afghanistan plan - kagan

8/14/2019 Afghanistan Plan - Kagan

1/45

AfghanistanForceRequirements

FrederickW.Kagan

Director,CriticalThreatsProject,AmericanEnterpriseInstituteKimberlyKagan

President,InstitutefortheStudyofWar19

SEP

2009


2/45

Disclaimer

Theviews,opinions,recommendations,and

conclusionsin

this

document

are

solely

those

oftheauthorsanddonotreflectonthe

opinionsorrecommendationsoftheir

institutionsorofanyotherindividualororganization.

9/21/2009 FrederickW.Kaganand KimberlyKagan 2


3/45

ContentsTopic Slides

Objectives andStrategicFramework 45

GovernanceandLegitimacy 611

Afghan,US,andInternationalForces 1217

Internationalpresenceasanoccupation 18

Prioritizingefforts

country

wide 19

21

RegionalCommandSouth 2232

Helmand 2728

Kandahar 2932

RegionalCommandEast 3335

Theatersynergies 36

Force

Requirements 37

38Consequencesofunderresourcing 39

Changingtoapurecounterterrorismstrategy 4044

Noteonpopulation figures 45

Contactinformation 46



4/45

Objectives

CreateconditionsinAfghanistantoprevent

there

establishment

of

safe

havens

for

al

Qaedaandothertransnationalterrorist

groups

Establishsufficientstabilitytoensurethat

theseconditionscanbesustainedovertime

withforeign

financial

assistance

but

with

very

limitedforeignmilitarypresence



5/45

COINStrategicFramework Security

DefeattheinsurgencytogetherwiththeANSF

ExpandandimprovetheANSFasrapidlyaspossible

Makethelinescross

Governance Remediate

damage

that

corruption

and

abuse

of

power

have

done

to

the

legitimacyoftheAfghanGovernment

HelpandcajoleGIRoA toemplacesystemsandprocedurestoimprovelegitimacyoverthenextfewyears

ImprovethecapacityofGIRoA atalllevelstoprovideessentialservicestotheAfghan

people,

especially

security,

justice,

dispute

resolution,

and

basic

agriculturalandtransportationinfrastructure

Development FocusdevelopmenteffortsonbuildingAfghancapacitytodeveloptheirown

countryratherthanondevelopingitforthem

Ensurethatdevelopmentempowersthegovernment,nottheenemy

Addresscorruptionandtheperceptionofcorruptionwithintheinternationaldevelopmenteffort

Securityandgovernancehavepriorityoverdevelopment



6/45

GovernanceandTroopLevels

ImprovingAfghangovernancerequiresasignificantpresenceofinternationalforcesto: Provide

security

and

mobility

to

advisors,

mentors,

andauditors

Provideindependentsourcesofinformationaboutthe

situationon

the

ground

Providethebureaucraticinfrastructurethroughwhichtodisburseandmonitortheexpenditureoffundsinanorganizedandpurposefulmanner

Createchecksonabusesofpowerbylocalofficials

Provideplanningcapabilitiesattheprovincialandlocallevel



7/45

AfghanGovernmentLegitimacy

EstablishingthelegitimacyoftheAfghangovernmentisarequirementforsuccessfulcounterinsurgency

Electionsareonewayofestablishinglegitimacy,buttheyareneithersufficientnor

necessarilydeterminative

USmustredoubleitseffortstohelpAfghanistanestablishthelegitimacyoftheinstitutionsofitsgovernment

AkeypartoftheseeffortsmustbedramaticallyincreasingtransparencyinAfghanbudgetaryprocedures(buildingonmodelsalreadyinplaceinsomeministries)

TheUS

must

also

work

to

encourage

the

Afghan

government

to

establish

proceduresforelectingprovincialanddistrictgovernorsandsubgovernorswhoarecurrentlyappointedbythepresident

TheUSandtheinternationalcommunitytogethercontrolvirtuallyallofAfghanistansbudget;theyhaveenormousleverageiftheychoosetouseit(much

morethan

the

leverage

the

US

had

on

oil

rich

Iraq)

ThepresenceoflargenumbersofAmericanandinternationalforcesandtheirreplaceableroletheycurrentlyplayinprovidingsecurityfortheAfghangovernmentanditsofficialsalsoofferenormousleverage



8/45

SourcesofLegitimacy Elections

are

one

source

of

legitimacy,

but

only

one

Legitimacyisalsodefinedbytheperformanceofthegovernment,bothinitsabilitytoprovidedesiredservicesandinitsadherencetosocialnorms

Karzai wouldlikelyhavewonfairelections,althoughpossiblynotinthe

first

round,

and

he

would

almost

certainly

have

carried

the

Pashtun areas

heavilysotheproblemisnottheimpositionofanunacceptableleaderbutratherthemanipulationsthatledtothisparticularoutcome

ThefraudisunquestionablydamagingtoKarzais legitimacyandthereforeharmfultotheISAFeffort

Butin

the

mid

and

long

term,

legitimacy

will

be

defined

much

more

by

theactionsKarzai andtheinternationalcommunitytakenowthanbythefraudulenceoftheseelections

Weshouldnotcondonethefraud;onthecontrary,weshoulddeploreit

Butwe

should

accept

the

outcome

of

the

Afghan

legal

processes

now

underwaytoreviewtheresultandthendevelopanduseallpossibleleveragewithKarzai toshapethenewgovernmentinwaysthewillrepairthedamagetoitslegitimacyandbegintoimprovethesituation



9/45

LegitimacyAftertheElection TheUScanalsoworktohelptheAfghangovernmentreformitselfusing

toolssimilar

to

those

we

employed

in

helping

the

Iraqi

government

rid

itselfofmalignactorssupportingsectariancleansinganddeathsquadsin2007: USforcescancollectevidenceofmalfeasancebyAfghanofficialsatalllevels

Thatevidencecanbepresentedtothoseofficials,totheirsuperiors,toKarzai,to

Afghan

courts,

to

the

public,

or,

in

some

cases,

to

international

courts

Insomecases,criminalactionshouldresult;insomecases,theofficialsshouldberemoved;insomecases,theaimissimplytopressurethoseofficialstostopcertainspecificbehaviorsthatthreatenthesuccessofthemission

Thisisnotacrusadeagainstcorruptionofficialsareonlytargetedwhentheiractions

seriously

jeopardize

our

efforts

ThisdoesnotrequiretheremovalofKarzai orsomeofhiskeyallies(includingfamilymembers)frompositionsofpowerasinIraq,itshouldbepossibletorechannel theirbehaviorawayfromtheactivitiesthataremostdamaging

The

US

has

demonstrated

that

it

can

generate

such

precise

and

surgical

pressureon

critical

points

in

apolitical

system

in

Iraq

ThisapproachrequiressignificantnumbersofAmericanforcesactivelypatrollingamongthepopulationonlyinthatwaycanourleadersdeveloptheintelligencetheyneedtodeterminewhichmalignactorsmust

beaddressed

and

to

gather

the

information

needed

to

address

them



10/45

LegitimacyandForceLevels The

flaws

of

the

August

20

election

increase

the

requirement

for

additionalforcesratherthandecreasingit

IftheUSdeclaresthatitwillnotsendadditionalforcesbecauseofthoseflaws,itisdefactodeclaringthatitregardstheelectionasillegitimate,theKarzai governmentasillegitimate,andtheAfghanenterpriseasunworthyof

additional

effort,

all

of

which

will

seriously

exacerbate

damage

to

the

legitimacyofthegovernmentwithinAfghanistanaswellastothewilloftheinternationalcommunitytocontinuethestruggle

Failingtosendadditionalforces,moreover,deprivestheUSoftheability

to

take

advantage

of

the

opportunities

offered

by

this

flawed

election,

particularlytheopportunitiestoleverageKarzais insecurityandgrowingrecognitionthathemusttakerealstepstoreestablishthelegitimacyofhisgovernment

Thisisnotasymbolicquestionundertakinganyofthestepsoutlinedin

thisdocument

to

address

systemic

problems

that

undermine

the

legitimacyoftheAfghangovernmentrequireadditionalAmericanmilitaryforcesoperatinginaCOINmissionontheground



11/45

LegitimacyandtheANSF

WhatistheANSFfightingforiftheUSmakesitclearthatitregardstheAfghanGovernmentasillegitimate?

TheANSF

leadership

is

well

aware

that

it

cannot

manage

theviolenceinAfghanistanonitsown

AnnouncingthatnoUSreinforcementsareonthewayislikelytodamageANSFmoraleseriously,particularlycoupled

with

US

interactions

with

the

Afghan

government

thatsuggesttheUSdoesnotacceptitslegitimacy

TheANSFdoesnotexistorfightinavacuumitsquality

andperformance

depends

heavily

on

its

belief

that

the

internationalcommunitysupportsitandwillcontinuetosupportitadequately,andonitsbeliefthatitscauseisjust



12/45

Security:

Making

the

Lines

Cross

Sooner


ANSFSize&Capacity

InsurgentSize&Capacity

InternationalForces

AnincreaseininternationalforcesisneededbothtoaccelerateANSFtraining

andtoreducetheinsurgentthreat,loweringtherequirementforANSFcapability

tomanagetheresidualthreatandallowingamorerapidstarttothereduction

ininternational

forces


13/45

ANSFCurrentStatus

As

of

June

2009,

the

Afghan

Ministry

of

Defense

had

103,475

authorized

personnel,with89,521actuallyassigned. Ofthose,AfghanNationalArmyoperationalunitshad66,406soldiersauthorizedwith53,417assignedinaround80kandaks (battalions). TheremainingMoD personnelwereassignedtoheadquarters,infrastructure,ministerialandgeneralstaffpositions,andtrainingandtransferaccounts. TheAWOLrateisrunningataround9%. Theofficial

capabilityratings

of

Afghan

kandaks puts

about

66%

of

them

in

operational

status

(CM1orCM2).

Theuniformedpolicehad47,384authorizedand51,406assigned. Thepolicehavebeenineffectiveandoftenaccelerantstotheinsurgencythroughtheircorruptionandpenetrationbymilitiasandinsurgents. TheUShasbeenoverseeingareform

programcalled

Focused

District

Development,

but

as

of

February

2009

FDD

had

trainedandwasreforming55of265districts,andanother9districtswereinprogress. CSTCAplannedtoput100districtsthroughtheFDDprograminFY2010.CorruptionandineffectivenessintheANPiscompoundedbyinadequateequipmenttoplayacounterinsurgentroleAfghanUniformedPolicehavelightweapons,noheavymachineguns,andveryfewarmoredorevenuparmoredvehicles,

so

they

are

often

outgunned

by

insurgents

with

no

meaningful

protection. Forthesereasons,wecannotnowconsiderAfghanUniformedPoliceascounterinsurgents.


BottomLine: TheANSFnowaddsaround50,000counterinsurgentstothemix


14/45

ANSFExpansion

Currentplans

call

for

expanding

the

ANA

to

134,000

by

theendof2011

Thisexpansioncanbeacceleratedtomeetthatgoalby

October2010

Assumingthecurrentratioofcombatforcestoendstrengthofaround60%,theANAcanprobablyhave

around

80,000

troops

in

combat

formations

by

October

2010,anadditionof30,000overJune2009

Addingthatmanytroopsrequiresrecruitingand

training

even

more

to

account

for

significant

casualty

ratesamongthecombatforces


Bottomline: TheANAcanaddaround30,000counterinsurgentsbyOctober2010,

foratotalof80,000butonlyifdecisionstoaccelerateANSFexpansionand

resourcesnecessary

for

it

are

made

and

committed

at

once


15/45

USForces

USForcesinAfghanistancurrentlynumberaround64,000

Ofthose,roughly34,000arecombatformationsassigned

tocounter

insurgency

roles;

the

rest

are

support

elements,

trainers,andclassifiedforces

USCOINformationsincluderoughly17maneuverbattalionsandasmanyas12combatsupportbattalionsre

missioned tofunction

as

counter

insurgents

TheUScontingentthereforecanputabout23,300soldiersonthegrounddoingcounterinsurgency

In

Iraq,

by

contrast,

the

15

US

brigades

before

the

surge

could

putaround72,000counterinsurgentsontheground;attheheightofthesurge,itwasmorelike105,000



16/45

ISAFForces

42countriesnowcontributemilitaryforcestotheNATOmissioninAfghanistan

11of

them

provide

battalion

sized

maneuver

formationsthatcanparticipateinCOINoperations:

Italy:3

Holland:1

Canada:2

France:2

Turkey1

Poland:1

Denmark:1

UK:6

Australia:1

Romania:1


Bottomline: roughly20deployablenonUSISAFbattalionscanprovidearound

16,000counterinsurgents


17/45

AvailableCounterInsurgents

US: 23,200

Non

US

ISAF:

16,000

AfghanNationalArmy: 50,000*

TOTAL:

89,200 ANAexpansioncanadd30,000moreby

October2010,bringingthetotalto119,200

*Onlyabout66%ofANAtroopsareinkandaks ratedasoperationallycapable(CM1orCM2)



18/45

Occupation?

InAfghanistan,oneandahalftimesaslargeasIraqwithatleastaslargeapopulation,thetotalnumberofinternational

forces

available

to

interact

with

the

populationnowisunder50,000

MostAfghansneverseeamemberofISAF

AfghanswhointeractwithISAFforcesaregenerallyfarmoreconcernedwithwhatthoseforcesaredoingandwhetherornottheyareprovidingsecuritythanwith

howmany

of

them

there

are

Theissueofforeignoccupationisapropagandatheme,notafinelycalibratedreality



19/45

PrioritizingEfforts MostdangerousinsurgencyisinRC(South)andintheGreaterPaktia areaofRC(East)

RC(South)

CriticalpopulationconcentrationsinHelmandRiverValleyfromGarmsir toSangin (~650k)

CriticalpopulationconcentrationsinKandahararoundKandaharCity(~1million)

Tarin Khowt (~95k)

Enemysupportzonesandsanctuariesinsurroundingareas(~780kpopulationwidely

dispersed) COINeffortshouldfocusonpopulationof~1,650,000concentratedinanareaofabout800

squaremilesinHelmandandabout450squaremilesinKandahar

Operationsinenemysanctuariesandsupportzoneswillalsoberequired,butatlesserforcedensities

RC(East)

Contestedpopulation

centers

in

Greater

Paktia (Khowst,

Paktia,

and

eastern

Paktika Provinces)

number~650koverabout3,500squaremiles,includingsomesupportzonesandsanctuaries

COINeffortsshouldfocusonKhowst Province,Paktia Province,andBermel DistrictofPaktikaProvince

ConcentrateeffortsinNangarhar andalongtheKonar RiverValley,butnotinnorthernKonar orNuristan

SustaineffortsinWardak,Lowgar,Kapisa,andParwan

AcceptsignificantriskinGhazni,andUruzgan outsideofTarin Khowt

MitigateriskinKonduz

HoldinParwan,Wardak,Lowgar,Kapisa,Laghman

AcceptriskinHerat

Acceptsignificant

risk

in

Farah

and

Nimruz,

Badghis,

and

Ghor


P i i A


20/45

PriorityAreas


i ib i f d


21/45

DistributionofANAandISAFForces


8USbattalions

6UKbattalions

1Danishbattalion

2Canadianbattalions

1Dutchbattalion

1Australianbattalion

1Romanianbattalion

23ANA

kandaks

4USbattalions

6ANAkandaks

2USbattalions

2Frenchbattalions

1Turkishbattalion

1Italian

battalions

1Polishbattalion

11ANAkandaks

2Italianbattalions

9ANAkandaks

1GermanQRFbattalion

9ANAkandaks

3USbattalions

19ANAkandaks

ISAFandANAforcesaregenerally

deployedinaccordwiththethreatand

theaterprioritiestherearenoexcess

forcesin

any

areas

to

be

moved

around


22/45

PopulationofContestedAreasinRC(South)byDistrict

Source: AfghanistanInformationManagementServices(www.aims.org.af),butseefinalslideformethodologicaldetail

9/21/2009 22FrederickW.Kaganand KimberlyKagan
http://www.aims.org.af/http://www.aims.org.af/


23/45

106Miles

ContestedDistrictsinRC(South)withTerrain



24/45

106Miles

HQHQ

HQ

CoalitionForcesinRC(South)

Eachsymbolrepresentsonebattalion(roughly800soldiers/Marines)


Populations of Contested Centers and Enemy Support Zones


25/45

106MilesContestedPopulationCenters

EnemySanctuaries

and

Support

Zones

1,014,900

173,370

95,400167,550

295,700

150,000

PopulationsofContestedCentersandEnemySupportZones

andSanctuaries

Source: AfghanistanInformationManagementServices(www.aims.org.af)



26/45

CoalitionandAfghanArmyDeploymentinHelmandProvince



27/45

CoalitionandANSFForcesinHelmand

4,000USMarines

3,200British

soldiers

in

combat

units

800 BritishtrainerswithAfghanunits

700 Danishsoldiers

1,800AfghanNationalArmysoldiers

TOTAL:10,500counterinsurgents

ForceRatioinHelmandRiverValley(SangintoGarmsir)

7Coalitionbattalions

3Afghanarmykandaks

TOTAL:

7,400troops

615,000population

Currentforcetopopulationratio: 1:83

Ratioof1:50wouldrequire12,300counterinsurgentsor

4,900additionalforces(roughly1.5additionalbrigades)



28/45

CoalitionandAfghanForcesinKandaharCityandEnvirons



29/45

KandaharCity

Urbanarea

with

around

750,000

people

ISAFdoesnotmaintainpermanentsecuritypresenceorregularpatrolsinKandaharCity

3Afghankandaks inthecityarenotpartneredwithISAFforces

Talibanis

present

in

the

city

and

influences

the

city

from

surrounding

districts,

but

theextentofitspresenceandinfluenceisnotknowable

SinceAfghansdonotgenerallyfightincities,itisnotclearwhetherornotISAFandtheANSFwillhavetoclearthecitywithatraditional1:50counterinsurgencyratioofforces

Someargue

that

sending

any

ISAF

forces

into

the

city

will

cause

it

to

explode

or,

at

least,deteriorate,butthereisnoclearevidenceorhistoricalpatterntocorroboratethisassertion

WhetherornotISAFsendsforcesintothecity,theANSFwillatsomepointhavetosecureitandmaintainitssecuritycounterinsurgentrequirementsinthe

province

therefore

must

take

account

of

this

requirement

as

well TheneedtoprovideISAFassistancetotheANSFinsecuringthecityissufficiently

likelythatsoundplanningrequiresensuringthatISAFhasadequateforcesatitsdisposalforthiseventuality,givingCOMISAFtheoptionsheneedstorespondtochangingcircumstances



30/45

CoalitionandANSFForcesinKandaharCityarea

1,600Canadiansoldiers

2,400Afghan

army

soldiers

800 USsoldiers

TOTAL: 4,800counterinsurgents

ForceRatioinKandaharCityArea

2Canadianbattalions

1US(Stryker)battalion

4Afghanarmykandaks


1,015,000population

Currentforceratio:1:211

1:50force

ratio

would

require

20,300

counter

insurgents

or

15,500additionaltroops(roughly4.5brigades)

AssumingNoCoalitionForcesDeployinKandaharCity

312,700population

2Canadianand1US(Stryker)brigade

1Afghanarmykandak


Currentforceratio: 1:104

1:50forceratiowouldrequire6,254counterinsurgentsor

3,254additional

troops

(roughly

1brigade)



31/45

CoalitionandANAForcesinKandaharProvince

3,200USsoldiers

1,600Canadiansoldiers

2,400Afghanarmysoldiers


1,151,100population

Currentforceratio: 1:160

1:50forceratiowouldrequire23,022counterinsurgentsor

15,822additional

forces

(roughly

4.5

brigades)

AssumingNoCoalitionForcesDeployinKandaharCity

450,800population

5,400counterinsurgents

Current

force

ratio:

1:831:50forceratiowouldrequire9,016counterinsurgentsor

3,616additionalforces(roughly1brigade)



32/45

ContestedAreasinGreaterPaktia



33/45

USandAfghanForcesinGreaterPaktia



34/45

Coalition

and

Afghan

Forces4,000USsoldiers

4,200Afghanarmysoldiers


650,000populationincontesteddistricts

Currentforceratio:1:79

1:50force

ratio

would

require

13,000

counterinsurgentsor

3,800additionalforces(roughly1brigade)


h


35/45

TheaterSynergies

Achieving

isolated

successes

in

Helmand,

Kandahar,

Oruzgan,

and

GreaterPaktia isnotenough Isolatedinkspotssurroundedbyenemycontrolledareasare

vulnerable

The

isolation

leaves

the

enemy

too

much

flexibility

to

respond

to

coalitionoperations,fadingawayinsomeareas,concentratinginothers

Theinkspotsmustmergeatsomepointtoachievesustainablesecurity

Withcurrent

forces,

including

planned

ANSF

expansion,

there

is

no

prospectofconnectingpocketsofsuccessinanyreasonabletimeframe

Properlyresourcingthecounterinsurgencyeffortnowwouldallow

subsequentphases

of

operations

to

connect

pockets

of

success

oncetheANSFhasdevelopedenoughtoholdareasthathavebeenclearedwithlessISAFassistance



36/45

BottomLine: AdditionalRequirements

Helmand: 1.5brigades

Kandahar: 14brigades(dependingonassumptions

aboutKandahar

City)

GreaterPaktia:1brigade

Total: 3.56.5brigades

NB:

TheDutch

battalion

in

Oruzgan will

not

be

replacedin2010andthetwoCanadianbattalionsinKandaharwillnotbereplacedin2011

Either

the

US

or

NATO

will

thus

have

to

find

an

additionalbrigadetooffsetthosedepartureswithinthenexttwoyears



37/45

OtherConsiderations

The

best

way

to

train

indigenous

forces

rapidly

is

to

partner

coalition

units

with

them

together

in

combat

ThenewISAFcommanderisrefocusinghiseffortsonsuchpartnership

DecidingnottosendISAFunitsintoKandaharcitymeansthatanyAfghanforcestherewillnothavecoalitionpartnership

TheabsenceofcoalitionforceslegallyabletoconductregularpatrollingintheNorth,andthelack

ofsufficient

forces

to

conduct

meaningful

patrolling

in

the

West,

means

that

Afghan

forces

in

those

areasarealsonotpartnered

ThemostrapidandeffectiveprogramfordevelopingtheANSF,therefore,wouldlikelyrequiretheabilitytosendUSforcestopartnerwithAfghantroopsinKandaharCity(thehigherendoftheestimateinthepreviousslide)ANDanadditionalUSbrigadetoprovidepartnerunitsforANAkandaks intheNorthandWest

Withthese

considerations,

the

total

additional

requirement

would

be

roughly

7.5

brigades26,500

troopswithinthebrigadesthemselves;37,500overallincludingnecessaryenablers

Thetheater,moreover,iscurrentlyverysparseandrequiresadditional Routeclearanceteams

Intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceassetsandanalysts

Engineeringunits(tohelpbuildandmaintainbasesforexpandingISAFandANSFforces)

Aviationsupport

(particularly

helicopters,

which

are

at

apremium

in

Afghanistans

terrain)

The4th Brigadeofthe82nd AirborneDivisionwillbedeployinglaterthisyear,butithasthemissionoftrainingAfghantroopsanddoesnot,therefore,fillanyoftherequirementsidentifiedabove

Theoverallforcerequirement,thereforeislikelyinthe40,00045,000range


C f U d R i


38/45

ConsequencesofUnderResourcing ISAFforcesarenotadequatetotherequirementsinanypartofthecountry

SmallscaleredeploymentsinRC(East)willaddresssomelocal,tacticalissues,butcannotmakeup

forthe

operational

level

shortfalls

in

the

area

as

awhole

TherearenoforcestoberedeployedinRC(South)allarefullycommittedintasksthatcannotbeabandoned

WithoutadditionalforcesinRC(South),therefore,commanderswillfacethefollowingoptions: ContinueanindecisivefightinHelmandwhilecedingKandahartotheenemy

AbandonthefightinHelmand,acceptingamajorpropagandadefeatandhumiliatingtheBritish,cedethearea

to

the

enemy

and

allow

the

Taliban

to

extract

vengeance

on

all

those

who

co

operated

with

us,

and

attempttoretakeKandahar

ReduceforcesinHelmand,possiblytippingwhatisnowapproachingastalemateintoaslowlosescenario,andattempttoretakeKandaharwithforcesthatarenotadequatetothemission

Inallcases,commanderswilllikelybeforcedtocontinuetoshiftISAFtroopsaroundinresponsetogrowingemergencies,vitiatinganymeaningfulCOINapproach

Current

force

levels

do

not

permit

coalition

troops

to

partner

with

Afghan

forces

outside

of

HelmandandGreaterPaktia,afactorthatwillsignificantlydelaythegrowthinqualityoftheANSF

ConsideringthatANSFtroopsDONOTROTATEaroundthecountry,thismeansthatANSFforcesinNorthandWest,inKandaharCity,andinotherpartsofRC(South)arenotandwillnotbepartneredwithISAFforces

BecauseANSFforcesdonotrotate,ANAunitsinRC(South)arebeinggroundupdisproportionately.

Itis

not

at

all

clear

that

they

will

survive

even

the

current

level

of

strain.

Increasing

the

strain

by

requiringthemtoundertaketheclearingandholdingoflargeareasofenemyheldgroundwithoutUSreinforcementscouldwellbreakthem.

Asthecommanderofthe205th CorpsbasedinKandaharasked,Areyoutryingtobuildanenduring[Afghan]Armyoranexpendableone?

Bottomline: Failingtosendreinforcementsforcesourcommanderstoask,Whatpartsofthe

countrywould

you

like

us

to

cede

to

the

enemy?

How

can

we

cede

areas

to

the

enemy

and

still

achievethepresidentsobjectivesofpreventingthereestablishmentofterroristsanctuaries?


Counter Terrorism?


39/45

CounterTerrorism?

TherangeofanarmedPredatorUAVislessthan500milesreachingtheareas

usedin

the

1990s

as

training

camps

for

al

Qaeda

requires

bases

in

either

AfghanistanorPakistan

SpecialForcesteamscanlaunchfromfurtheraway,butrequiretheavailabilityofCombatSearchandRescuecapabilitieswhich,again,requirebasesineitherAfghanistanorPakistan

Theonly

option

for

pure

CT

operations

that

does

not

require

local

bases

is

long

rangeprecisionguidedmunitionsfiredeitherfrommannedaircraftorfromshipsorsubmarines ButPGMscanonlyhitthetargetstheyareaimedat;theycannotgatheradditionalintelligence

onthegroundorreacttochangingcircumstancesasSFteamscan,norcantheyhangaroundtoreviewtheeffectsoftheirinitialstrikeandthenretarget,asUAVscan

Thelikelihood

of

seriously

disrupting

any

network

using

only

long

range

PGMs

is

extremely

low

CToperationssuchasthesearebyfarthemostdamagingindividualundertakingsfortheperceptionofAmericaintheregiontheyhavebeentheprincipalcauseoftheciviliancasualtiesthathavesodamagedAmericasimageinAfghanistan,and

theyhave

been

the

source

of

continual

outrage

by

Pakistanis

over

the

American

violationofPakistanisovereignty

ThisstrategywouldconfineAmericanmilitaryinvolvementinthisregionsolelytosuchoperations



40/45

CT: Intelligence? AdoptinganoverthehorizonCTapproachmeansdependingentirelyonSignals

Intelligence(SIGINT)

and

CIA

networks

to

locate

targets

EnemyleadershipisverySIGINTsavvyandveryhardtotargetusingonlysuchinformation

CIAnetworks,evensupplementedbyISIreportinginPakistanandlocalreportingthroughUSandalliedforcesinAfghanistan,arenotabletoprovidetargetable

intelligenceon

key

enemy

leaders

even

now

IttookmonthstogainactionableintelligenceonBeitullah Mehsud evenwiththousandsofPakistanitroopsmillingaroundhisbasesandanenormousbountyonhishead

InsurgentleadersmoveintoandthroughAfghanistanevennowdespiteISAFeffortstotargetthem

ExtremelyaggressiveeffortsbyUSandIraqiforceswithnearlycompletefreedomof

movementhave

failed

to

provide

actionable

intelligence

to

target

Abu

Ayyub al

Masri,

leader

ofalQaedainIraqsincemid2006

Thefartherthestrikeasset(SFteam,UAV,ormissile)isbased,theGREATERtheintelligencerequirement: Ifthestrikeassetislocatednearthetarget,thentheintelligencerequirementistoknow

wherethetargetwillbeinanhourortwo

Ifthe

strike

asset

is

located

over

the

horizon,

the

intelligence

requirement

is

to

know

where

thetargetwillbein12,16,or24hours

Thedifferenceisenormouswhendealingwithprofessionalterroristswhoknowthedangersofstayinginoneplacetoolongormovingaccordingtoanydetectiblepattern

Thefewerintelligencegatheringassetsoperatingnearthetarget,finally,theless

likelythey

are

to

obtain

actionable

intelligence

of

any

variety



41/45

CTBasesinPakistan?

Earlierthisyear,mediareportsindicatedthatAmericanUAVswereflyingfromaPakistaniairbasenearQuetta

The

revelation

caused

great

embarrassment

and

diplomatic

concernandreportedlyalsocausedtheUStoestablishanewUAVbaseatJalalabad,Afghanistan,incasethePakistanisbannedfutureoperationsfromtheirbase

ConsideringthesensitivityofthePakistanigovernmentandmilitaryto

the

issues

of

Pakistani

sovereignty,

and

the

problems

associated

withPakistansappearanceofsupportinganAmericanwaragainstitsownpeople,relyingontheuseofPakistanibasestoconductCToperationsinPakistanorinAfghanistanappearshighlydubious

Ataminimum,

any

such

strategy

would

be

entirely

dependent

on

thecontinuationinIslamabadofagovernmentwillingtopursuethecurrentpoliciesaneventualitythatseemshighlyquestionablegiventhevolatilityofPakistanipolitics,particularlyonthisissue



42/45

CTBasesinAfghanistan? Scenario: TheUSwithdrawscombatforcesfromAfghanistan,includingtrainersfor

theANSF

(which

cannot

be

sustained

without

the

presence

of

combat

forces);

NATOalsowithdraws(inevitablyfollowingaUSwithdrawal);violenceincreasesastheANSFisunabletofillthevoid;theAfghanGovernmentlosescontroloverlargeareasofthecountry,andKabulcomesunderattack.

Question: WhyonearthwouldanyAfghanleadersupportcontinuedAmerican

militaryoperations

in

his

country

aimed

only

at

the

enemies

who

threaten

him

the

least?

Question: WhatwouldberequiredtoprotectUSforcesbasedinAfghanistantoconductCTmissions?

Question: Howwouldtheybesupplied?

Question:

Howwould

the

US

prevent

the

enemy

from

attacking

lines

of

communicationastheydidwiththeSoviets? Wecouldcertainlynotrelyonanyoverlandtransport

Relyingonairresupplyispossible,BUTthemujahideen hadlongexperienceinrocketingandmortaringrunwayswhentheSovietsdidnotcontrolthesurroundinghighground

Allof

the

airbases

we

could

use

for

such

operations

are

vulnerable

to

such

attacks

Wouldwethenhavetocontrolthesurroundingareas? Withwhat?

Thelargertheforcerequiredtoprotectthestrikeforce,thegreaterthelogisticalrequirementsandthemorevulnerablethelinesofcommunicationbecometoevenbriefinterruptions



43/45

LegalFrameworkforAfghanCTBases

Presenceof

international

forces

now

is

based

on

the

requestoftheAfghanGovernmentforsupportinimplementingtoAfghanCompact

Adoptingapure

CT

approach

implies

abrogating

the

US

commitmenttothatcompact,andthereforethebasisforthepresenceandactivitiesofUSforcesinthesovereignstateofAfghanistan

TheUS

would

have

to

renegotiate

aStatus

of

Forces

AgreementwiththeAfghangovernmenttocontinueCToperationsfollowingsuchawithdrawal

Whatwould

the

Afghans

demand

in

return

for

such

an

agreement? Whatrestrictionswouldtheyimpose?Howlongwouldthenegotiationstake? Whatwouldwedointheinterim?



44/45

AfghanPopulation

ThereisnoreliabledataonthesizeordistributionoftheAfghanpopulationbecausetherehasbeennocensusinAfghanistansince1979

ThemostdetailedandsoberpresentationisbytheAfghanInformationManagement

Services

(www.aims.org.af),

which

is

the

source

of

the

populationdatausedinthispresentation

ThedistrictpopulationfiguresgivenbyAIMS,however,totalroughly20million,whereasthegenerallyacceptedfigureforAfghanistans

population

is

around

32

million

(although

the

CIA

World

Factbook notes

thatthisfigureisbeingreviseddownwardandmaybemorelike27.5million)

EstimatesinthisproductthereforeuseAIMSnumbersmultipliedby1.5

AnadditionalcaveatisthatAfghanistanspopulationisveryyoung

roughlyhalf

the

population

is

under

15

years

of

age

according

to

the

CIA

WorldFactbook

Itisthuspossiblethatcurrentestimatesstillunderstatetheactualsizeofthepopulation

http://www.aims.org.af/http://www.aims.org.af/http://www.aims.org.af/http://www.aims.org.af/http://www.aims.org.af/


45/45

ContactInformation

FrederickW.Kagan

Director,CriticalThreatsProject,AmericanEnterpriseInstitute

[email protected]

(202)8625925

orcontact

MasehZarif

([email protected])

(202)8625929

KimberlyKagan

President,InstitutefortheStudyofWar

[email protected]

(202)2935550

orcontact

DavidPhillips

([email protected])

(202)2935550
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]

afghanistan plan - kagan

Documents