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After Action Report for 03/23/1945

C Company 506th PIR 101st Airborne

After receiving intelligence from Company S2 of a force of German Heer fortifying a ford five mileseast of our current position that threatened or advance in the region as the ford was the onlytraversable spot along the river without necessitating the construction and defence of bridges.

I ordered 1st Platoon, C Company on a patrol to attack the ford in force to deny the Germans

access to the river crossing. 1st Squad attacked from the left of the road to the ford from the

treeline, with 2nd Squad attacking from the right. 1st Platoons bazooka and light mortar teamsattacked to the right of the road using the cover of the nearby treeline to approach on the ford fromthe extreme flank.

1st Platoon immediately came under inaccurate mortar fire from a concealed German position;however, a mortar spotter who had been hiding on the bank who radioed their arrival back to the

mortar stood to verify the fall of the rounds, thus exposing his position. 1st Squad placed a base of

fire on his position, killing him. Pvt Jenkins, was confirmed to have killed the spotter. Simultaneously2nd Squad located the mortars location and placed a base of fire onto it. Tech Specialist Howard,squad LMG operator, confirmed kill on the mortar operator, and rendered the weapon itselfinoperable, forcing the remaining crew to abandon their position.

As 1st Platoon continued their advance, 2nd Lieutenant Jacobs personally came under German firefrom the edge of the ford, while he and his platoon adjutant were able to take cover of a nearbyhedgerow, Pvt Smith, his platoon runner was confirmed KIA.

A Sherman 75mm, from the 8th Armoured was redirected down the road towards the ford to provide

fire support as well as a 75mm Light Howitzer and immediately provided suppressing fire ontoGerman positions, forward elements of the platoon reported minimal initial combat effectiveness ofthese units aside from a morale boost.

1st Squad came under immediate, accurate fire from elements of German Infantry as they crossedthe field towards the ford, pinning them in the open. At the same time a German Sturmgeschtz tankdestroyer arrived on the opposite side of the ford and immediately knocked out the Sherman, thecrew was not able to be recovered (Records sent to Quartermaster: Burial/Recovery).

Sgt Watters, Platoon Radio Operator called in air support assets to attack the Sturmgeschtz,however, initially as other operations were occurring simultaneously within the region delayed an

initial response (See radio transcript records A-6987.157). 1st Squad remained pinned in the openwhile being harassed by multiple squads of German infantry, this fire was largely inaccurate (noserious casualties recorded from point of initial contact to mission time +ten minutes) it wassuccessful in halting their advance almost entirely, while 1st Squad was stopped, they were stillcritical in allowing the advance on the eastern side of the road by drawing German assets awayfrom the ford.

2nd Squad advanced to a hedgerow close to the riverbank unopposed and proceeded to providesupressing fire on the ford, Tech Specialist Howard, Pvt Wallace, Corporal Lewis all with multipleconfirmed kills against German squads. 75mm Howitzer and 65mm Mortar teams likewisecontinued to harass and pin down German units in the open. Specialist Jones, Platoon Bazooka

operator opened fire on what was suspected to be German reinforcements, later revealed to be aGerman medical team who had been called up to deal with German casualties. 2LT Jacobs hasverbally reprimanded the Specialist for firing on medical personnel in direct violation of the GenevaConvention, however, as no casualties were reported in the German medics, no further disciplinaryaction will be undertaken.

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Sgt Watters was able to call in a P36 Fighter Bomber onto the Sturmgeschtz which was sufficientto rattle the crew inside, however it still presented as a serious threat to the operation. By this time,

German units had sustained heavy casualties (estimates 4 KIA, 6 WIA) by comparison, 1st platoon

had 3 WIA, and 1 KIA however still maintained control of the ford. 1st squad was still pinned down

by four units of German infantry, but was still able to divert attention from 2nd Squad. However, 2nd

Squad appeared unwilling to capitalise on this presumably due to their ideal positions within thehedgerow. This move prevented our forces from driving off the Germans from the ford.

Sgt Watters was able to secure an additional strike by a P47 ATG aircraft which destroyed theSturmgeschtz. Almost simultaneously, an accurate and deadly artillery barrage fell upon theGerman positions. This strike had not been called by our Forward Observers and prisonerscaptured on a follow up operation confirmed that this strike was from German artillery batteries. Itwould seem that a German forward observer had panicked when our forces started the raid andcalled in pre-set coordinates that would have been used in the event that they had lost the ford.There was little our forces could do but watch as German soldiers were killed or wounded by theirown guns. A German Scout Car which had arrived on the scene to provide fire support wasimmediately destroyed by the strike, and all German units were sent scurrying for cover.

1st Squad was able to capitalize on this and moved to cover of the hedgerow as the shellscontinued to fall. At this point 2LT Jacobs decided that considering diminishing ammunition suppliesand the aftereffects of the German shelling their own positions that the force holding the ford hadbeen severely weakened to deny them a tactical advantage; but his own forces were not sufficient topress that advantage. 2LT Jacobs ordered a withdrawal back to our lines. Operation timecommenced 0955 completed 1210. Find attached list of recommendations for awards and

commendations for 1st Platoon.

Regards

506th PIR Co C Commanding Officer