american foreign policyFebruary 2012

Volume XI, Issue III

American Foreign Policy2

From the Editor-in-Chief

Dear Readers,

The New Year has brought new beginnings to countries around the world. Protests have begun in both Russia and China, putting pressure on the nations’ governments to democratize. Demonstrations of quite a different sort have been launched in Japan to object to the restarting of the nuclear program. Egypt has nominated a member of the Mus-lim Brotherhood to be its Speaker of Parliament. Meanwhile, as Euro-pean leaders continue to work for a solution to the debt crisis gripping the Euro, Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti has begun implementing widely unpopular austerity measures.

Seongcheol Kim, in this issue’s cover article, explicates the Russian protests for us. The protesters thus far have been successful in winning the narrative in Russia and gathering popular support for the move-ments. Instead of regime change, however, Medvedev opts for reform-ing the government by incorporating a few of the protesters’ demands. Jeff Schwartz discusses Prime Minister Monti’s austerity efforts in Italy. These efforts, Schwartz argues, have provided the Italian government with the leadership needed to implement these difficult policies. Collin Berger provides us with a picture of current happenings in North Korea. He asserts that by no means is Kim Jong Eun’s position as Supreme Leader guaranteed and until it is, the United States would be unwise to intervene.

While many would classify the failing Euro or new North Korean leadership as the biggest problem the United States is facing currently, Dillon Smith contends that it is a hasty American withdrawal from Paki-stan. He sat down with a senior Indian diplomat to try to get a picture of what American support should look like going forward. Joe Margolies looks toward the United States and President Obama’s signing of the National Defense Authorization Act. He suggests that such measures are the wrong way of combatting the War on Terror. Christina Renfro sheds light on the dangers of the continued rule of the African National Con-gress in South Africa. Finally, George Maliha previews the effects of the United States’ new Asia-Pacific strategy.

I have greatly enjoyed working on my first issue as Editor-in-Chief and am looking forward to a busy but exciting year ahead in the world.

Sincerely, Adam Safadi Editor-in-Chief

StaffEditor-in-Chief

Adam Safadi ‘14

PublisherGeorge Maliha ‘13

Managing EditorsRachel Webb ‘14

Rohan Bhargava ‘14

Editors

LayoutEmily VanderLinden ‘13 Production Manager

Copy EditorsChristina Henricks ‘13 Ben Kotopka ‘13

Editors-in-Chief EmeritiRush Doshi ‘11 Dan May ‘11 Ben Cogan ‘12

Taman Narayan ‘13

Business StaffKimberly Hopewell ‘13 Zara Mannan ‘13

AFP Advisory BoardWolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein

Institute for Self-DeterminationRobert P. George: Director, James Madison ProgramG. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of

Politics and International Affairs Christina Paxson: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School

Yun ChungSweta HaldarJim HaoNatalie KimCharlie MetzgerJay ParikhPeter WangMatt AronsKristie Liao Jonathan LinAndres Perez-BenzoChristiana RenfroDaniel TokerEmily VanderLinden

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Audrye Wong Sunny JeonValarie HansenSuchi MandavilliAmy GopinathanJared IsensteinSimon SegertConleigh ByersZach OgleJoanne ImRahul SubramanianMonica ChonDavid ZhaoRyan Low

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AmericAn Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. AmericAn Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.

No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for of-fice. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or AmericAn Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible.

All correspondence may be directed to:AmericAn Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544

afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com

Kim HopewellAdam SafadiAmy GopinathanSam Watters

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Mia RifaiKathryn MooreJoe MargoliesDavid Zhao

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February 2012 3

AmericAn Foreign PolicyFebruary 2012 Volume XI, Issue III t a b l e o f c o n t e n t s

Photo Credits: mirror.co.uk, firstpost.com, ablocal.go.com Cover Image by Joe Margolies ‘15

cover Story

AFPWhat is to be done?Understanding the Russian ProtestsSeongcheol Kim ‘14

Italian Austerity MeasuresA Model for EuropeJeff Schwartz ‘13

AFP Quiz Adam Safadi ‘14

Fathers and SonsKim Jong Eun’s Efforts to Emulate the Past Collin Berger ‘14

Global UpdateRachel Webb ‘14

A Series of Unfortunate EventsIndian Perspective on U.S.-Pakistani RelationsDillon Smith ‘14

The Art of WarThe National Defense Authorization ActJoe Margolies ‘15

In Context Rohan Bhargava ‘14

Cry, the Beloved CountryThe Decline of the African National CongressChristiana Renfro ‘13

Containing ChinaEscalating Tensions in the South China SeaGeorge Maliha ‘13

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American Foreign Policy4

WhAt iS to be done?UnderStAnding the rUSSiAn ProteStS

Seongcheol Kim ‘14

regimented rallies held by these groups fed the impression that grassroots civic activism was on the side of the regime – providing a basis for legitimacy beyond formal electoral dominance, itself often grounded in little more than a controlled press and dealings with regional elites. For years, the various pro-democracy protest campaigns, from the Dissent-ers’ Marches in 2007 to the more recent “Article 31” demonstrations for freedom of assembly, had been suppressed not only by the force of batons, but also by the numerical and organizational supe-riority of pro-Kremlin counter-rallies that seemed to render plausible the gov-ernment’s claims that the unauthorized protests were the work of marginal ex-tremists and agents of foreign powers. Yet with the December events, the tide seems to be turning, and the standard narrative seems to be crumbling: the pro-Kremlin movements could find lit-tle answer to the deluge of post-election protest, and, for all their Kremlin fund-ing, could not match the anti-regime rallies in size. Unless the U.S. State De-partment had paid its protesters more than the Kremlin had its own, the popu-lar mobilization was surely genuine.

Opponents of the regime are also winning back ground on the level of narrative – the combination of strate-gic reasoning and public presentation that defines the ways in which the wider

The recent post-election pro-tests in Russia have the mark-ings of something unprec-edented. Not only do these

protests dwarf all the largely futile pro-test campaigns that the liberal extra-parliamentary opposition has tried in the past five years, but the protesters themselves do not resemble the hopeless medley of young extremists and aging liberals who always seemed to consti-tute the bulk of earlier protests. Of all the moments of symbolic significance from last month’s protests, the most telling has arguably been the protest-ers’ dynamic defiance of the regime’s characteristic attempt to explain away the protests. Vladamir Putin’s auto-matic response on December 15 to the protests – that the participants and or-ganizers were allegedly paid by “foreign powers” – was reduced to ridicule on countless placards and tongue-in-cheek field interviews. Not only had the locus of popular mobilization shifted to the opposition; the opposition was openly defying the dominant narratives as they came, daring to contest the logic that

ultimately underlies the legitimacy of United Russia rule.

On one level, this anti-regime up-surge is indicative of a wider shift in locus of contentious politics, a shift that became evident last month when a pro-Putin counter-protest on December 12 was easily dwarfed in size by the opposi-tion protest from two days earlier. For years, the Kremlin had largely succeed-ed in pumping social capital into pro-re-gime youth organizations as an effective counter-weight to the democratic oppo-sition. These groups, such as Nashi and Young Guard (the youth wing of United Russia), served multiple functions, such as mobilizing youth onto the side of power and giving off the impression that the regime was supporting “anti-fascist” initiatives to counter the grave problem of fascist radicalization among youth. These groups soon enough became known for peculiar actions in the name of “anti-fascism,” such as vehemently, and at times violently, denouncing Es-tonia’s removal of Soviet war memorials as an instance of “fascism.” Most im-portantly, the well-attended and well-

eUroPe

Protestors in the streets of St. Petersburg. From theaustralian.com.au

February 2012 5

struggle between regime and opposition is framed. Putin’s contention that the December protesters were paid off by foreign powers was characteristic of the dominant narrative that the regime has long deployed to neutralize the opposi-tion. The characterization of the liberal opposition as American puppets – a pe-rennially recurring motif in government responses as well as the pro-Kremlin counter-protests – has long been held up by a combination of facts and deep-root-ed sentiments. The U.S. did, for exam-ple, fund many of the youth movements behind the various “color revolutions” – such as Otpor in Serbia and Pora in Ukraine – which some Russian liber-als have long attempted to emulate, and against which groups like Nashi have formed. Moreover, leading opposition figures have appealed for support from Western media and governments. These convenient truths, coupled with deep suspicions within the public toward any kind of U.S. intervention and the ver-sion of capitalism and democracy as-sociated with it, have kept the Kremlin’s narrative alive for years, at least enough for citizens to refrain from contesting it in open protest. A related issue is that the opposition suffers from association with the economic misery of the 1990s – which coincided with a period of rela-tive democracy – during which several leaders of today’s opposition, including Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, held positions of power. Putin has, ac-cordingly, exploited these associations in his narrative against the opposition; in one striking instance, he contended in a 2010 speech that Nemtsov and other liberal politicians, during the 1990s, “dragged a lot of billions along with Ber-ezovsky [an oligarch in exile] and those who are now in prison… And now they want to go back and fill their pockets.” The Kremlin, in exploiting the conflu-ence of facts and sentiments unfavorable to the extra-parliamentary liberals, has long succeeded in systematically dis-crediting the opposition.

It is in this area of contesting narra-tives that the opposition seems to have made the most remarkable advances in the past month. Opponents of the re-gime have begun in numbers to contest openly and profane the Kremlin’s stan-dard narrative against the opposition, if not in words (“Hillary, where is my

money?”), then through the very act of taking to the streets in greater num-bers than what the pro-Kremlin groups could hope to achieve. Yet the real test for the opposition’s dynamic dissent, it seems, is only beginning. The challenge has not so much come in the form of po-lice batons: the opposition has generally steered clear of confrontation by opting for periodic, authorized gatherings, and the authorities have generally refrained from shows of force. Instead, the most pointed challenge to the protest cam-paign thus far has been laid bare in the ostensibly reform-minded approach tak-en by outgoing President Medvedev.

In a December 22 speech, Medvedev expressed his intention to restore direct elections of governors as well as to fa-cilitate registration of political parties – two of the opposition’s core demands for several years. The speech could be interpreted as a shift in approach on the side of the regime: namely, the coun-terbalancing of Putin’s strong-man rhetoric and characteristic narrative of power with Medvedev’s ostensible re-form politics. In what may be his last major speech as president, Medvedev has made a thinly veiled effort to blunt the opposition’s edge by making reform-oriented concessions that adhere to or even legitimize the continued frame-work of United Russia rule. He has, in the past, selectively absorbed opposition

demands into a wider agenda meant to demonstrate the regime’s ability to re-spond open-mindedly to challenges – as in the police reform of 2011 and the low-ering of the electoral threshold for par-liamentary representation to 5%.

Medvedev’s offer is that of a “man-aged democracy,” whereby liberal de-mands for multi-party competition, a reform-minded approach to institu-tions, and an economic modernization program are selectively met. There is a hidden narrative of power in Medve-dev’s presentation, ultimately grounded in the same logic of one-party consoli-dation: his world is one of reform in lieu of regime change, in which the ruling party, by occasionally absorbing con-structive demands by the opposition, demonstrates its ability to integrate public opinion into its continued, oth-erwise unobstructed rule. Each new reform attests to United Russia’s ability to perform the functions of government while all that is needed of the opposi-tion is to register its demands. Mean-while, the party can further reinforce its legitimacy through internal reshuf-fles: well before the December election, the United Russia leadership had an-nounced that 50% of its parliamentary group would be renewed. While oppo-nents of the regime are finally coming to dislodge Putin’s narrative of power, they must now find their way around Medvedev’s; they took some ten years to start resisting the former, but may have less than ten weeks – that is, until the presidential ballot – to react to the lat-ter. What they might have to do, above all, is to take their contestation to the next level and to develop a comprehen-sive counter-narrative – this time, to the Medvedev narrative of controlled re-form. They must start proclaiming on their banners that multi-party competi-tion means little in the context of struc-tural domination by one party; that de-mocracy is about occasionally changing the party in power, rather than merely changing what the party does; and that, to paraphrase Patrick Pearse, while “the party of swindlers and thieves” remains in power, Russia unfree shall never be at peace. Afp

Seongcheol may be reached at seongche@princeton.edu

“Opponents of the regime are also winning

back ground on the level of narrative —

the combination of strategic reasoning and

public presentation that defines the ways in

which the wider struggle between the regime and

opposition is framed.”

Europe

American Foreign Policy6

crisis intact. The economic efficacy of this new Italian budget was rivaled only by its political courage required to put it together. Prime Min-ister Mario Monti stood up to the powerful industrial groups, labor unions, and the Italian public by proposing tax increases and pension reductions. At the same time, he disregarded his critics in Germany by diverting some resources away from the deficit and towards economic growth. Regardless of the immediate outcome of the crisis, Prime Minister Monti’s actions have provided other Eurozone officials with the demonstration of bold and decisive leadership that they so desperately need, and have already improved Italy’s economic outlook.

Prime Minister Monti achieved several notable accomplishments through his ‘save Italy’ measures. Prior to these initiatives, inves-tors had demanded as much as 6.5% interest on their six-month government bonds and well over 7%, a rate commonly understood to in-hibit a country from meeting its interest obliga-tions, on long-term securities. Such significant risk premiums obviously only further added to Italy’s deficits and national debt, creating a vi-

Embroiled in a debt crisis since the late 2009, European leaders have been be-set by urgent appeals for action. De-spite the looming threat of insolvency,

however, negotiations and summits have thus far failed to produce any meaningful progress in addressing their unprecedented economic and financial challenges. Italy, however—the nation perceived as both the most significant risk and one of the most egregious offenders—has managed to break the inertia that has so far dominated the response to this crisis by or-chestrating a response that meets even the most rigorous criteria. These ‘save Italy’ measures achieve much-needed austerity through the balance of structural expenditure reforms and revenue increases that has eluded the govern-ments of many debt-ridden Western nations. At the same time, the government has managed to mitigate the consequences of fiscal austerity on aggregate demand by reallocating resources lost in tax evasion and transfer payments that simply add to deficits to investment in infra-structure and other pro-growth measures cru-cial to Italy and Europe’s ability to survive this

cious cycle fueled by market panic that appeared unbreakable. Because these interest rates were more a reflection of the widespread and rapidly growing panic surrounding the Eurozone than a testament to the unsustainable nature of Italy’s national finances, lowering them required more than sound economic policy. It required leader-ship that could assuage both nervous investors and a frightened Italian public.

Monti has confronted this market panic with unwavering calm, responding by provid-ing the type of national reform that investors needed to be assured that Italy will be capable of paying the interest on its debt. The two largest sources of Italian debt are vastly over-generous transfer payments to its citizens and tax eva-sion by much of its populace. The new Prime Minister confronted the former on a variety of levels, most notably by raising the retirement age for men from 65 to 66 and for women im-mediately from 60 to 62 while providing for the implementation of a gradual increase to 66 by 2018. He also provided economic incentives

itAliAn AUSterity meASUreS

A model For eUroPe

Jeff Schwartz ‘13

eUroPe

“Prime Minister Monti also began to address

another major source of Italy’s fiscal imbalance:

the severe recession.”

Prime Minister Mario Monti discussing his new austerity measures. Photo from dailylife.com

February 2012 7

to continue working to age 70, which should both reduce retirement pensions and increase revenue generated for the government. Lastly, Monti proceeded to remove the full inflation proofing of government pensions, with the ex-ception of the smallest of pensions paid to the most indigent in the population, meaning that the real government expense of retirement will decline over time. The severity of these mea-sures obviously made them highly unpopular with the Italian public and their elected repre-sentatives in Parliament. However, they were critical in addressing unsustainable spending on a population whose demographics continue to shift more towards the elderly.

To address Italy’s severe tax evasion prob-lem, Prime Minister Monti instituted a national ban on all financial transactions in cash exceed-ing the value of a thousand Euros, thus attempt-ing to force more of Italy’s legitimate economic activity into the realm of taxable income. Given that many economists estimate that up to 27% of economic exchanges in Italy occur in the so-called ‘shadow economy’, this politically unpop-ular reform should have significant implications for future Italian budgets. He further reinstated a highly unpopular property tax on first homes, increased the value added tax by 2%, bringing it to 23%, instituted a new tax on petrol and lux-ury cars, and instituted new taxes on a variety of capital income that was once exempt (some retroactively).

In addition to the austerity measures men-tioned above, Prime Minister Monti also began to address another major source of Italy’s fiscal imbalance: the severe recession currently plagu-ing its economy. Despite strong international pressure to exclusively implement reforms that would immediately reduce the short-term budget deficit, Prime Minister Monti realized that Italy will only be able to achieve this lofty goal by restarting economic growth and reduc-ing unemployment. This will not only increase national income, and thus tax revenue, but also decrease government expenditures to the un-employed and needy. In order to restart this much needed economic growth, Prime Minis-ter Monti also resisted more populist demands to implement taxes that would stifle employ-ment and business investment too severely or that would simply allow Italians evading their taxes to ignore a greater burden at the expense of those already stretched to the limit. He suc-cessfully implemented a variety of revenue rais-ing mechanisms for the government that should have relatively minimal effects on aggregate demand, and also passed legislation increasing infrastructure spending and providing targeted tax credits for hiring new employees, especially

young workers. Such measures are indisputably essential for a nation expected to, even by the most optimistic measures, suffer from a reces-sion of approximately 0.5% of GDP in 2012 and stagnant economic growth the year after.

Prime Minister Monti recognized that such reforms would not be easily attainable and took the decisive step of first implement-ing them through emergency decree and later having the Parliament ratify them. While crit-ics might label such action undemocratic, this crisis has unfortunately brought out the worst of democracies, with electoral majorities prohibit-ing elected officials from serving as leaders and making the decisions required to actually save their countries. Prime Minister Monti took on many powerful special interest groups in Italian politics to ensure that the necessary sacrifice was truly shared equitably among the Italian public.

The Italian Prime Minister also stood up to the international community, challenging German doctrine, which prioritizes balanced budgets and fiscal restraint above all other eco-nomic virtues. By offsetting austerity with fiscal stimulus, Monti demonstrated a commitment to enhancing Italy’s economic condition, rather than placating audiences either domestically or abroad. Thus far, he is the first true leader to have emerged from the financial crisis, and it is time for others throughout Europe to follow his example in order to arrive at a meaningful reso-lution to this catastrophe. For the myriad other Eurozone nations facing a crisis in investor confidence and unsustainable national spend-ing, Italy has demonstrated that it is possible to achieve balanced reform that does not inflict undue pain onto one’s people so long as elected ‘leaders’ are willing to suffer from a potential de-cline in poll numbers.

The bond markets responded to Prime Minister Monti’s announcement by immediate-ly reducing the needed interest rates on Italian short term bonds by 50% to 3.25% and on long term bonds to under the symbolic market stan-dard of 7%. This is a reflection of not only the lack of leadership that international investors have come to expect from the European com-munity, but to the extent that this crisis is still within the control of individual policy makers and public officials. Hopefully, Prime Minister Monti will be the spark that ignites forward mo-tion in this crisis in either achieving fiscal union to accompany the monetary union of the Euro-zone or by at least preventing Italy, as one of the world’s largest economies, from defaulting on a debt that is truly and clearly manageable. Afp

Europe

Jeff may be reached at jastwo@princeton.edu

AFP QuizMultiple Choice Monthly

Adam Safadi ‘14

1. Islamist militants in which country recently launched an attack that killed about 150 people? a. Syria b. Egypt c. Nigeria d. Sudan

2. What item is FIFA requesting Bra-zil allow to be sold at the 2014 World Cup? a. Vuvuzelas b. Beer c. Foam Fingers d. Apple Products

3. Who won the recent election for Speaker of Parliament in Egypt? a. Amr Moussa b. Saad al-Katatni c. Omar Samra d. Sidi Bouzid

4. It was discovered that Mitt Romney actually lost the Iowa caucus by how many votes? a. 42 b. 15 c. 105 d. 34

5. Researchers in the U.S. and what other country halted research on a mutant strain of bird flu for fear that it could be used by terrorists? a. Netherlands b. United Kingdom c. Saudi Arabia d. Canada

Answers on page 19

American Foreign Policy8

in a new direction. Mr. Kim’s inner circle will be the clearest representation of this personnel continuity, since the inner circle of relatives and generals that aided Kim Jong Il is carrying over to Kim Jong Eun’s reign. This offers Kim Jong Eun several advantages, like his supporting claims of continuity with Kim Jong Il’s example. On top of that, these officials are politically savvy and have ties to various political and military factions. Since the military has significant influence economically and politically, and a small elite class dominates the government, these individuals will be essential allies as Kim Jong Eun’s reign gains traction. At the same time, he does not yet have the influence necessary to clean house without jeopardizing his control over his country’s power brokers. While those nearest Kim Jong Eun’s seat of power will pressure his actions, those in North Korea’s chief economic and military ally will do likewise.

In pursuit of its self-interest, China will also push Mr. Kim toward policies that will maintain his government’s stability. A Time Magazine article recently noted China’s concern that turmoil in North Korea would

send huge numbers of refugees across its border. From the Chinese state’s perspective, it would be particularly bad if China’s government and society faced this strain in the near future since the government is presently intensifying efforts to maintain its own stability. Some articles have postulated that the recent protests in the village of Wukan may indicate more widespread social ills, and that recent efforts to censor television programs suggest concerns about the nation’s ideological fortitude. Developments among China’s political elite further increase its interest in North Korean stability. With a change of some 70% of China’s leadership early next year, a crisis could harm the new officials’ political capital. Another important factor is that China is in the process of stretching its military power and regional influence. According to Time, Beijing fears

President” who accomplished “immortal achievements,” and always stressed how his policies continued Kim Il Sung’s. As such, it is hardly shocking that the new ruler has begun to appropriate this rhetoric, as seen in how the North Korean government’s website says Mr. Kim is “identical to [sic] idea, leadership and personality of Kim Jong Il.” Information published in the New York Times suggests that Kim Jong Il may have appointed Kim Jong Eun as his successor because he would continue Kim Jong Il’s policies. In defiance of traditional inheritance practices that would pass a father’s estate to the eldest son, Kim Jong Il selected his third and youngest son. While the oldest son contrasted Kim Jong Il’s personality and the second son experienced a relatively public rift with his father, Kim Jong Eun reportedly demonstrated an affinity for North Korea’s official philosophy since childhood. Kim Jong Eun’s actions will not be the only force pushing for continuity, though. The lack of change among subordinates will also prevent policy shifts.

Since Kim Jong Eun is still in the process of securing his footing, he may not yet have the power or desire necessary to brush aside the current officials. By avoiding a shake-up in the near future, he will avoid alienating needed allies and inherit an intact and experienced government. While an expert quoted in the New York Times recently predicted that it will be only a matter of months before the government passes to a younger generation, one scenario that The Economist describes seems more likely in the near future: the seasoned and experienced officials will keep Mr. Kim in check. Once he consolidates power, he will have the chance to oversee a generational shift among North Korean officials, however this will by no means give him free rein. There is a strong likelihood that current officials will pass their positions to similarly-minded relatives, which means the new leader will be hard pressed to wipe the slate clean and thereby steer his government

No one mourns the wicked,” a recurring quote from the musical “Wicked” by Stephen Schwartz and Winnie Holzman,

expresses the jubilation following the Wicked Witch of the West’s demise. The citizens of Oz would not mourn Kim Jong Il, the recently deceased North Korean dictator who rose to power after his father and predecessor, Kim Il Sung, died in 1994. During his rule, Kim Jong Il consistently prioritized guns over butter, resulting in a country that possessed nuclear weapons yet suffered chronic food shortages that killed over a million people. It might appear that a change in leadership could provide North Korea an opportunity to improve its citizens’ quality of life; however, the lack of widespread Oz-like excitement implies recognition that this is unlikely. With the rise of Kim Jong Eun, Kim Jong Il’s son and hand-picked heir, North Korean policy will center around continuing the policies and ideals left by Kim Jong Eun’s father and grandfather, for this will best secure the new ruler’s legitimacy.

Still in his twenties and having only a few years of experience within the government’s highest echelons, Kim Jong Eun’s legitimacy will depend largely on his ability to emulate his predecessors. It is important to note that the new leader’s position and dominance are by no means guaranteed; Kim Jong Il’s relatives continually vie for influence, several of whom are generals in the military, with experience dating back to Kim Il Sung’s reign. Although Kim Jong Eun is securing the official positions left by his father, North Korea is a society that, according to the Wall Street Journal, generally follows “a seniority-based hierarchical ideal.” This means that youth and inexperience could jeopardize Kim Jong Eun’s ability to command officials twice his age. In comparison, his father had far more experience when he took power yet still ruled for three years in his predecessor’s name. Not only that, but Kim Jong Il maintained his father’s role as the “eternal

FAtherS And SonS

Kim Jong eUn’S eFFortS to emUlAte the PASt

Collin Berger ‘14

ASiA

“The philosophy of emulation that Mr. Kim

plans to employ will direct North Korea’s

short-term nuclear policy.”

February 2012 9

top officials would rebuff any suspected American intervention. In addition, any U.S. involvement would also irritate the U.S.’s complex relationship with China. Therefore, the potential price of either overt or covert action with the intention of influencing North Korea is tremendous. This means that the U.S. should expect a continuation of the same challenges, policies, and obstinateness seen in Kim Jong Il’s final years. In light of this fact, the U.S. should offer Kim Jong Eun the same deals it offered his father and also not oppose Mr. Kim as he consolidates power. To this effect, the Obama Administration has been wise to call for a “peaceful, stable transition” but should not have officially suspended the ongoing discussions. Resuming such discussions as quickly as possible will minimize any increase in U.S.-North Korea tension caused by the transition. It would also indicate that the U.S. recognizes that Kim Jong Il’s death is not indicative of a North Korean paradigm shift. There are several reasons why countries around the world have responded to Kim Jong Il’s death with somber messages and heightened wariness rather than the excitement seen among the characters in “Wicked.” Perhaps the most significant is that reality’s Wicked Witch has a successor who has every reason to grab a broomstick and pointy hat. As such, the death of Kim Jong Il is heralding Kim Jong Eun’s rise as the leader of continued anti-U.S. policy and resistance to political change. Afp

the West, South Korea, and even China all oppose North Korea’s efforts to develop a nuclear arsenal, any efforts to scale back the program or even enter serious negotiations to that end would jeopardize Mr. Kim’s credibility as a strong anti-Western leader among his population, especially among senior officials old enough to have lived during the country’s formation and the 1950s Korean Conflict. North Korea’s state philosophy, which stresses self-reliance and was created by Mr. Kim’s grandfather, would underscore this issue. One might argue that Mr. Kim can compromise to win incentives from the West and free up his own domestic budget. However, this appears unlikely. The new leader’s connection to his predecessors is the cornerstone of his legitimacy, and past rewards have had little influence on North Korean policymakers. In North Korea, greater loyalty, power, and service to the state correlate with a better livelihood, so the ideologues among the political and military elite do not feel the impact of food shortages like the masses who work outside the state do. These ideologues pose a greater threat to Mr. Kim since they could fragment his power or spark an ideological schism. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the North Korean government recently announced that it would not change its foreign policy and would maintain an aggressive stance toward South Korea.

The U.S. now finds itself in an uncomfortable position as it looks towards the future. In these circumstances, it would be unwise to attempt to manipulate the present situation since Mr. Kim and his

that a political collapse in North Korea would likely cause Korean unification under the Seoul government. For an aspiring regional power like China, it would be a painful setback if a U.S. ally gained ground at a fallen ally’s expense. Intelligence reports and news articles agree that China wants North Korea to undergo certain reforms in order to boost regional stability, so China will not be Mr. Kim’s most conservative influence. China’s overriding interest, though, is that Mr. Kim’s government does not fall. Therefore, in the event that Chinese leaders see the young leader’s policies as erratic or dangerous, they will use whatever influence they have to correct his course. This could potentially happen if, for example, Mr. Kim proposes a major internal shake-up, drastic social reform, or an inconsistent foreign policy, which could cause China to regard Mr. Kim as an incompetent leader and a liability for his regime’s stability. Thus, North Korea’s untested ruler must prove his leadership ability and his government’s functionality to audiences at home and abroad. Despite some alignment between North Korean and Chinese interests, they do not fully overlap, so they will at times push Mr. Kim in contradictory directions.

In particular, the philosophy of emulation that Mr. Kim plans to employ will direct North Korea’s short-term nuclear policy. Because North Korea’s nuclear weapons program began decades ago, Kim Jong Eun has little choice but to continue supporting nuclear development or else he would undermine his own legitimacy as his father’s and grandfather’s heir. Since

Asia

Collin may be reached at cmberger@princeton.edu

Kim Jong Eun during a tour of a military base. Photo from tumblr.com.

American Foreign Policy10

A: A member of the Muslim Brotherhood is nominated to be EGYPT’s next parliament speaker. The Brotherhood’s party, the Freedom and Justice party, won more than 40% of parliament seats in recent elections.

B: Former U.S. presidential can-didate Rick Perry’s denunciation of TURKEY as a country ruled by “Is-lamic terrorists” sparks a response from the Turkish government. A State Department spokesperson as-serted that this is not an official U.S. position.

C: IRELAND passes its fourth quarterly test to qualify for a joint IMF, EU, and ECB four-year bailout program. The nation’s austerity measures have been approved for each of the quarterly assessments in 2011.

G: The High Court of the UK rules in favor of the City of London Corp., which had applied to evict Occupy London protestors camping outside St. Paul’s Cathedral. A number of officials of the cathedral resigned over threats to evict the protestors.

H: Authorities are considering calling off the rescue mission for missing passengers of the Costa Concordia. Rescuers attempted to blow holes in the hull of the ship, which hit rocks off the coast of the ITALIAN island of Giglio.

I: Activists in SYRIA have report-ed that the Free Syria Army suc-ceeded in forcing the withdrawal of the Syrian army from the town of Zabadani. The FSA is made up of former government soldiers.

February 2012 11

D: State media report the attack of a group of tourists in ETHIO-PIA. Gunmen killed five people while twelve were rescued by a helicopter.

E: A panel of leaders, business executives, and legal experts in AUS-TRALIA recommend that Aborigines be recognized in the constitution. It proposes repealing two provisions that are considered to be racist.

F: ROMANIA’s deputy health minister withdraws his resignation after it triggers protests, saying that changes he had opposed in health care had been scrapped. Protestors demonstrate against recent austerity measures and call for early elections.

J: After an alleged member of Boko Haram, a militant Islamist group, escaped custody in NIGERIA a police commissioner has been suspended. The escapee was detained after arriv-ing uninvited to the home of a state governor.

K: Protestors gathered in JAPAN to protest the proposed restarting of the nation’s nuclear plants. If no more reactors are brought online by April, the country will have no nuclear plants in operation.

L: The US Peace Corps has pulled all its 150 volunteers out of HON-DURAS. Drug-related violence and crime have prompted security con-cerns, as the nation has the world’s highest homicide rate.

American Foreign Policy12

From the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, the most dangerous country in the world is not China, North Korea, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, or any of our

current enemies or potential rivals. Instead, the most dangerous nation on earth is our former Cold War client and alleged anti-terror ally, Pakistan. No other country is both so capable of damaging U.S. interests and so likely to do so in the near future. For American policy planners the danger zone lies not in the nuclear test sites in Iran, but in the shadowy intelligence service headquarters in Islamabad and the heroin-in-fested hinterlands of North Waziristan.

While America imagines itself to be locked in a deadly cage match in the War on Terror, there is a substantial chance that we will later look back on the current era as the quaint and quiet good old days in that fight – the time be-fore the bad guys had nukes. Similarly, after a weary decade of counter-insurgency interven-tion in Afghanistan, America is likely to with-draw its forces well before a stable government and civil society can take hold. Therefore, the “peace” following the American pull-out is likely to be a much more hazardous period than the “war,” with a distinct prospect of renewed civil war and a pronounced drift toward failed statehood and warlord rule. While a failed state north of the Hindu Kush would render mean-ingless America’s long Afghan intervention, a failed state south of the Kush in nuclearized Pakistan would be far worse of a disaster in the global War on Terror. Worryingly, the Zardari government today is struggling to fend off a coup from the same security forces that appar-ently harbored Osama bin Laden for years in a safe house near the capital. In each of these nightmares, our worst fears would be realized in Pakistan.

Given all of that, stabilizing the U.S. re-lationship with Pakistan is likely to be one the most important challenges this country faces on the international stage in the next ten years. And yet, as critical as Pakistan is to U.S. foreign policy, it is a country that we poorly understand and therefore struggle to influence. If there is any country that understands Pakistan, it is its

behemoth neighbor and estranged fraternal twin, India. While the enmity between these two nations can hardly be overstated, no nation on earth has expended more effort analyzing, cajoling, and indeed obsessing over Pakistan than India. With that in mind, I met with a se-nior diplomat in the Indian Ministry of Exter-nal Affairs on a recent trip to New Delhi.

Such expert relationship counseling is nec-essary because sadly the history of the U.S.-Pak-istani relationship has not been encouraging. During the Cold War, Pakistan was the United States’ staunch ally in the region against Soviet-aligned India, and Pakistan received billions of

dollars in economic and military assistance. Af-ter the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, re-lations soured over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons in 1998 despite strong U.S. opposition, and remains the only Muslim state in the nuclear club. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was a key supporter of the Taliban. After 9/11, however, President Bush convinced former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to join the War on Terror, and the U.S. has given large amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past ten years. In return, Pakistan has made efforts to aid in the war, for example by letting the U.S. use a base in their territory for drone strikes. Nevertheless, Pakistan is still plagued by numerous terrorist

groups, and many of its provinces are complete-ly out of the control of the central government in Islamabad and are run entirely by the Taliban.

This past year has seen relations fall to an all-time low. It began with the incident of Ray Davis, a CIA contractor who shot dead two Pakistanis on the streets of Lahore whom he thought were attempting to rob him (the U.S. then tried to keep a straight face while claiming diplomatic immunity). Next there was the clan-destine May raid by Navy Seals to kill Osama bin Laden, which infuriated diplomats both in Islamabad (for Pakistan’s lack of foreknowledge, let alone permission) and in Washington (for Pakistan’s either incompetence in not finding or complicity in sheltering bin Laden). This caused criticism of the Pakistani government in Wash-ington to boil over in public, most notably by outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who in September ac-cused Pakistan’s ISI spy agency of funding and directing terrorist groups. Finally, in December there was the inadvertent killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO airstrike, which prompted Pakistani diplomats to boycott a conference at Bonn on the future of Afghanistan.

Nor is the problem due simply to miscom-munication and unfounded mistrust; the U.S. and Pakistan have fundamentally opposing in-terests in the region. While the U.S. obviously wants to stop nuclear proliferation, some mem-bers of the Pakistani government likely would not mind if more Muslim nations became nuclear armed. In the War on Terror, George Bush committed America to fighting terror-ism wherever it crops up. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, have perceived great utility in spon-soring terrorist groups in their struggle with India over Kashmir and use terrorist groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (responsible for the 2008 Mumbai bombings) as, in the words of Admiral Mullen, a “veritable arm” of the ISI. In the theater of Afghanistan, no peace agreement or successful exit strategy can be concluded without Pakistan, mostly be-cause Pakistan controls many proxy forces in Afghanistan which could either sustain or bring down the central government in Kabul. As long as the mountains of Pakistan are a ha-ven for anti-Kabul terrorists, Pakistan can keep Afghanistan completely destabilized. While the U.S. wants Afghanistan to develop into a peace-ful democracy, Pakistan would be happy to see a weak, corruptible Muslim theocracy, destroy-ing everything U.S. soldiers have fought for over the past ten years. To put it bluntly, Washington wants an American puppet state, while Islam-abad wants a Pakistani puppet state. These goals are not compatible.

ASiA

A SerieS oF UnFortUnAte eventS

indiAn PerSPective on U.S.-PAKiStAni relAtionS

Dillon Smith ‘14

“Although this strategy is bold and

would represent a radical change in U.S.-Pakistani

relations, it is likely the only possible way

forward is if the U.S.is to achieve its goals in the

region.”

February 2012 13

Given that as soon as the Afghan war is over, the U.S. will want to disengage from the Middle Eastern quagmire and will no longer need Pakistan as a strategic partner, many com-mentators in both countries have urged patience and forgiveness for Pakistan’s ever more appar-ent unfaithfulness and double-dealing. This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed. It fails to account for the most crucial factor in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship: aid money. Between 2002 and 2010, Pakistan received roughly $18 billion in economic and military aid from the United States. Towards the end of the decade, this amounted to almost 10 percent of the Paki-stani government’s budget. The U.S. is by far Pakistan’s largest foreign donor, and Pakistani leaders know that no other country could pro-vide more than a small fraction of the largesse that U.S. friendship guarantees.

Clearly the U.S. has a troubled relation-ship with Pakistan and needs to find a new way forward to prevent the partnership from falling apart. I sat down with a senior diplomat (who would prefer to remain anonymous) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the coun-try with the most experience of all in building a relationship with Pakistan – India. Although the two countries share a troubled past, India has learned to build a stable relationship with Pakistan and relations have been improving

Asiadramatically over the past ten years. When asked how the U.S. could improve its relation-ship with Pakistan, my contact jumped imme-diately to a simple, yet prudent conclusion: “The United States must benchmark assistance to Pakistan to achieve its objectives.” Over the past ten years, the U.S. has poured aid money into Pakistan to be used more or less at Pakistan’s discretion, and in return asked for Pakistani help – or at least non-interference – in combat-ing terrorism.

This strategy, however, has plainly failed, and this senior diplomat therefore implored the U.S. to pursue what he deemed a “transaction-al” relationship with Pakistan. “Pakistan can’t survive without U.S. aid,” he continued, “and the government knows this. The U.S. needs to be clear and direct [and say] for example if you pursue these terrorists in Waziristan, we’ll give you X in military aid. Otherwise it’s going to be another ten years of billions of dollars down the drain.” The U.S. needs to be clear and direct about what its objectives are and what help it needs from the Pakistani government, and then pursue those objectives relentlessly using aid money as leverage.

Although this strategy is bold and would represent a radical change in U.S.-Pakistani re-lations, it is likely the only possible way forward if the U.S. is to achieve its goals in the region.

Dillon may be reached at dillons@princeton.edu

With the end of the war in Afghanistan in sight, failure is not an option. For the past ten years the U.S. has showered Pakistan with aid money and not gotten what it paid for. Every U.S. dip-lomat travelling to Pakistan should remember that the Pakistanis need our aid money just as much as we need their help in the war.

The U.S. needs to make aid to this troubled South Asian nation contingent on achieving real results, both in pursuing terrorists and internal reform. While this transactional ap-proach risks being perceived as blunt and short-sighted, our unstable ally in Islamabad is the precarious fulcrum on which the outcome of our Afghan war is hinged. We need their un-ambiguous cooperation, and we need it imme-diately. Despite our long military adventure in Afghanistan, that war is still just as likely to be-come another Vietnam in which our allies and interests are devastated following our exit as it is another Kuwait in which the regime we install survives our departure. Pakistan holds the key to that outcome. Perhaps ultimately the analogy for the Afghan war will become the Gulf Wars, of which, ominously, there were not one, but two. Afp

Robert Gates sits down with Pakistani General Ashfaq Kayani. Photo from opinion-maker.org

American Foreign Policy14

On New Year’s Eve, President Obama signed into law the 2012 National Defense Au-thorization Act (NDAA),

which contains budgetary and execu-tive provisions for what the adminis-tration calls “the defense of the United States and its interests abroad.” Since then, the Act has received a great deal of negative media attention, especially concerning sections 1021 and 1022, which codify the military’s right to detain and deny trial indefinitely to anyone — including United States citi-zens — suspected of actively support-ing terrorism.

The President’s concurrent expres-sion of “serious reservations” regard-ing parts of the bill, especially those “that regulate the detention, interro-gation, and prosecution of suspected terrorists,” features prominently in the press’s coverage of the NDAA. The White House supports the majority of the bill, but still considers certain as-pects imperfect. Due to these misgiv-ings, the President announced that his administration “will not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens,” remarking that, “doing so would break with our most important traditions and values as a Nation.”

Of course, there is no guarantee that future presidents will join Obama in and forego their power to detain U.S. citizens. The authority, after all, potentially extends indefinitely and Obama’s promise provides no legal or lasting assurance. Compounding the issue, the wording of the relevant sec-tions of the law is alarmingly vague. Those suspected of “a belligerent act or...directly support[ing] such hos-tilities” can be held without trial, but reasonable standards for suspicion are difficult to establish without due process.

The relatively recent phenomenon

of incorporating counter-terrorist efforts at large into national defense policy bears the responsibility for this inappropriate inclusion of controver-sial provisions in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, and has produced worrisome results. In order to protect the rights of citizens and the credibility of the United States, Congress and the President must keep basic freedoms at the forefront when making future policy decisions.

The passing of an act allowing the execution of powers that make even the President uncomfortable is a testa-ment to the hold that terrorism has upon our country. That the United States Congress can even consider denying its citizens due process illus-trates the dangerously widening scope of the government’s ‘War on Terror’. It is not coincidence that terrorist activity is the only crime for which the government may detain its citizens indefinitely and without trial based upon mere suspicion.

Since the passage of the Autho-rization for Use of Military Force (against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks) under the Bush Administra-tion, an increasing number of extreme powers have been granted to the gov-ernment under the auspices of fighting terrorism. Many of these, including the ability to electronically monitor citizens without obtaining a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-lance Court, have been unprecedented and inapplicable in other realms of law enforcement. The NDAA is only the most recent in a long stream of evidence for the view that good inten-tions lead to problematic legislation, but is especially concerning in its indication that the trend is intensify-ing.

The codification of the new and potentially dangerous executive pow-ers is in large part due to its inclusion in essential legislation unrelated to ci-

vilian detention policy. The National Defense Authorization Act is a typi-cally tame bill that has passed every year for almost five decades, tradi-tionally doing little more than allocat-ing a budget to the armed forces and establishing guidelines for its use. It is also, however, an extremely impor-tant bill, to the extent that the Presi-dent felt compelled to sign it despite finding certain provisions abhorrent to the American ethos. The NDAA now bears Obama’s signature because failing to adopt the act into law would mean that starting the following Monday morning, there would be no additional money appropriated to the military personnel and families reliant on the United States Department of Defense for their paychecks, pensions, and healthcare.

The extreme measures, motivated by the good but overzealous intentions of antiterrorism and facilitated by their combination with routine budget allocation into one all-or-nothing bill, have created a disquieting state of affairs. There is, however, a relatively simple two-part solution.

First, we must utilize the usual legal means to combat domestic ter-rorism in the future. The sixth amend-ment of the Constitution guarantees all citizens accused of a crime the right to a speedy and public trial. Terrorism is a particularly heinous crime, but is a crime nonetheless and should therefore be treated as such. The government should present evi-dence against U.S. citizens suspected

the Art oF WArthe nAtionAl deFenSe AUthorizAtion Act

Joe Margolies ‘15

“In order to protect the rights of citizens and the credibility of the United States, Congress and the

President must keep basic freedoms at the forefront

when making future policy decisions.”

US Foreign Policy

February 2012 15

of terrorism in a civilian court, where their guilt and sentence can then be determined. In the absence of the alarmingly authoritarian executive powers codified in the NDAA, due process could still neutralize potential terrorists. Accusations would simply require solid justification, preserving the fundamental rights of US citizens.

Second, if more radical meth-ods become necessary, they must be passed in discrete legislation, and certainly not in bills that authorize essential government funding. The additions to the 2012 iteration of the NDAA do not belong there. They instead resemble provisions more appropriate for inclusion in pieces of legislation like the PATRIOT Act or an authorization for use of military force.

In pursuit of such methods, though, basic rights must remain at the forefront. If they do not, our methods of counter-terrorism under-mine the very ideals that motivate them. Obama has said that among other things, he signed the NDAA because it contained provisions to preserve the “liberty of the American people.” When we attempt to preserve this liberty by encroaching on our ba-sic freedoms, however, we only dam-age its foundations. As an unshake-able bastion of democracy, the United States cannot afford to forget these fundamental liberties when making policy that affects its citizens.

In the coming months, it will be important to watch how the judicial branch interprets the application of the law. Reactions from other nations, political commentators, and organi-zations will likely prove relevant as well. In the meantime, the President and Congress cannot simply ignore the controversy surrounding the Act. President Obama has put his name on a bill that he and many in congress consider flawed. He and America’s lawmakers now have a responsibility to address their misgivings lest they appear, to concerned citizens and international observers alike, satisfied with a new and treacherous precedent. Afp

Joe may be reached at jhmargol@princeton.edu

US Foreign Policy

In ContextCompiled by Rohan Bhargava ‘14

“I’m just sharing my thoughts, but it’s very, very, very strange.” Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez, explaining his fears that

the U.S. government had found a way to give him cancer

“In the next four years, cross-strait relations will be more peaceful, with greater mutual trust and the chance of conflict will be less.” Ma Ying-jeou, incumbent Taiwanese president,

addressing jubilant supporters after a succesful re-election bid

“This is, perhaps, the most serious decision I’ve ever taken. I’m running for president.” Billionaire owner of the New Jersey Nets

Mikhail Prokhorov, announcing his candidacy for the Russian presidency against Vladimir Putin

“We are confronted by an unprecedented crisis that forces us to cut spending, lower our deficits but also to find the path to new growth by resolving our competitiveness problems”

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in a statement three days after France’s credit downgrade

“Western countries know that Iran does not follow atomic bomb in its nuclear activities because the era for atomic bomb is finished and no country can use it anymore.” Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

on Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions

“Foreigners are not going to give money forever.” Afghani President Hamid Karzai, addressing

his nation’s urgent need for self-sufficiency

Sources: Reuters, Moscow News, Bloomberg, ISNA, Economics Times.

American Foreign Policy16

it has encouraged it. The nation’s future internal stability and international repu-tation as an example of successful dem-ocratic transition will depend on the willingness of the organization to favor democratic values over its own position of power, if and when the constituency it has so long represented grows tired of its mediocre governance.

The association of the ANC with liberation and democracy within much of South Africa is hard earned, dating back to the founding of the organiza-tion in 1912 to protest racial inequality under British rule and its subsequent use of non-violent boycotts, demonstra-tions, and appeals to the international community following the beginning of apartheid in 1948. Following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, however, ANC founded an armed wing, known as the Umkhonto we Size (Spear of the Na-tion), and began a campaign of violent resistance alongside their nonviolent struggle throughout the 1960’s and 70’s, as much of their leadership—most prominently, Nelson Mandela—was captured and imprisoned. Beginning in the 1980’s, the ANC began negotiations with officials from the National Party, the majority representative of the white government, which eventually resulted in a comprehensive agreement that determined the political and economic post-apartheid order. In 1994, the ANC won 63% of the popular vote in the nation’s first fully free elections, bring-ing longtime de facto leader and former

On January 8th, African kings and tribal chiefs congregat-ed alongside world leaders and political figures in an

overcrowded South African stadium to pay homage to an organization that rightfully refers to itself as “Africa’s old-est liberation movement”: the African National Congress. Founded in 1912, its purpose was to oppose the political status quo within South Africa.

At the back of the stadium lies a view of Bloemfontein’s impoverished townships, a defunct power station tow-ering over them. In the back of many peoples’ minds is a sense that the cel-ebration—at a cost of nearly $12.3 mil-lion—was in poor taste, and emblematic not of the ANC’s impressive past, but of its uncertain future, and that of the country it now governs.

One development South Africans feel particularly uncertain about is the Protection of State Information Bill, derogatorily referred to as “the se-crecy bill.” It would punish journalists who obtain classified information that reveals government corruption, and those who do not turn that informa-tion over to the police. Journalists who possess such material would face up to five years in prison; those who pub-lish it, up to twenty-five. Recipients of such information beyond the journalist would also be vulnerable to prosecution. The government claims that the bill will protect the nation from an “increasing threat of espionage” and “foreign spies” which cannot be sufficiently quashed by existing legislation.

In a 1990 article, arguing against the repression of information that had long been so common in her country, South African writer and future Nobel Prize laureate Nadine Gordimer wrote, “Censorship is never over for those who have experienced it. It is a brand on the imagination that affects the indi-vidual who has suffered it, forever.” In

November of 2011, she repeated her accusation, this time against the ANC, a political organization to whom Gordi-mer once gave her support, before it was legal to do so.

While Gordimer’s is only one of many public criticisms the law has re-ceived, the Protection of State Informa-tion Bill is merely the latest in a series of controversies that have involved accusations—and often evidence—of corruption and mismanagement within South Africa, much of it involving the ANC. Furthermore, in recent years, concern has increased over the extent to which the ANC has come to dominate political life in South Africa. In effect, it has created a one-party democracy in which the opposition, while free to ex-ist, has little support.

This domination has thus far not resulted in any deterioration of the na-tion’s fundamentally democratic nature. Yet on the eve of its 100th anniversary as a political organization, it has be-come increasingly clear that the ANC’s grip on power has burdened South Africa’s fledgling democracy more than

cry, the beloved coUntry

the decline oF the AFricAn nAtionAl congreSS

Christiana Renfro ‘13

South Africans celebrate the African National Congress’ 100th anniversary. Photo from boston.com.

AFricA

February 2012 17

political prisoner Nelson Mandela to power.

Though Mandela’s time in power was generally regarded positively—his willingness to retire after just one term garnered comparisons to George Washington—the men who have fol-lowed him, all from the ANC, have not been looked upon so favorably. In 1999, just as Thabo Mbeki began his term as leader of South Africa, scandal erupted over an arms purchase of roughly $5 billion by the South African Defense Force from Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Spain, and Canada. Ac-cusations of corruption stemmed from bribes allegedly paid to facilitate the deal—bribes that have been associated with both Mbeki and his successor, Jacob Zuma. Schabir Shaik, Zuma’s per-sonal financial advisor, was convicted in 2005 of connection to bribes associated with the arms deal.

Since the 1999 elections, concern domestically and internationally over corruption within the South African government has increased exponen-tially. In 2011, the Special Investigating Unit, an organization set up to monitor government corruption, estimated that nearly one-fourth of the national budget was mismanaged due to corruption, and is currently investigating 12 billion

rand in questionable government deal-ings. The South African Social Security Agency is alleged to be rife with cor-ruption and financial chaos. The former head of the South African police force, Jackie Selebi, resigned in disgrace after he was found to be purchasing lav-ish gifts for his wife using government funds and taking bribes from a convict-ed drug smuggler.

In response, the ANC has seen a diminishing of its support from former allies. Both of its partners in South Africa’s Tripartite Alliance, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, have threatened to dissolve their association due to internal dis-agreement over economic policies, a move that would threaten a relationship created to strengthen resistance against apartheid. Moreover, prior to the 2009 elections that brought Zuma to power, a number of former ANC supporters split off to form the Congress of the People (COPE), prompting talk of an end to ANC dominance. Though the COPE only garnered 7% of the vote in 2009, they are still regarded as a potential future threat to the ANC’s power.

Despite these developments, the ANC still enjoys the loyalty of many South Africans, who see it as the orga-nization that fought for and eventually won universal suffrage and liberal de-mocracy for their country. Furthermore,

the association of Nelson Mandela, a man regarded as both liberator and founder of their young democracy, with the ANC, in addition to his continued support of that organization, has no doubt aided success. But other former supporters of the party, such as Gordi-mer and Archbishop Demond Tutu, have not been so forgiving. They repre-sent the disillusionment of many with the ANC’s lack of success in encourag-ing honesty and transparency.

It is only natural that a political party with such vast and total control—one that has in effect become a state and a party all at once—would fall prey to the seduction of easy wealth and luxury. Furthermore, it is equally inevitable that their popular support will diminish over time in the face of such misdeeds.

In 2009, shortly after his party was elected to a fourth term in power, Jacob Zuma announced to a crowd of sup-porters that the ANC would rule “until Jesus Christ comes.” One can only hope his statement was made in the spirit of hyperbole rather than truth and that, when the time comes, the ANC will give up power in a way that pays respect to both their former leader and the democ-racy they once helped create. Afp

Africa

Christiana may be reached at crenfro@princeton.edu

“The nation’s future internal stability

and international reputation as an

example of successful democratic transition

will depend on the willingness of the

organization to favor democratic values

over its own position of power...”

South African leaders and world politicians meet in the stadium in Bloemfontein. Photo from sina.com.

American Foreign Policy18

China, contrary to the conventional understanding of territorial waters (which is based upon distance from the continen-tal shelf under the Law of the Sea), has claimed the entire sea for itself based on its asserted historical sovereignty. While other nations have made such claims in the past, Beijing has shown a startling willingness to enforce them aggressively in recent years. The Chinese navy has had no compunction about sinking Vietnamese fishing vessels and has even warned oil giant Exxon Mobil last year not to explore for oil and gas resources with Vietnamese licenses and grants. Chinese forces have also been deployed to islands disputed by the Philippines, further demonstrat-ing their aggressive commitment to using military prowess to claim control.

Most analysts agree that these moves represent just the beginning of China’s expansion of regional influence as Beijing’s economic power increases. China has backed up its aggressive territorial claims with a military strategy to project its rising power. In August, the Chinese military began sea trials for its first aircraft carrier (refitted from an older Soviet model) and has started to test its first stealth bomber. In addition, to counterbalance American defense strategy, Beijing is also developing anti-aircraft systems and satellites (which underpin communications and guidance systems) that potentially target American bases in the Philippines, South Korea,

As China’s economic and military capabilities continue to develop rapidly, Southeast Asia has emerged as a strategic region

and an area of potential conflict between China and the United States. Although Southeast Asian countries gained indepen-dence relatively recently, regional powers and the U.S. have attempted to exert their influence over these states and to secure dip-lomatic ties with them. Today, in addition to Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, India and China, the United States has strategic and economic interests in the South China Sea and has committed naval forces and other assets to the region. In fact, U.S. Sec-retary of State Hilary Clinton has declared an open South China Sea to be an American “national interest,” and the U.S. has recently finalized plans to construct a new military base in Perth, Australia to increase its pres-ence in Southeast Asia. Increasingly, then, Southeast Asia represents both a bellwether of growing Chinese power and aggression and an unprecedented opportunity for the United States and its allies to act as a coun-terweight to Beijing.

The region’s waterways are vital to the global economic supply chain and free-navigability is key to continued prosper-ity in the immediate area and beyond. Approximately a quarter of the world’s oil passes through the Malacca Straits, destined to supply China and Indonesia as well as Japan, South Korea, and Tai-wan. Over $5 trillion worth of trade is conducted in the region every year—with more than a fifth of which is American. Moreover, much of the world’s computer manufacturing is performed in the region, with factories in each nation perform-ing complementary tasks towards a final product. The important trade routes in this area thus make it vital from both an economic and geopolitical standpoint.

One of the most important develop-ments in the region has been the increas-ingly contentious dispute over sovereignty in the South China Sea. Vietnam, the Philippines, and China continue to tussle over control of the Sea and the small islands lying above potential oil and gas reserves —estimated to match Kuwait’s.

contAining chinA

eScAlAting tenSionS in the SoUth chinA SeA

George Maliha ‘13

ASiA

American ships steam through the South China Sea. Photo from defense.gov.

February 2012 19

Australia, Japan, and elsewhere in the Pacific. In addition, the Chinese military has also invested in area denial weapons systems to counter American air superior-ity and hinder the movement of Ameri-can forces. Moreover, defense experts warn that Beijing is honing cyber warfare capabilities that have already been used to successfully access U.S. defense con-tractors’ sites as well as commercial sites. The intellectual yields of such intrusions have already gone into China’s new stealth bomber design. Recent reports also sug-gest that China’s cyber attacks targeted two American weather satellites and briefly gained command of one of them, further illustrating Beijing’s increased capability to interfere with American military commu-nication and surveillance infrastructure.

Such tactics, coupled with China’s economic clout, have begun to radically alter the dynamics within the region. Chi-nese aid, investment, and trade have been increasing in recent years as joint Sino-Vietnamese business ventures and Chinese support for Filipino infrastructure projects have become the norm in the region. This economic power translates into political influence, resulting in pro-China foreign policies emanating from regional gov-ernments. In fact, several nations in the region have disregarded the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) conventions by re-patriating Uyghur activists and dissidents back to China, where they face nearly certain persecution, imprisonment, and even torture or execution.

Nonetheless, Southeast Asia, through the Association of Southeast Asian Na-tions (ASEAN), has increasingly sought to counterbalance China by fostering ties with other states, most notably the United States—but also India, Japan, and others. In an interesting turn of events, American naval ships have increasingly berthed (and been repaired) in Vietnam, and the nation

has become one of the largest recipients of American aid. The United States has also approved sales of defense equipment to Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states. Regional powers have also stepped up their commitment to the region. Japan has pledged to increase trade and upgrade its submarine fleet and Australia has geared up for a decade-long upgrade to its naval and military assets.

Diplomatic relations between the various players in the region and the United States have warmed significantly as the U.S. remains the dominant sea power and has used its naval prowess to support regional nations against Beijing’s clout. In fact, domestic attitudes in regional nations toward Beijing have begun to turn nega-tive. For instance, in spite of growing trade and economic engagement with Beijing, last year, Vietnam halted a joint Sino-Vietnamese venture to extract bauxite, a mineral essential to China’s industries. The fact that outcry from many Vietnamese (including Buddhist monks, environmen-talists, and bloggers) countered Beijing’s pressure is indicative of regional anxiety over China’s influence.. Moreover, one of America’s staunchest allies in the region, Thailand, has strengthened its relations with Washington despite a military coup and riots in recent months. On another front, U.S.-Burma relations have begun to defrost after decades of sanctions, and some progress might be made in establish-ing democratic institutions and freeing political prisoners. These diplomatic suc-cesses have not gone unnoticed by China as Washington and Beijing pursue differ-ent objectives.

As Southeast Asia continues to expe-rience high rates of economic growth, the region will become increasingly important in the global economy. At the same time, the area encompasses some of the busiest maritime routes in the world as well as some of the most lucrative and promising natural resources. Both factors guarantee that China, other Southeast Asian coun-tries, and the U.S. will jockey for regional influence. China has made a strong show-ing in the region and undoubtedly exerts a strong hand in the affairs of the region. Nonetheless, as many Southeast nations have expressed, there must be a “balance” to maintain peace and prosperity. China’s willingness to use its economic clout, ag-gression, and coercion further hint at the urgency of maintaining a balanced power

structure in the region. The United States is in a unique posi-

tion to counterbalance Beijing growing aggression. Washington has the opportu-nity to increase engagement with regional nations through military and economic cooperation. Increased American naval presence can reassure regional govern-ments of the U.S.’s commitment to coun-tering Chinese intimidation and pressure. Encouraging Japan and India to also estab-lish and strengthen relationships in the re-gion will give those nations an incentive to counter Beijing to protect their interests. Moreover, highlighting Beijing’s continued horrendous human rights violations and supporting dissidents will weaken China’s prestige and force officials to turn inwards rather than pressure neighbors.

The rising boldness of Beijing in pursuit of its interests suggests that the American presence must increase. Although domestic debates in the United States threaten to cut defense budgets, defense spending represents an invest-ment in future stability to develop more ties to Southeast Asia. Along with military support, increased economic and politi-cal engagement with Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, the Philippines, and other na-tions is necessary to cement ties with regional capitals. While India and Japan have essential parts to play in maintain-ing peace in the region, the United States, on account of its military and economic power, is uniquely positioned to preserve its national interest and that of its allies by maintaining the freedom of the seas, open shipping lanes, and an independent Southeast Asia. Afp

Asia

George may be reached atgmaliha@princeton.edu

AFP Quiz AnswersMultiple Choice Monthly

1. C2. B3. B4. D5. D

“Most analysts agree that these moves repre-sent just the beginning of China’s expansion of regional influence...”

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