admin - up zambales ganapo and goss

8/12/2019 Admin - UP Zambales Ganapo and Goss

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Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members fromvarious disciplines and chaired by Dr. Duka-Ventura, to investigate theplagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommendedto UPD Chancellor Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on AWMC bewithdrawn

Dean Paz informed AWMC of the charges against her Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least 90instances or portions in private respondents thesis which were lifted fromsources without proper or due acknowledgment

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation towithdraw AWMCs degree and forwarded its recommendation to the UnivCouncil. UC approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the BOR.BOR deferred action.

Chancellor Roman summoned AWMC to a meeting on the same day andasked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her

During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of thecharges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating

committee.ii[13] AWMC, on the other hand, submitted her written explanationin a letter

Another meeting was held between Chancellor Roman and AWMC to discussher answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on but AWMC didnot attend it, alleging that the BOR had already decided her case before shecould be fully heard

AWMC wrote to UP President. Also wrote to Chair of BOR, complaining thatshe had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could nolonger withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already been accepted

Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members fromthe U.P. units outside Diliman to review the University Councilsrecommendation to withdraw private respondents degree. With the approvalof the BOR and the UPD Executive Committee, Posadas created a 5-mancommittee, chaired by Dr. Zafaralla. Members of the Zafaralla committee andAWMC met

Zafaralla Committees report:recommending the withdrawal of privaterespondents doctorate degree

BOR withdrew her degree AWMC sought reinvestigation of case. Denied. Filed a petition for mandamuswith a prayer for a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction and damages w/ RTC QC: alleged that petitioners hadunlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her

procedural due process. Dismissed on the grounds of academic freedom. CA reversed and held that AWMC was denied due process. Ruling: It is

worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assemblyculminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawalof petitioners Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be hearduntil after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitionerssubsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing

Issue: WON was accorded due process (YES)

Held: various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that AWMC

had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in


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her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the universityproceedings before AWMC was finally stripped of her degree, it is that therewere too many committee and individual investigations conducted

in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply theopportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seekreconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.iii[27] A party who hasavailed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to havebeen denied due process

AWMC was informed in writing of the charges against heriv[29] and affordedopportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her writtenexplanation, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993.v[30] AWMC thenmet with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee todiscuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authoritiesexplaining her position

not tenable for to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before theBOR. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-typeproceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.vi[32] It is noteworthy that

the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases areincluded as items on the agenda of the BOR Nor indeed was entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla

committee as part of her right to due process. ADMU vs Capulong:disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right tocross examination

BOR determined, after due investigation conducted by a committeecomposed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that AWMCcommitted no less than 90 instances of intellectual dishonesty in herdissertation. BOR decision to withdraw doctorate was based on documentson record including her admission that she committed the offense

was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed torefute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that herresponses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board ofRegents before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven.Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the performance of official dutiesin the absence of proof to the contrary

Indeed, as the appellate court observed, AWMC is no longer within the ambitof disciplinary powers of the U.P. cannot even be punished since, as sheclaims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinaryproceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. WhatU.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academicintegrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she

obtained through fraud CA reversed.

[Administrative ProcedureIn adjudication of casesdue processcardinalprimary rights]Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. CANov. 7, 1979J. Aquino

P-appellants: ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO., GONZALO P. NAVA, VIOLA S.NAVA, FEDERICO S. NAVA, PERLA NAVA, HONORATO P. NAVA, ALEJANDROS. NAVA, PURIFICACION SISON, A. TORDESILLAS, GUIDO ADVINCULA, PEDRO

ANGULO and TOMAS MARAMBA


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R-appellees: COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE ANDNATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, GREGORIO E. MARTINEZ,ALEJANDRO MENDEZ, NICANOR MARTY, VICENTE MISOLES, GUILLERMOYABUT, ANDRES R. FIAGOY, MIGUEL A. MANIAGO, CASIMIRO N. EBIDO,ENRIQUE RIVERA, SEVERINO MIVA, ELENITO B. MARTINEZ, LUCAS EDURAIN,FELIMON ENCIO, EMILIO ILOCO, DIOSDADO MISOLA, ERNESTO VALVERDE,PABLO PABILONA, ARMANDO MINAS, BARTOLOME MARAVE and CECILIOOOVILLA

Facts: In Mines Administrative Case, Director Gozon issued an order wherein he

dismissed the case filed by Zambales Chromite and other petitioners. In thatcase, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators andpossessors of 69 mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales

Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked andlocated mining claims in accordance with law

Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Martinez and Pabilona,

were duly located and registered Petitioners appealed from that order to the Sec of Agriculture and Natural

Resources. While the appeal was pending, Gozon was appointed Sec ofAgriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decidedthe appeal, as it he was adjudicating the case for the first time. 'Thus,Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he haddecided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appealfrom his own decision. he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the samecase

ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed mining claims.Dismissed appeal from his own decision.

petitioners filed a complaint in the CFI Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon'sdecision and praying that they be declared the prior locators and possessors

LC sustained Secretary Gozon's decision and dismissed the case. Held thatthe disqualification petition of a judge to review his own decision or rulingdoes not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in theMining Law, disqualifying the Secretary from deciding an appeal from a casewhich he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a groundfor disqualification; that the petitioners did not seasonably seek to disqualifySecretary Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidencethat the Secretary acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity orhostility to the petitioners

CA reversed: improper for Gozon to affirm his own decision as Director of

Mines (second decision); LCsjudgment, confirming the Secretary's decision,should be set aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources should reviewanew the decision of the Director of Mines "and, thereafter, furtherproceedings will be taken in the trial court. Held that Secs decision void beche was disqualified to review his own decision as Director of Mines.

Issue: WON Zambales Chromite was denied due process (YES)

Held: Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his

decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary ofAgriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of

Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.


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Mining Law: SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locationsshall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision: Provided, That thedecision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretaryof Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from the date of itsreceipt. In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision ororder of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources, the matter may be taken to the court of competent jurisdictionwithin thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order; otherwise thesaid decision or order shag be final and binding upon the parties concerned.

Provision of section 61 that the decision of the Director of Mines may beappealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplatesthat the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turnout to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officerwhose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view orthere would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewingofficer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same viewsince

being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of thecase He should have asked Undersecretary to undertake review Respondents denied due process (fundamental fairness) when Secretary

Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines we set aside the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

dated August 16, 1963 as affirmed by the trial court as well as the firstdecision of the Court of Appeals

Case returned to Minister of Natural Resources

[Administrative ProcedureIn adjudication of casesdue processcardinalprimary rights]Gannapao vs. CSCMay 31, 2011J. Villarama

P: RIMANDO A. GANNAPAOR: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC), THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE NATIONALPOLICE, THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCALGOVERNMENT, ARIEL G. RONQUILLO, J. WALDEMAR V. VALMORES, JOSE F.ERESTAIN, JR., and KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, ALL NAMED INDIVIDUALSIN THEIR CAPACITY AS OFFICERS OF THE CSC, RICARDO BARIEN,

INOCENCIO M. NAVALLO, LIGAYA M. GANDO, LEA MOLLEDA, FE R. VETONIO,PRIMO V. BABIANO, PATIGA J., JOSE TAEZA, G. DELOS SANTOS, LOSBAES,W., AVE PEDIGLORIO and CRESENCIA ROQUE

Facts: Private respondents, who are stockholders and board members of United

Workers Transport Corp. filed a verified complaint before the PNP, chargingRG with Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer forPreventive Suspension and Disarming. PRs are former drivers, conductors,mechanics and clerks of the defunct Metro Manila Transit Corp. UWTCstarted operating MMTCs buses which it acquired under a conditional salewith right of repossession. At about the same time, RG was allegedly

employed by Atty. Gironella, the general manager appointed by the Board ofDirectors of UWTC, as his personal bodyguard. Majority stockholders of


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UWTC sued Atty. Gironella and 5 other members of the UWTC Board ofDirectors for gross mismanagement.

Upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses regularly driven by them and otherstockholders/drivers/workers were confiscated by a "task force" composed offormer drivers, conductors and mechanics led by RG. Armed with deadlyweapons such as guns and knives, RG and his group intimidated andharassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses.RG is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority as police officer to actas bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce thedrivers/stockholders and the bus passengers. PRs prayed for the preventivesuspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his terminationafter due hearing

complaint passed a pre-charge investigation with The Inspector General,Internal Affairs Office of the PNP, and petitioner filed his Answer. Denied theallegations of the complaint and averred that he was never employed by Atty.G as bodyguard. Instead, it was his twin brother who worked as messenger atUWTC. In an undated Memorandum,6Chief Service Inspectorate Police

Superintendent Atty. Casugbo recommended the dismissal of the complaint,citing the affidavit of desistance allegedly executed National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Memorandum Circular No. 96-

0107dated July 31, 1996, was issued, and a summary hearing on thecomplaint was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service, PNP NationalHeadquarters in accordance with the newly promulgated rules.

Atty. Sierra of the Office of the Director General, PNP, issued a subpoena toRG requiring him to appear at the hearing of Adm. Case.8RG moved todismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata, citing the earlierdismissal of the complaint against him by Chief Service InspectorateCasugbo.9However, PNP Chief. Sarmiento denied the MTD

Chief Sarmiento rendered his Decision: Guilty. MR denied. Elevated case to NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board. Appeal

dismissed. Brought case to DILG. Sec denied appeal and affirmed suspension for 3

months. RG then appealed to the CSC claiming that he had been denied due process

in the proceedings before the Office of the Legal Service. He also sought toset aside the penalty of three months suspension

CSC issued Resolution dismissing petitioners appeal but modifying hispenalty of 3 months suspension to dismissal. Ruled that act of serving asbodyguard of Atty. G and harassing the bus drivers of UWTC is so grave asto warrant the penalty of dismissal.

CA affirmed CSC decision. CA ruled that RG cannot claim denial of dueprocess since he was given ample opportunity to present his side. where theopportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, isaccorded, and the party could present its side or defend its interest in duecourse, there is no denial of procedural due process.

RG contends that he was denied due process in the proceedings before theOffice of the Legal Service of the PNP since no notice and summons wereissued for him to answer the charges and no hearing was conducted. Heclaims that his dismissal was not proper and legal as there was nointroduction and presentation of evidence against him and he was not giventhe opportunity to defend his side

Issue: WON Gannapao was accorded due process (YES)
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Held: essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or anopportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.21In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to besafeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity tobe heard.22As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend hisinterests in due course, he was not denied due process.

Procedure (NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 96-010): Pre-ChargeInvestigation - 4.01 Within three (3) days from the receipt of the complaint,the Command/Unit Inspector, upon directive from the Disciplinary Authorityconcerned, shall conduct a preliminary inquiry/pre-charge investigationwherein both the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, if anyshall be summoned to appear. x x x After the inquiry, the Command/UnitInspector shall submit to the Disciplinary Authority concerned his Report ofInvestigation, together with his recommendation; Summary Hearing - 5.01After it has been determined from the results of the pre-charge investigation

that the complaint is a proper subject of summary hearing, the respondentPNP member shall be furnished with a copy of the complaint or charges filedagainst him to include copies of affidavits of witnesses and other documentssubmitted by the complainant should there be any, and he shall be directed tosubmit an answer within five (5) days from receipt of the complaint, attachingtherewith pertinent documents or evidence in support of his defense.

RG was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and hesubmitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted asummary hearing on the complaint, was again duly notified of theproceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side

Claim that he did not file an answer since no subpoena was issued to him

thus deserves scant consideration. had ample opportunity to present his sideduring the hearing and he was even advised by the hearing officer that hemay file a supplemental answer or a counter affidavit or he may adopt hisanswer filed. Instead, petitioner filed a MTD, reiterating the ground of resjudicata, based on his own assertion that the case against him had alreadybeen heard, tried and finally terminated. however, he did not present proof ofsuch dismissal. Indeed, he could not have presented such proof because, ascorrectly pointed out by the OSG, the undated memorandum of Atty.Casugbo, the hearing official who conducted the preliminary inquiry/pre-charge investigation, was merely recommendatory

when the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP found the complaint to be aproper subject of a summary hearing, and a further investigation wasconducted pursuant to the rules, the recommendation to dismiss was deemednot adopted or carried out. Having been given a reasonable opportunity toanswer the complaint against him, cannot now claim that he was deprived ofdue process

assertion that the complainants/witnesses against him have not been cross-examined by him, is likewise bereft of merit. While the right to cross-examineis a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not necessarilyrequire an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise thisright if desired by the party entitled to it.27In this case, while MemorandumCircular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shalltake the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination, RG

missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadlinefor the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly
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reasonable time thereafter," and that Ohio Rev.Code Ann. 3313.66 (1972)and regulations issued pursuant thereto were unconstitutional in permittingsuch suspensions. ordered that all references to plaintiffs' suspensions beremoved from school files

Although not imposing upon the Ohio school administrators any particulardisciplinary procedures and leaving them "free to adopt regulations providingfor fair suspension procedures which are consonant with the educationalgoals of their schools and reflective of the characteristics of their school andlocality," that there were "minimum requirements of notice and a hearing priorto suspension, except in emergency situations." In explication, the courtstated that relevant case authority would: (1) permit "[i]mmediate removal of astudent whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school,endangers fellow students, teachers or school officials, or damages property";(2) require notice of suspension proceedings to be sent to the student'sparents within 24 hours of the decision to conduct them; and (3) require ahearing to be held, with the student present, within 72 hours of his removal.Finally, the court stated that, with respect to the nature of the hearing, the

relevant cases required that statements in support of the charge be produced,that the student and others be permitted to make statements in defense ormitigation, and that the school need not permit attendance by counsel

Argument 1: appellants contend that, because there is no constitutional rightto an education at public expense, the Due Process Clause does not protectagainst expulsions from the public school system

Argument 2: even if there is a right to a public education protected by the DueProcess Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only when the Statesubjects a student to a "severe detriment or grievous loss." The loss of 10days, it is said, is neither severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause istherefore of no relevance

Issue: WON high school students were accorded due process (NO)

Held: On Argument 1: Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State to deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Protectedinterests in property are normally "not created by the Constitution. Rather,they are created and their dimensions are defined" by an independent sourcesuch as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits.

on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims ofentitlement to a public education. It is true that 3313.66 of the Code permitsschool principals to suspend students for up to 10 days; but suspensions maynot be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. All of the schools had theirown rules specifying the grounds for expulsion or suspension. Having chosento extend the right to an education to people of appellees' class generally,Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absentfundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct hasoccurred

young people do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the schoolhouse door Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen

against the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education notexcepted

West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette: authority possessed by theState to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools although

concededly very broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutionalsafeguards. Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a


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student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interestwhich is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be takenaway for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures requiredby that Clause

Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. "Where aperson's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because ofwhat the government is doing to him," the minimal requirements of the Clausemust be satisfied. School authorities here suspended appellees from schoolfor periods of up to 10 days based on charges of misconduct. If sustained andrecorded, those charges could seriously damage the students' standing withtheir fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with lateropportunities for higher education and employment. apparent that the claimedright of the State to determine unilaterally and without process whether thatmisconduct has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of theConstitution.

On Argument 2: "whether due process requirements apply in the first place,we must look not to the 'weight' but to the natureof the interest at stake.

Length and consequent severity of a deprivation, while another factor toweigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, "is not decisive of thebasic right" to a hearing of some kind. gravity is irrelevant to the questionwhether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause

On the question of what process must be due: Mullane v. Central HanoverTrust Co: at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or propertyby adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriateto the nature of the case

fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard Grannis v. Ordean: one is informed that the matter is pending and can

choose for himself whether to . . . contest Due Process Clause will not shield him from suspensions properly imposed,

but it disserves both his interest and the interest of the State if his suspensionis, in fact, unwarranted

Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order,but a valuable educational device. The prospect of imposing elaboratehearing requirements in every suspension case is viewed with great concern,and many school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to actunilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it would be astrange disciplinary system in an educational institution if no communicationwas sought by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him ofhis dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to make surethat an injustice is not done

due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, thatthe student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, ifhe denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and anopportunity to present his side of the story

no delay between the time "notice" is given and the time of the hearing;disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the studentminutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunityto explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be toldwhat he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is

Since the hearing may occur almost immediately following the misconduct, itfollows that as a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal ofthe student from school. We agree with the District Court, however, that there

are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insistedupon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or


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property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may beimmediately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary notice andrudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable, as the DistrictCourt indicated.

We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide,that hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the studentthe opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnessessupporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of theincident. Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless. To impose ineach such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelmadministrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost morethan it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizingthe suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary naturemay not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool, but also destroyits effectiveness as part of the teaching process

On the other hand, requiring effective notice and informal hearing permittingthe student to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge

against erroneous action. At least the disciplinarian will be alerted to theexistence of disputes about facts and arguments about cause and effect. Hemay then determine himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-examination, and allow the student to present his own witnesses. In moredifficult cases, he may permit counsel. In any event, his discretion will bemore informed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced

Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between studentand disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension, will add little to thefactfinding function where the disciplinarian himself has witnessed theconduct forming the basis for the charge

we have addressed ourselves solely to the short suspension, not exceeding10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school

term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures. Nor do we putaside the possibility that, in unusual situations, although involving only a shortsuspension, something more than the rudimentary procedures will berequired

District Court found each of the suspensions involved here to have occurredwithout a hearing, either before or after the suspension, and that eachsuspension was therefore invalid and the statute unconstitutional insofar as itpermits such suspensions without notice or hearing.

District Court judgment affirmed.MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICEBLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

The decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in theoperation of our public schools that may affect adversely the quality ofeducation. The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, ratherthan educational officials and state legislatures, have the authority todetermine the rules applicable to routine classroom discipline of children andteenagers in the public schools. It justifies this unprecedented intrusion intothe process of elementary and secondary education by identifying a newconstitutional right: the right of a student not to be suspended for as much asa single day without notice and a due process hearing either before orpromptly following the suspension.

Court's decision rests on the premise that, under Ohio law, education is aproperty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause, and therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hearing. Inmy view, a student's interest in education is not infringed by a suspension


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within the limited period prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent thatthere may be some arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, andinsubstantial to justify imposition of a constitutionalrule.

Ohio statute that creates the right to a "free" education also explicitlyauthorizes a principal to suspend a student for as much as 10 days

Ohio suspension statute allows no serious or significant infringement ofeducation. Only max of 8 school days. No significant damage. The State's interest, broadly put, is in the proper functioning of its public

school system for the benefit of all pupils and the public generally. Fewrulings would interfere more extensively in the daily functioning of schoolsthan subjecting routine discipline to the formalities and judicial oversight ofdue process. Suspensions are one of the traditional means -- ranging fromkeeping a student after class to permanent expulsion -- used to maintaindiscipline in the schools. It is common knowledge that maintaining order andreasonable decorum is a major educational problem

In assessing in constitutional terms the need to protect pupils from unfairminor discipline by school authorities, the Court ignores the commonality of

interest of the State and pupils in the public school system. Rather, it thinks intraditional judicial terms of an adversary situation. To be sure, there will bethe occasional pupil innocent of any rule infringement who is mistakenlysuspended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspension. But, whilethere is no evidence indicating the frequency of unjust suspensions, commonsense suggests that they will not be numerous in relation to the total number,and that mistakes or injustices will usually be righted by informal means

The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice both to parents and theBoard, is compatible with the teacher-pupil relationship and the informalresolution of mistaken disciplinary action. We have relied for generationsupon the experience, good faith and dedication of those who staff our publicschools, and the nonadversary means of airing grievances that always have

been available to pupils and their parents. One would have thought beforetoday's opinion that this informal method of resolving differences was morecompatible with the interests of all concerned than resort to anyconstitutionalized procedure, however blandly it may be defined by the Court

constitutionalizing of routine classroom decisions not only represents asignificant and unwise extension of the Due Process Clause

The Ohio statute, limiting suspensions to not more than eight school days,requires written notice including the "reasons therefor" to the student'sparents and to the Board of Education within 24 hours of any suspension.The Court only requires oral or written notice to the pupil, with no notice beingrequired to the parents or the Board of Education. The mere fact of the

statutory requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action by the principal.The Board, usually elected by the people and sensitive to constituentrelations, may be expected to identify a principal whose record ofsuspensions merits inquiry. In any event, parents placed on written noticemay exercise their rights as constituents by going directly to the Board or amember thereof if dissatisfied with the principal's decision

Nor does the Court's due process "hearing" appear to provide significantlymore protection than that already available. The Court holds only that theprincipal must listen to the student's "version of the events," either beforesuspension or thereafter -- depending upon the circumstances. Such atruncated "hearing" is likely to be considerably less meaningful than theopportunities for correcting mistakes already available to students and

parents. Indeed, in this case all of the students and parents were offered anopportunity to attend a conference with school officials


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