Multilateral regimes under Multilateral regimes under pressure from advances in pressure from advances in science and technology: science and technology: The examples of the CWC The examples of the CWC and the BWCand the BWC

Ralf TrappRalf TrappDisarmament ConsultantDisarmament ConsultantChessenaz (France)Chessenaz (France)

OverviewOverview

Why should we worry?Why should we worry?GPC versus control listsGPC versus control listsWhat to do about the GPCWhat to do about the GPCHow?How?

Why should we worry?Why should we worry?

“The pace of scientific and technological developments is now so rapid that the implications of new scientific and technological developments need to be reviewed more frequently than allowed by the five year cycle of BTWC Review Conferences.”(RS-IAP-ICSU international workshop on science and technology developments relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, London, September 2006)

ExamplesExamples

BWC:– Synthetic biology– Postgenomic technologies– Immunological research– Drug discovery and delivery– Agricultural and environmental biotechnology– Diagnosis and surveillance of infectious diseases

CWC:– Most of the above, and as one consequence:– Non-lethal agents for law enforcement purposes– Combinatorial synthesis and screening– Changing production technologies

What it might lead to:What it might lead to:

Artificial creation of new or modified organisms with Artificial creation of new or modified organisms with ““BW profileBW profile””Vastly increased capacity to synthesis and screen Vastly increased capacity to synthesis and screen new chemical compounds might lead to new new chemical compounds might lead to new candidate CW agentscandidate CW agentsEnhanced capabilities to identify potential drug Enhanced capabilities to identify potential drug targets might have the same resulttargets might have the same resultExploitation of ethnic polymorphisms for weapons Exploitation of ethnic polymorphisms for weapons purposes (purposes (““ethic weaponsethic weapons””))Agents that may evade detection, defeat treatment Agents that may evade detection, defeat treatment or resist decontaminationor resist decontamination

But:But:

Move from discovery of new agents to Move from discovery of new agents to weaponisation involves a series of weaponisation involves a series of steps (such as testing, formulation, steps (such as testing, formulation, production, stability in storage, production, stability in storage, effective dissemination, detection/ effective dissemination, detection/ protection/decon)protection/decon)These take time and effort (in fact: These take time and effort (in fact: they take an active programme)they take an active programme)

CWC: SAB to RCCWC: SAB to RC--11

““ …… while the time required for the early stages of while the time required for the early stages of agent development may have shrunk considerably agent development may have shrunk considerably as a result of these developments, the subsequent as a result of these developments, the subsequent stages in the development of such a new toxic stages in the development of such a new toxic chemical into an effective CW (in the traditional chemical into an effective CW (in the traditional meaning of the term, meaning of the term, ……) are much less affected by ) are much less affected by these developments in science and technologythese developments in science and technology

…… Notwithstanding these scientific developments and Notwithstanding these scientific developments and the SABthe SAB’’s conclusion that they do not significantly s conclusion that they do not significantly change the situation with respect to CW, it must change the situation with respect to CW, it must also be noted that experience has shown that there also be noted that experience has shown that there is a possibility that less sophisticated CW may be is a possibility that less sophisticated CW may be opted for, with little regard to agent stability and opted for, with little regard to agent stability and shelf life (i.e. weapons filled for immediate use).shelf life (i.e. weapons filled for immediate use).””

What has changedWhat has changed

Security environment, and consequentlySecurity environment, and consequentlyNotion of Notion of ““militarily significant quantitiesmilitarily significant quantities””If one includes terrorism into the threat If one includes terrorism into the threat assessment, many of the steps required in assessment, many of the steps required in military programs may not be relevant; in military programs may not be relevant; in any case, the required quantities will be far any case, the required quantities will be far smaller (TICs: tens of tonnes; classical and smaller (TICs: tens of tonnes; classical and ““makemake--shiftshift”” agents: kilograms; toxins: agents: kilograms; toxins: grams; organisms: ???)grams; organisms: ???)

Again: why should we Again: why should we worry?worry?The tremendous advances in biology, The tremendous advances in biology,

biotechnology, genomics, proteomics, synthetic biotechnology, genomics, proteomics, synthetic biology and bioinformatics in recent years are biology and bioinformatics in recent years are almost certain to lead to improved health and almost certain to lead to improved health and well being well being ……. Unfortunately, the possibility that . Unfortunately, the possibility that such advances will be deliberately misused to such advances will be deliberately misused to do harm on an unprecedented scale cannot be do harm on an unprecedented scale cannot be ignored, nor can the chance of a major ignored, nor can the chance of a major outbreak due to a laboratory accident. In short, outbreak due to a laboratory accident. In short, the knowledge and technologies that result the knowledge and technologies that result from life science research can be used for good from life science research can be used for good or harm, accidentally or intentionally.or harm, accidentally or intentionally.

(Draft (Draft Summary report from the WHO scientific working group meeting on Summary report from the WHO scientific working group meeting on life science life science research and global health security, Geneva October 2006)research and global health security, Geneva October 2006)

Risk assessmentRisk assessment

Natural outbreaks of diseases (old and Natural outbreaks of diseases (old and ““newnew””), other natural incidents (poisoning ), other natural incidents (poisoning ––e.g. red tides)e.g. red tides)Accidents (spills, laboratory releases, Accidents (spills, laboratory releases, releases caused by fire, transportation releases caused by fire, transportation incidents, incidents, ……))Intentional releases (or preparations Intentional releases (or preparations thereof)thereof)–– StatesStates–– NonNon--state actorsstate actors

A First ConclusionA First Conclusion

States Parties need to assess the impact of States Parties need to assess the impact of advances in science and technology from advances in science and technology from the perspective of the treatythe perspective of the treaty’’s scope and s scope and mandate (mandate (““object and purposeobject and purpose””))

ButButThey need to develop responses within a They need to develop responses within a wider context, as part of a broad and wider context, as part of a broad and balanced risk management strategy, if they balanced risk management strategy, if they are to attract the support of all States are to attract the support of all States PartiesParties

GPC versus control listsGPC versus control lists

Control lists can be implemented in a straightControl lists can be implemented in a straight--forward manner (list plus regulations, quantitative forward manner (list plus regulations, quantitative thresholds, permits, licensing etc.)thresholds, permits, licensing etc.)Lists provide transparency through regulatory Lists provide transparency through regulatory processes, identify (some) potential processes, identify (some) potential facilities/activities of concern, help prevent (some) facilities/activities of concern, help prevent (some) abuseabuseBut: lists are no good in dealing with new But: lists are no good in dealing with new discoveriesdiscoveriesGPC is the answer, but it requires an GPC is the answer, but it requires an evaluation evaluation processprocess (what and how much is justified for (what and how much is justified for purposes not prohibited, what is not?) as well as purposes not prohibited, what is not?) as well as adoption of the GPC in adoption of the GPC in national legislationnational legislation

Implementing the General Implementing the General Purpose Criterion is key to Purpose Criterion is key to dealing with advances in Science dealing with advances in Science and Technologyand Technology

But how does one implement a But how does one implement a criterioncriterion……..

A Second Conclusion

GPC in the BCWGPC in the BCW

Each State Party to this Convention Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire:acquire:(a) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins (a) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins

whatever their origin or method of production, whatever their origin or method of production, of of types and in quantities that have no justificationtypes and in quantities that have no justificationfor prophylactic, protective or other peaceful for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;purposes;

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit take any necessary measures to prohibit and preventand prevent ……

GPC in the CWCGPC in the CWC

Chemical weapons means the following, Chemical weapons means the following, together or separately:together or separately:(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except

when intended for purposes not prohibited when intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, under this Convention, as long as types and as long as types and quantities are consistent with such purposesquantities are consistent with such purposes

Each State Party shall Each State Party shall adopt the necessary adopt the necessary measures to ensuremeasures to ensure that toxic chemicals and that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred or used transferred or used …… for purposes not for purposes not prohibited under this Conventionprohibited under this Convention

What to do about the What to do about the GPC?GPC?

Apprehensions leading to the desire Apprehensions leading to the desire for reaffirmations that the treaty for reaffirmations that the treaty covers all new developments?covers all new developments?Desire to be specific as well as Desire to be specific as well as comprehensive with these comprehensive with these reaffirmations?reaffirmations?More frequent reviews of science and More frequent reviews of science and technology?technology?

BWC Review Conference BWC Review Conference 2006:2006:… declares that the Convention is comprehensive in

its scope and that all naturally or artificially created or altered microbial and other biological agents and toxins, as well as their components, regardless of their origin and method of production and whether they affect humans, animals or plants, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, are unequivocally covered by Article I.

… reaffirms that Article I applies to all scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to the Convention.

CWC Review Conference CWC Review Conference 2003:2003:…… The definitions contained in Article II The definitions contained in Article II ……

were were found to adequately cover these found to adequately cover these developmentsdevelopments and to provide for the and to provide for the application of the Conventionapplication of the Convention’’s prohibitions s prohibitions to any toxic chemical, except where to any toxic chemical, except where ……intended for purposes not prohibited intended for purposes not prohibited …… . .

…… noted, however, that science is rapidly noted, however, that science is rapidly advancing. advancing. New chemicals may have to be New chemicals may have to be assessedassessed in relation to their relevance to in relation to their relevance to the Schedules of Chemicalsthe Schedules of Chemicals ……. .

…… requested the Council to consider the requested the Council to consider the developmentsdevelopments in relation to additional in relation to additional chemicals that may be relevant to the chemicals that may be relevant to the Convention, and assess, Convention, and assess, inter aliainter alia, whether , whether these compounds should be considered these compounds should be considered in in the context of the Schedules of Chemicalsthe context of the Schedules of Chemicals..

A Third ConclusionA Third Conclusion

Applying the GPC is essentially a process of Applying the GPC is essentially a process of risk assessment / consistency evaluationrisk assessment / consistency evaluationIt works at the scientific/technical as well as It works at the scientific/technical as well as policy levelspolicy levelsIt requires dialogue between these two It requires dialogue between these two worldsworldsIt requires dialogue between the States It requires dialogue between the States PartiesPartiesIt requires national implementationIt requires national implementation……

What should be done?What should be done?

Awareness raising at the Awareness raising at the StateState level of implications level of implications of S&T advancesof S&T advancesAwareness raising within the Awareness raising within the scientific communityscientific communityof legal restrictions applicable to CBWof legal restrictions applicable to CBWStrengthening of Strengthening of legal barrierslegal barriers against CB weapons against CB weapons -- implementation of the GPC plus universalityimplementation of the GPC plus universalityDevelopment of a Development of a culture of compliance culture of compliance ––governance and ethical normsgovernance and ethical norms…… and what about and what about verificationverification??

Final ConclusionFinal Conclusion

To manage the impact of science and To manage the impact of science and technology on treaty regimes, the scientific technology on treaty regimes, the scientific community needs to understand and community needs to understand and support the treaty objectives, and the States support the treaty objectives, and the States Parties need to understand the potential Parties need to understand the potential impact of new discoveries on the regimesimpact of new discoveries on the regimesThe GPC is central to dealing with new The GPC is central to dealing with new scientific discoveries and knowledge, but it scientific discoveries and knowledge, but it is not necessarily is not necessarily ““selfself--enforcingenforcing”” –– there is there is a need for ongoing dialogue and improved a need for ongoing dialogue and improved implementationimplementation

Thank you!Thank you!

Comments are welcome!Comments are welcome!