent in 1994 The North on the other hand has consistently accounted for less than ten percent of national rice output Although North-ern diet is marked by a domination of wheat consumption rice consumption persists there and has in fact been steadily growing this is the factor that has long determined flows of rice from the South to the North Most corn in China is cultivated in the North where the crop has developed rapidly The propor-tion of northern corn production to national total has grown consistently from nearly seventy percent in the 1950s to over 80 percent in the 1990s Northern corn production accounted for 691 percent of national output in 1952 678 percent in 1965 782 percent in 1975 774 percent in 1984 and 813 percent in 1994 A great deal of northern corn has been shipped to the South since Reform and Opening as the modern livestock feed processing industry has grown most notably in the South Chinese wheat production has long been insuffi-cient to meet domestic demand and inbound shipments have been used to fill the gap There is therefore some flow of wheat between the North and the South but not much Most tubers have been consumed where they are produced with the exception of the years of food shortages in the early 1960s most tubers are not shipped between regions Beans and assorted grains and cereals are shipped interregionally with most shipments going from the North to the South but at much smaller amounts then those of rice and corn We can say therefore that rice and corn account for the majority of grain shipments between the North and South with the bulk of south-to-north shipment being of rice and the bulk of north-to-south grain shipment being of corn That is not to say however that there have been no transfers of other grain variet-ies between the North and South It is also not to say that no northern rice is

7 Translatorrsquos note The Chinese word liangshi is generally translated as ldquograins and cerealsrdquo in English but it also includes major cash crops such as soybeans and potatoes

ZHENG et al280

ltUNgt

transferred to the South We are merely saying that rice is the primary south-ern grain shipped northward and corn is the primary northern grain shipped southward all other grain varieties shipped are of secondary importance

Secondly the socioeconomic backgrounds to the period of south-to-north grain shipments and the period of north-to-south grain shipments are pro-foundly different in the following ways (1) The economic systems were dif-ferent During the South-to-North grain transfer period out-bound shipments of southern grain to the North were decided under the planned economy The government used administrative measures to execute out-bound shipments to meet consumption demands in the North mostly in large and mid-sized cities like Beijing and Tianjin in heavy industry bases in some areas of concentrated production of cash crops (mostly cotton-growing areas of the Huang-Huai-Hai Region) and some areas lacking conditions for production By contrast deci-sions about shipments of northern grain southward reflected reforms drive to create a market economy under which grains and cereals in regions with sur-pluses finds their way to regions with shortages and flow is established between regions with different prices (2) Consumption patterns are different During the South-to-North grain transfer period rice was the primary southern grain shipped to the North Centrally-made grain allocation decisions at this time were made to ensure adequate food supply in regions with shortages These al-location decisions reflected low levels of both production and consumption of grain During the North-to-South grain transfer period the primary northern grain shipped to the South has been corn which has mostly gone to meet the de-mand for feed production for the animal farming These allocation decisions in-dicate that per capita grain consumption in China has increased markedly and that there have been substantive changes to consumption patterns (3) Grain product industries developed to different levels During the South-to-North grain transfer period total amount of southern grain shipped to the North was low reflecting a low level of development of grain processing industries during this period During the North-to-South grain transfer period a greater amount of northern grain has been shipped southward indicating a higher level of de-velopment to Chinese grain processing industries in this period

Thirdly most provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities require adjustments to grain varieties planted due to mismatch between what they grow and their dietary preferences What we mean to stress here is that even large grain out-bound shipping provinces made inbound shipments of some grain varieties to correct the mismatch a lot of For example Jiangxi and Hunan are major out-bound shipment prov-inces of rice but both rely on large amount of northern corn to meet the needs of their livestock feed industries In another example in 1995 Jilin Province


ltUNgt

led the country in per capita grain output at 7811 kilograms nearly double the national average of 3939 kilograms Nevertheless although the province shipped a large amount of corn out of the province it relies on large amount of interregional and international wheat imports

Fourthly most provinces autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities saw changes to their identity as either net grain inbound shipment provincesor net grain out-bound shipment provinces Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Tibet and Hainan have consistently been net importers of grain All other provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities have been both Some shifting back and forth between the two

Fifthly since 1990 southern shortages of grain for feed production have in-creased with grain self-sufficiency rates falling particularly in southeastern coastal regions As reforms to the grain circulation system have deepened as commodification and marketization have increased in Chinarsquos food industry the flow of grains and cereals have become complex The most prominent im-balance in grain supply is the flow of northern grains southward to mitigate shortages in the feed production industry The regional supply and demand situation in corn is characterized as Northern surpluses coupled with Southern shortages In recent years corn surpluses have been concentrated in three large regions The first is the corn-basket of the three northeastern provinces and Inner Mongolia where corn surpluses average nearly twenty million tonnes annually The second are the Huang-Huai-Hai Region provinces of Shandong Hebei and Henan where corn surpluses average between five and ten mil-lion tonnes annually The third region consists of Shaanxi and Xinjiang in the Northwest where corn surpluses average nearly two million tonnes annually In 1994 corn production in these nine provinces and autonomous regions to-taled 7369 million tonnes accounting for seventy-four percent of national annual corn output of that total 4227 million tonnes were surplus account-ing for ninety percent of national total of corn surpluses Corn is in short sup-ply mostly in the South where eleven provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities see an annual corn shortfall of one million tonnes or more These include Guangdong Hunan Sichuan Ji-angxi Hubei Jiangsu Zhejiang Fujian Anhui Guangxi and Shanghai8 The Southrsquos chronic shortage of grain for manufacturing livestock feed is one of the

8 State Planning Commission Rural Economic Department and National Bureau of Statistics Rural Investigation Team 国家计委农经司国家统计局农调总队 ldquoZhongguo liang-shi gongxu pingheng wenti yanjiu 中国粮食供需平衡问题研究 [Research in the Topic of Balancing Chinarsquos Supply and Demand of Grains and cereals]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun guancha 《中国农村观察》 1 (1996)

ZHENG et al282

ltUNgt

major imbalances in nationwide grain supply and demand To address south-ern shortages of corn for manufacturing feed and their impact on the pig-raising industry in 1994 and 1995 the State Council freed up two million tonnes of state corn reservesmdashin two batchesmdashfrom Jilin Liaoning Heilongjiang Inner Mongolia and other regions to be allocated to the South to mitigate shortages

There are also imbalances in rice supply and demand particularly in south-eastern coastal regions which are already seeing a deficit The five provinces of Hunan Jiangxi Hubei Anhui and Jiangsu in the mid-and lower reaches of the Yangtze River make up Chinarsquos major rice producing regions Total arable land being used for rice cultivation in these regions fell by 21655 million mu from 1990 to 1994 and total rice output subsequently fell by 6045 million tonnes over this period Total arable land being used for rice cultivation in the South China rice producing region of Guangdong Fujian Guangxi and Hainan de-creased by 11457 million mu from 1990 to 1994 with output falling by 5665 mil-lion tonnes a margin of decrease second only to that of the aforementioned region These changes have led to shortages in rice supply In regional terms such has meant a reduction in the size of net rice out-bound shipment regions and an increase in that of net rice inbound shipment regions as well as an in-crease to the volume of international rice imports In 1984 the combined rice shipped from the seven southern provinces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities of Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Fujian Guangdong Guangxi and Hainan was 1509 million tonnes By 1994 they were receiving net shipmentsof a total of 148 million tonnes of rice9

iii Lessons from the Shift from South-to-North to North-to-South Grain Flow

We have gained a great deal of experience over the forty years of changes to the direction and quantities of grain transfers between the North and the South These experiences have left us profound lessons primarily in the fol-lowing areas

(A) Increases to Comprehensive Agricultural Productivity are the Foundation for the Development of Grain Output in Both the North and the South

Since 1949 there have been significant increases to comprehensive agricultural productivity in both the North and the South These increases have provided

9 Ibid


ltUNgt

the material basis for sustained increases to Chinese grain output which grew from 11318 million tonnes in 1949 to 490 million tonnes in 1996 Agricultural production conditions in the North were originally worse than in the South but over the last forty-plus years gains to comprehensive agricultural productiv-ity have brought about not only self-sufficiency but also surpluses in northern grain output This is a typical example There have been two primary reasons behind increases to grain output in the North The first lies in improvements to overall northern agricultural conditions beginning with large-scale develop-ment of farm fields and irrigation works in the 1950s In 1966 the ccp Central Committee and the State Council determined to establish agricultural groups in eight provinces (and autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities) under the personal direction of Premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 to eliminate backwardness in northern agriculture In 1970 the State Council convened a conference dedicated to agriculture in the North at which offi-cials strengthened leadership in agricultural work in the North and proposed strategic objectives for reversing the ldquoSouth-to-North grain transferrdquo There was another upsurge in the construction of farm fields and irrigation works during the ldquolearn from Dazhai in agriculturerdquo movement of the 1960s and 1970s and great achievements were made in the leveling of land in the erection of ter-raced fields on sloped land and in improving and cleaning up saline-alkaline soil All of these played an important role in improving agricultural conditions in the North The second reason was the development of chemical fertilizers farming machinery and other material gains in the development of agricul-tural industry There were great increases to investments in essential factors of production for chemical fertilizers and farming machinery this played an important role in improving northern agriculture The third reason was in the selection of improved varieties of corn and wheat and improvements in plant-ing techniques that came on the heels of advances to agricultural science and technology As agricultural production conditions gradually improved yields per unit of area planted grew rapidly Grain output per mu in the North grew 266 times over the period 1952 to 1994 an average annual increase of 31 per-cent 07 percent higher than the same average annual increase experienced in the South of 24 percent The fourth reason was the formation the Northrsquos Corn Belt which spurred rapid growth in northern corn production as well as increases to corn processing From 1985 to 1994 the North increased the size of corn-producing land by 3211 million mu which accounted for 619 percent of the national increase of 51474 million mu Over this period northern corn output increased by 32144 million tonnes accounting for 907 percent of the national gain in corn output over this period which was 35421 million tonnes During this period the Northrsquos contribution to national corn output increased

ZHENG et al284

ltUNgt

from 761 percent to 813 percent As commercial processing of corn for added value in the North grew most of Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning Inner Mongolia and Shanxi as well as parts of Hebei Shaanxi and Gansu became concen-trated producing regions for spring corn These regions also accounted for the bulk of nationwide commercial corn production In 1994 the central govern-ment purchased a total of 1675 million tonnes from these eight provinces or autonomous regions accounting for 767 percent of total central government corn purchases Of that total 7125 million tonnes of corn were purchased from the North via the fixed quota system from these eight provinces and autono-mous regions accounting for 828 percent of total fixed quota corn purchase in that year Most of that corn was exported to earn foreign exchange or exported to the South Increases to the Northrsquos comprehensive agricultural productiv-ity were an important reason behind the reversal ofdirection of grain flow between the North and South

(B) Reasonable Adjustments have been Made to Crop Growing Varieties and Dietary Patterns Tomitigate Imbalances in Grain between the North and the South

Analysis of the above characteristics of grain flows between the North and South clearly show that the North-to-South grain transfer is largely attribut-able to the Northrsquos need for southern grain as raw material in feed production In fact the total amount of interregional grain shipment used toward feed production exceeded the amount of northward shipment of southern grain during the south-to-north grain transfer period This fact speaks volumes of the degree of mismatch between what are grown and what are needed in each region A certain flow of grain between the North and South is allow-able and in some cases necessary but excessive flows have more negative than positive consequences To mitigate these imbalances we must begin by adjusting imbalances to regional grain production structures and consump-tion patterns To this end the North should continue to develop potential grain output capacity and play up the advantages of the Corn Belt while also making adjustments to grain production structures where there is excessive corn production capacity Officials in the North must also increase produc-tion of wheat rice and other crops to help ameliorate the damage years of planting only corn has had on the soil This decision would also help to meet local demand for diversity in grain supply At the same time officials should increase local processing of grains The South should increase grain output including corn early rice barley and other grains used as raw materials in feed production The goal should be increased self-sufficiency especially with respect to direct human consumption


ltUNgt

(C) Provide Policies Support for Grain Production and Give Grains a Certain Degree of Development Advantages in Regional Economies

Because grain production enjoys different degrees of relative development advantages in the North and the South over an extended period of time this ultimately led to sustained output increase in the North andstagnation in the South grain output and a northward shift of the center of grain production in China As market reforms have been deepened in both the economy in gen-eral and in grain sales in particular there have been increasing policy support for the grain industry The development advantages of grain production in re-gional economies have thus become more pronounced As a result grain pro-ducers can increase their incomes by increasing production These measures explain greater incentive among farmers to plant grains which has in turn driven output growth The government has put in place a number of measures to make growing grain more attractive to farmers The first is to increase the profitability of grain production through preferential pricing and investment policies The second is through integrating the trade industrial and agricul-tural dimensions of grain production and sales When farmers work closely with markets through companies and other intermediary organizations the different parties can share both benefits and risks Such behavior can promote not only food processing for grain in the North but also grain production in the South to meet the needs of feed production The third has been the promotion in select areas of large-scale grain production in order to take advantage of the economy of scale In these areas grain planting has yielded greater return through increases to labor and land productivity

(D) The Construction of an Integrated Nationwide Grain Market is an Imeasure for Ensuring Orderly Flows of Grains between the North and South and a Balancing of Supply and Demand

In 1985 the central government abolished the state grain monopoly and imple-mented contract purchasing and market purchasing systems giving green light to the sale of grain through multiple channels This change helped alleviate dif-ficulties in the sales of grain Long-term cooperation between producers and traders are now being established in grain producing regions Nevertheless an orderly system for the circulation of grain has yet to be truly established owing to stagnant development of Chinarsquos grain markets This oversight is a major reason behind grain price fluctuations and supply and demand imbalances in recent years Promoting sound flows of grain between the North and South must be a macroeconomic policy objective for the central government The central governmentrsquos emergency allocation of reserve grains to alleviate short-ages in 1995 played an important role in stabilizing the market for grains used

ZHENG et al286

ltUNgt

for feed production The central government should also adopt corresponding policies to avoid importing grain when there are domestic surpluses or export-ing it when there are domestic shortages In summary promoting sound flows of grain between the North and South and greater balance in regional supply and demand requires the establishment of an integrated orderly nationwide grain market supported by state macroeconomic policies and controls on im-ports and exports to avoid surpluses and shortages

(E) Ensuring Regional Equilibrium in Supply and Demand through Distribution of Grain Reserves

Climates vary widely between different regions in China and grain harvests are affected to a great degree by environmental factors Over the past ten or so years grain output has gone through cycles of about five years each with two years of increases one year of no changes and two years of decreases This conclusionis based on overall production figures We should pay more at-tention to differences in yields for different grain varieties and identify those that ill suit local conditions Furthermore the North and South are separated by great distances and shipping grain between them takes a great amount of resources It will be particularly difficult to resolve such problems as regional reductions to grain output owing to natural disasters and in particular to fluctuations in the grain markets This problem calls for sound distribution of central grain reserves in both the North and South and greater emphasis on reasonable blending of grain varieties We are presently shoring up the grain reserve system and strengthening the governmentrsquos role by separating the public policy functions of grain departments from their commercial functions This should prove helpful toward ensuring ample grain reserves

Since the 1980s we have experienced some periods in which either selling or storing grain was difficult both hurt the stable development of grain produc-tion Sluggishness in the construction of infrastructure for grain circulation is largely to blame We must address this problem


ltUNgt

chapter 12

Three Historic Changes to Inter-regional Grain Flows in the Peoplersquos Republic of China and Their Causes

Qu Shang and Su Shaozhi1

Abstract

Over the more than fifty years since the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China government allocation of grain has gradually given way to market allocation There were three historic changes to the direction and quantities of grain flows over this period from South-to-North grain transfer to North-to-South grain transfer then to Northrsquos dominance in international exports and Southrsquos dominance in international imports and finally to exporting by both the North and South An analysis of this process and related factors indicates that these three major shifts were the result of marked-directed imbalance in regional economic development This imbalance also had a large impact on further development and adjustments to regional economies the national economy and the global economy

Keywords

grain ndash South-to-North grain transfer ndash North-to-South grain transfer ndash exporting by the North and importing by the South ndash exporting by both the North and South

i The History of the South-to-North Grain Transfer and the First Historic Shift to North-to-South Grain Transfer

The agricultural civilization of the Chinese people was born in the Yellow River Valley After the Tang and Song Dynasties as the Yangtze and Pearl

1 Qu Shang (瞿商 ) was born in 1968 and is a lecturer in the Hubei University of Technology and a doctoral student in the Institute of Chinese Economics of the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Su Shaozhi (苏少之 ) was born in 1948 and is a professor in the Institute of Chinese Economics of the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

QU AND SU288

ltUNgt

River Valleys came within the pale of Chinese civilization the center of Chinarsquos economy gradually shifted southward By the Southern Song Dy-nasty Chinarsquos economic heart was firmly located in the South After unifica-tion of the country in the Yuan Dynasty officials built the Grand Canal and roads leading to the capital ie Yuan Dadu to ensure ample grain supply to the North This was how ldquoSouth-to-North grain transferrdquo got its start and it was a spectacular undertaking at the time The South-to-North grain transfer remained a key tool in maintaining regional food balances across the country through the Ming and Qing Dynasties as well as during the Republic of China

For a long time after the founding of The Peoplersquos Republic of China the South-to-North grain transfer remained in force After the state monopoly on grain and other agricultural products was imposed in 1953 all grain allocation was done by the central government Per data we compiled regarding net ship-ments in and out of the North and South2 based on yearly grain shipment data published by the Ministry of Commerce (mofcom) in the early 1950s both the North and South were net exporters of grain with most out-transfers of grain from both regions going to other countries The primary grain shipped out of the South was rice while the primary northern grain shipped to the South was soybeans

This development of exports is mostly attributable to economic recovery between land reforms and the agricultural cooperative movement Condi-tions for agricultural production improved and labor productivity increased bringing about marked increases to grain yields which in turn led to grain surpluses available for export The state monopoly under which the central government exercised absolute control over every aspect of grain from pro-duction to consumption ended Chinarsquos long tradition of keeping the rights and freedom to store grain in the hands of the people At this point grain was no longer simply a consumer good but would also be used to further socialist modernization It was precisely at this time that the state relied on exports of primary agricultural products to earn foreign currency badly needed to meet the capital technological and equipment demands of industrialization Thus grain exports particularly exports of southern rice increased steadily during this time Over the eight year period from 1954 to 1960 the net total of exports added to in-shipments of northern and southern grain totaled 1944 million tonnes Over the same period net out-shipments of grain from the North and

2 Here the ldquoSouthrdquo refers to the fifteen provinces autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities of East China (excluding Shandong) and South-central China (excluding Henan) The ldquoNorthrdquo refers to the fifteen provinces autonomous regions and direct-controlled cities of the Northeast North China and the Northwest


ltUNgt

the South together came to 26743 million tonnes with a difference of 7303 million tonnes in grain shipments between the two regions These figures in-dicate that inter-regional grain transfers ie flows of grain between the North and South were relatively small A small amount of northern soybeans and corn were shipped to the South at this time Excluding the portion that went to exports a small amount of southern rice was shipped to the North primar-ily to the two cities of Beijing and Tianjin and the major industrial province of Liaoning We also discovered that of all annual grain shipment figures from the North and South in the 1950s twelve of the fourteen southern provinces au-tonomous regions and direct-controlled cities were net out-shippers of grain with relatively large export figures Over this eight-year period total exports from the South stood at 26391 million tonnes an annual average of nearly 330 million tonnes The North was a net exporter of grain in the years 1953 to 1955 as well as in 1959 with a small amount of exports (an annual average of 880000 tonnes) but in the other four years of the period from 1953 to 1960 the North was a net grain importer (at an annual average of 800000 tonnes) In other words over this eight-year period grain shipment from the North southward was 352000 tonnes only 13 percent of the amount shipped northward from the South Evidently the South was the major grain producing region in China in the 1950s making enormous contribution to Chinarsquos international grain ex-ports and mitigating northern grain shortages in the mid and late 1950s During this period the North and the South were both net exporters but it was also at this time that the South-to-North grain flow began to take shape

Grain production efficiency and total grain output fell in the 1960s due to the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo and the rural peoplersquos commune movements This shortfall placed enormous strain on supply and demand for grain nationwide and so in 1961 China ceased to be a net grain exporter and became a net grain importer Grain output began to grow again in 1962 but at the same time the population was also growing dramatically and so grain shortages continued for a long time Throughout the decade of the 1960s net grain exports from the South totaled 16113 million tonnes while the North was a net grain importer in every year of the decade except 1967 Previously only five provinces autono-mous regions and central government directly-controlled cities had been net grain importers but that number now rose to ten The total amount of grain imports over this period was 2810 million tonnes The difference of 11987 mil-lion tonnes was made up primarily through imports China imported a total of 3349 million tonnes of grain in the 1960s mostly wheat that went to the North Three characteristics distinguished the 1960s from the 1950s The first is that the South remained a net exporter of grain and maintained grain sur-pluses but the total amount of outward shipments fell markedly The second

QU AND SU290

ltUNgt

Table 121 Net inbound or outbound shipments of grain in China by region and net exports and imports 1953ndash1992


1953 2573 mn 432000 3005 mn 182 mn1954 1659 mn 1065 mn 2724 mn 168 mn1955 2653 mn 547000 320 mn 205 mn1956 3451 mn minus870000 3364 mn 250 mn1957 4264 mn minus1611 mn 2653 mn 192 mn1958 4325 mn minus121000 4204 mn 266 mn1959 4383 mn 1515 mn 5898 mn 416 mn1960 3083 mn minus1388 mn 1695 mn 265 mn1961 191000 minus4285 mn minus4094 mn minus445 mn1962 262000 minus3594 mn minus3332 mn minus389 mn1963 1303 mn minus4281 mn minus2978 mn minus446 mn1964 2308 mn minus3515 mn minus1207 mn minus475 mn1965 2631 mn minus4461 mn minus1829 mn minus399 mn1966 201 mn minus1796 mn 214000 minus355 mn1967 1646 mn 117000 1763 mn minus171 mn1968 1975 mn minus1735 mn 240000 minus200 mn1969 187 mn minus2563 mn minus693000 minus145 mn1970 1917 mn minus1987 mn minus70000 minus324 mn1971 239 mn minus150 mn 890000 minus5500001972 1815 mn minus392 mn minus2105 mn minus184 mn1973 1594 mn minus3901 mn minus2307 mn minus424 mn1974 2275 mn minus2815 mn minus540000 minus448 mn1975 1451 mn 547000 1998 mn minus9300001976 708000 minus1255 mn minus547000 minus6000001977 115000 minus406 mn minus3945 mn minus569 mn1978 minus1052 mn minus5749 mn minus6801 mn minus695 mn1979 minus870000 minus5075 mn minus5945 mn minus1071 mn1980 minus266 mn minus7867 mn minus10527 mn minus1181 mn1981 minus3017 mn minus7932 mn minus10949 mn minus1348 mn1982 minus2214 mn minus10192 mn minus12406 mn minus1534 mn1983 minus3024 mn minus8074 mn minus11098 mn minus1234 mn1984 minus2261 mn minus7287 mn minus9548 mn minus722 mn

Unit million tonnes


ltUNgt

is that most southern outward shipments of grain in the 1950s went toward exports whereas most southern shipments of grain in the 1960s consisted of rice used to mitigate food shortages in the North where the rest of shortages were resolved through importation of wheat The third is that grain imports were greater than exports in the 1960s whereas China was a net grain exporter in the 1950s The south-north grain transfer remained the status quo in the 1960s with inter-regional allocations growing larger In imports and exports the North became a net importer of wheat The general situation at this time was north-south grain transfer and northern import of grain

In the 1970s the South-to-North grain transfer began to decline but grain imports into the North continued unabated This change was primarily be-cause the North improved the conditions and technology for agricultural pro-duction which spurred great increases to yields per unit area planted of wheat and corn thus augmenting the Northrsquos grain self-sufficiency At the same time the promotion of hybrid rice plants and other improved varieties in the South greatly increased grain yields per area planted there but population growth cancelled out the positive impact these had on general grain supply Thus the South maintained seven years of net exports of grain during the 1970s

Notes (1) Data sources Calculation of net change to grain supply in the North and South is based on materials compiled by the Ministry of Commerce international grain import and export figures were compiled from several years of the Zhongguo tongji nianjian《中国统计

年鉴》[China Statistical Yearbook] (2) Negative numbersindicate netgain in grain supply positive numbers indicate net loss in grain supply (3) Grain shipment figures from 1981 to 1990 were calculated based on both fixed and negotiated prices Figures from 1991 to 1992 were calculated on the basis of fixed prices only and do not include imports and exports made at negotiated prices


1985 3825 mn 2777 mn 6602 mn 332 mn1986 minus1825 mn minus5727 mn minus7552 mn 169 mn1987 minus6067 mn minus8979 mn minus15046 mn minus891 mn1988 minus9415 mn minus3792 mn minus13207 mn minus816 mn1989 minus5827 mn minus9863 mn minus1569 mn minus1002 mn1990 minus3303 mn minus503 mn minus8333 mn minus789 mn1991 minus128000 161000 330000 minus259 mn1992 minus577000 98000 minus479000 189 mn

QU AND SU292

ltUNgt

becoming a net grain in-transferer region only in 1978 Southern grain exports in this decade totaled only 5766 million tonnes the annual average of the de-cade being only 175 percent that of the 1950s and 358 percent that of the 1960s Northern net grain imports in this decade totaled 35595 million tonnes a 267 percent increase over the 1960s The continued need for imports was mostly attributable to rapid growth of the population which led to a grain shortage of 29829 million tonnes which was remedied through government grain reserves and wheat imports A total of 4780 million tonnes of grain was imported over this ten-year span with wheat accounting for over ninety percent of imported grain

Outward shipments of southern grain began to decline in the 1980s At this time rapid economic growth in the southeastern coastal regions spurred by Reform and Opening caused a massive influx of population from the interior which exacerbated grain shortages in Fujian and other provinces of in South-ern China With the added growth of Township Village Enterprises (tves) and of the livestock feed manufacturing industry the South was not only incapable of sustaining net shipments of grain to the North but also used a great deal of grain to manufacture feed At this point the South-to-North grain transfer could no longer continue At the same time agricultural productivity in the North grew greatly A ldquoCorn Beltrdquo developed in the Northeast where prov-inces gained comparative advantages New methods of grain planting greatly increased the Northrsquos grain self-sufficiency Nevertheless the North remained dependent on imports to mitigate grain shortages while northern grain began to be shipped to the South manufacture feed Through the decade of the 1980s the South imported a total of 33128 million tonnes of grain (mostly northern corn and imported wheat as southern rice production was sufficient to meet inter-provincial demand within the region) A total of 64099 million tonnes of grain were shipped into the North over the decade with imports of wheat over the ten-year span hitting 11446 million tonnes an annual average of 11446 million tonnes3 The North and South were collectively short by 97227 mil-lion tonnes of grain one third of total annual grain output in the late 1970s Imports were used to remedy this shortcoming but total grain imports in the 1980s totaled only 9020 million tonnes For this reason the trend of South-to-North grain transfer was fully reversed in the 1980s replaced by imports by both the North and the South as well as the emergence of the North-to-South grain transfer

3 Long Guoqiang 隆国强 Daguo kaifang zhong de liangshi liutong 《大国开放中的粮食流

通》 [Grain Circulation of a Major Nation during Opening] (Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe 1999) 110


ltUNgt

In the mid-1990s the historical shifttoward the North-to-South grain trans-fer of Chinarsquos inter-regional grain circulation was complete In this decade northern grain supply greatly exceeded the regionrsquos demand at which point the North began providing abundant grain for the development of the south-ern feed industry

ii Analysis of the Factors behind the Historical Shift from the South-to-North Grain Transfer to the North-to-South Grain Flow

(A) Factors behind the South-to-North Grain TransferThe South-to-North grain transfer was a product of Chinarsquos historical devel-opment and economic growth The following are the factors that led to its emergence

One the particularities of grain production Prior to the 1980s grain produc-tion relied on traditional techniques which inevitably made grain yields sub-ject to the whims of nature In simple terms that means differences in climatic and geographic conditions Southern China has abundant water resources is hot gets plenty of sunshine and is endowed with fertile soil Irrigation in the South is highly developed after thousands of years of sustained agriculture Rice grows quickly and gives abundant yields there The South is Chinarsquos pri-mary grain-producing region The North by contrast is largely arid with low levels of soil fertility and poor water resources Yields per unit area for the pri-mary northern cash crops of wheat and corn are low as is overall output Thus the North suffered severe grain shortages prior to the 1980s

Two the first great successes in the cultivation of hybrid grain varieties in China were made in rice Improved varieties of the primary northern crops of wheat and corn came only later Conditions for grain production in the North and South constituted a major difference between the regions prior to the 1980s

Three the North and the South operated different modelsof grain produc-tion Soil in the North is mostly barren and unsuitable for intensive agriculture and so most farming there is done extensively given the lack of reliable irriga-tion conditions Most soil in the South however is fertile and water resources there are abundant thus making the region suitable for multiple cropping and intensive agriculture Yields there are higher as well With the large population of the region most people opt for intensive farming methods

Four prior to Reform and Opening Chinarsquos foreign trade including trade of grains was subject to sanctions and blockades from capitalist countries So in Chinarsquos ldquoself-reliantrdquo closed economic system the best method for resolving northern grain shortages was to ship southern grain surpluses northward

QU AND SU294

ltUNgt

In summary the primary reason behind the south-north grain transfer was a comparative advantage on the part of the South owing to differences in geo-graphic and climatic conditions Differences in grain output between the two regions and the closed nature of the economy made the South-to-North grain transfer most prominent in the 1960s and 1970s thereby making the South-to-North grain transfer the basic characteristic of inter-regional grain flows dur-ing that time

(B) Analysis of the Factors behind the Historic Shift toward the North-to-South Grain Transfer

First since Reform and Opening the central government has established a state of openness in economic special zones and in regions along the coast and along major rivers it has also accorded preferential policies to these places The exemplary and guiding effects of the ldquowindow on the Southrdquo have caused the pace of Reform and Opening to proceed much faster in the South than in the North Economic growth in the South is consequently much faster The duties of economic restructuring in the South were much more urgent and completed with much more vigor and over a much wider area Furthermore global economic growth cycles have also been smoothly adjusted since the 1980s The result of all these adjustments was rapid growth in secondary and tertiary industries in the South particularly in tves which propped up not only the southern economy but the entire national economy At this point ag-riculture and grain production took a backseat The land water and enormous amount of labor required for grain production have increased the opportunity costs of grain production in the South Even though the South remains the countryrsquos major grain-producing region non-agricultural industries there have become more attractive to laborers4 Rural citizens there however are more willing to work in secondary and tertiary industries ie as technicians or in producing more labor-intensive products with higher added value than grain This dichotomy pitted grain production in the South in a conflict of interest with the development of secondary and tertiary industries These industries which have greater comparative advantages (higher returns for resources used) competed for resources with grain production This competition has forced the South to exchange land resources for guaranteed grain supply

4 Wu Shanlin 伍山林 ldquoZhongguo liangshi shengchan quyu tezheng yu chengyin fenxi ndash shichanghua gaige yilai de shizheng fenxi 中国粮食生产区域特征与成因分析mdashmdash市

场化改革以来的实证分析 [Analysis of Regional Characteristics and Contributing Fac-tors for Chinese Grains Production ndash Empirical Analysis of the Period since Marketization Reforms]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》 10 (2000)


ltUNgt

Second Reform and Opening has proceeded more slowly in the North where the level of the economy and economic growth are both lower than in the South The North is also Chinarsquos central region for production of commod-ity grains this fact has imposed constraints in the form of economic factors as well as government policies on industry restructuring With economic growth in the North slow the state implemented policies to support grain production there notably by raising grain prices thus lowering the opportunity costs of grain production in the North Sluggish growth in secondary and tertiary in-dustries in the North has meant a scarcity of non-agricultural employment opportunities for denizens of the region The great amount of northern la-bor mired in agriculture serve as a guarantee for sustained grain production This increase in northern production has been ideal for the South which is exchanging money for northern grain as well as freeing up resources for other enterprises

Third advances in grain production technologies and introduction of improved grain varieties in the North have greatly increased rice and wheat yields (the products of which are refined white rice and wheat flour collective-ly referred to in China as xiliang or ldquorefined grainsrdquo) and of corn Production of refined grains has grown rapidly in China From 1979 to 1989 annual growth in refined grains was 38 percent in the Northeast 48 percent in North China and 45 percent in the Northwest Growth in southern refined grain production over that same period held below three percent particularly in the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan Guizhou and Zhejiang where annual growth held below two percent5 Total size of the area planted with grains in these regions also fell dramatically In this way the North gradually became grain self- sufficient and then began to see surpluses The major grain- producing regions of the South in the mid- and lower reaches of the Yangtze River were barely able to meet southern demand much less to produce surpluses for export There was also an enormous shortage of grain in the livestock feed manufac-turing industry (see Table 122)

Fourth differences in grain production structures and consumption pat-terns between the North and the South have led to the mismatch between pro-duction of corn in the North and demand for grain from the southern feed and animal products industries Rice is the primary grain produced in the South where the two food items consumed the most are rice and poultry Growth in demand for poultry was the result of rapid economic growth in the South

5 Yan Ruizhen et al 严瑞珍等 Jingji quanqiuhua yu zhongguo liangshi wenti 《经济全球化

与中国粮食问题》 [Economic Globalization and Chinarsquos Grain Problem] (Beijing Zhong-guo renmin daxue chubanshe 2001) 304

QU AND SU296

ltUNgt

which also drove growth in the southern husbandry and feed manufacturing industries Using rice to manufacture feed is not just uneconomical but in fact wasteful So the South was in need of large quantities of northern grain to reduce the costs of manufacturing feed Statistics indicate that since the beginning of the 1990s the North has accounted for eighty percent of national corn output and the South has accounted for the remaining twenty percent The North however consumes only fifty percent of Chinarsquos corn and the South accounts for sixty-seven percent of nationwide meat production This supply-demand gap grew as a result of regional imbalances in economic growth and differences in southern and northern grain production structures and consumption patterns There was surplus grain in the North but insuffi-cient supply of grain in the South for feed manufacturing the ldquoNorth-to-South grain transferrdquo has helped to mitigate grain shortages in the South The true nature of the transfer then was ldquosouthbound flows of northern feed grainrdquo

Table 122 Changes to production consumption and sales of grain in the north and south

1978ndash1980 1981ndash1985 1986ndash1990 1991ndash1994 1997

South Amount produced

18946 mn 22213 mn 23596 mn 24065 mn 268292 mn

Amount consumed

18440 mn 20661 mn 23061 mn 25290 mn 282791 mn

Sales ()

1027 1075 1022 952 949

North Amount produced

12969 mn 14851 mn 17314 mn 20410 mn 13295 mn

Amount consumed

13370 mn 14546 mn 16192 mn 18109 mn 11725 mn

Sales ()

970 1021 1069 1127 1134

Sales in Northeast ()

1144 1145 1282 1441

Data source Xiao Yun 肖云 Zhongguo liangshi shengchan yu liutong tizhi gaige 《中国粮食生产与流通体制改革》[Reforms to Chinarsquos System for Production and Circulation of Grain] ( Jingji kexue chubanshe 1998) 44Note Figures marked with an denote nationwide figures for corn production consumption and sales in 1998 the authors calculated figures for 1997 and all Northeastern figures

Unit tonnes


ltUNgt

Fifth the North gradually gained a certain degree of regional comparative advantage in grain production through its course of economic development Table 123 indicates that nine provinces and autonomous regions maintained comparative advantages in grain production in the mid- to late 1980s four of which in the South By 1990 only seven southern provinces and autonomous regions still maintained comparative advantages in grain production down to six in 1993 at which time the Northrsquos count had risen to nine If we calcu-late based purely on cereal grain production then in 1993 eleven provinces autonomous regions or central government directly-controlled cities of the North had comparative advantages as compared to only four in the South This distribution of comparative advantages coupled with regional industrial comparative advantages in the South propelled the historic change toward the northndashsouth grain transfer In recent years while strengthening grain pro-tection and increasing grain prices the state has increased levels of capital and technological investments in agriculture augmented infrastructure for grain production improved conditions for agricultural production increased the number of mid- to low-yielding fields greatly increased both aggregate and per-unit-of-area grain output and reduced the opportunity costs of grain production In addition comparative advantages for grain production in the North have become more evident as more area of land per capita is planted with grain in the North than in the South as the northern plains are highly convenient for mechanized agriculture and as land and labor costs in the North are low

In this essay Jireduces fractions of market distortion factors to compute grain production comparative advantage coefficients for each province autonomous region and direct-controlled city His formula is as follows

Note Figures enclosed in parentheses are comparative advantage coefficients for cereal grains

Sixth prominent development in secondary and tertiary industries in the overall economic development of the South has not only attracted surplus agricultural labor within the region but has also attracted a large number of workers from around the country which led to a dramatic increase in the float-ing population in the South which further exacerbated pressure on supply of grain and poultry products in the South This exacerbation was another factor behind the emergence of the North-to-South grain transfer

The historic change toward the North-to-South grain transfer is the product of Chinarsquos economic development since the advent of Reform and Opening

λ=thinsp  Total value of national grain output total national grain output    _____________________________________________________    Total value of local grain output local grain output 

λ= Total value of national grain output  total national grain output Totalvalueoflocalgrainoutputlocalgrainoutput

QU AND SU298

ltUNgt

Data source Ji Mingfeng 冀名峰 ldquoWoguo liangshi shengchan de quyu bijiao youshi fenxi 我国粮食生产的区域比较优势分析 [Analysis of Regional Comparative Advan-tages of Grain Production in China]rdquo Nongye jingji wenti《农业经济问题》5 (1996)

Table 123 Grain production comparative advantage coefficients for each province autonomous region and central government directly-controlled city

Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Beijing 098 066 068 084 085 086 094 (094)Tianjin 072 060 051 068 070 072 080 (088)Hebei 107 107 103 104 105 094 095 (099)Shanxi 107 106 098 099 095 097 107 (113)Inner Mongolia

085 085 083 092 090 095 093 (114)

Liaoning 086 086 076 095 094 098 099 (105)Jilin 104 108 117 115 113 110 110 (118)Heilongjiang 091 097 103 096 095 092 093 (114)Shanghai 101 103 086 089 090 091 073 (067)Jiangsu 091 088 095 095 095 095 088 (088)Zhejiang 105 106 102 102 100 103 096 (093)Anhui 089 086 087 094 102 104 095 (097)Fujian 113 104 105 099 096 096 088 (983)Jiangxi 123 134 132 112 114 123 120 (115)Shandong 092 085 089 091 096 100 113 (108)Henan 085 088 084 102 098 092 108 (104)Hubei 102 100 101 100 099 116 109 (107)Hunan 132 146 140 110 108 111 106 (100)Guangdong 094 090 086 095 094 092 084 (079)Guangxi 137 148 141 112 112 112 106 (100)Hainan 052 056 083 085 087 074 (080)Sichuan 116 120 127 112 110 106 103 (096)Guizhou 098 089 095 101 097 095 111 (108)Yunnan 125 137 129 098 099 098 095 (090)Tibet 061 066 067 052 048 056 065 (070)Shaanxi 091 098 091 092 094 091 095 (099)Gansu 083 095 101 094 093 091 106 (116)Qinghai 081 083 080 079 081 087 100 (108)Ningxia 089 092 092 095 091 089 100 (104)Xinjiang 108 092 097 101 103 098 103 (105)


ltUNgt

It is also the product of economic restructuring in the South It is likewise the product of differences in the speed of economic growth in the North and the South combined with other factors (such as the factors we analyzed above) The primary factor behind the North-to-South grain transfer however is eco-nomic restructuring in the South Southern economic restructuring was an integral part of economic development there and was also the manifestation of the differential comparative advantage between the North and the South In other words it was the combination of the Southrsquos comparative advantages in secondary and tertiary industries over primary industries with regional com-parative advantages It was also the result of optimized resource allocation both by region and by industry

iii Analysis of the Second Change toward Northern Exports and Southern Imports and Factors behind the Change

In the mid to late 1990s Chinarsquos grain trend was ldquoexports from the North and imports to the Southrdquo In other words the North exported a large amount of grainwhile the South was the imported an appropriate amount This was the second major change (see Table 124) a result of Chinarsquos further integration with the global economy It was also a result of the ample use of international and domestic resources and markets as guided by the market Finally it was a result of an increase in the use of space outside the country for grain produc-tion as well as the extension of industry comparative advantages abroad We shall analyze this change by examining Chinese policies for grain circulation the economy in general as well as economic globalization

(A) Marketization Reform Policies for Grain Circulation Drove the Second Major Change toward Northern Exports and Southern Imports in a Circuitous Manner

Macro-control of inter-regional grain circulation was held firmly in the hands of the central government during the era of the planned economy In 1986 Central Document Number One 中央一号文件 mandated that prices for grain to be distributed by the system be negotiated by the government in each province autonomous region and central government directly-controlled city excluding grain produced under the household contract responsibility system bringing inter-regional grain circulation into what has been called the ldquotwo-track systemrdquo In 1993 after the state monopoly on grain and inter-provincial planned allocations of grain had been abolished the market came to con-trol all inter-provincial flows of grain Thereafter grain output fell and grain

QU AND SU300

ltUNgt

Data source Zhongguo tongji nianjian《中国统计年鉴》[China Statistical Yearbook] (1985ndash2000)Note Figures in parentheses are of imports

prices rose which caused rural citizens to be unwilling to sell their grain and exerted strain on supply and demand In 1995 the ldquorice sackrdquo system which placed responsibility on provincial governors once again mandated that pro-vincial governments of major grain-producing provinces meet government-set requirements for inter-provincial grain allocations The central government further augmented support for grain production at this time In 1994 the state raised official grain purchasing prices by forty percent and in 1996 raised prices another forty-two percent from the 1994 level6 In 1997 the state took further steps to protect grain prices and bring about grain surpluses These policy measures effectively protected the interests of grain-planting rural citizens particularly those living in major grain-producing regions and in-creased incentives to grow grain At the same time the state placed nation-al focus on improvement of mid- to low-yielding farmfields construction of irrigation works and investments toward economic restructuring in the North beginning in the early 1990s In 1994 the state began five consecutive years of annual allocations of five billion yuan in loans to support the development of rural agriculture in major commodity-grain-producing counties These fiscal

6 Song Hongyuan et al 宋洪远等 Gaige yilai zhongguo nongye he nongcun jingji zhengce de yanbian 《改革以来中国农业和农村经济政策的演变》 [The Evolution of Chinarsquos Ag-ricultural and Rural Economic Policies since Reform and Opening] (Zhongguo jingji chuban-she 2000) 92

1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999


932 mn (600 mn)

656 mn (1658 mn)

583 mn (1372 mn)

1086 mn (1345 mn)

1364 mn (1175 mn)

1535 mn (752 mn)

1346 mn (1920 mn)

214 mn (2081 mn)

198 mn (1223 mn)

834 mn (417 mn)

889 mn (388 mn)

738 mn (339 mn)



Rice 101 mn 320000 330000 690000 950000 143 mn 152 mn 50000 270000 940000 (330000)

375 mn (240000)

271 mn (170000)


114 mn 125 mn 940000 111 mn 660000 (120000)

370000 (100000)

830000 (50000)

380000 (290000)

190000 (110 mn)

662 mn 469 mn (250000)

431 mn (70000)


Table 124 Changes to Chinese imports and exports of grainUnit million tonnes


ltUNgt

measures provided further guarantees for stable and high grain output In the mid- to late 1990s Chinarsquos overall grain output reversed its downward trend thus providing the material conditions for the second major change in inter-regional grain circulation Seen from this vantage the trend toward northern exports and southern imports of grain was the result of changes to Chinarsquos grain circulation system

(B) Various Factors at the Economic Level were the Primary Causes of the Second Major Change

Since the implementation of Reform and Opening smooth adjustments made to industry structures in developed southern areas led to reductions to the comparative profitability of grain production and most rural citizens became unwilling to grow grain Economic growth also increased living standards brought about rapid growth in the husbandry industry and increased demand for grain in the feed manufacturing industry and other industries further exac-erbating southern grain shortages In 1995 the ldquorice sackrdquo system led to gradual increases in area of land planted with grain in every region of the South miti-gating southern grain shortages to a certain extent However driven by market mechanisms resource allocations on the whole became skewed toward sec-tors and regions with high efficiency and high returns making it impossible for major grain producing regions and major grain consuming regions to meet in the middle on domestic markets The short period of North-to-South grain transfersmdashan integral part of the statersquosgrain allocations prior to the 1990smdashfurther intensified the conflicts between major grain producing regions

1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999


932 mn (600 mn)

656 mn (1658 mn)

583 mn (1372 mn)

1086 mn (1345 mn)

1364 mn (1175 mn)

1535 mn (752 mn)

1346 mn (1920 mn)

214 mn (2081 mn)

198 mn (1223 mn)

834 mn (417 mn)

889 mn (388 mn)

738 mn (339 mn)



Rice 101 mn 320000 330000 690000 950000 143 mn 152 mn 50000 270000 940000 (330000)

375 mn (240000)

271 mn (170000)


114 mn 125 mn 940000 111 mn 660000 (120000)

370000 (100000)

830000 (50000)

380000 (290000)

190000 (110 mn)

662 mn 469 mn (250000)

431 mn (70000)


QU AND SU302

ltUNgt

and grain consuming regions This intensification of conflicts stymied the North-to-South grain transfer and ultimately led to Northrsquos dominance in inter-national exporting and Southrsquos dominance in international importing Below we shall analyze the economic factors behind this change

First northern dominance in exporting and southern dominance in im-portinggrew out of the North-to-South grain transfer This dominance was the result of the continued role played by regional and industry comparative ad-vantages during the period of the North-to-South grain transfer (see Table 125) Most grain crops had become initially centralized in regions with comparative advantages such as the Corn Belt in the Northeast and the Rice Belt in the mid to lower reaches of the Yangtze River The formation of these belts optimized grain distribution and reduced costs of grain production and purchasing

Second beginning in the early 1990s economic globalization was further accelerated by great reductions in transaction costs spurred by rapid devel-opment in information and transportation technology Many developing countries including China were swept up by the wave of globalization in which markets served to optimize resource allocations China was then able to make ample use of resources on both domestic and international markets helping to extend the aforementioned regional and industry comparative ad-vantages abroad which gave rise to international and domestic market link-age mechanisms in the optimization of resource allocations Driven by these

Table 125 Grain location quotient values for the eight major agricultural regions of China in the early 1990s

Region North China

Northeast Huang-Huai-Hai

Mid and lower reaches of the Yangtze

Southeastern coastal regions

South China

Southwest Northwest

Location quotient

107 110 110 110 079 085 096 170

Data source Yuan Yongkang 袁永康 Zhongguo liangqing liutong zhidu de bianqian 《中国粮情流通制度的变迁》[Changes to Chinarsquos Grain Situation and Grain Circulation System] (Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe 1994) 153 Note Location quotient = (XAXB) divide (YAYB) This value indicates the degree of specialization (concentration) of an industry in this areaXA and YA are the quantative characteristics X and Y of region AXB and YB are the quantitative characteristics X and Y of the national average for all regions


ltUNgt

mechanisms overseas demands for the superior resources of grain producing regions in Northern China encouraged exports of grain from the region At the same time the South began to take advantageof the comparative advantag-es in grain production abroad by importing a certain amount of grains from abroad Thus in the early to mid-1990s spatial exchanges of grain production resources between the North and South which had eroded profits for Chinarsquos major grain-producing region were corrected by international market mecha-nisms Under these mechanisms both northern grain producers and southern grain consumers were able to reach the levelof surplus each was either capable of or in need of The trend of northern exports and southern imports brought about economic efficiency and optimization of resource allocations

Third this situation was the result of the ldquorice sackrdquo system of responsibil-ity of provincial governors for grain production implemented in the mid to late 1990s The true nature of 1995rsquos ldquorice sackrdquo system was to establish inter- regional balance in grain supply and demand on the foundation of balance within each individual province and region as well as to have major grain pro-ducing regions proactively complete state-mandated tasks of inter-provincial grain allocations The objective of this policy was to properly allocate means of production via administrative measures But with marketization reforms for grain consumption already in place the transportation costs of moving northern grain two to three thousand kilometers made that grain pricier than imported grain for the South making grain producers in major grain producing regions of the North unwilling to ship their products to the South and south-ern grain consumers unwilling to accept the higher price of northern grain The ldquorice sackrdquo systemrsquos design ensured dissatisfaction in both the North and the South Strides in marketization reform and the countryrsquos greater opening to the outside encouraged both the North and the South to turn to interna-tional markets eventually leading to the Northrsquos dominance in exporting and the Southrsquos dominance in importing

The fourth cause is the high costs of transportation between the distant North and South An ancient saying holds that ldquoyou donrsquot ship grain across a thousand lirdquo Vast distances separate North China from South China and the primary grain-producing and the primary grain-consuming regions are located at opposite extremes Grain takes up a lot of space but itrsquos of low value and con-sumed quickly It must travel two to three thousand kilometers from primary production regions to reach primary consumption regions These properties of grain lead to enormous investments of labor and material resources and is very expensive During the era of planned allocations the state bore the costs of transportation As the grain circulation system became marketized the costs of transportation were shifted onto consumers in primary consumption

QU AND SU304

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regions the result of which was rising grain prices These costs which had been hidden now came to light Thus low-cost grain imports from nearby countries became more appealing to southern consumersthan expensive do-mestic grain from the distant North Grain imports began to rise in the South At the same time the North began accumulating grain surpluses As reforms to the trade system had already been put in place northerners made use of their geographical advantage and exported excess grain to nearby countries thereby using their comparative advantage on the international market to protect the interests of grain producers

Fifth differences in grain production structures and consumption patterns led southerners to hold grain in storage while importing grain at the same time as a result of stimulation by open purchasing policies coupled with state-mandated ldquograin protectionrdquo prices As the economy and living standards grew standards for the quality of grain consumption began to appear especially in consumption of grain consumed by humans The Northrsquos primary grain sur-plus was of corn while the Southrsquos greatest grain import was of rice Southern climates are more favorable to the cultivation of rice which can be planted twice and sometimes three times a year in the South For this reason there are many different seasonal varieties of rice early rice middle rice and late rice as well as long-grained and short-grained rice These seasonal differences in turn gave rise to different quality standards for different rice varieties It is generally held that early long-grain rice is of poor quality but high yields whereas mid-dle and late long-grain rice as well as short-grain rice taste good but givelower yields In 1997 the state implemented a policy of open purchases at a state-mandated protection price This policy did not differentiate between varieties or qualities and as such the price difference between early long-grain and late long-grain middle long-grain and short-grain rice was generally around three yuan per fifty kilograms That led to income losses of between eighty and 100 yuan per mu for planting middle and late rice varieties The result was that nearly all grain purchased in the South was early long-grain rice The provinces and autonomous regions of the South had previously remedied grain surpluses and shortages by selling to or buying from nearby regions but the state grain purchasing policy made it so that nearly all surplus grain available for pur-chase was inferior quality early long-grain rice Provinces with grain shortages such as Guangdong and Fujian were unwilling to buy inferior quality grains per previously settled agreements for ldquograin adjustmentsrdquo instead preferring to import superior quality rice from abroad to meet consumer demands This preference was a further reason behind the rise of southern grain imports Viewed from this perspective the southern turn toward grain imports was a kind of revolutionary change At the same time major grain producing prov-inces and autonomous regions of the South such as Hubei Anhui Hunan and


ltUNgt

Jiangxi built up overstocks of early long-grain rice which ended up rotting in warehouses This waste exerted a heavy fiscal burden on the state

Sixth to avoid erosion of profits from value-added processing on grain many northern grain producing regions began to develop grain processing en-terprises Most of these enterprises operated at low technological levels and multiple similar companies were established in the same area They lacked not only technology but also access to economically developed markets and so they were largely ineffective This ineffectiveness indicates the closed mental-ity of protectionism in northern grain producing regions which hurt effective allocation of grain resources At another level this planrsquos lack of effectiveness gave no choice to northern grain producers but to set their sights abroad to find more suitable markets to sell their grain giving rise to two consequenc-es solidifying the flow of northern grain abroad and reducing the quantity of northern grain sent to the South

(C) Economic Globalization and Expansion of Chinarsquos ldquoOpeningrdquo were the External Factors behind the Rise of Northern Dominance in Exporting and Southern Dominance in Importing

Comparative advantages in international trade lie in the comparative advan-tages in natural resource endowments of different countries It is just such com-parative advantages that gave rise to international trade in the first place and that drive economic globalization which in turn drives the development of the economies of different countries International trade then helps the countries of the world turn their comparative advantages into profits In the early 1990s China increased its degree of openness to the outside and actively participated in international trade and exchanges of technology At this time China also reformed the foreign trade system and greatly reduced the scope and degree of state controls on foreign trade allowing China to strengthen its competitive edge in international trade while also providing the opportunity for foreign industries with comparative advantages to compete in Chinese markets It was these advantageous internal and external conditions that opened up channels for northern exports of surplus grain and southern imports of grain to mitigate shortages The Northrsquos dominance in exporting and the Southrsquos in importing grain thereby fully took shape

iv Economic Impact of the Northern Exports and Southern Imports of Grain

The Southrsquos importing of grain was one result of successful adjustments to tertiary industries in Chinarsquos southern coastal regions which abound with

QU AND SU306

ltUNgt

plentiful ports and access to maritime trade indicating not only the compara-tive advantage in industry the South had attained through its rapid economic development but also the Southrsquos successful use of foreign resources now available as a result of opening The Southrsquos use of domestic and foreign mar-kets and resources granted that region a comparative advantage which played a role in boosting the Southrsquos economic development Putdifferently this move was an overseas extension of the Southrsquos domestic industrial comparative ad-vantage This extension was advantageous not only to upgrading of the Southrsquos industry structure but also to helping the South use its industrial compara-tive advantages to compete in international markets In the end it helped the South further increase its international competitiveness

The Southrsquos importing of grain was just the result of internal adjustments to the grain industry structure and agriculture in the South The Southrsquos pri-mary grain shortages are of grain for feed manufacturing and grain for human consumption in southeastern coastal regions One reason for these particu-lar shortages is that using the Southrsquos major grain crop rice to manufacture feed would be wasteful and costly The second reason is that the quality of feed manufactured from rice is inferior to that made from corn Southern corn production however is concentrated in the Yunnan-Guizhou plateau and in Sichuan and even in those regions production is limited Corn grown in oth-er regions of the South is planted in between other crops which leads to low quality and low yields For all these reasons southern corn production falls far short of southern demands Furthermore when we say ldquosouthern grain short-agesrdquo we mean shortages experienced by some but not all parts of the South Southeastern coastal regions primarily Guangdong Fujian and Shanghai ac-count for the majority of grain shortages but Guizhou also suffers from some degree of deficit

Since the early 1990s primary southern rice producing regions along the mid- and lower reaches of the Yangtze River have maintained self- sufficiency and even seen surpluses in grain output (for direct human consumption) Surpluses from these regions are generally sufficient to meet demand for grain for human consumption in nearby southern provinces and autonomous re-gions Primary grain producing regions generally sign grain allocation and sales agreements with nearby provinces and regions with shortages However the primary grain variety sold under such agreements is early long-grain rice which does not meet the quality demands of consumers in economically de-veloped southern provinces and regions These inter-provincial agreements are often unenforceable and provinces and regions with shortages often end up importing superior quality rice from abroad The South had previously im-ported only wheat but now the region imports both wheat and rice which has


ltUNgt

led to a vicious cycle in which southern early long-grain rice piles up in ware-houses while wealthier regions continue to import foreign rice This abnormal phenomenon has had a large adverse impact on the coordinated economic development of regions of the South both those with and those without grain surpluses One major repercussion is the loss of precious foreign reserves through grain purchases and another is the enormous waste of southern surplus grain reserves exerting pressure for capital on both economically de-veloped primary consumption regions as well as relatively backward primary production regions To correct this abnormality we must eliminate overstock of early long-grain rice as quickly as possible and find sales channels for it We must also optimize the product structure of grain production as quickly as possible We must make appropriate adjustments to the amount of area planted with early long-grain rice and increase the area planted with superior quality rice such as drought-resistant Brazilian upland rice At one level the rise of southern grain imports is the result of internal adjustments to agri-culture and the grain industry structure At another level this phenomenon has exerted enormous pressure on internal adjustments to agriculture and the grain industry structure in the South It has however given us an enor-mous opportunity for development To resolve these issues the government will need to make use of micro and macroeconomic policies and measures to guide support and protect

The Southrsquos dominance in importing is beneficial to a transitioning of the southern agricultural population toward secondary and tertiary industries which in turn can help mitigate land resource scarcity in the South and lay a material foundation for agriculture and grain production and sales at an appropriate scale This is a rare opportunity for both reducing opportunity costs of agriculture in general and for grain production in particular as well as for promoting agricultural mechanization If we take advantage of this opportunity agriculture and grain production in China will become increas-ingly less dependent on the labor-intensive and family-based petty peasant economy and will become more socially-oriented of larger scale and more mechanized

What then are the economic effects of ldquonorthern exportsrdquo of grain Firstthis situationgrew out of the North-to-South grain transfer They are the result of northerners in regions with grain surpluses developing international markets in the mid to late 1990s Chinarsquos traditional grain exports are southern rice and northern soybeans Since the mid to late 1990s however Chinarsquos major grain exports have been primarily of southern rice and northern corn with north-ern corn accounting for the overwhelming majority The North also accounts for 30 percent of international rice exports In 1999 the North accounted for

QU AND SU308

ltUNgt

7225 percent of nationwide grain exports7 Northern grain exports have made enormous contributions to Chinarsquos foreign reserves as well as to guaranteeing increases to the incomes of northern rural citizens

ldquoNorthern exportsrdquo are likewise the results of the overseas extension of the Northrsquos geographical advantages and industry advantages in grain production at home Following Chinarsquos accession to the World Trade Organization (wto) in 2001 the degree of unilateral trade protection on agriculture and grain pro-duction will gradually diminish and eventually we will be completely in line with international trends The reduction of protectionism will pose a severe challenge to agriculture and grain production in China It has been estimated that China still possesses a degree of international comparative advantage in rice production since accession to the wto but Chinarsquos comparative ad-vantages in other grains have diminished (see Table 126 and 127) Thus as the economy becomes further globalized whether or not the international comparative advantages and location advantages of Chinese grain output particularly in the North can rapidly be converted into international compara-tive advantages and geographical advantages will exert an important influence on Chinarsquos grain economy and on the development of the overall national economy

7 Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian (2000 nian) 《中国农村统计年鉴(2000年)》 [China Rural Statistical Yearbook (2000)] (Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 2000) 229ndash230

Table 126 Comparisons in international prices under grain production costs in China and abroad (prices from mid-November 2001)

Domestic price (yuantonne)

International price (yuantonne)

Price after importation to China (yuantonne)

Wheat 1150 843 1500Rice 1450 1323 1800Corn 1050 678 1100Soybeans 1800 1356 2050

Data source Bian Chongjing 卞崇静 ldquoGuoneiwai nongchanpin jiage bijiao ji jing-zhengli fenxi 国内外农产品价格比较及竞争力分析 [Comparisons of Domestic and International Prices for Agricultural Products and Analysis of Competitiveness]rdquo Liangyou shichang bao《粮油市场报》 March 14 2002 Note Domestic price figures are wholesale prices in primary sales regions International prices have been converted to renminbi from usd Rice prices are based on Thai rice All other prices are based on products of the usa Prices for importation to China are based on taxation within quota (one percent)


ltUNgt

In summary Chinarsquos North-to-South grain transfer has rapidly evolved into the coexistence of northern dominance in exporting and southern dominance in importing as a result of both domestic and international factors Both north-ern exports and southern imports of grain are the results of adjustments to economic development and to interests in the North and South in recent years They are also a positive result of the role played by economic factors In other words they are the positive result of the growth of industry comparative ad-vantages and geographical advantages amid the course of unbalanced devel-opment of regional economies These will play a positive role in promoting economic growth and in upgrading Chinarsquos industry structure and are also a positive result of Chinarsquos integration with the global economy These trends will however pose a serious challenge to adjustments to the structure of Chinese agriculture and grain production

v The Third Historical Change of Exports by Both the North and the South and Restoration of the North-to-South Grain Transfer

It seems at present that the northeastern Corn Belt will remain sustainable for a period of time Here are some of the important reasons

First corn produced in the Corn Belt of Chinarsquos Northeast is not genetically modified (gmo) whereas most corn grown in the us is gmo American gmo

Table 127 Comparative advantages in Chinese wheat corn and rice (calculated based on purchasing price indices) 1990ndash1996

Year Wheatcorn Wheatrice Cornrice

1990 1 1 11991 1068 0982 09201992 1087 1110 10211993 0960 0939 09781994 0966 0928 09601995 0913 1022 11201996 1045 1072 1026

Data source Zhong Funing et al 钟甫宁等 ldquoZhongguo dui oumeng zhuyao nongchanpin bijiao youshi biandong fenxi 中国对欧盟主要农产品比较优势变动分析 rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji《中国农村经济》2 (2002)

QU AND SU310

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corn has a price advantage as its production costs are low but international doubts regarding the safety of gmo foods have led the worldrsquos two greatest im-porters of cornmdashJapan and South Koreamdashto turn away from American corn opening large market space for Chinese corn

Second there are inherent geo-economic ties between Japan South Korea Russia and North Koreaand Chinarsquos northeastern Corn Belt In South Korea and Japan in particular it is customary and traditional to import corn from China It costs them about as much to import American corn as it does for China to import American corn As shown in Table 126 the domestic price advantage of American corn is offset by the costs of long-distance overseas transportation In other words Chinarsquos northeastern Corn Belt still has a regional export price advantage

Third unlikecorn from the us which must be transported on large trans-continental ships north eastern corn has a regional advantage in that exports to nearby nations can be made on small ships This ability increases flexibility and speed and reduces warehousing costs

Fourth corn producers in the northeastern Corn Belt can make use of the ldquoyellow box policyrdquo allowed under wto regulations Under this policy original subsidies of export corn are continued (the state paid 260 yuan in subsidies per tonne of corn prior to wto accession) to the circulation and production industries More matching policies are currently being drafted This policy has a large impact on the sustaining of exports of northeastern corn

While exports of northern corn have garnered the most attention re-cent northern exports of rice as well as shipments of northern rice to the South are also noteworthy Rice grown in the Northeast is of superior qual-ity and its flavor makes it more suitable to demand for rice consumption in the South than early long-grain rice That gives northern rice an outstanding advantage in both domestic and international markets In recent years grain companies in cities and provinces in the Yangtze Plain with grain shortages such as Shanghai Zhejiang Jiangsu and others have signed agreements re-garding the construction of rice producing bases with northeastern produc-ers ldquoGo plant grain in the Northeastrdquo has become a popular saying The Lehui Rice Company Ltd of Shanghai has not only invested in the construction of a large rice processing facility in Northern Jiangsu but has also signed an agree-ment with the Heilongjiang Farm and Land Reclamation Bureau to produce ldquoLehuirdquo brand beidahuangmdashgreat northern wildernessmdashrice with an annual production capacity of 138 million tonnes8 The Heilongjiang Rice Compa-ny has signed an agreement with the Hangzhou Grain Bureau regarding the

8 Liangyou shichang bao《粮油市场报》 May 14 2005


ltUNgt

construction of a storage processing and sales base for Heilongjiang rice in Hangzhou This facilityrsquos production line slated to produce a million tonnes of rice per day will provided 10000 tonnes per annum of late short-grain rice as city-level grain reserves to the Hangzhou government The Heilongjiang Farm and Land Reclamation Bureau has also invested 360 million yuan into the con-struction of a green oil center in Wenzhou Zhejiang These steps have greatly changed the situation in which the South relies on imports of rice to remedy grain shortages while also reducing southern imports of Thai rice and Ameri-can corn to southern China In order to remove the obstacle of high costs to the North-to-South grain transfer and reclaim the market for consumption of southern corn feed the State Planning Commission has resolved to exempt railroad construction fees for the transportation of grain and other agricultural commodities from 2002 until December 31 2005 This policy will reduce the transportation costs of domestic corn sales by between twenty and 130 yuan per tonne and will reduce the price of corn from the northeastern Corn Belt in the South below the cif (cost insurance and freight) price of imported corn (in March 2002 the cif price of American corn in China was 1150 yuantonne)9 In this way it will be nearly impossible for any corn outside of quotas to enter grain markets in Chinarsquos South This situation has provided some of the conditions for restoration of the North-to-South grain transfer Imports of rice to southeastern coastal regions will persist as the short distance from Thailand to South China means lower prices for Thai rice than for northeastern rice In the short term provinces and autonomous regions with grain shortages such as Guangdong Fujian Guangxi and Hainan will not consume large quanti-ties of northeastern rice This situation basically divides the grain-scarce prov-inces autonomous regions and central government directly-controlled cities of the south into two large zones those in the Yangtze River Delta where the North-to-South grain transfer has been restored and those in the Pearl River Delta where rice imports will continue The quantity of rice imports however is relatively stable at about 300000 tonnes per year

The North and the South are now both net exporters of rice Chinarsquos inter-national rice exports greatly exceeded imports in the mid to late 1990s North-ern rice exports account for 30 percent of nationwide total rice exports but southern long-grain rice also has a strong price advantage and general com-petitive edge in foreign markets The North-to-South grain transfer northern dominance in exporting and southern dominance in importing and simulta-neous exporting from both the North and South are all just facets of Chinarsquos inter-regional grain circulation and international linkages following the early

9 Liangyou shichang bao《粮油市场报》 April 13 2002

QU AND SU312

ltUNgt

1990s they are all linked The coexistence of northern dominance in exports and southern dominance in imports of grain has now been replaced by a re-turn to the domestic North-to-South grain transfer on one hand and simul-taneous exports from both the North and South on the other Officials in the northeastern Corn Belt are now energetically promoting regionalization stan-dardization specialization and scale production in corn planting to further reduce corn production costs and to establish northeastern corn as an export brand Officials in the Yangtze River Delta have reduced the size of the area planted with early long-grain rice and have optimized the structure of early rice planting Now over fifty percent of total area planted with rice is planted with superior quality rice which will help meet the demand for high quality rice in southern China

There is one more question that of Chinarsquos food security Under the socialist market economy conditions of the new century food security has been defined as food self-sufficiency In some cases the demand for national self- sufficiency translated into provincial and regional self-sufficiency That however is in violation of the efficiency principles of the market economy In other words such demands lead to suboptimal allocation of resources and are therefore unreasonable Table 124 indicates that there were perfectly opposite trends for grain imports in the early 1990s and the mid to late 1990s Imports increased progressively in the first period and then decreased progressively in the sec-ond Exports increased progressively in the first period with exports greater than imports in some years Exports remained stable in the second period but grain exports were greater than imports in every year From 1997 to 1999 annu-al grain exports were nearly double annual grain imports which goes to show that China has greatly augmented its capacity to resolve food security issues If ever China faces an international embargo or a crop failure a redirection of grains reserved for export toward domestic markets will suffice to meet do-mestic demand At the same time since the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China we have assured growth in grain output through fiscal investments In particular the large-scale construction of farm field infrastructure since the 1960s and 1970s has kept Chinarsquos effective irrigation rates near the global fore-front The direct effects of this can be seen in the extremely low levels of fluc-tuation in grain output High irrigation rates are a fundamental condition of Chinarsquos resolution to address food security issues Furthermore the major na-tion effect of Chinarsquos vast territory and immense population coupled with the continued existence of a certain degree of the planned system (plans and the double-track system from before 1995 and the ldquorice sackrdquo system after 1995) are reliable inherent mechanisms for ensuring Chinarsquos stable sustained growth in


ltUNgt

grain output10 Under the rules of international markets all manner of rural citizen economic organizations are participating in exchange activities both domestic and international which has initiated us in the notion of risk on in-ternational markets and allowed us to accumulate experience in international markets and has helped to tighten the linkage between Chinarsquos domestic grain circulation and international trends We should make better use of spatial ex-changes of both domestic and international resources increase the competi-tiveness of Chinarsquos grain production and agriculture in general to respond to integrated international markets and try to benefit as much from domestic and international industry comparative advantages and geographical advan-tages as possible This is the only way in which we can link food security to economic factors and not political factors And this is the only way in which we can effectively arrive at the three great grain policy objectives of security efficiency and fairness

References

Long Guoqiang 隆国强 Daguo kaifang zhong de liangshi liutong 《大国开放中的粮

食流通》 [Grain Circulation ina Major Nation during Opening] (Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe 1999)

Song Hongyuan et al 宋洪远等 Gaige yilai zhongguo nongye he nongcun jingji zhengce de yanbian 《改革以来中国农业和农村经济政策的演变》 [The Evo-lution of Chinarsquos Agricultural and Rural Economic Policies since Reform and Opening] (Zhongguo jingji chubanshe 2000)

Li Yueyun et al 李岳云等 Zhongguo liangshi bodong lun 《中国粮食波动论》 [The Theory of Fluctuations to Chinarsquos Grain] (Zhongguo nongye chubanshe 2001)

Yan Ruizhen et al 严瑞珍等 Jingji quanqiuhua yu zhongguo liangshi wenti 《经济

全球化与中国粮食问题》 [Economic Globalization and Chinarsquos Grain Problem] (Beijing Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 2001)

Wu Shanlin 伍山林 ldquoZhongguo liangshi shengchan quyu tezheng yu chengyin fenxi ndash shichanghua gaige yilai de shizheng fenxi 中国粮食生产区域特征与成因分

析mdashmdash市场化改革以来的实证分析 [Analysis of Regional Characteristics and Contributing Factors Thereto of Chinese Grain outputmdashEmpirical Analysis of the Period since Marketization Reforms]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》 10 (2000)

10 Li Yueyun et al 李岳云等 Zhongguo liangshi bodong lun《中国粮食波动论》 [The Theory of Fluctuations to Chinarsquos Grain] (Zhongguo nongye chubanshe 2001) 79ndash85


ltUNgt

chapter 13

Rural Population Flows in the Era of CollectivizationmdashA Study of the Border Region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guangdong Provinces

You Haihua1

Abstract

Researchers generally hold that during the more than twenty years of the era of col-lectivization it was difficult for rural citizens to pick up and move and that there was very little population mobility in rural society at this time Analysis of population movements in rural areas of the border region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guang-dong shows that a trickle of rural population movement did occur during the era of collectivization There was some movement of urban population to the countryside as well as movement of rural laborers into cities There were also movements of popula-tion within the countryside During this era population movements were to a large extent organized and executed by the government In general members of Chinarsquos rural population who moved during this time moved mostly toward the countryside and mountainous regions

Keywords

era of collectivization ndash Gan-Min-Yue Border Region ndash population ndash movement

In this essay the border region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guangdong Prov-inces2 refers to the large area covering the Southeast of Jiangxi the West of Fujian and the Northeast of Guangdong3 encompassing the Wuyi Mountains

1 You Haihua (游海华 ) was born in 1972 and is a lecturer in the history department of Jiangxi Normal University

2 Translatorrsquos Note Hereafter referred to as the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region adopting the ab-breviated names for the three provinces

3 Here the ldquoSoutheast of Jiangxirdquo refers to the county and city level administrative districts of Xunwu Huichang Ruijin Shicheng Ningdu Xingguo Yudu Anyuan Gan County Ganzhou


ltUNgt

and spanning the Jiulian Mountains This essay will refer to this region as the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region [ldquoGanrdquo being short for Jiangxi ldquoMinrdquo being short for Fujian and ldquoYuerdquo being short for Guangdong] This is a mountainous area where road networks are not well developed and distances from political and economic centers are far These are impoverished regions of all three prov-inces In this essay I shall focus attention on these mountainous rural areas that are relatively isolated and socioeconomically underdeveloped to answer the following questions During the era of collectivization was there nearly no movement of the rural population If there were movements then how did the people move My goal is to focus on the microcosm of the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region in order to piece together the overall pattern of rural population move-ments4 across the country

i The Urban Movement of ldquoGoing to the Countrysiderdquo

During the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo a large number of rural laborers entered cit-ies causing a sudden inflation to urban populations and subsequent supply shortages helping to trigger the introduction of government policies that bi-furcated Chinarsquos population into urban and rural As urban centers became saturated and grew less able to absorb the annual increases to the number of unemployed governments adopted administrative measures to create a ldquogreen channelrdquo for siphoning excess urban population off to the countryside which led to a great countercurrent population flow in which people moved in large numbers from towns and cities to rural areas a phenomenon scarcely observed in all of Chinese history There were three groups of them

The first group consisted of surplus urban population that resulted from the downsizing of the urban workforce many of whom had originally come from the countryside As explained earlier too many had moved to towns and cities during the Great Leap Forward When this proved to overwhelm urban supplies the state adopted drastic measures to correct the situation Chen You-zhen 陈友桢 (fifty years old) who had lived on Beimiaoqian Street 北庙前街

Xinfeng Longnan Quannan Dingnan and other regions The ldquoWest of Fujianrdquo refers to the county and city level administrative districts of Changting Shanghang Wuping Yongding Longyan Liancheng Ninghua and other regions The ldquoNortheast of Guangdongrdquo refers to the county and city level administrative districts of Pingyuan Jiaoling Mei County Xingning Fengshun Dabu and other regions

4 In this essay ldquopopulation movmentrdquo generally refers to changes in area of household registra-tion changes in area of residence and changes in area of work (ie leaving the village)

YOU316

ltUNgt

in Xunwu County 寻乌县 Jiangxi Province recalled his familyrsquos experience as follows ldquoIn 1968 my entire family was ordered to move to Xikeng 茜坑 in Sanbiaofuzhai 三标富寨 Xikeng is in the mountains The place had a small population and plentiful farm land Only one household was living there at the time After we moved there my father herded cattle and I became a car-penter We had abundant grain at the time with plenty to eat At that time there were many other families like mine who were relocated to Sanbiaofurdquo5 Families with similar experiences could be found all over the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region

Table 131 shows the numbers of urban workers reduced from the workforce at this time in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region The size of the workforce in the towns and cities in nine counties in the region was reduced by a total of 36336 people from the late 1950s to the 1960s The vast majority of these laid-off workers ended up taking their families to live and work in the countryside Assuming that on average each household had four to five people in it this would mean that over 100000 people were relocated back to the heartland of these nine counties over this period Statistics for urban workforce downsiz-ings in the 1960s are based on incomplete data the actual number of people who returned to the countryside during this time is possibly over 200000 Over the years 1959 to 1962 40900 people were shed from the urban workforce in Mei County 梅县 located in northeastern Guangdong the vast majority of them returned to the countryside to become farmers6 From 1960 to 1962 even a tiny town such as Wuping County 武平县 in western Fujian province saw 11140 of its residents departed back to the countryside7 In Shanghang County 上杭县 the number was 60000 from 1959 to 19658 While the number was only 2334 for Xunwu County Jiangxi province for the early years of 1960s the overall historical total for this region was 87519 These four counties alone for which we have clear data saw 120000 people relocated to the countryside In

5 Based on a field study I performed in the capital of Xunwu County in 19996 Mei xian zhi 《梅县志》 [Records of Mei County] ed Mei County Records Compilation

Committee 梅县志编纂委员会 (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1994) 6087 Wuping xian zhi 《武平县志》 [Records of Wuping County] ed Wuping County Records

Compilation Committee 武平县志编纂委员会 (Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 1993) 46

8 Shanghang xian zhi 《上杭县志》 [Records of Shanghang County] ed Shanghang Coun-ty Records Compilation Committee 上杭县志编纂委员会 (Fujian renmin chubanshe 1993) 641

9 Xunwu xian zhi 《寻乌县志》 [Records of Xunwu County] ed Xunwu County Records Compilation Committee 寻乌县志编纂委员会 (Xinhua chubanshe 1996) 273


ltUNgt

percentage terms the reductions were fairly large Xunwu County shrankits state workforce by 137 percent in 1961 and then again by 226 percent in 1962 and its urban populations by 286 percent in 1961 and then by 271 percent in 196210

Downsizing of the urban workforce affected the following population seg-ments (1) workers recruited from the countryside after 1958 (2) households from the countryside containing laborers (3) older workers willing to retire (4) workers who chose of their own volition to quit their jobs and return to the

10 Zhongguo guoqing congshu ndash bai xianshi jingji shehui diaocha ndash xunwu juan 《中国国

情丛书mdashmdash百县市经济社会调查middot寻乌卷》 [China National Conditions Series ndash Socioeconomic Investigations in 100 Counties and Cities ndash Xunwu Edition] ed Ding Weizhi 丁伟志 (Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 1996) 58

Table 131 Reductions of urban workers in the Gan-Min-Yue border region from the late 1950s to 1960s



Xunwu 1961ndash1963 2334 Wuping 1961ndash1962 3291Huichang 1957ndash1968 1887 Mei 1966 1229Ruijin 1960ndash1962 6094 Jiaoling 1961ndash1965 2395Changting 1961ndash1963 6643 Pingyuan 1961ndash1965 5554Shanghang 1960 6909Total 36336

Data source Xunwu xian zhi 《寻乌县志》 [Records of Xunwu County] (Xinhua chubanshe 1996) 273 Huichang xian zhi 《会昌县志》 [Records of Huichang County] (Xinhua chubanshe 1993) 156 Ruijin xian zhi 《瑞金县志》 [Records of Ruijin County] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1996) 65ndash66 Changting xian zhi 《长汀县

志》 [Records of Changting County] (Shenghuo-dushu-xinzhi sanlian shudian 1993) 643 Shanghang xian zhi 《上杭县志》 [Records of Shanghang County] (Fujian renmin chubanshe 1993) 40 Wuping xian zhi 《武平县志》 [Records of Wuping County] (Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 1993) 46 Mei xian zhi 《梅县志》 [Records of Mei County] (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1994) 608ndash609 Jiaoling xian zhi 《蕉

岭县志》 [Records of Jiaoling County] (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1992) 469 and Pingyuan xian zhi 《平远县志》 [Records of Pingyuan County] (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1993) 473ndash474Note The above figures were gleaned from county records and maybe incomplete

YOU318

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countryside and (5) urban residents who chose of their own volition to move to the countryside In fact all these people fell into one of two groups those who were ordered by the government to return to the countryside and those who chose of their own volition (largely in response to the increasingly acute supply shortages that were becoming common in overcrowded towns and cit-ies) to move to the countryside and become farmers The popular saying at the time ldquoa workerrsquos watch isnrsquot worth as much as a farmerrsquos bushel of lotus rootsrdquo goes to show that some people were indeed willing to go to the countryside voluntarily The downsizing trend for the urban workforce persisted for a long time from the late 1950s all the way to the 1970s in starts and fits

The second group of people who moved from towns and cities to the coun-tryside included educated youth (zhiqing) who had been sent en masse to the countryside to participate in agricultural production In the early 1960s with pressing supply shortages in many urban areas some urban youths were sent to rural farms or forestry centers of their home counties to take up labor In 1968 after Mao Zedong issued his ldquogo to the countrysiderdquo directive a large number of educated youths went ldquouprdquo to the mountains or ldquodownrdquo to the coun-tryside Placement of these young people followed four different principles The first was to return people to their place of origin to work in agriculture The second was to have people join a rural production team in some countymdashtheir own or notmdashand settle in that area allegedly so they could learn from the poor and middle peasants For example several dozen educated youths were sent to Rentian Town 壬田镇 Ruijin County 瑞金县 where they registered to become local residents during the ldquoCultural Revolutionrdquo11 The third was to establish a youth production brigade under the collective ownership system the members of which would collectively cultivate virgin land and plant the fields In one example in 1971 the number one production team of Tianbei Village 田背村 Shanghang County Fujian Province established an educated youth team that would work lands some distance from the village this team was dispatched to a large swath of uncultivated land ten huali [five kilometers] away (bordering the territory of Xiangdong Township 象洞乡 Wuping Coun-ty) where they camped and cultivated 91 mu of mountainous land Within two years this area originally an isolated mountain col at the border between two counties became a bustling village In 1973 the Zhongdu Commune 中都公社 of Shanghang County allocated funds toward the Zhongzhai Production Team 中寨队 for the construction of collective living quarters for educated youths in 1975 an educated youth mountain-planting brigade was dispatched to live

11 Based on a field study I performed in Rentian Town Ruijin City in 1998


ltUNgt

there and cultivate virgin land12 The fourth method was to dispatch educated youth to labor in state-run farms and forestry centers

Educated youth sent to the countryside in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Re-gion came not only from counties and towns within the region but also from regional metropolises like Ganzhou 赣州 Xiamen 厦门 Longyan 龙岩 Chaozhou 潮州 and Shantou 汕头 and also from provincial capitals like Nan-chang Fuzhou and Guangzhou Some even came from far away major cities like Shanghai Incomplete data indicate that in the 1960s a total of 45186 edu-cated youth were sent to the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region (see Table 132) an average of 5021 per county Shanghang County Fujian received the most edu-cated youth at 1014113 Five of Shanghang Countyrsquos twenty communersquos received over 1000 educated youth Zhongdu Xikou 溪口 Taiba 太拔 Jiaoyang 蛟洋 and Gutian 古田 Of those Zhongdu received the most at 1800 Even the Pan-jing Commune 泮镜公社 with a population of less than 5000 received over 500 educated youth who came to account for eleven percent of the local popu-lation14 The above figures show that a large number of educated youth were

12 Shanghang wenshi ziliao di 24 ji 《上杭文史资料》第24 辑 [Cultural and Historical Materials of Shanghang Vol 24] ed Chinese Peoplersquos Political Consultative Conference Shanghang County Cultural and Historical Materials Editing Committee 政协上杭县文

史资料编辑委员会13 Another account sets the total at over 14000 people See Shanghang wenshi ziliao di 24 ji 11114 Ibid

Table 132 Relocations of educated youth to the countryside in the Gan-Min-Yue border region

County Total relocated

County Total relocated County Total relocated

Xunwu 2432 Changting 长汀

4461 Mei 9750

Huichang 会昌

3927 Shanghang 10141 Jiaoling 蕉岭 1083

Ruijin 5241 Wuping 6308 Pingyuan 平远 1843

Total 45186

Data source Xunwu xian zhi 273 Huichang xian zhi 156 Ruijin xian zhi 279 Changting xian zhi 646 Shanghang xian zhi 640 Wuping xian zhi 576 Mei xian zhi 608 Jiaoling xian zhi 475 and Pingyuan xian zhi 473

YOU320

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sent down to the countryside During the ldquoreturn to the city movementrdquo of the 1970s and 1980s the vast majority of educated youth sent down to the country-side returned to their native cities with only a small portion of educated youth remaining in the countryside because of marriage or work Data compiled by officials in Xunwu County Jiangxi in 1985 indicated that less than one percent of educated youth had remained in the countryside there15

The third group consisted of officials that were ordered to go to the coun-tryside to participate in and supervise agricultural production Most of these officials had gone to the countryside driven by the ideology of ldquoindustry sup-ports agriculture and cities support the countrysiderdquo They went to the coun-tryside to strengthen leadership over rural grassroots work and help resolve agricultural and economic difficulties In 1959 for example the government of Shanghang County Fujian dispatched 333 officials to peoplersquos communes and brigades to take up posts with real power From 1960 to 1965 the coun-ty government thoroughly adjusted its guiding policy and sent another 134 officials to the countryside to work in agriculture16 In 1958 the government of Mei County Guangdong province sent 2017 officials 1560 of whom to be enrolled in education through labor and the remaining 457 to participate in grassroots work In 1958 the county government sent another 1342 officials to labor in farms forestry centers factories mines and agricultural coopera-tives In 1960 county government officials sent 2470 officials at the commune-level to strengthen the leadership of communes and brigades and 1332 more to production teams to participate in production and labor17 As you can see in Table 133 incomplete data indicate that from the late 1950s to the 1960s eight county governments in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region (Jiangling County was not included as we could not find relevant data) ordered a total of 12344 of-ficials to go to the countryside Some officials stayed in the countryside for sev-eral months and some for several years The majority returned to their original posts in cities once their term in the countryside had expired A small percent-age stayed for good

ii The Flow of Rural Population into Cities

Even amid the tumultuous movement of state-organized population reloca-tion to the countryside trickles of rural citizens from fringe areas continued to

15 Xunwu xian zhi 27316 Shanghang xian zhi 64917 Mei xian zhi 826


ltUNgt

move into cities The scale was miniscule compared to the torrent of human migration bound for the countryside Rural citizens entering cities at this time generally did so to pursue education to join the military or because they were recruited to work in cities or had been promoted in official careers For nearly one third of the era of collectivization which spanned over twenty years the work of recruiting students was halted For this reason technical and special-ized colleges recruited very few students during this period There was maybe one rural youth able to test into technical and specialized colleges per thou-sand square kilometers at this time and even fewer recommended into uni-versities Thus among the three groups of rural citizens entering cities at this time those doing so to pursue studies were the least numerous

More people moved to cities to join the military than to pursue studies during this period As shown in Table 134 a total of 34260 soldiers were re-cruited from the five counties of Ruijin Huichang Changting Shanghang and Wuping from the 1950s to the 1980s The difference between recruitment figures and dischargedemobilization figures for this period was 8904 people In other words nearly 10000 people permanently left the countryside of these five counties as a result of joining the military during this period Although the period of time covered in Table 134 went beyond the era of collectiviza-tion the figures given still give a more or less accurate picture of the number of people who left the countryside to join the military during the era of col-lectivization The majority of service-people demobilized or discharged from

Table 133 Officials sent down in the Gan-Min-Yue border region in the era of collectivization



Xunwu 1968 344 Mei 1958ndash1960 7151Huichang 1957ndash1968 2349 Shanghang 1959ndash1960 467Ruijin 1959 1961 125 127 Wuping 1958 1959ndash1963 312 196Pingyuan 1957

1962ndash1963380 332 Changting 1958 1961ndash1962 432 129

Total 12344

Data source Xunwu xian zhi 273 Huichang xian zhi 156 Ruijin xian zhi 64 and 283 Pingyuan xian zhi 479 Mei xian zhi 826 Shanghang xian zhi 649 Wuping xian zhi 577 and Changting xian zhi 648Note The above figures were gleaned from county records and may be incomplete

YOU322

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the militarymdashexcluding those sacrificedmdashreturned to their native regions to work following the governmentrsquos principle of ldquofrom whence you came thence you returnrdquo The vast majority of those returned to the villages where they were raised Nevertheless some military personnel went to cities upon decommissioning as a result of official promotions or changing professions Some others left the countryside to work in construction projects All military service-people who were decommissioned between 1967 and 1970 in Ruijin County were placed in jobs regardless of whether they held urban or rural household registrations18 In the years 1961 1970 and 1971 the government of Mei County sent 660 veterans as well as 308 accompanying family members to help in the construction of Hainan Island19 Although they account for but a small portion of the large number of those who joined the military young people from rural families and who ended up moving permanently to cities

18 Ruijin xian zhi 《瑞金县志》 [Records of Ruijin County] ed Ruijin County Records Compilation Committee 瑞金县志编纂委员会 (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chuban-she 1993) 254

19 Mei xian zhi 810

Table 134 Military conscriptions and demobilizations and discharges in the Gan-Min-Yue border region

County Years Conscriptions Demobilizations and discharges

Difference between conscriptions and demobiliza-tions + discharges

Ruijin 1950ndash1985 10686 9530 1156Huichang 1955ndash1985 5574 3472 2102Changting 1957ndash1978 5583 3720 1863Shanghang 1954ndash1978 6194 3524 2652Wuping 1955ndash1987 6223 5092 1131

Total 34260 25356 8904

Note Figures for demobilization and discharges in Wuping County run from 1949 to 1985 Incomplete data from other counties made it impossible to incorporate figures from the same time span for other counties in the tableData source Ruijin xian zhi 254 and 309 Huichang xian zhi 181 and 195 Changting xian zhi 671ndash672 Shanghang xian zhi 681ndash682 and Wuping xian zhi 529 and 558ndash559


ltUNgt

can count themselves among those who had left village and farming life behind them

Relatively speaking recruitment was the most important channel by which rural citizens moved to cities during the era of collectivization Recruitment was how a large number of them became ldquocity folkrdquo during this period The apex of recruitment of rural citizens to work in the cities occurred during the Great Leap Forward but the majority of these were returned to the countryside during the adjustments that followed in the early 1960s In the southeastern Jiangxi county of Huichang a slew of rural citizens became state workers dur-ing the Great Forging of Steel and Iron movement from 1958 to 195920 In 1959 the western Fujian county of Wuping recruited 4870 rural citizens to work in public institutions or enterprises of those 3291 were soon sent back to the countryside as the result of policy adjustments21 All of the 1892 rural citizens recruited from the countryside to work in Changting County in 1958 or after were sent back to the countryside in the adjustments of 1961 Soon thereafter all remaining rural workers remaining in urban centers there were also sent home22 Public institutions and enterprises generally recruited four kinds of people decommissioned and discharged service-people from the countryside educated youth sent to the country urban youth and children from rural fami-lies For example most workers recruited to work in Ruijin County from 1959 to 1966 were urban youths living on government grain rations but most recruits there from 1967 to 1974 were rural educated youth and urban educated youth who had already spent two years or more in the countryside A total of 13542 workers were recruited to work there from 1958 to 1978 of whom a portion were farmers for whom this would be a very good opportunity to leave their rural homeland23 In Mei County during the ldquoCultural Revolutionrdquo 8000 urban educated youths were sent to the countryside but 4666 rural residents (some of whom veterans) were recruited to work in urban public enterprises24 Al-though the majority of rural citizens who had moved to urban areas of Wuping County during the Great Leap Forward were shed from the urban workforce

20 Huichang xian zhi 《会昌县志》 [Records of Huichang County] ed Huichang County Records Compilation Committee 会昌县志编纂委员会 (Xinhua chubanshe 1993) 154

21 Wuping xian zhi 57322 Changting xian zhi 《长汀县志》 [Records of Changting County] ed Changting County

Records Compilation Committee 长汀县志编纂委员会 (Shenghuo-dushu-xinzhi san-lian shudian 1993) 643

23 Ruijin xian zhi 274ndash27524 Mei xian zhi 609

YOU324

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and sent home 1579 did retain their jobs in urban public enterprises Another 4890 rural residents were recruited from the countryside to work in urban jobs in Wuping County over the 27 years from 1960 to 1987 half or more of those movedto cities during the era of collectivization25

iii Population Movements within the Countryside

In addition to the flows of population between urban and rural areas described above there were also movements of population within the countryside in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region during this time Some moved to rural mountain-ous regions to work and others moved to areas where land was more plentiful others moved wherever their jobs took them Although there were fewer peo-ple moving within the countryside than between rural and urban areas such population movements comprised a major portion of population movements in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region in the era of collectivization

Rural laborers went to remote mountainous areas to take up two kinds of work The first was jobs in state-run or collective farms or forestry centers For example many residents of Xiewupai Village 谢屋排村 worked in the con-struction of the Longshan Reservoir 龙山水库 in Yeping 叶坪 Ruijin As to the remuneration for this work seventy percent went to the production team and thirty percent to the worker or twenty days for the production team and ten days for the workerin work-day terms the production team would also log workpoints for the workers for this labor26 Wang Gongming 王公明 Director of the Luokou Township 洛口乡 Neighborhood Committee in Ningdu County 宁都县 told us that he left his production team to work in the communersquos for-estry center in 1976 Wang paid 03 yuan from his daily earnings to the produc-tion team and kept the rest which he claimed was more than what was paid to the production team27 We discovered in interviews conducted in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region that commune members working in collective farms or forestry centers outside of their own production team were sometimes al-lowed to do jobs like collecting pine resin the earnings for which were split between the worker and the production team at differing ratios The only rea-son that production teams let their members work elsewhere was because of a win-win ldquogentlemenrsquos agreementrdquo (ie an unwritten agreement) that existed between the team and the individual workers

25 Wuping xian zhi 57326 Based on a field study I did in Yeping Township Ruijin City in 199827 Based on a field study I did in Luokou Township Ningdu County in 1998


ltUNgt

The second kind of work rural laborers were sent to remote mountainous areas to do was large-scale construction of farm fields or rural infrastructure or-ganized under ldquolarge formation warfarerdquo28 or other political movements It was common for large numbers of rural laborers to be swept up in these campaigns A total of 6896 rural laborers from Changting County were swept up in the construction of the Yingtan 鹰潭 to Xiamen Railway the Longyan to Zhang-zhou 漳州 Railway the Sibao Highway 四堡公路 in Liancheng 连城 and the Ting River Hydropower Plant 汀江沿河水电站 in 195829 From 1958 to 1967 officials in Shanghang County dispatched 12200 laborers to assist provincial-level and prefectural-level public enterprises in mining transportation and construction30

Rural citizens who moved to areas with more land came in two varieties as well The first was those who moved to mountainous regions This kind of reset-tlement had been going on since the dawn of history and had been particularly common in times of war or political upheavals The political situation began to stabilize in China in the 1950s at which point the population began to grow rapidly which became a problem in rural areas during the era of collectiviza-tion as the population grew but available land did not which meant reductions in per capita food rations In some places rural citizens never had enough to eat The mass movement of urban citizens toward the countryside doubtlessly exacerbated this situation Labor productivity in agriculture was low during the era of collectivization and this further reduced per capita food rations All the above factors pushed some rural citizens with means to move into moun-tainous regions that had more land in order to improve their chances of sur-vival Other important reasons for resettling in mountainous regions include the desire to escape tense political environments and to seek more autonomy in production In one example the residents of Jinhua Village 金华村 Rent-ian Town Ruijin are the ancestors of migrants from many different eras bear-ing many last names including Lin Zeng Zhong Qin Huang Yang and Deng The father of Jinhuarsquos Village Director Deng Dachun 邓大春 moved into the Puyuan Group 普圆小组 of Jinhua Village from Huangbai Township 黄柏乡

in the late 1950s Deng told us that his father moved to the village because his family was poor and he had too many brothers Although it was located far away in the mountains there was virgin land to cultivate and arable land to

28 Translatorrsquos note the so-called ldquoda bingtuan zuozhanrdquo refers to the military-style organi-zation of a mass movement

29 Changting xian zhi 64230 Shanghang xian zhi 641

YOU326

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plant on and his life was relatively free there31 Xie Yuanxin who lives about five kilometers from the capital of Ruijin County in Xiewupai Village Yeping Township moved to Dabaidi 大柏地 in the mountains with his family around the same time He did so because of a drought in Xiewupai which made life very difficult32 Similar stories of resettlement in the mountains in pursuit of survival or improvement to onersquos lot in life are commonthroughout the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region However these resettlements were relatively small in scale They happened against the backdrop of the great population congestion during the era of collectivization and represented a final episode in the wave of ldquomountain-bound migrationrdquo

Secondly people also moved from the densely populated areas of eastern Guangdong and western Fujian into the relatively more land-abundant and less densely populated area of southern Jiangxi province In an investigation conducted in Chengjiang Town 澄江镇 Xunwu County we ran across Deng Dingxiang 邓丁祥 a fifty-one-year-old resident of Guifeng Village 桂丰村 He had originally come from the Laowu Group 老屋组 of Songlin Village 松林村 Shishan Town 石扇镇 Mei County In 1971 he moved in with the fam-ily of his bride He told us ldquoWe had a lot of brothers in my family at the time (four) and we were extremely poor We didnrsquot even have enough to eat Here therersquos plenty of farmland and enough to eat so I came to Jiangxirdquo He said that many people came to Jiangxi for similar reasons33 A senior resident of Junmenling Town 筠门岭 Huichang County told us that a lot of girls married into the area from eastern Guangdong between the time of 1949 and the 1960s and 1970s One local cadre surnamed Ye (now nearly fifty years old) told us that all his five brothers had married girls from Guangdong34

A total of 3149 people moved to Xunwu County between 1959 and 1960 to flee disasters or economic difficulties at home Even after officials had sent many away 1461 refugees remained in the area and settled down35 The major-ity of refugees who have settled in southeastern Jiangximdashan area of bountiful grain harvests and surplusesmdashto escape famine throughout history have come from the border regions of Fujian and Guangdong Several thousand residents of Shanghang County fled famine during the three years of economic difficul-ties Manyof these fled to southern Jiangxi A significant drop in grain yields in

31 Based on an field study I performed in Rentian Town Ruijin City in 199832 Based on an field study I performed in Xiewupai Village Yeping Township Ruijin City in

199833 Based on an field study I performed in Chengjiang Town Xunwu County in 199834 Based on a field study I performed in Junmenling Town Huichang County in 199835 Xunwu xian zhi 294


ltUNgt

1960 led to the flight of 9070 people from Ninghua County 宁化县 Fujian in 1960 some of these settled in Shicheng Ningdu Guangchang 广昌 and oth-er counties of Jiangxi36 Of course there can be no comparison between the amount of people who settled in Jiangxi as a result of abnormal marriages or flight from famine and those who have fled from border regions of Fujian and Guangdong throughout history and founded villages there Nevertheless it is an undeniable fact that there was an upsurge in migration from the border re-gions of Fujian and Guangdong into Jiangxi at the time of collectivization We do not however have any accurate data to determine the scale of such migra-tion during this time A small number of people also moved in pursuit of job opportunities Working as porters or engaging in trade during the slack farm-ing season is the traditional means of earning secondary income for people in the border region These activities were strictly forbidden during the era of collectivization but some rural citizens did them anyway driven by necessity In the early 1960s one old resident from the Dongmen Brigade 东门大队of Chengyuan 城原 Changting County Fujian established a secret commercial relationship with another rural resident from Ningdu County Jiangxi The man in Changting stealthily delivered chili peppers to Ningdu and the man in Ningdu sent fire-cured tobacco back to Changting Once the shipments arrived at their destination the seller generally left them there to be sold on consign-ment Lai Huomu 赖火木 a resident of Shangjie Village 上街村 Hetian Town 河田镇 Changting also sold chili peppers to Ganzhou in stealth where they were purchased by a state-run store One such shipment of peppers earned him the equivalent of two to three months of pay for working in the production team He told us that at the time others in his area sold young bamboo to Ruijin but ldquothere werenrsquot many doing business like me then because I was braverdquo37

iv Conclusions

Theoretically speaking rural residents in the era of collectivization lost nearly all freedom of movement in stark contrast to their counterparts in the Ming and Qing Dynasties as a result of the state monopoly policy the collective ownership policy the urban-vs-rural dual household registration system and other policies The vast majority of rural residents at this time were chained

36 Ninghua xian zhi 《宁化县志》 [Records of Ninghua County] ed Ninghua County Records Compilation Committee 宁化县志编纂委员会 (Fujian renmin chubanshe 1992) 136

37 Based on a field study I performed in Changting County in 2000

YOU328

ltUNgt

to agriculture and confined to their villages During the era of collectivization rural China was a nearly ldquoimmobile societyrdquo However we have discovered through our research that in the Gan-Min-Yue Border Region during the era of collectivization there were some flows of population from the city to the countryside (as a result of downsizing of urban workforces sending educated youth to the countryside and dispatching of urban officials) as well as flows of rural laborers into cities (such as those pursuing studies those recruited to work in cities and those who joined the military) There were even some population movements within the countryside (such as those who moved to remote mountainous regions to work those who resettled in areas with more land those who had been involved in unusual marriages those fleeing fam-ine and some who were engaged in illicit trading) During this time flows of population between urban and rural areas and within the countryside never ceased Of course compared to the ldquopeasant worker tiderdquo and frequent flows of population between urban and rural areas of today the aforementioned popu-lation movements were but a trickle Such a characterization does not mean however that we should overlook large-scale movements of laborers spurred by governmental actions or institutional planning (such as the ldquogo to the coun-trysiderdquo movement) or voluntary movement of rural populations on a smaller scale Rural society during the era of collectivization was not an ldquoimmobile societyrdquo To a large extent it was a society in which great swaths of population moved to the countryside or into mountainous regions and the era of collec-tivization was to a great extent an era of institutionally planned population movements

References

Changting xian zhi 《长汀县志》 [Records of Changting County] ed Changting County Records Compilation Committee 长汀县志编纂委员会 (Shenghuo- dushu-xinzhi sanlian shudian 1993)

Huichang xian zhi 《会昌县志》 [Records of Huichang County] ed Huichang Coun-ty Records Compilation Committee 会昌县志编纂委员会 (Xinhua chubanshe 1993)

Mei xian zhi 《梅县志》 [Records of Mei County] ed Mei County Records Compila-tion Committee 梅县志编纂委员会 (Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1994)

Ninghua xian zhi 《宁化县志》 [Records of Ninghua County] ed Ninghua County Records Compilation Committee 宁化县志编纂委员会 (Fujian renmin chuban-she 1992)


ltUNgt

Ruijin xian zhi 《瑞金县志》 [Records of Ruijin County] ed Ruijin County Records Compilation Committee 瑞金县志编纂委员会 (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1993)

Shanghang wenshi ziliao di 24 ji 《上杭文史资料》第24 辑 [Cultural and Historical Materials of Shanghang Vol 24] ed Chinese Peoplersquos Political Consultative Confer-ence Shanghang County Cultural and Historical Materials Editing Committee 政协

上杭县文史资料编辑委员会 Shanghang xian zhi 《上杭县志》 [Records of Shanghang County] ed Shanghang

County Records Compilation Committee 上杭县志编纂委员会 (Fujian renmin chubanshe 1993)

Wuping xian zhi 《武平县志》 [Records of Wuping County] ed Wuping County Re-cords Compilation Committee 武平县志编纂委员会 (Zhongguo dabaike quans-hu chubanshe 1993)

Xunwu xian zhi 《寻乌县志》 [Records of Xunwu County] ed Xunwu County Re-cords Compilation Committee 寻乌县志编纂委员会 (Xinhua chubanshe 1996)

Zhongguo guoqing congshu ndash bai xianshi jingji shehui diaocha ndash xunwu juan 《中

国国情丛书mdashmdash百县市经济社会调查middot寻乌卷》 [China National Conditions SeriesmdashSocioeconomic Investigations in 100 Counties and Cities ndash Xunwu Edition] ed Ding Weizhi 丁伟志 (Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 1996)


ltUNgt

chapter 14

A Review of Research on the State Monopoly1

Wang Danli2

Keywords

state monopoly ndash industrialization ndash planned economy ndash coupon system ndash research review

The imposition of the state grain monopoly in 1953 is one of the most note-worthy events in the economic history of the Peoplersquos Republic of China The passage and continual development of this policy not only exerted a profound influence on the production and circulation systems for Chinarsquos agricultural products but also became an important symbol for the planned economy shortly after the founding of the nation closely linked with progress made in Chinarsquos march toward industrialization It is precisely for this reason that the state monopoly has long been of great interest to Chinese academics A review of this research is beneficial not only to furthering discussion in this topic at the academic level but also to the making of objective examinations and fair assessments of the course of Chinarsquos economic development shortly after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China

i The Establishment and Development of the State Monopoly

Officials in the early days of the Peoplersquos Republic of China established the ldquothree great battlesrdquo of the ldquofinancial battlefrontrdquo establishing national unifor-mity in financial work establishing the state monopoly and subjecting capital-ist industrial and commercial enterprises family-based agricultural operations and handicraft workshops to socialist reformation3 This placement among the

1 This essay was selected for the Seventh Annual Academic Forum on National History2 Wang Danli (王丹莉 ) is an assistant research fellow in the second research department of

the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies3 Bo Yibo 薄一波 Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu shang《若干重大决策与事

件的回顾》 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 1] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1991) 255


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top three priorities illustrates the importance of the state monopoly policy In these early years the central government did not seal off free markets Rather it obtained grain by requisitioning of public grain and by making purchases from the open market As the economy gradually recovered and large-scale economic construction was launched an increasingly large gap began to emerge between state-controlled grain reserves and grain the state needed to provide to urban and rural areas To extricate itself from this predicament as quickly as possible the Communist Party of China (ccp) Central Committee after repeated inquiries and discussion issued the ldquoResolutions on Implement-ing Planned Purchases and Planned Supply of Grainrdquo 关于实行粮食的计划收

购与计划供应的决议 on October 16 19534 On November 19 of that year the State Administrative Council issued the ldquoOrders on Implementing Planned Purchases and Planned Supply of Grainrdquo 关于实行粮食的计划收购和计划供

应的命令 which included concrete measures for the state grain monopoly at which point the grain monopoly was officially implemented5

Generally speaking the core of the state monopolyon grain can be summed up by the following First officials implemented the policy of planned pur-chases from rural households that had surplus grain with purchase prices and grain varieties to be purchased dictated directly by the center Second offi-cials implemented the policy of planned grain supply for urban dwellers and rural residents who were not self-sufficient Third work responsibilities were divided between the central and local governments and under the uniform guidance of the center and all grain-related planning was done by the central government excluding grain allocated to regional governments but including grain flows between regions grain exports grain reserves emergency grain re-serves disaster relief grain and so on6

The scope of the state monopoly grew over the years In November 1953 the ccp Central Committee approved the resolutions of the Central Financial Committee regarding nationwide implementation of planned purchases of oil bearing materials In November the following year the State Administrative Council issued the ldquoOrders on Implementing Planned Purchases of Cottonrdquo 关于实行棉花计划收购的命令 In addition to grain cotton and edible oil the state also included fire-cured tobacco live pigs wool and leather as well as some ingredients for Traditional Chinese Medicine (tcm) aquatic prod-ucts scrap copper scrap tin scrap steel and several other important products

4 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 4 ce《建国以来重要文献选编》第4 册 [Se-lected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 4] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1993) 477

5 Ibid 5616 Ibid 478

Danli332

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within the scope of the monopoly Rural residents were unable to sell anything on markets even those things they had reserved for personal use All sales had to be made to state-commissioned stores It was permissible for citizens to sell some agricultural products such as chickens ducks geese fresh eggs spices aquatic products from scattered production areas dried fruits and nuts and fresh fruits on the markets but at time of necessity provincial-level peoplersquos committees were authorized to enforce the rules of the state monopoly on those products as well7 The enormous state monopoly system was thus gradu-ally taking shape

The state monopoly on agricultural productsmdashcentered primarily on grainmdashwas in place for a total of thirty-two years from its implementation in 1953 to its replacement by the contract purchasing system for grain and cot-ton in 1985 Its overall impact went far beyond its effects on the circulation of agricultural products

ii The Present State of Research and a Survey of Existing Literature

A great deal has been written by both Chinese and foreign researchers on the state monopoly The vast majority of this work is articles few books are de-voted to the topic Most past research has focused on issues such as the forma-tion and evolution of policies related to the state monopoly the impact of the monopoly on agricultural production and rural citizens its relationship with industry and with the grain circulation system In this essay I will review some themes within this body of research in order to arrive at a clearer understand-ing and firmer grasp of their findings so far The following areas have received the most attention

(A) Rationale for the State Monopoly Policy and the Process of its Formulation

The logical starting point for research into the state monopoly is the introduc-tion of the policy that created the state monopoly system so this issue has garnered a great deal of attention Many researchers have cited the grain crisis of 1953 in their discussions of the state monopoly as a major factor for the

7 Liang mian you tonggoutongxiao zhengce faling wenjian xuanbian 《粮棉油统购统

销政策法令文件选编》 [Selected Policies Decrees and Documents on the State Monop-oly on Grains and cereals Cotton and Oil] ed China Renmin University Economics Depart-ment Document Bureau 中国人民大学贸易经济系资料室 (1979) 232ndash234


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creation of the state monopoly8 According to Bo Yibo 薄一波 the state mo-nopoly was a product of the severe imbalance between supply and demand of grain between the summer and autumn of 1953 At the time increased scale of economic construction had led to the rapid growth in the countryrsquos overall demand for grain grain consumption among the rural population had mark-edly increased following land reform and the government was finding itself increasingly in competition with private grain traders for supply9 Xu Jianqing analyzed the economic reasons behind the statersquos introduction of the state mo-nopoly policy from the perspectives of the mechanism and costs of market op-erations On the basis of an analysis of grain and printed gauze she was able to showthat the costs of using the market pricing mechanism and government-set prices at the same time can be extremely high When severe inconsistency and disconnect between government-set prices and market prices make it difficult to contain the latter by means of the former and when serious imbalance exists between government purchases and sales of grain introducing government-planning in the purchases and sales of grain while admittedly less than ideal may have been the cheapest of options in terms of transaction costs for help-ing to ensure basic grain supply and the smooth implementation of the ldquoFirst Five-Year Planrdquo In this historical period finding the cheapest and fastest way to realize the countryrsquos objectives as they were laid out in its development plans was the basis of all state policy decisions at this time10 The Cambridge History of the Peoplersquos Republic of China (1949ndash1965) edited by Roderick MacFarquhar and John Fairbank gives a detailed description of the lackadaisical growth in agricultural production and the grain crisis around the year 1953 The authors

8 For example Liu Yang 刘洋 ldquoTonggoutongxiao ndash jianguo chuqi tongzhi jingji sixiang de tixian 统购统销mdashmdash 建国初期统制经济思想的体现 [The State Monopoly ndash the Appearance of Ideology of Ruling the Economy Soon after the Founding of the Na-tion]rdquo Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu 《中共党史研究》 6 (2004) Chen Guoqing 陈国庆 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de chansheng ji qi yingxiang 统购统销政策的产生及其

影响 [The Creation of the State Monopoly Policy and its Effects]rdquo Xuexi yu tansuo 《学

习与探索》2 (2006) and so on No academic studying the state monopoly has denied the direct relationship between the severity of the crisis in grains and cereals supply and demand and the issuance of the state monopoly policy and so I shall not give superfluous accounts here

9 Bo Yibo 255ndash25810 Xu Jianqing 徐建青 ldquoJianguo qianqi de shijia yu paijia ndash cong jiage jizhi dao tonggou-

tongxiao 建国前期的市价与牌价mdashmdash从价格机制到统购统销 [Market Prices and List Prices in the Early Days of the Nationmdashfrom Pricing Mechanisms to the State Monopoly]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研究》2 (2002)

Danli334

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pointed out that a close relationship exists between grain purchase prices fiscal revenue the scale of investments towards means of production and pro-duction sectors and other factors With industrialization as the highest policy priority at the time the government opted for monopolistic purchases of grain at fixed prices from the end of autumn 1953 in conjunction with measured expediting of cooperatization as the solution11

Two other books A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events by Bo Yibo and Grain Work in Contemporary China edited by Zhao Fasheng12 have given a detailed account of the workings behind the establishment of the state grain monopoly policy Justin Yifu Lin et al have also given an explanation for this process in their work on the topic13 Chen Yunrsquos 陈云 role in this process is also noteworthy A study of his writings and of articles written about him provide us with a great amount of information about the state monopoly In October 1953 Chen gave a speech entitled ldquoImplementing the State Grain Mo-nopolyrdquo 实行粮食统购统销 at the national grain conference In his speech Chen gave a detailed analysis of the severity of the nationwide grain problem different possible plans to solve the problem the limitations of each and the time required as well as quantities and measures to be employed in the state requisitioning of grain14 One could say that this speech was the earliest systematic description of the state grain monopoly policy of 1953 This docu-ment presents the reasons for its introduction and how the policy took shaped from the perspective of policymakers Yi Shui discusses the formulation of the state monopoly from the perspective of Chenrsquos work and decision-making ap-proaches15 Zhang Fengrsquoao places emphasis on Chenrsquos thinking on grain in his

11 Jianqiao zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (1949ndash1965) 《剑桥中华人民共和国史

(1949~1965)》 [Cambridge History of the Peoplersquos Republic of China (1949ndash1965)] ed Rod-erick MacFarquhar and Fei Zhengqing 费正清 translated from the English (Beijing Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1990) 166ndash181

12 Dangdai zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo 《当代中国的粮食工作》 [Grain Work in Contemporary China] ed Zhao Fasheng 赵发生 (Beijing Zhongguo shehui kexue chu-banshe 1988) 71ndash74

13 Lin Yifu Cai Fang and Li Zhou 林毅夫蔡昉李周 Zhongguo de qiji fazhan zhanluumle yu jingji gaige 《中国的奇迹发展战略与经济改革》 [The Chinese Miracle Devel-opment Strategy and Economic Reforms] (Shanghai Shanghai sanlian shudian and Shang-hai renmin chubanshe 1994) 40ndash41

14 Chen Yun wenxuan (yi jiu si jiu ndash yi jiu wu liu nian) 《陈云文选 (一九四九mdashmdash 一九

五六年 )》 [Selected Works of Chen Yun (1949ndash1956)] (Beijing renmin chubanshe 1984) 202ndash216

15 Yi Shui 亦水 ldquolsquoShi bu shi haiyou biede banfarsquo ndash cong quding tonggoutongxiao zhengce kan Chen Yun de gongzuo he jiejue fangfa lsquo是不是还有别的办法rsquomdashmdash从确定统


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essay ldquoA Brief Discussion of Chen Yunrsquos Idea that lsquoWithout Grain there is Anar-chyrsquordquo in which he provides a new perspective for understanding the state mo-nopoly16 These works focused mostly on the rationale for the state monopoly and how it came to be

(B) Research on the State Monopoly and IndustrializationAlthough significant shortages in grain supply in 1953 put the introduction of the state monopoly policy on the fast track another major reason for the rapid increase in the countryrsquos demands for grain was its commitment to industri-alization In other words there was a direct link between the introduction of the state monopoly policy and industrialization This link has been the focus of many writings on the subject

In the opinion of Liu Chuanjiang as the rapid development of heavy industry began to take precedence over other policy objectives in 1953 the government adopted the monopolistic grain circulation system in order to fulfill its grain purchase requirements and to ensure that needs for industrial-ization were met17 In his article Lu Ling contends that conflicts between the small peasant economy and industrialization helped trigger the grain crisis of 1953 Lu offers an analysis of the relationship between the grain crisis and the government policy commitment to industrialization and how this relationship was connected with of the introduction of the state monopoly policy18

Justin Yifu Lin et al go a step further in pointing out that having resolved to ldquocatch up to and overtake [more advanced economies] China nonethe-less faced a number of difficulties at the time including a low starting point shortages of capital and resources and low economic surpluses Under such

购统销政策看陈云的工作和决策方法 [lsquoIs There Another WayrsquomdashA Look at Chen Yunrsquos Work and Decision-making Approaches through the Establishment of the State Mo-nopoloy Policy]rdquo Dang de wenxian 《党的文献》3 (2005)

16 Zhang Fengrsquoao 张凤翱 ldquoJianlun Chen Yun de lsquowu liang ze luanrsquo sixiang 简论陈云的 rsquo无粮则乱 rsquo思想 [A Brief Discussion of Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of lsquoWithout Grains and cereals there is Anarchyrsquo]rdquo Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao 《湖南师范大学社会科

学学报》5 (2001)17 Liu Chuanjiang 刘传江 ldquoZhongguo liangshi liutong de zhidu anpai ji qi bianqian 中国

粮食流通的制度安排及其变迁 [Arrangements of Chinarsquos Grain Circulation System and Changes Thereto]rdquo Jingji pinglun 《经济评论》2 (2000)

18 Lu Ling 庐陵 ldquo1953 nian zhongguo de liangshi weiji yu tonggoutongxiao zhengce de qi-yuan 1953 年中国的粮食危机与统购统销政策的起源 [Chinarsquos Grain Crisis of 1953 and the Genesis of the State Monopoly Policy]rdquo Beijing daxue yanjiusheng xuekan 《北

京大学研究生学刊》 4 (1993)

Danli336

ltUNgt

circumstances setting up the necessary institutional arrangement for keeping the costs of developing heavy industry low offered an obvious way out of this predicamentrdquo In other words market resource allocation mechanisms alone would not have achieved this solution Therefore the government needed to establish a set of resource planning and allocation institutions suitable to the policy environment of the time in order to ensure adequate supply of scarce material resources and of resources to industries to which the government had given priority19 Logically speaking the state monopoly policy was the inevita-ble product of the statersquos strategy of prioritizing development of heavy industry over other industries and sectors In the essay ldquoCong tonggoutongxiao dao tudi shui 从统购统销到土地税 [From the State Monopoly to Land Taxes]rdquo Song Guoqing points out that the conflict between welfare provision and capital accumulation was the primary conflict in Chinarsquos early period of industrial-ization With the industrial monopoly unable to meet objectives for capital accumulation and conditions for the levying of a heavy land tax not yet ripe the state monopoly became the choice and development model most suitable to Chinarsquos national conditions According to Song it would be reasonable to think of the state monopoly as both a method of providing welfare and a mechanism for capital accumulation20 Li Feng holds that the implementation of the state monopoly reflected the conflict between rural consumption and industrializa-tion in the partitioning of national income The so-called ldquograin crisisrdquo was not actually an absolute lack of grain supply but was rather an inability of rural citizens to purchase sufficient quantities of grain through voluntary transac-tions as a result of government-set prices Thus the state monopoly endowed with the function of income redistribution was the result of the complex effects of industrialization and the specific economic environment shortly after the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China21

Some works on the ldquoprice scissorsrdquo effect and industrial accumulations also touch on the state monopoly Wu Li holds that it was difficult for the Peoplersquos Republic of China established on a foundation of economic backwardness and

19 Lin Yifu et al 19 and 3620 Nongcun biange yu zhongguo fazhan 1978ndash1989 xia《农村变革与中国发展 1978~

1989》下 [Rural Revolution and Chinarsquos Development 1978ndash1989 Vol 2] ed Zhou Qiren 周其仁 (Hong Kong Oxford University Press China 1994) 362ndash413

21 Lu Feng 卢锋 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de shishi yu feishichang tizhi de jianli 统购

统销政策的实施与非市场体制的建立 [The Implementation of the State Monopoly Policy and the Erection of a Non-Market System]rdquo Jiaoxue yu yanjiu 《教学与研究》3 (1989)


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traditional agriculture to rely on external factors for achieving the ldquo primitive accumulation of capitalrdquo that was needed for industrialization making agri-cultural surpluses one of the most important sources of capital for industri-alization22 It is however a worthwhile endeavor to study exactly how much agricultural surplus the state attained through the state monopoly In another essay on the ldquoprice scissorsrdquo effect Wu gives a rough calculation of the ldquoprice scissorsrdquo difference by comparing government-set prices market prices and international prices of agricultural products and by-products and industrial products and then excluding agricultural products and by-products resold by the state in the countryside and industrial commodities sold to the country-side He concludes that the ldquoprice scissorsrdquo difference has been exaggerated by some scholars as has the amount of agricultural surplus exacted by the state23 Cui Xiaoli arrives at a similar conclusion Cui explores the issues of the state monopoly and industrial accumulation by looking at the structure of capital used for industrialization during the ldquoFirst Five-Year Planrdquo period the propor-tion of agricultural accumulation to overall capital accumulations for industri-alization the collection of the agricultural tax and other areas In the end Cui concludes that the state monopoly did not accomplish the objective of accu-mulating surplus capital for industrial accumulation at the most agricultural contributions to industrial capital accumulation held even with agricultural tax rates Another of Cuirsquos core arguments is that Chinarsquos state monopoly was different from the Soviet Unionrsquos ldquoSystem of Compulsory Sales to the Staterdquo and that although some of the impact of the state monopoly were negative its problem lay not in the sacrificing of agriculture but rather in its institutional rigidity24 Of course these discussions are made relative to the level of contri-butions made All researchers agree that the state monopoly system did indeed promote industrial accumulation and industrialization itself

22 Wu Li 武力 ldquoShilun jianguo yilai nongye shengyu ji qi fenpei zhidu de bianhua 试论

建国以来农业剩余及其分配制度的变化 [On the Subject of Changes to Agri-cultural Surpluses and Distribution Systems since the Founding of the Nation]rdquo Fujian shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 《福建师范大学学报 (哲学社会

科学版 )》3 (2004)23 Wu Li 武力 ldquo1949 ndash 1978 nian zhongguo ldquojiandaochardquo charsquoe bianzheng 1949~1978 年

中国lsquo剪刀差rsquo差额辨正 [Identification and Correction of Chinarsquos lsquoPrice Scissorsrsquo Discrepancy from 1949 to 1978]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研究》4 (2001)

24 Cui Xiaoli 崔晓黎 ldquoTonggoutongxiao yu gongye jilei 统购统销与工业积累 [The State Monopoly and Industrial Accumulation]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研

究》4 (1988)

Danli338

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(C) The Impact of the State Monopoly on Agricultural Production and Rural Citizens

In 1985 Central Document Number One upheld the positive role unified pur-chases of agricultural products played in guaranteeing supply and supporting construction At the same time however the document noted that as produc-tion had developed many of the adverse effects of the policy had become evi-dent which made it disadvantageous to the development of rural production of commercial products as well as to increases to economic efficiency25 This understanding would later lay the foundation for the introduction of a series of reform measures

In the early 1980s some researchers began a debate regarding the role played by the law of value during the era of the state monopoly in agricultural produc-tion and the management of agricultural products26 Bo Yibo has this to say on the subject ldquoThe primary malady of the state monopoly system was that it lim-ited the role of the law of value in agricultural production and the management of agricultural products So it inevitably had a negative impact on work incen-tives among rural citizens and the implementation of economic accounting in industrial and commercial enterprisesrdquo Excessive state requisitioning of grain was a universal phenomenon during this era which severely restricted work in-centives among rural citizens and so there was no great breakthrough in grain yields for a long time27 Zhang Xuebing holds that from 1953 to 1958 when the state monopoly was in place the system on the whole maintained prices and quantities in a relatively reasonable scope of adjustments benefiting both the government and the people That said there emerged many problems in the system including transgression of the law of value ldquoexcessive requisitioningrdquo forcible implementation of the system and so on The emergence of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo the peoplersquos commune movement and other factors such as ag-ricultural production after 1958 led to further imbalances between government planning and the peoplersquos livelihoods greatly discouraging rural citizens from working28 Lu Yunhang offersan econometric analysis of the issue Lu focuses

25 Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 《新时期农业和农

村工作重要文献选编》 [Selected Important Works on Agriculture and Rural Work in the New Era] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992) 326ndash327

26 Wu Shuo 吴硕 ldquoTongoutongxiao yu jiazhi guiluuml de yunyong 统购统销与价值规律的

运用 [The State Monopoly and Use of the Law of Value]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》 1 (1984)

27 Bo Yibo 280ndash28228 Zhang Xuebing 张学兵 ldquo1953 ndash 1958 nian tonggoutongxiao ji ge wenti kaoyi 1953~1958年

统购统销几个问题考议 [Discussion of Some Issues of the State Monopoly from 1953 to 1958]rdquo Changbai xuekan 《长白学刊》 4 (2006)


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his research on a production team in Xiangshan County Zhejiang Province on which he employed a method of calculating grain production functions and examiningintegration and causality to collect empirical evidence for the nega-tive effects of the state monopoly system on the work incentives among rural citizens Lu notes that the state monopoly was in fact a taxation system in-tended to provide capital accumulation for industrialization Once the govern-ment had requisitioned all surplus grain from collective agriculture it became extremely difficult for officials to be effective in attracting increased inputs of labor into collectivized agriculture When studying the operational efficiency of collectivized agriculture one should make note of the negative impact on the work incentives among rural citizens of the macroeconomic policy factors of the state monopoly29

According to Wu Li the state monopoly begun in the autumn of 1953 amounted to a kind of ldquoquota-based distribution schemerdquo On the basis of this scheme the governmentset consumption quotas for agricultural products for rural citizens and kept the rest Wu holds that this allowed the government to keep a maximum amount of agricultural surpluses However in order for this system to work as intended the government had to interfere in and control the production activities of rural citizens This level of control inevitably damp-ened the incentives of the rural population and led to low agricultural produc-tivity and made the state monopoly an undesirable system in the long term30 In his essay ldquoOn Reforms to the Purchase and Sale System of Grain Products in Chinardquo Ding Shengjun first notes the myriad demerits of the state monopoly and then advocates for reforms to the purchase and sale system for grain31 Gao Ying and Li Yueyun begin their analysis from the perspective of produc-tion and sale of grains The long-term imposition of the state monopoly they write distorted grain prices and caused imbalances in all the distribution of benefits and burdens relating to grain production and sales which in the end

29 Lu Yunhang 陆云航 ldquoDui jianqing nongmin fudan wenti de yi ge gongxian ndash tonggou-tongxiao dui liangshi shengchan yingxiang de shizheng yanjiu 1953ndash1982对减轻农

民负担问题的一个贡献mdashmdash 统购统销对粮食生产影响的实证研究 1953~1982 [A Contribution to the Issue of Reducing Rural Burdens ndash Empirical Research into the Influence of the State Monopoly on Grain Production]rdquo Nankai jingji yanjiu 《南开经

济研究》4 (2005)30 Wu Li ldquoShilun jianguo yilai nongye shengyu ji qi fenpei zhidu de bianhuardquo31 Ding Shengjun 丁声俊 ldquoGuanyu woguo liangshi shangpin gouxiao tizhi de gaige 关于我

国粮食商品购销体制的改革 [On Reforms to the Purchase and Sale System of Grain Products in China]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》8 (1984)

Danli340

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negatively affected the incentives among grain growers32 Many other articles have discussed or otherwise mentioned the negative impact the state monop-oly system had on the work incentives among grain growers For researchers in this field this is now one of the issues most worthy of deep reflection

(D) The Impact of the State Monopoly on the Grain Circulation SystemMany writings have touched on the changes to the grain circulation system that occurred under the state monopoly Many writers including Bo Yibo33 Zhao Fasheng34 Chen Jiyuan35 and others have reflected on the evolution of the circulation system under the monopoly Other articles cover changes to the grain circulation system to varying extents including Chen Tingxuanrsquos ldquoEvo-lution of the Grain Circulation System since the Founding of the Nationrdquo36 Zheng Youguirsquos ldquoReforms to the Grain Circulation System Analysis of Changes to Policies and their Effectsrdquo37 and Dai Daxinrsquos ldquoEvaluation and Analysis of the Policy of State Monopoly on Grain Cotton and Oil in the Early Period of the Nationrdquo38

Chen gives us a relatively thorough overview of the changes that took place in the state grain circulation system from 1949 through the 1980s He di-vides the changes into four phases The first ran from 1949 to 1952 when the

32 Gao Ying and Li Yueyun 高瑛李岳云 ldquoDui woguo liangshi chanxiao liyi shiheng wen-ti de fenxi 对我国粮食产销利益失衡问题的分析 [Analysis of the Issue of Imbal-ance of Interests between Production and Consumption of Grains and cereals in China]rdquo Jianghai xuekan 《江海学刊》6 (2006)

33 Bo Yibo 267ndash27934 Dangdai zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo 75ndash9635 Zhongguo nongcun shehui jingji bianqian (1949ndash1989) 《中国农村社会经济变迁

(1949~1989)》 [Rural Socioeconomic Changes in China (1949ndash1989)] ed Chen Jiyuan et al 陈吉元等 (Shanxi jingji chubanshe 1993) 177ndash185

36 Chen Tingxuan 陈廷煊 ldquoJianguo yilai liangshi liutong tizhi de yanbian 建国以来粮

食流通体制的演变 [Evolution of the Grain Circulation System since the Founding of the Nation]rdquo Gaige 《改革》 (1996) 6

37 Zheng Yougui 郑有贵 ldquoLiangshi liutong tizhi gaige zhengce yanbian ji qi jixiao fenxi 粮食流通体制改革政策演变及其绩效分析 [Reforms to the Grain Circulation Sys-tem Analysis of Changes to Policies and their Effects]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》4 (1998)

38 Dai Daxin 戴大新 ldquoJianguo chuqi liang mian you tonggoutongxiao zhengce pingxi 建国

初期粮棉油统购统销政策评析 [Evaluation and Analysis of the Policy of State Mo-nopoly on Grains and cereals Cotton and Oil in the Early Period of the Nation]rdquo Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao 《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2 (2001)


ltUNgt

state gradually established its overarching regulatory role in grain trade but purchases and sales remained outside the scope of government planning Grain output was unstable during this period and fluctuations began to appear in supply and demand opportunistic behavior jacked up grain prices The second period ran from 1953 to 1978 this being the era of the state grain monopoly The third period ran from 1979 to 1984 during which the state grain monopoly underwent partial reform and the marketrsquos role began to grow in grain produc-tion and pricing The final period from 1985 until present has been marked by a combination of the contract purchase system and the government fixed pur-chase system and by the increased importance of the market as allocation and distribution mechanism Chinarsquos state grain monopoly finally came to an end with its abolishment in 198539 Zhang Zhihua evaluates the evolution of the state grain monopoly from the perspective of grain prices40 Since the issuance of Document Number One in 1985 some researchers have begun to discuss the problems inherent to the original grain circulation system Such discussions can be found in among others Zhao Longyuersquos articleldquoScientifically-informed Choices for Grain Production and Consumption Policiesrdquo41 Yang Wenliangrsquos article ldquoPerspective on the Phenomenon of lsquoBoth Ends Making the Middle Laughrsquo in the Purchase and Sale of Grainrdquo42 Zhang Quanxinrsquos article ldquoResearch into Reforms to the Cotton Purchase and Sale Systemrdquo43 and Jin Su and Luo Yunrsquos article ldquoThe Evolution of Chinarsquos Grain Purchase and Sale System and Thoughts on Reformrdquo44

39 Chen Tingxuan40 Zhang Zhihua 张治华 ldquoJiage dui woguo liangshi shengchan yingxiang de shizheng fenxi

ji zhengce jianyi 价格对我国粮食生产影响的实证分析及政策建议 [Empirical Analysis of the Influence of Prices on Chinarsquos Grain Production and Policy Suggestions]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》9 (1997)

41 Zhao Longyue 赵龙跃 ldquoLiangshi chanxiao zhengce de kexue jueze 粮食产销政策的

科学抉择 [Scientific Choices for Grain Production and Consumption Policies]rdquo Jingji kexue《经济科学》6 (1994)

42 Yang Wenliang 杨文良 ldquoLiangshi gouxiao lsquoliang tou jiao zhongjian xiaorsquo xianxiang toushi 粮食购销 lsquo两头叫中间笑 rsquo 现象透视 [Unhappy Farmers and Consumers Happy Mid-dlemen An Analysis]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》 11 (1995)

43 Zhang Quanxin 张泉欣 ldquoMianhua gouxiao zhidu gaige yanjiu 棉花购销制度改革

研究 [Research into Reforms to the Cotton Purchase and Sale System]rdquo Nongye jingji wenti《农业经济问题》 5 (1996)

44 Jin Su and Luo Yun 金溯罗芸 ldquoWoguo liangshi gouxiao tizhi yanbian yu gaige de sisuo 我国粮食购销体制演变与改革的思索 [The Evolution of Chinarsquos Grain Pur-chase and Sale System and Thoughts on Reform]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村

经济》 4 (1998)

Danli342

ltUNgt

(E) The Relationship between the State Monopoly and Agricultural Cooperatives and Grassroots Organizations

At one level the state monopoly was the decisive factor in the establishment and evolution of the grain circulation system At another level it promoted ag-ricultural collectivization and the rise of cooperatives To a certain extent the state monopoly was a catalyst for both collectivization and the agricultural co-operative movement following the founding of the nation In his analysis of the ldquothree fixedsrdquo policy that went into effect in the mid-1950s Philip Huang notes that ldquothe three fixeds policy not only incorporated the entirety of the small peasant economy within state planning but also firmly pushed rural citizens onto the road of collectivizationrdquo45 Justin Yifu Lin et al give a logical analysis ofthe relationship between the state monopoly and agricultural collectiviza-tion ldquoIn order to ensure that rural citizens invest resources into production of agricultural products needed for industrialization under conditions of a low-price monopoly [officials] put in place institutional arrangements that gave the government direct control of agricultural production through administra-tive mandate According to this logic the agricultural collectivization move-ment began prior to the introduction of the state monopoly on agricultural products and then picked up its pace until 1958 when the peoplersquos commune system was establishedrdquo ldquoThe establishment of a purchase and sales system for agricultural products was merely the first step in the construction of the traditional rural economic system the peoplersquos commune movement was the true symbol that this system along with corresponding macroeconomic poli-cies for the rural economic system had fully formedrdquo46 This is what Lin et al refer toby ldquoa three-in-one traditional economic systemrdquo Specifically it means setting prioritized development of heavy industry as the logical starting point gradually forming a macroeconomic policy environment for distorted product and factor prices and the establishment of a highly-centralized resource plan-ning and allocation system and microeconomic management mechanisms that leave no space whatsoever for individual autonomy in decision-making These were used to ensure that rural surplus products flowed to urban and industrial sectors were available at relatively low prices

Xiao Donglian gives us an in-depth explanation of the reasons behind ag-ricultural collectivization To Xiao a key push for accelerating agricultural

45 Huang Zongzhi 黄宗智 Changjiang sanjiaozhou xiaonong jiating yu xiangcun fazhan 《长江三角洲小农家庭与乡村发展》 [The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta 1350ndash1988] (Zhonghua shuju 1992) 175

46 Lin Yifu et al 38 and 43


ltUNgt

collectivization stemmed from the desire to find a fundamental means of resolving the conflicts between prioritized development of heavy industry and backward agriculture47 First collectivization provided an effective organiza-tion model for ensuring state requisitioning and accumulation which reduced significantly the costs of the state monopoly Second the reason Xiao think agricultural collectivization offers a fundamental resolution to the conflicts between agriculture and industry is that at the time it was widely believed that agricultural collectivization could rapidly increase production output As early as July 1957 Chen Yun clearly noted his hope that agricultural coopera-tives and collectivization could achieve the dual goals of ensuring state requi-sitioning and increasing agricultural output in a speech titled ldquoPersist in and Develop the State Grain Monopolyrdquo 坚持和改进粮食的统购统销 ldquoWe rely primarily on agricultural cooperatives for agricultural development and great increases to grain output That is to say that we should actively steadily de-velop agricultural cooperatives and organize the hundreds of millions of farm-ing households into production cooperatives When that time arrives we will have achieved great increases in grain output at which time performing the work of a state monopoly in agricultural cooperatives will be much easier and much more reasonablerdquo48 Many researchers have performed in-depth studies of the mutual reinforcement between the state monopoly and the agricultural cooperative movement49 In the essay ldquoShanghai Alleys Grassroots Political

47 Xiao Donglian 肖冬连 ldquoJiasu nongye jitihua de yige zhongyao dongyin ndash lun youxian fazhan zhong gongye yu nongye de maodun 加速农业集体化的一个重要动因mdashmdash论优先发展重工业与农业的矛盾 [An Important Factor Behind Acceleration of Ag-ricultural Collectivization ndash On the Conflict between Prioritized Development of Heavy Industry and Agriculture]rdquo Zhonggong dang shi yanjiu 《中共党史研究》4 (1988)

48 Chen Yun wenxuan (yi jiu si jiu ndash yi jiu wu liu nian) 27649 See also Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoJiceng dang zheng jigou shehui zuzhi yu liangshi

tonggoutongxiao zhengce de tuixing 基层党政机构社会组织与粮食统购统销

政策的推行 [Grassroots Party and Government Organs Social Organizations and the Promotion of the State Grain Monopoly Policy]rdquo Shi lin《史林》 1 (2007) Xu Jingyong 许经勇 ldquoLun shehuizhuyi shichang jingji yu woguo nongye fazhan 论社会主义市场

经济与我国农业发展 [On the Socialist Market Economy and the Development of Agriculture in China]rdquo Jingji zongheng 《经济纵横》2 (1994) Zhang Ju and Shao Jin-dong 张举和邵近东 ldquoYi zhong nongcun chaoqiang kongzhi moshi一种农村超强控

制模式 [An Extremely Strong Model for Rural Control]rdquo Lilun xuekan 《理论学刊》7 (2005) as well as Zhang Xuebing 张学兵 ldquolsquoBoduorsquo yu lsquogaizaorsquo ndash tonggoutongxiao zhidu dui dangdai zhongguo nongcun de yingxiang (1953ndash1985) lsquo剥夺 rsquo与 rsquo改造 rsquomdashmdash 统购统

销制度对当代中国农村的影响 (1953~1985) [lsquoExpropriationrsquo and lsquoReformationrsquomdashThe Influence of the State Monopoly on Contemporary Rural China (1953ndash1985)]rdquo (masters

Danli344

ltUNgt

Mobilization and Trends of National Social Integration (1950ndash1955)rdquo Zhang Jishun analyzes the dual state and social role played by resident committees in Shanghai in the first half of the 1950s in political mobilization and system implementation of planned supply50 That dual role means that the supply sys-tem to which the state monopoly gave birth caused grassroots organizations to act as a part of the political mobilization of the planned system These orga-nizations became both drivers and organizers of the planned supply system which to a certain extent strengthened integration of the state and society

(F) The State Monopoly and the Construction of the Dural System of Urban vs Rural China

As Lu Feng points out the problems generated by the state monopoly were more profound and numerous than those it helped to resolved51 Some re-searchers hold that in addition to changing Chinarsquos grain circulation system the state monopoly had other consequences One rather serious repercussion was the formation and strengthening of Chinarsquos urban-rural duality

Xie Jing points out that with its enormous population and poor conditions at the beginning of industrialization China already faced a social system and social structure characterized by the urban-rural division and differenti-ated governance Once large-scale economic construction had been begun shortly after the founding of the nation the state monopoly and the rigorously enforced household registration system together played an important role in reinforcing and solidifying this social duality The state monopoly ensured supply of daily life products at low prices per household planning as well as price subsidies for urban areas The household registration system strictly controlled the growth of the urban population to mitigate pressure on the state caused by industrialization and overly-fast urbanization Under these conditions however systemic planning gave rise to a series of social prob-lems such as the widening urban-rural gap a narrowing of room for social mobility identity inequality sluggishness in the urbanization of Chinarsquos vast

thesis Capital Normal University department of contemporary history 2004) All aca-demic theses quoted in this essay come from the China Outstanding Scholars Theses Database

50 Zhang Jishun 张济顺 ldquoShanghai lilong jiceng zhengzhi dongyuan yu guojia shehui yitihua zouxiang (1950ndash1955) 上海里弄基层政治动员与国家社会一体化走向

(1950~1955) [Shanghai Alleys Grassroots Political Mobilization and Trends of National Social Integration (1950ndash1955)]rdquo Zhongguo shehui kexue 《中国社会科学》2 (2004)

51 Lu Feng


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countryside and so on52 Tang Shuiqing holds that the establishment of the planned supply of grain systemmdashpart of the state grain monopolymdashplayed a key role in the formation of Chinarsquos dual urbanndashrural social system The grain monopoly severed primary market connections between urban and rural ar-eas The system also distinguished between urban and rural identities for the first time by moving rural citizens en masse back to the countryside and re-stricting population movement from the countryside toward cities The system also imposed differentiated supply quota systems on different populations all depending on whether one had an urban household registration or not The system excluded the vast majority of the rural population from the scope of planned supply while at the same time also giving rise to a strictly enforced household registration system53

(G) Implementation of the State Monopoly in Different AreasThe different ways in which the state grain monopoly policy was implemented in different areas have garnered the attention of some researchers Represen-tative works in this field include Zhu Danrsquos ldquoThe Implementation and Effects of the State Monopoly Policy in Hubeirdquo54 Tang Wenqirsquos ldquoA Look Back on the Grain Situation in the Jiangsu Region Prior to the State Monopoly and Les-sons Learnedrdquo55 ldquoBrief Commentary on Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of the State Grain MonopolymdashBeginning with a Discussion of the Implementation of the State Grain Monopoly Policy in Jiangsurdquo56 and ldquoDisaster Relief Work in the

52 Xie Jing 谢敬 ldquoDui tonggoutongxiao zhengce yunxing sanshi yu nian de huigu yu Pingxi 对统购统销政策运行三十余年的回顾与评析 [A Look Back on Commentary on and Analysis of the Over Thirty Years of the State Monopoly Policy]rdquo Jiangxi shehui kexue 《江西社会科学》4 (2003)

53 Tang Shuiqing 汤水清 ldquoLun xin Zhongguo chengxiang eryuan shehui zhidu de xingcheng 论新中国城乡二元社会制度的形成 [On the Emergence of the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Dual Urban-rural Social System]rdquo Jiangxi shehui kexue 《江西社会科学》 8 (2006)

54 Zhu Dan 朱丹 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce zai Hubei de shishi ji yingxiang 统购统销

政策在湖北的实施及影响 [The Implementation and Effects of the State Monopoly Policy in Hubei]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》 1 (1995)

55 Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoTonggoutongxiao qian Jiangsu diqu liangshi xingshi de huigu ji qi qishi 统购统销前江苏地区粮食形势的回顾及其启示 [A Look Back on the Grain Situation in the Jiangsu Region Prior to the State Monopoly and Lessons Learned]rdquo Xian-dai jingji tantao 《现代经济探讨》6 (1994)

56 Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoJianlun Chen Yun lianshi tonggoutongxiao sixiang ndash cong liang-shi tonggoutongxiao zhengce zai Jiangsu Guanche shishi tanqi 简论陈云粮食统购统

销思想mdashmdash 从粮食统购统销政策在江苏贯彻实行谈起 [Brief Commentary on

Danli346

ltUNgt

Era of the State Grain MonopolymdashSelected Pieces from Records of Sichuan ProvincemiddotGrain Recordsrdquo57 Zeng Weirsquos ldquoThe Positive Effects and Negative Effects the State Grain Monopoly had in the History of Guangdongrdquo58 Zhou Zuyin and Jiang Shaoqingrsquos ldquoA Preliminary Exploration into Adjusting Base Numbers for Grain RequisitioningmdashA Look at Reforms to Grain Requisitioning Methods in the Commodity Grain Base of Tielingrdquo59 and others

These articles focus on the implementation and effects of the state mo-nopoly in Hubei Jiangsu Sichuan Guangdong and other places and offer discussions of grain supply and demand and general economic development conditions in these provinces prior to the introduction of the monopoly sys-tem Such analysis of the background of these areas prior to the era of monop-oly system more effectively demonstrate the policyrsquos necessity Zhu Zeng and Tang also analyze the negative and positive roles played by the state monopoly policy in different places Zhou and Jiang explore the maladies present in fixed state grain requisitioning quotas as well as possible solutions In the essay ldquoEs-tablishment of the Planned Grain Supply System in Shanghai (1953ndash1956)rdquo Tang Shuiqing offers a comprehensive analysis of the steps of and process by which the planned supply of grain system was implemented in Shanghai from 1953 to 1956 and the positive and negative impacts of this system60 In ldquoThe Formation of the State Grain Monopoly System and its Use in Tanghe

Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of the State Grain Monopoly ndash Beginning with a Discussion of the Implementation of the State Grain Monopoly Policy in Jiangsu]rdquo Xue hai 《学海》 6 (1995)

57 Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao shiqi de jiuzai gongzuo ndash Sichuan sheng zhimiddotLiangshi zhi xuandeng 粮食统购统销时期的救灾工作mdashmdash〈四川省志 middot粮

食志〉选登 [Disaster Relief Work in the Era of the State Grain Monopoly ndash Selected Pieces from Records of Sichuan ProvincemiddotGrain Records]rdquo Liangshi wenti yanjiu《粮

食问题研究》 1 (1996)58 Zeng Wei 曾伟 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao zai Guangdong lishi shang suo qi de jiji zuoy-

ong he xiaoji zuoyong 粮食统购统销在广东历史上所起的积极作用和消极作用 [The Positive Effects and Negative Effects the State Grain Monopoly Played in the History of Guangdong]rdquo Shangye jingji wenhui 《商业经济文荟》5 (1996)

59 Zhou Zuyin and Jiang Shaoqing 周祖尹姜绍卿 ldquoGuanyu tiaozheng liangshi zheng-gou jishu de chubu tantao ndash cong tieling diqu shangpinliang jidi kan liangshi zhenggou banfa de gaige 关于调整粮食征购基数的初步探讨mdashmdash 从铁岭地区商品粮基

地看粮食征购办法的改革 [An Initial Exploration into Adjusting Base Numbers for Government Purchase of GrainmdashA Look at Reforms to the Governmentrsquos Grain Purchas-ing Methods in the Commodity Grain Base of Tieling]rdquo Nongye jingji 《农业经济》 1 (1983)

60 Tang Shuiqing 汤水清 ldquoShanghai liangshi jihua gongying zhidu de jianli (1953ndash1956) 上海粮食计划供应制度的建立 (1953~1956) [Establishment of the Planned Grains


ltUNgt

Countyrdquo Tian Xiquan uses a large amount of case material and records in his analysis of how the state grain monopoly actually operated on the ground and its effects on the daily life of the ordinary people He focuses especially on Tanghe County Henan Province61 In addition local grain records compiled by various provincial (or direct-controlled city) prefectural and county grain departments62 provide records of the implementation of the state monopoly in these places These records provide a range of data such as those on grain requisitioning grain supply and sales the promotion of the coupon system and so on Abundant as these data are they are mere descriptions and lack analytical import

(H) The State Monopoly and the Coupon SystemThe creation of the coupon rationing system and the rolling out of the state monopoly are closely related On November 23 1953 the State Administrative Council resolved to implement a state monopoly on grain On August 23 1955 the State Administrative Council put into effect the system of supply quotas by which grains were available to urban residents for purchase only through grain coupons On September 15 1954 the State Administrative Council decided to include cottonmdashboth in the state of raw material and in the form of finished productsmdashwithin the state monopoly making coupons necessary for buying cotton wadding and cotton cloth At the same time local governments around the country instituted coupon rationing systems on pork eggs milk fish veg-etables sugar dietary alkali coal soap matches bicycles wristwatches and other commodities Local governments did not begin to abolish their coupon rationing systems until 1985 after the ccp Central Committee had resolved to abolish the state grain monopoly putting an end to the 30-year quota system

While acknowledging the benefits of the coupon rationing system such as price stability and guarantee of basic living standards Wan Dianwu also points out problems with the system such as its deviation from the law of value its

and cereals Supply System in Shanghai (1953ndash1956)]rdquo (2005 doctoral thesis in the Fudan University department of history)

61 Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao zhidu de xingcheng ji qi zai Tanghe xian de yunzuo (1953ndash1957) 粮食统购统销制度的形成及其在唐河县的运作

(1953~1957) [The Formation of the State Grain Monopoly System and its Use in Tanghe County]rdquo (2004 doctoral thesis in the Fudan Unviersity department of history)

62 Such as Jiangsu sheng liangshi zhi 《江苏省粮食志》 [Grain Records of Jiangsu Province] (Jiangsu renmin chubanshe 1993) Henan sheng liangshi zhi 《河南省粮食

志》 [Grain Records of Henan Province] (Zhongguo shangye chubanshe 2003) Hebei sheng zhi bull liangshi zhi《河北省志bull粮食志》 [Records of Hubei Province bull Grain Records] (Zhongguo chengshi chubanshe 1994) and so on

Danli348

ltUNgt

negative effect on the work incentives of farmers and workers the creation of highly-centralized monopolistic commercialized bloated management and administrative organs under it and its having apparently triggered the intro-duction of the coupon system for other goods63 Some other researchers have given a descriptive account of the impact of the coupon rationing system on peoplersquos lives in the era of material shortages64 Zhang Shuguang provides an analysis of the formation evolution and characteristics of the state grain mo-nopoly using from the point of view of institutional economics in his article ldquoOpening up Grain Prices and Abolishing Grain Couponsmdasha Study of Changes to Chinarsquos Grain Purchase and Sales System 放开粮价取消粮票mdash中国

粮食购销制度变迁研究 rdquo Zhang discusses the relationships between rights and obligations of government officials rural citizens urban citizens and oth-er social groups that formed in response to the introduction of the state grain monopoly and the impact these relationships had on institutional evolution In particular he offers an in-depth exploration of the functions and effects of grain coupons andprice changes65 In their book Grain Coupons Grain Prices Tang Zhong and Song Jiqing give a historical account and analysis of the grain coupon system in which they examine the ills of the use of the grain coupon system and the direction of grain reforms66

Many researchers present case studies in the implementation of the grain coupon rationing system Tian Xiquan for example shows how the use of various grain coupons provided an effective guarantee for the thorough implementation of the state grain monopoly policy through a study of the issuance and administration of different kinds of grain coupons in Henan Province from 1953 to 1957 The use of these coupons was both necessary and feasible under the conditions at the time and they had an important role to play As time passed however the downsides of the system (such as the pernicious tendency for grain coupons gradually to take on the function of

63 Wan Dianwu 万典武 ldquoCong liangshi mian bu deng piaozheng de xingfei kan gaige 从粮食棉布等票证的兴废看改革 [A Look at Reforms from the Rise and Fall of Coupon Systems for Grains and cerealss Cotton Cloth and So On]rdquo Shangye jingji yanjiu《商业经济研究》 12 (1998)

64 Lei Yi 雷颐 ldquolsquoRichang shenghuorsquo yu lishi yanjiu lsquo日常生活 rsquo与历史研究 [Research into lsquoDaily Lifersquo and History]rdquo Shixue lilun yanjiu 《史学理论研究》3 (2000)

65 Zhongguo zhidu bianqian de anli yanjiu di 1 ji 《中国制度变迁的案例研究》第 1 集 [Evolution of Chinarsquos Institutions and Case Studies Vol 1] ed Beijing Tianze Research Center 北京天则研究所 (Shanghai Renmin chubanshe 1996) 266ndash230

66 Tang Zhong and Song Jiqing 唐忠宋继青 Liangpiao Liangjia 《粮票粮价》 [Grain Coupons Grain Prices] (Beijing Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 1992)


ltUNgt

certificates that carried genuine valuemdashoften called ldquothe second currencyrdquomdash which attracted opportunists to misuse and abuse them) became more evi-dent and grain coupons became an important symbol of the urban-rural duality that had emerged in China in the era of the state monopoly67

(I) Foreign Research into the State MonopolyTian Xiquan has performed the most extensive survey of works by foreign researchers on Chinarsquos state monopoly to date My exposition here is more or less entirely based on Tianrsquos work68 Dwight Perkins notes quite early in his analysis of the state monopoly the pressure that emphasizing development of heavy industry shortly after the founding of the nation exerted on grain mar-kets and production He also analyzes the necessity of the implementation of the fixed supply system for grain cotton cloth edible oils and other com-modities owing to the premium placed on heavy industry the lack of invest-ments in agriculture prevailing ideologies and political controls69 Vivienne Shue holds that the introduction of the ldquothree fixedsrdquo policy in 1955 indicated a reduction in government demand for grain and did not represent an at-tempt by the government to become more austere on the basis of changes to state grain requisitioning quantities before and after the policyrsquos issuance70 Thomas Bernstein gives an in-depth discussion of the grain crisis of spring 1955 an analysis of the reasons behind it and an account of the mechanisms through which Chinarsquos rural mass movements were launched71

67 Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoTonggoutongxiao chuqi de liangshi piaozheng zhidu tanxi ndash yi 1953ndash1957 nian de Henan wei gersquoan 统购统销初期的粮食票证制度探析mdashmdash以

1953~1957 年的河南为个案 [Exploration of the Grain Coupon System in the Early State Monopoly Period ndash Using 1953ndash1957 Henan as a Case Study]rdquo Shixue yuekan 《史学月

刊》5 (2004)68 Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoLiangshi tongoutongxiao zhidu yanjiu de huigu he sikao 粮食

统购统销制度研究的回顾和思考 [A Look Back on and Thoughts on Research into the State Grain Monopoly System]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研

究》2 (2006) and Tian Xiquan 田锡全 Geming yu nongcun ndash guojia sheng xian yu liangshi tonggoutongxiao zhidu 1953ndash1957 《革命与乡村mdashmdash国家省县与粮食

统购统销制度 1953~1957》 [Revolution and the Countryside ndash the State the Province the County and the State Grain Monopoly System 1953ndash1957] (Shanghai Shehui kexue chubanshe 2006) 8ndash9

69 Dwight H Perkins Market Control and Planning in Communist China (Cambridge Harvard University Press 1968) 42 and 205ndash214

70 Vivenne Shue Peasant China in Transition The Dynamics of Development Toward Social-ism 1949ndash1956 (Berkely University of California Press 1980) 236

71 Thomas P Bernstein ldquoCadre and Peasant Behavior Under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955rdquo in Chinese Communist Politics

Danli350

ltUNgt

Foreign researchers have produced a great number of weighty works on the operations of the state grain monopoly on the ground level Shue describes the implementation of the state grain monopoly in Hubei and Hunan and the changes it engendered in the countryside72 In his book Food Grain Procure-ment and Consumption in China Kenneth Walker traces the development of the state grain monopoly over the period 1953 to 1962 and in the late 1970s Walker focuses primarily on evaluations of grain requisitioning and sales fig-ures within provinces between provinces and between urban and rural areas on the basis of which he attempts to determine the impact of the state mo-nopoly system on grain consumption73 In her book State and Peasant in Con-temporary China The Political Economy of Village Government Jean Oi makes an in-depth exploration of the Chinarsquos countryside in the period of collectiv-ization (1955 to 1984) particularly the course of grain requisitioning during the era of the peoplersquos commune and the various power relationships to which it gave rise74 Foreign research in the field of the Chinese state monopoly is well worth careful study

iii Comprehensive Evaluation and Overall Understanding of the State Monopoly Policy

Some research has attempted to provide comprehensive examination and evaluations of the state monopoly policy For example in ldquoMemorandum on Grain Issues 粮食问题备忘录 rdquo Gao Xiaomeng offers a systematic discus-sion of the characteristics functions and inherent problems of the state monopoly system Gao notes the three important functions of the system stabilizing general price levels contributing to state capital accumulation and ensuring urban supply to satisfy the demands for agricultural products of industrialization The author also explains that matching contributions and exchanges and matching subsidies and exchanges were the root of all the ills of the state monopoly75 Researchers have however generally acknowledged

in Action ed Doak Barnett (Seattle and London University of Washington Press 1970) 365ndash399

72 Zhou Zuyin and Jiang Shaoqing 214ndash24573 Kenneth R Walker Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge

Cambridge University Press 1984)74 Jean C Oi State and Peasant in Contemporary China The Political Economy of Village Gov-

ernment (Berkeley Los Angeles and Oxford University of California Press 1989)75 Nongcun biange yu zhongguo fazhan 1978ndash1989 xia 429ndash433


ltUNgt

the benefits of the state monopoly system holding almost unanimously that the state monopoly propelled industrialization in China Some researchers have noted that the general line for the transitionary period issued in 1953 gave top priority to industrialization but China did not use models for primi-tive accumulation of capital for industrialization that had historically been common elsewhere in the world such as the ldquoenclosurerdquo movement em-ployed in England Rather Chinese officials adopted the Soviet model of pri-oritizing heavy industry which demanded large-scale capital accumulation At the end of 1952 agriculture accounted for 569 percent of Chinarsquos com-bined agricultural and industrial output value and light industry accounted for 644 percent of total industrial output value Production of goods manu-factured from agricultural products then accounted for 875 percent of total light industry output value Faced with such a lopsided industry structure Chinese officials at the time could not depend on industry to provide capi-tal accumulation and national savings required for industrialization Such a situation meant that the primary sector of economic growth in China at the time namely agriculture was the only sector which could provide capital accumulation The state monopoly on grain and other major industrial crops provided light industry with a stable low-cost source of raw materials which in turn ensured growth The profits and taxes the state earned from light industry were then invested in heavy industry the development of which development followed76 One could say that the state monopoly played an extremely importantmdashin fact irreplaceablemdashrole in driving industrialization in China and that it played a positive role over this period in the history of contemporary China

Researchers have also made thorough evaluations of the central role the state monopoly system played in giving rise to the socialist planned econ-omy After the founding of the Peoplersquos Republic of China the state began the transition from a new democratic society toward a socialist society and gradually developed the planned economy As the planned economy was taking shape how to handle the rural population widely spread out and numerous as it was and agriculture backward as it was and threating to obstruct the advancement of industrialization became two major problems for the government The key lay in incorporating the ubiquitous small peasant economy within the scope of the planned economy In the opinion of Chen Guoqing the grain monopoly policy of 1953 brought the highly spread-out

76 Chen Guoqing 陈国庆 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de chansheng ji qi yingxiang 统购统

销政策的产生及其影响 [The Creation of the State Monopoly Policy and its Effects]rdquo Xuexi yu tansuo 《学习与探索》2 (2006)

Danli352

ltUNgt

rural population under state control and abolished the free market which had been established over a broad area The state then came to control grain and all other primary agricultural products its long arms even reaching into the realm of consumption laying the foundation for the establishment later of the planned economy77 Xie Jing also confirms the positive role the state monopoly played in accelerating the pace of socialist reformation The state monopoly and socialist reformation were interdependent Together they in-corporated the small peasant economy within the scope of the state planned economy giving rise to mutual aid and cooperation and bringing the rural economy onto the path of socialism78 Many researchers have acknowledged the role the state monopoly played in mitigating the grain crisis and stabi-lizing prices Others have reconsidered the problems and ills generated by the state monopoly policy as I already reviewed above One must point out however that any appraisal made of the state monopoly policy must not be made independent of consideration of the background and historical condi-tions of the times as only by considering the whole picture can one truly be objective and fair

iv Examining the State Monopoly under Its Particular Historical Circumstances

Du Runsheng once said ldquoThe issues of rural areas agriculture and rural citizens [ie the ldquothree rural issuesrdquo] are absolutely not simple nor are they isolated they are rather closely related to the overall national development strategy and domestic and foreign historical circumstances at the time There-fore in order to understand break down or analyze the experiences and lessons gained from Chinarsquos agricultural policies in the long term one must set them against these grand historical narratives before drawing conclusionsrdquo79 The state monopoly came about soon after the founding of the Peoplersquos Repub-lic of China Over its thirty years it evolved into an institutional system richly characteristic of the planned economy It had a deep impact on the formation and evolution of Chinarsquos planned economy it also had a profound impact on Chinarsquos socioeconomic development and social structure The state monopoly was in essence a grain circulation system established against the backdrop of

77 Ibid78 Xie Jing79 Du Runsheng 杜润生 Zhongguo nongcun tizhi biange zhongda juece jishi 《中国农村

体制变革重大决策纪实》 [Records of Major Decisions in Reforms to Chinarsquos Rural System] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 2005) 215ndash216


ltUNgt

grain shortages following the founding of the nation dramatic fluctuation to market prices for grain and rampant speculation Given those conditions the state monopoly played an enormous role in reigning in opportunistic behavior stabilizing market prices and mitigating the adverse effects of the grain crisis The state grain monopoly was a necessary choice under the economic condi-tions of the time The only way we can arrive at an objective fair understand-ing of the formation of the state monopoly system is to make a comprehensive survey of domestic and international economic and political conditions as well as historical circumstances of the time

We should likewise realize that the state monopoly system was not only a necessary product of history but that it had a profound and far-reaching impact on the formation of economic and social systems in China for over thirty years In fact its impact can still be felt even today At the economic level the state monopoly system was an integral part of Chinarsquos planned economy One could even call it one of the first attempts toward the planned economy The state monopolyrsquos solidification of production factor and market prices its microeconomic restrictions on the autonomy of market entities and its rigorous macroeconomic controls on the production and sale of grain laid the institutional and microeconomic foundations for the planned economy At the national strategy level the state monopoly was an integral part of Chinarsquos strategy of prioritizing development of heavy industry In fact it was the state monopoly that enabled the state to obtain large quantities of resources and agricultural surpluses from the agricultural sector to support rapid industrialization The state monopoly also provided enormous amounts of capital accumulation and low-cost materials for industrialization We could say that the state monopoly was an important undergrid for industrialization in China and that it played an important role in Chinarsquos economic develop-ment At the social level the state monopoly triggered great changes to Chinarsquos social structure and strengthened the urban-rural duality social barriers be-tween urban and rural areas were further solidified within the state monopoly system At the same time however the state monopoly also accelerated the course of both collectivization and the agricultural cooperative movement Agricultural collectivization and the cooperative movement in turn laid an organizational and institutional foundation for the formation of the state monopoly ultimately propelling the peoplersquos commune movement in China One cannot therefore evaluate or try to understand the state monopoly pol-icy through a narrow perspective The introduction of the state monopoly policy was logically consistent with other policies the Chinese government ad-opted under the prevailing conditions of the time On the whole all these poli-cies served to accelerate industrialization and help the country catch up with and overtake more economically developed countries elsewhere in the world

Danli354

ltUNgt

If one looks at the entire lifespan of the state monopoly from its inception to its end one must acknowledge that the system did indeed play its intended historical role shortly after it took shape and its contribution to early industri-alization efforts should not go unrecognized Of course we should also see the ills to which this system gave rise in its later years as economic development levels rose The state monopoly arbitrarily erected a barrier between rural citi-zens and the market The state replaced grain markets with a uniform grain pur-chase and sale system which violated the law of value in price regulation and resource allocation Rural citizens with no guidance from the market did not have the right to dispose of their own products as they saw fit This lack of rights served to hurt their incentives to work which then contributed towards chronic economic shortages The state also suffered enormous losses in several areas and was encumbered with a heavy burden giving rise to grievances on the part of the government the rural population and the urban population alike We should draw lessons from this history The reforms the government instituted to the grain circulation system following 1985rsquos abolition of the state monopoly es-sentially placed emphasis on the role of the market as well as on the normative function of the law of value Thereafter as the state began to exert a degree of macroeconomic controls to ensure state grain security officials brought about a new grain circulation system suitable to the market economy and guided by the market Following the end of the state monopoly system many negative aspects of the system under the auspices of the planned economy have gradually been contained These include the ever-widening urban-rural gap limited room for social mobility inequality among social identities sluggish urbanization imbalances in social and economic structure unreasonable mechanisms for resource and production factor allocations and so on These too were histori-cally inevitable We should come to understand the state monopoly systemrsquos formation and development as set against the backdrop of a particular set of historical conditions We must not however deny the enormous positive role it once played on account of some of the adverse effects it had in its later years

References

Bernstein Thomas P ldquoCadre and Peasant Behavior Under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955rdquo in Chinese Commu-nist Politics in Action ed Doak Barnett (Seattle and London University of Washing-ton Press 1970)


事件的回顾》 [A Look Back on Several Major Policies and Events Vol 1] (Beijing Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 1991)


ltUNgt

Chen Guoqing 陈国庆 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de chansheng ji qi yingxiang 统购

统销政策的产生及其影响 [The Creation of the State Monopoly Policy and its Effects]rdquo Xuexi yu tansuo 《学习与探索》 2 (2006)

Chen Tingxuan 陈廷煊 ldquoJianguo yilai liangshi liutong tizhi de yanbian 建国以来粮

食流通体制的演变 [Evolution of the Grain Circulation System since the Found-ing of the Nation]rdquo Gaige 《改革》 6 (1996)

Chen Yun wenxuan (yi jiu si jiu ndash yi jiu wu liu nian) 《陈云文选(一九四九mdashmdash 一

九五六年)》 [Selected Works of Chen Yun (1949ndash1956)] (Beijing renmin chuban-she 1984)

Cui Xiaoli 崔晓黎 ldquoTonggoutongxiao yu gongye jilei 统购统销与工业积累 [The State Monopoly and Industrial Accumulation]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国

经济史研究》 4 (1988)Dai Daxin 戴大新 ldquoJianguo chuqi liang mian you tonggoutongxiao zhengce Pingxi

建国初期粮棉油统购统销政策评析 [Evaluation and Analysis of the Policy of State Monopoly on Grain Cotton and Oil in the Early Period of the Country]rdquo Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2 (2001)

Dangdai zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo 《当代中国的粮食工作》 [Grain Work in Contemporary China] ed Zhao Fasheng 赵发生 (Beijing Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1988)

Ding Shengjun 丁声俊 ldquoGuanyu woguo liangshi shangpin gouxiao tizhi de gaige 关于

我国粮食商品购销体制的改革 [On Reforms to the Purchase and Sale System of Grain Products in China]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济研究》 8 (1984)

Du Runsheng 杜润生 Zhongguo nongcun tizhi biange zhongda juece jishi 《中国农村

体制变革重大决策纪实》 [Records of Major Decisions in Reforms to Chinarsquos Rural System] (Beijing Renmin chubanshe 2005)

Gao Ying and Li Yueyun 高瑛李岳云 ldquoDui woguo liangshi chanxiao liyi shiheng wenti de fenxi 对我国粮食产销利益失衡问题的分析 [Analysis of the Issue of Imbalance of Interests between Production and Consumption of Grain in China]rdquo Jianghai xuekan 《江海学刊》 6 (2006)

Huang Zongzhi 黄宗智 Changjiang sanjiaozhou xiaonong jiating yu xiangcun fazhan 《长江三角洲小农家庭与乡村发展》 [The Peasant Family and Rural Develop-ment in the Yangzi Delta 1350ndash1988] (Zhonghua shuju 1992)


4册 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the Nation Vol 4] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1993)

Jianqiao zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (1949ndash1965) 《剑桥中华人民共和国史

(1949~1965)》 [Cambridge History of the Peoplersquos Republic of China (1949ndash1965)] ed Roderick MacFarquhar and Fei Zhengqing 费正清 translated from the English (Beijing Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1990)

Jin Su and Luo Yun 金溯罗芸 ldquoWoguo liangshi gouxiao tizhi yanbian yu gaige de sisuo 我国粮食购销体制演变与改革的思索 [The Evolution of Chinarsquos Grain

Danli356

ltUNgt

Purchase and Sale System and Thoughts on Reform]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》 4 (1998)

Lei Yi 雷颐 ldquolsquoRichang shenghuorsquo yu lishi yanjiu lsquo日常生活 rsquo与历史研究 [Research into lsquoDaily Lifersquo and History]rdquo Shixue lilun yanjiu 《史学理论研究》 3 (2000)

Lin Yifu Cai Fang and Li Zhou 林毅夫蔡昉李周 Zhongguo de qiji fazhan zhan-luumle yu jingji gaige 《中国的奇迹发展战略与经济改革》 [The Chinese Miracle Development Strategy and Economic Reforms] (Shanghai Shanghai sanlian shudian and Shanghai renmin chubanshe 1994)

Liu Chuanjiang 刘传江 ldquoZhongguo liangshi liutong de zhidu anpai ji qi bianqian 中国粮食流通的制度安排及其变迁 [Arrangements of Chinarsquos Grain Circula-tion System and Changes Thereto]rdquo Jingji pinglun 《经济评论》 2 (2000)

Lu Feng 卢锋 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce de shishi yu feishichang tizhi de jianli 统购

统销政策的实施与非市场体制的建立 [The Implementation of the State Mo-nopoly Policy and the Erection of a Non-Market System]rdquo Jiaoxue yu yanjiu 《教学

与研究》 3 (1989)Lu Ling 庐陵 ldquo1953 nian zhongguo de liangshi weiji yu tonggoutongxiao zhengce de

qiyuan 1953年中国的粮食危机与统购统销政策的起源 [Chinarsquos Grain Crisis of 1953 and the Genesis of the State Monopoly Policy]rdquo Beijing daxue yanjiusheng xuekan 《北京大学研究生学刊》 4 (1993)

Lu Yunhang 陆云航 ldquoDui jianqing nongmin fudan wenti de yi ge gongxian ndash tonggou-tongxiao dui liangshi shengchan yingxiang de shizheng yanjiu 1953ndash1982 对减

轻农民负担问题的一个贡献 mdashmdash统购统销对粮食生产影响的实证研究 1953~1982 [A Contribution to the Issue of Reducing Rural BurdensmdashEmpirical Research into the Influence of the State Monopoly on Grain Production]rdquo Nankai jingji yanjiu 《南开经济研究》 4 (2005)

Nongcun biange yu zhongguo fazhan 1978ndash1989 xia 《农村变革与中国发展 1978~1989》下 [Rural Revolution and Chinarsquos Development 1978ndash1989 Vol 2] ed Zhou Qiren 周其仁 (Hong Kong Oxford University Press China 1994)

Oi Jean C State and Peasant in Contemporary China The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley Los Angeles and Oxford University of California Press 1989)

Perkins Dwight H Market Control and Planning in Communist China (Cambridge Harvard University Press 1968)

Shue Vivenne Peasant China in Transition The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism 1949ndash1956 (Berkely University of California Press 1980)

Tang Shuiqing 汤水清 ldquoLun xin Zhongguo chengxiang eryuan shehui zhidu de xingcheng 论新中国城乡二元社会制度的形成 [On the Emergence of the Peo-plersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Dual Urbanndashrural Social System]rdquo Jiangxi shehui kexue 《江西社会科学》 8 (2006)

Tang Shuiqing 汤水清 ldquoShanghai liangshi jihua gongying zhidu de jianli (1953ndash1956) 上海粮食计划供应制度的建立(1953~1956)[Establishment of the Planned Grain


ltUNgt

Supply System in Shanghai (1953ndash1956)]rdquo (2005 doctoral thesis in the Fudan Univer-sity department of history)

Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoJianlun Chen Yun lianshi tonggoutongxiao sixiang ndash cong liangshi tonggoutongxiao zhengce zai Jiangsu Guanche shishi tanqi 简论陈

云粮食统购统销思想mdashmdash从粮食统购统销政策在江苏贯彻实行谈起 [Brief Commentary on Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of the State Grain Monopoly ndash Beginning with a Discussion of the Implementation of the State Grain Monopoly Policy in Jiangsu]rdquo Xue hai 《学海》 6 (1995)

Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoTonggoutongxiao qian Jiangsu diqu liangshi xingshi de huigu ji qi qishi 统购统销前江苏地区粮食形势的回顾及其启示 [A Look Back on the Grain Situation in the Jiangsu Region Prior to the State Monopoly and Lessons Learned]rdquo Xiandai jingji tantao 《现代经济探讨》 6 (1994)

Tang Wenqi 唐文起 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao shiqi de jiuzai gongzuo ndash Sich-uan sheng zhimiddotLiangshi zhi xuandeng 粮食统购统销时期的救灾工作mdashmdash 〈四川省志粮食志〉选登 [Disaster Relief Work in the Era of the State Grain MonopolymdashSelected Pieces from Records of Sichuan ProvincemiddotGrain Records]rdquo Liangshi wenti yanjiu 《粮食问题研究》 1 (1996)

Tang Zhong and Song Jiqing 唐忠宋继青 Liangpiao Liangjia 《粮票粮价》 [Grain Coupons Grain Prices] (Beijing Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 1992)

Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoTonggoutongxiao chuqi de liangshi piaozheng zhidu tanxi ndash yi 1953ndash1957 nian de Henan wei gersquoan 统购统销初期的粮食票证制度探析mdashmdash以

1953~1957 年的河南为个案 [Exploration of the Grain Coupon System in the Early State Monopoly PeriodmdashUsing 1953ndash1957 Henan as a Case Study]rdquo Shixue yuekan 《史学月刊》 5 (2004)

Tian Xiquan 田锡全 Geming yu nongcun ndash guojia sheng xian yu liangshi tonggou-tongxiao zhidu 1953ndash1957 《革命与乡村mdashmdash国家省县与粮食统购统销

制度 1953~1957》 [Revolution and the Countrysidemdashthe State the Province the County and the State Grain Monopoly System 1953ndash1957] (Shanghai Shehui kexue chubanshe 2006)

Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao zhidu de xingcheng ji qi zai Tang-he xian de yunzuo (1953ndash1957) 粮食统购统销制度的形成及其在唐河县的运

作(1953~1957) [The Formation of the State Grain Monopoly System and its Use in Tanghe County]rdquo (2004 doctoral thesis in the Fudan Unviersity department of history)

Tian Xiquan 田锡全 ldquoLiangshi tongoutongxiao zhidu yanjiu de huigu he sikao 粮食

统购统销制度研究的回顾和思考 [A Look Back on and Thoughts on Research into the State Grain Monopoly System]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史

研究》 2 (2006)Walker Kenneth R Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge

Cambridge University Press 1984)

Danli358

ltUNgt

Wan Dianwu 万典武 ldquoCong liangshi mian bu deng piaozheng de xingfei kan gaige从粮食棉布等票证的兴废看改革 [A Look at Reforms from the Rise and Fall of Coupon Systems for Grains Cotton Cloth and So On]rdquo Shangye jingji yanjiu 《商

业经济研究》 12 (1998)Wu Li 武力 ldquo1949ndash1978 nian zhongguo ldquojiandaochardquo charsquoe bianzheng 1949~1978年中

国 lsquo剪刀差 rsquo差额辨正 [Identification and Correction of Chinarsquos lsquoPrice Scissorsrsquo Dis-crepancy from 1949 to 1978]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研究》 4 (2001)

Wu Li 武力 ldquoShilun jianguo yilai nongye shengyu ji qi fenpei zhidu de bianhua 试论建

国以来农业剩余及其分配制度的变化 [On the Subject of Changes to Agricul-tural Surpluses and Distribution Systems since the Founding of the Nation]rdquo Fujian shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 《福建师范大学学报(哲学社会

科学版)》 3 (2004)Wu Shuo 吴硕 ldquoTongoutongxiao yu jiazhi guiluuml de yunyong 统购统销与价值规律

的运用 [The State Monopoly and Use of the Law of Value]rdquo Jingji yanjiu 《经济

研究》 1 (1984)Xiao Donglian 肖冬连 ldquoJiasu nongye jitihua de yige zhongyao dongyin ndash lun youx-

ian fazhan zhong gongye yu nongye de maodun 加速农业集体化的一个重要

动因mdashmdash论优先发展重工业与农业的矛盾 [An Important Factor Behind Acceleration of Agricultural Collectivization ndash On the Conflict between Prioritized Development of Heavy Industry and Agriculture]rdquo Zhonggong dang shi yanjiu《中

共党史研究》 4 (1988)Xie Jing 谢敬 ldquoDui tonggoutongxiao zhengce yunxing sanshi yu nian de huigu yu

pingxi 对统购统销政策运行三十余年的回顾与评析 [A Look Back on Com-mentary on and Analysis of the Over Thirty Years of the State Monopoly Policy]rdquo Jiangxi shehui kexue 《江西社会科学》 4 (2003)

Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 《新时期农业

和农村工作重要文献选编》 [Selected Important Works on Agriculture and Rural Work in the New Era] (Beijing Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1992)

Xu Jianqing 徐建青 ldquoJianguo qianqi de shijia yu paijia ndash cong jiage jizhi dao tonggou-tongxiao 建国前期的市价与牌价mdashmdash从价格机制到统购统销 [Market Prices and Government-set prices in the Early Days of the Nationmdashfrom Pricing Mechanisms to the State Monopoly]rdquo Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu 《中国经济史研究》 2 (2002)

Yang Wenliang 杨文良 ldquoLiangshi gouxiao lsquoliang tou jiao zhongjian xiaorsquo xianxiang toushi 粮食购销 lsquo两头叫中间笑 rsquo现象透视 [Perspective on the Phenomenon of lsquoBoth Ends Making the Middle Laughrsquo in the Purchase and Sale of Grain]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》 11 (1995)

Yi Shui 亦水 ldquolsquoShi bu shi haiyou biede banfarsquo ndash cong quding tonggoutongxiao zhengce kan Chen Yun de gongzuo he jiejue fangfa lsquo是不是还有别的办法rsquomdashmdash从确定


ltUNgt

统购统销政策看陈云的工作和决策方法 [lsquoIs There Another WayrsquomdashA Look at Chen Yunrsquos Work and Methodological Approach through the Establishment of the State Monopoloy Policy]rdquo Dang de wenxian 《党的文献》 3 (2005)

Zeng Wei 曾伟 ldquoLiangshi tonggoutongxiao zai Guangdong lishi shang suo qi de jiji zuoyong he xiaoji zuoyong 粮食统购统销在广东历史上所起的积极作用和消

极作用 [The Positive Effects and Negative Effects the State Grain Monopoly Played in the History of Guangdong]rdquo Shangye jingji wenhui 《商业经济文荟》 5 (1996)

Zhang Fengrsquoao 张凤翱 ldquoJianlun Chen Yun de lsquowu liang ze luanrsquo sixiang 简论陈云

的 rsquo无粮则乱 rsquo思想 [A Brief Discussion of Chen Yunrsquos Ideology of lsquoWithout Grain there is Anarchyrsquo]rdquo Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao 《湖南师范大学社

会科学学报》 5 (2001)Zhang Jishun 张济顺 ldquoShanghai lilong jiceng zhengzhi dongyuan yu guojia shehui

yitihua zouxiang (1950ndash1955) 上海里弄基层政治动员与国家社会一体化走向

(1950~1955) [Shanghai Alleys Grassroots Political Mobilization and Trends of Na-tional Social Integration (1950ndash1955)]rdquo Zhongguo shehui kexue 《中国社会科学》 2 (2004)

Zhang Quanxin 张泉欣 ldquoMianhua gouxiao zhidu gaige yanjiu 棉花购销制度改革研

究 [Research into Reforms to the Cotton Purchase and Sale System]rdquo Nongye jingji wenti《农业经济问题》5 (1996)

Zhang Xuebing 张学兵 ldquo1953 ndash 1958 nian tonggoutongxiao ji ge wenti kaoyi 1953~1958 年统购统销几个问题考议 [Discussion of Some Issues of the State Monopoly from 1953 to 1958]rdquo Changbai xuekan 《长白学刊》 4 (2006)

Zhang Zhihua 张治华 ldquoJiage dui woguo liangshi shengchan yingxiang de shizheng fenxi ji zhengce jianyi 价格对我国粮食生产影响的实证分析及政策建议 [Em-pirical Analysis of the Influence of Prices on Chinarsquos Grain output and Policy Sug-gestions]rdquo Zhongguo nongcun jingji 《中国农村经济》 9 (1997)

Zhao Longyue 赵龙跃 ldquoLiangshi chanxiao zhengce de kexue jueze 粮食产销政策的

科学抉择 [Scientific Choices for Grain output and Consumption Policies]rdquo Jingji kexue 《经济科学》 6 (1994)

Zheng Yougui 郑有贵 ldquoLiangshi liutong tizhi gaige zhengce yanbian ji qi jixiao fenxi 粮食流通体制改革政策演变及其绩效分析 [Reforms to the Grain Circulation System Analysis of Changes to Policies and their Effects]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》 4 (1998)

Zhongguo nongcun shehui jingji bianqian (1949ndash1989) 《中国农村社会经济变迁

(1949~1989)》 [Rural Socioeconomic Changes in China (1949ndash1989)] ed Chen Jiyuan et al 陈吉元等 (Shanxi jingji chubanshe 1993)

Zhongguo zhidu bianqian de anli yanjiu di 1 ji 《中国制度变迁的案例研究》第 1 集 [Evolution of Chinarsquos Institutions and Case Studies Vol 1] ed Beijing Tianze Re-search Center 北京天则研究所 (Shanghai Renmin chubanshe 1996)

Danli360

ltUNgt

Zhou Zuyin and Jiang Shaoqing 周祖尹姜绍卿 ldquoGuanyu tiaozheng liangshi zhenggou jishu de chubu tantao ndash cong tieling diqu shangpinliang jidi kan liangshi zhenggou banfa de gaige 关于调整粮食征购基数的初步探讨mdashmdash从铁岭地区

商品粮基地看粮食征购办法的改革 [An Initial Exploration into Adjusting Base Numbers for Grain RequisitioningmdashA Look at Reforms to Grain Requisitioning Methods in the Commodity Grain Base of Tieling]rdquo Nongye jingji 《农业经济》 1 (1983)

Zhu Dan 朱丹 ldquoTonggoutongxiao zhengce zai Hubei de shishi ji yingxiang 统购统销

政策在湖北的实施及影响 [The Implementation and Effects of the State Monop-oly Policy in Hubei]rdquo Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu 《当代中国史研究》 1 (1995)

ltUNgt

Index

abnormal marriagesemsp327academicsemsp5 25n1 26ndash28 32 36 43

53 102ndash103n5 121 134 156 193 224 227 330 330n1 333n8 343ndash344n49

accumulationemsp7 26 45 69 169 171 206 208 235 246 257 304 336 337 337n24 339 343 350 351 353

accumulation of means of productionemsp257adjudicationemsp241adjustments to agricultureemsp307adventurismemsp145ndash146 151agricultural civilizationemsp287agricultural collectivizationemsp1 5ndash11 55

156n3 190ndash191n56 231 257 342 343 343n47 353

agricultural cooperative movementemsp69 70 109 288 342 343 353

agricultural cooperativesemsp53 62 75 82 102 102n4 104ndash106 116 133 135ndash139 136n7 136n10 141 150 164 232 246 257 320 342 343

agricultural cooperatizationemsp6n8 53 67 70 162n18

agricultural frontemsp106agricultural history researchemsp267n1 268agricultural household registrationsemsp45 217agricultural investmentsemsp220 221agricultural modernizationemsp28 41 213agricultural productionemsp3 6ndash8 15 26 30ndash32

41 48 106 116 123 136 161 176ndash178 246 252n36 272 283 288 291 297 318 320 332 333 338ndash340 342

agricultural production front lineemsp178agricultural production mutual aidemsp246agricultural productivityemsp1 4 26 79 109

282ndash284 292 339agricultural products and by-productsemsp119

158 171 194 337agricultural science and technologyemsp283agricultural surplusesemsp6 29 337 337n22

339 353agricultural taxesemsp16 53n2 165 166 337agricultural yieldsemsp26 75 78 79 96 103 106

107 109 113 127 127n31 174 176

allocationsemsp14 16 30 42 43 46 121 149 162 182 182n43 183 188 188n51 200 214 246 268 280 285 288 291 299ndash303 305 306 312 336 341 342 354

amenorrheaemsp157American cornemsp310 311Anhuiemsp15 31 60 62 63n14 64 65 68 82 89

182 268 271 273 275n4 278 281 282 298 304

animal products industriesemsp295anti-rightist movementemsp125 127appropriate rural landemsp47appropriationemsp39 47 49 159 161ndash174

172n27 176 178 179 186 188 189 215aquatic productsemsp331 332Asian Financial Crisisemsp43assemblies of geniuses and heroesemsp108austereemsp349auxiliary foods See non-staple foods

backwardnessemsp7 109 283 336backwardness of the rural economyemsp262backyard furnaceemsp118balancing of supply and demandemsp285ndash286bambooemsp110 118 166 171 181 182 182n43

188n52 220 327bankruptemsp159ndash160 174 189 206 207 255 256basic grain supplyemsp333beansemsp109 119 271 278 279 279n7 288 289

300 307 308Beidaiheemsp78 117 118Beijingemsp6n9 12n21 26n2 30 37 49 55n6

55n7 70n18 71n19 75n3 77n8 78n10 82 95n28 97n33 112n20 121n13 121n14 122n15 124n20 126n26 128n33 129 129n35 130n36 143n29 156n3 158n7 159n10 160n11 160n12 161n16 161n17 162n18 194n6 232n2 244n20 267n1 268 271 273 277 278 280 281 289 295n5 298 317 322n18 330n3 331n4 334n11 334n12 334n14 335n18 338n25 348n65 348n66 352n79

bicyclesemsp197 347big responsibility systememsp199ndash203 205Bixi Roademsp18 212ndash213 227

blind direction of productionemsp165 174 188 188n52

blockadesemsp293border regionemsp53 314ndash328Bo Yiboemsp71 71n19 77n8 128n33 143n29

161n17 330n3 333 333n9 334 338 338n27 340 340n33

burden on rural citizensemsp43 119 214 216 224 225

busy seasonemsp13 116 122 177 250busy-season childcare centersemsp133ndash152

capital accumulationemsp69 336 337 339 350 351 353

capital accumulation for industrializationemsp339

capitalist industrial and commercial enterprisesemsp330

capitalist roademsp244capitalistsemsp53 160 244 293 330capitalizationemsp259capital shortagesemsp262cash crop productionemsp278CAS Soil Instituteemsp92cattleemsp316CBEs See commune brigade enterprises

(CBEs)CCP See Communist Party of China (CCP)CCP Central Directives on Deep Plowing and

Soil Improvementemsp78CCP Central General Officeemsp109CCP Central Northeast Bureau Rural Work

Departmentemsp56CCP Central Politburoemsp78 117 121CCP Central South-Central Bureau Rural

Work Departmentemsp63CCP Fifth Central Committeeemsp108CCP Politburo Standing Committeeemsp267Central Committeeemsp12 30 34 54 55 74 97

108 116 117 120ndash122 125 126 128ndash130 158 161 163 174 194n6 244 283 331 347

Central Document Number Oneemsp299 338Central Financial Committeeemsp331central governmentemsp3 11 31 38 40 46 47

49 51 117 126 158 189 195 214 268 271ndash274 278 280ndash286 288 289 294 297 298ndash300 311 331

Central Secretariatemsp161Chaharemsp55

Changge Countyemsp75ndash77 76n4 76n5 79ndash81 80n12 83ndash88 92 93 93n24 96 97

Changshu Cityemsp18 212ndash227chemical fertilizersemsp2ndash4 15 16 168 283Chen Yunemsp29 30 174 334 335 343 345Chiang Kai-shekemsp267chickensemsp144 332Childcareemsp14 124 133ndash152 178childcare mutual aidemsp134 142n26chili peppersemsp327China Academy of Agricultural Sciencesemsp84

87 95 95n31 367n1China Academy of Agricultural Sciences

Mechanization Instituteemsp84China Academy of Sciences Biology

Divisionemsp94China Academy of Sciences (CAS)

Mechanical Instituteemsp90China Institute of Agricultural Sciencesemsp93China Institute of Water Resources and

Hydropower Researchemsp94 94n27Chinarsquos economyemsp3 288Chinese civilizationemsp287ndash288Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central

Committeeemsp54Chinese Peoplersquos Political Consultative

Conference (CPPCC)emsp144 319n12CIF See cost insurance and freight (CIF)circulation of agricultural productsemsp48circulation system for agricultural

productsemsp48citizen incomeemsp217 219 220 222ndash224class distributionemsp237 238class lineemsp261climatic and geographic conditionsemsp293coalemsp106 125 149 183 197 267 347collateralemsp251 252collective agricultureemsp1 10 15 339collective asset managementemsp226collective assetsemsp214ndash220 222ndash227collective contractingemsp200 205collective economic organizationsemsp41

212ndash227collective economyemsp18 181 203 213 224collective-owned assetsemsp219collective ownershipemsp160 318 327collective ownership systememsp318collective property rightsemsp225collective-run enterpriseemsp217 219 220

362 Index

ltUNgt

collective welfare enterprisesemsp118 124 147ndash152

collectivizationemsp1ndash11 14ndash18 29 41 53 55 70 101ndash114 149 156n3 201 231 257 314ndash328 342 343 350 353

collectivized productionemsp125commodity grainsemsp295 300 346 346n59commune and brigade industriesemsp194commune brigade enterprises (CBEs)emsp16ndash17

192ndash196 192ndash207 198ndash208communismemsp11 13 117 118 123 142 150 151

156 156n2 158 159 160 167communist base areasemsp134Communist Party of China (CCP)emsp10 12 28

54ndash59 63 74 76ndash78 81 108 109 116 117 120ndash122 125 126 128 129 133 158 161 174 176 179 194 213 219 232 244 267 283 331 347

Communist Party of China (CCP)rsquos Eighth National Congressemsp76

communist pilotsemsp117comparative advantagesemsp292 294 297ndash299

302ndash306 308 309 313compensation and promotions of local

officialsemsp215compulsory educationemsp41 46Compulsory Education Lawemsp46Conference of 7000 Cadresemsp174conservationemsp102ndash107 109ndash114 124 130conservation workemsp102 103 103n5 104

104n8 105 106 109 113constructionemsp3 5 7 10 11 13 14 16 18 19 26

27 31 33 34 38 40ndash42 75 76 101ndash114 116 117 119 120 134 142 143 146 148 149 151 160 162 163 164 165 168 170 177 181 182 188 196 197 212ndash227 257 259 283 285ndash286 300 310ndash312 318 322 324 325 331 333 338 342 344ndash345

consumer goodemsp2ndash3 11 288consumptionemsp10 33 120 122 149 166 255

273 277 279 280 284 288 295 296 303 304 306 307 310 311 333 336 339 340 341 350 352

consumption quotasemsp339contracting system for collective

enterprisesemsp219contracting systemsemsp102ndash107 109ndash114 124

130 206contract management systememsp215

contract purchase systememsp341contract purchasing and market purchasing

systemsemsp285controls on imports and exportsemsp286cooperative economic organizationsemsp

224ndash225 261cooperative economiesemsp224ndash225 261cooperative movementemsp6 63 69 70 109 116

134 136 185 288 342 343 353cooperativizationemsp45cooperatizationemsp6n8 53 67 69 70 105 108

109 134 141 144 162n18 334copperemsp166 331cornemsp19 31 76 77 80 106 151 272ndash284

289 291ndash293 295 296 300 302 304 306ndash312

Corn Beltemsp283 284 292 302 309ndash312corn processingemsp283corn surplusesemsp281corruptionemsp40cost insurance and freight (CIF)emsp311cottage industriesemsp193cottonemsp27ndash30 63 77 119 197 255 273 278

280 331 332 340 341 347ndash349coupon rationing systememsp347ndash348coupon systememsp31 347ndash349credit cooperativesemsp239 245 251 256

258ndash263creditworthinessemsp248 251ndash252crisis preparednessemsp253crop failuresemsp10 37n16 66 67n16 312crossover zonesemsp67 68Cultural Revolutionemsp4 11n18 82n15 318 323cultureemsp42 47 51 102n5 147 150 175cyanosisemsp157

damsemsp102 102n3 104 167Dazhaiemsp12 30 110 111n19 283debt burdensemsp43 232 255 256debt to agricultureemsp48decommissioned and discharged

service-peopleemsp323deep plowingemsp12 13 18 74ndash97demand for grainemsp31 32 273 277 289 295

301 306 333 349democratic governmentsemsp53 54democratic policiesemsp71democratic principlesemsp159Deng Xiaopingemsp1 31 129

363Index

ltUNgt

Deng Xiaopingrsquos ldquosouthern tourrdquoemsp31depositsemsp101 232 258 259 261development advantages of grain

productionemsp285dietary alkaliemsp347disaster reliefemsp31 331 345 346disaster relief grainemsp331disastersemsp10 11 31 33 127 173 235 286 326

331 345 346dischargedemobilizationemsp321ndash323distributionemsp6 10 15 30 46ndash47 51ndash71 93

117 118 120 122 126 127 161 166 168 197 200 203 204n32 220 222 223 225 237 238 278 286 297 302 336 337n22 339 341

Document Number Oneemsp299 338 341domestic and international marketsemsp302 310domestic industrial comparative

advantageemsp306domestic resources and marketsemsp299downsizing of urban workforcesemsp328draft animalsemsp5ndash6 79 80 81 84 91 92 95

256dried fruits and nutsemsp332droughtemsp10 307 326Dual-oversightemsp215ducksemsp332

East Chinaemsp31 60 64 88 213 288economic backwardnessemsp336economic competitionemsp68ndash70economic constructionemsp11 31 34 41 331

333 344economic developmentemsp1 2 53 54 65ndash67

69 120 193 210 213 223 234 256 267 277 297 299 306 307 309 330 346 352ndash354

economic globalizationemsp295n5 299 302 305ndash313

economic growthemsp3 11 14 43 55 69 212 216 223 225ndash227 292ndash296 299 301 309 351

economic reliefemsp262economic restructuringemsp294 299 300economic special zonesemsp294economic statusemsp49 238 254economyemsp1 2n1 4n4 9n15 13 26 33 42 44

53 62 70 91 112 118 156 182 201 208 213n2 216 217 223 224 239 285 294 295 299 304 308 309 331 333n8 350 350n74

edemaemsp157edible oilsemsp349educated youth (zhiqing)emsp318educationemsp42 46 47 51 92 140ndash142 145 147

150ndash152 175 190 190n56 197 320 321egalitarianismemsp54 118 129 156 159eggsemsp96 332 347Eight Character Guiding Policyemsp128elderlyemsp69 124 249 252 253embezzlementemsp188emergency grain reservesemsp331empty shell villagesemsp224Englandemsp351enterprise of communismemsp142 150era of collectivizationemsp1 101ndash114 201

314ndash328era of cooperatizationemsp141 144exchange of equivalentsemsp159ndash161exchanges of technologyemsp305exploitationemsp7 52 160 234 241 253exploiter classemsp240exploit the peasant massesemsp248export processingemsp196

factor and market pricesemsp353factor pricesemsp342family-based agricultural operationsemsp330family-based petty peasant economyemsp307family side businessesemsp123 176family side industriesemsp194famineemsp11n20 12n22 12n23 120 127 157 240

249 252 326ndash328 1012famous Chinese brandsemsp213 217farm field infrastructureemsp312farm implementsemsp6 76n5 84 84n18 88 89

90n20 96n32 162 164 168 169 171 185 189 196 235 256 259

farming implementsemsp76 81 246 251farming machineryemsp283feed productionemsp280 281 284ndash286female laboremsp134 136 137 139 142n28

146n39 150fertilizeremsp2ndash4 15 16 27 76 77 80 93 95 96

106 168 256 257 259 283feudal exploitationemsp241feudal landlord classemsp248financial battlefrontemsp330financial organizationsemsp261 263financial regulationemsp215fire-cured tobaccoemsp327 331

364 Index

ltUNgt

first big and second publicemsp146 148First Five-year Planemsp7 8 10 333 337First Ministry of Machine-Buildingemsp90 91

91n21fishemsp33 166 198 347fisheriesemsp32 198five constantsemsp215five things in vogueemsp156 156n2 159 161fixed quota systememsp284flood controlemsp102 102n3flow of rural populationemsp320ndash324food processingemsp196 285food securityemsp312 313food supplyemsp117 127 280food supply systememsp117 118forcible borrowingemsp241foreign exchangeemsp275 284foreign researchersemsp332 349 350foreign resourcesemsp306foreign trade systememsp305forestry centersemsp318ndash320 324four great freedomsemsp231freedom to lendemsp231 242free marketemsp331 352fresh fruitsemsp332Fujianemsp17 19n35 37 40 60 64 65 68 88

122n16 214 268 272 274 278 281 282 292 298 304 306 311 314ndash328 337n22

Gan-Min-Yue Border Regionemsp314n2 315ndash317 319ndash322 324 326 328

Gansuemsp37 53 60 64 65 68 82 268 271 284 298

geeseemsp332general line for the transitionary periodemsp63

244 246 351genetically modified (GMO)emsp309ndash310geographical advantagesemsp304 308 309 313global economyemsp294 299 309gluttonousemsp255GMO See genetically modified (GMO)ldquogoing to the countrysiderdquoemsp315ndash320government allocationsemsp268government-enterprise relationsemsp214government-enterprise separationemsp218government fixed purchase systememsp341government grain reservesemsp292government-set pricesemsp333 336 337grainemsp26 63 76 103n5 119 136 166 222 233

267ndash313 316 331

grain allocationemsp280 288 300 301 303 306

grain allocation and sales agreementsemsp306grain as the guiding principleemsp30 176grain circulationemsp45 286 292n3 293

299ndash301 311 313grain circulation systememsp281 301ndash303

332 335 337n17 340ndash342 344 352 354grain couponsemsp31 347ndash349 348n66

349n67grain crisis of 1953emsp7 332 335 335n18grain crisis of spring 1955emsp349grain growersemsp340grain industry structureemsp306 307grain outputemsp3 31 33 41 106 108 112

119 127ndash129 271 279 281ndash286 289 292 294 297 299 301 306 308 312ndash313 341 343

grain price fluctuationsemsp285grain pricesemsp19 30 33 41 45 285 295

297 300 304 339 341 348 348n66grain processing enterprisesemsp305grain processing industriesemsp280grain protectionemsp297 304grain rationsemsp128 222 323grain requisitioningemsp119 123 179 346

347 349 350grain reserve systememsp286grains and cereals flowsemsp267ndash286 332n7

333n8 335n16 340n32 340n38 348n63grain self-sufficiencyemsp272 273 281 291

292 295grain shortagesemsp10 289 292 293 296

301 304 306 310 311 352ndash353grain surplusesemsp30 288 289 293 300

304 307grain yieldsemsp82n13 105ndash107 111ndash113 119

271 288 291 293 326ndash327 338grand and spectacular movementemsp79Grand Canalemsp288grand tacticsemsp174 177grand tactics operationsemsp164grassroots laboremsp112grassroots organizationsemsp342ndash344Grassroots Political Mobilizationemsp343ndash344

344n50great enterprise of communismemsp142Great Forging of Steel and Ironemsp119 164 166

168 171 172 174 188ndash189

365Index

ltUNgt

Great Forging of Steel and Iron movementemsp156 323

Great Forging of Steel and Iron of the Entire Populaceemsp118

Great Leapemsp12n22 12n23 146Great Leap Forwardemsp1 2 4 9ndash14 74ndash97

106 115ndash118 116n2 123 125ndash127 126n26 155ndash158 167 174 178 188n52 271 289 315 323 338

green channelemsp315Guangdongemsp37 40 61 63ndash65 68 128 128n34

268 268n3 271 273 274 278 281 282 298 304 306 311 314ndash328 346 346n58

Guangxiemsp61 88 103 268 271 273 274 278 281 282 298 311

Guangzhou Central Working Conferenceemsp129

guarantoremsp251 252Guizhouemsp37 61 64 65 68 126 268 271 272

274 278 295 298 306

handicraft industriesemsp176handicraftsemsp14 145 151 194 196handicraft workshopsemsp330Han Dynastiesemsp103Hangzhou Grain Bureauemsp310healthcareemsp46 47 51 117n3 219 221 259health insuranceemsp216heavy industryemsp2 3 11 335 336 342 343

343n47 349 351 353heavy industry basesemsp273 278 280Hebeiemsp16 55 60 64 65 68 80 82 82n13

115ndash130 192ndash208 268 271 272 274 277n6 281 284 298 347n62

Hebei Provincial Committeeemsp117 119ndash122 124 129

Hebei Provincial Party Congressemsp120Heilongjiangemsp19 54n5 56ndash60 64 65 68

268 271 282 284 298 310 311Heilongjiang Farm and Land Reclamation

Bureauemsp310 311high-interest loansemsp259 260 262high yield agricultureemsp168high yieldsemsp92ndash96 107 109 110 112 166 168

304hired farmhand householdsemsp55 237 238

247 250 252 254 256 258hired farmhandsemsp55 234 237 238 242 253

262

hiring relationshipsemsp244history of contemporary Chinaemsp351ldquohope projectsrdquoemsp46 226n5household contract responsibility

systememsp30 33 36 41 198 202 205 220 emsp 222 223 299

household economiesemsp63 176 239 262household operationsemsp203 204household planningemsp344household registrationsemsp35 45 217 315n4

322 345household registration systememsp9 45 327

344 345household responsibility system (HRS)emsp1 15

26 199 202 203 206 222housingemsp117n3 140 163 164 165 169n26

169n27 170 174 181ndash185 181n38 183n46 186n50 188n51 218 219

HRS See Household responsibility system (HRS)

Huang-Huai-Hai Regionemsp273 277n6 278 280 281 302

Hubeiemsp8 42 61ndash65 62n11 68 82 231ndash263 268 273 274 275n4 278 281 282 287n1 298 304 345 345n54 346 347n62 350

human migrationemsp321hunanemsp61ndash66 62n12 66n15 68 128 129 244

268 271 273 274 275n4 278ndash282 298 304ndash305 335n16 340n38 350

husbandryemsp32 83 196 198 296husbandry industryemsp301

illicit tradingemsp328illiteracyemsp41ndash42imbalance between supply and demand of

grainemsp333imbalance in grains and cereals outputemsp277immature soilemsp76 78 79 92 105 106

108ndash109impoverished rural householdsemsp258 261 262improved varietiesemsp283 291 293incomeemsp4 6 9 26 27 35ndash37 43 50 52

56n8 61 63ndash67 67n16 70 70n18 123 137 139 169 176 181 194 197 198 202 214ndash227 235 240 247 249 253ndash255 261 262 285 304 308 327 336

distributionemsp9 46ndash47 51redistributionemsp336

incomes of northern rural citizensemsp308

366 Index

ltUNgt

increased yieldsemsp13 75 76n6 96 97individual economyemsp62 68 70 201ndash203indolenceemsp255industrial commoditiesemsp337industrializationemsp1ndash3 8 14ndash18 27 33 34 45

48 217 288 330 334ndash337 339 342 344 350 351 353 354

industrial monopolyemsp336industrial productsemsp28 337industryemsp7 10 26ndash28 33 35 42 54 91n21

127 140 175ndash178 193n4 195 197 203ndash205 207 213 217 220 223 279 281 282 285 295 299 301 302 306ndash309 313 320 332 343 351

comparative advantagesemsp299 302 309 313

restructuringemsp295structureemsp301 306 307 309 351

infirmemsp39 69 174 249 253information and transportation

technologyemsp302infrastructureemsp27 33 38 41 170 312 325infrastructure for grain circulationemsp286

297Inner Mongoliaemsp64 68 83 83n16 268 271

272 281 282 284inputs of laboremsp339Institute of Economics of the China Academy

of Sciencesemsp121 193n4institutional planningemsp328insuranceemsp216 219 222 311integrated nationwide grain

marketemsp285ndash286integration with the global economyemsp299

309intensive agricultureemsp96 176 293interestemsp4 8 33 34 40 45 46 53 54 121 140

164 190 214 232ndash234 238 240ndash244 248ndash253 255 257ndash259 262 294 300 304 309 340n32

interest-free loansemsp248 250 262interest ratesemsp164 243 244 249 250 251

253 258 262interlaced influence effectemsp207international comparative advantage in rice

productionemsp308international embargoemsp5 312international marketsemsp302ndash304 306 307

310 313

inter-provincial planned allocations of grainemsp299

inter-regional grain circulationemsp293 299 311inter-regional grain flowsemsp287ndash313intra-regional transfersemsp268irrigationemsp4 14 41 75 97 101n2 104 104n7

105n11 106n12 111 113 113n21 116 119 175 221 256 257 293 312

irrigation worksemsp27 33 75 102 116 119 164 167 168 170 174 181 185 283 300

Japanemsp28 48 53 54 54n3 310Jiangnanemsp103 155n1Jiangsuemsp17 37 40 60 64 65 68 82 155ndash190

212ndash213 217 222 225ndash227 268 273 275n4 278 281 282 298 310 345 345n55 345n56 346 346n56 347n62

Jiangsu Bosideng Corpemsp222Jiangsu Changsheng Group Co Ltdemsp217

219ndash220Jiangsu Menglan Group Coemsp221Jiangxiemsp61ndash63 62n13 182 244 268 271 273

275n4 278 280ndash282 298 305 314ndash328Jiang Zeminemsp42Jilinemsp54n5 56 57 59 60 64 65 68 83n16

268 271 274 277n6 278 280ndash282 284 298

Jiulian Mountainsemsp315

kindergartenemsp14 124 133ndash152 164knitting industryemsp205Kunshanemsp157 157n5 184 185 187 188n51

laboremsp2ndash4 6 9 10 12ndash14 16 17 27 29 30 31 33 35 36 47 49 52 54 69 80 81ndash83 94 95 97 105 106 108ndash112 110 111 116 116n2 118 119 125 128 129 134ndash140 136 137 143n28 146n39 150 151 156 160 162 163 165 168ndash170 174 175ndash178ndash180 176ndash178 178n36 188n52 189 204 205 206 219 219n4 223 233 238 240 250 251 253 255 258 285 288 294 295 297 303 307 315 317 318ndash320 324 325 328 339

and land productivityemsp285cooperativesemsp177exchangeemsp138ndash140

laboring massesemsp93 232 238 239laid-off workersemsp316

367Index

ltUNgt

laissez-faireemsp122landemsp29 53 75 103 123 136 158 202 214

234 282 294 316 336appropriationsemsp49and labor costsemsp297ownershipemsp50ndash51 53pawningemsp255reformsemsp5 5n7 6 9 10 33 52ndash71 75

231ndash241 246ndash258 262 288 333rentingemsp244requisitioningemsp38 39 40 49 179 181resourceemsp38 40 168 178 294 307revolutionsemsp53salesemsp49 244 255taxesemsp336

landlord classemsp232 234 238 240 248landlordsemsp53 54 60 64 160 232 234 235

237 238 240 248 250 251 253laogaiemsp180large formation warfareemsp325large-scale campaignsemsp178 184large-scale construction of farm fieldsemsp312

325large-scale development of farm fieldsemsp283large-scale economic constructionemsp331 334large-scale establishment of collective

settlementsemsp172large-scale establishment of commune and

brigade public enterprisesemsp174large-scale establishment of public

canteensemsp121 123 156 164 166 167 172large-scale movementsemsp165 328law of valueemsp338 338n26 347 354leatheremsp197 200 331leftistemsp13 54 113 118 120 123ndash125 127 156

174 271 272ldquoleftistrdquo mistakesemsp118 120 125 156 174 271

272legislative protectionsemsp241Lehui Rice Companyemsp310liaoningemsp54n5 56 59 60 64 65 68 82

82n15 268 271 274 277n6 278 282 284 289 298

Liaoxiemsp56ndash59liberating female laborersemsp137 142n28liberationemsp26 53ndash54 54n4 116n2 125 134ndash

135 137 142n28 150ndash152 233 251n35liberation of womenemsp125Li Dequanemsp144light industryemsp2 351

Lijiazhaiemsp75 79 96Li Pengemsp18 212 213n2literacyemsp41ndash42 137Liu Shaoqiemsp129 161 161n16livestock feedemsp273 275 277ndash281 292 295

industryemsp273 275 280manufacturing industryemsp292 295processing industryemsp279

living needsemsp240 263living standardsemsp301 304 347Li Xiannianemsp29 30Liyuejuemsp75loansemsp3 7 18 159 232ndash235 238ndash263 300loan sharkingemsp232 245 248 254local processing of grainsemsp284loessemsp101Loess Plateauemsp101ndash104 102n2 102n5 103n5

103n6 106 107 109ndash113loomsemsp202 204ndash205 207lower-middle-income peasantemsp261low-interest loansemsp240 260low interest ratesemsp250 258 262Luuml Bingguangemsp76 76n7Luumlliang Mountain Rangeemsp101Lushan Conferenceemsp123ndash125 127 157

macroeconomic controlsemsp43 353 354macroeconomic policyemsp285 286 307 339

342main foods See staple foodsManchuriaemsp58manureemsp76 95 96 106 116 166manure fertilizeremsp95Mao Zedongemsp6n9 31 33 54 75 75n2 75n3

77 97n33 112 112n20 121 121n13 121n14 124n21 128n34 156 159n10 160n11 160n12 189 244n20 267 318

market economyemsp17 18 39 44ndash45 50 280 312 343n49 354

marketizationemsp281marketization reformsemsp268 281 294n4

299ndash301 303marketsemsp2 4 7 13 17 18 27 28 31ndash32 38

39 41 44ndash45 50 182 182n43 194 217 249 280 285ndash286 297 299 301ndash307 310ndash313 331ndash333 333n10 336 337 341 343n49 345 349 349n69 352ndash354

operationsemsp333pricing mechanismemsp333reformsemsp13 285

368 Index

ltUNgt

resource allocation mechanismsemsp336marriage and funeral expensesemsp259martyrsemsp69 108marxistemsp159 160mass lineemsp13 162 176matchesemsp117n3 347Ma Tongyiemsp75meal ticketemsp122 123 126 127means of productionemsp69 162 166 168 182

257 258 303 334meat productionemsp296mechanisms for resource and production

factor allocationsemsp354mechanizedemsp307mechanized agricultureemsp297microeconomic management

mechanismsemsp342microeconomic restrictionsemsp353middle-income-peasanthoodemsp254middle-income peasant householdsemsp240

247 254 255 261middle-peasant-izationemsp65 67 67n17 71middle peasantsemsp6 9 53 54 55 60 64 67

69 70 129 238 239 242 244 250 254 256 257 262 318

migrant laborersemsp31 35 36 47 49migrantsemsp1 17 39 49 151 325militaryemsp13 80 82 160 165 168 180ndash181 242

251 321 322 325n28 328milkemsp347milletemsp77minesemsp316 320Ming and Qing Dynastiesemsp288 327Ministry of Agricultureemsp40 43 49 77 78 84

84n18 90n20 91 125 212n1 267n1Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)emsp268 270

276 288 291Ministry of Financeemsp43 52 53n2Ministry of Land and Resourcesemsp38 49Ministry of Land Resourcesemsp40Ministry of Water Resourcesemsp39ndash40misappropriations of funds and

materialsemsp156model kindergartensemsp142ndash149modern corporate governance

structuresemsp226modern corporate systemsemsp218modern financial systememsp262MOFCOM See Ministry of Commerce

(MOFCOM)

money lendingemsp45mountain-bound migrationemsp326mountainousemsp103 108 109 113 315 318 324

325 328mountainous regionsemsp103 109 113 324 325

328movement of the populationemsp50multiple croppingemsp176 293mushroomsemsp198mutual aidemsp5 6 75 134 141 142n26 241 246

248 251 254 257 260ndash262mutual aid and cooperationemsp244 245 352

National Bureau of Statisticsemsp31 56 56n8 61 63 70n18 281n8

National Conference for Selection through Appraisal and Lectures Regarding Deep Plowing Implementsemsp91 91n22

National Conference on Deep Plowing Imple-ments and Soil Improvementemsp84 92

national economyemsp6 26 28ndash30 118 127 128 173 194 199n15 239 294 308

national grain conferenceemsp334National Peoplersquos Congressemsp46 213 221 222national savingsemsp351Nationwide Deep Plowing Implements and

Soil Improvementemsp77nationwide grain marketemsp285ndash286natural disastersemsp11ndash12 33 127 235 286net exportersemsp29 271 275 288 289 311new areasemsp54n4 62 67 68 232 243new democratic societyemsp351newly liberated areaemsp54n4 232new rich peasant economyemsp58 63new rich peasantsemsp52ndash71 247 254Ninth Plenum of the Eighth CCP

Congressemsp128 161 174no-interestemsp260non-agricultural industriesemsp217 294non-staple foodsemsp32North Chinaemsp55 60 64 288 295 302 303North China Bureauemsp55northeastemsp48 54n5 56ndash60 62ndash64 68 204

277 281 288 292 295 296 302 309 310 314 315

Northeast Bureauemsp54 56ndash59Northeastern Corn Beltemsp309ndash312northern plainsemsp297Northern Region Agricultural

Conferenceemsp272

369Index

ltUNgt

northern rice self-sufficiencyemsp275north-to-south grain transferemsp268 270

273ndash278 280 284 287ndash293 296 297 299 301 302 307 309ndash313

northwestemsp60 64 204 281 288n2 295 302Northwest Agriculture and Forestry

Universityemsp93Number One Cooperativeemsp75nursemaid groupemsp135 137

official promotionsemsp322officialsemsp5 8 14 17 18 31 37 38 40ndash42

48 51 63 80 83 105 108 109 112 113 117ndash121 125 127 135 140 142 144ndash148 150 152 156 159 173 176 188 189 215ndash217 219 223ndash226 231 241 242 244 246 254 258 261 270 272 283 284 288 300 312 320 321 325 328 330 331 339 342 348 351 354

oil bearing materialsemsp331old areasemsp54 54n4 55 56 64 67 68Old Chinaemsp237 244opening to the outsideemsp303open marketemsp331opportunistic behavioremsp341 353opportunity costs of agricultureemsp294 295

297 307organic fertilizersemsp96Outline Land Law of Chinaemsp54ownership by all the peopleemsp160

paddy fieldemsp84 91 95 108Panjing Communeemsp319partitioning of national incomeemsp336patriotic educationemsp142Pearl River Deltaemsp17 39 311Pearl River Valleysemsp287ndash288peasantryemsp45 160 162peasantsemsp6 7 8 9 12 13 15 18 26 33 45

52ndash71 151 159 160 161 169n24 178n36 232 233 234 235 238 239 240 242 243 244 247 253 261 262 318

peasant worker tideemsp328penalties for non-paymentemsp258Peng Dehuaiemsp11 13 123 124n19pensionemsp221 222pension insuranceemsp216Peoplersquos Bank of Chinaemsp244 245

peoplersquos commune movementemsp115 118 124 133 142 143 144 156 158 159 164 166 271 289 338 342 353

peoplersquos communesemsp1 10 12 29 41 82 83 102n4 117 118 120 121 122 126 128 129 130 146 151 158 159 162 168n21 232 320

peoplersquos livelihoodsemsp238peoplersquos militiasemsp177Peoplersquos Republic of Chinaemsp2 29 41 52ndash71

75 84n18 101n2 102 104 112 113 134 151 156n3 194 232n2 237 238 240 241 256 270 287ndash313 330 333 334n11 336 345n53 351 352

period of collectivizationemsp350pigsemsp135 144 178 235 331planned allocationsemsp299 303planned birthemsp42planned economyemsp26 37 39 40 44ndash47 49

50 268 280 299 351ndash354planned grain supplyemsp331 346planned purchases and planned supplyemsp331planned supplyemsp331 344 345 346planning and allocation institutionsemsp336

342plow oxenemsp171 257 259polarizationemsp7 53 71political upheavalsemsp325poor and middle peasantsemsp6 318poor peasantsemsp7 53 54 55 60 65 69 70

159 234 237 238 239 242 247 250 252 253 254 255 256 258 261 262

populationemsp1 4 10 12 15 16 27ndash29 31ndash35 45 46 50 56 59 65 70 71 77 116 157 172 174 176 189 214ndash216 218 260 289 291ndash293 297 307 312 314ndash328 333 339 344 345 351 352 354

population movementemsp16 315 324ndash328 345porkemsp347poultryemsp295 297povertyemsp1 4 35 37 50 55 69 71 106 107

109 204 232 245 254 257 258 262practical experienceemsp48 96 97pre-approved budget and accounting

systememsp215 216prefectural-level citiesemsp48preferential policiesemsp294preferential pricingemsp285pre-schoolemsp145 150 151

370 Index

ltUNgt

preschool educationemsp142 143 147 150price scissorsemsp38 48 336 337 337n23price subsidiesemsp344primary agricultural productsemsp288 352primitive accumulation of capitalemsp26 45

337 351private enterprisesemsp36 39 192ndash208 219private family side-businessesemsp123private grain tradersemsp333private lendingemsp8 231ndash263private ownershipemsp6 126private ownership systememsp176private property rightsemsp242 252productionemsp1 26 55 82 104 116 134 156 194

231 272 288 318 330production and circulation systemsemsp330production brigadeemsp13 41 102n4 104 116

125 128 143 159 165 174 318production mutual aid teamsemsp246 257professionalization of officialsemsp223ndash224profitsemsp38 49 200 201 206 218 221 222 253

261 303 305 351profit sharingemsp206promissory notesemsp173 185 186 187 188 189property rightsemsp17 218 225 242 252property rights reformsemsp218 220 226protectionismemsp305 308public accumulation fundsemsp246public enterprisesemsp159 165 167 168 174 177

179 323 324 325public granariesemsp233public institutions and enterprisesemsp323public welfare enterpriseemsp149 246purchase and sales system for agricultural

productsemsp342 348pursuit of profitemsp245 253

Qinemsp103 135 136 139 146 149 325Qing Dynastyemsp40 102n3Qinghaiemsp37 60 64 65 68 268 271 298quotaemsp111 126 127 166 178 179 198 200 201

284 308 311 339 345 346 347

rationsemsp118 121ndash123 126 128 129 143 149 166 176 222 323 325

raw material in feed productionemsp284reactionaryemsp125recruiting studentsemsp321recruitmentemsp174 321 323

refined goodsemsp249refined grainemsp149 249 295refined white riceemsp295reform and openingemsp26 27 28 30 33 35 44

47 113 192ndash208 232 279 292ndash295 297 300n6 301

regional balance of grains and cereals supply and demandemsp267 303

regional comparative advantageemsp297ndash299regional export price advantageemsp310regional grain production structuresemsp284regional supply of and demand for grains and

cerealsemsp277regulatoryemsp341Reheemsp56ndash59 61Renmin ribaoemsp76 76n7 78 78n9 79n11

82n13 82n14 82n15 83n16 93 93n23 93n25 94n26 95n30 96n31 118n4 123n17 143n28 233n5

Republican Eraemsp40 54n5requisitioningemsp38ndash40 49 119 120 123 179

181 331 334 338 343 346 347 349 350requisitioning of public grainemsp331researchemsp5 12 12n21 13 19 25n25 27 43

53 54n3 56n8 74n1 84 89 90 92 94 94n27 102n5 113 128 133 133n1 134 155 156 158n7 159n10 163n19 174 181 192 193 193n2 193n4 194n6 212 213 232 251n35 267n1 268 281n8 328 330ndash354

resident committeesemsp344resource planning and allocation

systememsp336 342restitutionemsp13 155ndash190

campaignemsp190committeesemsp162

restructuring of rural industryemsp274return to the city movementemsp320revolutionemsp1 4 4n5 5 7 8 9n16 11n18 13 33

53 54 69 76n5 81 82n15 84 90 93 110 134 176 193n4 304 318 323 336n20 349n68

riceemsp4 31 103 197 198 203 220 268 271ndash280 275n4 277n5 282 284 288 289 291ndash293 295 296 300ndash312

Rice Beltemsp302rice sackemsp300 301 303 312rich peasant(s)emsp7ndash9 18 52ndash71 232 234 237

238 240 242ndash245 247 250 253 254

371Index

ltUNgt

rich peasant economyemsp58 63 245rightist conservative thoughtemsp77rightist opportunismemsp157rightist opportunistsemsp124road networksemsp315rural areasemsp4 5 26ndash30 32 33 35 37

40ndash51 53ndash55 63n14 64 116 117 118 125 126n26 127 142 151 155 157ndash159 161 176 194 202 204 213 234 315 324 325 328 331 345 350 352 353

rural assistance loansemsp246rural capitalemsp245 262 263rural childcare organizationsemsp133ndash152rural Chinaemsp1 2 17 17n33 18 26 41 134 145

238 250n32 328 343n49 344ndash345rural citizen(s)emsp5 26ndash51 54 55 75 119 123

126 138 185 188 189 214 216 217 222 224 225 231 232 239 241 243 245 246 249ndash253 255ndash258 261 294 300 301 308 313 320 321 323 325 327 332 336 338ndash340 342 345 348 352 354

rural citizen economic organizationsemsp313rural class structureemsp70rural collectivesemsp63 119rural communesemsp67 144rural cooperative movementemsp116rural credit cooperativesemsp239 251 258ndash263rural debt(s)emsp18 232 241 242 243Rural Debt Disputesemsp232rural economic developmentemsp54 65 69 213rural economic policiesemsp34 69 300n6rural economyemsp5 34 41 50 52n2 54ndash59

62n12 63 65 66 68 69 212n1 213 215 233n4 234 236 237n8 239 242 258n49 262 352

rural financial regulation reformsemsp215rural financial servicesemsp263rural financial systememsp231 235 263rural grassroots workemsp320rural householdsemsp41 45 55 56n8 58 59 61

63 64 66ndash70 70n18 183 186 201 202 203 205 207 232 234 235 237 239 240 244 245 246 247 252 254 255 257 258 261 262 322 331

rural individual economyemsp62 68rural industrializationemsp1 2 14ndash18 192 217rural industryemsp193n4 207 255 257 274rural laborersemsp49 177 315 324 325 328rural land systememsp50

rural lending demandemsp261rural loansemsp252ndash256rural mass movementsemsp349rural modernizationemsp213 214 217rural peoplersquos commune movementsemsp271

289Rural Peoplersquos Communesemsp102n4 120 126

128 129 130 158Rural Peoplersquos Cooperativesemsp155ndash190rural populationemsp4 15 34 35 45 46 59 65

70 71 116 157 260 314ndash328 333 339 345 351 352 354

rural population flowsemsp314ndash328rural private enterprisesemsp192ndash208rural private lendingemsp231ndash263rural public canteensemsp115ndash130 151rural restitution workemsp186rural systememsp50 352n79rural taxationemsp215rural workemsp5 27 28 44 122 123n17 126

194n6 338n25Rural Work Departmentsemsp5 51 56ndash59 58n9

63 63n14 167 177 179n37 181n40 244 246 247 256 258 259 260

Russiaemsp310

salaries of professionalized officialsemsp223saline-alkaline soilemsp283sanctionsemsp293sanitationemsp140 142SARSemsp47Satellite Communeemsp117 118 145 149scientific experimentationemsp97seasonal productionemsp259secondary and tertiary industriesemsp39 43 49

220 223 294 295 297 299 307secondary enterprisesemsp137 177secondary incomeemsp327Second World Waremsp48self-reliantemsp293self-sufficiencyemsp168 272 273 275 281 283

284 291 292 306 312seniorsemsp137 141 157 219 221 222 253 326separation of government from

enterprisesemsp224sesameemsp77sesame oilemsp243Shaanxiemsp37 53 53n2 61 64 65 68 82 103

103n5 107 251n34 268 271 281 284 298

372 Index

ltUNgt

Shandongemsp40 60 64 65 68 74 75 82 83 89 268 271 272 277n6 281 288n2 298

Shanghaiemsp36 37 49 129 268 271 274 278 281 282 298 306 310 319 334n13 343 344 344n50 346 346n60 348n65 349n68

Shanghai-Nanjing Roademsp168Shanxiemsp12 60 62 62n10 64 65 68 82

101ndash114 133ndash152 268 271 284 298 340n35

shareholding corporationsemsp185 214 218 220 226

shareholding reformsemsp225sharesemsp15 18 188 204ndash205 207 218 219 224

226 247 258 259 279 285Sichuanemsp61 64 65 68 129 268 271 273 274

278 281 298 306 346 346n57sideline industryemsp194 201 202 204n31 219

255 257 259six in-the-fieldsemsp83Sixth Plenum of the Eighth CCP Central

Committeeemsp120 121Sixty-Article Regulations for

Agricultureemsp179 180slack farming seasonemsp177 250 327small peasant economyemsp335 342 351 352Smith Adamemsp251 252n34soapemsp117n3 347socialismemsp4n4 7 8n13 124ndash127 143n28 160

213n2 349n70 352socialist constructionemsp11 106 108n17 109n18

114 120 146n38 148 149socialist economyemsp11 112 245 245n22socialist education movementemsp190socialist market economyemsp190 190n56socialist modernizationemsp26 27 33 288socialist reformationemsp134 330 352socialist societyemsp351social mobilityemsp344 354social security systememsp235 262social structureemsp45ndash46 134 344 352 353socioeconomic developmentemsp223 267 352soil erosionemsp101 102 102n5 103 104 108

112 113soil improvementemsp77 78 78n9 79 84 89

90n19 92 103soil maturationemsp107solo practitionersemsp202

song-and-dance troupesemsp177Songjiangemsp56 57 59South-central regionemsp69 244n19 251n35Southern Jiangsu Modelemsp17 212ndash213

225ndash227South Koreaemsp48 310south-to-north grains and cereals

transferemsp267 270 273 277South-to-North grain transferemsp268 270 273

280 283 284 287ndash294Soviet Unionemsp3 7 9 11 29 45 142 337soybeansemsp271 278 279 279n7 288 289 300

307 308specialized and vocational schoolsemsp219 223spicesemsp332 354stabilizing market pricesemsp353standardized kindergartensemsp143staple foodsemsp32State Administrative Councilemsp52 232 331

347State Agricultural Loansemsp251 256ndash259state bank loansemsp259state banksemsp239 256 259 263State Bureau for Letters and Callsemsp40state corn reservesemsp282State Councilemsp31 109 116 174 179 194 194n6

195n7 243 272 282 283State Councilrsquos Development Instituteemsp46State Councilrsquos Research Development

Instituteemsp43state grain monopolyemsp8 30 41 248 249 262

285 330 331 334 341 343n49 345ndash348 346n56 346n57 346n58 347n61 349n68 350 353

state guiding policy for agricultureemsp272state macroeconomic policiesemsp286state-mandated protection priceemsp304state monopolyemsp248 249 288 327 330ndash354state monopoly on grainemsp63 248 299 332n7

339n29 340 340n38 347 351state planningemsp182 195 281n8 311 342state requisitioning of grainemsp334 338 343state-run agricultureemsp257state-run farmsemsp179 180 319state-run or collective farmsemsp324state-run storeemsp327steelemsp10 87 97 118 119 156 164 166 168 171

172 174 188 323 331stud farmsemsp172

373Index

ltUNgt

374 Index

ltUNgt

sugaremsp197supply and demandemsp239 285ndash286 300supply and demand for grainsemsp267 273

277 281 282 282n8 286 289 303 333 333n8 341 346

supply and demand imbalancesemsp285supply and demand of capitalemsp243 251 262supply quota systemsemsp345 347supply systememsp117 118 123 124 125 129 344

346 346n60 349surplusesemsp6 29 30 31 259 280 281 283 286

288 289 293 295 300 304 306 307 326 335 337 337n22 339 353

surplus grainemsp45 239 261 296 304 305 307 331 339

Suzhouemsp156 157n4 162 163 163n19 163n20 167ndash171 168n21 168n22 168n23 169n24 169n25 169n26 169n27 172n28 173n32 174 174n33 174n35 176 178 178n36 179 179n37 181 181n38 181n39 181n40 182 182n41 182n42 182n43 183n44 183n46 183n47 184ndash187 186n50 187 188n51 190n56

sweet potatoesemsp77 80 93

Taiwanemsp48taking grain as the key linkemsp103n5 272Tang and Song Dynastiesemsp287taxation systememsp339technical and specialized collegesemsp321technical schoolemsp216terraced fieldsemsp101ndash114 283terracesemsp12 102ndash113tertiary industryemsp39 43 49 220 223 294

295 297 299 305 307textilesemsp192 193n4 196 197 201ndash205 207Thai riceemsp308 311Third Plenum of the Eleventh Communist

Party of China (CCP) Congressemsp194Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee

of the Communist Party of Chinaemsp30 3414th National Conference of the Communist



Party of Chinaemsp35 49ldquothree fixedsrdquo policyemsp342 349three great battlesemsp330

three-in-one traditional economic systememsp342

Three Norths Conferenceemsp128ldquothree rural issuesrdquoemsp5 25ndash51 113 352Three Souths Conferenceemsp128three-tiered economy of communesemsp194three years of economic difficultiesemsp326Tianjinemsp37 90 124 268 271 273 277 278

280 281 289 298Tibetemsp37 268 271 274 278 281 298tile kilnemsp196 197 203timberemsp166 181 182tinemsp166 331tobaccoemsp77 80 197 327 331topsoilemsp84 91 95 96 105ndash108town economic service centeremsp215town management of village

accountsemsp214ndash216town management of village financesemsp224township and village enterprises (TVEs)emsp1

17 33ndash34 42 44ndash45 206n37 207n39 213 217 220 292 294

tractorsemsp4 90 91 111trade systememsp304 305traditional agricultureemsp336ndash337Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM)emsp331traditional handicraftsemsp196traditional rural economic systememsp342traditional techniquesemsp293transaction costsemsp302 333transcontinental shipsemsp310transportationemsp2 16 42 48 160 168 175 177

197ndash198 302ndash304 310 311 325trends of pessimistic thoughtemsp124troubled householdsemsp69 248tubersemsp279TVEs See township and village enterprises

(TVEs)Twelve Instructionsemsp128 158two-track systememsp299 312

uncompensated appropriationsemsp161ndash174 178 179 186 188 189 215

uncultivated landemsp165 180 318United States (US)emsp11 309 310university studentsemsp47unusual marriagesemsp328upgradingemsp15 111 112 306 309upgrading Chinarsquos industry structureemsp309

375Index

ltUNgt

urbanizationemsp1 2 27 32 34 37ndash39 344 354urban or rural household registrationsemsp45

322 345urban public enterprisesemsp323 324urban-rural disparityemsp38 45ndash46 48ndash50urban-rural dualityemsp50 344 349 353urban-rural dual social structureemsp45ndash46urban-rural gapemsp26 27 36 46 48 51 344

354urban-rural integrationemsp27 50urban-rural relationshipemsp27urban-rural social dualityemsp49ndash50urban-vs-rural dual household registration

systememsp327urban workforce downsizingsemsp315ndash318 328urban youthsemsp318 323Urgent Instructions on Current Policy Issues

in Rural Peoplersquos Communes See Twelve Instructions

usurersemsp236 239 240 248ndash249usuriousemsp242 250 251 262usuryemsp231 245 246 251 253uterine prolapseemsp157

value-added processingemsp305vegetablesemsp32 33 144 149 150 166 179 180

347village assetsemsp215village-collective-run enterpriseemsp217 220village collectivesemsp51 206 207 212ndash227

215ndash219 222ndash227assetsemsp214ndash219 222economic organizationsemsp212ndash227economiesemsp213ndash216 226enterprisesemsp206 218 226sharesemsp218

village cooperative economic organizationsemsp212 224 225 261

virgin landemsp318ndash319 325vocational schoolsemsp216 219n4 223vogue of communismemsp13 118 151 156

158ndash160 167voluntary lendingemsp241 242

walking plowemsp80 83 84 88 92waremsp2 13 48 53 54n3 54n4 82 325war against Japanemsp53 54warehousing costsemsp310War of Liberationemsp53ndash54

wasting diseaseemsp157water and soil conservationemsp102ndash107

109ndash113water resourcesemsp39ndash40 94 94n27 221 293welfareemsp5 14 139n17 142 145 151 175 180

214 219ndash224 246 336enterprisesemsp118 124 134 147ndash152 178

221 246levelsemsp217 219 220 222 223 225 226

Wenzhou Modelemsp17 193 193n3wheatemsp94 95 95n30 95n31 151 243 255

268 271 272 279 281 283 284 289 291ndash293 295 300 306 308 309

wheat flouremsp295window on the Southemsp294womenemsp4 14 75n2 125 134ndash141 145ndash148

149n46 150ndash152 157 221Womenrsquos Federationemsp136 140 141n24

145n33 146 146n39 146n40 148 150 150n51

woolemsp207 331work incentivesemsp30 189 206 338ndash340

348workpointsemsp129 136 138 139 198 202 324World Trade Organization (WTO)emsp308 310wristwatchesemsp347Wuyi Mountainsemsp314

Xinjiangemsp61 64 65 68 268 271 272 281 298

Yangtze deltaemsp103 273Yangtze Riveremsp103 274 282 295 302 306Yangtze River Deltaemsp39 311 312yellow box policyemsp310Yellow Riveremsp102 102n5Yellow River Valleyemsp287youth league committeeemsp150youth production brigadeemsp318Yuan Dynastyemsp288Yunnanemsp37 61 103 268 273 274 295 298Yunnan-Guizhou plateauemsp306

Zhang Wentianemsp54 55n6 123 124n20Zhejiangemsp17 37 40 60 64 65 68 128 160

193n3 268 271 273 275n4 278 281 282 295 298 310 311 339

Zhou Enlaiemsp129 129n35 283Zhu Deemsp129


Copyright

Contents



Introduction Chinese Agriculture and Rural Development Reexamined Western and Chinese Perspectives

Part 1 Political Programs in Practice

1 The Origins and Development of Chinarsquos ldquoThree Rural Issuesrdquo

2 The Scale and Distribution of New Rich Peasants after the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos Land Reforms

3 The Deep Plowing Movement of the ldquoGreat Leap Forwardrdquo

4 A Study of the Construction of Terraced Fields in Liulin County Shanxi Province in the Era of Collectivization

5 Historical Observations Regarding the Large-scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens in Hebei Province

6 From Busy-Season Childcare Centers to Full-scale KindergartensmdashRural Childcare Organizations in Shanxi Province in the 1950s

7 Restitution Paid by Rural Peoplersquos Cooperatives in the 1960smdashAn Inquiry Focused on Jiangsu Province

8 Transformations to Commune and Brigade Enterprises and the Rise of Rural Private Enterprises in Gaoyang County Hebei Province in the Early Days of Reform and Opening

9 Analysis of the Construction of Village Collective Economic Organizations and Related Issues in Changshu CitymdashFour Case Studies

Part 2 Flows of Goods Money and People

10 The History of Rural Private Lending in Hubei Province 1952ndash1954

11 The South-to-North and North-to-South Flows of Grains and CerealsmdashChanges to Directions and Quantities of Flows of Grains and Cereals between North and South in Contemporary China

12 Three Historic Changes to Inter-regional Grain Flows in the Peoplersquos Republic of China and Their Causes

13 Rural Population Flows in the Era of CollectivizationmdashA Study of the Border Region between Jiangxi Fujian and Guangdong Provinces

14 A Review of Research on the State Monopoly

Index