after the green revolution bt cotton in india

5/20/2018 After the Green Revolution Bt Cotton in India

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AFTER THE GREEN REVOLUTION, BT COTTON IN INDIA:

BLESSING OR REGULATORY HEADACHE?

By

Shyama V. Ramani

*ALISS-INRA

65 Bd de Brandebourg

94205 Ivry sur Seine Cedex, France

and

Ecole Polytechnique,

1 Rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, Francetel+33 (0)1 49 59 69 43; Fax +33(0) 1 49 59 69 98

[email protected]

AUGUST 2008

ABSTRACT

Transfer of technology in the development context is regarded as a means to increase the

supply and quality of essential goods of which the Green Revolution is an excellent example.

Today as food security problems loom large and the Green Revolution yellows, rejuvenation

of the agriculture sector is being promised by transgenic plant varieties. Using the

methodology of narrative history, the present paper identifies the factors that facilitated the

introduction of the Green Revolution and Bt cotton in India and the controversies surrounding

their adoption. It then examines the management of tradeoffs between short terms gains and

medium to long term risk in the case of Bt cotton, the only transgenic product to be sold in the

Indian market at present. It demonstrates that in India, more than the technological risk, the

real danger in adopting transgenic varieties, lies in not being able to ensure institutional and

actor cooperation to preserve environmental security.

Key words:Bt cotton, Green Revolution, India, Controversy.

JEL Classification : O130, O310, O330.

*Please address correspondence to Shyama V. Ramani, INRA, 65 Bd de Brandebourg,94205 Ivry sur Seine Cedex, France. [email protected]

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank and acknowledge the collaboration of Samira Rousseliere on an earlier

version of the paper. I am also very grateful to Eric Gall, Nico Rasters, Carl Pray, Peter

Phillips and Richard Nelson for useful comments.


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AFTER THE GREEN REVOLUTION, BT COTTON IN INDIA:

BLESSING OR REGULATORY HEADACHE?

1. IntroductionIn the context of development, transfer of technology is regarded as a means to

increase the supply and quality of essential goods, under the assumption that it will improve

access to the same. The Green Revolution in agriculture is an excellent example of such a

technology transfer. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that the spectre of famine, which

haunted India during the 1960s was chased away by the adoption of the Green Revolution, a

technology package involving improved quality seeds, also termed modern variety seeds,

controlled irrigation and measured doses of fertilizers and pesticides. However, while the

Green Revolution heralded a veritable increase in agricultural productivity and food

production, it left in its wake serious environmental problems. Today, the Green Revolution

itself is felt to be yellowing. And in its place, rejuvenation of the agriculture sector is being

promised by a new technology paradigm, agbiotechnology, referring to the application of

modern biotechnology1 to agriculture. Agbiotechnology, according to its protagonists,

promises even greater advantages than the Green Revolution, but according to its opponents,

presents even greater risks. In the above context, the present paper has a two-fold objective.

First, it attempts to identify the factors that facilitated the introduction and adoption of the

Green Revolution and Bt cotton in India in order to gain insight on the similarities and the

differences between the two technology paradigms. Second, through the case study of Bt

cotton, the only transgenic product to be sold in the Indian market at present, it examines the

management of tradeoffs between short terms gains and medium to long term risk.

Through a study of the existing literature, the paper demonstrates that though the

introduction of the Green Revolution and transgenic cotton were supported by the State as themost efficient solution to an agricultural crisis in terms of falling productivity and lack of

sufficient production, an important difference is that in the case of transgenic plant varieties,

there is a heightened awareness of the possible long term negative consequences on the

environment and subsequently on the economy, and yet State policy and regulation is unable

to minimize this risk in practise. Thus, the problems posed by agbiotechnology for developing

countries like India are not linked to the technology alone but also to the institutional capacity

to manage the new paradigm optimally to ensure socio-economic security to farmers while

protecting environmental security at large.

The paper is organized in four sections. The two sections discuss the strategic

foundations of the introduction of the Green Revolution and commercialization of Bt cottonin India. Then the similarities and differences between the two technology paradigms are

highlighted with a focus on the risks posed by Bt cotton. The final section concludes.

2. The Green Revolution in India

From the beginning of the 1960s, when Indias population rose to about 480 million,

severe food shortages began to be experienced and India began to import about 10% of its

indigenous food grains production from the USA under the PL480 program (Public Law

480). It is widely acknowledged that the Lyndon Johnson administration was trying to use the

1Modern Biotechnology refers to techniques that involve manipulation or change of the genetic patrimony ofliving organisms


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PL480 program for political ends also, to put pressure on India to take a favorable view of the

American involvement in the Vietnam War. Such was the food shortage that the Indian Prime

Minister called upon his countrymen in 1964 to skip one meal a week so that others could eat

(Sinha, 2001). International portrayals of India as a country with a begging bowl were far

from flattering. In the above context, the Prime Minister appointed someone he considered to

be able, C.Subramaniam as the Minister of Agriculture, shifting him from the Steel and Minesportfolio, to resolve this crisis. In response, C.Subramaniam unfolded a two-pronged strategy

in the Parliament in 1964: first, search for the best technology possible in the world to grow

food grains; second, change the pricing policy to provide sufficient incentives to farmers to

increase production.

Norman Borlaug, an American professor of agriculture science arrived in Mexico in

1945 to join the International Centre for the Improvement of Wheat and Maize, the

CIMMYT (Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo) as part of a collaboration

program between the Rockefeller Foundation and the agricultural ministry of Mexico. His

creative research over the following decade led to the creation of a new dwarf variety of

wheat, with short legs that could support a greater amount of wheat grains on any stalk.Borlaug created this new variety by crossing local varieties with Japanese varieties of wheat

containing the gene Dwarfin. The hybrid dwarf variety clearly yielded more than the

conventional varieties of wheat of that time and led to the creation of a set of new high

yielding varieties or modern varieties (MV) ushering in the green revolution2. Norman

Borlaug visited India in 1963 and left 100 kg of seed of four wheat MV produced in the

CIMMYT with the Rockefeller Foundation, which in turn collaborated with the Ford

Foundation to find Indian partner institutions to test these MV.

The International Rice Research Institute or the IRRI in Manila was established in

1960 by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation in cooperation with the

Government of the Republic of the Phillipines. By the mid-1960s, the IRRI had developed

its initial semi-dwarf breeding lines and its first MV rice variety, the IR8, was released in

1966.

In India, C.Subramaniam called upon the scientists from the (IARI, Indian

Agricultural Research Institute) headed by B.P. Pal for advice, to formulate a strategy to

resolve the food crisis and they in turn introduced him to Ralph Cummings of the Rockefeller

Foundation. In 1965 C.Subramaniam went to a regional FAO conference in Manila and also

met scientists from the IARRI.

Indias history changed when C.Subramaniam decided to take the bold step that the

Indian Government must pave the way for the adoption of MV. This meant increasing the

government expenditure significantly on MV seeds and it provoked an outcry from all

quarters: the academics within IARI, and other politicians, especially the Communist Party,

which was paradoxically in favour of American grain imports as the USSR was also

importing from the USA. However, with the support of the Indian Prime Minister,

C.Subramaniam sanctioned the import of 23,000 tons of seed from Mexico, of which 18,000

tons was from the CIMMYT for distribution in the 1965-66 crop season. A former director of

the IARI notes Thus began the ambitious program of producing 25 million tons of wheat,

unparalleled in the history of agriculture anywhere in the world Dr. Borlaugh later said that

while CIMMYT evolved the new seed, it was the decision of India to import 18000 tons

(23000 tons in all) of this seed that set a chain reaction not only in India but also in Pakistan

2Professor Borlaug was awarded the Noble Peace Prize in 1970 for his role in the creation and diffusion of thislife-saving innovation throughout the world.


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and elsewhere. (Sinha, 2001). C. Subramaniam chose Punjab in the north as the candidate

state for wheat MV and Tamil Nadu in the south as the candidate state for rice MV.

The enormous success of the Green Revolution in terms of its adoption resulting in

increased food production and assurance of food security has been well documented in the

records of Indian Ministry of Agriculture. However, though it contributed to a very

significant increase in the productivity and production of cereals, the Green Revolution was

not neutral in terms of its socio-economic impact creating an income cleavage between those

farmers who could adopt MV given their larger land holding or better access to

complementary inputs like water and agrochemicals, and those who could not (for good

surveys and analysis of Green Revolution in India see Parayil (1992); Freebairn (1995) Das

(2002)and Evenson and Gollin (2003)). It also led to degradation of the soil and groundwater

resources in regions like the Punjab given its water intensive and chemicals intensive

production technology (Murgai, Ali and Byerlee, 2001). Activists like Vandana Shiva (1989)

point out that the Green Revolution caused a significant loss of bio-diversity and increased

the dependence of farmers on agro-chemicals, problems that the Indian State did not address

sufficiently even after the euphoria about the Green Revolution had blown over.In the Indian case, the triumph of the Green Revolution was not due to technology

alone, but to a lining up of a favourable configuration of actors and conditions that promoted

the integration of the Green Revolution. In the context of the Green Revolution in India, five

features are noteworthy.

First, there were visionary leaders like C.Subramaniam, the bureaucrat, who took the

bold political decision to import MV despite protests from many quarters, and then continued

to reorganize the Indian agricultural research system along the lines of American land grant

universities; administrator-scientists like B.P. Pal, responsible for creating a vibrant research

network with extension services that made the new varieties accessible to small and big

farmers and entrepreneurial scientists like M.S. Swaminathan who brought the MV to thefarmers through demonstration plots and work on extension services (Gulati, 2005).

Second, there were strong networks with international research organizations mainly

of US origin. As Parayil (1992) explains three agencies: the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID), the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller

Foundation played a crucial role in shaping Indias scientific base in agriculture and the

integration of MV. Between 1952 and 1972, USAID promoted the creation of agricultural

universities in India along the lines of land grant universities in the USA and facilitated the

training of Indian scientists through exchange programs. The Rockefeller Foundation and the

Ford Foundation thereafter played a crucial role in creating scientific competence through

funding projects and participating in the creation of farm extension services. Though food

security was the official and indeed central motivation, as Parayil (2003; p. 278) points out,

The Green Revolution is an unlikely spillover, or perhaps spinoff, of cold-war geopolitics. It

is an ironic and unexpected outcome of the campaigns by the US and its allies to check the

expansion of the Red Revolution in the Third World.

Third, there were competent Indian scientists who were also extremely motivated. For

the Indian public laboratories, adoption of the Green Revolution was a mission-mode targeted

effort in a crisis context, where ensuring food security was tantamount to the preservation of

national security. Indian scientists played a major role in the International Agricultural

Research Centers (IARC); much of the basic germplasm in IARCs came from Indian

research institutes and they designed the MV to be resistant to local pests, making them taste


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good, increasing their yield potential, etc. The cotton MV is entirely an Indian creation3.

Evenson (2002) notes that in Asia, the contribution of the IARC network to the creation of

MV from 1965 to 1988 was greatly outweighed by those of the national agricultural research

systems, in terms of investment in scientific manpower and R&D expenditures .

Four, some regions of India were ecologically suitable for MV. The two most

consumed cereals in India are wheat in the north and rice in the south. Punjab located in the

Indo-Gangetic plains in the north, was chosen as the target for MV wheat seeds because it

benefits from being one of the most fertile regions of India with an irrigation system largely

developed under British colonial rule. Tamil Nadu in the south has been since historic times,

the rice bowl of India.

Five, the State provided institutional support and subsidized adoption. The Indian

government initiated the Green Revolution as a package. The components of this package

included MV seeds, irrigation facilities, subsidized provision of water, power and fertilizers

and support prices in the final market. These supporting features were crucial to the success

of the Green Revolution. If MV had been simply sold on markets, it is doubtful whether the

impact would have been the same. In addition, a number of new supporting organizationswere created for public purchase and distribution and access to credit for seeds, equipment

and farm inputs was greatly improved in the rural areas (Dorin and Landy, 2002).

Thus, the Green Revolution was ushered in during a crisis situation with the target of

securing economic and food security in the short run through adoption of a new technology.

Though it is realized that it was a socially discriminatory technology, it was felt that in the

context of a crisis, the need of the hour was to increase production, and any socio-economic

inequality that was aggravated among farmers could be dealt with through other policy

instruments such as government procurement at minimum prices, easy credit, supply of seeds

to farmers by public research institutions etc. To the best knowledge of the authors, there does

not seem to have been much of an awareness or foresight on the environmental consequencesof the Green Revolution through increased use of fertilizers, pesticides and water. The entire

revolution was furthermore realized because of the scientific competence of Indian

researchers in the public laboratory system, their links with US laboratories and the

willingness of quasi-public US organisations like the Rockefeller Foundation to transfer

technology without charging high royalties in the near absence of an intellectual property

rights system.

2. The commercialization of Bt cotton In India

India is the third largest producer of cotton in the world, after China and the U.S.A.,

with acreage of about 9 million hectares, representing about 20% of the land surface devoted

to cotton in the world and the largest area under cotton for any country. About 8 million

hectares or more than 88% of the area under cotton cultivation is grown with hybrids, of

which 60% comes from the private sector breeders and 40% are from the public labs affiliated

to the ICAR (Qaim, 2003). Cotton-based industry is among the most important in the country,

employing about 60 million people in production, industry and trade, including 4 million

small farmers (ABCoAB, 2006). Till the introduction of the Bt varieties, Indian cotton yields

were among the lowest in world, with poor quality seeds, high cost of culture and poor fibre

attributes of hybrids, which deteriorated rapidly with successive pickings4. While acreage

under cotton constitutes 6% of the land under cultivation, it is responsible for 54% of the

3Observation provided by Carl Pray.4Document of Cotton Corporation of India: http://texmin.nic.in/tmc_introduction.pdf


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consumption of pesticides in India due to attacks from insects of the pernicious bollworm

family, leading to high costs for poor farmers and extreme environmental damage

(Raghuram, 2002). In short, the cotton sector was in the doldrums in India at the end of the

Green Revolution in the 1990s.

In 1911 in the province of Thuringia, in Germany, a scientist discovered that a

commonly occurring bacterium of the regionBacillus Thuringensiscould act as an insecticide

against the local flour moth. This led to the commercialization of an insecticide using this

bacterium in France in 1938 and in the USA during the 1950s. Subsequent generations of the

product were marketed in the form of a bacterial spray. Around 1982, scientists in Monsanto,

a leading agrochemicals company then, and a world-leader in agbiotechnology now,

succeeded in isolating the genes responsible for the production of the toxin in the bacteria.

Then, they managed to insert the gene from Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), a non-plant living

organism, into cotton plants to create Bt cotton. Monsanto commercialized Bt cotton varieties

in the USA by 1996 and began to seek to introduce it in other countries thereafter.

Bt cotton is a typical example of a genetically modified plant variety containing its own

insecticide, repelling bollworm attacks by secreting the Bt protein-based toxin that kills theinsect when it ingests any part of the plant. The gene inserted in Bt cotton seeds, Cry1Ac, is

reputed to provide a high degree of resistance to the American bollworm, the spotted

bollworm and the pink bollworm, which are also among the major insect pests in cotton.

Monsanto had established a subsidiary, Monsanto India Ltd, in Mumbai, in December

1949, as a private limited company and it became open as a public limited company in 19785.

Following policy reforms in India in 1991, Monsanto introduced Round-up, a broad spectrum

herbicide, in India more than 15 years after it had been launched in the USA6. Then it also

acquired the Indian subsidiaries of Dekalb and Cargill (Pray et al.2001a).

According to Newell (2003), Monsanto sought to get Government approval for the

commercialization of its agbiotech products from 1990, but bids to license the technology toIndian firms were refused, as the technology fees were deemed too high. It seems likely that

at this point it approached the biggest Indian seed company Mahyco7.

Mahyco was established in 1964 in Maharashtra, India, by Badrinarayan R. Barwale,

a respected plant scientist who was to win the prestigious World Food Prize in 1998. Mahyco

applied to the Department of Biotechnology or DBT, which operates under the aegis of the

Ministry of Science and Technology to import Bt cotton seeds developed by Monsanto,

containing the gene Cry1Ac, and the DBT authorized the import of 100 grams Bt cotton seed

in March 1995.

The next two years were not only devoted to crossing the American Bt cotton variety

with the local Indian ones, but also to consolidate market power and establish a research base

in the Indian seed sector. In 1998 Monsanto acquired a 26 % stake in Mahyco and went on to

create a joint venture, Mahyco Monsanto Biotech company (MMB) with 50% equity holding

for each. Simultaneously, Mahyco established a research facility devoted to agbiotechnology8

and Monsanto opened a joint research lab with one of the best life schools in India, The

Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore dedicated to crop transformation research.9

5Indias success stories: http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/business-climate/success-story.htm6website of Monsanto India http://www.monsantoindia.com/monsanto/layout/products/default.asp

7Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company Limited.

8website of Monsanto: http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/media/02/03-27-02a.asp, website ofMahyco: http://www.mahyco.com/9http://sid.iisc.ernet.in/monsanto.html


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Here begins a tale of one of the most controversial technology transfers to India that

mobilized a wide variety of actors. In April 1998, the DBT approved of Mahycos request to

carry out small trials of Bt cotton, using 100 grams in each trial plot. However, the company

did not restrict itself to these small trials. In November 1998, the farmers group KRRS

(Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha) brought to the notice of the public and the government that

Bt cotton seeds were being planted illegally by MMB in other areas before clearance hadbeen obtained, burning crops in field trials to drive home their point10. In January, 1999, the

well known activist Vandana Shiva's Research Foundation for Science, Technology and

Ecology filed a case in the Supreme Court challenging the "illegality" of the field trials

authorized by the DBT.

In July 2000, the DBT granted permission to Mahyco to conduct large-scale field

trials including seed production at 40 sites in six states: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andra Pradesh,

Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu with the results to be monitored by the DBT.

Nevertheless, a year later, in June 2001, the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee

(GEAC) which operates under the Ministry of Environment insisted that field trials of Bt

Cotton be extended by another year and that large-scale trials on 100 hectares in seven statesbe conducted again to ascertain their safety. These field trials were to be monitored by the

Indian Council of Agricultural Research also. This additional year of field testing which

delayed the commercialization of Bt cotton was instigated by protests from Vandana Shiva

of, Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, and Nanjundaswamy, the

leader of the Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha (Karnataka State Farmers Organization).

Such opposition was also supported by other prominent NGOs such as Gene Campaign and

Green Peace-India.

Again in October 2001, suspicions were aroused when 30% of the cotton crop

remained unaffected by the bollworm infection that was sweeping the state of Gujarat. In

response to complaints from MMB, the regulatory agency GEAC conducted tests that

revealed that the cotton in doubt was indeed transgenic containing a gene from Bt, at a time

when commercialization had not been approved by the GEAC. Navbharat Seeds, the

company selling the illegal variety claimed that their seeds had been developed from healthy

plants found in a bollworm infested field. Monsanto stated that it could not press charges

against Navbharat Seeds for its Bt-gene was not patent protected in India, (Jayaraman,

2001b). Though GEAC threatened immediately to burn the cotton fields grown with illegal

seeds and bring Navbharat Seeds to task, it could do nothing, because the farmers were very

happy with their increased crop and protested violently at the idea of having their fields burnt.

A year later, on the 27th of March, the GEAC approved the commercialization of

three varieties of insect-protected hybrid Bt cotton that could be made available to the Indian

farmers for the 2002 growing season (Mech-12 Bt, Mech-162 Bt and Mech-184 Bt,) underthe Bollgard brand name11. Authorization for commercialization was granted for April 2002

to March 2005 under the following condition. Any farmer using Bt cotton has to plant refuge

zones with non-Bt Cotton along the edge, in five rows with a width of 2.5 to 3 meters

irrespective of the size of the holding, constituting at least 20% of the cultivated land, to act

as a barrier to pollen flow and to prevent development of insect resistance. This was the same

principle as followed in the USA. Second, Mahyco has to transmit information on the results

of the field trials every year to the GEAC. This authorization was renewed in May 2005 and

the GEAC permitted at least six more Bt cotton varieties to be commercialized (Jayaraman,

K.S., 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2005).

10http://www.viacampesina.org/IMG/_article_PDF/article_136.pdf.11website of Monsanto : http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/media/02/03-27-02a.asp


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At present, there is very random compliance with the security measures regarding

refuge. Furthermore, since 2002 an illegal market for Bt cotton seeds, i.e. seeds which have

not been validated by the Indian biosafety regulatory system before entering the market, has

grown steadily and is now flourishing. Demand for illegal seeds is high due to their

confirmed ability to resist bollworm and their low price (Jayaraman, 2004b). The market for

unauthorized seeds is also supported by the development of new varieties created by localfarming ingenuity and by informal social networks between farmers based on trust, though

their quality is affirmed to be lower than that of the legal seeds (Morse, Bennett& Ismael,

2005). A micro-study of 45 farmers in Gujarat in 2002-2003 showed that most farmers mix

MMB seeds with both illegal Bt varieties and conventional seeds according to their

availability of water and their capacity to purchase fertilisers and pesticides, fitting these seed

mixes into traditional strategies for minimizing risk and assuring a livelihood (Roy, Herring

and Geisler, 2007).

3. Discussion: What lessons learnt for Bt cotton from the Green Revolution?

There are a number of similarities and contrasts in the adoption of the two radically

new technology paradigms namely Green Revolution (GR) and Bt cotton (Bt). Both were

introduced in India in contexts of crisis in terms of falling productivity and lack of sufficient

production as a technology quick-fix solution. Both were strategic to the national economy,

GR concerned an essential commodity, food in the form of cereal, while Bt cotton is a

commercial crop that supports millions of farmers and other professionals on the value chain

to final markets. The introduction of both technologies has been mired in controversy. In the

case of GR, the decision to introduce the technology was taken by a few politicians and

bureaucrats, who came to be revered for their vision as granaries overflowed and food

security was restored. With Bt cotton, public agencies had to agree to legalization, ex-post to

unexplained and unauthorized introduction of the new technology with no one being hailed asa hero. Finally, both technology paradigms are a resounding success in some Indian States

with farmers.

In addition to the above, in terms of technology, both GR and BT present the same

kind of advantages and disadvantages to farmers. They augment productivity and production

but increase the variance in yields. Initial studies on field trials carried out by Mahyco in

2001 indicated that the average yields on Bt cotton were 80% higher than those on non-Bt

varieties (Qaim (2003) and similar results were also reported in Qaim and Zilberman

(2003)). This striking performance was explained by the heavy incidence of pests in the

region and by the fact that the Bt-varieties had to be sprayed three times less often than their

non-Bt counterparts, even though the spraying frequency against the other pests had not

decreased.

More recent studies have refined the above result. Based on 341 interviews with

cotton farmers over four states, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu,

Qaim et al. (2006) confirm that on average, utilization of Bt cotton leads to substantial

pesticide reduction, yield increase and income augmentation. However, these positive effects

exhibit significant variations due to random pest incidence and heterogeneous agroecological

conditions. This could be because a Bt variety leads to higher yields only if the incidence of

pests for which the Bt cotton contains its own insecticide is high, otherwise not.

Furthermore, the variation in the income generation decreases with access to water and

access to credit to buy the other complementary agrochemical inputs. A detailed study on

Maharashtra by Bennett et al., (2004) based on the performance of Bt cotton and non-Btcotton in 9000 farm plots during the 2002 and 2003 seasons also finds that Bt cotton leads to


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significant increases in yield and income, but is accompanied by a non-negligible spatial and

temporal variation, again due to heterogeneous agronomic and weather conditions.

Subramanian and Qaim (2008) simulate a micro-social accounting matrix at the village level

extrapolating field-level data and find that the technology is employment generating and

increases the empowerment of women, though again the income gains are greater for larger

farms.

Such findings are complemented by innumerable studies by NGOs that confirm the

high degree of variance in returns to Bt cotton (See APCoAB 2006 for survey). Among

them, a report that has been widely discussed is a study of Andra Pradesh (a State in which

Bt cotton has failed badly) by Qayam and Sakkhari (2005) commissioned by the Deccan

Development Society, the Andra Pradesh Coalition in Defence of Biodiversity and the

Permaculture Association of India, a coalition representing 140 Indian NGOs. Based on an

examination of the performance of Bt cotton of 164 small farmers in three zones of Andra

Pradesh over three years 2002-2005, they confirm that water is a very complementary input

to Bt cotton seed, so that yield increases are experienced more in irrigated areas than in rain-

fed areas. There is practically no difference in expenditure between Bt users and non-users ifincidence of pests, and therefore use of pesticide, is minimal. In such cases, the profit of non-

Bt cotton farmers is higher than those of Bt cotton farmers on average, because Bt cotton

seeds are costlier than conventional seeds. Thus, returns from Bt cotton are very location and

season specific with the determinants of the variation not yet clearly identified and

understood.

Here stop the similarities. A number of differences mark the evolution of Bt cotton in

India as compared to the Green Revolution and they concern the strategies of the other stake

holders such as the State and public laboratories and the management of environmental risk.

It is to these issues that we now turn, again detailing with respect to Bt cotton.

Role of the State : During the mid 1960s the government intervened directly incollaboration with public laboratories to promote the GR among potential adopters, and

minimized risk for all farmers through arranging for easy credit and ensuring a minimum

price for public procurement. With respect to Bt, the Indian State set the stage for evolution

of the seeds market during the 1990s by initiating economic reform and thereafter focussed

on preservation of environmental security through the creation of institutions with the mission

of effectuating the safe creation and commercialization of transgenic varieties.

Transgenic cotton would not have seen the light of day in India had Monsanto tried to

introduce it in the pre-liberalisation period of the license Raj i.e. before the 1990s, when

international commodity and capital transactions and increase in the manufacturing base in

any sector had to be validated by a license from the concerned ministry through extremely

time consuming routines. Furthermore, during this epoch, both large domestic and foreign

firms were banned from the seeds sector.

As Pray et al. (2001a) explain, by the near-end of the Green Revolution, during the

1980s, public sector agricultural research expenditure was going down and the question was

how to promote private investment in seed research and whether or not to allow for foreign

participation and collaboration in the Indian seeds sector. In 1988 the New Seed Policy was

announced, whereby all seeds except for rice and wheat could be imported, subject to certain

conditions. Large domestic firms, as well as foreign firms, could enter the seed sector. In

1990, in collaboration with the World Bank, a reform of the seeds sector was initiated, with

30 million dollars made available for private firms to invest in production and distribution of

seeds. Then in 1991, economic liberalization was introduced, and for the seed sector, thismeant that foreign companies could set up Indian subsidiaries with up to 51% equity


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participation automatically. These policy measures increased the number of firms in the seeds

markets, as well as the total private R&D expenditure of the industry.

In 1994 India signed GATT and also the Biodiversity convention, and in 1995 as a

member of the WTO (World Trade Organization), India signed TRIPS convention (Trade

Related Intellectual Property Rights System). According to the latter, a sui-generis system (or

own system) of intellectual property rights system had to be established for new plant

varietes. Thus, in 2001, a law was passed to ensure the protection of plant varieties and the

rights of farmers : the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers Rights, PPVFR). This law was

also to ensure conformity with the international convention of UPOV: lUnion internationale

pour la Protection des Obtentions Vgtales. The PPVFR act recognizes the rights of

farmers to stock, use, exchange, and share the products from their cultivation, even when it

concerns a protected variety. This was followed in 2002 by a second law on seeds

recognizing transgenic varieties. These changes in industrial policy, seed policy and

intellectual property regime encouraged foreign companies like Monsanto, Cargill and

Pioneer to enter and strengthen their base in the Indian seeds market.

From the mid-1990s, as activists mounted campaigns against transgenic varieties, amyriad of public agencies were created to ensure full traceability of transgenics and

adherence to safety measures as a State response (See Chaturvedi 2007 for complete details

on regulatory system). Andhra Pradesh, a state in which the success of Bt has been contested,

presents an interesting case study of the impact of the above State bureaucracy. Incorrect

expectations about the returns to Bt cotton led to social unrest in this state, and mobilized the

local governments in some areas, to press charges against Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech ltd and

demand compensation for farmers. The dispute was settled through an out of court settlement

in 2003 whereby MMB committed to giving compensation to farmers under certain

conditions12. However, on receiving repeated complaints from the Andhra Pradesh

government, the GEAC refused to renew licenses for the commercial cultivation of Mech-12

Bt, Mech-162 Bt and Mech-184 Bt in 200513. According to press reports, the sales of other

varieties of Bt cotton containing the same genetic trait Cry1Ac present in the banned varieties

Mech-12 Bt, Mech-162 Bt and Mech-184 continue to thrive in Andhra Pradesh14.

In addition, Dr.Suman Sahai of Gene Campaign points out that the network of

regulatory agencies is not yet sufficiently developed in many states including Andhra Pradesh

and as of 2007 neither State Level nor District Level Committees had been set up

constituting: a breach of law and a direct violation of the prescribed rules for the

manufacture, use, import, export and storage of hazardous micro-organisms and genetically

engineered organisms and cells, under the Environment Protection Act, 1989.15

Pray et al.(2005) point out in their review of the Indian regulatory system, that one of

the features of the Indian regulatory system, that makes it different from its Western

counterparts, is its objective to minimize any possible adverse socio-economic effects of the

commercialisation of new plant varieties. Cases such as that of Andhra Pradesh cast doubts

about whether this target is being met. Chaturvedi et al. (2007) suggest that the regulatory

system can be made more effective by changing the current requirements for the provision of

voluminous firm-specific data by applicants to a homogeneous, streamlined and precise data

collection through a common application form detailing socio-economic gains to farmers.

12http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/07/stories/2007120757550400.htm

13http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2005/India-Rejects-Monsanto-Bt4may05.htm14http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/07/stories/2007120757550400.htm15http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/view/128337/1/5339


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Role of Public laboratories: Another difference between the integration of the GR

and Bt is the virtual absence of public sector laboratories as key players and competitors to

private companies. The active involvement of private firms in the commercialization of Bt

cotton testifies to their technological competence, to which as of present no public laboratory

is offering sufficient competition. The eclipse of the public sector seems to be mainly due to

the continual reduction in agricultural research spending from the 1980s and the near fixedfocus of the Indian agricultural research system (given the success of the Green Revolution)

on the creation of new MV to suit the different terrains of India, to the neglect of new fields

like agrobiotechnology. Bureaucratic routines of project selection and researcher evaluation

further entrenched traditional lines of research (Raina, 1999). On the other hand, the

investment on subsidies continued far beyond the initial phase of the Green Revolution, rising

steadily, so that by 2005 it was around five to six times the investment in public research

(Braun et al., 2005). Finally, as part of the reform package in 1991, public spending on

agricultural research was cut even more, lowering even further the incentives for innovation

creation.

Another reason for the lack-lustre performance of public laboratories could bebecause there is no clearly defined strategy of how the public sector in India can catch up

with agbiotech companies to close their knowledge retard. In a comparison of private-public

research cooperation in agriculture in Brazil, China and India, Pray (2001b) makes a number

of interesting observations. In Brazil, both private and public sector organizations have

strong research programs and collaborations, including with foreign multinationals, which

are geared to promote its national objective of becoming internationally competitive in the

export of agricultural goods. China has a good public sector research program and a cautious

approach towards public-private collaboration, especially when it involves foreign

multinationals. But still, it engages in them because its objective is to become a key player in

the international market for transgenics. India on the other hand, has a good public sector

research system and private sector firms that are doing research more actively than in China,but private-public collaboration is viewed with a jaundiced eye, foreign multinationals even

more so and there are no clearly defined national targets.

The caveats of the biotech revolution for the farmers of the developing world, which

were well spelt by Buttel, Kennel and Kloppenberg (1985), in their excellent visionary article

written as early as 1985, before the commercialization of any GMV anywhere in the world,

have been more than realized in the Indian case. Their most important recommendation

called for a greater public investment in agricultural research and more innovations from

public labs because of the international trend towards privatisation of agricultural research

and ownership of agricultural patents by private companies. Though there is news about

GMV creation by ICAR labs and recently a consortium of seven Indian seed companies,Swarna Pharat Biotechnics Private (SBBPL) has started sourcing beneficial genes from

public laboratories with a view to developing GMV, they are not viewed as a threat by

Monsanto given their technological retard (Jayaraman 2004a).

Management of environmental risk : Both scientists and activist groups point out that

there are four types of long term risks associated with the adoption of Bt cotton. First, non-

transgenic plants of the same species could be contaminated through natural pollination

(through wind, insects or birds). Second, undesired weeds could develop resistance to

chemicals, including herbicides, through pollination with Roundup Ready Bt varieties. Third,

the pests, i.e. bollworms could develop resistance to the Bt toxin over time through mutation.

Four, disequilibrium could be provoked in the eco-system, say through an increase in the

population of other pests, reduction in the biodiversity, production of new allergens harmfulto human health etc.


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Addressing these issues raised by activists on Bt varieties entomologist Shelton

(2007), argues in a comprehensive survey that according to the available evidence there has

been no significant detrimental impact on human health or the environment. Hence, the risks

posed by Bt plants are minimal and acceptable as a means to increase productivity and

production. Furthermore, Bt varieties contribute to preserving environmental security

through lowering the use of pesticides and herbicides. However, he agrees that risksassociated with Bt cotton cannot be wished away and it is not possible to rule out adverse

events with certainty.

Indeed other scientists, Thies and Devare (2007), take a less optimistic view of risk.

On the one hand, they agree that as of now there are no observations of any negative

environmental impact that should cause concern, and they concede that some part of the

reticence towards transgenic crops may simply be based on a fear and hence rejection of the

unknown. On the other hand, they point out that even new plant varieties obtained from

conventional breeding provoke a change in the environment on a micro scale; and sometimes

on a meso scale. Therefore, issues such as gene flow, resistance management, and soil

economy merit long term monitoring and establishment of a track record for safety, beforeregulation can be loosened.

What then is the response in India to addressing such risks?

In collaboration with public laboratories, a number of genetically modified (or GM)

vegetables are being developed in India with the same gene pool, the cry1Ac gene, used by

MMB in Bt cotton, while even developed countries like the USA have introduced it in only

a few crops like cotton and corn. Between 2005 and 2007, a 130 varieties of Bt cotton, all of

them containing cry 1Ac have approved by GEAC (Chaturvedi et al. 2007). According to

some scientists, the effect of such myopic integration of new technology in new plant

varieties makes the threat of widespread contamination and loss of biodiversity a real one in

India (Jayaraman, 2005).At the level of farmers, it is common knowledge that many farmers, especially small

farmers, have not planted a refuge border around the Bt cotton fields as per government

regulations making development of resistance in the pest inevitable (Jayarman 2002;

Tabashnik 2005). As of now it is not clear how the GEAC intends to enforce or even monitor

for non-compliance (Jayaraman, 2005). A reason for non-compliance could be the highly-

imperfect knowledge and information base of many farmers. For instance, Orphal (2005)

presents the results of a survey of 100 farmers in the southern state of Karnataka during the

cropping season of 2002-2003. She finds that there is a lot of ignorance both among farmers

and extension agents, who consider Bt cotton simply as a new high yielding variety that does

not require pesticides. In areas, where the incidence of pests is not high, the use of Bt cotton

does not translate into higher yields or higher profit. This last effect is particularly noticeable

in rain fed cultivated areas, which form 2/3 of total cultivated area. Thus, many farmers use

Bt cotton with mistaken expectations about returns, leading to incorrectly high estimations of

the opportunity costs of compliance.

Large scale adoption, whether through ignorance or through purchases from official

or illegal markets, also reveals the good feature of transgenic seeds, namely that they are

accessible to poor farmers also. It has been pointed out a number of times (Roy, Herring,

Geisler 2007) that unlike innovations that require heavy capital investment, transgenic seeds

are accessible to farmers, permitting them to experiment by mixing them with conventional

varieties for best results. On the other hand, such accessibility makes the problem of

imposing compliance to safety measures even more difficult.


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4. Conclusion

During the 1960s the Green Revolution changed the destiny of India enabling it to

become self-sufficient in agriculture, ensure a basic level of food security, put in place a

public distribution system for food grains, and affirm its national sovereignty. Given the

increasing demand for Bt cotton and the increasing supply of the same, through official and

illegal markets, it would seem that Bt cotton is a similar success story of the millennium. Yet,

the diffusion of Bt varieties remains shrouded in controversy, with activists urging the

government to ban Bt varieties and farmers to continue with conventional varieties. Thus, the

future of transgenic plant varieties in India is not certain.

The present paper tried to analyse the anatomy of this controversy through tracing the

introduction of the Green Revolution and Bt cotton in India, comparing their strategic

foundations and examining the role of the main actors involved: the State, public laboratories,

firms and farmers. Its contribution to the debate on whether or not transgenic products should

be promoted in India can be summarized in the following arguments.

First, both the Green Revolution and Bt cotton have been introduced as technology

quick-fix-solutions to agricultural crises of falling productivity. However, there has been

very little questioning about the larger picture of why agricultural productivity has fallen in

the first place, and why the quick-fix approach is the best one for India to follow. Why? So

that India follows the same path as South America with GM Soya boosting exports through

adoption of transgenic varieties? Should Brazil and Argentina be the role models for

developing countries to boost agricultural productivity? It is not clear as to why the agbiotech

road has been adopted without much questioning, just as the Green Revolution was earlier, as

the high-yielding road, without an in-depth evaluation of other alternative technologies with

respect to not only productivity but also environmental security and farmers autonomy.

Second, the success of any innovation depends not so much on its intrinsic qualities as

on its final impact with the buyers, which is a function of a variety of other complementaryfactors as well, such as marketing strategies and advertising. In this respect, the statistics on

the sales of Bt cotton indicate that farmers are buying Bt cotton seeds in increasing quantities,

declaring this innovation to be a success. Whatever other stakeholders may prefer, farmers in

many areas are voting with their feet and announcing their readiness to bear the risk of

adoption of this new technology. Therefore, any conventional alternative to Bt cotton or other

transgenic varieties must be as efficient in terms of productivity and generation of revenue, if

farmers are to be induced to buy them. This is indeed a big challenge for public laboratories

to meet. In response, instead of an increased effort on finding alternative technologies that are

equally productive but less dependent on purchases of seeds and agrochemicals from private

companies, the Indian State is cutting down on funds for agriculture research. Moreover,

little is being done to improve the productivity of public research that is mired in bureaucracy

and career mobility policies not linked to scientific merit. Indeed, collaboration with private

companies is being promoted as the only solution to counter both these drawbacks.

Third, even scientists admit that a possible long term risk to the environment cannot

be ruled out by transgenic varieties. Here, preferences towards risk determine whether a risk

averse strategy of taking precautionary measures beforehand is adopted or a wait and see if

an accident actually happens policy is followed. As of now, the latter course of action seems

to be preferred. The Indian State is trying to manage environmental risk through the creation

of an elaborate regulatory system with new institutions and biosafety protocols. Though the

situation might be much worse if these institutions had not been created, in practise the

regulatory mechanism has been manipulated a few times by private firms and it is unable topersuade farmers to adopt basic precautionary measures.


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The above arguments indicate that if no catastrophe occurs, then it will be well for all

except the reputations of NGOs presently calling for bans on transgenic varieties. However,

should an ecological catastrophe occur, however small the probability a priori, the cost will

be initially borne by the farmers and eventually paid by the tax payers as the State is called to

bail them out. Given the past experience, it seems likely that it will be difficult to pin

liabilities on the firms introducing the transgenic varieties in the market, in the case of anadverse event. This is particularly of concern because events in the past have repeatedly

shown that agbiotech firms could know more about the risk of contamination and other

possible negative effects and not share such information with the government or other stake

holders (Clapp, 2008). Even in the CSR or corporate social responsibility projects of large

agbiotech companies, the interests of poor farmers and the core interests of the firm may not

coincide (Glover, 2007).

There are two possible approaches to improve the present situation. The effectiveness

of the regulatory bureaucracy can be improved through streamlining institutions and

formulating safety protocols that are actually respected by farmers and firms. Furthermore,

the system of public laboratories can be revitalized, with an open but watchful mind towardspublic-private cooperation in order to become more competitive. Resources can be allocated

not only to catch up in agbiotechnology but also to develop better conventional varieties that

can compete effectively with transgenic ones.

To sum up, though no ecological catastrophe has occurred in India yet due to the

growing of Bt cotton (and opinions are divided as to whether there is any significant risk or

not in the future), it is clear that the lessons given by the Green Revolution have not reached

home. Certainly environmental risks are not being minimized by farmers who are ignorant

about the origins of their seeds, buying from illegal markets and growing transgenic plant

varieties in areas where there is no regulatory body to oversee production. Even with

regulation to steer the introduction of transgenic plant varieties, firms have been able to twist

the arm of regulators on more than one occasion. Though India was the leader in the

formulation of biosafety protocols in the developing world, today it is difficult to identify

practises working effectively towards preservation of environmental security.

Therefore, the Indian experience with the commercialization of Bt cotton has been

like putting a cart, not just before one horse, but several horses. Perhaps more than the

technological risk, the real danger in adopting transgenic varieties, lies in not being able to

arrive at a consensus beforehand to ensure institutional and actor cooperation in order to

coordinate together to preserve environmental security. As firms and farmers strive to

increase profits and the government supports them to augment sectoral productivity and

incomes, NGOs, general civic groups and even some academics are becoming more

combative as anti-GM activists and whistle blowers16. The latter are not only concerned aboutthe potential negative externalities generated by Bt cotton but also about having a regulation

that clearly defines the financial responsibilities of the State, the seed firms and the farmers in

the case of an adverse event and investing in the creation of equally efficient non-transgenic

alternatives for farmers. These are strategic problems, complementary but still distinct from

technological risk. But, they must be addressed while debates continue on whether

agbiotechnology is pro-poor or anti-poor in developing countries and before further

commercialization of transgenic varieties is promoted.

16Presentation of Christian Velot in the conference on Whistle blowers and expert systems: Towards an ideallegislation in 2008 organized by Fondation Science Citoyennes at the French Senate in Paris on Marh 27 2008.


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