Advanced School of Economics in VeniceCa' Foscari University of Venice

Director: Agar Brugiavini

Agostini Marisamarisa.agostini@unive.it

Marisa Agostini - E-mail: marisa.agostini@unive.it - Web: http://virgo.unive.it/marisa.agostini

Ph.D. Program in Business(DEA - 1st year - A.A. 2008/2009)

Department of Business Economics and ManagementDirector: Massimo Warglien

Venice, 4h of October, 2010 Ref: Transcript of Grades – Marisa Agostini This is to certify that Ms. MARISA AGOSTINI is a student of good standing and is currently in the third year of the Doctoral Program in Business at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. During the first two years of the program she has taken and passed the following exams: FIRST YEAR COURSES

SECOND YEAR COURSES Note: numerical grading is given in 4.00/4.00 All courses held within the Doctoral Program in Business are in English.

Maths and Probability B+ 3,34

Microeconomics I A- 3,70

Game Theory B 3,00

Behavioral Economics A- 3,67

Financial Accounting A+ 4,33

Management Accounting A 4,00

Statistical Methods A+ 4.33 Organisation Theory & Qualitative Research Methods A+ 4,33 Competitive Analysis I A 4,00

Competitive Analysis II A+ 4,33

Finance A 4,00

Computational Models A 4,00

Ranking and Average grade 1st 3,92

Business History A- 3.67

Econometrics A- 3,67

Corporate Stretegy A 4.00

Corporate Governance PASS

Mathematics and ProbabilityPreparatory Course

Syllabus

Information at a glance

Course: Mathematical EconomicsWeb Site: http://www.dma.unive.it/~ferrettiProfessor: Paola Ferretti (email: ferretti@unive.it)Course: ProbabilityWeb Site: http://www.dst.unive.it/~sartoriProfessor: Nicola Sartori (email: sartori@unive.it)

Purpose of course. This preparatory course reviews the standard content of a secondlevel course in mathematical optimization and of an undergraduate-master level coursein probability. The first lectures are devoted to the presentation of some basic results onunconstrained and constrained optimization. Topics covered in the second part of the courseinclude: axioms of probability, conditional probability and independence, random variablesand their distributions, conditional distributions and expectations, convergence of randomvariables, laws of large numbers, central limit theorem.

Prerequisites. You are expected to be familiar with standard material in analysis andsome elementary notions on probability (both at the undergraduate level). More precisely,the following topics are assumed to be well-known: matrix algebra, determinants, linearindependence, vector spaces, basis, systems of linear equations (chapters 8–11, 26–28 ofC. P. Simon, L. Blume (1994); alternatively, chapter 1 of A. Vaglio (2004)). For the prob-ability part of the course, you are expected to be familiar (at an undergraduate level) withthe basic concepts of Probability theory, such as the concept of probability itself (of course!),independence, expected values, and conditional distributions.

Teaching method. There will be twenty meetings: ten of mathematics and ten of prob-ability. Additional material can be made available on the class websites.

Examination policy. This course is administered on a pass/fail basis, which is decidedbased on a final test. Students who choose not to attend this course must obtain a waiveror pass the test. Homework sets are proposed during the class.

Contents. The first ten lectures of the preparatory course ((ME) course) cover the fol-lowing topics:

ME1. Unconstrained maximization. Existence of solutions. First-order conditions. Second orderconditions.

ME2. Constrained maximization. The case of equality constraints; Lagrange’s method.

ME3. Constrained maximization. The case of inequality constraints; Kuhn-Tucker’s method.

ME4. Metric spaces; normed spaces; Cauchy sequences.

ME5. Contractions; uniform continuity. Fixed points. Banach’s Theorem.

The second part of the preparatory course ((P) course) covers the following topics:

P1. Definition of probability, independence, conditional probability.

P2. Random variables.

P3. Transformation of random variables.

P4. Expectation.

P5. Sampling distributions and limits.

Reading material in Mathematical Economics

The textbooks for the class are R. K. Sundaram (1999) and C. P. Simon, L. Blume (1994).A list of papers on covered topics will be published on the course webpage.

1) R. K. Sundaram (1999), A First Course in Optimization Theory, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge. [Chapters 3–6 and Appendix C.]

2) C. P. Simon, L. Blume (1994), Mathematics for Economics, WW Northorn & Company.[Chapters 16–19,29,30.]

3) A. Vaglio (2004), Matematica per Economisti, Apogeo, Milano.

Reading material in Probability

The textbooks for this part of the course are Evans and Rosenthal (2003, Chapters 1–4)and Casella and Berger (2002, Chapters 1–5). More detailed reference to these (and other)books will be given during the lectures.

1) M.J. Evans and J.S. Rosenthal (2003). Probability and Statistics - The Science of Un-certainty. W. H. Freeman.

2) G. Casella and R.L. Berger (2002). Statistical Inference, second edition. Duxbury Thomp-son Learning.

3) C.M. Grinstead and J.L. Snell (2006). Introduction to Probability. Available for free athttp://math.dartmouth.edu/∼prob/prob/prob.pdf.

4 D. Stirzaker (2003) Elementary Probability, Cambridge University Press.

Revised: 08.9.2008 GT: 0 c©M. LiCalzi

Game TheorySyllabus

Information at a glance

Course: Game TheoryWeb Site: <http://venus.unive.it/licalzi/game.html>Professor: Marco LiCalzi (email: licalzi@unive.it)Teaching Assistant: Oktay Surucu (email: oktay.surucu@unive.it)Lectures: See schedule belowOffice Hours: After class or by appointment

Purpose of course. This course covers the standard content of a first-year graduate-levelcourse in noncooperative game theory, including applications to industrial organization andauction theory.

Prerequisites. You are expected to be familiar with standard material in analysis andprobability at the level of the mathematical appendix in Jehle and Reny (2001) or somewherebelow the level of the mathematical appendix in Mas-Colell et alii (1995). No previousformal knowledge of game theory is required, although familiarity with simple examplessuch as the Prisoners’ Dilemma or the Battle of Sexes is assumed.

Teaching method. There will be twenty meetings. Some will be lectures, some will bepractice sessions. Additional material is available on the class website.

Examination policy. Grading is comparative. It is based on a final written exam (50%),four homework sets (10% each) and class participation (10%).

Reading material

The textbooks for the class are Jehle and Reny (2001) and Mas-Colell et alii (1995). For analternative presentation of game theory, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). A good sourceof solved exercises is LiCalzi (1995).

B) J. Bergin (2005), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. [Chapters 4, 7, 10,11, 14.]

J) G.A. Jehle and P.J. Reny (2001), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, second edition,Addison-Wesley. [Chapters 7 and 9.]

L) M. LiCalzi (1995), Teoria dei Giochi, Etas-Kompass.

M) A. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston and J.R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, OxfordUniversity Press. [Chapters 8–9, 12–13.]

O) M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press.[Chapters 2–3, 8.]

T) J. Tirole (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press. [Chapters 8,9.]

Schedule. Pages initialed by “J” refer to Jehle and Reny (2001). Similar notation appliesto other sources. Reading sources for each class overlap in content: you can just read thoseyou like better.

Class Day Time Topic Reading material1 22/9 9:15–10:45 Strategic form games J267–2742 23/9 9:15–10:45 Nash equilibrium J274–2803 29/9 9:15–10:45 Iterated dominance O53–644 30/9 9:15–10:45 Static oligopoly M387–394

Homework 1 (due back 16/10)5 6/10 9:15–10:45 Practice session6 7/10 9:15–10:45 Games of incomplete information J280–285, M253–2577 13/10 9:15–10:45 Increasing differences, cutoff strategies8 14/10 9:15–10:45 Auctions J374–383, B101–1079 20/10 9:15–10:45 Revenue equivalence theorem B107–113, J383–389

Homework 2 (due back 6/11)10 21/10 9:15–10:45 Extensive form games J285–29211 27/10 9:15–10:45 Games of perfect information J293–29712 28/10 9:15–10:45 Subgame perfect equilibrium J297–30613 3/11 9:15–10:45 Entry, accomodation, exit T305–337

Homework 3 (due back 22/11)14 4/11 9:15–10:45 Sequential equilibrium J306–32115 10/11 12:15–13:45 Signaling games M450–45916 11/11 14:00–15:30 Belief-based refinements M292–29617 17/11 12:15–13:45 Limit pricing and other examples T367–37418 18/11 14:00–15:30 Repeated games M400–405, M417–423

Homework 4 (due back 11/12)19 24/11 12:15–13:45 More equilibria O44–51, 246–25320 25/11 14:00–15:30 Cooperative game theory

Topics in Mathematics and StatisticsSyllabus

Information at a glance

Course: Mathematical EconomicsWeb Site: http://www.dma.unive.it/~ferrettiProfessor: Paola Ferretti (email: ferretti@unive.it)Course: StatisticsWeb Site: http://www.dst.unive.it/~sartoriProfessor: Nicola Sartori (email: sartori@unive.it)

Purpose of course. We aim to present some topics in mathematical analysis whichbear special relevance to the study of mathematical economics and game theory and toreview the standard contents of a master level course in probability. Topics covered inMathematics include Fixed Points Theorems, Correspondences, Dynamic Programming andsome applications. Topics covered in Statistics include: statistical inference, likelihood,maximum likelihood estimation, hypothesis testing, confidence regions, special models.

Prerequisites. You are expected to be familiar with all the material presented in thepreparatory course on Mathematics and Probability.

Teaching method. There will be twenty meetings: ten of mathematics and ten of statis-tics. The material will be presented rigorously during the class for the most importantresults. Additional material is made available on the class websites.

Examination policy. The final grade for Mathematics is based on five homeworks (50%)and on a final written exam (50%). The grading for Statistics Probability is based on fivehomeworks (50%) and on a final written exam (50%).

Contents. The Mathematics course ((M) course) is structured in the following lecturestopics:

M1. Parametric continuity. Correspondences.

M2. Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem; Schauder’s Theorem. Parametric monotonicity. Lattices.Sublattices.

M3. Supermodularity. Increasing differences. Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem. Zhou’s Theorem.

M4. Monotone Maximum Theorem. Monotonicity of value function: some results.

M5. Continuous Maximum Theorem.

M6. Finite horizon dynamic programming problems. Existence of an optimal strategy.

M7. Backwards induction method.

M8. Bellman Principle.

M9. Stationary discounted dynamic programming problems. Bellman Principle.

M10. Existence of an optimal strategy.

The ten lectures on Statistics ((S) course) cover (mainly) the following topics:

S1. Statistical inference. Statistics and probability.

S2. Statistical models. Statistical likelihood.

S3. Sufficient statistics and exponential families.

S4. Maximum likelihood estimator (MLE).

S5. Fisher information. Properties of the MLE.

S6. Some numerical examples.

S7. Three test statistics related to the likelihood.

S8. Likelihood ratio test.

S9. Interval estimation.

S10. Some special models.

Reading material in Mathematical Economics

The textbooks for the class are R. K. Sundaram (1999) and C. P. Simon, L. Blume (1994).A list of papers on covered topics will be published on the course webpage.

1) M. Carter (2001), Foundations of Mathematical Economics, The MIT Press, Massachusetts.[Chapters 2,3.]

2) R. K. Sundaram (1999), A First Course in Optimization Theory, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge. [Chapters 9–12]

Reading material in Statistics

The textbooks for this part of the course are Azzalini (1996, Chapters 1–4) and Evans andRosenthal (2003, Chapters 5–7). More detailed reference to these (and other) books will begiven during the lectures.

1) A. Azzalini (1996), Statistical Inference Based on the Likelihood, Chapman & Hall.

2) G. Casella and R.L. Berger (2002). Statistical Inference, second edition. Duxbury Thomp-son Learning.

3) A. Davison (2003) Statistical Models, Cambridge University Press.

4) M.J. Evans and J.S. Rosenthal (2003). Probability and Statistics - The Science of Un-certainty. W. H. Freeman.

DEA-DEC Microeconomics 1 Agar Brugiavini brugiavi@unive.it http://docenti.dse.unive.it/brugiavini/ Purpose of the course The course examines modern consumer theory, notions of producer competitive behaviour and notions of the equilibrium. Consumer theory is discussed at some length (including applications and data analysis) because of its importance and because its methods are paradigms for many other topics in economics. Prerequisite Students are expected to have a background in standard microeconomics from their undergraduate courses. Students should be familiar with standard material in analysis and probability at the level of the mathematical appendix in Jehle and Reny (2001). Teaching method. There will be twenty meetings. Some will be lectures, some will be practice sessions. Exercises will be proposed during the course. Examination policy. Grading is comparative. It is based on a written exam (70%), homework sets (20%) and class participation (10%). Reading material A.Mas-Colell, M. Whinston e J. Green, Microeconomic theory, Oxford University Press, 1995. (MWG) A. Deaton and J. Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behaviour, 1980, Cambridge University Press (DM) J. A. Jehle and P.J. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 2001, Addison-Wesley (JR) Content Preferences and Utility JR or MWG The Consumer’s Problem JR or MWG Indirect Utility and Expenditure JR or MWG Properties of Consumer Demand JR or MWG and DM Applications of Demand Theory DM Duality JR or MWG Production JR or MWG Cost JR or MWG Equilibrium and Welfare JR or MWG

Statistical modelling for management research

Prof. Claudio Agostinelli

June 17, 2008

1 Description

The course aims to provide a thorough insight into the classical regression andanalysis of variance techniques and also give practical experience of analysingdata sets with modern statistical packages.

2 Previous knowledge

Students should have a good knowledge about linear algebra (simple ma-trix operations, inverses, eigenvalues) and the basic concepts of probabilityand statistics (random variables, confidence intervals, hypothesis testing, p-values). Basic knowdlege of the statistical software R (www.r-project.org) isencouraged.

3 Topics

The course is structure in the following topics:

1. Introduction.

2. Estimation using least squares and likelihood.

3. Inference using likelihood and bootstrap.

4. Analysis of variance.

5. Model specification, diagnostic, checking and selection.

1

6. Stability of the inference, alternative methods: Ridge regression, Gen-eralized Least Squares, Robust Estimation.

Text books

A.C. Rencher (2000) Linear Models in Statistics. Wiley series in probabilityand statistics. isbn: 0-471-31564-8.

A. Davison (2003) Statistical Models, Cambridge UNiversity press, isbn:0–521–77339–3

R.A. Maronna, R.D. Martin and V.J. Yohai (2006) Robust Statistics,Wiley, isbn: 0–470–01092–4

R Core Team (2008) An Introduction to R, isbn: 3-900051-12-7, version2.7.0 (2008-04-22), available online at: cran.r-project.org.

2

Financial accounting

Carlo Bagnolibagnoli@unive.it

www.unive.it/bagnoli

Faculty of EconomicUniversity Ca’ Foscari of Venice

Purpose of the course

• The course introduce to the main financial accounting researchtopics. The primary objective of the course is to expose studentsto the main questions in this area and to survey the current stateof the art by examining selected research works.

• It will begin by defining the “(financial) accounting” concept andidentifying the financial reporting systems and the key financialstatements. It will then describe the development of financialaccounting practice over the past and locating the accompanyingchanges in accounting theories. It will finally consider theprincipal areas of, and approaches to, financial accountingresearch, and assess their methodological bases. Voluntarydisclosure research in particular, as a recent body of research, willbe explored in depth

Prerequisites

• Students are expected to have attended undergraduatecourses in Financial Accounting.

• For those who are not familiar with these issues, thepre-reading of one of the following is recommended:– Warren C.S., Reeve J.M. and Duchac, Financial Accounting,

2006;– Libby R., Libby P. and Short D.G., Financial Accounting,

2005;– Harrison and Horngren, Financial Accounting, 2006;– XXXXX and XXXXX, Financial Accounting, 200X.

Teaching method

• Ten lectures:– September, 24 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– October, 01 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– October, 08 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– October, 15 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– October, 22 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– October, 29 - from 2.30 to 4.00 p.m.– (November, 05 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.)– November, 12 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– November, 19 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– November, 26 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– December, 03 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.– (December, 10 - from 8.45 to 10.15 a.m.)

• Exercises and case studies are set for class discussion

Examination policy

• During the course, students are required to make twopresentations summarizing analytical frameworks usedand/or empirical evidences found in different researchareas. These class presentations forms 30% of theassessment.

• Furthermore evaluation will be based on participationto class (20%) and on a project work consisting in aliterature review and research questions identificationstarting from the results of an already carried researchon the following topic: “Strategy disclosure of Italianlisted company” (50%).

Course program

1. Fundamental concepts in financial accounting2. Normative and positive theories of financial accounting3. Contracting theory and accounting (homework)4. Financial accounting information and corporate governance

(homework)5. Empirical research on accounting choice6. Value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard

setting (homework)7. Capital market research in accounting (homework)8. Analytical disclosure literature (homework)9. Empirical disclosure literature10. “Strategy disclosure of Italian listed company” - literature

review and research questions identification

Reading list

• Lambert R.A. (2001), Contracting theory and accounting, Journal of Accounting& Economics, 31 (pp. 3-87)

• Magee R.P. (2001), Discussion of “Contracting theory and accounting”,Journal of Accounting & Economics, 31 (pp. 89-96)

• Bushman R.M. and Smith A.J. (2001), Financial accounting information andcorporate governance, Journal of Accounting & Economics, 32 (pp. 237-333)

• Sloan R.G. (2001), Financial accounting information and corporategovernance: a discussion, Journal of Accounting & Economics, 32 (pp. 335-347)

• Fields T.D., Lys T.Z. and Vincent L. (2001), Empirical research onaccounting choice, Journal of Accounting & Economics, 31 (pp. 255-307)

• Francis J. (2001), Discussion on empirical research on accounting choice,Journal of Accounting & Economics, 31 (pp. 309-319)

• Holthausen R.W. and Watts R.L. (2001), The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting, Journal ofAccounting & Economics, 31 (pp. 3-75)

Reading list

• Barth M., Beaver W.H. and Landsman W.R. (2001), The relevance of thevalue-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting: anotherview, Journal of Accounting & Economics, 31 (pp. 77-104)

• Kothari S.P. (2001), Capital market research in accounting, Journal ofAccounting & Economics, 31 (pp. 105-231)

• Lee C.M.C. (2001), Market efficiency and accounting research: a discussionof ‘capital market research in accounting’ by S.P. Kothari, Journal of Accounting& Economics, 31 (pp. 233-253)

• Verrecchia R.E. (2001), Essays on disclosure, Journal of Accounting &Economics, 32 (pp.97-180);

• Dye R.A. (2001), An evaluation of “essay on disclosure” and the disclosureliterature in accounting, , Journal of Accounting & Economics, 32 (pp.181-235).

• Healy P.M. & Palepu K.G. (2001), Information asymmetry, corporatedisclosure, and the capital market: a review of empirical disclosure literature,Journal of Accounting & Economics, 31 (pp. 405-440);

• Core J.E. (2001), A review of the empirical disclosure literature: discussion,Journal of Accounting & Economics, 31 (pp. 441-456)

Course: Behavioral Economics Professor: Massimo Warglien (email: warglien@unive.it) Office Hours: After class or by appointment Purpose of the course The course introduces to recent developments in experimental economics and in behavioral models of evonomic behavior. The course has two parts. The first part deals with experimentally observed violations of expected utility and introduces alternative models of individual behavior. The second part reconsiders basic solution concepts in game theory in the light of the experimental evidence on game playing and explores behavioral models of interactive decision making. Prerequisites Students are expected to have basic notions of expected utility theory and some familiarity with the basic concepts of game theory. Teaching method There will be twenty lectures on experimental methods and results, and basic models of behavioral economics. Examination policy Evaluation will be based on participation to class work, an oral exam on an indidual reading list to be agreed with the teacher, and a project work consisting in the design of an economic experiment. Course Program (20 lectures of 1:30')

1) Introduction: contents and methods

Part I: Individual behavior 2) Expected utility: biases and violations 3) Probabilistic reasoning 4) Some alternatives to expected utility:

Prospect theory Rank dependent utility Experimental evidence on non-EU models

5) Similarity, analogy and case-based decision making

Part II: Behavioral game theory

6) Reasoning in games: Common knowledge Dominance and iterated dominance. Backward induction and subgame perfect equilibria. A model of bounded rationality with limited reasoning steps: the "Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy" Quantal Response equilibria 7) Learning in games 8) Motivation and fairness. Inequality aversion. Fairness equilibria.

Reading list (most papers are available via electornic library services) General reference books on the course topics are:

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John Kagel and Alvin Roth, Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton 1995. Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction, Princeton,

2003

Introductory overview papers are: Matt Rabin (1998) Psychology and Economics, Journal of Economic Literature 36(1) 11-46 Alvin Roth (1995) "Introduction to Experimental Economics" chapter 1 of Kagel and Roth,

Handbook of Experimental Economics

Papers (ony a first list; other readings will be suggested during the classes)

Violations of Expected Utility; bias and heuristics Maurice Allais "Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des

postulats et axiomes de l'École Americaine", 1953, Econometrica. Ellsberg, D. (1961) "Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms," Quarterly Journal of

Economics, 75:643-69. Grether, D. and C. Plott (1979) "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal

Phenomenon," American Economic Review, 69:623-38 Becker, G.M., DeGroot, M.H., & Marschak, J. "Measuring Utility by a Single Response

Sequential Method(1964) Behavioral Science. 9, 226-232. C.Holt (1986) "Preference reversal and the independence axiom" American Economic Review

508-515 Tversky, A., P. Slovic, and D. Kahneman (1990) "The causes of preference reversal," American

Economic Review, 80:204-17 Hsee, C. et. al. (1999) "Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of

Options: A Theoretical Analysis," Psychological Bulletin, 125(5):576-90 Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974) "Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,"

Science 185, 1124-31. Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1981) "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of

Choice," Science, 211:453-58 Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) "Prospect theory and asset prices". Quarterly Journal of

Economics. Benartzi & Thaler, (1995) "Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle," Quarterly

Journal of Economics, 110, 73-92. Rabin, M. (2000) "Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem,"

Econometrica, 68(5), 1281-1292 Simonson, I. and A. Tversky (1992) "Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and

Extremeness Aversion," Journal of Marketing Research, 29(3), 281-95 Shafir, E. I. Simonson, and A.Tversky "Reason-based choice," Cognition, 1993, 49, 11-36. Thaler, R. (1985) "Mental accounting and consumer choice". Marketing Science, Camerer and Dan Lovallo.(1999) "Overconfidence and excess business entry: An experimental

approach", American Economic Review

Non-EU models Starmer, C. "Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive

Theory of Choice Under Risk," Journal of Economic Literature, 38:332-82 Kahneman, Daniel & Amos Tversky, "Prospect theory," Econometrica 1979, 47(2), 263-91 Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman, D. (1992) "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative

Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 297-323

Iterated reasoning in games Randolph Beard and Richard Beil, "Do People Rely on the Self-interested Maximization of

Others? An Experimental Test," Management Science 40 (1994), 252-262

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Andrew Schotter, Keith Weigelt, and Charles Wilson, "A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects," Games and Economic Behavior 6 (1994), 445-468

Nagel, R. (1995) "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," AER, 85(5):1313-26.;

Stahl, D. and P. Wilson (1995) "On player's models of other players: theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, 10:218-54;

E.Johnson, C.Camerer, S.Sen, T.Rymon (2002) "Detecting failures of backward induction" Journal of Economic Theory:16-47

Colin Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, and Juin-Kuan Chong, "A Cognitive Hierarchy Theory of One-Shot Games forthcoming QJE

QRE equilibria

Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey, "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal-Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 6-38

Learning in games

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine, The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT 1998 Yaw Nyarko , Andrew Schotter (2002) "An experimental study of belief learning using elicited

beliefs" Econometrica Ido Erev and A. Roth, Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in

experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. 1998 AER, 88, 848-881. R.Selten, K.Abbink,, R.Cox "Learning direction theory and the winner's curse" WP, UNi.Bonn,

2002 Colin Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho, "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form

Games," Econometrica, 67 (1999), 827-874

Case-based decision making I.Gilboa, D.Schmeidler "Case based decision-making" QJE 1995, 605-639

Fairness and reciprocity Alvin Roth, "Bargaining Experiments," chapters 1 and 4 of Kagel and Roth, Handbook of

Experimental Economics Colin Camerer and Richard Thaler, "Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners," Journal of

Economic Perspectives 9 (1995), 209-219 Bolton, G.E. and A. Ockenfels (2000) "ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition,"

American Economic Review, 90(1):166-93 Fehr, E, and K, Schmidt (1999) "A Theory of Fairness, competition, and cooperation,"

Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3):817-68 Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter (2000) "Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity".

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 159-81 Matthew Rabin, "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American

Economic Review 83 (1993), 1281-1302 George Akerlof (1982) " Labour contracts as partial gift exchange " Quarterly Journal of

Economics, 97, 543-69 Lazear, Edward (1989) "Pay equality and industrial politics," Journal of Political Economy, 97,

561-580.

Other recommended papers: John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, and Richard O. Beil (1990) Tacit Coordination

Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure. American Economic Review, 80, 234-48 Roberto Weber and Colin Camerer (2003) Cultural conflict and merger failure . Management

Science 49 (4) 400-415. Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe (1995) Trust reciproccity and social history, Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122-142

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Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter (2000) Do incentive contracts crowd-out voluntary cooperation? WP, University of Zurich

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Ph.d in Business Organization theory prof. Anna Comacchio comacchio@unive.it Office hours: Wednesday 10-12 and after lectures

Purpose of the course The PHD course on organization theory is design to provide an overview of organization theory and its evolution, to develop the ability to read and evaluate a theoretical contribution to the study and understanding of organization, to enable PhD students to draw on the organizational literature for their own research purpose even if it is not in the organization field. The course aims are the following:

1. Introduce to main questions and approaches of organization studies and provide a frameworks of analysis to understand the major theoretical perspective in organization theory, with a special attention on theories that takes the organizational level of analysis

2. Analyse the organizational economics’ perspectives within the organization theory and study more in depth two models of this perspective: transaction cost theory and agency theory

3. Provide an understanding on more recent contributions to organizational studies by analysing the resource based view approach and knowledge-based perspective

4. Develop an understanding of issues and problems related to the interplay between theory and methods

Prerequisites Students are expected to have basic notions of theory of the firm Teaching method and requirements Doctoral student are asked to actively participate to the course in two ways. Firstly they are asked to participate to class activity and discussion during each lecture. The readings are selected in order to encourage discussion on each section’s issues. Since class discussion is an integral part of the course, each participant is required to come prepared to class. PhD students are required to write a short memo of one page in advance about the topic of the lecture to be discussed, based on the required readings. Memos should be sent by e-mail the day before the

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two lectures of the four weeks from 2nd week to the 5th. A memo about the first week is required at the end of the section as a summary of the main issues highlighted by discussions and readings. Secondly they are asked to lead the discussion by preparing a critical presentation in two sections of the course, based on an article selected among optional readings. Short memo: i. will identify the major ideas, concepts, hypothesis, research methods that have been found worth remembering and stimulating for class debate ii. raise questions and critiques for discussion on the general topic of the lecture s. Presentation should be prepared for the third or forth sections and for the fifth sections, they can be based on slide and last 15 minutes. Lectures The course is organized in ten lectures of two hours each, grouped in five weeks-sections. The first and second weeks are focused on organization theory and on the frameworks of analysis of its evolution. From this point of view two main theoretical approaches are chosen to be analysed more extensively: bounded rationality (second week) and organizational economics (third week). The third week-section goes in more depth on the discussion of two models of organizational economics : transaction cost theory and agency theory. The fourth week-section is focused on more recent contributions to the advancement of organization theory: resource based view and knowledge approaches to organization theory. The fifth week is devoted to discuss the relationship between theory and method starting from a debate within the organization theory on the style of this theory. Examination policy Evaluation will be based on participation to class activity (including memo), the two presentations and an final oral exam. Each of these assignments is worth the following amount: Presentations 30% Participation 30% Final exam 40%

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Ph.d in Business

QMR – Qualitative Research Methodsprof. Anna Comacchiocomacchio@unive.itOffice hours: Wednesday 10-12 and after lectures

Purpose of the course

The objective of this course is to teach students how to undertake a field research using qualitativeresearch methods. The focus is on practice and theory about methods and how methods have been usedin the literature.The course is intended to enable participants to learn the skills needed to approach the research designand execution using several qualitative methodologies.

Teaching method and requirementsDoctoral student are asked to actively participate to the course in two ways.Firstly they are asked to participate to class activity and discussion during each lecture. The readings areselected in order to encourage discussion on each section’s issues. Since class discussion is an integralpart of the course, each participant is required to come prepared to class. PhD students are required towrite a short memo of one page in advance about the topic of the lecture to be discussed, based on therequired readings. Memos should be sent by e-mail the day before the two lectures of the four weeksfrom 3rd week to the 5th.Secondly they are asked to lead the discussion by preparing a critical presentation in one sections of thecourse, based on a reading selected by the instructor.

Short memo: i. will identify the major ideas, concepts, hypothesis, research methods that have beenfound worth remembering and stimulating for class debate ii. raise questions and critiques for discussionon the general topic of the lecture s.Seminar readings on specific research methods will contribute to the formulation of a research project tobe written and hand out at the end of the course and discussed with the instructor during the oral exam.

Lectures

The course is organized in ten lectures of two hours each, grouped in five weeks-sections.The first and second weeks are focused on qualitative research strategy and on the process of researchdesign. The third and fourth week-section goes in more depth on the discussion of different researchmethods such as: content analysis, ethnographic methods, cases research and grounded theory .Content analysis refers to systematic, often quantitative analysis of textual data that has beentransformed by coding into variables. The lecture on ethnographic methods includes more subjective andinformal ways of analyzing textual data, as well as interviewing techniques and ways of approachingparticipant observation. The fifth week is organized around meetings with the instructor to discussworking papers, readings and other research experiences.

Schedule

Week 1 – Introduction to qualitative research

Readings

Van Maanen J., 1997, Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organizational Research: A Preface,Administrative Science Quarterly, Dec79, Vol. 24 Issue 4, pp. 520-526

Sutton R. Staw B.W., (1995), What theory is not, Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, pp.371-384

Suggested ReadingsSonali K.S., Corley K.G., 2006. Building better theory by bridging the quantitative–qualitativedivide. Journal of Management Studies, 43 (8), 1822-1835.

Week 2 – Research design

ReadingsMiles M. & Huberman M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis, Baverly Hills CA: SageCh 2 focusing and bounding the collection of data: a substantive start

Suggested ReadingsBengtsson L., Elg U., Lind J., 1997, “Bridging the transatlantic publishing gap: how northamerican reviewers evaluate european idiographic research”, Scandinavian Journal ofManagement, vol.13, n.4, pp.473-492

Week 3 - Case study and grounded theoryReadingsEisenhardt K.M., 1989, Building theories from case study research, in Academy of managementreview, Special forum on theory building, vol.14, n.4, 532-550Leonard-Barton, D., « A dual methodology for case studies : Synergistic use of a longitudinal sitewith replicated multiple sites », Organization Science, 1(3), 1990, (248-266).

Suggested ReadingsEisenhardt K.M., 2007, Building theories from case study: opportunities and challenges, inAcademy of management journal, vol.50, n,1, 25-32

Week 4 – Collecting evidence and ethnographic methods

Yin R.K., 2003, Case study research, London, SAGE ch 4 Conducting case studies: collecting theevidence

References (articles, working paper and research reports) will be suggested and /or hand outbefore the section

Suggested Readings

Huber, G.P. and Power, D.J., « Retrospective reports of strategic-level managers : Guidelines forincreasing accuracy,” Strategic Management Journal, 6(2), 1985, (171-180).

Week 5 – Qualitative data analysisReadingsMiles M. & Huberman M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis, Baverly Hills CA: SageCh 4 and 10

Examination policy

Evaluation will be based on participation to class activity (including memo), the presentation and researchproposal and an final oral exam.

Each of these assignments is worth the following amount:Presentations and research proposal 40%Participation 30%Final exam 30%

Main ReferencesBartunek Jean and Meryl Louis. Insider/Outsider Research. London, Sage. 0-8039-7159-

Bernard, H. R. (2000). Social research methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches., ThousandOaks, Calif.: Sage

Fetterman D.M., 1998, Ethnography, London, SAGE.Fowler F.J., 2003, Survey research methods, Sage , LondonGladwin C. Ethnographic Decision Tree Modeling. London, Sage. 0 8039 3487 4Glaser B.G., Strauss A.L., 1967, The discovery of grounded theory analysis, Chicago, AldineKirk J., Miller M.L., 1986, Reliability and validity in qualitative research, SAGEKruskal and Wish. Multidimensional Scaling. London, Sage. 0-8039-0940-3Lee T.W., 1999, Using qualitative methods in organizational research, Sage, LondonMiles M. & Huberman M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis, Baverly Hills CA: SagePatton, M.Q., 2002, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3e Edition, Newbury Park :Sage.Spradley J. The Ethnographic Interview. Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch College Publishers. 0-03-044496-9Spradley J.P., 1980, Participant Observation, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publisher.Strauss & Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research. London, Sage.Weller Sue and Romney Kim. Systematic Data Collection. London, Sage.Yin R.K., 2003, Case study research, London, SAGE

Further references (articles, working paper and research reports) will be suggested and /or handout during sections

Syllabus of “Competitive Analysis” (Giuseppe Volpato, Andrea Stocchetti) Purpose of the course The course aims at providing concepts and tools for the analysis of industry characteristics and evolutionary traits, together with theoretical and operational instruments for the competitive analysis at a business level. The learning objectives are: a) acquiring a critic view of strategic and competitive analysis; b) developing the ability to define the current and prospective competitive scenario in a industry; c) identifying an effective and efficient competitive strategy related to the industry structure and the specific firm’s situation. Prerequisites Students are expected to have basic notions of microeconomics, business administration and marketing. Teaching method The course is divided into two parts, made of ten lectures each. The first part will focus on industrial structure and competitive analysis, while the second part will be related to techniques of competitive analysis at the business level. First Part – Giuseppe Volpato Methodological Introduction The most relevant epistemological problems concerning Economics and Business Economics The dialectic relationship between Economic Environment & Economic Theory The Model: Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) – A critical Assessment The concept of Industry – Definition of Industry’s Boundaries Competitive Advantages: Economies of Scale Economies of Scope Economies of Learning Differentiation Industrial Concentration Vertical Integration and Decentralization Diversification

Content and exams: Part 1: Giuseppe Volpato Industrial Structure and Competitive Analysis 1. Different Views in Industrial Economics

1.1 The Harvard School 1.2 The Applied Industrial Economics (J.S. Bain) 1.3 The Chicago School 1.4 The Game Theory School 1.5 Contestable Market Theory 1.6 The Strategic School

2. Pure Market Models

2.1 Perfect Competition (Definition, Equilibrium, Implications). 2.2 Monopoly (Definition, Equilibrium, Implications). 2.3 Oligopoly, (Definition, Equilibrium, Implications).

3. The Structure-Conduct-Performance Model

3.1 Assumptions of the Model 3.2 Functioning of the Model 3.3 Critical Evaluation of the Model

4. From Pure Models to Empirical Models

4.1 The Marshallian lesson: the Industry concept 4.2 Why do we need the “Industry” concept?

5. The concept of “Industry” and its use 6.1 Definition of “Industry” 6.2 Entry Barriers 6.3 Exit Barriers 6.4 Instability of Industry Boundaries

6. Competitive Advantages

6.1 Economies of Scale 6.1 At Plant level 6.2 At Firm level

6.2 Economies of Scope 6.3 Learning Economies 6.4 Other Sources of Advantages

7. Product differentiation 7.1 Definitions of product differentiation 7.2 Vertical and Horizontal differentiation 7.3 Product positioning

8. Industry concentration

8.1 Definitions of concentration 8.2 Measures of concentration

9. Vertical Integration and Network Relationships 9.1 Make or Buy Decisions 9.2 The “Quasi-Vertical Integration” 9.3 Vertical Relationships vs Network Relationships

10. Diversification

10.1 Concept and measures of diversification 10.2 Diversification between opportunities and threats

Exams Written exam: paper on an issue to be agreed with the teacher Reading List Reference Books on the course topics are: Volpato G. (2008), Concorrenza Impresa Strategia, il Mulino, Bologna, III ed. Morvan Y. (1991), Fondements d’économie industrielle, Economica, Paris, II ed. Scherer F.M. (1980), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Houghton Mifflin,

Boston. Papers A list of recommended readings will be suggested at the beginning of the course. Part II – Andrea Stocchetti Tools and Techniques for Business Competitive Analysis - Introduction to Business Competitive Analysis - The competitive positioning concept; Ideal Product and Product Positioning Analysis - Product competitiveness analysis - The portfolio analysis approach: insights about BCG Growth-Share Portfolio Analysis, GE Business Screen Matrix, the MCC matrix. - Product Life-Cycle Analysis - SWOT Analysis and the “competitive advantage” concept - Customer Satisfaction Analysis - Importance – Performance Analysis - Value Chain Analysis

Reading List Reference Book on the course topics is: - Fleisher C.S, Bensoussan B (2002), Strategic and Competitive Analysis: Methods and Techniques for Analyzing Business Competition, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River A list of article will be provided in electronic version at the beginning of the course; students are required to study these article in order to be able to describe and discuss them both during lectures and in the final exam. Exams and evaluation The final degree will be the weighted average of degrees obtained in four areas:

- homework 10% - discussion and participation during lectures 20% - surprise test 30% - final exam 40%

The surprise test will take place during one of the scheduled lesson and it will consist in a written exam (series of question and/or problems) to be developed in one hour and related to topics & article previously studied. The final exam will consist in a written report and a discussion.

FINANCE Prof. Ugo Rigoni

Course outline The course covers two macro issues: the first one concerns how an investor should perform the task to invest its money in financial markets. The investment process begins with the assessment of investor’s features, such as the willingness to take risks, the investment’s objectives and the constraints. In the following step the investor must choose an asset allocation policy and a portfolio consistent with its features. The second main issue regards corporate decisions that have financial implications and it is carried out answering two basic questions: how should a firm invest its financial resources and how should it finance these investments. These questions lead to a more general one, that is how to assess the value of a firm and its ability to create shareholder value. The aim of the course is to provide the theoretical principles for a robust understanding of these issues, trying to emphasize the empirical application of the theoretical methodologies. While the general references give a comprehensive and structured cover of course’s program, the specific references will be the basis for a more in depth study of the most prominent topics of the program. The specific references are seminal papers which contributed to the theoretical and/or empirical progress of research. General references Copeland T.E., Weston J.F., Shastri K., 2004, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, The Addison-Wesley Series in Finance, 4th Edition. Specific references The following list is not exhaustive: students can choose other papers subject to approval of the professor. Asset Pricing Sharpe W., 1964, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk”, Journal of Finance, 19: 425-442.

Fama E.F. and K.R. French, 1992, “The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns”, Journal of Finance, 47: 427-465.

Black F. and M. Scholes, 1973, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities”, Journal of Political Economy, 637-659.

Cox J., Ross S. and Rubinstein M., 1979, “Option Pricing: A Simlified Approach”, Journal of Financial Economics, September, 229–263.

Market Efficiency E.F. Fama, 1970, “Efficient Capital Markets: A review of Theory and Empirical Work”, Journal of Finance, 25: 383-417.

E.F. Fama, 1991, “Efficient Capital Markets: A review of Theory and Empirical Work”, Journal of Finance, 46: 383-417.

Fama E. F. 1998, “Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 49: 283-306.

Asset Allocation and Portfolio Choice Barberis N., 2000, “Investing for the Long Run when Returns are Predictable”, Journal of Finance, 55: 225-264.

Canner N., Mankiw N. G. and D.N. Weil, (1997), “An Asset Allocation Puzzle”, American Economic Review, 87: 181-191.

Elton E.J. and M.J. Gruber, 2000, “The Rationality of Asset Allocation Recommendations”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35: 27-41.

Markowitz H., 1952, “Portfolio Selection”, The Journal of Finance, 7: 77 – 91.

Capital Budgeting Froot, K. A., and J. Stein, 1998, " Risk Management, Capital Budgeting and Capital Structure Policy for Financial Institutions: An Integrated Approach”, Journal of Financial Economics, 47: 55-82.

The firm’s financial structure Modigliani F. and M. H. Miller, 1958, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment”, American Economic Review, 48: 261-297.

Rajan R. and L. Zingales, 1995, “What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence From International Data”, Journal of Finance, 50: 1421-1460.

Assessment 50% Class presentation and discussion of papers chosen from the selected references. 50% Written examination.

Prof. Vedovato Marco

Università Ca' Foscari VeneziaDip. di Economia e Direzione Aziendale

Cannaregio 873 - S. Giobbe30121 Venezia (Italy)

Tel: + 39 041 234 8777Fax: + 39 041 234 8701

E-mail: vedovato@unive.it

Management Accounting

Evaluation will be based on the participation to open class discussion, the presentation ofa paper and the editing of a research project (paper).

The class discussion program would be:

31/3: Chapman, 1997Bhimani and Langfeld Smith, 20071/4: Roberts, 1990Ahrens, 19972/4: Quattrone and Hopper, 2001Ezzamel et alii, 2008

Each paper will be specific responsibility of one student, who will prepare a .pptpresentation addressing, at least, the following points:

- Aim- Relevant Theory(-ies)- Method- Findings- Links with oter contributions or streams of research (contrasted orsupported)

Anyway, everyone have to reed all the papers, and will be evaluated also for theparticipation to the discussion.

vescovi@unive.it / 0412348741

Prof. Tiziano Vescovi

Advanced Marketing (Ph.D)

The day after marketing mix

Foreword

Marketing paradigms are recently found unable to identify and select suitable tools for managers and scholars in understanding the behavioursand the wants of the consumers, in order to develop effective marketing strategies fitting with the market dynamics.

The course aims to explore innovative marketing approaches, beyond the dominant marketing culture based on the Kotler’s marketing mixparadigm.

Contents

From marketing mix to consumer led marketingWhy marketing mix paradigm is loosing effectiveness

Changes in market structure and relationshipsNew consumer’s attitudes and wants: the hybrid consumer

Post modern marketing as a partial toolTribal and community marketing

Communitarian vs. individual marketing – the Mediterranean answerMarketing and technology

Mutual relationships changing the traditional marketing rulesTechnology and the power of the market

Technology readinessNew rules for marketing in the web

Marketing strategy by paradoxes

The research of impossible equilibriums between companies and costumersCreativity and arts as marketing tools

Moving away from the myth of the detail perfection

Assignments

The students should write a paper on marketing themes, to be submitted to the VII International Conference on Marketing Trends, January 2008Venice-Italy.

Oral examination about course topics

References

ANDERSON C. (2006); THE LONG TAIL; RANDOM HOUSE, LONDON

BERTHON P., MAC HULBERT J., PITT L.(2005); “Consuming Technology: Why Marketers Sometimes Get It Wrong”; California Management Review, vol. 40, fall.

Brown S. (2001): Marketing: the Retro revolution; SAGE Publications.

Brown S. (2001); “Torment Your Customers (They’ll Love It)”; Harvard Business Review, October.

Brown S. (1997): Postmodern Marketing Two: Telling Tales; Thomson Learning.

COLBY C.L., PARASURAMAN A. (2003); “Technology still matters”; Marketing Management, July/August.

Costantinides E. (2006); “The Marketing mix Revisited: Toward the 21st

Century Marketing”; Journal of Marketing Management, vol.22, n. 4.

Cova B., Cova V. (2002); “Tribal Marketing: the Tribalization of Society and its Impact on the Conduct of Marketing”; European Journal ofMarketing.

Cova B. (1999); “Tribal Marketing: a Latin Deconstruction of a Northern Construction”; First International Conference on Critical managementStudies, UMIST.

DEV C.S., SCHULTZ D.E. (2005); “A CUSTOMER-FOCUSED APPROACH CAN BRING THE CURRENT MARKETING MIX INTO THE 21 CENTURY”; MARKETING MANAGEMENT,JAN/FEB2005, VOL. 14 ISSUE 1

GLADWELL M. (2002); THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE; BACK BAY BOOKS, BOSTON.

GRÖNROOS C. (1994); “QUO VADIS, MARKETING? TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP MARKETING PARADIGM”; JOURNAL OF MARKETING MANAGEMENT, VOL. 10, JULY.

MICK D.G., FOURNIER S. (1998);“Paradoxes of Technology: Consumer Cognizance, Emotion, and Coping Strategies”; Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 25,September.

Parasuraman A., Colby C. L. (2001); Techno Ready Marketing: How and Why Your Customers Adopt Technology; Free Press.

PORTER M. (2001); “Strategy and the Internet”; Harvard Business Review, March.

TAPSCOTT D. (2001); “Rethinking Strategy in a Networked World”; Strategy & Business, issue 24.

VESCOVI T. (2007); Il marketing e la Rete; Il Sole 24 Ore, Milano.

Wind J.,Mahajan V., Gunther R. (2001); Convergence Marketing: Strategies for Reaching the New Hybrid Consumer; Financial Times PrenticeHall.

day classroom timemorning Sarperllon 11:00-12:30afternoon Sarpellon 14:00-15:30

Computer modelling for management research(Massimo Warglien, Davide Marchiori)June 8-12 - Hours: 24 hours of lecture and programming practice - Aula Dottorato

Lecture 1 (June 8)9 -10:30 AM (MW)What is computer simulation?Types of simulation in management research.From garbage cans to agent based-modelsComputational resources

11-12:30 AM (DM)Introduction to R as a programming language

3- 5 PM (DM)Practice session

Lecture 2 (June 9)9 -10:30 AM (MW)Constraint satisfaction modelsModelling local coherenceHopfield nets

11-12:30 AM (MW)Applications: Modelling coalitions and firm alliancesApplications: Modelling complementarities and tradeoffsApplications: Associative memory and consumer behaviorApplications: Communication in Teams (Hutchins)

3- 5 PM (DM)Further applications

Lecture 3 (June 10)9 -10:30 AM (MW)Evolutionary dynamicsGenetic algorithmsExploration and exploitation

11-12:30 AM (MW)Applications: The evolution of strategiesClimbing rugged landscapes

3- 5 PM (DM)Constructing a genetic algorithm that plays games

Lecture 4 (June 11)9 -10:30 AM (MW)LearningReinforcement learningApplications: learning strategies in games(a)

11-12:30 AM (DM)Learning with neural netsApplications: learning strategies in games (b)Applications: the transfer of learning

3- 5 PM (DM)Programming reinforcement learning

Ph.D. Program in Business (DEA) University Ca’Foscari of Venice - Department of Business Economics and Management

Director: Massimo Warglien

Agostini Marisa marisa.agostini@unive.it

Business History - Prof. Giovanni Favero gfavero@unive.it

Econometrics - Prof. Mario Padula

mpadula@unive.it Corporate Governance - Prof. Sandro Trento

sandro.trento@unitn.it

Corporate Strategy - Prof. Francesco Zirpoli fzirpoli@unisa.it

SECOND YEAR COURSES Advanced School of Economics – Ph.D. DEA – 2nd year - A.Y. 2009/2010

Business History – Prof. Favero Giovanni CALENDAR 1) Tuesday, September 15, 2009 Introduction to the course: theory and history of business 2) Friday, September 18, 2009 Pre-industrial businesses and institutions: a critical view on neo-institutionalism (Epstein 1998; Ekelund-Tollison 1980; Ogilvie 2007) 3) Tuesday, September 22, 2009 The rhetoric of accounting: from double-entry bookkeeping to cost accounting (Carruthers-Espeland 1991; Fleischman-Tyson 1993). 4) Friday, September 25, 2009 Theories of entrepreneurship (Schumpeter 1949; Langlois 2002; Amatori 2006) 5) Tuesday, September 29, 2009 Technology: endogenous or exogenous? (Rosenberg 1974; 1976; Mokyr 1992) 6) Friday, October 2, 2009 Business history as the history of organisations (Chandler 1970; 1973) 7) Tuesday, October 6, 2009 Theories of the firm (Coase 1937; Williamson 1981; Lamoreaux 1998) 8) Friday, October 9, 2009 Rational choice challenged (Heiner 1983; Krugman 2009: discussion) 9) Tuesday, October 13, 2009 Networks: an alternative to hierarchy and market? (Powell 1990: discussion) 10) Friday, October 16, 2009 Historical explanations of changes in business governance (Becker 2002: discussion)

Home > Facoltà > Facoltà di Economia > Schede corsi e Orari Facoltà Economia

ECONOMETRICS Anno Accademico: 2009/2010 Codice Insegnamento: EM2008 Crediti: 6 Livello laurea: Laurea Magistrale dm270 Settore: SECS-P/05 Periodo: 1° Periodo Anno corso: 1

Docenti PADULA Mario (6.00 cfu) PETTINICCHI Yuri 9h Lezione, (6.00 cfu)

Corsi di laurea e percorsi [EM2] ECONOMIA

economics and management

Orario delle lezioni

Programma

Obiettivi Formativi Il corso rivede il modello lineare e presenta i modelli non lineari destinati allo studio di variabili dipendenti limitate, come i modelli per le variabili dicotomiche, policotomiche, censurate, e troncate, alla luce del problema della causalità in econometria. L'enfasi è sulle applicazioni economiche, senza trascurare elementi rilevanti di teoria econometrica.

Prerequisiti Matematica e Statistica

Contenuti 1. Cenni al modello lineare. 2. Metodo della massima verosimiglianza. 3. Modelli per variabili di risposta dicotomiche. 4. Modelli per variabili di risposta policotomiche. 5. Modelli per variabili di risposta policotomiche non ordinate. 6. Valutazione dei programmi. 7. Modelli per variabili troncate e censurate. 8. Modelli di selezione endogena.

Testi di riferimento

Giorno Ora Sede Aula NoteMercoledì 12.15-13.45 San Giobbe AULA 8BGiovedì 14.00-15.30 San Giobbe AULA 8BGiovedì 15.45-17.15 San Giobbe AULA 8B esercitazioni Dott.Pettinicchi dal 24/9Venerdì 14.00-15.30 San Giobbe AULA 8B

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P.H. Franses and R. Paap, QuantitativeModels in Marketing Research, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 29-46, 49-70, 76-107, 112-129, 133-150,133-150. M.Verbeek, A Guide to Modern Econometrics, John Wiley and Sons,LTD, 2000, pp. 7-41, 151-167, 216-220. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 2001. Angrist, J.D. and J. Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion, Princeton University Press, 2009.

Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento Scritto.

Metodi didattici Lezioni frontali ed esercitazioni nel laboratorio informatico.

Lingua di insegnamento Inglese

AF: 83426 AR: 47486

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Academic year 2009-10

Università di Trento

PhD Program in Management and Economics

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WORKSHOP

Sandro Trento

This workshop examines various topics related to corporate governance and it will be based

on a multi-disciplinary approach, using comparative institutional analysis and historical

experience.

The class is conducted mainly through discussion and you are expected to read all papers

assigned each time. Each class will be organized in sections, dedicated to the analysis and

discussion of some readings. There will be students opening each class with a presentation.

Class participation is very relevant for students evaluations.

NOTICE

STUDENTS SHOULD READ THE MATERIAL BEFORE COMING TO CLASS; IN

CLASS THEY WILL BE ASKED TO SUMMARISE AND PRESENT THE ASSIGNED

READINGS.

Reading list

1. October 6, 2009 h: 15.00- 19.00 (readings **):

Introduction

Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York,

Macmillan.

Marris, R. (1964), The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, Glencoe, Ill.., Free Press.

2

Corporate governance – definition

** Hart, O. (1988), An Economist Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, in Columbia Law

Review, 89, 7, pp.1757-1774.

Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

** Becht, M., Bolton, P. and Roel, A. (2002), Corporate Governance and Control, NBER Working

paper 9371, December.

** Hart, O. (1995), Corporate Governance: some Theory and Implications, The Economic

Journal, 105, pp. 678-689.

** Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997), A Survey of Corporate Governance, The Journal of

Finance, vol. LII, n. 2.

** Tirole, J. (2001), Corporate Governance, Econometrica, vol. 69, n. 1, pp. 1-35.

** Zingales, L. (1998), Corporate Governance, CEPR Discussion Paper n. 1806.

2. October 20, 2009 h: 15.00- 19.00 (readings **):

Financial systems

** Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. (eds), Financial Structure and Economic Growth. A Cross-

Country Comparison of Banks, Markets and Development, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press.

** Carlin, W. and Mayer, C. (2002), Finance, Investment and Growth.

** Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (1999), Financial Systems, Industrial Structure, and Growth,

Supplement n. 23 to the Government Inquiry on the International Competitiveness of

Swedish Financial Sector.

Corporate governance systems – a taxonomy

** Dick, A. and Zingales, L. (2002), Private Benefits of Control: an International Comparison,

NBER Working Paper 8711.

** La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), Corporate Ownership Around

the World, Journal of Finance, Vol. LIV, n. 2.

3

** La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997), Legal

Determinants of External Finance, The Journal of Finance, vol. LII, n. 3.

** La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (2000), Investor

Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics 58, pp. 3-27.

* Aguilera, R.V. and Jackson, G. (2002), The Cross-national Diversity of Corporate Governance:

Dimensions and Determinants.

* Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (2000), Funding Growth in Bank-Based and

Market-Based Financial Systems: Evidence from Firm Level Data, The World Bank

Development Research Group Finance, Policy Research Working Paper n. 2432.

* Mayer, C., Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance in Corporate Governance,

Financial Markets and Global Convergence, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 235-260.

* Moerland, Pietre W. (1995), Corporate Ownership and Control Structures: an International

Comparison, Review of Industrial Organization 10, pp. 443-464.

* Weimer, J., Pape and Joost, C. (1999), A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance, vol. 7,

n. 2.

Private Benefits of Control

* Doidge, C., Karolyi, A., Lins, K.V., Miller, D.P., and Stulz, R.M., (2009), Private

benefits of control, ownership, and the cross-listing decision, Journal of Finance 64, 425-466

* Dyck, A, and Zingales, L., (2004), Private Benefits of Control: an International Comparison,

Journal of Finance 59, 537-600.

* Nenova, T., (2003), The value of corporate voting rights andcontrol: a cross-country

analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 68, 325-351.

* Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., and Mullainathan, S., (2002), Ferreting out Tunneling: an

Application to Indian Business Groups, Quarterly Journal of Finance February, 121-148.

* Villalonga, B. , and Amit, R., (2008), Family control of firms and industries, Working Paper,

Harvard Business School.

4

3. November , 3 2009 h: 15.00- 19.00 (*)

Hedge Fund Activism and Shareholder Activism

* Henry Hu and Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic

and Voting Ownership, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2007.

* Apil Klein, Emanuel Zur - Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other

Private Investors, Finance Working Paper No. 140/2006.

* Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, Randall Thomas, (2006) Hedge Fund Activism,

Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, ECGI working paper No. 139/2006.

* Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, Stefano Rossi, (2006), Returns to Shareholder

Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, ECGI. Working

paper 138/2006

Other Topics

Bertrand and Mullainathan (2002), Pyramids, MIT Working Paper 02-03.

Burkhart, M., Panunzi, F. and Shleifer, A. (2003), Family Firms, in Journal of Finance, 58, pp.

2167-2202.

Demsetz, H. and Villalonga, B. (2001), Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, in

Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, pp. 209-233.

Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (2000), The Governance of the new Enterprise, NBER Working

Paper 7958.

Roe, M. (2003), Political Determinants of Corporate Governance, Oxford, Oxford University

Press.

Zahra, Shaker A. (1996), Governance, Ownership, and Corporate Entrepreneurship: the

Moderating Impact of Industry Technological Opportunities, Academy of Management Journal,

vol. 39, n. 6, pp. 1713-1735.

Zingales, L. (1999), Sistemi finanziari, struttura industriale e crescita.

Comparative Corporate Governance

5

Japan

* Aoki, M. and Patrick, H. (2000), Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Banking System:

An Analytical and Developmental View, in The Japanese Main Bank System, Oxford University

Press, pp. 109-141.

* Aoki, M., Hugh, P. and Sheard, P. (2000), An Introductory Overview, in The Japanese Main

Bank System, pp. 3-49.

** Morck, R., and Nakamura, M., (1999), Banks and Corporate Control in Japan, Journal of

Finance 54, 319-339

** Morck, R., and Nakamura, M., Shivdasani, A.,(2000), Ownership structure, and firm

value in Japan, Journal of Business 73, 539-567

** Peek, J., and Rosengren, E.S., (2005), Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives

and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan, American Economic Review 95, 1144-1166

- Aoki, M. (2000), Organizational Diversity and Comparative Informational Efficiency: is the

Production Function Really a Technological Given?, in Information, Corporate Governance, and

Institutional Diversity, Competitiveness in Japan, the USA, and the Transitional Economies, Oxford

University Press, pp. 22-93.

- Gilson, R. and Roe, Mark, J. (1999), Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution

of Japanese Corporate Governance, Columbia Law Review, 1999, n. 2.

- Kaplan, Steven N. (1997), Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: a

Comparison of Germany, Japan, and U.S., Bank of America, Journal of Applied Corporate

Finance, vol. 9, n. 4, pp. 86-93.

4. November , 10 2009 h: 15.00- 19.00 (*)

Germany

* Faccio, M. and Lang, L.H.P., The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations,

Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

Calomiris, Charles W. (1993), Corporate-Finance Benefits from Universal Banking :

Germany and United States, 1870-1914, NBER Working Paper n. 4408.

6

* Edwards, J. and Nibler, M. (2000), Corporate Governance in Germany: the Role of Banks

and Ownership Concentration, Economic Policy, pp. 239-267.

* Franks, J.R. and Mayer, C. (2001), Ownership and Control of German Corporations, CEPR

Discussion Paper n. 2898.

* Chirinko, R.S., Elston, J.A., (2006), Finance, control and profitability: the influence of

German banks, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 59, 69-88.

* Dittmann, I., Maug, E., and Schneider, C., (2009), Bankers on the boards of German firms:

what they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there, Review of Finance,

forthcoming.

Italy

* Bianchi, M., Bianco, M. and Enquires, L. (2003), Pyramidal Groups and the Separation

Between Ownership and Control in Italy, Mimeo.

* Barca, F. and Trento, S. (1997), State Ownership and the Evolution of Italian Corporate

Governance, in Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 6, n. 3.

* Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., Giacomelli, S., Pacces, A. and Trento, S. (2005), Proprietà e

controllo delle imprese in Italia, Bologna, il Mulino.

Franzosi, A. and Pellizzoni, E. (2003), La quotazione in Borsa: attitudini e comportamenti

delle imprese italiane, BitNotes n. 7, pp.1-55.

Macchiati, A. (1999), Breve storia delle privatizzazioni in Italia: 1992-1999. Ovvero: si poteva

fare meglio?, in Mercato, concorrenza, regole, a. I, n. 3, pp. 447-468.

Sweden

* Agnblad, J., Berglöf, E., Högfeldt, P. and Svancar, H. (2001), Ownership and Control in

Sweden: Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social Control, in The Control of Corporate Europe,

F. Barca and M. Becht (eds), Oxford, Oxford University Press.

* Högfeldt, P. (2004), The Politics and History of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, NBER

Working Paper n. 10641.

7

UK

* Franks, J.R., Mayer, C. and Rossi, S. (2002), The Origination and Evolution of Ownership

and Control.

Georgen, M. and Renneboog, L. (2001), Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in

the UK, in The Control of Corporate Europe, F. Barca and M. Bect (eds), Oxford, Oxford

University Press.

* Gompers, P.A. and Lerner, J. (1998), The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success:

Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities, NBER Working Paper 6725.

4. November 24, 2009 h: 15.00- 19.00

Institutional Complementarities – Varieties of Capitalism

Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2001), An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in Hall, P.A. e

Soskice, D. (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage

in Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Jackson, G. (2005), Toward a Comparative Perspective on Corporate Governance and Labour

Management: Enterprise Coalitions and National Trajectories in Gospel, H. and Pendleton, A.

(eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management. An International Comparison, Oxford,

Oxford University Press.

Anglo-Saxon

Jacoby, S.M. (2005), Corporate Governance and Employees in the United States, in Gospel, H. and

Pendleton, A. (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management. An International Comparison,

Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Pendleton, A. and Gospel, H. (2005), Markets and Relationships: Finance, Governance, and

Labour in the United Kingdom, in Gospel, H. and Pendleton, A. (eds), Corporate Governance and

Labour Management. An International Comparison, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Vitols, S. (2001), Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK, in

Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of

Comparative Advantage, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

8

Germany

Jackson, G., Hoepner, M. and Kurdelbusch, A. (2005), Corporate Governance and Employees in

Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions, in Gospel, H. and Pendleton, A.

(eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management. An International Comparison, Oxford,

Oxford University Press.

Frick, B. and Lehmann, E. (2005), Corporate Governance in Germany: Ownership.

Codetermination, and Firm Performance in a Stakeholder Economy, in Gospel, H. and Pendleton,

A. (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management. An International Comparison, Oxford,

Oxford University Press.

France

Goyer, M. and Hancké B. (2005), Labour in French Corporate Governance: The Missing Link, in

Gospel, H. and Pendleton, A. (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management. An

International Comparison, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Spain

Aguilera, R.V. (2005), Corporate Governance and Employment Relations: Spain in the Context of

Western Europe, in Gospel, H. and Pendleton, A. (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour

Management. An International Comparison, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Japan

Araki, T. (2005), Corporate Governance, Labour, and Employment Relations in Japan: the Future of

the Stakeholder Model?, in Gospel, H. and Pendleton, A. (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour

Management. An International Comparison, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PhD in Business – Course in Corporate Strategy Instructor: Francesco Zirpoli Time: October 30 – 4 hours (afternoon)

November 13 - 4 hours (morning) + 4 hours (afternoon) November 27 - 4 hours (morning) + 4 hours (afternoon)

Aim of the course: The aim of this course is to provide a solid understanding and stimulate a critical reading of current research in the field of corporate strategy. Course Description: The course analyzes how business organizations develop their knowledge and resource base in order to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. Identification of mechanisms that explain why firms in seemingly similar circumstances experience persistent differences in performance is a major theoretical challenge. In fact, the central question of strategy is, why persistent differences in economic performance between industries, and even between firms within the same industry, are generally observed. Different theoretical perspectives offer competing explanations for this observation1. This course focuses on the firm-level analysis whose point of departure is the resource-based perspective which stipulates why the firm’s resource base can be a source of sustainable competitive advantage. In a dynamic perspective theories of search and learning processes as well as competence development are added to traditional approaches within the strategy literature. The course also considers that corporate strategy should include a strategy for managing innovation and examines the challenges of value creation and value appropriation in a dynamic environment. Prerequisites: This course is designed for students that have already attended the “Organization Theory” course and the “Competitive Analysis” course within the SSE PhD program. Course format: The course is interactive and based on the discussion of seminal papers. To prepare for discussion, student must read all the articles listed in the section

1 These theories draw on economics and lie at the intersection of strategic management and organization research. They are useful for understanding the importance of the industry context as well as firm specific factors. Included are theories of industrial organization and technological change, transaction cost economics and the property rights approach, as well as network approaches. An overview will be provided in the first seminar of the course. Moreover, reference to classical readings, including complementary theories and approaches will provided in the supplementary reading list.

“Seminars and mandatory readings”. The students are supposed to be completely familiar with the articles and think critically about their content. The instructor will guide the discussion and introduce the theme of the seminar but will not be the main contributor to the discussion. Seminars and mandatory readings: The articles listed below will be discussed in each seminar (pdf files can be provided upon request). During classes, students will be asked to report on each article following the structure of the paper, step by step (students will rotate during the paper presentation, so each student is supposed to read all the papers and contribute to the discussion on each paper). The aim of such a procedure is not only to analyse the main contribution of the article to the field of strategy but also the article’s structure, how the authors develop their argument and what can be learnt on how to write a successful academic paper in the field. No power point presentation is expected, but students can use this format if they wish. Seminar 1: An introduction to corporate strategy research (readings for October 30) This seminar introduces the course, describes the historical development of the field and shows recent trend in corporate strategy research (see section “A guided tour into Corporate Strategy” below).

Williamson, O. E. (1999), “Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspectives”, Strategic Management Journal, 20(12), pp. 1087-1109.

Seminar 2: Resources and dynamic capabilities (readings for November 13) Diericks I. and Cool K. (1989), “Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage,” Management Science, 35: 1504-1511, with comment by Jay Barney at 1511-1513. Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen, (1997), “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management,” Strategic Management Journal, 18: 509-533. Eisenhardt K. and J. Martin, (2000) “Dynamic Capabilities: What are they?”, Strategic Management Journal 21:1105-1121.  

Winter, Sidney G. (2003), “Understanding Dynamic Capabilities”, Strategic 

Management Journal, 24: 991 – 995.  Jacobides, M. G, Winter, S., (2005), “The co-evolution of capabilities and transaction costs: explaining the institutional structure of production”, Strategic Management Journal, 26: 395 – 413.

Seminar 3: Value creation and value appropriation in a dynamic environment (readings for November 13) Christensen C. and J. Bower, (1996) “Customer Power, Strategic Investment and the Failure of Leading Firms”, Strategic Management Journal,17:197-218. Rebecca H. and K. Clark, (1990), “Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established”, Administrative Science Quarterly”, 35:9-30. Teece, D. (1986), “Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy”, Research Policy, 15:285-305. Jacobides M., Knudsen T., Augier. M. (2006). “Benefiting from innovation: value creation, value appropriation and the role of industry architectures”, Research Policy, 35(8) 1200-1221. Seminar 4 & 5: The challenges of adaptation (readings for November 27) March, J., “Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning”, Organization Science, Vol. 1, N°2, pp. 71-87 (1991). Levinthal D. A. and J. G. March, (1993), “The Myopia of Learning,” Strategic Management Journal, 14, pp. 95-112. Levinthal D., (1997), “Adaption on Rugged Landscapes,” Management Science, 43: 934-950. Greve H. R. (2003), “A Behavioral Theory of R&D Expenditures and Innovations: Evidence from Shipbuilding”, The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 46, No. 6, pp. 685-702. Birkinshaw, J. and C. Gibson (2004), “Building Ambidexterity Into an Organization”. MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol.47, 47-55. March, J. 1962 ‘The Business Firm as a Political Coalition’, Journal of Politics, 24: 662-678. Kaplan, S. (2008). “Framing Contests: Strategy Making Under Uncertainty”, Organization Science, 19(5), 729–752. Examination policy:

Evaluation will be based on participation to class and on the proficiency with which the reading assignment and the following discussion will be performed. A “guided” tour into Corporate Strategy literature The course offers an overview on Corporate Strategy and zooms on its fundamentals. In this section a comprehensive list of themes and relative readings is provided. Framing corporate strategy Collis and Montgomery (1998), “Creating corporate advantage,” Harward Business Review, 76(3): 71-83. Bowman & Helfat (2001), “Does corporate strategy matter?,” Strategic Management Journal 22(1): 1-23. Gavetti, G., Levinthal, D. A. (2004), ”The Strategy Field from the Perspective of Management Science”, Management Science, Vol. 50 Issue 10, pp. 1309-1318. Economies of Scope Teece (1980) "Economies of scope & the scope of the enterprise", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1: 223-247. Bailey & Friedlaender (1982) “Market structure and multiproduct industries,” Journal of Economic Literature 20(3): 1024-1048. Jensen & Zajac (2004), “Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm,” Strategic Management Journal 25(6): 507-524. Vertical Integration Mahoney (1992) “The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration”, Strategic Management Journal 13(8): 559-584. Williamson (1981) “The modern corporation: Origins, evolution, attributes”, Journal of Economic Literature 19:1537-1658. Walker & Weber (1984) “A transaction cost approach to make-or-buy decisions”, Administrative Science Quarterly 29: 373-91.

Harrigan (1985) “Vertical integration and corporate strategy”, Academy of Management Journal 28: 397-425. Poppo & Zenger (1998) “Testing alternative theories of the firm: Transactions cost, knowledge-based and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information services,” Strategic Management Journal 19(9): 853-878. Diversification Rumelt (1982) “Diversification strategy and profitability”, Strategic Management Journal 3(4): 359-369. Christiansen & Montgomery (1981) “Corporate economic performance: Diversification strategy versus market structure”, Strategic Management Journal 2(4): 327-343. Palich, Cardinal & (2000). “Curvilinearity in the diversification- performance linkage: An examination of over three decades of research”, Strategic Management Journal 21(2): 155-174. Teece, Rumelt, Dosi & Winter (1994) “Understanding corporate coherence: Theory & evidence”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 32(1): 1-30. Ramanujam, & Varadarajan (1989) “Research on corporate diversification: A synthesis,” Strategic Management Journal 10: 523-51. Acquisitions Seth (1990) “Value creation in acquisitions: A reexamination of performance issues”, Strategic Management Journal 11: 99-115. Seth (1990) “Sources of value creation in acquisitions: An empirical investigation”, Strategic Management Journal 11(6): 431-446. Capron (1999) “The Long-Term Performance of Horizontal Acquisitions,” Strategic Management Journal 20: 987-1018. Capron & Pistre (2002) “When do acquirers earn abnormal returns?,” Strategic Management Journal 23(9): 781-794. Haunschild, Davis-Blake & Fichman (1994), “Managerial overcommitment in corporate acquisition processes,” Organization Science, 5(4): 528-540.

Post-merger integration Jemison & Sitkin (1986) “Corporate acquisitions: A process perspective”, Academy of Management Review, 11(Jan): 145-63. Larsson & Finkelstein (1999), “Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource perspectives on mergers and acquisitions: A case survey of synergy realization,” Organization Science, 10(1): 1-26. Finkelstein & Haleblian (2002), “Understanding acquisition performance: The role of transfer effects,” Organization Science, 13(1): 36-47. King, Dalton, Daily & Covin (2004), “Meta-analyses of post-acquisition performance: Indications of unidentified moderators,” Strategic Management Journal 25(2): 187-200. Strategic alliances Kogut (1988) “Joint ventures: Theoretical & empirical perspectives”, Strategic Management Journal 9(4): 319-332. Kogut (1991), “Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire,” Management Science 37(1): 19-33. Gulati (1995), “Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances,” Academy of Management Journal 38: 85-112. Gulati & Singh (1998), “The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4): 781-814. Folta & Miller (2002), “Real options in equity partnerships,” Strategic Management Journal, 23(1): 77-88. Internal venturing & Corporate venture capital Thornhill & Amit (2001), “A dynamic perspective of internal fit in corporate venturing,” Journal of Business Venturing 16(1): 25-50. Zahra (1996), “Technology strategy and new venture performance: A study of corporate-sponsored and independent biotechnology ventures,” Journal of

Business Venturing 11(4): 289-321. Garud & Van de Ven (1992), “An Empirical evaluation of the internal corporate venturing process,” Strategic Management Journal 13: 93-109. Chesbrough (2002), “Graceful exits and missed opportunities: Xerox's management of its technology Spin-off organizations,” Business History Review 76(4): 803-837. Chesbrough (2002), “Making sense of corporate venture capital,” HBR 80(3): 90-99. Divestment Harrigan (1981) “Deterrents to divestiture”, Academy of Management Journal 24(2): 306-323. Montgomery & Thomas & Kamath (1984) “Divestiture, market valuation, and strategy”, Academy of Management Journal 27: 830-40. Duhaime & Grant (1984) “Factors influencing divestment decision-making: evidence from a field study”, Strategic Management Journal 5: 301-18. Bethel & Liebeskind (1993) “The effects of ownership structure on corporate restructuring”, Strategic Management Journal 14: 15-31. Chang (1996) “An evolutionary perspective on diversification and corporate restructuring: Entry, exit, and economic performance during 1981-89,” Strategic Management Journal 17: 587-611. Role of the corporate office Nayyar & Kazanjian (1993), “Organizing to attain potential benefits from informational asymmetries and economies of scope in related diversified firms,” Academy of Management Review, 18: 735-759. Hoskisson (1987), “Multidivisional structure and performance,” Academy of Management Journal, 30: 625-644. Chandler (1994), “The functions of the HQ unit in the multibusiness firm,” in Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, ed. Fundamental Issues in Strategy, HBS Press. Goold, Campbell & Alexander (1994), Corporate-level Strategy: Creating Value in the Multibusiness Company, Ch. 5: pp. 77-89.

Corporate governance Oviatt (1988) “Agency and transaction cost perspectives on the manager-shareholder relationship: Incentives for congruent interest”, Academy of Management Review 13: 214-25. Demsetz & Lehn (1985) “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences”, Journal of Political Economy 93: 1155-77. Hill & Snell (1989) “Effects of ownership structure and control on corporate productivity,” Academy of Management Journal 32: 25-46. Mizruchi (1996), “What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates,” Annual Review of Sociology 22: 271-298. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson (1998), “Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance,” Strategic Management Journal 19(3): 269-290. “Real options” in strategy Myers (1984), “Finance theory and financial strategy,” Interfaces 14(1): 126-137. Trigeorgis (1993), “Real options and interactions with financial flexibility”, Financial Management 22 (Autumn): 202-24. Kogut & Kulatilaka (2001), “Capabilities as real options,” Organization Science 12(6): 744-758. Bowman & Moskowitz (2001), “Real options analysis and strategic decision making,” Organization Science 12(6): 772-777. Adner & Levinthal (2004). “What is not a real option: Considering boundaries for the application of real options to business strategy,” Academy of Management Review 29(1): 74-85. Suggested handbooks Robert M Grant, (2007) Contemporary Strategy Analysis: Concepts, Techniques, Applications, 6th Edition, John Wiley & Sons, ISBN: 978-1-4051-6309-5. David Collis and Cynthia A. Montgomery, (2005) Corporate Strategy, McGraw-Hill, ISBN: 978-0-0723-1286-7.

David O. Faulkner and Andrew Campbell, (2003) The Oxford Handbook of Strategy, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-925017-0. Classical readings, including complementary theories and approaches Strategy Chandler, A.D., Jr. (1962). Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ansoff, H.I. (1965). Corporate Strategy: An Analytical Approach to Business Policy for Growth and Expansion. New York: McGraw-Hill. Industrial organization Bain, J.S. (1956). Barriers to New Competition. Mass.: harvard University Press. Scherer, F.M. (1970). Industrial market Structure and Economic Performance. Chicago: Rand Mcnally. Tirole (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. The economics of technological change Dosi, G.; Freeman, C.; Nelson, R.R.; Silverberg, G.; Soete, L. (1988). Technical Change and Economic Theory. London: Pinter Publishers. Kaldor, N. (1966). Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth in the United Kingdom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nelson, R.R. (1959). The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research. Journal of Politicl Economy, 67(3): 297-306. Mansfield, E. (1962). Industrial Research and Technological Innovation: An Econometric Analysis. New York: W.W. Norton. Rosenberg, N. (1976). Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.

The resource- and competence based view Penrose, E.T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. London: Basil Blackwell. The behavioural approach Simon, H.A. (1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69, pp. 99-118. Simon, H.A. (1956). Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, Psychological Review, 63, pp. 129-138. March, J.G. and Simon, H.A. (1958). Organizations. New York. Wiley. Cyert, R.M., and March, J.G. (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. The evolutionary approach Veblen, T.B. (1898). Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, July, pp. 373-397. Alchian, A.A. (1950) Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. Journal of Political Economy, 58, 211-221. Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Property Rights and Transaction costs Alchian, A. amd Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, 62(5), pp. 777-795. Coase, R.H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4, pp. 386-405. Klein, B.R.; Crawford, R. and Alchian, A. (1978). Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21, pp. 297-326. Williamson, O.E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies, New York: The Free Press.