advanced corporate finance fina 7330 ronald f. singer agency problems and control lecture 4 fall,...

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Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

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Page 1: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Advanced Corporate FinanceFINA 7330

Ronald F. Singer

Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4Fall, 2010

Page 2: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Agency Problem

• The Principal-Agent Relationship Typically in a Corporation, there are what is called agents and

principals:The Agent is the “person that acts,” whereas the Principal

is the person that receives the benefits from the actions.

Typical Principal/Agent relationships:

• The Agency Problem tries to solve the natural conflict of interest that arises as a result of this principal agent problem

Page 3: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Conflicts of Interest

• Reduced effort on the part of the agent• Excessive perks consumption • Empire building• Entrenchment• Risk avoidance

Page 4: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Agency Problem

• How do you resolve these conflicts?– Monitoring • Stockholders • Bondholders • Board of Directors • Financial Press• SEC and other government regulators • Outside auditors

– Issues opinion regarding whether reports are consistent with generally accepted accounting standards

– Qualified or unqualified opinion

Page 5: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Agency Problem

– Incentives • Provide a compensation package to managers

that try to induce them to act in stockholders’ interest• Can’t determine this directly –Difficult to separate effort from luck

• Usually this is performance (or value) based incentives –Stock options

Page 6: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Agency Problem

• Problems with value based compensation – Difficult to distinguish between effort and

competence, versus luck – Could be subject to manipulation • Enron, Fannie Mae, • Stock options backdating scandal

– Compensation determined by Board• Sarbanes Oxley: SOX: Compensation Committee must

be independent directors

Page 7: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Agency Problem

• The Basic problem is how do you measure performance, and how do you get information that is unbiased?

• You get what you measure

Page 8: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Incentive Issues

• Monitoring - Reviewing the actions of managers and providing incentives to maximize shareholder value.

• Free Rider Problem - When owners rely on the efforts of others to monitor the company.

• Management Compensation - How to pay managers so as to reduce the cost and need for monitoring and to maximize shareholder value.

Page 9: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Residual Income & EVA

• Emphasizes NPV concepts in performance evaluation over accounting standards.

• Looks more to long term than short term decisions.

• More closely tracks shareholder value than accounting measurements.

Page 10: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Performance Evaluation

• How do you know if management is doing a good job or not:

• What you measure is what you get • Must consider tradeoffs of high early return

versus growth• You want to capture the economic value of

investment not book values

Page 11: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Message of EVA+ Advantages

Managers are motivated to only invest in projects that earn more than they cost.

EVA makes cost of capital visible to managers.Leads to a reduction in assets employed. Present Value of EVA measures NPV and thus

consistent rewarding via EVA leads to good decisions

- Disavantages EVA does not directly measure present valueRewards quick paybacks and ignores time value of

money

Page 12: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

What is Economic Value Added (EVA)

EVA = Residual Income = Income earned – Income required

= Income earned – Cost of Capital X Capital InvestedNote: Earned income can be written as:

ROI X Book Value of Capital Income required can be written as:

CoC X Book Value of Capital

SO: = (ROI – CoC) X BV of Capital (see spreadsheet)

Page 13: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

EVA of US firms - 2003

Econimic Value Added (EVA)

Capital Invested

Return on Capital

Cost of Capital

NPV of Cash Flow

Wal-Mart Stores 4,525 79,177 12.30% 6.60% 68,380Johnson & Johnson 4,459 51,508 17.6 8.9 50,351Microsoft 4,027 24,677 29.8 13.5 29,795Merck 3,347 40,941 16.9 8.7 38,588Coca Cola 2,729 20,503 20.1 6.7 41,006Intel Corp. (57) 31,216 15.6 15.8 (395)Dow Chemical (1,503) 44,158 3.6 7 (21,448)Boeing (1,974) 50,046 2.2 6.1 (31,997)Delta Airlines (2,288) 27,238 -0.9 7.5 (30,507)Viacom (5,508) 96,515 3.5 9.2 (59,797)IBM (7,505) 108,926 4.6 11.5 (65,356)

Correlation 0.97 0.51

($ in millions)

Page 14: Advanced Corporate Finance FINA 7330 Ronald F. Singer Agency Problems and Control Lecture 4 Fall, 2010

Summary of Performance Valuation

• Use EVA Measure• Use Economic Depreciation • Estimate Cash Flows• Estimate Economic Depreciation from above• Find EVA using existing Economic Depreciation

estimates • Then value performance on that basis