agreeing in principle: utilitarianism and economic values as support for the european union in...

Agreeing in Principle: Utilitarianism andEconomic Values as Support for the EuropeanUnion in Central and Eastern Europejcms_2088 1083..1106

MATTHEW LOVELESSUniversity of Mississippi

Abstract

Using new mass surveys in central and eastern Europe, this article tests utilitarianismand economic values as the bases of support for the European Union. Advancing ourunderstanding, the empirical findings point to increasingly nuanced economic criteriaas the perception of social inequality strongly and independently influences EUsupport.

Introduction

Analyses of pre-European Union membership in central and eastern Europe(CEE) have resulted in conflicting findings that contrast the utilitarianapproach with ideological congruency on the free market and democracy asdeterminants of European Union (EU) support. Utilitarianism is an extensionof individuals’ social location and the perceptions of their own economicexperience and expectations in their respective market economies to supportfor EU membership (Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; for CEE see Tucker et al., 2002).Others present evidence that this approach is not only misplaced but notreproducible in other analyses (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2004, 2006),suggesting instead that ideological congruence between individuals and theunderlying principles of the EU, namely democratic governance and marketeconomies, are the mechanism of support. One shared element of thisgrowing literature is that individuals predominantly use economic criteria as

JCMS 2010 Volume 48. Number 4. pp. 1083–1106

© 2010 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148,USA

the basis for their assessment of the EU and while this article does not deviatefrom that (and in fact, finds ongoing support for this notion) it refines thedimensions of this debate.

This article argues that individuals’ economic situations and social loca-tions are less important than ideological principles congruent with the EUbut that they both overlook the perception of the preferred functioning ofmarket economies in CEE. Individuals’ perceptions that the resultant marketeconomies are ‘unfair’ or ‘too unequal’ suggest not that the ideologicalunderpinning is in jeopardy, but, that it has either failed to produce sufficienteconomic and social opportunities or has done so in an unequal manner.Thus, more than direct, individual financial assessments and abstract ideo-logical congruency, perception of societal access and opportunity can aswell be significant determinants of EU support. This is not to argue thatindividuals’ abstract views about the free market (and thus the EU) areinherently misleading, although ‘economic backsliding’ or forging an insti-tutional alternative in post-accession CEE is increasingly implausible.Rather we can envision citizens’ ideological support while at the same timeseeing a desire for it to work differently within the institutions of a freemarket economy.

For CEE, there was initial support for the inherent inequality of marketliberalization in the transition years as it was expected to expand the economycreating opportunities for individuals to ‘move up’ (Nee, 1989; Kelley andZagorski, 2004). However, later research pointed to an increasing displeasurewith this inequality as social mobility, opportunities, and access to broadersocial goods did not materialize for all or did so in a greatly unequal manner(Centeno and Rands, 1996; Duke and Grime, 1997). Thus, individuals’ per-ceptions of income or social inequality need not be explicit repudiations ofthe broader ideological values of market economies (and the EU) but rathersignal conflict over its proper (or preferred) functioning.

Why is this important? First, although citizens by and large subscribe tofree market economic principles, contesting how it should function doesreinvigorate the question of the government–governed congruency necessaryfor long-term stability and efficacy (Almond and Verba, 1963; for evidence ofthis in CEE see Whitefield, 2006). This debate then ushers in the issue of thestate’s legitimacy as a function of its ability to meet the concerns of itsconstituents. Second, in the presence of the significant influence of severaleconomic variables, this increased economic specificity is likely to becomemore important, especially with EU membership and continuing concreteeconomic changes.

This article proceeds by introducing the literature of the utilitarianismapproach as it has developed in western Europe and the values/experiential

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© 2010 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

critique when it migrated to the literature of pre-EU CEE. I update this to thepresent in which the CEE countries are now Member States of the EU andthen argue that individuals’ perception of social inequality relieves some ofthe tension in this theoretical contest and contributes to our understandingof the increasingly specific economic bases of EU support. Using new masspublic surveys from CEE in 2007, it compares these approaches, demonstrat-ing a weakening of utilitarianism, the ongoing influence of economic (andpolitical) values, and the independent influence of the perception of socialinequality. I conclude with what these findings mean for the current literatureand directions for future research.

I. The Origins of the Utilitarian Approach to EU Support in CEE

Beginning in the mid-1990s, the utilitarian approach was applied to under-standing EU support of mass publics in western Europe. Simply stated, itposited that individuals evaluate membership of the EU based on broad sociallocation variables such that those in a position to benefit from integrationwere deemed ‘winners’ and those likely to fare poorly were ‘losers’ (Gabel,1998a, 1998b). Rather than relying on national-level indicators of economicperformance, this approach used social locations and SES profiles to identifythose most likely to benefit (or lose) from further integration. Individualswere classified as members of one of these groups largely by the level ofincome, education, skill sets, and position defined by occupational groups(Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; see also Inglehart, 1997;Inglehart et al., 1991).1 This cost–benefit approach is predicated on the abilityof individuals to assess their economic situation accurately and predict whatcontinued integration would mean to them economically. Further it assumesthat continued integration with the EU would continue to both reinforce theinstitutions of a market economy and, more normatively, provide opportuni-ties in the form of increased income and opportunities. Simply put, based onan individual’s array of these skills and attributes, ongoing economic inte-gration would generate support for or opposition to the EU. Others suggestedthat ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ perceived EU membership in terms of not onlyegocentric but sociotropic economic concerns as well (Eichenberg andDalton, 1993) and under direct assessment, in the west, national-level eco-nomic indicators were found to produce stronger support as predictors of

1 While not explicitly a part of this literature, the broader implication is, as Sørensen suggests, thatindividuals change due to something endemic to the location/position, such that structural location affectspeople ‘because of their location in the social structure, change[s] their effort and skills and [they] thusbecome more or less productive’ (1996, p. 1334).

AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE 1085


individuals’ support for the EU than individuals’ assignment of ‘winning’ or‘losing’ (Gabel and Whitten, 1997).2

For this analysis of the CEE, and in accordance with Tucker et al., ‘[w]hileit would be foolish to suggest that we ignore the rich theoretical contributionof studies focused on the advanced industrial democracies, it behoves us toconsider the particulars of the post-communist experience as well’ (2002,p. 570). These particulars are reflected in research on CEE and the EU in theunique transitional experiences of the preceding 15 years leading up to EUmembership. Secondly, ‘support for the EU’ was whether or not they shouldjoin the EU or whether EU membership was viewed as a positive thing fortheir country versus the west European assessment of the EU as members. Ineither case, the basis for understanding has been fundamentally economicevaluations, particularly individuals’ perceptions of what they have andmight get.

In the pre-EU period of CEE, it was assumed by extrapolating from thewestern literature that their accession to membership would be a means ofsolidifying both democratic political and liberal market institutions, thusmaking the EU a guarantor of these practices (Tucker et al., 2002; Cichowski,2000; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006). Not unsurprisingly, the utilitar-ian approach was quickly put to use to explain support for EU membership inthe countries of central eastern Europe (Tucker et al., 2002; Cichowski, 2000)although it has returned mixed support.3

Why the mixed support? The utilitarianist approach understands indi-viduals as ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ in structural terms. That is, individuals’‘calculations’ of winning and losing are not explicit but rather inferred fromtheir socio-economic location and SES profile. Tverdova andAnderson (2004)provide evidence for several utilitarian indicators (except education) andweaker support for questions about satisfaction with political and economictransition. Tucker et al. (2002) also attempt to export the utilitarian model tothe pre-EU CEE, although they modify the approach by not attributing‘winners’ and losers’ to a fixed set of demographic characteristics but ratherusing individuals’ perceptions of their own economic situations. Based on thepremise that economic conditions (vs social location) of transition shapedindividuals’ assessments of future EU membership, they put forth an additivevariable that combined individuals’ retrospective and prospective egocentriceconomic evaluations, producing a measure of ‘how good things have been’and ‘how good they will be’ for individuals. In this conceptualization they do

2 A more detailed summary of individual perceptions of the EU as a system of governance can be found inLoveless and Rohrschneider (2008).3 For a review of the full CEE/EU literature beyond these approaches discussed here, see Rohrschneiderand Whitefield (2006).



find some support for utilitarianism, although the overall pattern stronglysuggests that SES variables are less useful than this newer conceptualization ofexperienced and anticipated economic situations.

However, performance of the utilitarian model continued to weaken by theinconsistency in the demographic and experiential effects on support (seeEhin, 2001; Tverdova and Anderson, 2004); although, individuals’ economicperceptions and attitudes variables often maintained their significance acrossstudies. Thus, as an alternative, this value-based approach has found support-ing evidence in a number of studies. Cichowski (2000) identifies attitudestoward democracy, capitalism and individuals’ political partisanship as strongdeterminants of EU membership support although diverges from Tucker et al.(2002) by finding that economic perceptions appear to have little impact.More forcefully, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2004) find that the instru-mental or utilitarian approaches do not apply well to post-communist publicsat all, instead finding citizens of CEE more likely to base their assessments ofintegration on underlying economic values rather than expected and overtmaterial pay-offs, a function, they argue, of the disparate experiences ofthe CEE countries from their western counterparts (Rohrschneider andWhitefield, 2004, p. 147; similar to the ‘particulars’ suggested by Tuckeret al., 2002). More recently, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006) argue thatfor the citizens of CEE, not only abstract attachments to regime ideals butregime performance and experience with these new political and economicprocesses are strong influences in individuals’ EU evaluations.

Therefore, what emerges from this debate is a twofold understanding ofEU support for membership in pre-EU CEE. First, evidence suggests personaleconomic situations and expectations are relevant (Tucker et al., 2002;Tverdova and Anderson, 2004) while others assert the primacy of individuals’attachment to and experience with liberal market values and democracyas the primary mechanism of individuals’ EU support (Rohrschneider andWhitefield, 2004, 2006).4 Second, both suggest that the underlying mecha-nism of support in CEE is strongly grounded in economic criteria.

This brings us to the present. Underpinning both approaches, as Tuckeret al.(2002) suggest, is the question of the future of market economies inCEE. They state:

4 Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s use of experiential variables is somewhat misleading under the headingof their ‘values’ approach. While democratic and market experience might seem theoretically bettersubsumed under the utilitarian approach, particularly the latter, in keeping with the divergent approachesof the two sets of authors, this article chooses to keep these variables under the authorship of Rohrschneiderand Whitefield as it is their contribution. This demarcation assigns ‘credit’ for the findings by authorshipand this article has no intention of taking sides on this debate as this theoretical distinction is better left tothe authors of this approach. To make the distinction clearer, their approach will be referred to in this articleas the ‘values/experiential approach’.



We maintain that the utilitarian approach makes unrealistic assumptionabout both the stability of post-communist societies and citizens’ under-standing of the realities of EU membership. Instead, we posit merely thatcitizens have a sense of whether they are doing well in this new world andwhether they would like the new free market economy to continue in thefuture. (2002, p. 558, fn. 1)

In this analysis, the countries of CEE are now EU members and thus there isa very strong likelihood that there will be continuity of stable politicalenvironments and market economies. Given this, one might suspect a reversalof the findings from the previous period. For example, an ideological rejec-tion of the market as the basis for support for the EU might be a somewhatnaïve value position for a citizen in an EU Member State. Holding this value,in other words, is largely symbolic in the face of entrenched market principlesof both the EU and its Member States. While at the same time, ongoingintegration with the EU is likely to revitalize the role of structural location andSES variables as transnational (east to west) barriers are dismantled poten-tially providing a wealth of opportunities for those that can take advantage ofthem. EU membership serves as a larger – and better functioning – market inwhich ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ may re-emerge.

While embedded in the literature exported from western Europe and inpre-EU phase CEE, rather than limit the investigation of economic values andassessments, this article argues that the distinction may be that while the EUis a continuation of the market economy, within that set of economic institu-tions, perceptions of its continued and inherently unequal distribution ofmaterial wealth and access are increasingly salient. That is to say, it is notindividuals’ overt rejection of the market economy per se but how it functionsin practice that now plays a significant role in determining EU support.

II. Inequality and the Market Economy in CEE

One of the particular differences between the understanding of support for theEU between east and west is the societal changes associated with liberalizingthe CEE economies. Far from merely cosmetic, these fundamental overhaulswere expected to change not only how the economy functioned but howindividuals would earn a living in an environment of increased labour marketfluidity, opportunities (in the form of a burgeoning middle class, a shift fromstate to private market sectors, and new employment sectors altogether), aswell as merely procure goods and services. More pointedly, in CEE, theappeal of a market economy was the opportunity not simply to make moneybut to have the opportunity to change jobs, follow a career, improve the



quality of life, in short, to have options. Expectations for the citizens of CEEcountries were grounded in the idea that a market economy would multiplythe availabilities of goods and services and dismantle the structuralizedunequal (and ossified) access to political, social and economic goods.

Reflecting this, the earliest examinations were optimistic. Economic lib-eralization was touted to increase privatization, create private sector jobs outof state jobs, ease the transition between labour markets, and temporizeunemployment. Many welcomed income inequality as it was expected be an‘incentivizer’, serving to motor economic growth.5 More normatively, Kelleyand Zagorski (2004), in re-evaluating this literature, note that social andincome inequality are inevitable consequences of market economics andthose that accepted the free market are more likely to accept its fleas such thata transition from socialist economy would increase normative support forincome inequality even to the point that the bigger the difference, the moremorally legitimate inequality would become.

Evidence in this region suggests otherwise. Böröcz and Róna-Tas (1995)find evidence that economic elites started with and retained disproportionateadvantages throughout the transition period (see also Duke and Grime, 1997).In all CEE countries there was a pattern of increasing income inequality anddecreasing real incomes (Milanovic, 1998) and more broadly, social inequal-ity increased by class, ethnicity, gender and age differences (Centeno andRands, 1996; Duke and Grime, 1997). Unsurprisingly, public perceptions ofsocial inequality increased accordingly.

For individuals, the perception of social inequality is predicated on thefailure of market reform to produce social mobility and increased opportuni-ties and that it instead leads to a set of institutions that reinforced inequali-ties.6 Germane to this analysis, research on these perceptions of income andsocial inequality points not to a rejection of market liberalization, but ratherto the persistent view among the least well off that the ability to get aheadis not meritocratic but through connections and ‘unfair’ means (Örkeny andSzékelyi, 2000). Similarly, Kreidl (2000) finds that wealth in CEE is per-ceived as exceptional individual effort and talents (both of positive andnegative qualities) whereas poverty is caused by the lack of positive attributes.

5 Although suggesting that inequality would in fact diminish, Nee (1989) claimed that the emergence ofmarkets in state socialist societies would reduce the most privileged stratum (elites) while those at thebottom would benefit. Inequality in income and access to goods would be reduced. Szelenyi and Kostelloput the question discussing the relationship between markets and inequality thus: ‘markets as such andredistribution as such do not have inherently egalitarian or inegalitarian outcomes. Their social outcomesdepend on the broader macro-institutional settings in which they are embedded’ (Szelenyi and Kostello,1996, p. 1085).6 Duke and Grime argue that not only did this resonate as a backlash in the early to mid-1990s, they suggestthat this was the basis for the return of ex-Communist parties in the early 1990s (1997, p. 889).



More importantly, he finds significant support for the perception that struc-tural explanations of poverty and wealth are grounded in the perception ofunequal structural opportunities for these groups of differing wealth.

The CEE/EU literature is not unaware of this. Rohrschneider andWhitefield touch on this, saying, ‘[s]ocialist ideals (for example, in favour ofan egalitarian society) may also reduce support for a future, Europe-widepolity if it does not secure egalitarian outcomes’ (Rohrschneider andWhitefield, 2006, p. 148) and ‘[i]n order to create a single economic market,the EU promises to improve economic performance and social welfare’(Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006, p. 144, author’s own emphasis). Butthey fail to identify the alternative explanation that it is not a rejection of the‘ideals’ of a market economy (and thus the EU) but a critique within theboundaries of a market economy to function in a more egalitarian manner.The theoretical implication is that ideological free market support retains itspower as an explanatory variable yet in the context of CEE as permanent EUMember States, this is a weak proposition. In other words, it may not be thefree market per se but the way it has functioned as a distributor of material,public and social goods that drives individuals’ support of the EU.

Therefore, it is not unreasonable to argue that economic ideological valuesand individual economic evaluations are somewhat too vague and limitedassessments, respectively. Evaluating past and future egocentric economicsituations is unduly bounded by strict economic terms and does not speak tothe potentialities of social mobility or chances for improving one’s lot, onlythat things are expected to change or not. Further, it is often limited toevaluations of economic success in the strict sense of welfare and growth.Similarly, the values/experiential approach seems hindered by the absence ofa real ideological alternative and considers ‘experience’ too broadly to allowfor finer evaluations to emerge. What is missing is a direct evaluation of howthe free market actually affects individuals’ perceptions of the systemicopportunities and access, as having a small income is not necessarily ‘losing’inasmuch as it is not perceived by that individual to be a hindrance to accessto the market and social goods.

A more direct and conceptually accurate manner then to assess individu-als’ economic perceptions is to evaluate their perceptions of the opportunitiesavailable rather than assuming that having an unsatisfactory (or satisfactory)income determines the lack (or wealth) of their opportunities. That is to say,people are not so much ideologues but form their evaluations of marketeconomy pragmatically. The perception of social inequality is thus linked tosupport for the EU by assessing the actual experiences of integration, that is,how it is ‘felt’ regardless of an overall preference for market economies.Inasmuch as the EU is perceived as the guarantor of market and democratic



practices and membership ‘solidifies’ the changes of the past decade, citizens’perceptions of ‘what it has created’ (i.e. social inequality) likely shapes theirsupport. Thus, within the structure of EU membership (institutional align-ment with democratic political governance and free market economies), doindividuals’ economic perspectives about these changes in the distributivecapacity of the market shape support for the EU?

This theory would suggest that while underlying values continue to shapeindividuals’ assessment of EU membership, perceptions of how the markethas produced opportunities and access serve as nuanced criteria of the marketin practice. Rather than contradicting prior theory (although it does suggestthat utilitarianism may find renewed support), it expands the values/experience approach by introducing further specificity to the source ofeconomic perceptions as determinants of EU support.

We arrive at the following hypotheses:

H1: Utilitarianism, measured as socio-economic status, social location andegocentric economic evaluations, is positively correlated with support forthe EU.

H2: Normative preferences (ideological values) for democracy and marketeconomy are positively correlated with support for the EU.

H3: Positive experiences with democracy and the market economy arepositively correlated with support for the EU.

H4: Higher perceptions of social inequality are negatively correlated withsupport for the EU.

III. Methodology

The data for this analysis are new mass public surveys conducted in Bulgaria,the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romaniaand Slovakia in 2006.7 In contrast to earlier studies of support for EU mem-bership, as the countries of CEE are now EU members, this analysis uses aquestion about the influence of European institutions on countries. Respon-dents are asked to agree with contrasting opinions about the EU (‘Europeaninstitutions have been helpful and supportive of our country’ or ‘Europeaninstitutions have been interfering in our affairs and using our difficultiesfor their own advantage’) and are asked to identify which one of thesetwo statements comes closest to their own view. Although not directly7 Data collection for this article was carried out as part of the Eurequal project ‘Social Inequality and WhyIt Matters for the Economic and Democratic Development of Europe and Its Citizens: Post-CommunistCentral and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective’, funded by the European Commission undercontract No 028920 (CIT5), Framework 6.



comparable to long-standing assessments of individuals’ support for the EU,as Rohrschneider and Whitefield have argued (2004, 2006), the literature onsupport for the EU in CEE is distinct from the literature in western Europeboth in terms of what the EU ‘means’ to nascent members and, as this analysishas demonstrated, what we know about the determinants of that orientation.This line of inquiry furthers the study of the support for the EU in CEE bycontributing to the question of what determines the citizens of new MemberStates’ orientations towards EU membership.

A thorough test of the utilitarianism approach includes using the socio-economic status variables age, education, income, gender and employmentstatus (‘winning’ and ‘losing’); and the retrospective and prospective egocen-tric (as well as sociotropic) economic evaluations (of Tucker et al., 2002; seethe Measurement Appendix for a full listing of all included variables). Thus,either by way of individuals’ structural locations (socio-economic status[SES] and occupation) or ‘calculation’ of past and future (national andindividual) economic situations, evidence for utilitarianism has ampleopportunity to present itself.

According to Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2004, 2006), underlyingeconomic or political values are more effective than the utilitarian approach.Therefore the following questions were used to tap respondents’ feelingsabout democratic governance and market economies as ideal and appropriate(and reflect the value assessments of Rohrschneider and Whitefield): ‘Tell us,please, what do you think about the idea that a democracy, in which multipleparties compete for power, is the best system for governing [country]’. And‘[a]nd what do you think about the idea that a market economy, in which thereis private property and economic freedom to entrepreneurs, is the best systemfor [country]’. Additionally, I use respondents’ left–right self-placement asbroad ideological measures (see Kaltenhaler et al., 2008).

Additionally, Rohrschneider and Whitefield and others have cited citizens’actual experiences with transition as relevant (see also Tverdova andAnderson, 2004). Therefore, I include respondents’ responses to the follow-ing questions: ‘How would you evaluate the actual experience of the marketeconomy [democracy] here in [country] so far?’ These serve as broad con-ceptual categories of market (and democratic) experience that the variable ofinterest, perception of social inequality, must differ significantly from.Dummy variables for each country are also included.

To assess the viability and comparative strength of the perception ofinequality of opportunities and access in society, two attitudinal variables areincluded. First, I use a measure of individuals’ perception of social inequalityby the straightforward question, ‘Some people say that there is too muchsocial inequality in our society. Others say that there is no or almost no social



inequality in our society. What is your view?’8 The use of this variablecaptures individuals’ sociotropic assessments of the distribution of social andeconomic goods. We can think of this variable as conceptually summarizinga composite view on the equality of societal economic results. To complementthis, I include a variable to capture a direct and egocentric assessment of theequality of opportunities and access. It assesses individuals’ self-reportedstandard of living and access to both health care and cultural goods, i.e. theability to satisfy individual needs (scale reliability coefficient, a = 0.8514).

Finally, it is possible that individuals’ perceptions of social inequalitymight vary according to their own ideological orientation and economicpreferences. To account for this, interaction terms between individuals’ per-ceptions of social inequality and individuals’ self-reported ideology, marketexperience and market values have been included.9

IV. Empirical Results

For the analysis, five models are run (see Table 1). The first three test utili-tarianism, the values/experiential and the social inequality approaches sepa-rately. The fourth is a simultaneous test of all approaches and the fifth is thefull model with the theorized interactions included.

In the first model (model 1), we can as well see that socio-economic statusvariables are on the whole absent. Only education is positively correlated withsupport for the EU (r = 0.05, p < 0.001). More importantly, it seems indi-viduals’ perceptions of retrospective and prospective economic situations arestrongly associated with sociotropic evaluations (r = 0.11, p < 0.001) ratherthan egocentric (r = 0.02, not statistically significant) as the basis for EUsupport. Notably, as individuals’ sociotropic economic evaluations retainpredictive power across all models (model 5: r = 0.08, p < 0.001), one couldargue that economic assessments and expectations for the country drive EUsupport. It would seem that, overall, despite our expectation that the post-EUmembership experience might revitalize the utilitarian approach, there is littlesupport for Hypothesis 1.

In the second model, a positive experience with both democracy (r =0.08, p < 0.001) and the market economy (r = 0.12, p < 0.001) are both

8 As this question is not inherently ordinal, the responses were collapsed into two response categories: ‘toomuch social inequality’ and the rest. This recoding produces a variable that highlights individuals’perception that there is an unequal economic distribution or that the level of inequality is about right (if notsufficiently unequal or non-existent).9 The variables included in the interaction effects were centred before being multiplied in order to make theinteraction terms orthogonal to the original variables, thus mitigating the effect of multi-collinearity in theestimation (see Jaccard et al., 1990).



Table 1: Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe

Utilitarian Values/Experiential

SocialInequality

FullModel

Full Modelw/Interactions

Too Much SocialInequality

-0.23*** -0.12*** -0.13***(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)

Access to Social Goods 0.03*** 0.01 0.01(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

H’hold Financial Sit. 0.02 0.01 0.01(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

C’try Financial Sit. 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.08***(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Exp with Democracy 0.08*** 0.06** 0.06**(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Exp with Free Market 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Democracy Ideal 0.04** 0.03* 0.03*(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Mkt Economy Ideal 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09***(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Left–RightSelf-Placement

0.04*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.02**(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

18–29 yrs 0.07 0.06 0.10* 0.01 0.01(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

30–44 yrs 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

45–59 yrs -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)

Education 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03* 0.03*(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Income 0.04 0.06*** 0.06** 0.00 0.00(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Gender -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)

Employed 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)

InteractionsSocIneq*Mkt

Economy Ideal0.02

(0.04)SocIneq*LR

Self-Placement0.02

(0.02)SocIneq* Exp with

Free Market-0.00(0.04)

Bulgaria -0.17** -0.13* -0.14* -0.07 -0.07(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Estonia 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.40*** 0.28*** 0.27***(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)



substantively and statistically significant in increasing EU support (H3). Simi-larly, so are democratic and market ideological values (H2; r = 0.04, p < 0.01;r = 0.11, p < 0.001, respectively). Left–right self-placement as well plays arole such that as individuals shift to the right, there is more support for the EU(r = 0.02, p < 0.001). However, left–right placement, democratic politicalvalues and experience with democracy lose substantial influence (all losesome statistical significance) in the full model (model 5).10 Thus, overall,there seems to be substantive support for the values/experiential approach,although it seems that the primary and most consistent predictors of EUsupport are individuals’ market economy values and experiences.

While there is mild evidence for utilitarianism on its own (model 1) andstrong support for the values/experiential approach (model 2), the percep-tion of social inequality (in model 3) is both substantive and statisticallysignificant (r = -0.23, p < 0.001). Individuals’ perceptions that there is

10 Socio-economic status variables are of course correlated with and have been used to explain some ofthe political and economic values in the full model and may provide some of the explanation as to why theyfail to reach statistical significance. All models have been checked for multi-collinearity and return noevidence.

Table 1: (Continued)

Utilitarian Values/Experiential

SocialInequality

FullModel

Full Modelw/Interactions

Hungary -0.02 -0.09 -0.21*** 0.10 0.09(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Latvia -0.64*** -0.47*** -0.52*** -0.54*** -0.55***(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Lithuania 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.36***(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)

Poland 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.35***(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)

Romania 0.04 0.12* 0.06 0.04 0.03(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Slovakia 0.17** 0.18** 0.21*** 0.15** 0.15*(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Constant 1.86*** 1.63*** 2.52*** 1.49*** 1.51***(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)

R-squared 0.1214 0.1372 0.1046 0.1577 0.1579Number of Obs 6243 7462 7039 5982 5982

Source: Author’s own data.Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Ordinary Least Squares regression, reporting unstandardizedbetas (standard error) with reference categories: Age: 60+, Country: Czech Republic. The data areestimated with both inverse probability weighting and robust standard errors.



too much social inequality, a perception grounded in the societal distribu-tion of opportunities and access to material, public and social goods,reduce individuals’ evaluations of how EU membership has benefited theircountry (H4). The more egocentric inequality measure of access is as wellstatistically significant (r = 0.03, p < 0.001). However, in the full model(model 5), only individuals’ perceptions of social inequality remain statis-tically significant while the egocentric inequality variable fails to do thesame.

Model 4 presents all of the approaches in a single model. As we can see,the perception of social inequality retains its explanatory power and in thecase of adding interactions to account for variation in individuals’ perceptionsof social inequality by ideology, market experience and market values (model5), the effects are largely unaffected. Thus, as model 5 represents the mostrigorous test of these approaches, we find strong empirical evidence for theinfluence of perceptions of social inequality.

It would as well seem that there are several overlapping themes. Aboveall, there is a decidedly economic underpinning to most of the evaluativeassessments: individuals’ evaluations of their countries’ retrospective andprospective standards of living, as well as experiential and ideologicalsupport for a market economy (standardized betas from model 5: 0.118,0.096 and 0.074, respectively).11 While experiential support for democraticgovernance is as well supportive of EU membership (0.050 standardizedbeta), there is only weak buttress for a claim of a broader, political valuesexplanation for EU support. Although this finding is in alignment with pre-vious research, the model of influence on EU support presented here issomewhat loaded in favour of finding an economic answer as less politicalvalues are included. However, this research should serve as an impetus tobroaden our search to include increasingly nuanced political and economicattitudes and values as well. EU support in the new Member States of CEEseems to be built on individuals’ economic perceptions of the market and itsattendant effects, particularly in a manner of agreeing with the overallproject, but dissatisfaction with the actual workings of it. Yet, the effects of‘experience with the market’, ‘market values’ and ‘social inequality’ seemincongruent as they push EU support in different directions. I would arguethat this contrast actually illuminates rather than distorts the theoreticalunderstanding presented here. While there is broad economic support in theform of economic ideological congruency and experience with marketeconomies, perceptions of social inequality tap individuals’ perceptions ofa growth in labour markets, the opening of new employment sectors,

11 The operationalization of the dependent variable also favours the sociotropic parameters.



and an increase of goods and services in the shift from the state to theprivate market. In short, the market has ushered in an economic state thathas, in general, been ‘better’. What differs is that their perceptions of thedistribution of these goods, their availability, and individuals’ own access tothese goods signal a disapproval of the manner in which the market func-tions. These are not contradictory evaluations at all. Analogous to citizens’participation in democracy, the idea that the government could be ‘run dif-ferently’ (indicated by individuals’ various party affiliations) does not under-mine the fact it is taking place within the confines of democratic institutions.Thus, both economic values of the market and experience with the market arebroad evaluative assessments while individuals’ perceptions of socialinequality represent what one might be tempted to call their perceptions ofthe ‘really existing market economy’.

Discussion and Conclusions

[P]ublics may endorse markets and integration in principle and reject morespecific policies to achieve them. It is notable, therefore, that public supportfor particular aspects of integration, and indeed the ways in which EastEuropean publics come to make judgments about them, are not well under-stood. (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2004, p. 314)

This article has analysed support for the EU in the new Member States ofCEE. The findings repudiate the utilitarian approach while underscoring thevalues/experiential approach. Further, it has demonstrated that while thisvalues/experiential approach continues to underpin support for the EU, itmakes available the opportunity to define more narrowly elements of indi-viduals’ assessments of market economies that include perceptions of itsability to distribute the goods of the new economy. Rather than an appeal tostrict economic egalitarianism, this approach builds on the research ofsocial and income inequality that demonstrates that citizens of these coun-tries are willing to accept a degree of inequality but beyond a point,inequality unfairly advantages some and disadvantages others, and is per-ceived as such (see Jasso, 1999). The contribution is that in addition toagreeing in principle on the market as the basis of economic function,within that set of institutions, the inherent inequality of market institutions,realized by individuals’ perceptions of their access and opportunities tobroader sets of social and public goods, deflates the notion that ideologicalcongruency is sufficient for EU support. In doing so, this article highlightsthe actual experience and evaluation of what the market economy means toindividuals more concretely.



The findings do suggest that ideological value congruence is necessaryto harmonize popular support and the principles of the organization inquestion (in pre-EU CEE); however, post-accession, these citizens are in aposition to revise and expand these perceptions. We should therefore directour attention at the evidence for considering increasingly nuanced evalua-tions of individuals’ economic and political assessments as determinantsof EU support.

While western theory has long suggested this, it seems in many ways notonly are evaluations economic but mainly sociotropic as well. As mentionedabove, the literature in CEE suggests that the perception of social inequalityrose in many groups. It would seem that regardless of social location, thesystem can be simply ‘too’ unfair and social inequality is representative ofthis as individuals assess societal differentials in access and opportunityrather than their own.12

Further still, one is tempted to ask what is to be gained by increasing thespecificity of economic variables. The perception of social inequality speaksdirectly to satisfaction with what the markets have been able to produce. Theincreased specificity is an attempt to parse evaluations of the market, not as anideological opponent to other economic institutions or a preference for oneover the other, but rather by what it has created. For the constituents of theseeconomies, inasmuch as individuals perceive that the market producesaccessible material and non-material goods, the market, as a set of inherentlyunequal institutions, are legitimized. Although, the reverse is as well argu-able. Integrating the values and inequalities approach, Kreidl writes, ‘[t]hesystem is perceived as legitimate only [. . .] if the causes for inequality aperson perceives are those that he or she supports normatively’ (Kreidl, 2000,p. 152; see also Verwiebe and Wegener, 2000). This underscores the inherentcontradiction that a stratification system can be considered legitimate, evenfor the disadvantaged. However, if the disadvantaged perceive market econo-mies as permanently and structurally impenetrable, they will exhibit resis-tance to the structure itself. This introduces the spectre of long-terminequality as a potential source of economic dissatisfaction that extends notonly to the political arena but also to the underlying values of the system, eventhe EU.

These findings should not be entirely unexpected. Recent research sug-gests that income inequality plays an increasingly important role in Europeannational politics and by extension, the ongoing project of the EU (Kaltenhaleret al., 2008; and economic issues in specific for CEE, see Rohrschneider and

12 This is supported by the failure of the access variable to retain significance and the success of perceptionsof social inequality to explain support.



Loveless, forthcoming). It further introduces researchers to new questionsabout the newest Member States as these citizens seem to exhibit moresophisticated and nuanced assessments of what their countries’ membershipin the EU means to them than the literature has thus far allowed.

Research on CEE and the EU in the pre-EU period, and continuingto the present, has regarded these countries as a unit of accession states.There are arguments for this approach although in assessment of support forthe EU, it is likely to overlook cross-national variation. The analysis here isno different. For these countries, aggregate levels of both support for theEU and perceptions of social inequality vary. The newest Member States(i.e. Romania and Bulgaria) possibly evaluate membership somewhat dif-ferently from those having been courted for the past decade (i.e. Hungary,the Czech Republic, Poland, etc.) as longer exposure to and the earlierimposition of market principles as the basis for EU membership givecitizens of various countries varied experiences from which to assess EUmembership. Similarly, the origins of the perceptions of social inequalitymay vary and thus differently affect support for the EU (although, prelimi-nary research suggests that this may not be the case, see Loveless andWhitefield, forthcoming). In this analysis, the cross-national variation ineffects is low13 although a source for future research that is able to integratethe source of perceptions of both market economies and democratic politicsand support for the EU.

Finally, where from here? The findings here suggest two directions. One isto identify elements of individuals’ evaluations of democracy and marketeconomies that render a fuller conceptual distinction between broad andspecific congruency (see Easton, 1965). For example, what are the perceptionsof the realized state of democratic governance in terms of responsiveness,representativeness, openness, efficacy, etc.? The EU’s stature as a guarantor ofmarket principles and political democracy will continue to find its supportgrounded in the fundament of ideological congruency; however, the nature andprecise exercise of those principles are likely to distort this pleasing, overallview. This debate is as well likely to manifest itself in both the electoral arenaand in the public venues of political discussion (for example, mass media).Thus, the second direction is to evaluate the role of political and socialintermediaries on this debate. It is clear from the literature that we need toexpand the number and variety of sources for EU support now given CEE’s

13 A country by country analysis was run but the number of observations across countries varied greatly dueto differences in the number of responses to some of the questions making the output somewhat problem-atic. Thus, like much of the research on the CEE/EU question, we can think of the findings here as anaggregate starting point for increasingly nuanced, cross-national research.



change in membership status. While some studies have sidestepped the issue(Tucker et al., 2002; and this one), more recent research suggests that CEEparties have been able to function as effective intermediaries and presentcoherent policy platforms (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2007). If so, thenparties exert an influence not only by setting the agenda of the EU debate butalso by choosing the dimensions of that debate. They then serve to influenceindividuals’ perceptions of the EU via direct ideological positions and indi-rectly through the activation of economic and political concerns.

Correspondence:Matthew LovelessThe University of MississippiDepartment of Political ScienceThe University of Mississippi226 Deupree HallP.O. Box 1848University, MS 38677-1848, USATel +1 662-915-7415email [email protected]

Measurement Appendix

Data collection for this article was carried out as part of the Eurequal project‘Social Inequality and Why It Matters for the Economic and DemocraticDevelopment of Europe and Its Citizens: Post-Communist Central andEastern Europe in Comparative Perspective’, funded by the European Com-mission under contract No. 028920 (CIT5), Framework 6. Fieldwork wasconducted by national survey/polling institutes in each country (face-to-faceinterviews), with the majority of unstratified cluster-sampled data. In theanalysis, each country’s data were weighted to N = 1,000.

Country N

Bulgaria 1,000Czech Republic 994Estonia 1,057Hungary 1,030Latvia 1,001Lithuania 1,002Poland 1,498Romania 1,492Slovakia 1,032



Dependent Variable

Support for European Union (e8a): Consider the following pairs of state-ments. Can you say which one of these two statements comes closest to yourown views: 1. European institutions have been helpful and supportive of ourcountry OR 2. European institutions have been interfering in our affairs andusing our difficulties for their own advantage

– definitely the first opinion, the first opinion rather than the second, inbetween, the second opinion rather than the first, definitely the secondopinion.

– recoded so that support is higher and the ‘DK’ to the middle category.

Independent Variables

Social Inequality‘Too Much’ Social Inequality (b5): Some people say that there is too muchsocial inequality in our society. Others say that there is no or almost no socialinequality in our society What is your view? Do you think that there is:

– too much social inequality; about the right amount of social inequality; notenough social inequality; there is no or almost no social inequality?

– recode so that ‘too much’ is 1 and the others are 0.– DK coded to missing

Access to Social Goods (l7e + l7f + l7h): Alpha (scale reliability coefficient):0.8514

– (l7e) Now please compare your household’s standard of living with anaverage standard of living in the country as a whole. Would you say thatyour household’s standard of living is . . .

– (l7f) Now, please compare your household’s access to health care with theaverage access in the country as a whole? Would you say that your house-hold’s health care access is . . .

– (l7h) Now, please compare your household’s access to cultural goods(books, Internet, theatre etc.) with the average access in the country as awhole? Would you say that your household’s cultural goods is . . .

– Response categories for each are: Well below average; Below average;Somewhat below average; Average; Somewhat above average; Aboveaverage; Well above average; Do not know.

Attitudes towards the Market Economy and Democracy:Democracy as Ideal (a1a): Tell us, please, what do you think about the ideathat a democracy, in which multiple parties compete for power, is the bestsystem for governing [country].



– strong supporter, supporter, opponent, strong opponent, neither supporternor opponent.

– recoded so that very positively is highest and that the ‘neither’ and ‘DK’categories are a middle, neutral category.

Market Economy as Ideal (a2a): And what do you think about the idea thata market economy, in which there is private property and economic freedomto entrepreneurs, is the best system for [country].

– strong supporter, supporter, opponent, strong opponent, neither supporternor opponent.


Experience with Market Economy (a2b): And how would you evaluate theactual experience of the market economy so far?

– very positively, positively, negatively, very negatively, neither positivelynor negatively.


Experience with Democracy (a1b): And how would you evaluate the actualpractice of democracy here in [country] so far?

– very positively, positively, negatively; very negatively, neither positivelynor negatively.

– recoded so that very positively is highest and that the ‘neither’ and ‘DK’categories were a middle, neutral category.

Ideology (e3): Many people think of political attitudes as being on the ‘Left’or the ‘Right’. This is a scale stretching from the Left to the Right. When youthink of your own political attitudes, where would you put yourself?

– (Left) 1–10 (Right); recoded so that ‘DK’ is missing

Economic Evaluations:Retrospective Household Standard of Living (l6f): Compared with fiveyears ago, has your household’s standard of living fallen a great deal, fallena little, stayed about the same, risen a little, or has it risen a lot?

– DK coded as missing

Prospective Household Standard of Living (l6g): And looking ahead overthe next five years, do you think that your household’s standard of living willfall a great deal from its current level, fall a little, stay about the same as it isnow, rise a little, or rise a lot from its current level?




Retrospective National Standard of Living (l7a): Thinking now of thecountry as a whole, do you think that compared with five years ago, standardsof living have fallen a great deal, fallen a little, stayed about the same, risena little, or risen a lot?


Prospective National Standard of Living (l7b): And looking ahead over thenext five years, do you think that standards of living will fall a great deal fromtheir current level, fall a little, stay about the same as now, rise a little, or risea lot from their current level?


Socio-economic LocationAge (o1):

– age_1: 18–29; age_2: 30–44; age_3: 45–59; age 4: 60+ (referencecategory)

Education (std_education): all countries were adjusted to the ISCED 1997.

– pre-primary level of education (0), primary level of education (1), lowersecondary level of education (2), upper secondary level of education (3),post-secondary, non-tertiary level of education (4), first stage tertiaryeducation (5), second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advancedresearch qualification) of education (6).

Income (l7c): Which of the following statements best describes yourhousehold’s financial circumstances?

– we do not have enough money even to buy food; we have enough money tobuy food but we cannot afford to buy clothes and shoes; we have enoughmoney to buy food, clothes and shoes and have some savings but notenough to buy more expensive goods such as a TV set and fridge; we canbuy some expensive goods such as a TV set and fridge but we cannot affordall things we would want; we can afford everything that we would want; donot know.

– DK is recoded to missing

Gender (o2): Coded so that male is 1 and female is 0

Employment (j1): Is the respondent currently in paid work? Coded soemployed is 1 and unemployed is 0.



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