RATIONALITYAND THESTRUCTURE OF THE SELF Volume II: A Kantian Conception Adrian M. S. Piper APRA Foundation Berlin Germany 2013 2nd Edition Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without prior written permission from the publisher. First published 2008 2nd Edition 2013 ISBN #978-3-9813763-3-3 Cover by Adrian Piper Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception I require of a critique of pure practical reason that when it iscompleted,wemustbeabletoshowitsunitywiththe speculativeinacommonprinciple,becauseintheend there can be only one and the same reason, which must be differentiated solely in its application. (G, Ak.391) To the Memory of Philip Zohn RATIONALITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELF Contents of Volume II: A Kantian Conception Summary Contents Preface to the Second Edition................................................................................. xiii Acknowledgements to Volume II............................................................................xx Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of SocraticMetaethics.......................................................................................................................1 PART ONE: IDEALS ..................................................................................................48 Chapter II. Reason in the Structure of the Self......................................................52 Chapter III. The Concept of a Genuine Preference ............................................106 Chapter IV. McClennen on Resolute Choice.......................................................164 Chapter V. How Reason Causes Action...............................................................188 Chapter VI. Moral Interiority .................................................................................240 PART TWO: REALITIES .........................................................................................287 Chapter VII. Pseudorationality ..............................................................................289 Chapter VIII. First-Person Anomaly.....................................................................317 Chapter IX. Ought.................................................................................................354 Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness...........................................................381 Chapter XI. Xenophobia and Moral Anomaly....................................................415 Bibliography...............................................................................................................471 Anonymous praise from the referees of Cambridge and Oxford UniversityPresses for Rationality and the Structure of the Self,Volume I: The Humean Conception..........................................................................505 Tables of Contentsvi Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin RATIONALITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELF Contents of Volume II: A Kantian Conception Detailed Contents Frontispiece .................................................................................................................. iii Dedication..................................................................................................................... iv Tables of Contents.........................................................................................................v List of Figures ............................................................................................................. xii Preface to the Second Edition................................................................................. xiii Acknowledgements to Volume II............................................................................xx Abbreviated Citations to Kants Works ............................................................ xxvii Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics......................................................................................................................1 1. Transpersonal Rationality and Power .........................................................3 2. Transpersonal Rationality as Philosophical Virtue..................................6 3. Philosophical Rationality: Transpersonal or Egocentric?.....................10 4. Philosophy, Power, and Historical Circumstance ..................................17 5. Philosophy as Exemplar of Transpersonal Rationality.........................24 6. The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics.......................................................26 7. Rationality and the Structure of the Self ...................................................32 7.1. Two Conceptions of the Self............................................................32 7.2. Volume I: The Humean Conception..............................................35 7.2.1. The Two Models.....................................................................35 7.2.2. Three Metaethical Problems .................................................36 7.2.3. Hume Himself.........................................................................39 7.3. Volume II: A Kantian Conception..................................................39 7.3.1. A First Critique Analysis of Transpersonal Rationality..41 7.3.2. A First Critique Analysis of Pseudorationality.................42 7.3.3. Some Advantages and Limitations of the Kantian Alternative..........................................................................................43 PART ONE: IDEALS ..................................................................................................48 Chapter II. Reason in the Structure of the Self......................................................52 1. Is Kant an Inferentialist?. ..............................................................................54 1.1. Brandoms Inferentialism..................................................................55 Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conceptionvii Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 1.2. Brandoms Kant ...................................................................................60 1.3. My Kant.................................................................................................62 2. Nonsentential Intentional Objects...............................................................68 2.1. Intentionality and Sententiality........................................................68 2.2. The Psychological Primacy of Nonsentential IntentionalObjects...........................................................................................................72 2.3. Intentionality and Subsentential Consistency...............................76 3. Rational Intelligibility and the Holistic Regress ......................................79 4. Horizontal and Vertical Consistency .........................................................84 4.1. Horizontal Consistency......................................................................84 4.2. Vertical Consistency ...........................................................................85 4.3. Kant on Horizontal and Vertical Consistency ..............................88 4.4. The Interdependence of Horizontal and Vertical Consistency .90 5. Intentionality, Consistency and Rational Intelligibility .........................93 6. The Self-Consciousness Property................................................................96 7. Intelligibility and Transpersonal Integrity..............................................100 Chapter III. The Concept of a Genuine Preference ............................................106 1. A Problem about Cyclical Inconsistency.................................................108 2. Savages Concept of a Simple Ordering Reconsidered........................115 3. Notational Desiderata for Preference Alternatives ...............................120 4. Some Further Limitations of Standard QuantificationalNotation ..............................................................................................................122 5. A Variable Term Calculus: Subsentential Applications.......................125 6. Indifference, Indecision, and Equivalence ..............................................133 6.1. Kaplan on Rational Indecision .......................................................133 6.1.1. Preference and Indifference.................................................133 6.1.2. Indecision and Decisional Incapacity................................135 6.2. Indifference and Equivalence in the Jeffrey-BolkerRepresentation Theorem.........................................................................139 6.2.1. Occasional Truth Tables for SubsententialConstituents ......................................................................................140 6.2.2. Is Indifference an Equivalence Relation?..........................142 7. Criteria for a Genuine Preference..............................................................148 8. The Variable Term Calculus: Subsentential Predication......................151 9. De Jongh and Lius Constraint-Based Analysis of Strict Preference .154 10. The Intensionality of Genuine Preference.............................................157 11. The Consistency of Savages Simple Ordering (T3).............................161 Chapter IV. McClennen on Resolute Choice.......................................................164 1. McClennens Project ....................................................................................165 2. Myopic Choice...............................................................................................166 3. Precommitment and Sophisticated Choice .............................................168 Tables of Contentsviii Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 4. Resolute Choice.............................................................................................171 5. Resolute Choice and Genuine Preference ...............................................174 6. Two Psychologies of Choice.......................................................................177 7. Nomologicality and Kants Derivation of Promise-Keeping ..............180 8. Free Riding and Moral Emotion................................................................183 Chapter V. How Reason Causes Action...............................................................188 1. Rational Action..............................................................................................190 2. Literal Self-Preservation..............................................................................190 2.1. Motivational Efficacy .......................................................................191 2.2. A Good But Not an End or a Desire..............................................192 2.3. Pain and Physical Self-Preservation..............................................195 3. Baron on Secondary Motives .....................................................................196 4. Rationality as a Sufficient Condition of Action......................................201 4.1. How Thoughts Cause Action .........................................................201 4.2. Baron on Primary Motives ..............................................................203 4.3. Minimally Precipitating Thoughts ................................................209 4.4. Will .......................................................................................................210 4.4.1. Motivationally Ineffective Intellect ....................................211 4.4.2. Opportunistically Effective Intellect..................................211 4.4.3. Motivationally Effective Intellect .......................................213 4.5. Fully Effective Intellect and Implicit Self-Recognition .............214 5. An Instantiation: Kants Moral Theory....................................................218 5.1. Descriptive..........................................................................................218 5.2. Explanatory ........................................................................................221 6. Two Ideals of Rational Motivation ...........................................................228 6.1. Egocentric Rationality and the Ideal of Spontaneity.................228 6.2. Transpersonal Rationality and the Ideal of Interiority .............233 Chapter VI. Moral Interiority .................................................................................240 1. Impartiality ....................................................................................................241 2. Modal Imagination.......................................................................................244 3. Self-Absorption and Vicarious Possession..............................................248 4. Compassion ...................................................................................................253 4.1. Empathy..............................................................................................253 4.2. Sympathy and Empathy..................................................................256 4.3. Symmetry............................................................................................257 5. Blums Argument Against Impartiality...................................................263 6. Strict Impartiality..........................................................................................267 7. Moral Motivation and Moral Alienation Revisited...............................274 7.1. Motive versus Purpose ....................................................................274 7.2. Motives and Respect for Principle.................................................277 7.3. Moral Integrity...................................................................................280 Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conceptionix Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 8. Explaining the Whistle-Blower..................................................................282 PART TWO: REALITIES .........................................................................................287 Chapter VII. Pseudorationality ..............................................................................289 1. Three Pseudorational Mechanisms...........................................................291 2. Conceptual vs. Theoretical Anomaly.......................................................292 3. Test Case #1: Encounter on West Broadway..........................................296 4. Denial and Theoretical Investment...........................................................300 4.1. The Naf...............................................................................................300 4.2. The Ideologue ....................................................................................303 4.3. The True Skeptic................................................................................304 4.4. The Dogmatist....................................................................................305 5. Denial as Biased Nonrecognition..............................................................306 6. Dissociation as Biased Negation ...............................................................308 7. Rationalization as Biased Predication......................................................312 8. Pseudorationality in Application..............................................................314 Chapter VIII. First-Person Anomaly.....................................................................317 1. Self-Deception ...............................................................................................319 1.1. Selfless Dogmatism vs. Self-Deception.........................................320 1.2. The Standard Analysis of Self-Deception ....................................322 1.3. Test Case #2: The Margin .................................................................323 1.4. Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge .............................................326 2. Affective and Conative Anomaly..............................................................328 2.1. Affective Anomaly............................................................................328 2.2. Conative Anomaly............................................................................329 2.3. Behavioral Anomaly and Moral Paralysis...................................331 3. Third-Person Moral Anomaly and an Origin of Evil............................332 4. Kant (and Others) on First-Person Moral Anomaly..............................335 4.1. Kant on Rationalization...................................................................335 4.2. Kant on Dissociation.........................................................................338 4.3. Aristotle, Kant and Nietzsche on Denial......................................339 5. The Self as Unrecognized Particular ........................................................344 6. More on Moral Integrity..............................................................................347 7. Why I Ought Not Spend My Evenings Howling at the Moon ...........350 Chapter IX. Ought.................................................................................................354 1. The Authority of Fact...................................................................................355 2. Commands.....................................................................................................357 3. The Authority of Consensus and of Reward..........................................360 4. The Loss of Innocence..................................................................................362 Tables of Contentsx Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 5. Imperatives ....................................................................................................367 6. Some Counterexamples Resolved.............................................................370 6.1. Incompatibilities................................................................................371 6.2. Incorrigibilities...................................................................................371 6.3. Inconsistencies ...................................................................................373 7. Innocence, Naivet and Corruption .........................................................373 8. Justifying the Whistleblower......................................................................376 Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness...........................................................381 1. Theoretical Inclusiveness ............................................................................383 1.1. Postows Objection............................................................................383 1.2. Inclusiveness ......................................................................................384 1.3. Comprehensiveness..........................................................................385 2. Moral Inclusiveness......................................................................................386 2.1. Moral Recognition.............................................................................386 2.2. Explanatory Strength........................................................................387 2.3. Inclusiveness vs. Strength ...............................................................388 2.4. Disconfirmability...............................................................................388 2.5. Inclusiveness vs. Strict Impartiality ..............................................389 2.6. Inclusiveness and Moral Interpretation .......................................389 3. Moral Interpretation and Vertical Consistency......................................390 4. Test Case #3: The Great War for Control of Reality..............................394 5. Implications of Inclusiveness.....................................................................397 5.1. Recognition of Rationality...............................................................397 5.2. Recognition of Pain...........................................................................401 5.3. Recognition of Insight ......................................................................405 6. Nonrecognition of Bully Systems..............................................................410 7. Seeing Things ............................................................................................413 Chapter XI. Xenophobia and Moral Anomaly....................................................415 1. The Marxist Analysis of Xenophobia .......................................................418 2. A Kantian Analysis of Xenophobia ..........................................................421 3. Failures of Cognitive Discrimination.......................................................423 3.1. The Error of Confusing People with Personhood......................424 3.2. The Error of Assuming Privileged Access to the Self................426 3.3. The Error of Failing to Modally Imagine Interiority .................428 4. Test Case #4: Political Discrimination......................................................429 4.1. First-Order Political Discrimination..............................................430 4.2. Reciprocal First-Order Political Discrimination.........................434 4.3. Higher-Order Political Discrimination.........................................438 4.3.1. Transitivity and Comprehensiveness................................438 4.3.2. Reciprocality ...........................................................................443 4.3.3. Denial .......................................................................................445 Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conceptionxi Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 4.3.4. Exacerbation............................................................................453 5. Corrigibility and Vertical Consistency.....................................................455 6. Kant on the Xenophilia in Vertical Consistency ....................................457 7. Xenophilia and Aesthetic Anomaly..........................................................460 8. Xenophobia, Alienation and the Primacy of Principle.........................466 Bibliography...............................................................................................................471 Anonymous praise from the referees of Cambridge and Oxford UniversityPresses for Rationality and the Structure of the Self,Volume I: The Humean Conception..........................................................................505 List of Figures 1. Proposed Promotional Poster (2007) [Preface] ............................................... xiv 2. A Taxonomy of Ethics [I.7.3.2] .............................................................................47 3. Kants Conceptual Hierarchy [II.3] .....................................................................76 4. The Sophisticated Myopic [IV.3] .......................................................................170 5. The Resolute Chooser [IV.4] ...............................................................................172 6. An Intrapersonally Coordinated Resolute Chooser [IV.4]...........................173 7. The Nave Myopic [IV.5] .....................................................................................175 8. The Highest-Order Disposition to Literal Self-Preservation [V.2] .............193 9. Pincha Mayurasana [VIII.6] ................................................................................347 Preface to the Second Edition RationalityandtheStructureoftheSelfhasalwayshadacurioushistory; indeed,34yearsworthtocompletion.Butthosewererelativelyuneventful, comparedtoitspublicationhistory,whichhasonlygrowncuriouserand curiouser.Thisfifthpublicationanniversary,markedbyareformattedand redesigned second edition, is an opportune moment to review and take stock. WhenCynthiaReadfirstsolicitedRationalityandtheStructureoftheSelf forOxfordUniversityPressintheearly1980s,itwasalongish,one-volume manuscript that as I predicted at the time promised to grow. She apprised meofOUPstraditionalsympathyformulti-volumeprojects(inrecentyears by Frances Myrna Kamm, Bimal Krishna Matilal, Alexander Murray, Werner Jaeger, Wayne Waxman, Terence Irwin and Derek Parfit, to name a few recent examples). So in the late 1990s, I kept my promise to get back in touch when it wasclosetocompletion.Bythenithadgrowntofourvolumes.Peter Momtchiloff insisted that I cut it down to two. I did that. Then he insisted that I cut it down to one. I refused, and withdrew.TerryMooreofCambridgeUniversityPresssolicitedRationalityandthe StructureoftheSelfintheearly1990s.IbroughtittoCUPintheearly2000s, andstatedattheoutsetmyrefusaltocutitanyfurther.Iworkedwith BeatriceRehl.ShewasthebesteditorIcouldhavewished.Sheunderstood andrespectedtheinterconnectionofbothvolumes,theimpossibilityof marketingeachasacompletelyindependentwork,andevenmystubborn refusal to further reduce the size of either one.ButBeatricewasevenbetterthanthat.BecauseVolumeI:TheHumean Conceptionisverycriticalofaconceptionoftheselfthatvirtuallyeveryone, bothinphilosophyandinthesocialsciences,takesforgranted,itwas extremelydifficulttofindreliablereadersforthisvolume.Morethanthirty peoplesimplyrefusedtoreadit,andBeatricerefusedtocountenancethe impertinentposterIdesignedinordertoexploitthemarketingpotentialof thisremarkablefact(seeFigure1,nextpage).Afewofmycolleagueswrote readersreportsthatweresomad-dog,chewing-up-the-rugsavagethatthey subvertedtheirowncredibility.Forexample,onefulminatedagainstits purportedfailingsatverygreatlength,withoutbotheringinanyinstanceto cite the text. Another fabricated objectionable text against which to fulminate, in the apparent certitude that Beatrice had not bothered to familiarize herself withthetextIactuallywrote.Athird,sothinlydisguisedasnottohave neededtobotherwiththepretenseofanonymity,objectedtomyhaving neglected to discuss her recent book.Any other editor would have used such reports as a convenient excuse to get rid of Volume I entirely, and demand that I publish Volume II: A Kantian Preface to the Second Editionxiv Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin Figure 1. Proposed Promotional Poster (2007) Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception xv Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin Conceptioneitherseparatelyornotatall.Beatricecouldhavedonethat,but she did not. Instead she spent a great deal of time and money finding readers forbothvolumeswhoseword,thoughcritical,couldbetrusted.Both volumes are very much improved for the rigorous, constructive criticism and encouragementherchosenreadersfinallysupplied.Mydebttoherandto them is very great. It was a privilege to work with an editor of this calibre. But CUPs review procedure isunusual in requiring yet a further round of vetting: Each volume also had tobe independently read and approvedby theCambridgeUniversityPressSyndicate,agroupofeighteenCambridge Universityprofessorsfromdifferentdisciplineswhopassjudgmentoneach manuscript which CUPs editors submit for publication. That both volumes of Rationality and the Structure of the Self survived this highly ramified gauntlet of specialized professional evaluation reinforces my belief in its worth.After both volumes had been fully and formally approved for publication byacademicscholarsprofessionallytrainedtomakesuchjudgments,CUPs marketing department then demanded that I cut 100 pages any 100 pages fromeachvolume,inordertosellthemmoreeasily.Beatricehadagreedin writingnottorequirethis.ButitisCUPsmarketingdepartment,notits editorsorsyndicateofscholars,thatfinallydetermineswhatCUPpublishes and in what form. Of course the resulting books would not have been the ones thattheCUPSyndicatehadapproved.Irefused,withdrew,andpublished both volumes at my website.This is what happens when you break a promise to a Kantian. AlthoughCUPsvettingprocedureisunusuallydemanding,itsultimate deferral to the financial bottom line is not unusual at all. The reality is that the economicclimateforallprintpublishers,butparticularlyforacademicprint publishers,hasbeenextremelydifficultandgettingsteadilyworseoverthe lastdecade.Pig-headedauthorssuchasmyselfdonothelpthesituation. Some publishers are forthright and transparent about these limitations. Others trytomakeavirtueofnecessity,andtoconvincetheirauthorsthatthese limitations are, indeed, a virtue. As I accept only those limitations dictated by the imperatives of the work itself, I have sought virtues elsewhere. IdidnotwriteRationalityandtheStructureoftheSelfinordertomakea profit. But I have derived very great profit indeed from its instant accessibility toanyonebesetbyevenamomentaryflickerofcuriosityaboutitscontents. Electronic, open-access self-publication has also done much more to bring it to publicattentionthanatraditionalprintpublisherscontractwouldhave allowed.Full-pageadvertisementsinTheProceedingsoftheAmerican PhilosophicalSociety,TheJournalofPhilosophy,ThePhilosophicalReview,Mind, Ethics,PoliticalTheory,TheEuropeanJournalofPhilosophy,andEconomicsand Philosophy have secured its place in the historical record. And advertising it on Preface to the Second Editionxvi Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin thePhilosophyinEuropeE-List1hasinadvertentlygeneratedsomevery heated debate about having done so.Granted:disagreementswiththeactualargumentsofRationalityandthe Structure of the Self have not been aired where they should be, in the arena of scholarlydebate,asoneofitsanonymousreadershadexpected.Indeedto myknowledge,ithasnotreceivedasinglemention,muchlessareview,in anyacademicforum,conference,journalorbookinthefiveyearssinceits firstpublication;anditmaywellhavetowaitformanypeopletodie, includingme,beforeitgetsone.Icanlivewiththat.2Forintheend,weall die. Then all that is left is the work, and all that matters is its quality.But in the meantime, this over-my-dead-body collectivepublic disregard has enlivened a thriving private interest in both volumes atmy website. Off-the-record magnanimous comments have also provided cardiopulmonary life support.Andaproliferationinrecentyearsoftalk,conference,journal,and editedcollectiontopicsconcerningtheself,self-deception,desire,reasons, rationality, and the Humean model of motivation has had an equally pleasant resuscitatingeffect.PerhapsIwillrisefromthegrave.Inanycase,these developmentsatleastembalmtheprojectinaregenerativeadmixtureof edginess and scholarly significance.Rationality and the Structure of the Self also has manifested a different kind of significance. In effect, it hasbeen functioning as a litmustest of the theory of professional power dynamics introduced in Chapter I. Formulated in 1998, that theorybest explained the data of my experience andobservations in the field of academic philosophy: Itisbecauserationalphilosophicaldialoguerecognizesnoprofessional hierarchythatother,extra-philosophicalorevenanti-philosophical measuresmustbeinvokedtomaintainitundercircumstancesinwhich hierarchicalstatusisthesurestindexofprofessionalsurvival.Inthis traditionalhierarchy,withfewexceptions,novices,newcomers, 1SeeAdrianPiper,Re.:Self-Advertisements,postedbyPhilosophyinEurope PHILOS-L@liverpool.ac.ukonSaturdayOctober4,2008,at15:01.Archivedat http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html.Withover7,000subscribersin57 countries,plusduplicationtoseveraladditionalglobalredistributionlists,the Philosophy in Europe e-list is the largest philosophy mailing list in the world. 2I argue in Volume II that when most people want todosomething,they find a reason todoit;whereaswhentheywantnotto,theyfindareasonnotto.Sothedeafening silence has not moved me to seek explanations for it. But some have been pressed upon menevertheless.Impromptupublicremarksabouttheprojectincludepretentious, presumptuous,andtheopinionthatRationalityandtheStructureoftheSelfspanstoo many different areas of specialization for any one person to review it. So it would seem that the one person who wrote it actually must have comprised several different ghosts in the machine, each ghostwriting a different chapter. Or perhaps she is in reality just an oversized Swiss army knife, presuming to dissect any fodder on the chopping block. Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception xvii Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin provisionalmembers,andinterloperstendtorankamongthelowest subordinatesofall.Accordingly,themoretheydivergeinthought, appearanceorpedigreefromthetradition,theclosertothebottomof thehierarchytheyarelikelytobefound,andthemoreblatantthe exercises of power that keep them there.3 But as of that writing, I had not yet been gently eased out of the United States, nor gently eased out of my tenured full professorship, nor gently eased out of my retirement benefits, nor gently eased out of my agreement with CUP, nor gentlyeasedoutofanyremainingstatusinthatprofessionalhierarchy.This gentleandeasysequenceofeventsatteststothepredictivepowerofthe theory developed in Chapter I, legitimates its aspiration to truth, andsecures my role as experimental guinea pig of my own theory. For that reason, among others, I have made no revisions of content, aside from minor corrective line-edits, in the main text of this second edition. Perhaps the passage of time will graduallydisclosethepredictivepoweroftheoriesdevelopedinsubsequent chapters of the project as well. Socratesremindsusthatahierarchyofstatusisnotthesameasa hierarchy of quality. I recurred to this useful advice each time I was forced to choose between them, by refusing repeatedly, under institutional pressure, to publishRationalityandtheStructureoftheSelfprematurelyorinbutchered form.I have never regretted my decision to pay any price necessary in order topublishthisworkatthehigheststandardofphilosophicalachievementof whichIamcapable.Ofcoursethepriceofdoingtheverybestphilosophical work I had it in me to do should not have been that expensive. But it has been morethanrepaidbytheinsightsithasyieldedintothedefactoworkingsof the profession.Themostimportantoftheseinsightsmaybeworthsharing:Whether yourworkisblacklisted,ignored,orsimplyoverlookedbyyourcolleagues doesnotnecessarilyundermine,andmayevenaidandabetyourabilityto producethebestworkyoupossiblycan.Ifyouareluckyenoughtohave accesstoalaptopandalibrary,4noonecanstopyoufromdoingthatwork unless you let them. Document and archive it properly, and you will get your 15 minutes eventually. We all do. Write for that audience, not this one. TheseinsightshaveyieldedafreedomtosayanddoandwritewhatI wantthatmypreviousinvestmentintheinstitutionalhierarchyofacademic 3RationalityandtheStructureoftheSelf,ChapterI.GeneralIntroductiontotheProject: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics, 21 (both volumes), below. 4andperhapssomesenseofkinshipwiththemanyartistswhochoosetomoonlight alongside day jobs that pay the bills. Philosophy is much cheaper to finance and just as easytofeed.Teachingphilosophyofcourseshouldbemuchmorethanthat.Butifits proffered working conditions effectively thwart any such activity worth the name, then it is much less; and may offermuch less foodfor thought than other available day jobs such as managing an office or driving a cab. Preface to the Second Editionxviii Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin philosophy had not returned. Having been gently eased out of the profession, Icannowindulgewithoutguilttheluxuryofdevotingmyselftothe discipline;andofdoingevenmoreoftheverybestworkIpossiblycan, regardless of whom it offends.5 The anonymous acclaim collected at the back of these volumes lends empirical support to these insights, while minimizing the professional dangers that public exposure of the culprits would bring. My choices have turned me into a walking institutional critique; and I find I enjoy this new persona very much.6

Recentlyaveryeminentcolleagueoflongstanding,almostexactlymy age and the recipient of a named chair at a top-ranked university, invited me tolunchandinquiredastohowthingsweregoingwithRationalityandthe StructureoftheSelf.IreportedtohimwhatIhavereportedtoothercurious bystanders,andwhatIhavenowreportedhere,onceandforall,inthis Preface.Hequestionedwhethergettingkickedoutofthefieldwasan accuratedescriptionofmyexperience.Heinquiredintotheeventsand personalitiesattheacademicinstitutionthathaddeliveredtheboot.Andhe describedwithrelishhisreviewofanothermutualcolleaguesrecenttwo-volume work. He offered to send me boththe review, published a year after theappearanceofbothvolumes,andthevolumesthemselves.Iappreciated the opportunity to make some useful comparisons. My colleague had read the textcarefully,annotatingkeypassagesinthemargins andindexingthemon theflyleaves.Hisreviewwasfair,thorough,attentivetotheargument,and appropriatelyrespectfuloftheauthorsdiligenteffortsandexalted professionalstatus.Itregretfullyconcludedthattheworkunderreviewwas deeply misguided and historically worthless.MyeffortsinRationalityandtheStructureandtheSelfwereonlyslightly less diligent (a measly1,212 total printed pages for my twovolumesto 1,365 for his). But my professional status is considerably less exalted. In fact, it is so microscopically Tom Thumb-diminutive that Rationality and the Structure of the Selfoffersnoprofessionalincentivewhatsoever,asidefromunattributeduse ofitsideas,toreadit.Thereisnolegitimateprofessionalendtowhich attentiontothisprojectisameans.Neitheracademicstanding,norpeer recognition,norprofessorialapproval,norenhancedprofessional connections,norpowerfulpatronage,norjoboffers,nortenure,norjournal publication, nor external research funding, nor any other professional rewards willaccrueforpubliclydisclosingonesacquaintancewithorinterestinthis work.Indeed,anysuchattentionspentmustdebitandjustifythetime, 5 After all, what are any offended parties going to do about it? Kick me out of the field? 6 However, I am no match for Gene Roddenberrys Borg, the uncontested winners of the PinkFloydLifetimeAchievementAwardforinstitutionalcritiqueintheperipatetic tradition. Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception xix Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin attentionandenergytherebylosttootherendeavorsmoreconduciveto professional flourishing.As for its worth, the only reasons to read Rationality and the Structure of the Self(inprivate,ofcourse,orelseconcealedinaplainbrownpaperbag)are stubborn curiosity about that very question:Was it, infact,really worth it? pluswhateverhistoricalworthitscuriouserandcuriouserhistoryhas inadvertentlyconferred.Iamgladithascaughttheattentionofthecurious, and I value their curiosity.Ihopeyourcuriositywillbeslakedbywhatyoufindinthefollowing pages;thattheywillanswerthatquestion,bothtoyoursatisfactionandto mine; and that the answer you find there will have been worth the trouble of seeking it out. Adrian M. S. Piper Berlin, 24 January 2013 It is much more honorable and much easier not to suppress others, but to make yourselves as good as you can.7 7Plato,ApologyXXX,inEuthyphro,Apology,Crito,Trans.F.J.ChurchandRobertD. Cumming (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) Acknowledgements to Volume II MyfirstinklingthattherewassomethingamisswiththeHumean conception of the self came before I knew enough Western philosophy to call it that. I am grateful to AllenGinsberg, Timothy Leary, Edward Sullivan and Swami Vishnudevananda for urging me to read the Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita andYogaSutrasin1965.IamgratefulmostofalltoPhillipZohnforhis willingness to argue with me at length about the import of these texts, and for introducingmetoKantsCritiqueofPureReasonin1969,afterreadinganart textofmineonspaceandtime(Hypothesis)thatinadvertentlyechoedits doctrine of transcendental idealism. The influence of all of these works on my thinkinghasinformedmy(youwillpardonthepun)criticalandskeptical approach to the Humean conception from the beginning. This project has been in production for a very long time. The ancestor of the conceptofpseudorationality introduced in Chapter VIIof VolumeIIwas myundergraduateSocialSciencesPhiBetaKappaMedalHonorsThesis, DeceptionandSelf-Deception(CityCollegeofNewYork,1974).Iam gratefultoMartinTamny,ArthurCollinsandDavidWeissmanfortheir guidanceandinputatthatstage.Theancestoroftheanalysisofcyclicaland genuinepreferenceinChapterIVofVolumeIandChapterIIIofVolumeII wasChapterIIofmySecond-YearPaper,ATheoryofRationalAgency (Harvard University, 1976), for advice and comments on which I am indebted toJohnRawls.Bothancestorsliasedinrevisedforminmydissertation,A New Model of Rationality (Harvard University, 1981) under the supervision ofJohnRawlsandRoderickFirth,inwhosedebtIpermanentlyremain. ProfessorFirthprovidedthesoundingboard,thedetailedandrigorous criticism, and thepersonal encouragement that has helpedpreserve my faith inthevalueofthisproject.Iamdeeplygratefulforhisinvolvementwithit, and to have known him as a teacher and colleague. MyanimateddiscussionswithProfessorJohnRawls,bothaboutmy workandabouttheroleoftheutility-maximizingmodelinhiswork,were absolutelycrucialtomyconvictionthatIwasontosomething.Hisexample asascholarandteacher,thebreadthanddepthofhislearning,andhis magisterial achievement in A Theory of Justice have remained an inspiration to meinallofmywork.IrankRawlssachievementasatheory-buildera philosopherwhoconstructssubstantivetheorieswiththoseofthemiddle and late Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, and Habermas. A critic, by contrast, is aphilosopherwhomostlycriticizes,improvesupon,ordemolishestheory-builderstheories.Thequintessentialcriticwouldbetheslice-em-and-dice-emSocratesoftheearlyPlatonicdialogues.ButsomemightalsocountSt. ThomasAquinas,Sidgwick,thelaterWittgenstein,andRyleamongthe philosophicalcritics,fordifferentreasons.Philosophersmayreasonably Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conceptionxxi Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin disagreeabouthowsomeoftheseexamplesaretobeclassified,andmost philosophersevinceboththeory-buildingandcriticalinclinationstovarying degrees. But the distinction is nevertheless useful, because training in analytic philosophy is by default training in how to be a critic: We study the views of famousphilosophers,learnhowtodetectareasofinconsistencyorfaultor lack,andthenlearnhowtocorrect,supplementorlevelthem.Thereisno waytoteachtheory-building,exceptbyencouragingstudentstohave confidenceintheirintuitions.Soifwehappentoinclinetowardtheory-building, we are pretty much on our own,because there are no ground rules about how to proceed. In developing the theory defended in this project, I was fortunatefromtheverybeginningtoreceivegoodadviceabouthowto proceed,fromanothertheory-builderwhohadalreadybeenthereanddone that. The ground rules Rawls taught me were three: (1) Anchor your theory in relation to identifiablecurrent problem(s) orcontroversies.Describetheproblems,analyzesomerecentarguments thatpurporttosolvethem,andexplainthewaysinwhichthese arguments fail. Then briefly sketch how your theory avoids these failures, so that your readers will be able to locate your theory on their own map of philosophical issues in a way that confers meaning and importance on it for them.(2)Anchoryourtheoryrelativetotheviews,withwhichyou disagree,ofotherphilosopherswhohaveworkedontheproblemand havereceivedattentionfortheirefforts.Discussthoseviews,explain whatiswrongwiththem,anddescribehowyourtheoryavoidsthe criticismsyoumakeoftheirviews.Refertotheseopposingviewsin developing your own, in order to bring your theory into connection with a larger, ongoing philosophical discussion among your peers.(3) Avoid cooking up a straw man to attack. Show that you take your opponentsviewsseriously,bymakingthebestandmostsympathetic caseforthemyoupossiblycan,beforeshowinghowtheydisappoint despiteyourbestefforts.Theworstthatcanhappenisthatreally understanding your opponents views willconvince you tomodify your own. InthisprojectIhavetriedtohonorRawlssgroundrulesasbestIcan,in order to honor him as my teacher and their author, and also all of those others from whom I have learned so much by disputing their views in the following pages. Ihavealsobenefitedbyteachinganddiscussingextensiveportionsof bothvolumes of this projectwith several generations of graduate students at theUniversityofMichigan,Stanford,GeorgetownandUSCDparticularly RichardDees,JeffreyKahn,BrianLeiter,AlanMadry,MinervaSanJuan Acknowledgements to Volume IIxxii Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin McGraw,DavidReed-Maxfield,JoelRicheimer,LauraShanner,Cristel Steinvorth, and Sigrun Svavarsdottir; and fifteen years worth of brilliant and feisty undergraduates at Wellesley College.ChapterIofbothvolumes,GeneralIntroductiontotheProject:The EnterpriseofSocraticMetaethics,wasdraftedduringanunpaidleaveof absencefromWellesleyCollegeduringearly1998andfundedbyanNEH CollegeTeachersResearchFellowship.TheNEHsupportcameatacrucial momentandIamdeeplygratefulforit.Thischapterincorporatesand modifiessomepassagesandsectionsofmy"TwoConceptionsoftheSelf," published in Philosophical Studies 48, 2 (September l985), 173-197 and reprinted inThePhilosopher'sAnnualVIII(1985),222-246.ThediscussionofAnglo-American philosophical practice that appears in Sections I.2 and I.3 benefited fromcommentsbyAnitaAllen,HoustonBaker,PaulBoghossian,Ann Congleton,JoyceCarolOates,RuthAnnaPutnamandKennethWinkler,as wellasbymembersoftheaudiencetothe1994GreaterPhiladelphia PhilosophyConsortiumsymposium,"PhilosophyasPerformance"atwhich theseremarkswereoriginallypresented.Thechapterreceiveditsnear-final formduringmytenureasaResearchScholarattheGettyResearchInstitute duringtheacademicyears1998-1999.Forprovidingmewithallofthe conditionsIrequestedsomeveryidiosyncraticasnecessaryformeto makesubstantialprogressonthisandmanyotherpartsofthisproject,my gratitude to the Institute knows no bounds. My debt of thanks to Brian Davis, LarryHertzberg,KarenJoseph,MichaelRoth,andSabineSchlosseris particularly great. While there I also benefited a great deal from discussion of theseandrelatedtopicswithReinhartMeyer-Kalkus.Iwouldalsoliketo thankNaomiZackforherinterestandwillingnesstopublishanearlier versionofthischapter,despiteitslength,inhereditedcollection,Womenof Color and Philosophy (New York: Blackwell, 2000).EarlierversionsofChapterIIweredeliveredtotheAssociationforthe PhilosophyoftheUnconsciousattheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation Eastern Division Convention in December 1986, Akeel Bilgrami commenting; theUniversityofMinnesotaPhilosophyDepartmentinNovember1987;the Columbia University PhilosophyDepartment in March 1988; and the Moral Psychology and Moral Identity Conference at Oberlin College in April 1995, Michael Stocker commenting. The present version has benefited greatly from audiencecommentsandquestionsreceivedonthoseoccasions,and particularlyfromthoseofAkeelBilgrami,DickBoyd,NormanDahl,Jay Garfield,HenryMandel,CharlesParsons,ThomasPogge,MichaelStocker and Joan Weiner, with whom I discussed at length an early draft in 1994. ChapterIIIhasbenefitedgreatlyfrommyconversationswithDavid Auerbach,MarkKaplan,GlennLoury,NedMcClennen,RobertRubinowitz andRobertPaulWolff,andfromKaplansandWolffscommentsonearlier drafts.JoanWeinerprovidedvaluablefeedbackwhenIwasmakingfinal Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conceptionxxiii Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin revisions.ChapterIVandpartsofChapterVweresolitarybutpleasurable undertakings for which I take full responsibility. Other parts of Chapter V, as wellasChapterIX,havereceived agooddealofexposure,forallofwhichI amgrateful.ChaptersV.5.1-2andIXwereexcerptedin"TheMeaningof 'Ought'andtheLossofInnocence,"deliveredatThePersonalTurninEthics ConferenceattheUniversityofMinnesotainApril1987;tothePhilosophy Departments at Vassar College in October 1987, the University of Mississippi atOxfordinNovember1987,theUniversityofCaliforniaatSanDiegoin April1989,theUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngelesinApril1989,the UniversityofColoradoatBoulderinOctober1989,asanInvitedPaperon EthicsdeliveredtotheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociationEasternDivision Convention,December1989,abstractedinTheProceedingsoftheAmerican Philosophical Association 63, 2 (October 1989), 53-54, at Mt. Holyoke College in September1993,MarquetteUniversityinOctober1993,GeorgiaState UniversityinSeptember1994,OberlinCollegeinOctober1994,atthe symposium, Diskursparadigma: Form at the University of Vienna in June 1995, theUniversityofUtah,SaltLakeCityinNovember1995,andatScripps College of ClaremontGraduateSchool in February 1996. Comments received fromeachoftheseaudiencesimprovedthesesectionsimmeasurably.Iam particularlygratefulforthecommentsofAnnetteBaier,LawrenceBlum, DavidBrink,JenniferChurch,JoanCopjec,NormanDahl,KeithDonellan, TerryEagleton,PhilippaFoot,JohnLadd,RobertLoudon,RuthBarcan Marcus,WarrenQuinn,RolfSartorius,GeorgSchollhammer,Thomas Wartenberg,andAllenWood.Inaddition,BarbaraHerman,Christine Korsgaard and Andrews Reath made illuminating remarks about the sections that were excerpted in my essay, "Kant on the Objectivity of the Moral Law," inAndrewsReath,BarbaraHermanandChristineM.Korsgaard,Eds., ReclaimingtheHistoryofEthics:EssaysforJohnRawls(NewYork:Cambridge University Press, 1997), 240-269. WorkonmostofChapterVIwassupportedbyaWoodrowWilson International Scholars' Fellowship in 1988-1989. An earlier version of Sections 16waspublishedunderthetitle,Impartiality,Compassion,andModal Imagination, Ethics 101 (July 1991), 726 757. Still earlier ones were delivered tothePhilosophyDepartmentsofWellesleyCollegeinNovember 1989,WesternMichiganUniversityinJanuary1990,PurdueUniversityand IllinoisStateUniversityinMarch1990,theImpartialityConferenceatHollins CollegeinJune1990,andattheUniversityofConnecticutatStorrsin December 1990. I am grateful for comments received on those occasions, and alsotoOwenFlanagan,CharlesGriswold,RuthAnnaPutnam,andthe editorsofEthics.AnearlierversionofSection7formedthesecondhalfof "MoralTheoryandMoralAlienation,"TheJournalofPhilosophyLXXXIV,2 (February1987),102-118.OnthetopicsdiscussedthereIlearnedmuchfrom thecommentsofAkeelBilgrami,JeffreyEvansandmembersofthe Acknowledgements to Volume IIxxiv Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin PhilosophyDepartmentaudiencesatWayneStateUniversityinNovember 1985, Penn State in January 1986, Georgetown, the University of California at SanDiego,NorthCarolinaState,Wesleyan,MemphisState,andthe University of Minnesota, all in February 1986. ExcerptsfromChaptersVIIandVIIIwerepublishedunderthetitle, "Pseudorationality,"inAmelieO.RortyandBrianMcLaughlin,Eds. PerspectivesonSelf-Deception(LosAngeles:UniversityofCalifornia,1988).I am grateful to Rorty and McLaughlin for comments on an earlier version, and to Paul Guyer and Louis Loeb for discussion. Other parts of Chapter VIII were supportedbyanAndrewMellonPost-DoctoralFellowshipatStanford Universityfrom1982to1984,andpublishedunderthetitle,Two Conceptions of theSelf, Philosophical Studies 48, 2 (September 1985), 173-197, reprinted in The Philosophers Annual VIII (1985), 222-246. Earlier versions were presented to the Philosophy and Anthropology Group and to the Department ofPhilosophyattheUniversityofMichigan;theDepartmentsofPhilosophy atStanfordinDecember1982,theUniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeleyin February1983,theUniversityofMinnesotaatMinneapolisinOctober1983, and the University of Pennsylvania in March 1984. I am grateful for comments receivedonthoseoccasions,andalsofromMichaelBratman,JeffreyEvans, and Allan Gibbard on earlier drafts. Sections 4 through 6 of Chapter VIII were deliveredunderthetitle,TheIdealofAgentIntegrity,attheUniversityof Wisconsin/MadisonHumanitiesInstituteConferenceonArt,Philosophyand PoliticsinApril2002,totheYaleUniversityDepartmentofPhilosophyin February2003,totheUniversityofMinnesotaandIndianaUniversity PhilosophyDepartmentsinNovember2006,andinGermanunderthetitle, DasIdealvonderIntegrittdesAkteurstotheRuhr-UniversittBochum workshop,LebenswissenMedialisierungGeschlechtinJune2007,aspart ofmytenureasMarie-JahodaGuestProfessorthere.Iwishtothankall audiences for their comments. I am particularly grateful to Norman Dahl, and toayoungman,unknowntoeveryoneelsepresentandevidentlyon reconnaissancefromanotherphilosophydepartment,formotivatingmeto rereadFrankfurtandreformulatemycriticismsofhim.Anearlierversionof theconcludingparagraphsofSection6appearedinLettertoaYoung Artist, Art on Paper 9, 6 (July/August 2005), 36-37; reprinted in Peter Nesbett and Sarah Andress, Eds. Letters to a Young Artist (New York: Darte Publishing, 2006), 83-88. AnearlierversionofChapterXwaspublishedunderthetitle,Seeing Things,intheSouthernJournalofPhilosophyXXIX,SupplementaryVolume: Moral Epistemology (1990), 29-60, following delivery at the Spindell Conference onMoralEpistemologyatMemphisStateUniversityinOctober1990,Betsy Postow commenting. Postows comments improved this chapter considerably. IalsobenefitedfromdiscussionwithSpindellConferenceparticipants,and Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conceptionxxv Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin particularlyDavidCopp,MichaelDePaulandWilliamTollhurst.Owen Flanagan and Ruth Anna Putnam offered many helpful suggestions. WorkonSections2and3ofChapterXIwassupportedbyanNEH SummerStipendin1988andtheWoodrowWilsonInternationalScholars Fellowship.ThesesectionsbenefitedfromthecommentsofAnitaAllen, AlisonMacIntyre,JohnPittman,andKennethWinkler.Itwaspresented underthetitle,XenophobiaandKantianRationalismtotheWellesley PhilosophyDepartmentFacultySeminarandtotheCornellUniversity PhilosophyDepartmentinFebruary1992;andpublishedunderthattitlein PhilosophicalForumXXIV,1-3(Fall-Spring1992-93),188-232;reprintedin FeministInterpretationsofImmanuelKant,Ed.RobinMaySchott(University Park:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,1997),21-73;andinAfrican-AmericanPerspectivesandPhilosophicalTraditions,Ed.JohnP.Pittman(New York:Routledge,1997).ItwasalsopresentedattheNewYorkUniversity Conference,WhatDoestheCritiqueofPureReasonHaveToDoWiththePure Critique of Racism? A Look at the Work of Adrian Piper in October 1992. I learned muchfromdiscussionoftheseissueswithcommentatorsPaulBoghossian and William Ruddick of the NYUPhilosophy Department.A revised version wasdeliveredunderthetitle,AKantianAnalysisofXenophobia,asthe PlenaryAddressattheVII.SymposiumderInternationalenAssoziationvon Philosophinnen,inVienna,AustriainSeptember1995;totheNewYork Institute for the Humanities at New York University in March 1996; and to the HumanitiesInstituteatSUNYStonybrookinSeptember1996.Workon Section 4 of this chapter was supportedby theMellon and Woodrow Wilson Fellowships,andpublishedunderthetitle,TwoKindsofDiscrimination, Yale Journal of Criticism 6, 1 (1993), 25-74; and reprintedin Race and Racism, ed. Bernard Boxill (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 193-237. Earlier versions weredeliveredtothePhilosophyDepartmentatGeorgeWashington University in November 1986, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics of Georgetown UniversityinJanuary1987,tothePhilosophyDepartmentsatHoward UniversityinOctober1987,theUniversityofMississippiatOxfordin November1987,theCityCollegeofNewYork,theUniversityofMaryland, andtheBostonAreaConferenceonCharacterandMoralityinApril1988, hostedbyRadcliffeandWellesleyColleges,NancyShermancommenting;at theSymposium,FeminismandRacism,attheAmericanPhilosophical AssociationEasternDivisionConvention,Washington,D.C.inDecember 1988;atFranklin andMarshallCollegeinNovember1989;WilliamsCollege,inJanuary1990;WesternMichiganUniversityinJanuary1990;andatthe Conference,EthicsandRacism,atBrownUniversityinMarch1990.Ithas benefitedfromdiscussionwiththoseaudiences,andparticularlyfromthe remarks of Nancy Sherman and Kenneth Winkler. Laurence Thomas provided extensivecommentsonanearlierdraft.TamasPatakiextendedhimselffar beyond the call of duty with not only penetrating comments and criticism but Acknowledgements to Volume IIxxvi Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin alsomuch-needededitorialhelponSections1,2and5.Iamparticularly grateful for his patience and forbearance.There is no way forme to express my gratitude and indebtedness to the veryfewindividualswhoprovidedencouragementandsupportduringthe final stretch of time in which I brought this project to completion. During two years of unpaid and extremely stressful medical leave from Wellesley College from Winter 2001 to Fall 2002, Bill Cain, Joe Feagin, Terry Irwin, Mark Kaplan, JamesKodera,RuthBarcanMarcus,JulieMatthaei,ReinhartMeyer-Kalkus, SusanNeiman,RobertRubinowitz,StephenSchiffer,HedwigSaxenhuber, GeorgSchollhammer,AnnStephens,andJoanWeinerextendedthemselves beyond theboundsofcollegial ormoral obligationby letting me know, each intheirownway,theimportanceandvaluetothemthatIdoso.Their encouragement was crucial. My debt to Ruth Barcan Marcus for her steadfast friendshipisbeyondmeasure.Theresearchandadministrativehelp provided,underlessthanidealconditionsandgreatgenerosityofspirit,by Robert Del Principe was invaluable. His patience, resourcefulness, persistence andgoodhumorinobtainingthesourcesIneededunderthemoststressful conditions,andtoleratingwithoutcomplainttwelveyearsworthofmy unendingincipienthysteriahasmanifestedbothheroismandmartyrdomof the highest order. My debt to him is incalculable. Without the moral support of all of these good people this project would not have been possible. The final draftwasbegununderconditionsofextremepersonalhardship,invirtually complete solitude during the long, hot summer of 2003; and received its final form in the sheltering anonymity and safety of the city of Berlin in early 2008. Iamprofoundlygratefulthatitisthere,andthatIamthere.Fortheunique opportunity to live and test the values defended in this project, I would like to thankthefacultyandadministrationofWellesleyCollege;Icommendthis workinexiletothem.Forthestrength,thesolaceandthesanctuaryIhave been blessed to find in reading, writing and teaching philosophy I am grateful most of all. Abbreviated Citations to Kants Works 1C =Kritik derreinen Vernunft, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausg. kniglichPreuischenbzw.DeutschenAkademieder Wissenschaften(Berlin,1911;NewYork:WalterdeGruyter), Vols. 3 [B Edition] and 4 [A Edition] KritikderReinenVernunft,Herausg.RaymundSchmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976) The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1998) TheCritiqueofPureReason,trans.NormanKempSmith(New York, N.Y.: St. Martins Press, 1970) Allreferencestothisworkareparenthesizedinthetext according to the standard A/B Edition pagination. P =Prolegomena zu einer jedenknftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschft wirdauftretenknnen,inKantsgesammelteSchriften,herausg. kniglichPreuischenbzw.DeutschenAkademieder Wissenschaften(Berlin,1911;NewYork:WalterdeGruyter), Vol. 4 ProlegomenatoAnyFutureMetaphysics,trans.LewisWhiteBeck (New York, N.Y.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950) Allreferencestothisworkareparenthesizedinthetext accordingtothePrussian/GermanAcademyEdition pagination. G =GrundlegungzurMetaphysikderSitten,inKantsgesammelte Schriften,herausg.kniglichPreuischenbzw.Deutschen AkademiederWissenschaften(Berlin,1911;NewYork:Walter de Gruyter), Vol. 4 GrundlegungzurMetaphysikderSitten,Herausg.vonKarl Vorlnder (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, (1965) Abbreviated Citations to Kants Worksxxviii Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin FundamentalPrinciplesoftheMetaphysicofMorals,trans.Thomas K. Abbott (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949) Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck; textandcriticalessayseditedbyRobertPaulWolff(NewYork: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969) Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett 1981) GroundworkoftheMetaphysicofMorals,trans.H.J.Paton(New York, N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2002)withcritical essays Allreferencestothisworkareparenthesizedinthetext accordingtothePrussian/GermanAcademyEdition pagination. 2C =KritikderpraktischenVernunft,inKantsgesammelteSchriften, herausg.kniglichPreuischenbzw.DeutschenAkademieder Wissenschaften(Berlin,1911;NewYork:WalterdeGruyter), Vol. 5 KritikderpraktischenVernunft,Herausg.KarlVorlnder (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1974) TheCritiqueofPracticalReason,trans.LewisWhiteBeck(New York, N.Y.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) CritiqueofPracticalReason,trans.MaryJ.Gregor(NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1997) Allreferencestothisworkareparenthesizedinthetext accordingtothePrussian/GermanAcademyEdition pagination. Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conceptionxxix Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin R =DieReligioninnerhalbderGrenzenderbloenVernunft,inKants gesammelteSchriften,herausg.kniglichPreuischenbzw. DeutschenAkademiederWissenschaften(Berlin,1911;New York: Walter de Gruyter), Vol. 6 DieReligioninnerhalbderGrenzenderbloenVernunft,Herausg. Karl Vorlnder (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978) Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York, N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1960) Allreferencestothisworkareparenthesizedinthetext accordingtothePrussian/GermanAcademyEdition pagination. MM =DieMetaphysikderSitten,inKantsgesammelteSchriften,herausg. kniglichPreuischenbzw.DeutschenAkademieder Wissenschaften(Berlin,1911;NewYork:WalterdeGruyter), Vol. 6 MetaphysikderSitten,Herausg.KarlVorlnder(Hamburg:Felix Meiner Verlag, 1966) TheMetaphysicalElementsofJustice:PartIoftheMetaphysicsof Morals, trans. John Ladd (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) TheDoctrineofVirtue:PartIIofTheMetaphysicofMorals,trans. MaryJ.Gregor(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress, 1971) The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1991) Allreferencestothisworkareparenthesizedinthetext accordingtothePrussian/GermanAcademyEdition pagination. L =Logik,inKantsgesammelteSchriften,herausg.kniglich Preuischenbzw.DeutschenAkademiederWissenschaften (Berlin, 1911; New York: Walter de Gruyter), Vol. 9 Abbreviated Citations to Kants Worksxxx Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin Logic, trans. Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974; first published 1800) Allreferencestothisworkareparenthesizedinthetext accordingtothePrussian/GermanAcademyEdition pagination. 3C =KritikderUrtheilskraft,inKantsgesammelteSchriften,herausg. kniglichPreuischenbzw.DeutschenAkademieder Wissenschaften(Berlin,1911;NewYork:WalterdeGruyter), Vol. 5 KritikderUrteilskraft,herausg.vonKarlVorlnder(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1974) CritiqueofJudgment,trans.J.H.Bernard(NewYork:Hafner Publishing Company, 1972) TheCritiqueofJudgement,trans.JamesCreedMeredith(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) CritiqueofJudgment,trans.WernerS.Pluhar(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft, herausg. von Gerhard Lehmann (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1977) FirstIntroductiontotheCritiqueofJudgment,trans.JamesHaden (Indianapolis: Bobb-Merrill, 1965) Allreferencestothisworkareparenthesizedinthetext accordingtothePrussian/GermanAcademyEdition pagination. All translations that appear in this Volume are mine, and deliberately sacrifice grace to literalness. Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project:The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics Buffetedandbruisedbythecurrentsofdesireandlongingforonceto ridethewave,wemaycastaboutforsomebuoyantdevicefromwhichto chart a rational course; and, finding none, ask ourselves these questions: Do we at least have the capacity ever to do anything beyond what is comfortable, convenient, profitable, or gratifying? Canourconsciousexplanationsforwhatwedoeverbeanything morethanopportunisticexpostfactorationalizationsforsatisfyingthese familiar egocentric desires?Ifso,arewecapableofdistinguishinginourselvesthosemoments whenweareinfactheedingtherequirementsofrationality,fromthose when we are merely rationalizing the temptations of opportunity?Iamcautiouslyoptimisticabouttheexistenceofabuoyantdevicenamely reason itself that offers encouraging answers to all three questions. Without hard-wired,principledrationaldispositionstoconsistency,coherence, impartiality,impersonality,intellectualdiscrimination,foresight, deliberation, self-reflection, and self-control that enable usto transcend the overwhelming attractions of comfort, convenience, profit, gratification and self-deception, we would be incapable of acting even on these lesser motives. Or so I argue in this project. I take it as my main task to spell out in detail the waysinwhichthesehard-wired,principleddispositionsrationallystructure the self; in effect, outfit human beings with high-caliber cognitive equipment we are not yet able to fully exploit. This task thus depends on a distinction between two different but related aspectsofrationality.Idescribeasegocentricrationalityactionguidedby considerationsofcomfort,convenience,profit,orgratificationinshort,by principlesspelledoutinwhatIcalltheHumeanconceptionoftheself.In VolumeI,Idefine,dissectandcriticizeindetailthisdesire-centered conceptionasformulatedinlate-twentiethcenturyAnglo-Americananalytic philosophy. Chapter VI of Volume I defends the claim that egocentric is the correctdescriptionofthisconception,againstobjectionsfromitsadvocates. AlthoughVolumeIveryoftencataloguestheshortcomingsofthiswidely heldview,itultimatelyarguesthatthestrengthsoftheHumeanconception canbefullyexploitedonlybysituatingitasaspecialcasewithinalarger context.ThislargercontextisgivenbyprinciplesofwhatIcalltranspersonal rationality, i.e. principles governing the hard-wired rational dispositions listed above.InVolumeII,IanalyzetheseprinciplesasconstitutiveofwhatIcall the Kantian conception of the self. I describe these principles as transpersonal because they directour attentionbeyond the preoccupations and interests of theego-self,includingitsparticular,definingsetofmoralandtheoretical Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 2 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin convictions; and apply in equal measure to oneself and others. Transpersonal principles thus often require us to transcend considerations even principled considerationsofpersonalcomfort,convenience,profit,orgratification, whetheractingonourownbehalforonbehalfofanother.ChapterVIIIof Volume Icontains discussion of the more familiar notions of impersonal and impartial principles, which each relate to transpersonal principles as instance toconcept.ChapterVofVolumeIIcontainsanextendedaccountofwhatit wouldbe like for us to guide all of our behavior by transpersonal principles, whetherself-orother-directed;andChaptersVIIthroughXIanaccountof how and why we compulsively try but usually fail to do so. Thusmydistinctionbetweentranspersonalandegocentricrationality cutsacrossthetraditionaldistinctionbetweentheoreticalandpractical reason.Transpersonalprinciplesincludeso-calledtheoreticalonesof coherenceandlogicalconsistency,aswellas so-calledpracticalprinciplesof foresightandself-control.Similarly,egocentricprinciplesmayincludeso-called theoretical ones relating cause to effectof the sort that are to be found inMachiavelli,aswellasso-calledpracticalprinciplesthatgovernthe maximizationofpersonalgratification.Iusetheslightlypejorativelocution so-called,becauseIbelievethatthisdistinctionhasbeenmadetocarry much more weight than it can bear, pace Kant, and in the end does not come to much. In Volume II I defend this opinion at length. Sections1through6,following,ofthisGeneralIntroductiontothe Projectelaboratetheintuitivedistinctionbetweenegocentricand transpersonalrationalitythroughitsapplicationtotheparticularcasethat mostpersonallymotivatesthisprojectforme,andthatIhopewillalso motivatethereadertopatientlybutpersistentlyfollowitssinglelineof argumentthroughtwolargevolumes,onesectionatatime.Thatparticular case is current philosophical practice itself. I choose to discuss this case, first, becauseitistheonethatmosturgentlycompelsmetoaddressthethree questions with which I began this Introduction; and second, because I do not find widespread recognition in the field that philosophers virtually universal obsessionwiththetopicofrationalitywithdefiningit,critiquingit, defendingit,rejectingit,elaboratingalternativestoitisimplicitlyan activityofprofessionalself-definition,self-critique,self-defense,self-rejection, and self-elaboration of the methodological foundationson which the practice of philosophy itself rests. The resulting failure to apply self-consciously to the practiceofphilosophytheprinciplesofrationalitythatphilosophyitself championshasbadconsequencesbothfortheoryandforpractice;and,I believe,leadsustounderestimatethenecessityofclarifyinginwhatour actualrelationtorationalityconsists,evenaswecontinuetobeobsessedby it.Bydirectingtheabovethreequestionsinthefirstinstancespecificallyto philosophicalpractice,Ihopetofindconsensusamongphilosopher-readers ofthisIntroductionontheimportanceoftryingself-consciouslytoanswer Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception3 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin them, even if not on the importance of the particular answers I myself offer in thisproject.Irecuroftentothisparticulartestcaseinthetwo-volume argument that follows. 1. Transpersonal Rationality and Power In order to actualize the potential for transpersonal rationality, one must firstgenuinelyvalueit.Thatis,onemustvaluebothrationalbehaviorthat transcendsthepersonalandegocentric,andalsothecharacterdispositions whichthatbehaviorexpresses.AccordingtoNietzsche,thecapacityfor reason becomes a value when it is valorized by a "slave morality" that assigns highest priority to thecharacter dispositions of transpersonal rationality and thespiritattheexpenseofnaturalhumaninstincts.LikeagoodUntertan,I intendtodoexactlythatinthisproject:notargueforthevalueof transpersonalrationality,butratherpresupposeitsvalue,andargueforour innate ability toturn it into a fact whatKant optimisticallycalls the factof reason. ThusIamgoingtopresupposethatifaperson'sfreedomtoactonher impulses and gratify her desires is constrained by the existence of equally or morepowerfulothers'conflictingimpulsesanddesires,thenshewillneed thecharacterdispositionsoftranspersonalrationalitytosurvive;andwill assignthemvalueaccordingly.Themorecircumscribedherfreedomand power,themoreessentialtosurvivalandflourishingthecharacter dispositions of transpersonal rationality become. And to the extent that such a person's power to achieve her ends is limited by a distribution of scarce social ormaterialresourcesoftenlessthanfairorfavorabletoherself,shewillto thatextent,atleast,valuethecharacterdispositionsoftranspersonal rationalityasa neededsourceofstrengthandsolace.Genuinelyvaluingthe capacity for reason, then, proceeds from concrete experience of its power. Ontheseassumptions,thevalorizationofthecharacterdispositionsof transpersonal rationality that typify a "slave morality" does not express mere sourgrapes,asNietzschesometimessuggestsinhismorecontemptuous moments.Nordoesitmerelymakeavirtueofnecessity,althoughitdoesat least do that. It recognizes an intrinsic good whose value may be less evident to those for whom it is less necessary as an instrument of survival: Howlongwillyouwaittothinkyourselfworthyofthehighestand transgressinnothingtheclearpronouncementofreason?...Therefore resolvebeforeitistoolatetoliveasonewhoismatureandproficient, and let all that seems best to you be a law that you cannot transgress. ... ThiswashowSocratesattainedperfection,attendingtonothingbut Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 4 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin reasoninallthatheencountered.AndifyouarenotyetSocrates,yet you ought to live as one who would wish to be a Socrates.1 Think of these injunctions as conjointly constitutive of the Socratic ideal. As the productofbiographicalfact,Epictetus'loyaltytotheSocraticideal,andin particularhisinjunctionsto"transgressinnothingtheclearpronouncement of reason," and to "atten[d] to nothing but reason in all that [we] encounte[r]" areanexpressionofwisdomborneofthepersonalexperienceof enslavement.Theyattesttothevaluationandcultivationoftranspersonal rationality as the weapon of choice for the unempowered to use on their own behalf. Theyboth underwrite Nietzsche's analysis of reason and the spirit as centralvaluesofa"slavemorality,"anddemonstratehowthat"slave morality" may have a kind of dignity that bermenschlichen views lack. Forifaperson'sfreedomandpowertogratifyhisimpulsesisgreater, thenhemaywellfindtheegocentricindulgenceofemotion,spontaneity, instinct, and the manipulation of power more attractive; and development of thecharacterdispositionsoftranspersonalrationalitycorrespondinglyless necessary,interesting,orvaluable.Afterall,suchindividualshaveathand other reserves of wealth, status, influence and coercion on which to draw toachievetheirends.Theuniquequalityofendsthatthecharacter dispositionsoftranspersonal rationality themselves inspire therefore may be accordedcorrespondinglylessimportance,iftheyarenoticedinthefirst place.Forsuchindividuals,theSocraticidealisnoidealatall;and perfunctory lip service to the value of rational decision-making is merely one dispensablestrategyamongothersforfacilitatingtheongoingindulgenceof impulse. Philosophyasanintellectualdisciplineisfundamentallydefinedand distinguishedfromotherintellectualdisciplinesbyitsdefactoloyaltytothe characterdispositionsoftranspersonalrationality,andsototheSocratic ideal. Anglo-American analytic philosophy is committed to these values with a particularly high degree of self-consciousness.Whatever the content ofthe philosophical view in question, the normsof transpersonal rationality define itsstandardsofphilosophicalexposition:clarity,structure,coherence, consistency, subtlety of intellectual discrimination. And as a professional and pedagogicalpractice,philosophyisideallydefinedbyitsadherencetothe normsofrationaldiscourseandcriticism.Inphilosophytheappealistothe other'srationality,irrespectiveofherpersonal,emotionalorprofessional investments, with the purpose of convincing her of the veracity of one's own 1Epictetus,EnchiridionLI.Ihaveconsultedtwotranslations:P.E.Matheson(Oxford: ClarendonPress),reprintedinJasonL.Saunders,Ed.GreekandRomanPhilosophyafter Aristotle(NewYork:TheFreePress,1966),147;andGeorgeLong(Chicago:Henry Regnery Co., 1956), 202-203. Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception5 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin pointofview.Itispresumedthatthispurposehasbeenachievedifthe other's subsequent behavior changes accordingly.Thispresumptionisfueledbyphilosophy'sunsupervisedinfluencein thepoliticalsphereofRousseauontheFrenchRevolution,Lockeonthe American Revolution, Marx on Communism, Nietzsche on the Second World War,Rawls'sDifferencePrincipleonReaganomics.Intheprivateandsocial sphere,rationalanalysisanddialoguemayjustaseasilygivewayto unsupervisedimbalancesinpowerandfreedom,paternalisticorcoercive relationships,orexploitativetransactions.Butevenhereitisnotimpossible forphilosophytohaveitsinfluence:inturninganotherasidefroman unethical or imprudent course of action, or requiring him to revise his views inlightofcertainobjections,oralteringhisattitudestowardoneself,or influencingotherstoaccommodatetheimportanceofcertainphilosophical considerations through compromise, tolerance, or mutual agreement. In both spheres, then,the attempt rationally to persuade and to conduct oneself rationally toward others is an expression of respect, not only for their rationalcapacity,buttherebyforthealternativeresourcesofpower coercion,bribery,retaliation,influencetheyareperceivedasfreetousein its stead. Toward one who is perceived to lack these alternative resources, no such respect need be shown, and raw power may be displayed and exercised morefreely,withoutthelimitingconstraintsofrationaljustification.For,as Hobbes reminds us,[h]onourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument orsignofpower....Andthereforetobehonoured,loved,orfearedof many,ishonourable;asargumentsofpower....Tospeaktoanother withconsideration,toappearbeforehimwithdecency,andhumility,is to honour him; as signs of fear tooffend.To speak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dishonour.2 Hobbes is wrong to think that treating another with respect is nothing but an expression of fear of the other's power. But he is surely right to think that it is atleastthat.OnNietzsche'srefinementofHobbes'analysis,theappealto reason expresses respect for another's rational autonomy to just and only that extenttowhichitsimultaneouslyexpressesfearofthealternative, nonrationalwaysinwhichthatautonomymaybeexercised.OnNietzsche's analysis of rational conduct, Hobbes and Kant may both be right. Sophilosophy'straditionalcommitmenttotheSocraticidealisone quintessential expression of a "slave morality" that acknowledges the danger ofunrestrainedinstinctandtheegocentricuseofpowerinitsservice,byto varyingdegreesconstrainingandsublimatinginstinct,impulse,andthe manipulation of power into a rational exercise of intellect and will that brings its own fulfillments: 2Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier, 1977), 75, 74. Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 6 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin Theignorantman'spositionandcharacteristhis:heneverlooksto himselfforbenefitorharm,buttotheworldoutsidehim.The philosopher's position and character is that he always looks to himself for benefitandharm.Thesignsofonewhoismakingprogressare:he blamesnone,praisesnone,complainsofnone,accusesnone,never speaksofhimselfasifheweresomebody,orasifheknewanything. When he is hindered, he blames himself.... He has got rid of desire, and hisaversionisdirectednolongertowhatisbeyondourpower[i.e.the body, property, reputation,office, and, in a word, everything that is not ourown doing]butonly to what is in ourpower [i.e.thought, impulse, desire,aversion,and,inaword,everythingthatisourowndoing]and contrary to nature. In all things he exercises his will temperately.3 The philosopher, according to Epictetus,foregoesthe egocentric gratification ofdesireandacquisitionofexternalgoodsandpowerforthesakeof cultivating the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality. Seeing that these two alternatives frequently conflict, she "atten[ds] to nothing but reason in all that [she] encounter[s]." The centrality and universality of the character dispositionsoftranspersonalrationalitytothedisciplineofphilosophy, enduringovernineteencenturies,mayexplainwhyalmostallphilosophers, regardless of their express philosophical views on the value of rationality, try tomustertheresourcesofrationalargumentation,analysis,andcriticismto defend those views. The consistency and sincerity with which they try to live uptotheSocraticidealbespeakstheseriousnessoftheirintenttoavoidthe dormant alternatives. 2. Transpersonal Rationality as Philosophical Virtue Thepriorityaccordedtothecharacterdispositionsoftranspersonal rationalityinthepracticeofphilosophyreceivesamorecontemporary formulation in the following Anglo-American analytic version of the Socratic ideal: [G. E.] Moore ... invented and propagated a style of philosophical talking whichhasbecomeoneofthemostusefulandattractivemodelsof rationalitythatwehave,andwhichisstillaproptoliberalvalues, havingpenetratedfarbeyondphilosophicalcirclesandfarbeyond Bloomsbury circles; it is also a source of continuing enjoyment, once one hasacquiredthehabitamongfriendswhohaveapassionforslow argument onboth abstract and personal topics. WhenI look back to the Thirties and call on memories, it even seems that Moore invented a new moralvirtue,avirtueofhighcivilizationadmittedly,whichhasits ancestorinSocrates'famousfollowingofanargumentwhereveritmay lead, but still with a quite distinctive modern and Moorean accent. Open- 3op. cit. Note 1, XLVIII; also see I. Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception7 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin mindedness in discussion is tobe associated with extreme literal clarity, withnorhetoricandtheleastpossibleuseofmetaphor,withan avoidanceoftechnicaltermswhereverpossible,andwithextreme patienceinstep-by-stepunfoldingofthereasonsthatsupportany assertion made, together with all the qualifications that need to be added topreserveliteraltruth,howevercommonplaceanddisappointingthe outcome.Itisastyleandadisciplinethatwringphilosophicalinsights fromtheEnglishlanguage,pressedhardandrepeatedly;asfarasI know,thestylehasnocounterpartinFrenchorGerman.AsNietzsche suggested, cultivated caution and modesty in assertion are incompatible with the bold egotismof most German philosophy after Kant. This style oftalking,particularlywhenappliedtoemotionallychargedpersonal issues,wasagifttotheworld,notonlytoBloomsbury,anditisstill useful a long way from Cambridge.4 ThewriterisStuartHampshire,andinthispassagehedescribesasan historicalfactamorerecentidealofphilosophicalpracticethatspeaksto some of the motives and impulses that attract many into the field. The essence oftheidealremainsSocratic:clarityandtruthasagoal,withpatience, persistence,precision,andanonjudgmentalopennesstodiscussionand contention as the means. Hampshire is right to describe this ideal as a "new moral virtue ... of high civilization."Itisamoralvirtuebecauseitimposesononetheobligationto subordinatetheegocentricdesirestoprevailinargument,toshinein conversation,ortoone-upone'sopponenttothedisinterestedethical requirementsofimpartiality,objectivityandtranspersonalrationalityin discussion. And it is avirtueof high civilizationbecause it is notpossible to achievethisvirtueoreventorecognizeitasavirtuewithoutalready havingcultivatedandbroughttofruitioncertaincivilizeddispositionsof character,tastesandvaluesthatoverridethedesiretoprevail.Thusthis moral virtue stands at the very center of a "slave morality" that sublimates the desiretoprevailtotheimperativesofreasonandthespirit.These imperatives, in turn, find expression in what Mill calls the higher pleasures of the intellect and moral and aesthetic sensibility. They presuppose the victory of"slavemorality"insubjugatinginstinctandtheegocentricexerciseof powertotheruleofreasonanditsattendantethicalvaluesoffairnessand impartialityinthoughtandaction.Thisvirtueofhighcivilization,then, presupposesbothitsparticipants'transpersonalrationalityandalsotheir achievement of a mutually equitable balance of power however the material and social instruments of power may be distributed. 4StuartHampshire,"Liberator,UptoaPoint,"TheNewYorkReviewofBooksXXXIV,5 (March 26, 1987), 37-39. Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 8 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin Thusthisidealcanhavemeaningonlyforsomeoneforwhombasic psychologicalandspiritualneedsforself-worth,andmoralneedsforthe affirmationofself-rectitudearenotsopressingthateverydialectical encounterwithotherswhetherwrittenorconversationalisminedforits potential to satisfy them. So when we say of such a person that he is civilized, we may mean, among other things, that in conversation he is disposed tobe generousinaccordingcredibilitytohisopponent'sview,graciousin acknowledging its significance, patient in drawing forth its implications, and graceful in accepting its criticism of his own. Someone who has mastered this newmoralvirtueofhighcivilizationissomeoneforwhomphilosophical practice expresses an ideal of personal civility; a civility made possible only by the control and sublimation of instinct, impulse, desire, and emotion. ThehigherpleasureofdoingphilosophyinthestyleHampshire describes is then the disinterested pleasure of thinking, considering, learning andknowingasendsinthemselves,andofgivingthesepleasurestoand receivingthemfromothersinvolvedinthesameenterprise,inactsof communication.Platowassurelyrighttosuggestthatwearedriventoseek erotic pleasure from others by the futile desire to merge, to become one with them.Eroticdesireisultimatelyfutileforreasonsofsimplephysics:weare eachstuckinourownphysicalbodies,andyoucannotachievethedesired unitybyknockingtwoseparatephysicalentitiestogether,nomatterhow closely and repeatedly, and no matter how much fun it is to do the knocking.Intellectual unitywith another is a different matter altogether, however; andthekindHampshiredescribesisparticularlysatisfyingbecauseitdoes notrequireeitherpartnertosubmergeorabnegateherselfinthewillor convictionsoftheother.Itdoesnotrequiresharingthesameopinions,or suppressing one's own worldview, or deferring or genuflecting to the other in order to achieve agreement with him. Rather, the enterprise is a collaborative onebetweenequalswhopooltheirphilosophicalresources.Bycontributing questions,amendments,refinements,criticisms,objections,examples, counterexamples,orelaborationsinresponsetotheother'sphilosophical assertions, we each extend and enrich both of our philosophical imaginations pasttheirindividuallimitsandintotheother'sdomain.Therearefew intellectualpleasuresmoreintensethantheAha-Erlebnisoffinally understanding, after long and careful dialogue, what another person actually means unless it is that of being understood oneself in this way. Thegroundrulesforsucceedinginthisenterpriseareethicalones.By makingsuchassertionsasclearlyasIcan,Iextendtoyouaninvitationto intellectualengagement;andIexpresstrust,vulnerabilityandrespectfor your opinion in performing that act. I thereby challenge you to exercise your trained philosophical character dispositions for impartiality, objectivity, and hencetranspersonalrationalityinexaminingmyassertions;andto demonstrate your mastery of the enterprise in the act of engaging in it. This is Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception9 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin the challenge to perform, in the practice of dialogue and conversation, at the ethical level made possible by our basic human capacities for language, logic and abstraction; and tobring thosecapacities themselvesunder the purview andguidanceofourconceptionofrightconduct.Byengaginginthe enterpriseofphilosophicaldialogue,wechallengeeachothertoobservethe ethical and intellectual obligations of philosophical practice.In this enterprise, I have failed if you feel crestfallen at having to concede apoint,ratherthaninspiredtoelaborateuponit;orashamedathaving missed a point, rather than driven to persist in untangling it; or self-important for having made a point, rather than keen to test its soundness. After all, the goal of the enterprise is to inspire both of us with the force of the ideas we are examining,nottomakeeitherofusfeelunequaltoconsideringthem,or smugforhavingintroducedthem.Toooftenweconceiveofmoralvirtueas havingtodoonlywithsuchthingsashelpingtheneedy,keepingpromises, or loyalty in friendship as though performing well in these areas relieved us of the obligation to refrain from making another person feel stupid, ashamed or crazy for voicing her thoughts; or ourselves feel superior for undermining them.Whenteachersfailtoimpartaloveofphilosophytotheir undergraduate students, or drive graduate students, traumatized, out of their classes and out of thefield, it is oftenbecause these elemental guidelines for conductingtheenterpriseguidelinesthatexpressthesimpletruththata loveofphilosophyisincompatiblewithfeelinghumiliatedortrouncedor arrogantorself-congratulatoryforone'scontributionstoithavebeen ignored. So this enterprise presupposes a basic and reciprocal respect for the minds,ideasandwordsofone'sdiscussants,arespectthatisexpressedin attention to and interest in what they have to say.Kant'sconceptofAchtungcapturestheintellectualattitudeinvolvedin this moral virtue of high civilization. The term is usually translated, in Kant's writings,as"respect";andtheobjectofAchtungisusuallyassumedtobe exclusivelythemorallaw.ButKant'saccountofreasoninthefirstCritique makesquiteclearthatthemorallawisnotseparatefromtheworkingsof theoretical reason more generally, but rather an application of it to the special caseoffirst-personalaction.OnKantsview,wefeelAchtungtowardallthe waysinwhichreasonregulatesouractivity,bothmentalandphysical. Moreover,intheGroundworkKantmakesitequallyclearthatheisnot divergingfromanimportantcommon,vernacularmeaningoftheterm, whichisclosertosomethinglike"respectfulattention."WhenyouandIare trying to get clear about the implications of a statement one of us has made whenwearefullyengagedintheactivityof"wring[ing]philosophical insights from the English language, pressed hard and repeatedly," Achtung is whatwefeelfortheintellectualprocessinwhichweareengagedandthe insights we thereby bring forth. Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 10 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin AndwhenKantsaysthatAchtung"impairs[Abbruchtut]se