Afterword

Advancing Posthuman Enhancement Dialogue1

Michael J. Selgelid

The preceding chapters shed light on the history of human enhancement and human strivings toward transcendence; the conceptual meanings of human enhancement, posthumanity, human nature, identity, and so on; and reasons for thinking that human enhancement and/or posthumanity are, ethically speaking, things we should pursue or avoid. The collection as a whole furthermore highlights important inter-connections between the history, meaning, and ethics of human enhancement and the pursuit of posthumanity. Human enhancement and strivings towards posthumanity are not altogether new, but their meanings and methods have changed with time and technology – sometimes in radical ways. Ethical conclusions about “enhancement” or “posthumanity” should importantly depend on both the meanings of such things and the methods used in their pursuit. The lessons of history should, finally, inform normative judgments and policy decisions that need to be made both now and in the future. We should not underestimate the value of further examining the interconnec-tions between historical, conceptual, and ethical issues revealed in this book. These relationships are complex, so we here have our work cut out for us.

The social consequences of a future consisting of “posthumans” that are different species (i.e., that cannot reproduce with human beings), for example, could be quite different from one where “posthumans” merely have (one or more) powers that surpass those of current humans; and social consequences will also depend on whether or not the posthuman powers we are talking about are made available (or actually provided) to everyone. We must be clear about what we are talking about before we can say whether or not provision of “posthuman” powers would be good or permissible. Otherwise, parties to the debate risk talking past one another. To transhumanists arguing that one kind of posthumanity could be a good thing, a response to the effect that another kind of posthumanity would be a bad thing misses its mark – if the aim was to refute the transhumanist vision being responded to. Though it may not be sufficient to resolve posthuman enhancement debates on its own, the (conceptual) clarity of analytic philosophy is essential for rational dialogue.

1 The author thanks the Brocher Foundation in Hermance, and the Institute for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Geneva, in Switzerland, for hosting him as a visiting scholar and supporting his research on this topic during the first half of 2007.

B. Gordijn, R. Chadwick (eds.) Medical Enhancement and Posthumanity, 237© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

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Further debate about posthuman enhancement, however, requires more than conceptual clarity and historically informed thinking. The papers in this volume reveal that the meaning, consequences, and ethics of enhancement largely (though not entirely) turn on key empirical questions. Is it likely that any given enhance-ment technology will actually be safe and effective? What will the actual benefits and costs (including opportunity costs) of particular technological advancements be? To what extent could such technologies extend our capacities? In what ways, if any, will posthumans themselves be limited? How would social relations actu-ally be affected under different scenarios where lifespans are extended by different amounts (in different ways)? If super intelligent rational posthumans were or were not to become different species, then how would they treat the merely human? How confused would posthuman cyborgs’ identities be – and how much would that bother them? What are the magnitudes of gains and losses of utility, equality, and liberty to be expected under various enhancement policy scenarios? How effi-cient/effective would various forms of regulation be? Whether or not a particular path of enhancement will actually be a good thing – and whether or not it should be forbidden, permitted, or required – will often depend on answers to questions like these.

Though the answers to such questions about the future will inevitably remain uncertain, we should address them as best as we can. Progress will here require more empirical study. In addition to science and history, other social science disci-plines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, politics and economics must play a larger role. A better division of intellectual labour is needed. Philosophers should more explicitly identify the empirical questions that the ethical questions turn on; and, when they lack special expertise for answering such questions them-selves, they should seek more input from other disciplines. Philosophy may then come back in to provide ethical analysis of empirical findings. The central inclusion of historical analysis in the organization of this volume is a step in the right direc-tion; this general kind of approach should be expanded in the future. In one respect, then, debates about enhancement and posthumanity will advance when philosophy attempts to do less, and when other disciplines do more, of the work required for ethical analysis and policymaking.

In other respects philosophy itself needs to do more – and I here point to the need for theoretical work of the deepest kind. The main political philosophy frame-works currently on the table may not be up to the job of resolving the policy ques-tions raised in this volume even if we had more solid answers to the empirical questions at stake. I refer to the problem of conflicting values and the lack of a well developed theory for striking a balance between them. It is not altogether implau-sible, for example, that the path to enhancement would in fact (perhaps severely) promote inequality. Let’s assume that a well-informed empirical analysis indicates that this will likely be the case. The big question then, from a policy standpoint, is how the goal to promote liberty should be balanced against the goal to promote equality. On the one hand, one might think that individuals should have liberty to benefit themselves and their children; but, on the other hand, equality and utility matter too.

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I would guess that most philosophers, policy makers, and citizens would deny that liberty, equality, or utility should always take priority over the others, regard-less of the extent to which the others are threatened. Citizens of modern democratic countries generally accept that tradeoffs should be made between such things,2 but the elephant in the room that no one mentions is the lack of a well developed philo-sophical framework for making such tradeoffs in practice. How much equality, for example, should we be willing to sacrifice for a given amount of liberty, or vice versa? Each of the three main strands of political philosophy – libertarianism, (Rawlsian) egalitarianism, and utilitarianism – places extreme weight on the spe-cific value it emphasizes. It is plausible to think that (and I would guess that most philosophers, policy makers and citizens would upon reflection agree that)3 that each of these theoretical perspectives is partly accurate – because the things they emphasize (i.e. liberty, equality, and utility) matter. But it is also quite plausible to think that (and I would guess that most would upon reflection agree that) each of these views is partly wrong – because they place too much weight on the values they emphasize.4 If this is correct, then we need a fourth – more moderate and plu-ralistic – theoretical framework that provides a principled wa y to strike a balance between liberty, equality, and utility.5 Philosophically speaking, this is much to ask for – especially in light of the apparent incommensurabilities involved. Be that as it may, progress in debates over posthuman enhancement will require philosophical advancement in this direction.

As others have recently noted, the enhancement debate also indicates the impor-tance of further research on questions about “quality of life” or well-being (Savulescu 2006). If enhancement involves making lives better, the question of what constitutes improvement is paramount. Is quality of life ultimately constituted by happiness (conceived as pleasure), preference satisfaction, or autonomy; or some combination of these, and perhaps also other, things (see Brock 1993; Kitcher 1996)? Insofar as social policy should be influenced by utilitarian considerations (i.e. measures of aggregate and/or average well-being), whose conception of well being should come into play? Again, these are philosophically challenging questions.

Debate about enhancement has grown steadily and gathered much momentum since the beginning of the millennium; and it is safe to say that the literature has now (at the time of this writing in 2007) reached a critical mass. The papers in this volume reveal that much progress has been made. Further advancement of posthuman enhancement dialogue requires both more empirical input from other disciplines and major developments in philosophical theory.

2 Liberal democracies, for example, generally employ progressive taxation – which involves trade-offs between equality and (negative) liberty.3 This kind of claim of course itself warrants empirical study.4 The suggestion that each of the three frameworks is partly flawed goes a long way towards explaining why there is debate (between libertarians, egalitarians, and utilitarians) to begin with – and why it has lasted so long. There are powerful counterexamples to each of the three main theories.5 For more on moderate pluralism see Selgelid (2002). Also see Sen (1999).

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References

Brock D (1993) Quality of Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics. In: Brock D, Life and Death. Cambridge University Press, New York

Kitcher P (1996) The Lives to Come. Simon & Schuster, New YorkSavulescu J (2006) What Is an Enhancement and When Should We Enhance People? Enhancing

Human Capacities: Ethics, Regulation, and European Policy, Conference held in association with the 8th World Congress of the International Association of Bioethics, 5 August, Beijing

Selgelid M J (2002) Societal Decision Making and the New Eugenics. Grey Series of the European Academy (Europaische Akademie) for the Study of Consequences of Scientific and Technological Advance, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH, Germany 30. Available at: http://www.ea-aw.de/fileadmin/downloads/Graue_Reihe/GR_30_Eugenics_042002.pdf

Sen A (1999) Development as Freedom. Anchor Books, New York